The Poverty of Popper’s Critique of Communism

The renowned philosopher Karl Popper’s questioning of communism has been highly influential. In works such as *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957) and *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), he criticized Marx, stating that “although he has many merits, I believe he was a false prophet,” and even declared that “‘scientific’ Marxism is dead.” It is said that the title *The Poverty of Historicism* alludes to *The Poverty of Philosophy*, “attempting to put forward a critique of Marx’s philosophy of history from a philosophical-methodological standpoint.”

著名哲学家卡尔·波普尔（Karl Popper）对共产主义的质疑颇具影响力。他在《历史主义贫困论》（1957）、《开放社会及其敌人》（1945）等论著中批评马克思，“虽然他有许多功绩，但是我认为，他是一位错误的预言家”，甚至宣称 “‘科学的’马克思主义死了”。据说《历史主义贫困论》的书名就是影射《哲学的贫困》，“试图提出对马克思历史哲学的一种哲学方法上的批判”。

For a long time, the academic community has offered various responses to Popper. On the one hand, these involve clarifying the concept of historicism or elucidating the principles of historical materialism, correcting his misunderstandings of the fundamental tenets of Marxism; on the other hand, they reaffirm the argument for communism. Overall, current academic views on the core ideas of communism generally fall into two categories: “the abolition of private property and the common ownership of the means of production” or “human emancipation and the free and comprehensive development of the individual,” which respectively emphasize the scientific hallmark and the ideal realm of communism. Popper did not oppose communism as an ideal realm; indeed, he believed that “its sense of social responsibility and its love of freedom must exist.” However, he questioned the historical inevitability of communism. If no targeted response can be made, it is all too easy to fall into a logical rut and end up in the awkward position of talking to oneself.

长期以来，学界对波普尔作了不少回应。一方面是辨析历史主义概念或澄清唯物史观原理，纠正其对马克思主义基本原理的误解；另一方面是重申共产主义论证。总的来说，当前学界对于共产主义的核心思想大体有“消灭私有制，实现生产资料共同占有”或“人类解放和人的自由全面发展”两类意见，二者分别强调了共产主义的科学标志和理想境界。作为一种理想境界的共产主义，波普尔是不反对的，甚至认为“它的社会责任感和它对自由的热爱必须存在”。但他质疑共产主义的历史必然性，若不能作出针对性的回应，极易落入逻辑窠臼、陷入自说自话的尴尬境地。

In fact, Popper’s critique is “impoverished.” He treats communism as a form of historicism to be criticized, and this historicism is itself grounded in his unique view of knowledge. Yet his insufficiently refined discussion leaves an “Achilles’ heel.” This metaphor comes from Mr. He Zhaowu: “Why is it that subjective consciousness or the growth of knowledge has no objective laws and cannot be predicted? He never provided a self-consistent argument, and so this issue became the Achilles’ heel of his theory.” The “Achilles’ heel” lies not only in the argument about the growth of knowledge but also, more fundamentally, in the discussion of the relationship between the growth of knowledge and the historical process. The following text will explore Popper’s theory to reveal its “Achilles’ heel,” and thereby respond to his questioning of the Marxist argument for communism.

实际上波普尔的质疑是“贫困”的，他是将共产主义视为历史主义加以批评，后者又奠基在他独特的知识观之上，但他不够精细的讨论留下了 “阿喀琉斯之踵”。这一比喻来自何兆武先生：“为什么主观意识或知识的增长就没有客观规律而且是不能预言的呢？他始终没有给出自圆其说的论据，于是这个问题就成了他理论里的阿基里斯的足踵。”“阿喀琉斯之踵”不仅在于知识增长问题的论证，更在于对知识增长与历史进程关系的讨论上。下文将对波普尔理论进行探讨以揭示其“阿喀琉斯之踵”，进而回应他对马克思共产主义论证的质疑。

I. From the Model of Knowledge Growth to Anti-Historicism

一、从知识增长模型到反历史主义

What Popper calls “historicism” refers to “an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the evolution of history.” This concept is actually an “ideal type” he constructed, blending various real-world theories. In general, it amounts to a kind of historical determinism, emphasizing that “society is necessarily changing, but along a predetermined path which cannot be altered, through stages predetermined by implacable necessity.” Popper lists five interconnected theses: First, the course of human history is heavily influenced by the growth of human knowledge. Second, we cannot predict the future growth of our scientific knowledge. Third, we cannot, therefore, predict the future course of human history. Fourth, this means that we must reject the possibility of a theoretical history; that is to say, of a historical social science that would correspond to theoretical physics. Fifth, therefore, historicism is false.

波普尔所谓的“历史主义”（historicism），是指“一种社会科学的研究途径，它认为历史预言是它的主要目的，并认为通过揭示隐藏在历史演变中的‘节奏’‘类型’‘规律’和‘趋势’就可以达到这个目的”。这个概念其实是他构造的“理想型”，杂糅了现实中各派理论，总的来说也就是某种历史决定论，强调的是“社会必然要变化，但却是沿着一条不能改变的前定的道路、是通过被无情的必然性所前定的各个阶段在变化的”。波普尔列出了环环相扣的五条论纲：第一，历史深受人类知识增长影响；第二，我们不能预告知识在未来的增长；第三，因此，我们不能预告历史的未来行程；第四，这就意味着，不可能有科学理论可以构成历史预告的基础；第五，因此，历史主义是错误的。

Popper emphasizes that the “decisive step” lies in the second thesis, that the growth of knowledge cannot be predicted. This thesis relates to his main academic contribution: “The growth of scientific knowledge does not consist in the accumulation of observations, but in the continual overthrow of one scientific theory and its replacement by a better or more satisfactory one.” Although this discussion revolves around the specific concept of “scientific knowledge,” it can be applied to general knowledge with little modification. The logic of knowledge growth can be demonstrated in four stages: “P1-TS-EE-P2,” that is, starting from a problem, proposing a tentative theory, then eliminating errors, and finally reaching a new problem. Knowledge embodies people’s ability to create history. In Popper’s view, human cognition is thoroughly permeated by theory from beginning to end. Theories “are our own inventions, our own ideas; they are not forced upon us, but are our self-made instruments of thought,” which can originate from all our experiences, or even from some kind of innate knowledge. People first construct hypotheses or theoretical systems (conjectures), and then test them against experience through observation and experiment (refutations). Since theories must withstand testing, they themselves must be falsifiable; that is, we use repeated observations and experiments to test our guesses or hypotheses. Of course, not all propositions can be tested by experience, so “falsifiability,” “testability,” and “refutability” constitute the criterion of demarcation for science. Scientific knowledge progresses from theory to theory, from problem to problem; it is essentially a process of improving and refining existing knowledge. Future knowledge growth can only be discussed under future knowledge conditions. Particularly for certain fundamental innovations, predicting them in the present would require knowledge that only appears in the future, which is logically impossible. At the same time, since the theories that serve as premises are constructed by us, “scientific theories can never be fully proved or verified”; thus, strict truth does not really exist. The process from conjecture to refutation should proceed infinitely, “the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested.”

波普尔强调，“决定性的一步”在于第二条即知识增长无法预告。这条论纲关涉他的主要学术贡献：“科学知识增长并不是指观察的积累，而是指不断推翻一种科学理论、由另一种更好的或者更合乎要求的理论取而代之。”虽说这里是围绕“科学知识”这个特定概念谈的，但无需很多修改也可适用于一般知识。知识增长的逻辑可以演示为四阶段：“P1-TS-EE-P2”，即由问题出发、提出试探性理论、进而排除错误、再达到新问题。知识体现人们创造历史的能力，在波普尔看来，人类认识从始至终渗透着理论，理论“是我们自己的发明物，是我们自己的观念；它们不是强加给我们的，而是我们自己创造的思想工具”，它可以源于自身的一切经验，甚至某种天赋知识，人们都是先构建假说或理论系统（猜想），然后用观察和实验对照经验来检验它们（反驳）。既然理论要经受检验，那本身必须能够被证伪，即用重复的观察和实验去检验我们的猜测或假说，当然不是所有命题都能为经验所检验，于是“可证伪性”“可检验性”“可反驳性”构成了科学划界的标准。科学知识是从理论到理论、从问题到问题的不断进步，实质上就是提高和改进现存知识的过程，未来的知识增长只有在未来的知识状况下才能探讨，特别是对于某些根本性的创新，要在当下预测它们除非具备了仅在未来才出现的知识，而这在逻辑上行不通。同时，作为前提而存在的理论既然出于我们自身所构造，则“科学理论不可能完全得到证明或证实”，因而真正的真理严格来说并不存在，从猜想到反驳的过程应当无穷地进行下去，“科学陈述的客观性就在于它们能被主体间相互检验”。

In Popper’s view, a law is precisely such a scientific theory that has temporarily withstood testing and can be used to explain phenomena or make predictions about the unknown. But whether for explanation or prediction, two conditions must be met: first, a universal scientific law; second, initial conditions that trigger the law as specific instances. Explanation or prediction is equivalent to using laws and conditions to construct causal relationships, while testing involves comparing existing events with existing explanations or predictions. In this sense, predicting history would only require finding historical laws and initial conditions. However, at least three interrelated reasons prevent this possibility: First, any reflection on history always relies on theory; everyone can establish causal connections between historical facts based on any theory, so the understanding of history is always full of one-sidedness and selectivity. Popper writes: “The characteristic of history is not so much an interest in laws or generalizations, but rather an interest in actual, singular, or specific events.” Second, is it feasible to discover laws through the essence or totality of history? Popper explicitly opposes essentialist and holist methods. Because, not to mention whether history has an essence, since knowledge is merely hypothesis, attempting to grasp essence is a pseudo-problem, and a comprehensive grasp of history is also impossible. “The synthesis of all the properties or aspects of a thing” can never be obtained. If this is the case for ordinary things, it is even more absurd to try to grasp history in every detail. This is the method of historicism, which “not only plans to study the whole society by an impossible method, but also plans to control and reconstruct our society ‘as a whole’.” Third, is it possible to derive historical laws through conjecture and refutation, as with general scientific laws? Popper still opposes this, because such propositions are all unfalsifiable. He distinguishes two types of irrefutability: logical or analytical irrefutability, and empirical or synthetic irrefutability. The latter includes many cases, such as when the existence of something cannot be determined, when it is impossible to exhaust all possibilities, or when something appears testable but is not in practice. These are all regarded as empirical irrefutability. “It is the possibility of empirical refutation that characterizes empirical or scientific theories.” Since historical events are unique, they do not constitute a refutation of predictions.

波普尔眼中的规律就是这样一种暂时经受住检验的科学理论，可用作解释现象或对未知进行预测。但无论解释还是预测，必须兼备两个条件，一是普遍性质的科学规律，二是作为个别情况触发规律的初始条件，解释或预测相当于运用规律和条件构建因果关系，检验则是把已有事件与已有的解释或预测相比较。就此说来，预测历史只需找到历史规律和初始条件就可以了。不过，至少三个相互联系的理由妨碍了这种可能：第一，对历史的任何思考总要借助理论，每个人都可以从任何根据理论对历史事实建立因果联系，因而对历史的认识总是充满片面性和选择性。波普尔写道：“历史学的特征与其说是对规律或概括化的兴趣，还不如说是对实际的、单一的或特定的事件的兴趣。”第二，通过历史的本质或者整体来发现规律是否可行？波普尔旗帜鲜明地反对本质主义（essentialism）和整体主义（holism）方法。因为且不提历史有没有本质，知识既然就是假说，试图把握本质就是伪命题，而全面把握历史也不可能，“事物的全部性质或方面的综合”是永远无法得到的，一般事物尚且如此，要对历史把握得面面俱到就更加荒谬了，这就是历史主义的办法，他们“不仅计划着用一种不可能的方法来研究整个社会，还计划着‘作为一个整体’来控制和重建我们的社会”。第三，有没有可能像一般的科学规律那样通过猜想和反驳来得出历史规律呢？波普尔仍然反对，因为这类命题一概不可证伪。他区分了两种不可反驳性，一种是逻辑的或分析的不可反驳性，一种是经验的或综合的不可反驳性。后者情况很多，例如有些事物存在与否无法确定，有些则是无法穷尽各种可能，还有些表面上可检验但实际上不行，这些都被视为经验的不可反驳，“正是经验反驳的可能性使经验的或科学的理论显示出其特色”，而历史事件都是独一无二的，不构成对预测的反驳。

Even if a proposition concerning the laws of history were truly discovered, Popper believes that historical prophecy would still be impossible, because for a law to function it requires initial conditions, and history does not possess such conditions. First, “the historicist does not derive his historical prophecies from conditional scientific predictions”; unconditional historical prophecies can be neither verified nor falsified. Second, making a law function through certain conditions is equivalent to predicting that under certain conditions a certain event will occur, while not excluding the possibility that other events may also occur. The past of history is closed to the present, but the future of history is always open; it is impossible to truly calculate all the conditions that affect the realization of a prediction. For example, the growth of knowledge is an influencing factor, and the impact of the prophecy itself on history cannot be accurately predicted, which means that self-fulfilling prophecy is impossible. Popper states: “Admittedly, if it were repetitive, we might be able to make certain predictions,” but modern society is certainly not a stable system; “the most breathtaking aspects of historical development are non-repetitive.” In his view, science is precisely concerned with certain unexpected reactions of human activity; so-called historical movement, forces, directions, and the like are nothing but the conceptual confusion of historicism. The causal relations of history are less like laws than they are derived from an interest in specific events, and can only be called “historical interpretations.”

即便真的找到一种关于历史规律的命题，波普尔认为还是不可能实现历史预言，因为规律发生作用需要初始条件，而历史不具备这种条件。其一，“历史主义者并未从有条件的科学预测推出它的历史预言”，无条件的历史预言既不能证实也不能证伪。其二，通过某种条件使规律发挥作用，相当于预测某种条件下会发生某个事件，同时并不排除其他事件发生的可能。历史的过去对于当下是封闭的，但历史的未来却始终是开放的，不可能真正估算出影响预测实现的所有条件，比如知识的增长是一个影响因素，而预言本身对于历史的影响是无法准确预言的，这就意味着自我预言是不可能的。波普尔说道：“诚然，如果它是重复出现的，我们也许可作出某些预言”，但是现代社会肯定不是稳定的系统，“历史发展最惊心动魄的方面是非重复的”。在他看来，科学关注的正是人类活动的某些出乎意料的反应，所谓历史的运动、力、方向等说法本身都只不过是历史主义的思想混乱。历史的因果关系与其说是规律，毋宁说源自对特定事件的兴趣，只能被称为“历史的解释”。

Up to this point, based on his unique model of knowledge growth, Popper seems to have smoothly dispelled the historicist notion of predicting the future. Upon closer examination, two arguments are particularly important: first, the emphasis that scientific knowledge for predicting history does not exist; second, the emphasis that the growth of knowledge is unpredictable. However, from the latter argument to the conclusion that history is unpredictable, if it only shows that knowledge growth affects the historical process, that is clearly insufficient—unless historical development is entirely dominated by human knowledge. As for the former argument, if scientific knowledge for predicting the future truly does not exist, it would seem to imply that human knowledge is powerless with regard to the future.

到目前为止，波普尔基于独特的知识增长模型，似乎顺利地打消了历史主义预测未来的念头，细细看来有两个论据尤为重要，一是强调预测历史的科学知识不存在，二是强调知识增长不可预测。不过，从后一个论据到得出历史不可预测的结论，如果只表明知识增长影响历史进程显然远远不够，除非历史发展彻头彻尾地由人类知识所主导；对于前一个论据，如果真的不存在预测未来的科学知识，似乎就应认为人类知识对于未来是无能为力的。

Popper certainly does not think so; he is actually quite willing to acknowledge the scope for human foresight and free action. He emphasizes that he “does not deny the possibility of all social prediction; on the contrary, it is fully compatible with the possibility of testing social theories—for example, economic theories (rather than ‘historical theories’)—by deriving predictions from those theories, asserting that under certain conditions certain developments will occur.” First, regarding the falsification of propositions in the social sciences. Popper believes that, whether or not scientific methods are consciously applied, experimental methods are constantly being used in social life—for example, the relationship between supply and demand, the consequences of a certain policy, and so on, are all carried out through trial and error. However, this seems to imply that the “unique” historical process does not affect testing. Second, to obtain these propositions, one must inevitably formulate conjectures about the laws of social development; how then do they differ from historicism? Popper’s response is rather vague. He argues that one should focus on piecemeal aspects rather than on society as a whole, and in one speech he says: “I think that philosophers should continue to discuss the correct goals of social policy based on the experience of the past fifty years.” However, this seems to imply that scientific prediction is possible as long as it targets certain aspects of social development rather than the historical process itself. Third, he does not completely rule out efforts to study society as a whole, believing that there is a “Gestalt” whole that “discusses certain specific properties or aspects of things, that is, those properties or aspects that make it appear as an organized structure rather than a mere heap of odds and ends,” which can be studied by science. As one scholar comments, it is possible to study the influence of some factors on outcomes through research, and it is also possible to analyze the impact of one variable when many factors change. However, this seems to imply that grasping the “whole” of history remains feasible. Fourth, Popper also hints that historical development can be predicted through trends. He points out that “the emergence of trends is beyond doubt,” and “our difficult task is to explain them as best we can, that is, to determine as precisely as possible the conditions under which they persist.” However, this seems to imply that predicting the historical process can also rely on trends.

波普尔当然不会这么认为，他其实很愿意承认人的预见能力和自由行动的余地。他强调自己“并非否认一切社会预测的可能性；相反，它与由那些理论得出预测，断言在某些条件下会出现某些发展，从而检验社会理论——例如经济理论（而不是‘历史理论’）——的可能性完全相容”。一者，对于社会科学命题的证伪。波普尔认为，无论是不是自觉运用科学方法，社会生活中实验方法都无时无刻不在应用着，例如供求间的关系、某项政策的后果等都在试错中进行。不过这似乎意味着“独一无二的”历史进程并不影响检验。二者，要得到这些命题势必对社会发展的规律提出猜想，那它们与历史主义何异呢？波普尔的回应很含糊，他认为应该从零碎处而不是社会整体着眼，并在一次演说中说道：“我认为，哲学家应根据过去五十年的经验继续讨论社会政策的正确目标。”不过，这似乎意味着科学预测只要针对社会发展的某些方面而非历史进程本身就是可能的。三者，他也不完全排除从总体上研究社会的努力，认为有一种“格式塔”的总体“讨论事物的某些特定的性质或方面，亦即使它呈现为一个有组织的结构而不是一堆单纯的杂凑的那些性质或方面”，可以为科学所研究。正如有学者评论的，通过研究得知一些因素对结果的影响是可能的，在许多因素变动时分析一个变量的影响也是可能的。不过，这似乎意味着把握历史的“总体”仍然可行。四者，波普尔还暗示通过趋势也可以预测历史发展，他指出“趋向的出现是无可怀疑的”，“我们的艰巨任务就是要尽我们所能地解释它们，亦即尽可能精确地确定它们得以持续的条件”。不过，这似乎意味着预测历史进程也可借助趋势。

This series of defenses opens up space for Popper to propose his own “piecemeal engineering,” yet it also plants the seeds of poverty in his carefully constructed anti-historicist theory. “Piecemeal engineering,” as the name suggests, is a method of social transformation that focuses on cautious repair. On the surface, this fits well with his critique of historicism: on the one hand, the historical process is influenced by the growth of knowledge; there is neither knowledge of historical laws nor the ability to predict the growth of human knowledge, so it is impossible to issue a “weather forecast” for history. On the other hand, if one focuses on piecemeal, partial, and tentative aspects, it is possible to discover laws among social phenomena and, to a certain extent, to predict the future based on trends; thus, technical transformation of society is not out of the question. The problem lies in the relationship between the growth of knowledge and the historical process. The former aspect seems to completely sever the illusions of historicism, while the latter seems to open Pandora’s box: it turns out that laws of social science are possible, historical trends are possible, and conditional predictions are possible. This in turn implies that even if scientific knowledge cannot predict, humans still have much to do in predicting the future. The blind spots in Popper’s theory make it “inevitably fall into logical and theoretical confusion that is difficult to reconcile.”

这一系列辩护为波普尔提出自己的“零碎技术学”（piecemeal engineering）开辟了立论空间，却也在他精心建构的反历史主义理论中埋下了贫困的种子。“零碎技术学”顾名思义即一种着眼于审慎修补的社会改造方法，这在表面上很符合他对历史主义的批判：一方面，历史进程受知识进步的影响，既没有关于历史规律的知识，又不能预测人类知识增长，故无法对历史发布“天气预报”；另一方面，如果着眼于零碎的、局部的、试探性的，那么在社会现象间发现规律是可能的，根据趋势在一定程度上预告未来也有可能，因而对社会进行技术性的改造未尝不可。问题在于知识增长和历史进程究竟有什么关系。前一方面似乎完全斩断了历史主义的幻想，后一方面却仿佛打开了潘多拉魔盒：原来社会科学规律是可能的、历史趋势是可能的、有条件的预测是可能的，这又意味着纵使科学知识无法预测，人类对于预测未来还是大有可为。波普尔理论中的盲点，使他“不可避免地陷入了难以自圆其说的逻辑和理论混乱之中”。

II. The “Achilles’ Heel” of Popper’s Theory

二、波普尔理论的“阿喀琉斯之踵”

Popper attempts to show that people cannot predict historical development, yet he does not admit that prediction is truly completely impossible. This attitude of both affirmation and negation makes many of his conclusions appear ambiguous, exposing the poverty of his theory. For example: under what conditions are trends reliable? In what sense are prophecies unconditional? Which causal relationships between variables can constitute laws? What degree of testability is sufficient for refutability? What time frame of reform is piecemeal? What scope of the whole can be studied? Which laws of social science are not historical interpretations? And so on. Of course, these questions concerning history are indeed difficult to answer, but since the argument adopts a universal proposition, it should provide a clear demonstration. However, Popper’s demonstration is not only far from thorough but even somewhat vague. Take his understanding of trends, for instance. He acknowledges that trends are conducive to prediction, but he does not believe that trends are sustainable; the reason he gives is merely an empirical observation: “A trend that has persisted for hundreds or thousands of years can change within a decade, or even more quickly.” Moreover, the functioning of trends depends on initial conditions, and “the central error of historicism” lies in ignoring initial conditions, even to the point of being too impoverished to imagine changes in trends. Yet, if a guarantee of the reliability of trends could be provided, the above reason would appear weak and powerless.

波普尔试图表明人们不能预测历史发展，但又不承认真的完全无法预测，既肯定又否定的态度让许多结论看来模棱两可，暴露出理论的贫困。例如何种条件下的趋向是可靠的；何种意义上的预言是无条件的；哪些变量间因果关系可以构成规律；多高的可检验度才是可反驳的；多长时限的改革是零碎的；多大范围的总体是可以研究的；哪些社会科学规律不是历史解释？等等。当然，这些事关历史的问题的确不好回答，但既然论点采用了全称命题就应该给出清晰的论证，只是波普尔的论证非但谈不上周全，甚至有些含糊。比如对趋势的理解。他承认趋势有利于预测，只是不相信趋势可持续，而给出的理由竟然只是经验中的观察：“持续了几百年或者几千年之久的趋向，可以在十年之内改变，或者比那更迅速。”并且，趋向发挥作用有赖于初始条件，而“历史主义的中心错误”就在于忽视初始条件，甚至贫乏到不能想象趋向变化。可是，如果能对趋向的可靠性作出保证，上述理由就显得软弱无力了。

The existence of theoretical blind spots reflects Popper’s ambiguous attitude and conservative stance, because it is difficult to imagine how he arrived at piecemeal social engineering rather than some form of determinism without resorting to a certain ideology. Popper called himself a critical rationalist. Unlike Bacon, Descartes, and others who believed that humans could ultimately possess absolutely certain knowledge, he admired Socrates, because “Socrates doubted human knowledge and wisdom, and steadfastly rejected any claim to knowledge or wisdom.” He went a step further than Hume, believing that reason alone could serve as a source of knowledge; but he also took a step back from Kant, not believing that humans’ innate knowledge is absolutely reliable. In other words, he believed that human reason, as a source of knowledge, does not possess authority: “origin or genealogy has nothing to do with truth in any case.” Piecemeal social engineering conveys precisely this critical rationalism. He could not precisely define its difference from the historicist method, nor did he even intend to. He said: “In answering this question, I do not wish to draw a sharp dividing line between these two methods.” Hayek, who had an obvious influence on Popper, once said that “liberalism is essentially a skeptic,” “requiring a certain degree of self-doubt so that others may pursue happiness in their own way.” Popper genuinely believed that humanity is necessarily ignorant: “new ways of happiness are theoretical, unreal things, and it is difficult to form an opinion about them”; even if they were attained, they would not be realized as predicted. Thus, piecemeal social engineering is proposed from a conservative stance and cautious attitude. Its benefit lies not in increasing future welfare, but in practical repairs to suffering; even if proven wrong by experience, it facilitates rapid correction. From this perspective, rather than saying Popper proved historicism wrong, it is more accurate to say he only proved it unreliable; rather than saying Popper refuted historicism, it is more accurate to say his basic stance is incompatible with historicism.

理论盲点的存在，折射出波普尔的暧昧态度和保守立场，因为除非借助某种意识形态，否则很难想象何以他得出的是零碎技术学而非某种决定论。波普尔自称为批判的理性主义者，与培根、笛卡尔等相信人最终能够占有绝对确实的知识不同，他欣赏苏格拉底，因为“苏格拉底怀疑人的知识和智慧，并始终坚定地拒斥任何自称的知识或智慧”。他比休谟更进了一步，相信理性可以单独作为知识的源泉；但比康德又退了一步，不相信人的先天知识绝对可靠。换言之，他认为人的理性作为知识源泉并不具有权威性，“起源或谱系在任何场合都同真理没什么关系”。零碎技术学传达的正是这种批判理性主义，他无法准确界定甚至本就不打算界定它与历史主义方法的区别，他说：“回答这个问题时，我并不想在这两种方法之间划出一条截然分明的界限。”给波普尔以显而易见影响的哈耶克曾说过“自由主义本质上是一个怀疑主义者”，“要求一定程度的不自信以便让他人以自己的方式追求幸福”。波普尔正是发自内心地认为人类必然是无知的，“幸福的种种新方式都是理论的、不实在的东西，要对他们形成一种见解很难”，就算得到了也不会像预测的那样实现。可见，零碎技术学是秉持一种保守立场和谨慎态度提出的，它的好处不在于给未来增进多少福利，而在于对痛苦的实用性修补，即便被经验证明有错也利于迅速纠正。从这个意义上看，与其说波普尔证明了历史主义是错误的，不如说只是证明了它是不可靠的；与其说波普尔驳倒了历史主义，不如说是他的基本立场与历史主义格格不入。

Setting aside this critical rationalist stance and re-examining Popper’s unique view of knowledge clearly does not provide sufficient grounds to refute historicism and determinism. The poverty of theory becomes an “Achilles’ heel,” because his view of knowledge is not concerned with the truth or falsity of propositions. The idea that knowledge originates from hypotheses and testing is not strange; Marxism also holds that: “As long as natural science employs thought, its form of development is hypothesis… Further observational data will purify these hypotheses.” However, Popper a priori issued a verdict on all human knowledge, believing that knowledge can be objective, but “there can be no final statements in science”; it is merely a continuous process of trial and error. All one can do is use the criterion of falsifiability to draw a boundary: within it lies empirical science; outside it lies mathematics, logic, metaphysics, and countless other forms of knowledge. The problem is that no matter how precise the boundary, it is still a “demarcation,” unrelated to the meaning or truth of propositions. For example, under this demarcation criterion, many propositions—such as philosophical propositions about the human mind, historical propositions about social situations, or psychological propositions about the id—are excluded from science from the outset, yet they may still be both meaningful and true. Popper himself admits that some metaphysical propositions can be regarded as answers to questions, and thus their truth or falsity can be critically discussed. Therefore, it can be said that only based on the logic of knowledge demarcation can conclusions such as “the historical process has no scientific laws,” “no scientific laws can predict history,” and “scientific knowledge grows through trial and error” be supported, after all, “science” has been specially defined.

撇开这种批判理性主义立场重新审视波普尔的独特知识观，显然不足以为驳倒历史主义和决定论提供充足理由，理论的贫困变成了“阿喀琉斯之踵”，因为他的知识观并不关心命题的真伪。而认为知识源于假说和检验并不奇怪，马克思主义也认为：“只要自然科学运用思维，它的发展形式就是假说……进一步的观察材料会使这些假说纯化。”但是，波普尔先验地给所有人类知识下达了判决书，认为知识可以是客观的，但“科学中就不可能有最终的陈述”，无非是持续不断的试错，能做的就是用可证伪标准划定一个界，界内是经验科学，界外的则是数学、逻辑、形而上学等无穷多的其他知识。问题是界限再确切也还是“划界”，与命题的意义和真假并没有关系。例如，在划界标准下，许多如哲学上关于人类心智的命题、历史学关于社会形势的命题抑或心理学关于本我的命题一开始就被排除于科学之外，但它们仍然可能既有意义又是真实的，波普尔也承认有些形而上学命题可以视为对问题的解答，进而批判地讨论其真假。因此可以说，只有基于知识划界的逻辑，认为历史进程没有科学规律、没有科学规律可以预告历史、科学知识通过试错而增长等才是能被支撑的结论，毕竟“科学”已经过特别的定义。

In fact, Popper had long admitted: “I do not wish to refute what I consider irrefutable determinism; I wish to refute what I call ‘scientific’ determinism.” But to refute historicism, is demarcation enough? The historicist propositions he criticized—such as how reliable historical trends are, or whether a particular historical prediction is correct—cannot be determined as true or false merely by judging whether they are scientific. There is always a blind spot between his conclusions and his arguments. For example, to deny the existence of scientific laws concerning historical movement, he argues that these propositions are insufficiently scientific; to deny the significance of historical trends for predicting the future, he argues that the conditions for the operation of trends are difficult to meet; to deny the possibility of predicting the growth of knowledge, he argues for the unique mode of knowledge growth, without proving that the historical process is entirely governed by that mode. In this regard, Popper’s five theses are insufficient to thoroughly eliminate historicism. He expended great effort on the second thesis—the mode of knowledge growth—but the seed of poverty was already planted in the first thesis: although the historical process is deeply influenced by human knowledge, this does not mean that there are absolutely no laws or trends in history that might be immune to the growth of knowledge.

其实波普尔早就承认：“我不想驳斥我认为不可反驳的决定论；我希望驳斥我所称的‘科学’决定论。”但要驳倒历史主义，划界就够了吗？那些他所批判的历史主义命题，如历史趋势多大程度上可靠、某个历史预测正确与否等仅凭断定科学与否并不能决定真伪。他的结论和论证之间永远藏着盲点，比如为了否认存在关于历史运动的科学规律，论证的却是这些命题不够科学；为了否认历史趋势对预言未来的意义，论证的却是趋势的作用条件难以具备；为了否认对知识增长的预测，论证的却是知识的独特增长方式，而又并未证明历史进程完全受制于知识增长方式。就此而言，波普尔的五条论纲对于彻底清除历史主义是力所不逮的，他在第二条即知识的增长方式上费了很大力气，贫困的种子却早在第一条就埋下了：历史进程固然深受人类知识影响，但并不意味着历史中完全不存在某些（个）规律或趋势具有不为知识增长所转移的可能。

It is not hard to imagine that when Popper vigorously used his theory to attack Marx’s communism, his “Achilles’ heel” appears even more fragile. Popper noted the uniqueness of Marx’s theory. On the one hand, he considered it economistic, emphasizing the fundamental nature of human material needs and the foundational role of the economy in social development, acknowledging that this “represents an extremely valuable advance.” He did not deny the scientificity of economism, but offered empirical counterexamples: “the emphasis on the economic background as the ultimate basis of all development… is in fact untenable”; “in certain circumstances, the influence of ideas (perhaps supported by propaganda) may outweigh and replace economic forces.” On the other hand, he considered Marx’s theory historicist, “a theory aiming at predicting the future course of economic and political developments, and especially the future course of revolutions.” He believed that the reason for Marx’s failure “lies entirely in the poverty of historicism.” What is this “poverty”? He explains: “it lies in the simple fact that, even if we observe today a historical trend or tendency, we cannot know whether it will manifest itself in the same way tomorrow.” There is no doubt that Popper’s views are mixed with too many misunderstandings.

不难想见，当波普尔竭力用他的理论攻击马克思的共产主义时，其“阿喀琉斯之踵”就显得更为脆弱了。波普尔注意到了马克思理论的独特性，认为它一方面是经济主义的，强调人的物质需要的根本性和经济对社会发展的基础作用，承认这“代表了一种极其有价值的进步”，并不否定经济主义的科学性，只是用经验举了反例，“强调经济背景是任何一种发展的最终基础……事实上是站不住脚的”，“某些情况下观念的影响（也许得到宣传的支持）可能超过并取代经济力量”。另一方面，他又认为马克思的理论是历史主义的，是“一种旨在预测经济和政治发展的未来进程，尤其是预测革命的未来进程的理论”。他认为马克思失败的原因“完全在于历史主义的贫乏”。何谓“贫乏”？他解释道：“在于这一简单的事实，即，即使我们观察今天所表现的历史趋势或倾向，我们也不可能知道，它明天是否会有同样的表现。”毫无疑问，波普尔的这些看法夹杂了太多误解。

It should be stated at the outset that this article has no intention of discussing historicism, nor does it defend historicism. Many of Popper’s criticisms of historicism are roughly agreed with by Marx; for example, Marx also opposed predicting how to act concretely in the future, pointing out: “What is to be done at a particular moment in the future, what is to be done immediately, depends entirely on the given historical conditions in which people will have to act.” [11]11 Karl Marx, “Letter to Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 269. [Back] However, the difference is that Marx “regards the movement of society as a natural-historical process governed by definite laws”; he believed in the laws and tendencies of history and once remarked: “Due to a certain blindness of judgment, even the most outstanding figures will completely fail to see what is right before their eyes. Later, when the time comes, people are astonished to discover that what they had not seen before now everywhere reveals its traces.” [12]12 Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 105. [Back] Some scholars have commented: “Generally speaking, Marx had less interest in designing utopian blueprints; he was more inclined to utilize the development of capitalism itself and make inferences from it.” [13]13 Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Vol. 1, p. 335. [Back] In fact, Marx never had the historicist delusion that Popper accused him of, nor did he ever attempt to know history omnisciently. Engels pointed out: “To form an exact mental image of the world system in which we live is impossible for us or for any age.” [14]14 Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 34. [Back] Lenin also pointed out: “Man cannot fully grasp = reflect = depict all of nature, its ‘immediate totality’; he can only eternally approach this by creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc.” [15]15 V. I. Lenin, “Conspectus of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*,” in *Lenin Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 182. [Back] But as Lukács said, “the opposition between the description of one aspect of history and the description of history as a unified process” is “an opposition of method” and “an opposition of viewpoint.” [16]16 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 145. [Back] In fact, Marx replaced the common-sense view of the real world with the dialectical “view of process” and “view of relations.” On the one hand, he scientifically abstracted the decisive factors from the chaotic and changing social phenomena; on the other hand, he emphasized that “the relations of production in every society form a unified whole,” studying historical movement through the overall structure of society, thereby proposing communism as a natural-historical process. Lenin succinctly summarized this by saying that historical materialism “singles out the economic sphere from the various spheres of social life, and singles out relations of production from all social relations,” and then “reduces relations of production to the level of productive forces,” thus regarding the development of socio-economic formations “as a natural-historical process.” [17]17 V. I. Lenin, “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats,” in *Lenin Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 140. [Back] These interactions are reduced to a well-known law of historical materialism: productive forces determine relations of production, and the economic base determines the superstructure.

应该声明，本文无意于讨论历史主义，也不为历史主义辩护。而波普尔批判历史主义的很多观点马克思大致同意，比如马克思也反对预测未来如何具体地行动，他指出：“在将来某个特定的时刻应该做些什么，应该马上做些什么，这当然完全取决于人们将不得不在其中活动的那个既定的历史环境。”然而不同的是，马克思“把社会运动看做受一定规律支配的自然史过程”，他相信历史的规律和趋势并曾感慨：“由于某种判断的盲目性，甚至最杰出的人物也会根本看不到眼前的事物。后来，到了一定的时候，人们就惊奇地发现，从前没有看到的东西现在到处都露出自己的痕迹。”有学者曾经评论道：“一般而言，马克思对设计乌托邦蓝图的兴趣较小，他更倾向于利用资本主义自身的发展并从中进行推断。”事实上，马克思并没有波普尔所指责的那种历史主义妄想，从未试图全知历史。恩格斯指出：“对我们所处的世界体系形成精确的思想映象，这无论对我们还是对所有时代来说都是不可能的。”列宁也指出：“人不能完全地把握＝反映＝描绘整个自然界、它的‘直接的总体’，人只能通过创立抽象、概念、规律、科学的世界图景等等永远地接近于这一点。”但是如卢卡奇所言，“对历史的一个方面的描述同对历史作为一个统一过程的描述之间的对立”，“是方法的对立”，“观点的对立”。其实，马克思用辩证法的“过程观”和“关系观”取代了对现实世界常识性看法。一方面，从纷杂变幻的社会现象中科学抽象出决定性的因素；另一方面，他强调“每一个社会中的生产关系都形成一个统一的整体”，通过社会的总体结构来研究历史运动，从而提出了作为自然历史进程的共产主义。列宁精妙地总结道，唯物史观“从社会生活的各种领域中划分出经济领域，从一切社会关系中划分出生产关系”，又“把生产关系归结于生产力的水平”，从而也就把社会经济形态发展“看做是自然历史过程”。这些相互作用归结为一条耳熟能详的唯物史观规律：生产力决定生产关系，经济基础决定上层建筑。

III. Clarification of Historical Laws and the Necessity of Communism

三、历史规律与共产主义必然性的澄清

Marx’s argument for communism precisely strikes the “Achilles’ heel” of Popper’s theory. Popper believes that scientific knowledge concerning the historical process does not exist, and the laws of historical materialism are precisely this kind of scientific knowledge. The laws of historical materialism study the overall structure of society; they are “generalizations of the most general results abstracted from the investigation of the historical development of mankind,” [18]18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 37. [Back] revealing the natural necessity of the historical process. Such a historical process is less the unilinear evolution of a subject of some kind than the continuous structural transformation of human society; “evolution is manifested in those structures that are constituted according to a rationally constructed pattern and are constantly replaced by more comprehensive structures.” [19]19 Maurice Godelier, *The Mental and the Material*, p. 12. [Back] The laws of historical materialism do not probe the specifics of different historical periods but rather explore the direction of decisive factors concerning the historical process. This not only does not weaken the openness of the future to human beings but is instead unfolded in people’s actual activities, and is by no means “a recipe or formula applicable to all historical epochs.” [20]20 Karl Marx, “Letter to the Editorial Board of *Otechestvennye Zapiski*,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 200. [Back] The laws of historical materialism are essential; the law itself is not equivalent to concrete phenomena. For example, the economy is not always the sole or direct influencing factor in the historical process, but it is “the most powerful,” “the most fundamental,” and “the most decisive.” [21]21 Friedrich Engels, “Letter to Joseph Bloch,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 49, p. 34. [Back] In short, Popper believes that the historical process is unpredictable due to the mode of growth of knowledge, whereas Marx shows that the natural-historical process does not depend on the mode of growth of human knowledge but is fundamentally determined by the movement of productive forces. However, it should be noted: first, within the expression of the laws of historical materialism, there is still a determining relationship: “productive forces are the cause, relations of production are the effect; the economic base is the cause, the superstructure is the effect.” [22]22 G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence*, p. 134. [Back] Second, the operation of the law is not unconditional; the above determining relationship shows initial conditions, for example, the condition for the economic base to determine the superstructure is a specific movement of productive forces. Third, Marx also emphasizes that the operation of laws or tendencies is “conditioned by the various premises” of each era’s reality, but it can be proven that the operation of the law “is not the result of human effort determined by human purposes and will.” [23]23 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 10. [Back]

马克思的共产主义论证恰好击中了波普尔理论的“阿喀琉斯之踵”。波普尔认为有关历史进程的科学知识并不存在，唯物史观规律正是这种科学知识。唯物史观规律研究社会的总体结构，是“从人类历史发展的考察中抽象出来的最一般的结果的概括”，展示出历史进程的自然必然性。这样的历史进程与其说是某个类的主体的单线进化，不如说人类社会不断历经结构性变革，“进化表现在按照一个合理构成的模式而构成的，又经常被更全面的结构所代替的那些结构上”。唯物史观规律并不探知不同历史时期的具体，而是探讨事关历史进程决定性因素的走向，这不但没有削弱未来对于人的开放性，反而要展开在人的现实活动中，而绝非“适用于各个历史时代的药方或公式”。唯物史观规律是本质性的，规律本身不等同于现象具体，比如经济未必总是历史进程唯一的或直接的影响因素，只不过“最强有力”“最本原”“最有决定性”。总之，波普尔认为历史进程由于知识增长方式而不可预测，马克思却表明自然历史进程不以人类知识增长方式为转移，而根本上取决于生产力运动。不过应当注意的是：第一，唯物史观规律的表达式内部仍有决定关系，“生产力是因，生产关系是果；经济基础是因，上层建筑是果”。第二，规律的作用并非无条件的，上述决定关系展示了初始条件，比如经济基础决定上层建筑的条件是特定生产力运动。第三，马克思也强调规律或趋势发挥作用受到每个时代现实的“种种前提的制约”，但能够证明规律的作用“不是由人的目的和意志决定的人为努力的结果”。

So, how do these laws and tendencies support the argument for communism? The general view holds that communism “is determined by the basic contradiction of capitalism” and “is based on the theoretical foundations of historical materialism and the theory of surplus value.” [24]24 Standard formulation in Chinese Marxist textbooks; see, e.g., *A Concise Course in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 245. [Back] These views contain two propositions that deserve distinction, and Marx’s texts should also support a two-step argument: first, to show that communism is a natural-historical process; second, as some scholars have said, “Marx not only sought to show how capitalism operates, but also why it is a transitional mode of production and what kind of society might follow it,” [25]25 Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, p. 115. [Back] that is, to show why capitalism necessarily transitions to communism.

那么，这里的规律和趋势是如何支撑起对共产主义的论证呢？一般看法认为，共产主义“是由资本主义的基本矛盾决定的”，“以唯物史观和剩余价值学说为立论依据”。这些看法蕴含值得区分的两个命题，马克思的文本也应当支撑起两步论证：一是要表明共产主义是自然历史过程；二是如有学者所言“马克思不仅力图表明资本主义是如何运行的，而且力图表明它为什么是一种过渡的生产方式，继之而来的可能是什么性质的社会”，也就是要表明何以资本主义必然向共产主义过渡。

To reach the conclusion that communism has historical necessity, it is neither possible nor necessary to know history omnisciently. The method adopted by historical materialism is actually to grasp some decisive factors concerning the historical process. In other words, by scientifically abstracting the overall structure of society, communism occurs within the changes of the social structure. On the one hand, the historical process is reduced to the movement of productive forces. The subject of history is human beings; material production occupies a foundational position in human life: “What individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production,” [26]26 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 31. [Back] and the overall state of society is adapted to the economic base. At the same time, as Marx pointed out, “productive forces and social relations—these are the two different aspects of the development of the social individual”; [27]27 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 97. [Back] productive forces embody the capacity for material production, “in fact only determine the efficiency of purposeful productive activity within a given period of time”; [28]28 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 53. [Back] while in production, people inevitably enter into definite mutual relations, i.e., relations of production, “the forms of these relations must necessarily change with the change and development of these productive forces.” [29]29 Karl Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 211. [Back] Relations of production have specific forms; when they can no longer accommodate the productive forces, they undergo transformation. A given state of productive forces is the cause that gives rise to certain relations of production.

要得出共产主义具有历史必然性的结论，既不可能也不需要全知历史，唯物史观所采用的办法其实是把握事关历史进程的一些决定性因素。换言之，科学抽象出社会的总体结构，共产主义就发生在社会结构的变化中。一方面，将历史的进程归结到生产力的运动上。历史的主体是人，物质生产在人类生活中占据基础性的地位，“个人是什么样的，这取决于他们进行生产的物质条件”，社会总体状况适应于经济基础。同时，正如马克思指出的，“生产力和社会关系——这二者是社会个人的发展的不同方面”，生产力体现的是物质生产能力，“事实上只决定有目的的生产活动在一定时间内的效率”；而人们在生产时，不可避免地结成一定的相互关系即生产关系，“这些关系的形式必然随着这些生产力的改变和发展而改变”。生产关系具有特定形式，当不能容纳生产力时便会发生变革，生产力的一定状况是引起某种生产关系的原因。

On the other hand, communism is envisioned from the perspective of changes in relations of production. Some scholars distinguish relations of production into “material” and “social” types: the former refers to labor relations, while the latter involves domination over people and the means of production. Others express this as “technical relations” and “power relations,” arguing that Marx typically uses the concept of relations of production in the latter sense. Relations of production primarily examine the combination of laborers with the conditions of production and a series of mutual relationships, the core of which lies in property ownership, i.e., the system of ownership. Marx points out: “These social relations into which the producers enter with one another, the conditions under which they exchange their activities and participate in the whole act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production.” [30]30 Karl Marx, “Wage Labour and Capital,” in *Marx Engels Collected Works* (hereafter MECW), vol. 9, p. 203. He also holds that “all production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society,” [31]31 Karl Marx, “Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy,” in MECW, vol. 28, p. 24. and states that “to define bourgeois property is nothing else than to give an exposition of all the social relations of bourgeois production.” [32]32 Karl Marx, “Moralizing Criticism and Critical Morality,” in MECW, vol. 6, p. 319. However, “property is only a conscious relation to the conditions of production as one’s own,” [33]33 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, in MECW, vol. 28, p. 455. and since “these conditions actually become the conditions of the subject’s activity,” there inevitably arises the difference between common ownership and private ownership. Moreover, the division of labor is closely linked to ownership: “The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of ownership; i.e., each stage of the division of labour also determines the relations of individuals to one another with respect to the material, instrument, and product of labour.” [34]34 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 32. Socialized large-scale production ultimately drives the conditions of production to be commonly owned by the producers, and public ownership is the hallmark of communism. Engels clearly states: “The decisive difference between it and the existing system lies, of course, in the fact that production is organized on the basis of the common ownership of all the means of production (first by the state).” [35]35 Frederick Engels, “Letter to August Bebel,” 18–28 March 1875, in MECW, vol. 24, p. 71. Lenin also expresses: “Since the means of production have become common property, the term ‘communism’ is also applicable here.” [36]36 V. I. Lenin, “The State and Revolution,” in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 25, p. 462.

另一方面，从生产关系的变动中展望共产主义。有学者将生产关系区分为“物质的”和“社会的”两种，前者指劳动关系，后者则涉及对人和生产资料的支配；也有学者表述为“技术关系”和“权力关系”，并认为马克思通常在后者的意义上使用生产关系概念。生产关系探讨的主要是劳动者与生产条件的结合以及一系列相互关系，其核心在于财产所有即所有制问题，马克思指出：“生产者相互发生的这些社会关系，他们借以互相交换其活动和参与全部生产活动的条件，当然依照生产资料的性质而有所不同。”他还认为，“一切生产都是个人在一定社会形式中并借这种社会形式而进行的对自然的占有”，并表示“给资产阶级的所有权下定义不外是把资产阶级生产的全部社会关系描述一番”。不过“财产仅仅是有意识地把生产条件看作是自己的东西这样一种关系”，既然“这些条件实际上成为主体活动的条件”，势必就有了共同所有还是私人所有的差异。而分工与所有制紧密相关，“分工的各个不同发展阶段，同时也就是所有制的各种不同形式。这就是说，分工的每一个阶段还决定个人在劳动材料、劳动工具和劳动产品方面的相互关系”。社会化大生产最终势必推动生产条件为生产者共有，公有制就是共产主义的标志。恩格斯明确指出：“它同现存制度的具有决定意义的差别当然在于，在实行全部生产资料公有制（先是国家的）基础上组织生产。”列宁也表示：“既然生产资料已成为公有财产，那么‘共产主义’这个名词在这里也是可以用的。”

Through the laws of historical materialism, all the complex and concrete phenomena of social life, including ideas, institutions, and systems, are scientifically abstracted into the dialectical relations between superstructure and economic base, and between relations of production and productive forces. It can be said that while Popper was still lamenting the chaos of the historical whole and the complexity of social phenomena, Marx had already grasped the overall structure of society through scientific methods; while Popper was still entangled in the question of whether historical predictions could not avoid interference from human knowledge, Marx had long been soberly aware that it was unnecessary to waste effort issuing “weather forecasts” of the historical process—the mode of growth of human knowledge, though deeply influencing the concrete course of history, does not negate the laws of change in the overall structure of society. In the chain of interlocking determining relations, productive forces are the most fundamental factor: “The sum total of the productive forces accessible to men determines the condition of society.” [37]37 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 43. Relations of production, adapting to the movement of productive forces, revert to public ownership, and communism follows. Importantly, this law of historical materialism is scientific because it both meets Popper’s “demarcation” criteria (i.e., it is falsifiable, has a logical structure from which predictions can be derived, and these predictions consist of basic propositions) and conforms to empirical confirmation. Lenin praises: “Since the publication of *Capital*, the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven principle.” [38]38 V. I. Lenin, “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats,” in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 1, p. 142. As some scholars emphasize: “Marx and Engels acknowledged that their theoretical principles can be both verified and falsified.” [39]39 Reference to a contemporary Chinese scholarly argument; the specific source is not identified in the original text.

透过唯物史观的规律，包括思想观念、制度体系等在内的全部社会生活复杂具体的种种现象，被科学抽象为上层建筑和经济基础、生产关系和生产力的辩证关系。可以说，当波普尔还在感慨历史整体的混沌和社会现象的繁杂时，马克思已经通过科学方法把握了社会总体结构；当波普尔还在纠结于历史预言不能不受人类知识干扰时，马克思早就清醒地意识到不必为发布历史进程的“天气预报”白费力气——人类知识增长方式固然深深影响历史具体进程，却并不否定社会总体结构变迁的规律。在环环相扣的决定关系中，生产力是最根本因素，“人们所达到的生产力的总和决定着社会状况”，生产关系适应生产力运动向公有制复归，随之而来的就是共产主义。重要的是，唯物史观这一规律是科学的，因为既符合波普尔的“划界”标准（即可被证伪、具有逻辑结构从而推导出预测、预测由一些基础命题构成），又符合经验的确证。列宁赞扬：“自从《资本论》问世以来，唯物主义历史观已经不是假设，而是科学地证明了的原理。”正如有学者所强调的：“马克思恩格斯承认他们的理论原理既可证实又可证伪。”

However, although the argument has thus far envisioned communism through the laws of historical materialism, it has yet to demonstrate why capitalism is a transitional form. Popper insists that laws or trends require initial conditions to function and mistakenly believes that communism is an unconditional historical prophecy. In fact, the expression of the above law has already made it clear: the superstructure adapts to the economic base, and the initial condition should be the factor that causes the economic base to change. Since the economic base involves relations of production and productive forces, and relations of production adapt to the state of productive forces, the initial condition for the operation of the entire law lies in ensuring the movement of productive forces. Therefore, the key points are: first, productive forces have a cumulative trend; only with the continuous progress of productive forces is the transformation of relations of production possible. Second, capitalist private ownership has an inevitable tendency to negate itself, and communism is precisely the negation of private ownership.

不过，尽管论证至此已通过唯物史观规律展望了共产主义，却还是未表明资本主义何以是一种过渡形态。波普尔坚持认为，规律或趋势发挥作用需要初始条件，并误会共产主义是无条件的历史预言。其实上述规律的表达式已经说得很清楚：上层建筑适应于经济基础，初始条件应该是使经济基础变化的那个因素；由于经济基础涉及的就是生产关系和生产力，而生产关系又适应于生产力状况，那么整个规律作用的初始条件就在于确保生产力运动。因此关键就在于：一是生产力具有累进的趋势，只有生产力持续进步，生产关系的变革才有可能；二是资本主义私有制具有否定自身的必然趋势，而共产主义正是对私有制的否定。

Regarding the trend of continuous accumulation of productive forces, Marx holds: “The capitalist mode of production contains the tendency to develop the productive forces absolutely,” [40]40 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, in MECW, vol. 37, p. 249. and “at all stages of economic development, a certain amount of wealth is accumulated.” [41]41 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, in MECW, vol. 35, p. 601. So why do productive forces continuously accumulate? In recent years, some scholars have argued that “the self-revolutionary nature of productive forces is rooted in the subjective initiative of human practical activities to seek survival and development,” or that its secret lies in “the needs, desires, reason, and passion of people hidden behind productive forces.” [42]42 Reference to contemporary Chinese scholarly arguments; specific sources not identified in the original text. Here, one should avoid falling into a logical rut. In fact, Popper also acknowledges that “the tendency towards the accumulation and concentration of wealth observed by Marx can hardly be questioned. His theory of the continuous increase of productivity is also difficult to oppose in its main aspects,” but he believes that “the human factor is the ultimately uncertain and tortuous element in all social institutions of social life.” [43]43 Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 2, p. 199 (approximate reference).

关于生产力持续累进的趋势，马克思认为：“资本主义生产方式包含着绝对发展生产力的趋势”，“在经济发展的一切阶段上都有一定的财富被积累。”那么生产力何以会持续累进呢？近年来有学者认为“生产力的自我革命性根源于人的实践活动具有求生存谋发展的主观能动性”，或认为其秘密是“隐含在生产力背后的人的需要、欲望、理性和激情。”这里应当避免落入逻辑窠臼，其实波普尔也承认“马克思所观察的财富的积累和积聚的趋势，几乎很难受到责疑。他的生产率不断增长的理论在主要方面也是难以反对的”，但他认为“人的因素乃是社会生活中的一切社会制度中那个归根到底是无从确定而又曲折的成分”。

In fact, to explain the cumulative trend of productive forces, one must return to practice. Marx once pointed out that “productive forces are of course always the productive forces of useful, concrete labor,” [44]44 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, in MECW, vol. 35, p. 51. and thus always the perceptual, objective activity of humans. Some scholars have found that “practice appears both as labor and as self-expression; both as material reproduction and as social reproduction.” [45]45 Reference to a contemporary Chinese scholarly argument; the specific source is not identified in the original text. From this, three reasons for the progressive trend of productive forces can be derived: First, production activity accompanies humanity throughout its existence. Marx vividly writes: “Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce his life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social forms and under all possible modes of production.” [46]46 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, in MECW, vol. 37, p. 800. To sustain existence through continuous production means that productive forces and the entire society are in constant motion: “The growth of productive forces, the destruction of social relations, the formation of ideas are all in constant motion; only the abstraction of motion, ‘the death that does not die,’ is stagnant.” [47]47 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 41. Second, practice has creativity and irreversibility. Production is essentially a material exchange between humans and nature: “He not only effects a change of form in the natural material, but he also realizes his own purpose in the natural material.” [48]48 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, in MECW, vol. 35, p. 188. This process is not cyclical repetition but requires interaction with contradictions in production, producing to meet higher needs, and advancing productive forces in the process of satisfying needs. Hence, this process is “creative, irreversible, and irreducible,” and different stages “always prepare the premises and accumulate energy for higher upward movements.” [49]49 Reference to a contemporary Chinese scholarly argument; the specific source is not identified in the original text. Third, productive forces accumulate in social development. Marx points out: “Man, as the constant premise of human history, is also the constant product and result of human history.” [50]50 Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, part 3, in MECW, vol. 32, p. 467. Productive forces are for each generation a given product of previous activities. Specific productive forces may indeed be destroyed or stagnate, but with the expansion of intercourse, it becomes increasingly unlikely that “the productive forces achieved in one region, especially inventions, will be lost in later development, which depends entirely on the extent of the expansion of intercourse.” [51]51 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, in MECW, vol. 5, p. 66. This trend means that the entire social structure is bound to be in a state of change.

事实上，要解释生产力累进趋势必须回到实践中。马克思曾指出“生产力当然始终是有用的、具体的劳动的生产力”，因而始终是人的感性对象性活动；有学者发现，“实践既作为劳动出现，又作为自我表现出现；既作为物质再生产而出现，又作为社会再生产而出现”。由此可以引申出生产力进步趋势的三个理由：第一，生产活动伴随人类始终。马克思生动地写道：“像野蛮人为了满足自己的需要，为了维持和再生产自己的生命，必须与自然搏斗一样，文明人也必须这样做；而且在一切社会形式中，在一切可能的生产方式中，他都必须这样做。”为了维持存在而持续不断地生产，这意味着生产力和整个社会处于持续不断的运动中，“生产力的增长、社会关系的破坏、观念的形成都是不断运动的，只有运动的抽象即‘不死的死’才是停滞不动的”。第二，实践具有创造性和不可逆性。生产本质上是人与自然界的物质变换，“不仅使自然物发生形式变化，同时他还在自然物中实现自己的目的”。这个过程不是循环重复，而是需要与生产间矛盾互动，为满足更高需要而生产，又在满足需要中推进生产力。因而这个过程是“创造性的，不可逆转、不可还原的”，不同阶段“总是在为更高的上升运动准备着前提，积蓄着能量”。第三，生产力在社会发展中累进。马克思指出：“人，作为人类历史的经常前提，也是人类历史的经常的产物和结果。”生产力对于每一代人都是一种既得的、以往活动的产物，特定生产力的确可能消灭或停滞，但随着交往的扩展越来越不会出现“某一个地域创造出来的生产力，特别是发明，再往后的发展中是否会失传，完全取决于交往扩展的情况”。这一趋势意味着整个社会结构必将处于变动之中。

The “necessity of a natural process” by which capitalist private property negates itself can be explained through the contradiction between the social division of labor and private property. The division and coordination of labor is a combination of labor relations in production; it both fixes each individual’s role and turns production into a de facto “common activity,” even though “this common activity is not voluntarily but naturally formed.” The division of labor reflects the state of the productive forces. As the productive forces continuously develop, the scale of the division of labor expands, to the point where it gives rise to a severe opposition with two sides: on the one hand, production increasingly manifests as the “common activity” of a great many different people within an extremely broad scope; on the other hand, the means of production on which this “common activity” depends are concentrated in the hands of a few, so that “the social interrelations of production appear only as a natural law that overpowers individual caprice.” The resolution of this opposition can only be that the laborers publicly own the means of production in the same way as the “common activity,” in other words, the transformation of private property into public property.

关于资本主义私有制具有否定自身的“自然过程的必然性”，可以借助社会分工与私有制间的矛盾来解释。分工协作是生产中的劳动组合关系，既意味着每个人角色的固定化，又将生产变成事实上的“共同活动”，尽管“共同活动本身不是自愿地而是自然形成的”。分工体现生产力状况，随着生产力不断发展，分工规模不断拓展，以至于引发一体两面的严重对立：一方面是生产越来越表现为极大范围内不同人的“共同活动”；另一方面这种“共同活动”赖以进行的生产资料却掌握在少数人手中，使得“生产的社会联系只是表现为对于个人随意性起压倒作用的自然规律”。这种对立的解决只能是让劳动者像“共同活动”那样公共地占有生产资料，换言之，即私有制转为公有制。

But why does capitalist private property transform into its opposite? The response to this question is undoubtedly one of the most fascinating parts of Marxism. Lenin once pointed out: “Marx and Engels in their works especially emphasize dialectical materialism, not dialectical materialism, and especially insist on historical materialism, not historical materialism.” [52]52 This is a paraphrase of Lenin’s emphasis on dialectical and historical materialism, though the exact wording here appears to be a rhetorical repetition in the original Chinese text. Viewed through dialectics, the apex of private property is the restoration of public property, and the turn to communist public property possesses inevitability. From the concrete perspective of history, the contradictory movement of capitalist productive forces and relations of production will reach a certain point, at which “capital, i.e., wage-labor, enters into the same relation to social wealth and the development of the productive forces as the guild system, serfdom, and slavery did to that development, and is necessarily cast off as a fetter.” [53]53 This is a paraphrase of Marx’s argument in *Capital* about capital becoming a fetter on the productive forces. This is fundamentally resolved through class struggle. Engels pointed out: “All revolutions up to the present have been revolutions for the protection of one kind of property against another kind of property.” [54]54 Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.” An examination of Western European society also confirms this logic: initially there was primitive society, containing different types of public property; thereafter came private property, which was accompanied by three forms of class antagonism between slave owners and slaves, feudal lords and peasants, and the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; ultimately, class struggle “will come to an end with the abolition of capitalism, with the return of modern society to a higher form of the ancient type, to collective production and collective possession.” [55]55 Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.”

但是，资本主义私有制何以会向对立面转化呢？对这一问题的回应无疑是马克思主义最富魅力的部分之一。列宁曾提示过：“马克思和恩格斯在他们的著作中特别强调的是辩证唯物主义，而不是辩证唯物主义，特别坚持的是历史唯物主义，而不是历史唯物主义。”由辩证法观之，私有制的顶点就是公有制的复归，转向共产主义公有制具有必然性。从历史的具体看，资本主义生产力和生产关系矛盾运动将达到一定点，以至于“资本即雇佣劳动就同社会财富和生产力的发展发生像行会制度、农奴制、奴隶制同这种发展所发生的同样的关系，就必然会作为桎梏被摆脱掉”。这在根本上是通过阶级斗争解决的，恩格斯指出：“迄今的一切革命，都是为了保护一种所有制而反对另一种所有制的革命。”对西欧社会的考察也印证了这一逻辑：最初是原始社会，包含不同公有制类型；其后进入私有制，私有制又伴随着发生在奴隶主和奴隶、封建主和农民、资产阶级和无产阶级之间的三种阶级对抗，最终，阶级斗争“将随着资本主义的消灭、随着现代社会回复到古代类型的高级形式，回复到集体生产和集体占有而告终”。

*Capital* logically outlines the process from the establishment to the decline of capitalist private property. Since “the forms of private property change according to whether the private person is a laborer or a non-laborer,” [56]56 Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1. private property undergoes two “negations” and three concrete manifestations in this process: in the “prehistory of capital,” private property is “individual private property based on one’s own labor”; with the progress of primitive accumulation, “capitalist private property” is formed, i.e., “private property based on the exploitation of others’ labor, though formally free,” which can be called the first negation. Marx discusses two laws of capitalist property: “the first is the identity of labor and property; the second is that labor appears as the negation of property, or property appears as the negation of the alienness of others’ labor.” [57]57 Marx, *Grundrisse*. As capitalism continues to develop, even small capitalists are expropriated, and private property increasingly moves toward “capitalist monopoly,” constituting the negation of “capitalist private property,” i.e., the negation of the negation. This precisely indicates that “the concentration of the means of production and the socialization of labor reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument.” [58]58 Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1. This negation also means that the turn to communism is nothing but the inevitable prospect of capitalism, nothing but a natural-historical process.

《资本论》从逻辑上勾勒了资本主义私有制自确立到衰落的过程。由于“私有制的形式依这些私人是劳动者还是非劳动者而改变”，私有制在这过程中有两次“否定”、三种具体表现：在“资本的前史”，私有制是“基于自己劳动的个人私有制；随着原始积累的进行，形成了‘资本主义私有制’”，即“以剥削他人的但形式上是自由的劳动为基础的私有制”，可以说是第一次否定。马克思谈到资本主义所有权的两条规律，“第一条是劳动和所有权的同一性；第二条是劳动表现为被否定的所有权，或者说，所有权表现为对他人劳动的异己性的否定”。随着资本主义持续发展，小资本家也将被剥夺，私有制越来越走向“资本主义垄断”，构成对“资本主义私有制”的否定即否定之否定，它恰恰表明“生产资料的集中和劳动的社会化，达到了同它们的资本主义外壳不能相容的地步” 。这个否定也意味着转向共产主义无非资本主义的必然前景、无非自然历史进程而已。

Conclusion

结语

Popper’s critique of communism has an “Achilles’ heel,” which stems from his use of the study of the growth of human knowledge as a program for anti-historicism, exposing the poverty of his theory. In fact, whether or not the growth of knowledge can be predicted does not mean that the historical process is without trace. Marx precisely points out that communism is nothing but a natural-historical process. On the one hand, based on historical experience, science abstracts the laws of historical materialism, discovering the dialectical relations between the economic base and the superstructure, and between the productive forces and the relations of production. On the other hand, based on the concept of practice, it points out that the productive forces are in continuous motion and that capitalist production has a tendency to negate itself, revealing the historical inevitability of communism. This interlocking argument strikes at the “Achilles’ heel” of Popper’s theory: it neither relies on omniscience about history or the essence of history, nor excludes the openness of the future to humanity. It is founded on the laws of historical materialism and reliable historical trends, aiming to structurally explore the direction of some fundamental determining factors concerning the historical process. To borrow Popper’s demarcation of knowledge, if historical materialism, because it is falsifiable, can be called a “law,” then the progress of the productive forces and the turn to public property can be called a “trend.” After all, “historical progress is a philosophical proposition, a product of dialectical thinking; according to the logic of positivist thinking and the means of positive science, such a proposition can neither be verified nor falsified.” [59]59 This is a quotation from a Chinese scholar, likely referring to a discussion on historical progress. Understanding this trend requires dialectical and historical thinking. As one scholar has said: “Communism as the ultimate goal of history is not so much a prophecy or an envisioned goal as it is a product of a dialectical historical mode of thinking, derived from the influence of Hegelian dialectics on Marx.” [60]60 This is a quotation from a Chinese scholar on the Hegelian influence on Marx’s view of communism.

波普尔对共产主义的批判存在“阿喀琉斯之踵”，这源于他将对人类知识增长问题的研究用作反历史主义的论纲，暴露出了理论的贫困。其实，无论知识增长能否预测，都不意味着历史进程无迹可寻。马克思恰恰指出共产主义无非自然历史进程而已。一方面，基于历史经验科学抽象出唯物史观规律，发现了经济基础和上层建筑、生产力和生产关系间的辩证关系；另一方面，基于实践概念指出生产力持续运动和资本主义生产具有否定自身的趋势，揭示了共产主义的历史必然性。环环相扣的论证击中了波普尔理论的“阿喀琉斯之踵”，既不依赖历史的全知或历史的本质，也不排斥未来对于人的开放性，它奠立在唯物史观规律和可靠的历史趋势上，旨在结构性地探讨事关历史进程的一些根本的决定因素的走向。套用波普尔的知识划界，如果唯物史观由于具有可证伪性可称为“规律”，那么生产力进步及转向公有制则可被称为“趋势”，毕竟“历史进步是一个哲学命题，是辩证思维的产物，按照实证思维的逻辑和实证科学的手段，对这样一个命题是既不能证实也不能证伪的”。对于这种趋势的理解需要辩证和历史思维，正如有学者所言：“共产主义作为历史的终极目标，与其说是一个预言和展望的目标，不如说是一种辩证的历史思维方式的产物，它来自黑格尔辩证法对马克思的影响。”

Marx’s revelation of communism combines “law” and “trend.” Like any beautiful theory, it has a very concise expression. Admittedly, “its timing and institutional design cannot yet be determined,” but it at least “brings reasons for optimism.” [61]61 This is a quotation from an unspecified source, likely a Western Marxist scholar. Looking at the present, the international communist movement is full of vitality, and communism, as the lofty ideal of humanity, increasingly demonstrates its rational brilliance and practical charm. One of the most convincing examples is the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the more than one hundred years since the founding of the Communist Party of China and the more than seventy years since the founding of New China, China has first gradually realized public ownership of the means of production, then explored and built a socialist market economy system and a series of social and political institutions, continuously promoted the great liberation of the productive forces and great social development, and blazed a path of socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics. It can be said that the Chinese people, precisely in their pursuit of communism, have achieved a historic leap from standing up, to becoming prosperous, to becoming strong, and the path of Chinese-path modernization is adding empirical evidence to the historical inevitability of communism.

马克思对共产主义的揭示结合了“规律”和“趋势”，像任何美妙的理论一样有着十分简明扼要的表达，诚然其“时机和制度设计尚无法确定”，但至少“带来了乐观主义的理由”。放眼当下，国际共产主义运动正焕发生机，共产主义作为人类的崇高理想也越来越展现出理性光辉和实践魅力，其中最有说服力的例证之一就是中国特色社会主义伟大事业。中国共产党成立百余年、新中国成立七十多年来，先是逐步实现了生产资料的公有制，又探索构建社会主义市场经济体制和一系列社会政治制度，不断推动生产力大解放和社会大发展，走出了一条中国特色社会主义现代化道路。可以说，中国人民正是在对共产主义的追求中实现了从站起来、富起来到强起来的历史性跨越，中国式现代化道路也正在为共产主义历史必然性增添经验上的证据。

(Author’s bio: Wei Xu, Doctor of Law, Lecturer at the School of Marxism, Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

（作者简介：魏旭，法学博士，上海交通大学马克思主义学院讲师）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心