Foreign Marxist Scholars’ Research on Digital Capitalism

The digital economy was first proposed by Don Tapscott, used to highlight the enormous impact of the internet and digital information technology on traditional economic development.[1]1 Don Tapscott, *The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995). Through development by scholars and practitioners, the concept of the digital economy has acquired richer connotations. The digital economy is an extension of the information economy; it completes the leap from “humans using information for production” to “machines using information for production.”[2]2 See the distinction between the information economy and the digital economy in the relevant literature. This developmental process is not only the intellectualization of the means of production but also the intellectualization of the factors of production.

数字经济最早由唐·泰普斯科特(Don Tapscott)提出，用以突出互联网和数字化信息技术对传统经济发展产生的巨大影响1。经过学者和实务部门的发展，数字经济概念拥有了更加丰富的内涵。数字经济是信息经济的延伸，它完成了从“人使用信息进行生产”向“机器使用信息进行生产”的跨越2。这一发展过程不仅是生产工具的智能化，还是生产要素的智能化。

Digital capitalism, then, refers to the digital economy under the capitalist mode of production. Digital capitalism germinated in the U.S. information industry after the Second World War. According to the definition by Takeshi Mori and Hiroyuki Nitto, digital capitalism refers to “a system that uses digital technology to obtain profits by discovering, utilizing, and creating differences, and pursues the continuous accumulation of capital.”[3]3 Takeshi Mori and Hiroyuki Nitto, *Digital Capitalism* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004), p. 3. Dan Schiller points out: “Under the influence of expansionary market logic, the internet is driving the political economy toward a transformation into so-called digital capitalism.”[4]4 Dan Schiller, *Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. xiv. Although digital capitalism appears as an economic phenomenon at the level of productive forces, from the perspective of the unity of history and logic, it reveals the real possibility of the development of relations of production reacting back upon productive forces. Dan Schiller examined the developmental history of the U.S. postal industry in the 18th century and the telegraph and telephone industries in the 19th century, summarizing the decisive role of state power and commercial users in the transformation of the information industry. After the Second World War, digital technology, as the new dominant means of production, served not only as an economic tool, bringing rapid development of productive forces, but also as a political tool, strengthening political control over relations of production. Along with the expansion of the empire of capital, the digital economy has been integrated into the development of capitalism and has become a part of capitalism. Therefore, the rapid development of the digital economy is essentially an economic innovation induced by political needs under state intervention, reflecting the powerful reaction of the superstructure upon the economic base.

数字资本主义则是指资本主义形态下的数字经济。数字资本主义萌芽于第二次世界大战后的美国信息产业，根据森建(Takeshi Mori)和日户浩之(Hiroyuki Nitto)的界定，数字资本主义指“运用数字技术，通过发现、利用、创造差异来获取利润，追求持续不断积累资本的体系”3。丹·席勒(Dan Schiller)指出：“在扩张性市场逻辑的影响下，因特网正在带动政治经济向所谓的数字资本主义转变”4。数字资本主义虽然是表现为生产力层面的经济现象，但从历史和逻辑相统一的视角来看，它呈现了生产关系发展反作用于生产力的现实可能性。丹·席勒对美国18世纪邮政行业和19世纪电报、电话行业的发展历史进行了考察，概括了国家力量和商业用户在信息产业变革中的决定性作用。第二次世界大战后，数字技术作为新的主导性生产工具，不仅作为经济工具，带来生产力的迅猛发展，还作为政治工具，强化政治对生产关系的控制。伴随着资本帝国的扩张，数字经济已经融入资本主义的发展，成为资本主义的一部分。因此，数字经济的快速发展实质上是国家干预下政治需要引致的经济革新，反映了上层建筑对经济基础强大的反作用。

The speed of development of digital capital is astonishing. Yet “every technology or scientific gift has its dark side, and digital existence is no exception.”[5]5 Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), p. 229. This article follows the historical developmental trajectory of digital capitalism, sorting through the relevant research findings of foreign Marxist scholars across three stages: the germination and emergence of digital capitalism, its expansion and crisis, and its decline and recovery. It summarizes the characteristics and shortcomings of existing research, distills the developmental laws of digital capitalism, and offers a prospect for its developmental future.

数字资本的发展速度之快是令人惊讶的，然而“每一种技术或科学的馈赠都有其黑暗面，数字化生存也不例外”5。本文沿着数字资本主义的历史发展脉络，从数字资本主义的萌芽与破土、扩张与危机、衰退与复苏三个阶段梳理国外马克思主义学者的相关研究成果，概括现有研究的特点和不足之处，总结数字资本主义的发展规律，并对其发展前景进行展望。

I. The Germination and Emergence of Digital Capitalism

一、数字资本主义的萌芽与破土

The information revolution of the 20th century provided the technological foundation for digital capital. However, this process did not arise naturally; it was embedded in the historical process of imperial expansion. Under the leadership of state power and the impetus of commercial users, digital capitalism germinated within the U.S. information and communication industry. Starting in the 1980s, the tentacles of digital capitalism extended to the general public. It was not until the bursting of the internet bubble in 2001 that digital capitalism encountered its first crisis. During this period, the development of digital capitalism was marked by the combination of data and capitalism and the popularization of digital technology. Foreign Marxist research during this period focused on analyzing digital technology and digital labor, and on excavating the role played by capital in technological development.

20世纪的信息革命为数字资本提供了技术基础，然而这一过程不是自然衍生的，而是内嵌于帝国扩张的历史进程中。在国家力量的主导和商业用户的推动下，数字资本主义在美国的信息传播业中萌芽。从20世纪80年代开始，数字资本主义的触角得以延伸到民众中。直到2001年互联网泡沫破灭，数字资本主义遭遇了第一次危机。这一时期，数字资本主义的发展是以数据和资本主义的结合以及数字技术的普及为标志的。国外马克思主义这一时期的研究集中于对数字技术和数字劳动进行剖析，并从中挖掘资本在技术发展中扮演的角色。

(I) State Power and Commercial Users Jointly Select Digital Technology

(一)国家力量和商业用户共同选择数字技术

In the process of U.S. hegemonic expansion, the military and commercial demand for data grew day by day. The U.S. government facilitated the institutionalization of computer communication, pushed information providers to accelerate development, and deployed information and communication systems to every major social institution. By 1970, the U.S. government had become “the main source of information in almost every field.”[6]6 Dan Schiller, *Digital Capitalism*, p. 37. The United States treated digital technology as an economic growth point to circumvent social contradictions, abolished welfare responsibilities in the information technology sector, weakened the power of traditional industrial unions, created conditions for the outsourcing of manufacturing, and thereby deprived industrial workers of job opportunities and political power. Dan Schiller argues that in this process, hidden dangers such as cultural estrangement and political alienation between the “knowledge class” in the new technology field and the traditional working class quietly emerged, planting the seeds for the destruction of capitalism.[7]7 Dan Schiller, *Digital Capitalism*, p. 103. In the short term, this estrangement promoted the fragmentation of the working class and hindered the unification and revival of the workers’ movement; in the long term, as the digital economy develops and artificial intelligence increasingly replaces the work of the “knowledge class,” causing the latter to fall to the status of ordinary workers, it will in turn promote the awakening of the entire working class and advance the development of the socialist movement.

在美国扩张霸权的进程中，数据的军事需求和商业需求与日俱增，美国政府促成了计算机通信制度化，推动信息提供商加速发展，将信息通信系统布局到每个社会主要机构。到1970年，美国政府成为“几乎每个领域的主要信息来源”6。美国把数字技术当作规避社会矛盾的经济增长点，取消信息科技行业的福利责任，削弱传统产业工会权力，为制造业外包创造条件进而剥夺产业工人的工作机会和政治权力。丹·席勒认为，在这一过程中，新科技领域“知识阶层”和传统工人阶级文化隔阂、政治疏离等隐患悄然滋生，埋下毁灭资本主义的种子7。从短期看，这种隔阂促进了工人阶级的分化，阻碍了工人运动的统一和复兴；从长期看，随着数字经济的发展，人工智能不断取代“知识阶层”的工作，使后者跌落到普通工人的地位，又会促进整个工人阶级队伍的觉醒，推动社会主义运动的发展。

The alignment of interests between internet giants and the government helped them obtain ample political support, thereby dominating the development of the information and communication industry by lowering network service prices and promoting technological innovation. In the operational logic of commercial users of network services, the audience is the greatest source of profit. Dallas W. Smythe argues that the activities of audiences—watching, reading, and listening to commercial media—create value and can be sold as “commodities” by commercial media to advertising clients.[8]8 Dallas W. Smythe, “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism,” *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1977), pp. 1–27. Just as Marx pointed out, the invention of machinery can “give a new form to materials that in their original form could not be utilized in a new production process.”[9]9 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, ch. 15, sec. 2. Digital technology has transformed the social formation. However, “machinery, considered in itself, shortens the working day, while its capitalist application lengthens it; because machinery in itself lightens labor, while its capitalist application intensifies it.”[10]10 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, ch. 15, sec. 3. In its capitalist application, digital technology has intensified labor and blurred the boundary between labor and leisure. The selection of digital technology by political forces and commercial users is no accident, nor is the result of intensified labor intensity accidental; both stem from the logic of capital’s valorization and expansion.

网络巨头利益和政府利益的契合帮助他们获得了充分的政治支持，从而通过压低网络服务价格、推动技术创新主导信息传播业的发展。在网络服务商业用户的经营逻辑中，受众是利润的最大来源。达拉斯·史麦兹(Dallas W. Smythe)认为，受众对商业媒体的观看、阅读和聆听等活动创造价值，可以被商业媒体当作“商品”出售给广告客 户8。正 如马克思曾指出的，机器的发明可以“使那些在原有形式上本来不能利用的物质，获得一种在新的生产中可以利用的形 态”9,数 字技术更新了社会形态。然而，“机器就其本身来说缩短劳动时间，而它的资本主义应用延长工作日；因为机器本身减轻劳动，而它的资本主义应用提高劳动强 度”10,数 字技术在资本主义应用中提高了劳动强度、模糊了劳动和休闲的边界。政治力量和商业用户对数字技术的选择不是偶然，增强劳动强度的结果也不是偶然，都来自资本的增殖和扩张逻辑。

(II) Digital Media in the Culture Industry

(二)文化工业中的数字媒体

In 1991, Theodor Adorno proposed that the “culture industry” is an industry in which mass media combine standardized expression with rationalized distribution, severely limiting social imagination.[11]11 Theodor Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 98. As Christian Fuchs points out, mass culture inevitably involves economic factors.[12]12 Christian Fuchs, *Digital Labour and Karl Marx* (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 56. As the role of media and information attracted the attention of Western governments, commercial media initiated a wave of mergers in the creative industries. The ensuing academic defenses—for example, John Hartley’s claim that the internet brings about the democratization and popularization of creative products[13]13 John Hartley, *Creative Industries* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 23.—further obscured the nature of digital media’s use of popular creativity as a profit-making strategy. Thus, digital media, as a new field of capital competition, was cloaked in the guise of a “driving force for social change.” “Overestimation of the role of the internet logically follows from a short-sighted conception of time and an insufficient analysis of the rapid recuperative capacity of unequal structures themselves and the persistent internal factors within power structures,” leading to the fact that “no matter in what form it appears, this will inevitably steer academic analysis toward technological determinism, which holds that social change is generated by new communication mechanisms.”[14]14 Christian Fuchs, *Digital Labour and Karl Marx*, p. 112.

1991年，西奥多·阿多诺(Theodor Adorno)提出“文化工业”是大众媒介把标准化表达与理性化分销结合而产生的严重限制社会想象力的产业11。正如克里斯蒂安·福克斯(Christian Fuchs)指出的，大众文化不免涉及经济因素12,随 着媒体和信息的作用引起西方政府的重视，商业媒体开启了对创意产业的兼并潮流，随之而来的学界辩护，譬如哈特利(John Hartley)提出的互联网带来创意产品的民主化与大众 化13却 更加遮蔽了数字媒体把流行创意作为获利策略的本性，因此数字媒体作为新的资本竞争领域却披上了“社会变革动力”的外衣。“对互联网作用的过高评估，从逻辑上承接了一种短视的时间概念和对不平等结构本身的快速恢复能力以及权力结构中持续性内在因素的不充分的分析”导致了“无论以什么样的形式出现，这都会不可避免地招致学术分析朝向技术决定论的方向发展，并认为社会变革是由新的传播机制产生 的”14。

The reality is that digital media has not truly brought about the democratization or popularization of culture; instead, it has intensified conflicts and obscured culture. At the level of digital labor, it has turned part of the proletariat into a “cyber-proletariat”:[15]15 The term “cyber-proletariat” refers to the segment of the proletariat engaged in precarious digital labor, often outside formal employment structures. a large surplus population existing outside formal employment, engaged in various informal and precarious jobs, created by the replacement of human labor with digital equipment, leading to fragmentation within the proletariat. At the level of knowledge acquisition, it has brought about a societal “general knowledge proletarianization”:[16]16 “General knowledge proletarianization” describes the process by which digital technologies, under capitalist control, strip individuals of their cognitive capacities and knowledge, rendering them dependent on proprietary systems. digital technology, under the control of capital, deepens the expropriation of individuals’ general intellect, and the tertiary retention technologies[17]17 “Tertiary retention” is a concept from Bernard Stiegler’s philosophy of technology, referring to external memory supports (e.g., digital devices) that shape human cognition and memory. that aid human memory and thinking lead to the gradual loss of people’s knowledge and abilities.

事实是，数字媒体并没有真正带来文化的民主化、大众化，反而带来冲突的激化和文化的隐没。它在数字劳动层面把部分无产阶级变成了“赛博无产阶 级”15:由 于数字化设备代替人力而出现的存在于正式就业之外、从事各种非正式和不稳定就业的大量剩余人口，造成无产阶级内部的分化；在知识获取层面带来社会“普遍的知识无产 化”16—— 数字技术在资本控制下加深了对个体一般智力的剥夺，帮助人类记忆和思考的第三滞留技 术17导 致人们知识和能力的日渐丧失。

(III) The Emergence and Impact of Immaterial Labor

(三)非物质劳动的产生与影响

The Italian scholar Maurizio Lazzarato first proposed the concept of “immaterial labour”[18]18 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour,” in Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, eds., *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 133-147., that is, labour that produces the informational and cultural content of commodities. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri refined this theory and extended it to develop new forms of the empire and the proletariat—the multitude—based on immaterial labour as the ontology. They argue that the shift from an industrial economy to an information economy has transferred the hegemonic position of industrial labour to immaterial labour, which accelerates the global expansion of capital and the formation of empire, while the composition of the proletariat has also shifted from the “working class” to the “multitude”[19]19 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)..

意大利学者拉扎拉托(Maurizio Lazzarato)首先提出“非物质劳动”概念18,即生产商品的信息内容和文化内容的劳动。哈特(Micheal Hardt)和奈格里(Antonio Negri)对这一理论进行了完善，并延伸出以非物质劳动为本体的帝国和无产阶级的新形式——大众。他们认为，工业经济向信息经济的转变使得工业劳动的霸权地位转向非物质劳动，非物质劳动加速了资本全球扩张和帝国的形成，无产阶级的构成体也从“工人阶级”转向“大众”19。

The formation of immaterial labour ostensibly creates labour freedom, but in reality it makes capital’s exploitation of labour more concealed, turning people into “one-dimensional men” who have lost transcendence and criticality[20]20 Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964)., and the form of class conflict has thus changed. The new form of labour does not alter the essence of capitalism. Nick Dyer-Witheford, through empirical research, proves that class conflict still existed in capitalist society at that time, confirming the persistence of Marxism. He also borrows the concepts of class composition and cycles of struggle from autonomist Marxism to enumerate four aspects of class struggle: struggle at the site of production, struggle at the site of reproduction, struggle in the interaction between nature and humans, and struggle at the site of consumption. Drawing on the biological concept of “genetic mutation,” he proposes the possibility of using technology to achieve political transformation and move toward communism[21]21 Nick Dyer-Witheford, *Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High-Technology Capitalism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999)..

非物质劳动的形成表面上创造了劳动自由，实际上使资本对劳动的剥削更加隐蔽，使人成为失去超越性和批判性的“单向度的人”20,阶级冲突的形式也由此发生改变。新的劳动形态没有改变资本主义的实质，尼克·迪尔-维斯福特(Nick Dyer-Witheford)通过实证研究证明阶级冲突在当时的资本主义社会中仍然存在，印证了马克思主义的持续性。他还借用自治主义马克思主义的阶级构成和斗争周期概念列举了四个方面的阶级斗争，即生产地点的斗争、再生产地点的斗争、自然和人类相互作用过程中的斗争、消费场所的斗争，并借鉴生物的“基因突变”概念提出了运用技术实现政治转化、迈向共产主义的可能21。

II. The Expansion and Crisis of Digital Capitalism

二、数字资本主义的扩张与危机

To alleviate the crisis of the bursting of the internet bubble, digital capital initiated deep expansion through technological substitution as a means and broad expansion through the extension of time and space as a means, thereby undertaking a new round of capital accumulation. However, history has confirmed that the expansion of digital capitalism launched in 2001 to alleviate the crisis ended with a larger crisis in 2008; capital cannot save capital. During this period, foreign Marxism began to focus on the spatial imbalances caused by the temporal succession of digital capital, and at the same time, the plight of people in the era of digital capitalism entered the researchers’ field of vision.

为了缓解互联网泡沫破灭的危机，数字资本开启了以技术替代为手段的深度扩张和时空延伸为手段的广度扩张，以此进行新一轮的资本积累。但是，历史已经证实，2001年为缓解危机而启动的数字资本主义扩张以2008年更大的一次危机终止，资本无法拯救资本。这一时期的国外马克思主义开始关注数字资本在时间上的接续引致的空间上的不平衡，同时，数字资本主义时代的人的困境进入了研究者的视野。

(1) Deep Expansion of Digital Capital: Technological Substitution

(一)数字资本的深度扩张：技术替代

Technological substitution refers to the replacement of old technologies by new ones. The iteration of digital technology facilitates production and daily life, but also refreshes our modes of existence, challenging existing living spaces and security. Not only is the widespread application of digital technology a technological choice of capitalist states and capital, but so too is technological iteration. According to the development of the division of labour under capitalist production, Marx divided the labour process into three stages: simple cooperation, manufacture, and large-scale machine industry. Among these, the transition from simple cooperation to manufacture is a shift from independent labour to combined labour, where workers begin to submit to the discipline of capital; the transition from manufacture to large-scale machine industry causes “the skill in handling the tool to pass from the worker to the machine, together with the tool itself. The efficiency of the tool is liberated from the personal limitations of human labour-power. In this way, the technical basis of the division of labour in manufacture disappears”[22]22 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume I, Chapter 15, Section 3.. As a new tool, digital technology deepens the separation of labour power from the personality, turning “the means of labour into means of labour that can only be used in common”[23]23 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume I, Chapter 13.. The ever-strengthening and expanding information and communication technology attracts unrestrained financial speculation, “together with capital’s comprehensive integration of the digital (ization) system into the current political-economic structure”[24]24 Dan Schiller, *Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. xiv., jointly breeding the enormous crisis of financial expansion.

技术替代是指新技术对旧技术的替代，数字技术的更迭便捷了生产和生活，同时也刷新了我们的生存模式，挑战原有的生存空间和生存安全。不仅数字技术的广泛应用是资本主义国家和资本的技术选择，技术的迭代也是如此。按照资本主义生产分工的发展，马克思把劳动过程分为简单协作、工场手工业和机器大工业三个阶段。其中，简单协作到工场手工业的过程是独立劳动向联合劳动的转变，劳动者开始服膺于资本的规训；工场手工业到机器大工业的过程使得“使用劳动工具的技巧，也同劳动工具一起，从工人身上转到了机器上面。工具的效率从人类劳动力的人身限制下解放出来。这样一来，工场手工业分工的工艺基础就消失了”22。数字作为新的工具，更加深了劳动力和人格的分离，把“劳动资料日益转化为只能共同使用的劳动资料”23。不断增强和扩展的信息通信技术吸引了无节制的金融投机活动，“连同资本全方位地将数字(化)体系整合进当前的政治经济结构之中”24,共同孕育着金融扩张的巨大危机。

New digital technology offers consumers more choices, but at the same time, it squeezes the space for employment and investment, which is particularly severe for developing countries with large populations and heavy reliance on investment. Because big data and real-time platforms further increase the profit rate in the circulation process, productive capital drains away, circulation capital overflows, and emerging investment shifts from the real to the virtual economy. In essence, this is caused by the mismatch between productive forces and relations of production. When relations of production that have already matured within the womb of developed countries are forcibly imposed on developing countries, it inevitably brings about a “rejection reaction” that only developing countries experience.

新的数字技术为消费者带来更多选择，但与此同时，也挤占着就业和投资空间，对人口众多、严重依赖投资的发展中国家来说尤为严重。由于大数据和实时平台进一步提高了流通过程的利润率，生产资本流失，流通资本泛滥，新兴投资脱实向虚。这在实质上是生产力和生产关系的不相匹配造成的，在发达国家的胎胞里业已成熟的生产关系被强制赋予发展中国家，必然带来只有发展中国家才会出现的“排异反应”。

(2) Broad Expansion of Digital Capital: Extension of Time and Space

(二)数字资本的广度扩张：时空延伸

“Science and technology endow the functioning capital with an expansion capacity independent of its given magnitude”[25]25 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume I, Chapter 15, Section 1.. This expansion continuously plunges capitalism into periodic crises, as Fredric Jameson points out: “Capital is a ferocious machine that frequently breaks down and can only repair itself with difficulty through expansionary convulsions and the like”[26]26 Fredric Jameson, “Culture and Finance Capital,” *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1997), pp. 246-265.. Herbert Schiller argues that the industrial-electronic complex of the 20th century replaced the traditional geopolitical imperialism of the 19th-century United States. This complex, relying on powerful technological expansion capabilities, engages in cultural manipulation and penetration globally, strengthening the United States’ unilateral hegemony in space and ideology[27]27 Herbert Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).. Amid frantic expansion and external suppression, the U.S. backbone network (NSFNET) became the global internet, and the international governance mechanisms of the internet were firmly controlled by capital. Consequently, the global “digital divide”[28]28 The “digital divide” refers to the gap between those who have access to digital technologies (especially the internet) and those who do not, often along lines of class, geography, and development level. has increasingly widened, because in digital capitalism, “the nature of the relations of production within which the bourgeoisie operates is by no means single and simple, but dual: in the relations that produce wealth, they also produce poverty; in the relations that develop productive forces, they also develop a force that generates oppression”[29]29 Karl Marx, “Wage Labour and Capital,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 218.. According to statistics from the International Telecommunication Union, in 2019, the internet penetration rate in developed countries was as high as 86.6%, while in developing countries it was only 19.1%[30]30 International Telecommunication Union, *Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2019*.. This enormous divide, on the one hand, allows workers in the core countries of external expansion to share part of the “imperialist dividend,” thereby alleviating class contradictions within capitalist countries; on the other hand, it causes the accumulation of class and national contradictions in the peripheral countries subjected to expansion.

“科学和技术使执行职能的资本具有一种不以它的一定量为转移的扩张能力”25,这种扩张使资本主义不断陷入周期性的危机中，正如詹姆逊(Fredric Jameson)指出的，“资本是一架穷凶极恶的机器，经常发生故障，并只能费力地借助扩张抽搐等方式进行自我修复”26。赫伯特·席勒(Herbert Schiller)认为，20世纪后的工业—电子联合体取代了美国19世纪传统的地缘政治帝国主义，这一联合体依靠强大的技术扩张能力在全球进行文化操纵和文化渗透，加强了美国在空间和意识形态上的单极霸权27。在疯狂的扩张和对外打压中，美国的骨干网(NSFNET)成为覆盖全球的因特网，互联网国际治理机制被资本牢牢把控。随之而来的便是全球“数字鸿沟”28的日益扩大，因为数字资本主义中仍然存在着“资产阶级借以在其中活动的那些生产关系的性质绝不是单一的、单纯的，而是两重的：在产生财富的那些关系中也产生贫困；在发展生产力的那些关系中也发展一种产生压迫的力量”29。根据国际电信联盟统计数据，2019年，发达国家互联网普及率高达86.6%,而发展中国家互联网普及率仅为19.1%30。这一巨大的鸿沟一方面使对外扩张的核心国家内工人得以分享部分“帝国主义红利”,从而缓解资本主义国家内的阶级矛盾，另一方面使被扩张的边缘国家阶级矛盾和民族矛盾不断累积。

Capital does not stop at spatial expansion; the extension of time is also used to expand capital accumulation and profit. This extension is achieved through the combination of digital capital and financial capital. After World War II, the widespread application of digital technology and the institutionalization of venture capital brought about enormous speculation in the stock market. Once the derivative nature of finance and the expansive nature of digital technology collide, they unleash tremendous power, instantly sweeping across the globe. Under the catalysis of finance, neoliberalism penetrates into the sphere of social life, evolving into new consumerism, whereby digital capital extends the temporal domain of valorization into the future. Digital technology not only accelerates capital turnover but also breaks through the temporal and spatial limitations of communication media, achieving the expansion of the media domain. Wayne Hope proposes the concept of “co-temporality” to define the reshaping of historical moments by digital media. Co-temporality “opens the door to understanding lifestyles that were originally unrelated to each other within the same era”[31]31 Wayne Hope, “Time and the Digital: The Co-temporality of Media,” *Time & Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2-3 (2006), pp. 295-314.. And “in an economically interdependent world, driven by the instantaneous transmission of knowledge and information, an individual’s positioning of their own life is likely to be subtly linked to the lives of people elsewhere. The emergence of real-time alternative news forums, such as independent media, also forces global power structures and the simultaneously existing gap between rich and poor into the public view”[32]32 Wayne Hope, “Global Capitalism and the Digital Divide,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 5 (2007), pp. 985-1002..

资本不会止于空间的扩张，时间的延伸也被用来扩大资本积累和利润，这一延伸通过数字资本和金融资本的结合实现。第二次世界大战后，数字技术的广泛应用和风险投资的制度化就带来股票市场的巨大投机。金融的衍生性和数字的扩张性一旦碰撞，就释放出巨大威力，瞬时席卷全球。在金融的催化下，新自由主义向社会生活领域渗透，演化出新消费主义，数字资本由此将增殖时域扩张到未来。数字技术不仅加速了资本周转，还打破了交往媒介的时空局限，实现了媒介界域的扩张。韦恩·霍普(Wayne Hope)提出“共生性”的概念，以此来定义数字媒介对历史时刻的重塑。共生性“为对那些原本毫不相干的生活方式在同一时代背景下的理解打开了大 门”31。而 “在一个经济上相互依存的世界里，在即时的知识与信息传输的驱动下，一个人对自己生活的定位很可能会潜移默化地与其他地方人们的生活联系在一起，诸如独立媒介这样的实时另类新闻论坛的纷纷涌现，也迫使全球权力结构以及同时存在的贫富差距走进公众视 野”32。

III. The Decline and Recovery of Digital Capitalism

三、数字资本主义的衰退与复苏

The decline of digital capitalism began with the 2008 international financial crisis. The bursting of the financial bubble shattered the myth of the infinite expansion of digital capital, and digital capitalism became mired in decline. The recovery of digital capitalism began in 2014 with the popularization of mobile internet technology, bringing new vitality to digital capital. During this period, foreign Marxist scholars were able to examine digital capitalism and its development from a broader temporal and spatial perspective, revealing more deeply the macroscopic laws of development and microscopic logic of exploitation of digital capitalism.

数字资本主义的衰退起于2008年国际金融危机，金融泡沫破灭让数字资本无限扩张的神话也随之破灭，数字资本主义在衰退中深陷泥潭。数字资本主义的复苏起于2014年移动互联技术的普及，为数字资本带来新的生机。这个时期的国外马克思主义学者得以从更宽广的时空维度审视数字资本主义及其发展，更加深入地揭示数字资本主义的宏观发展规律和微观剥削逻辑。

(I) The Digital Decline of Humanity

(一)人的数字化衰退

When digital capital penetrates every corner and every field of the world, people become increasingly dependent on information technology, existing in a state of “digital survival”[33]33 A reference to the concept of “digital existence” or “digital survival,” highlighting the pervasive reliance on digital technology in contemporary life., and social life is accelerated forward by an invisible force. Beneath the intelligent and efficient shell of digital technology lies the compression of time; beneath the free and flexible appearance of digital media lies the domination of behavior; the human brain seems to have become a “brain in a vat”[34]34 An allusion to the “brain in a vat” thought experiment, questioning the nature of reality and perception in a digitally mediated world. composed of code.

当数字资本渗透到世界每一个角落和每一个领域，人越来越依赖信息技术，处于“数字化生存”33状态，社会生活被无形的力量推动而加速向前。在数字技术智能、高效的外壳之下是对时间的挤压，在数字媒介自由、灵活的表象下是对行为的支配，人的大脑仿佛成了由代码构成的“缸中之脑”34。

Because digital platforms employ intelligent machines on a large scale, the subjectivity of laborers is obscured, and labor behavior is reduced to prescribed operations that cater to machine demands. Ultimately, the new jobs created by digital information technology are far fewer than the jobs eliminated. As Nicholas G. Carr lists, the emergence of Wikipedia has led to unemployment for those who compiled encyclopedias.[35]35 Nicholas G. Carr, *The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains* (2010). If this is an unavoidable pain of economic development, then the financial “shock therapy”[36]36 A reference to rapid economic liberalization policies, often associated with post-Soviet transitions, here applied metaphorically to financial measures. created in the United States to protect the interests of large investors and the exposure of digital companies stealing user information and manipulating politics[37]37 Likely referring to scandals such as the Cambridge Analytica case (2018), where Facebook user data was misused for political advertising. indisputably symbolize the decline of digital capitalism. As Dan Schiller states, “The era we live in is marked not by expansion but by contraction; not by stagnation but by dizzying structural change.”[38]38 Dan Schiller, *Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System* (1999).

由于数字化平台大规模使用智能化机器，劳动者的主体性被遮蔽，劳动行为变成迎合机器需求的规定性操作，最终数字信息技术创造出来的新工作相比被削减的工作要少得多。正如尼古拉斯·卡尔(Nicholas G. Carr)列举的，维基百科的出现使得那些编写百科全书的工作人员只能失业35。如果说这是经济发展难以避免的阵痛，美国为保护大投资家利益而创造的金融“休克疗法”36和数字公司窃取用户信息并操纵政治的曝光37则无可争辩地象征着数字资本主义的衰退。正如丹·席勒所言，“我们所处的时代不以扩张为标志，而以紧缩为特质；不以停滞为标志，而以令人昏眩的结构性变革为特质”38。

(II) The Strong Recovery of Digital Capitalism

(二)数字资本主义的强劲复苏

Summoned by military and financial demands, the technological carriers of digital capitalism are constantly being updated. The widespread deployment of fourth-generation mobile communication technology (4G) and the formal popularization of the fourth-generation Apple smartphone were milestones in digital technology development, leading to rapid progress in the digital economy. Against this backdrop, private capital’s application of digital technology has enriched the forms of digital capitalism. Mori Ken and Hinode Hiroyuki argue that digitalization, through the “sharing economy” and other means, resolves capitalist social problems such as idle assets and labor shortages, increasing consumer surplus. Therefore, digital capitalism harbors a post-capitalist form of the “gift economy.”[39]39 Mori Ken and Hinode Hiroyuki, *Digital Capitalism* (2015, in Japanese). As of January 2022, internet access had brought the number of global social media users to 4.62 billion, nearly 60% of the world’s total population, and internet users reached 4.95 billion, nearly 5 billion.[40]40 Data from a report by We Are Social and Hootsuite, “Digital 2022 Global Overview Report.”

在军事和金融需求的召唤下，数字资本主义的技术载体不断更新。第四代移动通信技术(4G)的广泛投用和苹果第四代智能手机的正式普及是数字技术发展的里程碑，数字经济取得了突飞猛进的发展。在此背景下，私人资本对数字技术的应用丰富了数字资本主义的形式。森健和日户浩之认为，数字化通过“共享经济”等解决了资本主义的资产闲置、劳动力不足等社会问题，提高消费者剩余，因此数字资本主义中孕育着“赠予经济”的后资本主义形态39。截至2022年1月，网络接入使全球社交媒体用户数量达到46.2亿，将近世界人口总数的60%,互联网的用户达到49.5亿，将近50亿40。

(III) The Further Deepening of Digital Capitalism’s Inherent Crisis

(三)数字资本主义内在危机的进一步加深

The capitalist application of digital technology deepens the crisis of “digital decline,” including the “internet bubble,” the widening gap between rich and poor in society, and the global digital divide and distribution gap.[41]41 The “digital divide” refers to the gap between those with access to digital technologies and those without. Digital capitalism “produces, on the one side, a concentration of wealth, and on the other side, an accumulation of misery, agony of labor, slavery, ignorance, brutality, and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e., within the class that produces its own product as capital.”[42]42 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1, Chapter 25, “The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation.” It is precisely the recovery of digital capitalism that leaves people trapped in the recessionary vortex of “digital enclosure”[43]43 A term describing the enclosure of digital spaces and data by private capital, analogous to the historical enclosure of common lands. and financial expansion without realizing it. Behind the convenience of digital technology lies the invisible control of labor through digital surveillance; behind the increasingly rich propaganda methods of platforms lies the pursuit of commodifying digital activities; behind the flexible and free scheduling of time lies the “unfreedom” of being constantly online.[44]44 The “unfreedom” of being constantly connected to digital networks, blurring work and personal life.

数字技术的资本主义应用将“互联网泡沫”、社会贫富分化加剧、全球数字鸿沟和分配鸿沟扩大等“数字化衰退”的危机引向深 入41。数 字资本主义“在一极是财富的积累，同时在另一极，即在把自己的产品作为资本来生产的阶级方面，是贫困、劳动折磨、受奴役、无知、粗野和道德堕落的积 累”42。正 是数字资本主义的复苏让人们身处“数字圈 地”43和 金融扩张的衰退旋涡中而不自知。数字科技的便捷背后是数字化监控对劳动的隐形控制，平台日益丰富的宣传手段背后是对数字活动商品化的追求，灵活自由的时间安排背后是时刻在线的“不自 由”44。

Technological changes bring convenience in information dissemination. While accelerating knowledge sharing, the “information cocoon” and its associated “echo chamber effect” intensify capital’s control over ideology. The ease of knowledge acquisition leads to public knowledge dependence, plunging individuals into an abyss of “cultural degradation.” As Giovanni Cesareo states, the complex social power relations behind networked information consumption under oligopolistic systems, user-generated content (UGC) by “prosumers,” and self-media phenomena represented by “citizen journalism” bring about a chaotic state where “democratization and authoritarian trends coexist.”[45]45 Giovanni Cesareo, *Digital Capitalism and the New Media Ecology* (2018, in Italian).

技术变化带来信息传播的便利，在加速知识共享的同时，“信息茧房”及其带来的“回声室效应”加剧了资本对意识形态的控制。知识获取的便捷带来了大众的知识依赖，使个体坠入“文化堕落”的深渊。如乔凡尼·切萨雷奥(Giovanni Cesareo)所言，寡头垄断体制下的网络化信息消费、“产消者”原创内容(User-Generated Content, UGC)和以“公民新闻”为代表的自媒体现象背后复杂的社会权力关系带来“民主化与威权化趋势共存”的混沌状 态45。

IV. An Evaluation of Foreign Marxist Research on Digital Capitalism

四、对国外马克思主义数字资本主义研究的评析

Accompanying the actual development of digital capitalism, foreign Marxist research follows its developmental trajectory and Marxist methods, possessing considerable critical reflection but lacking foresight. In response, we offer evaluations in four aspects.

伴随着数字资本主义的现实发展，国外马克思主义的研究遵循其发展脉络和马克思主义方法，颇具否思性但缺乏前瞻性。对此，我们作出了四个方面的评价。

(I) A Tendency to Emphasize Cultural and Ideological Factors While Adhering to Historical Materialism

(一)在坚持唯物史观的基础上趋向于强调文化和意识形态因素

After the 2008 international financial crisis, a wave of “returning to Marx” emerged in academia. Voices within theoretical circles applying Marxist methodology to reveal the essence of digital capitalism and to critically reflect on it grew louder. Marx’s theory of economic crisis received significant attention, with many scholars using Marxist theory to study the impact of digital technology on society, reveal the living conditions of digital laborers, and encourage resistance among digital laborers.

2008年国际金融危机后，学界掀起了一股“回归马克思”的浪潮，理论界运用马克思主义方法论揭示数字资本主义本质、对其进行批判反思的声音也越来越响。马克思的经济危机理论获得极大关注，诸多学者运用马克思主义理论研究数字技术对社会的影响，揭示数字劳动者的生存现状，鼓励数字劳动者的抗争。

Looking at foreign Marxists’ research on digital capitalism, their research methods remain grounded in historical materialism, focusing on understanding the processes of digital technology and the information industry from the perspective of the interaction between productive forces and relations of production, and between the economic base and the superstructure, thereby delineating the genesis and developmental logic of digital capitalism. Through the analytical method of historical materialism concerning the interaction between productive forces and relations of production, the political considerations and the role of the state in the birth and expansion of digital capitalism receive full attention. Through the analytical method of historical materialism concerning the interaction between the economic base and the superstructure, the internal mechanisms implicit in the digital decline of humanity are revealed.

纵观国外马克思主义者对数字资本主义的研究，其研究方法仍然立足于唯物史观，注重从生产力与生产关系、经济基础与上层建筑的互动视角来理解数字技术、信息产业的进程，进而刻画出数字资本主义的产生和发展逻辑。通过唯物史观有关生产力与生产关系互动的分析方法，数字资本主义诞生和扩张过程中的政治考量和国家作用得到充分重视。通过唯物史观有关经济基础与上层建筑互动的分析方法，隐含在人的数字化衰退中的内在机制得以揭示。

Regarding solutions to digital decline, Slavoj Žižek argues that the “liberal democratic solutions” proposed by some new forms of “flexible capitalism”[46]46 “Flexible capitalism” refers to post-Fordist economic models emphasizing adaptability, outsourcing, and precarious labor. are crude and simplistic, and need to be replaced by an innovation of the Marxist concept of class.[47]47 Slavoj Žižek, *The Relevance of the Communist Manifesto* (2019). Eric Hobsbawm argues that contemporary global capitalism is rife with contradictions, crises, and socioeconomic inequality, and only Marxism can answer these questions.[48]48 Eric Hobsbawm, *How to Change the World: Marx and Marxism, 1840-2011* (2011). Fredric Jameson argues that global unemployment is a crisis of global capitalism, once again proving the contemporary relevance of Volume 1 of *Capital*.[49]49 Fredric Jameson, *Representing Capital: A Commentary on Volume One* (2011). Christian Fuchs uses historical materialism and the labor theory of value to present the working conditions of digital labor and the resistance methods of digital workers, emphasizing that capital is the common enemy of all workers, and overcoming capitalist domination requires economic globalization and network struggle.[50]50 Christian Fuchs, *Digital Labour and Karl Marx* (2014).

围绕数字化衰退的解决之道，齐泽克(Slavoj Žižek)认为，柔性资本主义46的一些新形式提出的“自由民主方案”是简单粗暴的，需要被马克思主义阶级概念的创新替代47;霍布斯鲍姆(Eric Hobsbawm)认为，当代全球资本主义充斥着矛盾、危机和社会经济不平等，只有马克思主义可以回答这些问题48;詹姆逊认为，全球性失业是全球资本主义的危机，它再次证明《资本论》第1卷的现实意义49;克里斯蒂安·福克斯(Christian Fuchs)运用唯物史观和劳动价值论展现了数字劳动的工作条件和数字工人的抵抗方式，强调资本是广大工人的共同敌人，克服资本主义统治需要经济全球化和网络斗争50。

In recent years, foreign Marxist research has often understood digital capitalism through superstructural factors such as digital fetishism and digital cultural hegemony, gradually detaching from material production activities themselves. Consequently, the foundation for the growth of culture and ideology has been weakened in this research. Critique at the superstructural level is conducive to reflecting on digital capitalism, but it does not offer useful opinions or suggestions on how to build a new economic base. Digital technology, as an important component of the economic base, provides powerful technical support for enhancing the “planability” of the economy and offers pathways for achieving human consensus and a global development community. Therefore, foreign Marxist research should, on the basis of critiquing digital capitalism, think more about how to build a socialist digital ideology and socialist digital culture, advocating for the construction of digital socialism through reflection on the economic base.

近年来，国外马克思主义研究多围绕数字拜物教、数字文化霸权等上层建筑因素理解数字资本主义，逐渐脱离了物质资料生产活动本身，这样一来，文化与意识形态的生长基础在研究中受到了削弱。上层建筑层面的批判有利于对数字资本主义进行反思，但对于如何建设一个新的经济基础并没有给出有益的意见和建议。作为经济基础重要组成部分的数字技术为提高经济的“可计划性”提供了强有力的技术支撑，也为人类共识和全球发展共同体提供实现途径。因此，国外马克思主义研究应在批判数字资本主义的基础上更多地思考如何建设社会主义数字意识形态和社会主义数字文化，在对经济基础的思索中倡导建设数字社会主义。

(II) A Tendency to Generalize the Category of Labor and Dissolve the Concept of the Proletariat

(二)呈现出泛化劳动范畴和消解无产阶级概念的倾向性

In the analysis of the capitalist labor process, on the one hand, because digital capitalism generalizes people’s daily activities into labor, foreign Marxist researchers have incorporated the “masses” into their analytical scope, expanding the breadth of analysis. On the other hand, existing literature also exhibits a tendency to dissolve the concept of the “proletariat,” merging it with the “masses” in analysis.

在资本主义劳动过程的分析中，一方面，由于数字资本主义把人的日常活动泛化为劳动，国外马克思主义研究者纷纷把“大众”纳入分析范围，拓展了分析的广度；另一方面，既有文献也存在消解“无产阶级”概念的倾向，并在分析中使之与“大众”合一。

In the view of foreign Marxist researchers, the main source of the dissolution of the concept of the “proletariat” lies in the laborization of daily activities in the digital capitalist environment, which ultimately stems from the capitalist application of data. Nick Srnicek argues that data is a substance that is extracted, refined, and used in various ways, a raw material that must be abstracted in the era of digital capitalism, while users’ digital activities of browsing web pages and using various applications are the natural source of this raw material.[51]51 Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), p. 39. The dissolution process of the concept of the “proletariat” is essentially the inevitable result of digital capital replacing the dominant position of industrial capital and financial capital under general data. In digital capitalism, as all activities related to data are incorporated into the category of living labor, data becomes a form of dead labor. The speed of data production is so fast that it fills every inch of air, becoming a dark cloud hanging over the heads of the “multitude.” Therefore, alienation also extends from the sphere of labor to daily life. For example, consumption on digital platforms creates value and becomes productive consumption. In reality, many digital platforms use this portion of profit to stimulate more productive consumption through rebate mechanisms. With the help of digital tools, traditional enterprises have developed flexible employment methods and unpaid “crowdsourcing,”[52]52 “Crowdsourcing” refers to the practice of obtaining labor or services from a large, undefined group of people, often via the internet, typically without formal employment or compensation. making labor more precarious and exploitation more invisible. Whether workers or consumers, as long as they touch digital capital, they are manipulated like puppets by an invisible hand. This causes one of the core concepts of Marxist theoretical system—the “proletariat”—to be dissolved, as labor and activity merge into one, and the proletariat degenerates into the “multitude.” Foreign scholars’ use of the “multitude” to analyze new employment methods is a convenient approach, but clearly the “multitude” cannot change the objective existence of the proletariat. In fact, this trend of generalizing the “proletariat” into the “multitude” is a regression of class analysis. The concept of the “proletariat” dissolves within the mild concept of the “multitude,” class exploitation is downplayed, and thus the concept of class itself is also downplayed.

在国外马克思主义研究者看来，“无产阶级”概念被消解的主要根源在于数字资本主义环境中日常活动的劳动化，归根结底来源于数据的资本主义运用。尼克·斯尔尼塞克(Nick Srnysek)认为，数据是一种被提取、被精炼并以各种方式被使用的物质，是在数字资本主义时代必须被抽象的原材料，而用户浏览网页、使用各种应用程序的数字活动是这种原料的天然来源51。“无产阶级”概念的消解过程实质上是一般数据下数字资本替代产业资本、金融资本主导地位的必然结果。在数字资本主义中，伴随着与数据相关的一切活动被纳入活劳动范畴，数据成为死劳动的一种形式。数据的生产速度如此之快，它充斥在每一寸空气中，成为笼罩在“大众”头顶的阴云，因此异化也从劳动领域扩展到日常生活。例如，数字平台的消费创造价值，成为生产性消费，现实中有众多数字平台便用这部分利润通过返利形式激发更多生产性消费。而借助数字工具，传统企业开辟灵活用工方式和无偿“众包”52,劳动变得更加不稳定，剥削更加隐于无形。不论劳动者还是消费者，只要触及数字资本，便如牵线木偶般被看不见的手支配。这就使得马克思主义理论体系的核心概念之一——“无产阶级”被消解，劳动与活动融为一体，无产阶级退化为“大众”。国外学者以“大众”来分析新的用工方式是一个简便的办法，但显然“大众”并不能改变无产阶级的客观存在。事实上，这一把“无产阶级”泛化为“大众”的趋势是阶级分析的退化，“无产阶级”概念在温和的“大众”概念中消融，阶级剥削被淡化，从而阶级概念本身也被淡化。

(3) Overly elevating the historical status of digital capitalism

(三)过度拔高数字资本主义的历史地位

The permeability of digital technology, intertwined with the derivative nature of financial products, has sown new seeds of capitalist economic crisis. Therefore, behind the recovery of digital technology lies the crisis of digital capitalism, where a surplus of social wealth and knowledge coexists with a deficit of individual wealth and knowledge.

数字技术的渗透性与金融产品的衍生性交织在一起，埋下了资本主义经济危机新的种子。因此，在数字技术复苏的背后隐藏着数字资本主义的危机，社会财富与知识的盈余和个体财富与知识的赤字并存。

Precisely because digital capitalism differs significantly from industrial capitalism in terms of both its technological foundation and economic interest relations, much of the foreign Marxist research tends to regard digital capitalism as an independent historical form completely distinct from previous economic forms, treating it as a new stage of development beyond capitalist industrial economy. We argue that, although the digital economy has had a tremendous impact on the organizational forms of social production and the various economic agents within it, changing traditional forms of labor and blurring the figure of “class,” within the framework of Marxist historical materialism, the digital labor process still belongs to the stage of large-scale machine industry. The digital economy has not departed from the essence of industrial civilization; it is merely that the organizational forms of production have undergone profound changes. In the stage of digital capitalism, “it is no longer the worker who interposes a modified natural object between himself and the object; rather, it is the worker who interposes the natural process, which he has transformed into an industrial process, as a means between himself and the inorganic nature he dominates. The worker no longer acts as the main agent in the production process; instead, he stands beside the production process.”[53]53 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 594. However, as a factor of production participating in production, “digital” transforms from information into “data” usable for production and daily life, and can possess “value” in the political-economic sense. The fundamental reason is that people expend a great deal of labor to collect, organize, filter, and integrate this information, turning it into “data.” This process itself is a labor process that consumes substantial human and material resources. Therefore, behind the formation of valuable data, there is still a need for large amounts of investment. It is in this sense that behind digital factors still lies capital. In other words, digital-intensive industries are necessarily capital-intensive industries, and digital enterprises are necessarily high-capital-investment enterprises. Similarly, within Marx’s three major social forms divided by “relations of personal dependence,” “personal independence based on dependence on things,” and “free and comprehensive development of the individual,” although digital capitalism contains some embryonic elements of the third major social form, it still belongs overall to the second major social form—the capitalist commodity economy form. Its inherent principal social contradiction remains the contradiction between the private ownership of the means of production and the social nature of production, except that here the means of production include more “digital capital.” Of course, this also means that future research can explore more pathways and methods through which the digital economy promotes the free and comprehensive development of the individual.

正是由于数字资本主义在技术基础和经济利益关系层面都呈现出与工业资本主义很大的不同，在国外马克思主义的研究中，有不少文献倾向于把数字资本主义视为与以往经济形态截然不同的独立历史形态，将其作为超越资本主义工业经济的新发展阶段。我们认为，虽然数字经济对社会生产组织方式和其中的各种经济主体产生了巨大影响，改变了传统的劳动形式并使“阶级”的身影模糊起来，但在马克思主义唯物史观框架下，数字劳动过程仍然属于机器大工业阶段，数字经济并没有脱离工业文明的本质，只是生产组织形式发生了深刻变化。在数字资本主义阶段，“已经不再是工人把改变了形态的自然物作为中间环节放在自己和对象之间；而是工人把由他改变为工业过程的自然过程作为中介放在自己和被他支配的无机自然界之间。工人不再是生产过程的主要作用者，而是站在生产过程的旁 边”53。但 是，“数字”作为一种生产要素参与到生产中，它从信息转化为能够为生产生活使用的“数据”,能够具备政治经济学意义上的“价值”,根本原因在于人们花费大量劳动收集、整理、筛选和整合这些信息，使之成为“数据”。这个过程本身就是一个需要耗费大量人力物力的劳动过程，因此，形成有价值数据的背后实际上也仍然需要大量投资。也正是在这个意义上，数字要素的背后仍然是资本。换言之，数字密集型产业也必然是资本密集型产业，数字企业也必然是高资本投入企业。同样，在马克思以“人的相互依赖关系”“以物的依赖性为基础的人的独立性”和“人的自由全面发展”划分的三大社会形态中，数字资本主义尽管包含了一些第三大社会形态的萌芽因素，但总体上仍然归属于第二大社会形态——资本主义商品经济形态，其内在的社会主要矛盾仍然是生产资料私人占有和生产社会化之间的矛盾，只不过这里的生产资料包含了更多的“数字资本”而已。当然，这也意味着在今后的研究中，可以更多地探寻数字经济促进人的自由全面发展的路径和方式。

(4) Adhering to a Western-centric research stance

(四)秉持西方中心主义的研究立场

Foreign Marxist scholars’ research on digital capitalism still follows a narrative logic dominated by Western-centrism. Not only do they consciously or unconsciously neglect the theories and practices of human liberation in 20th-century socialist countries in their selection of countries and regions for study, but scholars also tend to focus more on the survival of Western society in their stance. Although the research on digital capitalism is primarily critical, the absence of countermeasures still allows us to feel the “horizon of communism” disappearing, and the harms of digital capitalism in reality are also obscured by the bright side of digital technology. However, “national liberation movements and socialist revolutions did not occur where capitalism succeeded, but where it completely failed. Therefore, capitalism has never been, and cannot be, the only path to modernity and development, let alone the sole form.”[54]54 Samir Amin, *The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004), p. 12.

国外马克思主义学者关于数字资本主义的研究仍然遵循西方中心主义主导的叙事逻辑，不仅在国家、地区研究的选取中有意无意地忽视20世纪社会主义国家的人类解放理论和实践，学者在立场上也倾向于更关注西方社会的存续。虽然对数字资本主义的研究以批判为主，但应对的缺失仍能让我们感到“共产主义地平线”在消失，现实中数字资本主义的危害也被数字技术美好的一面所掩盖。然而，“民族解放运动和社会主义革命不是发生在资本主义成功的地方，而是彻底失败的地方。因此，资本主义不曾是，也不可能是现代性和发展的必由之路，遑论唯一形式”54。

And digital capitalism, as a new manifestation of capitalism, will likewise not achieve its own transcendence where capitalism succeeds. Even if endowed with stronger expansionary power, digital capitalism still cannot escape the inherent crisis laws of capitalism. We can also see that the potential of the digital as a tool for proletarian struggle is bursting forth. The “network occupation movement” using digital technology under the guidance of platform cooperativism is a precursor to this potential. And the prospect of digital socialism lies in the practices of developing countries. In the development process of China’s digital economy, the scale and direction of capital investment in the digital economy are constrained by policy, and the development of the sharing economy and digital commons has achieved initial results. Looking to the digital future, public ownership of data and the use of digital technology for centralized planning and dynamic adjustment may be the trends of digital socialism, which is also a feasible path to cracking digital survival and reconstructing human subjectivity.

而数字资本主义作为资本主义新的表现形式，同样不会在资本主义成功的地方实现对自身的超越。即使赋予资本主义更强的扩张力，数字资本主义仍然没有逃脱资本主义固有的危机规律。我们也可以看到，数字作为无产阶级抗争工具的潜力喷薄欲出。在平台合作主义引领下运用数字技术的“网络占领运动”便是这一潜力的先兆。而数字社会主义的前景蕴藏在发展中国家的实践中。在我国数字经济的发展过程中，资本投入数字经济的规模和方向受到政策约束，共享经济和数字公地的发展初见成效。展望数字化的未来，数据公有以及数字技术用于集中计划、动态调整或许是数字社会主义的趋势，这也是破解数字化生存、重构人的主体性的可行路径。

“Digital capitalism is not only a new stage of capitalism but also a reenactment of the history of past capitalism in digital space.”[55]55 Christian Fuchs, *Digital Labour and Karl Marx* (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 287. After digital capitalism, where will capitalism go? Digital capitalism has drawn mathematical methods and information technology, which have no inherent ideology, into the political vortex. So, where will capital’s keen sense for profit-seeking probe next? Into the organisms nurtured by the Earth over billions of years, or into extraterrestrial space physics, or even into the metaverse under a virtual backdrop? We do not know. Perhaps it is germinating somewhere we cannot see, brewing a new wave.

“数字资本主义不仅是资本主义的新阶段，还是在数字空间中，对过往资本主义历史的一次重演。”55在数字资本主义之后，资本主义又会走向何方?数字资本主义将本无意识形态的数学方法和信息技术卷入政治旋涡，那么，资本寻求利润的敏锐嗅觉下一次又将探向何方?是地球用数十亿年孕育出的生物体，抑或是地球外的空间物理，甚至是虚拟背景下的元宇宙?我们不得而知。也许它正在某个我们看不到的地方萌芽，酝酿着新一轮的浪潮。

Notes:

注释：

1 Tapscott Don, *The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in The Age of Networked Intelligence*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1996, pp. 26-28.

1Tapscott Don,The Digital Economy:Promise and Peril in The Age of Networked Intelligence,New York:McGraw Hill,1996,pp.26-28.

2 See Lü Tingjie, “The Transformation from Information Economy to Digital Economy,” http://www.xinhuanet.com/sikepro/20211231/058a792fa67149ba9421ec0777b3e88d/c.html.

2参见吕廷杰:《从信息经济到数字经济的转型》,http://www.xinhuanet.com/sikepro/20211231/058a792fa67149ba9421ec077 7b3e88d/c.html。

3 [Japan] Mori Ken and Hino Hiroyuki, *Digital Capitalism*, trans. Nomura Research Institute (Dalian) Technology Co., Ltd. (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2020), p. 35.

3[日]森健、日户浩之:《数字资本主义》,野村综研(大连)科技有限公司译,上海:复旦大学出版社,2020年,第35页。

4 [US] Dan Schiller, *Digital Capitalism*, trans. Yang Liping (Nanchang: Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2001), pp. 15-16.

4[美]丹·席勒:《数字资本主义》,杨立平译,南昌:江西人民出版社,2001年,第15-16页。

5 [US] Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital*, trans. Hu Yong and Fan Haiyan (Beijing: Electronic Industry Press, 2017), p. 229.

5[美]尼古拉·尼葛洛庞帝:《数字化生存》,胡泳、范海燕译,北京:电子工业出版社,2017年,第229页。

6 Henry Nicholas, “Copyright: Its Adequacy in Technological Societies,” *Science*, Vol. 186, No. 4168, 1974.

6Henry Nicholas,“Copyright:Its Adequacy in Technological Societies”,Science,Vol.186,No.4168,1974.

7 See [US] Dan Schiller, *The Rise and Expansion of Information Capitalism: Networks and the Nixon Era*, trans. Zhai Xiufeng (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2020), pp. 6-9.

7参见[美]丹·席勒:《信息资本主义的兴起与扩张——网络与尼克松时代》,翟秀凤译,北京:北京大学出版社,2020年,第6-9页。

8 Christian Fuchs, *Digital Labour and Karl Marx* (New York: Routledge Press, 2014), p. 74.

8Christian Fuchs,Digital Labour and Karl Marx,New York:Routledge Press,2014,p.74.

9 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 7 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 115.

9《马克思恩格斯文集》第7卷,北京:人民出版社,2009年,第115页。

10 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 508.

10《马克思恩格斯文集》第5卷,北京:人民出版社,2009年,第508页。

11 Theodor Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture* (London: Routledge Press, 1991), pp. 85-92.

11Theodor Adorno,The Culture Industry:Selected Essays on Mass Culture,London:Routledge Press,1991,pp.85-92.

12 Christian Fuchs, *Digital Labour and Karl Marx* (New York: Routledge Press, 2014), pp. 72-73.

12Christian Fuchs,Digital Labour and Karl Marx,New York:Routledge Press,2014,pp.72-73.

13 John Hartley, *The Uses of Digital Literacy* (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2009).

13John Hartley,The Uses of Digital Literacy,Brisbane:University of Queensland Press,2009.

14 [UK] Graham Murdock, [US] Janet Wasko, and [Portugal] Helena Sousa, eds., *Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, trans. Communication Relay (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2022), p. 4.

14[英]格雷厄姆·默多克、[美]珍妮特·瓦斯科、[葡]海伦娜·索萨编:《传播政治经济学手册》,传播驿站译,上海:华东师范大学出版社,2022年,第4页。

15 Nick Dyer-Witheford, *Cyber Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex* (Toronto: Pluto Press, 2014), p. 201. Regarding this labor group, there is also a view that mental labor and the laborer cannot be separated, so the knowledge possessed by mental laborers belongs to personal assets, and this group should be called the “cognitariat”; see Yann Moulier Boutang, *Cognitive Capitalism*, trans. E. Emery (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011). The author believes this is precisely the academic manifestation of the internal differentiation of the proletariat.

15Nick Dyer Witheford,Cyber Proletariat:Global Labour in the Digital Vortex,Toronto:Pluto Press,2014,p.201.针对这一劳动群体,也有观点认为脑力劳动和劳动者无法分离,因此脑力劳动者拥有的知识属于个人资产,并认为这一群体应该被称作“知产阶级”,参见Yann Moulier Boutang,Cognitive Capitalism,Translated by E.Emery,Cambridge:Polity Press,2011。笔者认为这正是无产阶级内部分化的学术表现。

16 Bernard Stiegler, *States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2015), p. 174.

16Bernard Stiegler,States of Shock:Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century,Bristol:Policy Press,2015,p.174.

17 The “tertiary retention” technology was proposed by Stiegler, referring to technical and technological objects created by humans that exist outside the human body and can serve to prompt memory. See Bernard Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, trans. Daniel Ross (London: Open Humanities Press, 2018), pp. 218-223.

17第三滞留技术由斯蒂格勒提出,指人类所创造的在人类躯体之外的技术和技术物体,能够起到提示记忆的作用。参见Bernard Stiegler,The Neganthropocene,Translated by Daniel Ross,London:Open Humanities Press,2018,pp.218-223。

18 A book introducing Italian left-wing theory includes this article; see Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (eds.), *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics* (Minneapolis and St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

18一本介绍意大利左翼理论的书收录了这一文章,参见Paolo Vimo and Miehael Hardt (eds.),Radical Thought in Italy:A Potential Politics,Minneapolis and St.Paul:University of Minnesota Press,1996。

19 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).

19Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri,Empire,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,2000;Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri,Multitude,New York:The Penguin Press,2004.

20 [US] Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, trans. Liu Ji (Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1989).

20[美]赫伯特·马尔库塞:《单向度的人——发达工业社会意识形态研究》,刘继译,上海:上海译文出版社,1989年。

21 Nick Dyer-Witheford, *Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High-technology Capitalism* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999).

21Nick Dyer-Witheford,Cyber-Marx:Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High-technology Capitalism,Urbana and Chicago:University of Illinois Press,1999.

22 *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 42 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2016), pp. 434-435.

22《马克思恩格斯全集》第42卷,北京:人民出版社,2016年,第434-435页。

23 *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 42 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2016), p. 779.

23《马克思恩格斯全集》第42卷,北京:人民出版社,2016年,第779页。

24 [US] Dan Schiller, *Digital Depression: Information Technology and Economic Crisis*, trans. Wu Changchang (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, 2017), Introduction, p. 9.

24[美]丹·席勒:《数字化衰退:信息技术与经济危机》,吴畅畅译,北京:中国传媒大学出版社,2017年,导论第9页。

25 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 699.

25《马克思恩格斯文集》第5卷,北京:人民出版社,2009年,第699页。

26 Fredric Jameson, *Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume One* (London: Verso, 2011), p. 87.

26Fredric Jameson,Representing Capital:A Reading of Volume One,London:Verso,2011,p.87.

27 Herbert Schiller, *Mass Communication and American Empire* (New York: A. M. Kelley Publishers, 1969).

27Herbert Schiller,Mass Communication and American Empire,New York:A.M.Kelley Publishers,1969.

28 In 2001, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defined the concept of the “digital divide” in a report, namely, “the gap between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard both to their opportunities to access information and communication technologies (ICTs) and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities.” See OECD, “Understanding the Digital Divide,” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/236405667766.pdf?expires=1676308443&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=0099DB55BCC17816587BD7910BB203AC.

28 2001年世界经济合作与发展组织在报告中界定了“数字鸿沟”的概念,即“不同社会经济水平的个人、家庭、企业和地区获取信息通信技术和利用因特网进行各种不同活动的机会的差距”。参见OECD,“Understanding the Digital Divide”,https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/236405667766.pdf?expires=1676308443&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=0099DB55BCC17816587BD7910BB203AC。

29 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 614.

29《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷,北京:人民出版社,2009年,第614页。

30 See *Global Digital Governance White Paper (2020)*, http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/202012/t20201215_366184.htm.

30参见《全球数字治理白皮书(2020年)》,http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/202012/t20201215_366184.htm。

31 [UK] Graham Murdock, [US] Janet Wasko, [Portugal] Helena Sousa, eds., *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, trans. Communication Relay Station (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2022), Introduction, pp. 17-18.

31[英]格雷厄姆·默多克、[美]珍妮特·瓦斯科、[葡]海伦娜·索萨编:《传播政治经济学手册》,传播驿站译,上海:华东师范大学出版社,2022年,导读第17-18页。

32 Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock and Helena Sousa, *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications* (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), p. 518.

32Jenet Wasko,Graham Murdock and Helena Sousa,The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications,Hoboken:Blackwell Publishing,2011,p.518.

33 [US] Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital*, trans. Hu Yong and Fan Haiyan (Beijing: Electronic Industry Press, 2017).

33[美]尼古拉·尼葛洛庞帝:《数字化生存》,胡泳、范海燕译,北京:电子工业出版社,2017年。

34 The “brain in a vat” is a hypothesis by the American philosopher Hilary Putnam, referring to a brain manipulated by a computer. See [US] Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, trans. Tong Shijun and Li Guangcheng (Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005).

34“缸中之脑”是美国哲学家希拉里·普特南的一种假想,指被计算机操纵的大脑。参见[美]希拉里·普特南:《理性、真理与历史》,童世骏、李光程译,上海:上海译文出版社,2005年。

35 [US] Nicholas Carr, *Digital Utopia*, trans. Jiang Zhongwei (Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2018), p. 14.

35[美]尼古拉斯·卡尔:《数字乌托邦》,姜忠伟译,北京:中信出版集团,2018年,第14页。

36 Financial “shock therapy” borrows the meaning of medical “shock therapy” to figuratively express the policy of continuing to raise interest rates to stimulate the economy under conditions of economic inflation. It was introduced into the economic field by the American economist Jeffrey Sachs in the mid-1980s and has significant side effects. See [US] Dan Schiller, *Digital Depression: Information Technology and Economic Crisis*, trans. Wu Changchang (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, 2017), p. 37.

36金融“休克疗法”借用医学“休克疗法”的含义形象地表达在经济通胀的情况下继续提高利率刺激经济的政策,于20世纪80年代中期由美国经济学家杰弗里·萨克斯引入经济领域,具有极大的副作用。参见[美]丹·席勒:《数字化衰退:信息技术与经济危机》,吴畅畅译,北京:中国传媒大学出版社,2017年,第37页。

37 Zuckerberg implemented an open operating model at Facebook starting in 2006. Cambridge Analytica, founded in 2013, exploited this opportunity to obtain data from 50 million Facebook users and interfered in the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit referendum. This scandal was exposed in 2018. See Sun Baoyun, Li Yan, Qi Wei, “Micro-Analysis of Cybersecurity’s Impact on Political Security: The Case of the ‘Cambridge Analytica’ Incident,” *Journal of Confidential Science and Technology*, No. 4, 2020.

37扎克伯格2006年起在脸书公司推行开放式运行模式,2013年成立的剑桥分析公司利用这一契机获取5000万脸书用户信息并干预2016年的美国大选和脱欧公投。这一丑闻于2018年曝光。参见孙宝云、李艳、齐巍:《网络安全影响政治安全的微观分析——以“剑桥分析”事件为例》,《保密科学技术》2020年第4期。

38 [US] Dan Schiller, *Digital Depression: Information Technology and Economic Crisis*, trans. Wu Changchang (Beijing: Communication University of China Press, 2017), Introduction, p. 6.

38[美]丹·席勒:《数字化衰退:信息技术与经济危机》,吴畅畅译,北京:中国传媒大学出版社,2017年,导论第6页。

39 See [Japan] Mori Ken, Hinoto Hiroyuki, *Digital Capitalism*, trans. Nomura Research Institute (Dalian) Technology Co., Ltd. (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2020), p. 8.

39参见[日]森健、日户浩之:《数字资本主义》,野村综研(大连)科技有限公司译,上海:复旦大学出版社,2020年,第8页。

40 Data from We Are Social & Hootsuite, “Digital 2022: Another Year of Bumper Growth,” https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2022/01/digital-2022-another-year-of-bumper-growth-2/.

40数据来源于We Are Social & Hootsuite,“Digital 2022:Another Year of Bumper Growth”,https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2022/01/digital-2022-another-year-of-bumper-growth-2/。

41 See Xu Hongxiao, “The Evolutionary Characteristics and Dual Effects of Digital Capitalism in the Post-Crisis Era,” *Marxism and Reality*, No. 2, 2020.

41参见徐宏潇:《后危机时代数字资本主义的演化特征及其双重效应》,《马克思主义与现实》2020年第2期。

42 *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 42 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2016), p. 665.

42《马克思恩格斯全集》第42卷,北京:人民出版社,2016年,第665页。

43 [UK] Graham Murdock, “Critical Political Economy and Communication Capitalism: Traditions, Challenges, and Struggles,” trans. Yao Jianhua and Xu Sisi, *Journalist*, No. 6, 2019.

43[英]格雷厄姆·默多克:《批判政治经济学与传播资本主义:传统、挑战和抗争》,姚建华、徐偲骕译,《新闻记者》2019年第6期。

44 [Sweden] Christian Fuchs, [Canada] Vincent Mosco, eds., *Marx Returns* (Vol. 1), trans. “Communication Relay Station” Workshop (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2016), p. 343.

44[瑞典]克里斯蒂安·福克斯、[加拿大]文森特·莫斯可主编:《马克思归来》(上),“传播驿站”工作坊译,上海:华东师范大学出版社,2016年,第343页。

45 See [UK] Graham Murdock, [US] Janet Wasko, [Portugal] Helena Sousa, eds., *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications*, trans. Communication Relay Station (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2022), Introduction, p. 14.

45参见[英]格雷厄姆·默多克、[美]珍妮特·瓦斯科、[葡]海伦娜·索萨编:《传播政治经济学手册》,传播驿站译,上海:华东师范大学出版社,2022年,导读第14页。

46 Soft capitalism, in English, is a concept used by Nigel Thrift to define contemporary capitalism, referring to a new form of capitalism where knowledge is the main source of comparative advantage.

46柔性资本主义英文为soft capitalism,是奈格尔·思瑞夫特用于界定当代资本主义的概念,指代以知识为比较优势主要来源的新形式的资本主义。

47 Slavoj Žižek, *In Defense of Lost Causes* (London: Verso, 2008), p. 6.

47Slavoj Žižek,In Defense of Lost Causes,London:Verso,2008,p.6.

48 Eric Hobsbawm, *How to Change the World: Marx and Marxism 1840-2011* (London: Little Brown, 2011), p. 13.

48Eric Hobsbawm,How to Change the World:Marx and Marxism 1840-2011,London:Little Brown,2011,p.13.

49 Fredric Jameson, *Representing Capital* (London: Verso, 2011), p. 1.

49Fredric Jameson,Representing Capital,London:Verso,2011,p.1.

50 Christian Fuchs, *Digital Labour And Karl Marx* (New York: Routledge Press, 2014).

50Christian Fuchs,Digital Labour And Karl Marx,New York:Routledge Press,2014.

51 See [Canada] Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism*, trans. Cheng Shuiying (Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2018), p. 36.

51参见[加拿大]尼克·斯尔尼塞克:《平台资本主义》,程水英译,广州:广东人民出版社,2018年,第36页。

52 “Crowdsourcing” refers to the practice of a company or institution outsourcing tasks previously performed by employees to a non-specific (and usually large) group of volunteers on a free and voluntary basis.

52“众包”指的是一个公司或机构把过去由员工执行的工作任务,以自由自愿的形式外包给非特定的(而且通常是大型的)大众志愿者的做法。

53 *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 31 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998), p. 100.

53《马克思恩格斯全集》第31卷,北京:人民出版社,1998年,第100页。

54 Lin Chun, *China and Global Capitalism: Reflections on Marxism, History and Contemporary Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 186.

54Lin Chun,China and Global Capitalism:Reflections on Marxism,History and Contemporary Politics,London:Palgrave Macmillan,2013,p.186.

55 [Japan] Mori Ken, Hinoto Hiroyuki, *Digital Capitalism*, trans. Nomura Research Institute (Dalian) Technology Co., Ltd. (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2020), p. 142.

55[日]森健、日户浩之:《数字资本主义》,野村综研(大连)科技有限公司译,上海:复旦大学出版社,2020年,第142页。

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