A Political Narrative of the Rise-and-Fall Logic of the Brazilian Workers’ Party’s “Labor Socialism”

As the largest left-wing political party in Brazil, the Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) has, since its founding on February 10, 1980, continuously striven to secure the interests of Brazil’s lower and middle classes. In the 1990s, against the backdrop of the United States promoting neoliberal penetration, the Cardoso government implemented neoliberal reforms characterized by “liberalization,” “marketization,” and “privatization.” The Brazilian economy gradually declined, various social contradictions became severely aggravated, and popular opposition to neoliberalism grew increasingly vocal. Against this background, the Brazilian Workers’ Party raised high the banner of “Labor Socialism,” won the support of the Brazilian people, and in 2002 attained governing status, ushering in a new stage of development for Brazil. Under the governing philosophy of “Labor Socialism,” the Workers’ Party adopted a policy approach of “change through moderation,” pursued prudent and pragmatic economic policies, and emphasized the coordinated development of the economy and society. However, after successfully coming to power, the Workers’ Party did not adopt the consistently proclaimed left-wing reform line of resisting neoliberalism in order to carry out social reforms. Instead, it transformed from an initially radical left-wing party into a moderate left-wing party, seeking a “third way” between “left” and “right.”

作为巴西最大的左翼政党，巴西劳工党（Partido dos Trabalhadores，简称PT）自1980年2月10日成立以来，就不断致力于为巴西中下层民众争取利益。20世纪90年代，在美国推行新自由主义渗透的背景下，卡多佐政府实施了以“自由化”、“市场化”、“私有化”为主要特征的新自由主义改革，巴西经济逐步衰退，各种社会矛盾严重激化，民众反对新自由主义的呼声越来越高。在这一背景下，巴西劳工党高举“劳工社会主义”的旗帜，赢得了巴西人民的支持，并于2002年获得了执政地位，为巴西迎来了新的发展阶段。劳工党在“劳工社会主义”的执政理念下，实行“温和中变革”的政策思路，采取稳健务实的经济政策，注重经济社会的协调发展。然而，劳工党在成功执政后，并没有采取一贯宣称的左翼改革路线，抵制新自由主义，以进行社会改革，而是从一开始的激进左翼政党转变为温和左翼政党，要在“左”与“右”之间寻找“第三条道路”。

Regarding the governing period of the Brazilian Workers’ Party from 2003 to 2016, how to view its developmental trajectory from strength to weakness and then back to weakness requires an analysis of the rise-and-fall logic of “Labor Socialism.” Based on the political practice of “Labor Socialism,” the Workers’ Party’s governing period can be divided into a prosperous phase from 2003 to 2010 and a declining phase from 2011 to 2016. Analysis reveals that the role “Labor Socialism” can play in essence is limited. In the short term, whether the Workers’ Party’s “Labor Socialism” concept can have a positive impact on Brazil depends on whether changes in the external environment of the international market are favorable to Brazil’s economic development and social stability. In the long term, “Labor Socialism” is not a scientific governing concept; it has not fundamentally eliminated the endogenous factors that have long constrained Brazil’s economic growth, and it cannot safeguard the sustainable development of Brazil’s economy and society. The Workers’ Party needs to seek a new path to break through its predicament. In essence, the governing concept of “Labor Socialism” violates the general principles of scientific socialism, lacks the logic of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and also lacks political identification with the “two inevitables.”[1]1 The “two inevitables” (两个必然) refers to the Marxist thesis that the victory of socialism over capitalism and the eventual triumph of communism are historically inevitable. This is of great significance for exploring the mysteries of the rise-and-fall logic of the Workers’ Party’s “Labor Socialism” model, as well as for China’s prevention of the erosion of neoliberalism and its construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

针对巴西劳工党2003至2016年的执政阶段，如何看待其由弱到强再到弱的发展历程，这就需要对“劳工社会主义”的兴衰逻辑进行分析。基于“劳工社会主义”政治实践，可以将劳工党执政阶段分为2003-2010年繁荣阶段和2011-2016年衰落阶段。通过分析发现，劳工党“劳工社会主义”在本质上能够发挥的作用是有限的。从短期来看，劳工党“劳工社会主义”理念是否能够对巴西产生积极影响，取决于国际市场的外部环境变化是否有益于巴西经济发展和社会稳定。从长期而言，“劳工社会主义”并非科学的执政理念，未从根本上消解长期制约巴西经济增长的内生因素，不能够为巴西经济社会的可持续发展保驾护航，劳工党需要寻求新的破局之路。从本质上看，“劳工社会主义”的执政理念违背了科学社会主义的一般原则，缺少辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义逻辑，也缺少了“两个必然”的政治认同。这对于探知劳工党“劳工社会主义”模式兴衰逻辑的奥秘，以及中国防范新自由主义的侵蚀、建设中国特色社会主义具有重要意义。

I. Theoretical Propositions of the Brazilian Workers’ Party’s “Labor Socialism”

一、巴西劳工党“劳工社会主义”理论主张

From its inception, the Brazilian Workers’ Party declared itself a socialist party. At the end of May 1990, the party established “Labor Socialism” as its guiding ideology, opposing capital exploitation and hegemonism, emphasizing democracy, equality, and freedom, and insisting on thorough substantive democracy and a pluralist political stance. During its governance, the Workers’ Party adhered to the governing concept of “Labor Socialism,” which can be said to have brought both achievements and challenges.

巴西劳工党自成立之初，就宣称自己是社会主义政党。1990年5月底，该党将“劳工社会主义”确立为指导思想，反对资本剥削和霸权主义，强调民主、平等与自由，坚持彻底的实质民主以及多元主义的政治立场。劳工党执政期间，坚持“劳工社会主义”的执政理念，可谓成效与挑战并存。

(1) The Policy Approach of the “Path of Least Resistance”

（一）“最小阻力道路”的政策思路

After coming to power, the Workers’ Party did not completely deny neoliberalism, nor did it adopt radical left-wing reform measures. To achieve economic development and social stability, Workers’ Party President Lula, under the logic of the “Labor Socialism” governing concept, promised that Brazil would “promote change in peace” and proposed achieving social justice and promoting economic development through “peace and moderation.” Thus, the “Labor Socialism” policy was not about a complete break with the existing system, but about establishing a government of gradual reform within the framework of Brazil’s existing economic order. On the basis of reflecting on and transforming neoliberalism, the Workers’ Party government promoted “Labor Socialism” propositions and adhered to a pragmatic governing concept.

劳工党执政后，并未完全否认新自由主义，也未采取激进的左翼改革措施。劳工党主席卢拉为实现经济发展和社会稳定，在“劳工社会主义”执政理念的逻辑下，承诺巴西将在“平和中推进变革”，提出在“和平和温良”中达成实现社会公正，推动经济发展的目标。因而“劳工社会主义”政策不是要与原有的体制彻底决裂，而是将在巴西现有的经济秩序框架下，建立一个渐进式改革的政府。劳工党政府在反思和变革新自由主义的基础上，推行“劳工社会主义”主张，坚持实用主义执政理念。

From an economic perspective, the Workers’ Party did not completely deny the economic policies implemented by the Cardoso government, such as privatization, trade liberalization, and financial liberalization. Instead, it implemented pragmatic reform measures. The Workers’ Party government took economic development as its primary goal, establishing primary fiscal surplus, floating exchange rates, and inflation control as the three pillars of economic stability, and encouraging private investment and exports. During Lula’s tenure, Brazil’s society and economy achieved rapid development. Specifically: from 2003 to 2005, Brazil’s average annual GDP growth rate was 3.4%; from 2006 to 2011, the average annual GDP growth rate reached 4.4%. Particularly in 2007 and 2008, the Brazilian economy entered a “golden growth period,” with GDP growth rates remaining above 5%, and in 2010 the GDP growth rate even reached 7.5%. It can be said that the Lula government achieved a miracle of world economic growth, worthy of being called the glory of Latin America’s revival. From a political perspective, to fulfill its promise of economic stability and maintain its governing position, the Workers’ Party continuously sought “political allies” domestically. The Workers’ Party placed great importance on exchange and cooperation with center-left parties, and even right-wing parties, uniting all forces that could be united. To a certain extent, this maintained its governing position, but it also resulted in political compromises. For example, Lula appointed his opponent, the banker from the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and former president of BankBoston, Henrique Meirelles, as president of the Central Bank; appointed the former mayor of Ribeirão Preto in São Paulo state, Antonio Palocci, as Minister of Finance; and appointed neoliberal economists to key positions in economic departments. A series of actions by the Workers’ Party alleviated the concerns of domestic and foreign investors and stabilized social stability in the early period of the Workers’ Party’s governance, but this also laid the groundwork for the party’s later decline.

从经济方面来看，劳工党并未完全否认卡多佐政府实施的私有化、贸易自由化和金融自由化等经济政策，而是推行务实的实用主义改革措施。劳工党政府以发展经济为首要目标，将初级财政盈余、浮动汇率和遏制通胀作为稳定经济的三大支柱，鼓励私人投资和对外出口。卢拉在任期间，巴西社会经济实现飞速发展。具体表现在：2003年至2005年，巴西GDP年均增长率为3.4%；2006年至2011年，巴西GDP年均增长率达到了4.4%。尤其是2007和2008年巴西经济进入了“黄金增长期”，GDP增长率均保持在5%以上，2010年GDP增长率甚至高达7.5%。可以说，卢拉政府实现了世界经济增长的奇迹，堪称拉美复兴的荣光。从政治方面来看，劳工党为完成其稳定经济的承诺，以及维护自己的执政地位，不断在国内寻求“政治盟友”。劳工党十分重视与中左翼政党之间的交流合作，甚至右翼政党，团结一切可以团结的力量。这在一定程度上维护了其执政地位，但也造成了政治妥协。诸如，卢拉任命其反对党社会民主党（Brazilian Social Democratic Party，PSDB）银行家——前波士顿银行行长恩里克梅雷莱斯为中央银行行长；任命圣保罗州里贝朗普雷图市前市长安东尼奥·帕洛奇为财政部部长；任命新自由主义经济学家在经济部门担任要职。劳工党的一系列做法，消解了国内外投资者的担忧，稳定了劳工党执政初期的社会稳定，但这也为劳工党后期的衰落埋下了伏笔。

Under the pragmatic governing concept, on the one hand, the Workers’ Party implemented moderate and pragmatic economic and political policies that alleviated the crisis of confidence at home and abroad and promoted the recovery and development of the Brazilian economy; on the other hand, to maintain its governing position, the Workers’ Party insisted on “change in peace,” maintaining political stability. But in essence, the Workers’ Party attempted to use the “thorough democracy” of a mass alliance to obscure the absence of genuine popular subjectivity. “Labor Socialism,” lacking subject participation, often fell into the quagmire of pluralism, ignoring the creative initiative of the masses as subjects, and completely violating the standpoint of popular subjectivity.

在实用主义执政理念下，劳工党一方面实行温和务实的经济政治政策缓解了国外内的信任危机，促进巴西经济的复苏和发展；另一方面，劳工党为维护自身执政地位，坚持在“在平和中变革”，维持了政治的稳定。但从本质上看，劳工党企图运用大众联盟的“彻底民主”遮蔽真正的人民主体性的缺失，而缺失主体参与的“劳工社会主义”往往陷入多元主义的泥沼中，忽视了人民群众的主体创造性，彻底违背了人民主体性的立场。

(2) Policy Propositions for Securing the Interests of the “C Class”

（二）争取“C阶层”利益的政策主张

The so-called “C Class” refers to the fact that Brazil’s social classes can be divided into five strata: A, B, C, D, and E. The C Class is also called the “new middle class.” Most people in the C Class originally belonged to the lowest social stratum. During the Workers’ Party’s governance, they achieved upward class mobility due to economic development, increased employment, higher minimum wages, and improved social welfare. The Workers’ Party consistently prioritized economic growth as the country’s primary development goal. However, along with economic growth, social problems such as the wealth gap did not see corresponding improvement; Brazil’s poverty and income polarization remained severe. The Workers’ Party government implemented a series of measures to secure the interests of the “C Class.”

所谓“C阶层”是指巴西的社会阶层可分为A、B、C、D、E五个阶层，其中Ｃ阶层也被称之为“新中产阶级”。C阶层中大多数人原属社会最底层，在劳工党执政期间因经济发展、就业增加、最低工资标准和社会福利提高等实现阶层的上升。劳工党始终把经济增长作为国家的优先发展目标，但伴随着经济的增长，贫富差距等社会问题并没有得到相应的改善，巴西贫困和收入两极化问题仍然严峻。劳工党政府推行系列措施，以争取“C阶层”利益。

First, a series of poverty reduction policies were introduced. After Lula came to power, based on the tasks of eradicating hunger and reducing the poverty rate, he successively implemented multiple poverty alleviation and reduction measures and plans, such as the “Zero Hunger Plan,” the “First Job Plan,” and the “Family Allowance Plan.” Among these, during the implementation of the “Zero Hunger Plan,” over 100 million people in Brazil benefited, greatly reducing the extreme poverty population. In addition, the Lula government also attached importance to raising the literacy rate in rural areas, implementing the “Scholarship Plan” and the “Second National Land Reform Plan,” improving rural infrastructure, ameliorating the situation of poverty and difficulty in accessing education in rural areas, promoting the improvement of education and economic levels in rural areas, and addressing intergenerational poverty. The reduction in the number of poor people allowed Brazil to incubate a new social group—the “C class.” During the Lula government period, the C class obtained tangible benefits, Brazil’s Gini coefficient continuously decreased, and social contradictions were further alleviated. Furthermore, the Lula government also implemented multiple measures in areas such as employment, healthcare, education, and social security, such as providing small low-interest loans for low-income groups, raising the minimum wage, the “Plan to Eradicate Child Labor,” the “Plan to Support Family Agriculture,” and the “Basic Medicine Assistance Plan.” After taking office, Rousseff continued the various moderate and pragmatic policies of the Lula government, continuing to implement poverty reduction plans, expanding various social welfare policies, and launching the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan,” the “Green Allowance Plan,” and the “My Life, My Home Plan.”

首先，出台系列减贫政策。卢拉上台执政之后，基于消灭饥饿和降低贫困率的任务，先后实施了多项扶贫减困措施和计划，诸如“零饥饿计划”、“第一次就业计划”、“家庭救助金计划”等。其中“零饥饿计划”实施中，巴西有1亿多人口从中受益，大幅度减少了极端贫困人口。此外，卢拉政府还重视提高农村地区识字率，推行“助学金计划”和“第二个国家土地改革计划”，完善农村基础设施，改善了农村地区贫困以及受教育难的现状，促进了农村地区教育和经济水平的提高，改善了代际贫困问题。贫困人口数量的减少使得巴西孵化出了一个新的社会群体——“C阶层”。在卢拉政府时期，C阶层获得了实在利益，巴西的基尼系数不断降低，社会矛盾得到进一步缓和。此外，卢拉政府在就业、医疗、教育、社会保障等方面也推行了多项措施，诸如为低收入人群提供小额低息贷款、提高最低工资标准、“杜绝童工计划”、“扶助家庭农业计划”及“基本药品援助计划”等。罗塞夫执政后，延续了卢拉政府的各项温和务实的政策，继续推行减贫计划、扩大各项社会福利政策，启动了“无赤贫的巴西计划”、“绿色救助金计划”、“我的生活我的家计划”。

Second, the goal of reducing the poverty rate was achieved. Active fiscal policies and the vigorous development of exports, as well as the increase in the minimum wage and transfer payments, promoted a virtuous cycle of economic growth and distribution in Brazil. This virtuous cycle drove the reduction of poverty and inequality in Brazil during the Workers’ Party government. The Lula government implemented a series of bold reforms around reducing the poverty rate, such as improving the labor market, national pensions, income transfer payments, and the “Family Allowance Plan.” Poverty and social inequality were both significantly improved, with the poverty rate dropping from 37.5% in 2001 to 20.9% in 2011. Lula thereby won the political support of the “C class” populace and successfully achieved re-election in 2006.

其次，实现贫困率下降的目标。积极的财政政策和出口的蓬勃发展，以及最低工资标准和转移支付的提高，促进了巴西经济增长和分配的良性循环。这一良性循环，推动了劳工党政府期间巴西贫困人口和不平等现象的减少。卢拉政府围绕减少贫困率可谓实施了一系列大刀阔斧的改革，如改善劳动力市场、国家养老金、收入转移支付、“家庭救助金计划”等政策，贫困和社会不公平现象均得到了明显的改善，贫困率从2001年的37.5%下降到2011年的20.9%。卢拉由此赢得了“C阶层”民众的政治支持，也成功在2006年实现连任。

However, during the 2011-2016 tenure of Lula’s successor, Brazilian President Rousseff, severe economic fluctuations and political instability reduced the government’s fiscal expenditure capacity and coordination ability. Although various welfare measures were continuously introduced, they did not fundamentally solve Brazil’s social problems, and ultimately the Workers’ Party lost its ruling position. The experience of the Workers’ Party in power shows that a development model relying solely on economic growth is unscientific. To comprehensively solve the various problems existing in Brazilian society, the Brazilian government also needs to adopt comprehensive policies to alleviate social contradictions, and only then can it achieve comprehensive and sustainable development.

然而，作为卢拉继任者，巴西总统罗塞夫在2011-2016年执政期间，经济的剧烈波动，政治的不稳定，使政府的财政支出、协调能力降低。尽管各项福利措施不断出台，但并未从根本上解决巴西社会问题，最终劳工党失去了执政地位。劳工党执政经验表明，单纯依赖经济增长的发展模式是不科学的。全面解决巴西社会存在的各种问题，巴西政府还需要采取全方位的政策以缓解社会矛盾，进而才能实现全面可持续发展。

II. The Prosperity Phase of 2003–2010: Analysis of the Brazilian Workers’ Party’s “Labor Socialism” Policies

二、2003—2010年的繁荣阶段：巴西劳工党“劳工社会主义”政策分析

On January 1, 2003, Lula was sworn in as president. The Workers’ Party became the first left-wing party in Brazilian history to successfully govern. Lula’s election rekindled the Brazilian people’s expectations for future economic and social development. During Lula’s eight years in power, the practice of “Labor Socialism” achieved Brazil’s golden economic growth in the first decade of the twenty-first century, making an outstanding contribution to solving prominent social problems such as severe wealth disparity.

2003年1月1日，卢拉宣誓就职总统。劳工党成为巴西历史上第一个成功执政的左翼政党。卢拉的当选重新唤起了巴西民众对未来经济社会发展的期待。在卢拉执政的8年间，“劳工社会主义”的实践实现了巴西经济在二十一世纪头十年的黄金增长，为巴西解决贫富差距严重等突出社会问题做出了卓越的贡献。

(A) Rapid Growth in Trade Export Volume

（一）贸易出口量的快速增长

As can be seen from the data in Table 1, exports did not become the cause of Brazil’s sustained economic growth. Between 2006 and 2011, exports accounted for only 5.6% of GDP, with an average annual growth rate of 0.2%. This had a minimal effect compared to government consumption, private investment, and especially private consumption. Although exports and capital inflows could not completely influence economic growth, they were sufficient to offset the restrictive effect of the balance of payments. Brazil’s foreign exchange reserves increased from US$54 billion in 2005 to US$379 billion in 2012, rising from 6.1% of GDP to 16.8%.

图片从表1数据可以看出，出口并未成为巴西经济持续增长的原因。2006年至2011年间，出口仅占GDP的5.6%，年均增长率为0.2%。这与政府消费、私人投资，特别是私人消费相比，作用甚微。虽然出口和资本流入并不能够完全影响经济的增长，但足以抵消国际收支平衡的限制作用。巴西的外汇储备从2005年的540亿美元增加到2012年的3790亿美元，从占GDP的6.1%上升到16.8%。

The rapid growth in trade export volume promoted Brazil’s economic development. During Lula’s tenure, the Brazilian economy grew rapidly (2003-2006, 2007-2010) (see Table 1). The main factors driving Brazil’s economic growth included the devaluation of the real in 1999, the global economic boom in the early 21st century, and China’s continuously expanding demand for primary commodities. Between 2001 and 2005, Brazil’s export volume increased by 64%, and export prices rose by 24%, which promoted a substantial increase in Brazil’s trade revenue. During this period, Brazilian export growth accounted for 43.5% of total demand growth, which was also the main reason Brazil’s GDP growth rate increased from 1.1% in 2003 to 5.8% in 2004. The global economic boom also brought increasing foreign direct investment and portfolio securities investment to Brazil: net capital inflows were approximately US$15 billion in 2003 and 2004, reaching US$116 billion in 2010, and thereafter remained between US$80 and 100 billion annually.

贸易出口量的快速增长，促进了巴西经济的发展。在卢拉执政期间，巴西经济快速增长（2003-2006，2007-2010）（见表1）。推动巴西经济增长的主要因素包括：1999年雷亚尔贬值、21世纪初全球经济繁荣以及中国对初级商品需求的不断扩大。2001年至2005年期间，巴西对外出口量增长了64%，出口价格上涨了24%，这促进了巴西贸易收入的大幅增长。在此期间，巴西出口增长占总需求增长的43.5%，这也是巴西GDP增长率从2003年的1.1%提升至2004年5.8%的主要原因。全球经济的繁荣还为巴西带来了越来越多的外国直接投资和资金证券投资：2003年和2004年的资金净流入约为150亿美元，2010年达到1160亿美元，此后每年资金净流入保持在800至1000亿美元之间。

However, the Workers’ Party government retained some neoliberal policies from the Cardoso government, which limited the growth impetus from exports. These restrictions included tight fiscal and monetary policies, a floating exchange rate, inflation targeting, and capital account liberalization. To fulfill his commitment to stabilize the economy, appease the opposition, minimize capital flight, and avoid conflict with powerful forces committed to neoliberalism such as finance and industry, Lula adopted a strategy of compromise. Given these compromise strategies, economic growth relying solely on foreign trade could not achieve sustainable economic development.

然而，劳工党政府保留了卡多佐政府时期的部分新自由主义政策，使得出口增长动力受到了限制。这些限制包括紧缩的财政货币政策、浮动汇率、通货膨胀目标制以及资本流动自由化。卢拉为完成其稳定经济的承诺，安抚反对派，最小化资本外流，避免与金融、工业等致力于新自由主义的强大力量发生冲突，采取妥协的策略。鉴于这些妥协策略，经济增长单纯地依靠对外贸易并不能够实现经济可持续性发展。

(B) Increase in the Minimum Wage

（二）最低工资标准的提高

The tax revenue brought by export growth enabled the Lula government to expand transfer payments and raise the minimum wage, thereby starting a new cycle of economic growth. However, the failure of the Cardoso government’s neoliberal policies also made it clear to the Workers’ Party that even if external conditions were favorable for economic development, traditional neoliberal policies still could not bring sustainable economic growth to Brazil.

出口增长带来的税收收入使卢拉政府扩大转移支付，提高最低工资标准，从而开启经济增长的新周期。然而，卡多佐政府新自由主义政策的失败，也让劳工党明确即使外部条件有利于经济发展，传统的新自由主义政策仍旧无法给巴西带来经济的可持续增长。

In his second term, Lula changed some of his previous policy approaches. Besides implementing neoliberal policies in a compromised manner, he also proposed a “New Developmentist Agenda” favoring the lower and middle classes. This shift also allowed the Brazilian economy to continue its steady growth. According to statistics, during Lula’s tenure, the Workers’ Party created approximately 21 million jobs. Especially from 2003 to 2014, the average real income of Brazilian residents increased by 70%, the unemployment rate fell by 3%, and the gradual increase in income promoted further improvement in distribution. For example, the share of wages in GDP fell from 50% in 1980 to 36% in the early 21st century, and by 2011, the share of wages in GDP had reached 50%.

卢拉在第二个任期中改变了之前的一些施策方案，除了妥协式推行新自由主义政策外，还提出了倾向于中下层民众的“新发展主义议程”。这一转变也使得巴西经济继续保持稳健增长。据统计，卢拉执政期间，劳工党创造了大约2100万个就业机会。尤其是2003年至2014年，巴西实际居民平均收入增长了70%，失业率下降了3%，收入的逐步提高促进了分配的进一步完善。比如，工资占GDP的比重从1980年的50%降至21世纪初的36%，到2011年时，工资的GDP占比已经达到50%。

Analyzing Table 2, the minimum wage policy implemented by the Lula government achieved remarkable results. Between 2006 and 2012, the real minimum wage increased by 27%. This increase had a huge impact on low-income labor groups. In 2005, 73% of formal employees and 47% of informal employees and self-employed workers had incomes between 1 and 3 times the minimum wage; by 2011, these proportions had risen to 79% and 49%, respectively. The increase in the minimum wage not only affected the labor market but also promoted improvements in various aspects of social security, such as pensions, social security, and unemployment benefits.

从表2分析，卢拉政府实施的最低工资标准政策取得了显著成果，2006年至2012年期间最低工资标准实际增长了27%。这一增长对低收入劳动力群体影响巨大，2005年，73%的正式雇员和47%的非正式雇员以及个体劳动者的收入达到了最低工资标准的1至3倍，到2011年，这一比例分别上升到79%和49%。最低工资标准的提高不仅仅对劳动力市场产生了影响，还促进了养老金、社会保障和失业救济金等各方面社会保障的提高。

(C) The Flourishing of Financial Credit

（三）金融信贷的蓬勃发展

In the area of financial credit, personal credit drove economic growth. According to relevant data: from January 2005 to December 2011, personal credit as a share of disposable income increased from 8% to 42%, and household credit and new consumer loans further spurred rapid economic growth. For example, the proportion of families with at least one credit card rose from 15% to 25%. Among citizens whose income was three to five times the minimum wage, credit card usage increased from 30% to 43%.

在金融信贷领域，个人信贷推动了经济的增长。据相关数据显示：从2005年1月到2011年12月，个人信贷占可支配收入从8%增加到了42%，家庭信贷和新的消费贷款也进一步推动了经济迅速增长。例如，至少有一张信用卡的家庭从15%上升到25%。收入是最低工资的3到5倍的公民，信用卡使用率从30%上升到43%。

On the one hand, the Lula government promoted reform in the financial credit sector, reshaping the government’s decision-making capacity and achieving coordinated economic and social development in Brazil. State finances injected capital into the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), aiming to enable the bank to provide loans and other financial support to domestic enterprises. This measure accelerated the development and growth of Brazilian national enterprises, such as Itaú Unibanco Holding, Banco Bradesco, Embraer, the construction company Odebrecht, the mining company Vale, the beverage company InBev, the steel company Gerdau, and the food company BRF. In 2007, the Workers’ Party government implemented the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) to accelerate infrastructure construction. Subsequently, it launched a Large Housing Programme (Minha Casa, Minha Vida) and provided additional fiscal allocations for education, health, and other public services, aiming to restore the government’s decision-making capacity, reduce economic dependence on foreign countries, and promote coordinated and orderly economic and social development.

一方面，卢拉政府推动金融信贷领域改革，重塑了政府的决策能力，实现巴西经济社会协调发展。国家财政为国家经济社会发展银行注资，旨在让该行对本国企业提供贷款和其他金融支持，这一举措加快了巴西民族企业的发展和壮大。诸如伊塔乌联合银行控股公司和布拉德斯科银行、巴西航空工业公司、建筑公司奥迪布里切特公司、采矿公司淡水河谷公司、饮料公司英博集团、钢铁公司盖尔道集团以及巴西食品公司。2007年，劳工党政府实施“增长加速计划”（Growth Acceleration Programme），加快基础设施建设。之后，又推出了“大型住房计划”（ALarge Housing Programme），还为教育、卫生和其他公共服务提供额外财政拨款，旨在重新恢复政府的决策能力和减少经济的对外依赖，促进经济社会协调有序发展。

On the other hand, policies such as public spending, transfer payments, and expanded investment further spurred vigorous economic growth. Faster economic growth, the increasing regularization of employment, rising employment rates, and export growth increased tax revenues and social security funds, providing nearly all the funding for public spending, transfer payments, and investment. According to a 2012 article by Morais and Saad-Filho, “Developmentalism and the Challenges of Economic Policy-Making in the Rousseff Era,” from 2003 to 2008, Brazil’s average primary fiscal surplus declined only slightly, reaching 2.3% of GDP, while the ratio of domestic public debt to GDP fell from 55% in 2002 to 40% in 2010.

另一方面，公共开支、转移支付和扩大投资等政策进一步促进经济蓬勃发展。经济增长的加快、就业不断规范化和就业率的提高以及出口增长，增加了税收收入和社会保障资金，为公共开支、转移支付和投资提供了几乎全部资金。根据2012年莫雷和赛德·菲尔的《罗塞夫执政时期新发展主义与经济政策制定挑战》一文可知，2003年至2008年，巴西政府平均基本财政盈余仅略有下降，达到GDP的2.3%，而国内公共债务占GDP的比例从2002年的55%降至2010年的40%。

(4) A Significant Reduction in the Poverty Population

（四）贫困人口的大幅缩减

Active fiscal policies, booming exports, increases in the minimum wage, and higher transfer payments fostered a virtuous cycle of economic growth and distribution in Brazil. This, in turn, drove a reduction in the poverty population and inequality during the Workers’ Party government, leading to an unprecedented economic boom.

积极的财政政策、出口的蓬勃发展、最低工资标准和转移支付的提高，促进了巴西经济增长和分配的良性循环，进而推动了在劳工党政府期间巴西贫困人口和不平等现象的减少，促使经济出现了前所未有的繁荣。

According to statistics, in 1993 Brazil had 60 million people living in poverty, accounting for 41% of the total population. By 2003, the number of poor remained at 60 million, but the proportion of the total population had fallen to 35%. In 2012, the poverty population dropped to below 30 million, accounting for 15% of the population. Additionally, the Gini coefficient also declined: from the mid-1970s to 2001, Brazil’s Gini coefficient for per capita household income hovered around the high threshold of 0.6, but by 2012 it had fallen to 0.53. The reasons for this decline were improvements in the labor market, national pension policies, and income transfer policies, such as the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família.

据统计，1993年巴西有6000万贫困人口，占总人口的41%，而到了2003年贫困人口数量保持在了6000万，占总人口比例维持在35%。2012年贫困人口下降至3000万人以下，占人口的15%。此外，基尼系数也在下降：在20世纪70年代中期至2001年，巴西家庭人均收入基尼系数在0.6的高系数边缘徘徊，2012年降至0.53。而产生这一下降的原因是劳动力市场的改善、国家养老金政策以及收入转移支付政策，如有条件的现金转移方案“家庭救助金计划”（ProgramaBolsa Famíla）。

Therefore, the economic growth under the Workers’ Party was initially driven by exports. Subsequently, policies to raise minimum incomes were implemented, particularly increases in the minimum wage and income transfer schemes supported by personal credit. In contrast, exports gradually lost momentum, while government spending and private investment remained secondary. The Lula government used limited, non-confrontational policies based on household income to achieve economic growth and income distribution. Under favorable external conditions, these policies could be sustained spontaneously by the market. However, there were also many problems in the implementation process. For example, private investment failed to recover; the production structure underwent no major transformation; public investment was insufficient to support the modernization of national infrastructure; and social policies did not fundamentally resolve unequal income distribution. During Lula’s tenure, the Workers’ Party adopted pragmatic “labor socialism” economic and social policies, which gradually revived the Brazilian economy from the economic depression of the late 19th century, achieving economic growth and social stability. But when external conditions turned unfavorable, the limitations of “labor socialism” became increasingly prominent, leading to the economic and social decline of Brazil during Rousseff’s tenure from 2011 to 2016.

因此，劳工党领导下的经济增长最初是由出口推动的。随后又施行提高最低收入的政策，特别是提高最低工资标准和在个人信贷支持下的收入转移方案。相比之下，出口逐渐失去动力，政府支出和私人投资始终是次要的。卢拉政府通过基于居民收入的有限且非对抗性的政策来实现经济增长和收入分配，在有利的外部条件下，这些政策可以通过市场自发维持。然而，政策实施过程中也存在很多问题。如私人投资未能回升；生产结构未产生重大转变；公共投资不足以支持国家基础设施现代化；社会政策并未彻底解决收入分配不均等。在卢拉执政期间，劳工党采取务实的“劳工社会主义”经济社会政策，使巴西经济从19世纪末的经济萧条中逐渐复苏起来，实现了经济增长和社会稳定。但当外部条件发生不利变化时，“劳工社会主义”主张的局限性日益凸显，导致了2011-2016年罗塞夫执政期间巴西经济社会的衰落。

III. The Decline Phase of 2011–2016: An Analysis of the Brazilian Workers’ Party’s “Labor Socialism” Policies

三、2011—2016年的衰落阶段：巴西劳工党“劳工社会主义”政策分析

Dilma Rousseff assumed the presidency in January 2011. The Rousseff government inherited the guiding ideology of “labor socialism” and implemented a series of new policies aimed at achieving faster economic growth and social stability. However, as the limitations of the Workers’ Party’s “labor socialism” became apparent, it stagnated in terms of growth and distribution, ultimately leading to Rousseff’s impeachment and the Workers’ Party losing its hard-won position in power.

迪尔玛·罗塞夫于2011年1月就任总统。罗塞夫政府在继承了“劳工社会主义”指导思想，推行了一系列新的政策，以实现更快的经济增长和社会稳定。然而，随着劳工党“劳工社会主义”局限性的凸显，其在增长和分配方面陷入滞缓，并最终导致罗塞夫下台，劳工党失去了来之不易的执政地位。

(1) Prominent Structural Supply Problems

（一）结构性供给问题突出

Brazil’s structural supply-demand problems in its industrial structure are long-standing. Both the Lula government and the Rousseff government were committed to changing the unbalanced structure of Brazil’s industry, but faced with deep-seated and long-standing structural supply-demand problems, their efforts still proved limited in effect.

巴西产业结构性供需问题由来已久。不论是卢拉政府还是罗塞夫政府，劳工党都一直致力于改变巴西产业结构不平衡的局面，但面临巴西结构性供需沉疴积弊的问题，仍显得作用有限。

In 2006, Brazil’s current account and trade surplus peaked at US$13 billion and US$45 billion respectively, and then gradually began to deteriorate. As the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Japan introduced quantitative easing policies, continuous inflows of foreign capital prevented Brazil from facing solvency problems. Although Brazil’s trade in goods remained in surplus until 2013, after 2006, with the volume of commodity exports unchanged, the growth in export revenue was almost entirely due to price increases. In contrast, Brazil’s import volume nearly doubled. Since 2007, Brazil’s current account had been continuously deteriorating, and in 2014 the fiscal deficit reached US$100 billion, equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. It was not until 2015, with the depreciation of the Brazilian currency, that the fiscal deficit decreased. However, accompanying the structural supply problems was a continuous economic downturn, and Brazil fell into the most severe economic crisis in its history.

2006年，巴西的经常账户和贸易顺差达到了峰值，分别为130亿美元和450亿美元，随后就逐步开始恶化。随着美国、英国、欧盟和日本推出量化宽松政策，外国资本不断的流入，使巴西避免了偿付能力问题。虽然巴西的商品贸易在2013年之前一直保持顺差，但2006年后，在商品出口量保持不变的情况下，出口收入的增长几乎完全是由于价格上涨导致的。相比之下，巴西对外进口量几乎翻了一番。自2007年以来，巴西经常账户不断恶化，在2014年财政赤字达到1000亿美元，相当于GDP的4.3%。直到2015年，随着巴西货币贬值，财政赤字才减少。然而伴随着结构性供应问题而来的是经济不断下滑，巴西陷入有史以来最严重的经济危机。

(2) Increasingly High Inflation Rates

（二）通货膨胀率日趋升高

Starting in 2013, Brazil’s inflation rate rose increasingly, and the real continuously depreciated. The exchange rate had played a key role in controlling inflation and international integration implemented in the early 1990s; on this point, the Workers’ Party continued the neoliberal policies of the Cardoso government. The Brazilian real remained persistently overvalued, with the average exchange rate rising from 3.08 reals per US dollar in 2003 to 1.67 reals per US dollar in 2011. In 2013, the real fell to 2.25 reals per US dollar. The depreciation of the real raised the price of imports in the domestic market, causing the inflation rate to break through the “upper limit” of the target range of 2.5% to 6.5% per year set by the central bank. This, in turn, led to a deadlock in the government’s macroeconomic policy: if it continued to control inflation through high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate, it would increase the current account deficit and exacerbate the economic slowdown; if it restricted wages and transfer payments to reduce aggregate demand, it would hinder economic growth and income distribution. Therefore, the Workers’ Party government used two means—price subsidies and administered prices—to control the inflation rate, but these measures were not only limited in effect but also carried high fiscal costs.

从2013年开始，巴西通货膨胀率日趋升高，雷亚尔不断贬值。汇率在20世纪90年代初实施的控制通胀和国际一体化中起到关键作用，在这一点上劳工党延续了卡多佐政府的新自由主义政策。巴西雷亚尔持续高估，平均汇率从2003年的1美元兑3.08雷亚尔上升到2011年的1美元兑1.67雷亚尔。2013年雷亚尔跌至1美元兑2.25雷亚尔。雷亚尔的贬值提高了国内市场的进口价格，导致通货膨胀率突破了中央银行设定的每年2.5%至6.5%的目标区间的“上限”，进而导致政府的宏观经济政策陷入了僵局，即如果继续通过高利率和汇率高估来控制通货膨胀，将造成经常账户赤字增加，经济放缓程度加剧；如果为了削减总需求而限制工资和转移支付，又会阻碍经济增长和收入分配。因此，劳工党政府实施价格补贴和行政价格两种手段来控制通货膨胀率，而这些措施不仅效果有限，且财政成本高昂。

(3) Serious Problems of Income Polarization

（三）收入两极化问题严重

The various poverty-reduction programs and social welfare systems implemented by the Workers' Party government reduced Brazil's poverty-stricken population to a historic low, pushing Brazilian society toward fairness and justice. However, income polarization in Brazil remained severe, and the wealth gap remained at a relatively high level in cross-national comparison. Brazilian tax return data show that income distribution improved only slightly during the Workers' Party's tenure, with the income of high-income groups remaining stable. From 2006 to 2011, the top 0.1% of earners captured nearly 10% of national income, and the top 1% captured 25% of total national income. Tax return data and household survey data indicate that from 2006 to 2012, the Gini coefficient for per capita household income in Brazil remained stable at around 0.69. The decline in the Gini coefficient was mainly contributed by capital profits and interest, income that is not subject to taxation in Brazil.

劳工党政府实行的各项减贫项目和社会福利制度，使巴西贫困人口降到了历史新低，促使巴西社会向着公平正义的方向发展。然而，巴西的收入两极化仍旧严峻，贫富差距横向比较仍处于较高水平。巴西纳税申报数据显示，劳工党执政以来收入分配改善较小，高收入人群收入仍旧保持稳定。2006年至2011年，收入前0.1%的人占有近10%的国民收入，收入前1%的人收入占国民收入总量的25%。纳税申报数据与家庭调查数据显示，2006至2012年，巴西家庭人均收入的基尼系数稳定在0.69左右。基尼系数的下降，主要是资本利润和利息的贡献，而这些收入在巴西不需要纳税。

Therefore, during the Workers' Party's tenure, policies such as raising public pensions, conditional cash transfers, and more equal income in the labor market achieved a degree of partial fairness in income distribution, but at the same time preserved severe inequality between low- and high-income groups and between income and capital distribution. As the income of the poor increased, Brazil's poverty-stricken population shrank and wage inequality gradually decreased, but the income of the rich did not decline. Income polarization will produce the following consequences: first, it means that policies that regulate income distribution by raising the minimum wage and through transfer payments will inevitably face constraints; second, the middle class will be squeezed by the pressure of the rich to maintain their status, the improvement in the living conditions of the poor, and the scarcity of high-paying jobs; third, reducing income polarization and increasing the income of low-income groups will raise the cost of urban service industries.

因此，在劳工党执政期间，提高公共养老金政策、有条件的现金转移支付和劳动力市场上更平等的收入，从某种程度上来说实现了收入分配的部分公平，但同时也保留了低收入和高收入群体、收入和资本分配的严重不平等。随着贫困人口收入的增加，巴西贫困人口减少，工资不平等程度逐步降低，但富人的收入并没有减少。收入的两极分化将会造成以下结果：第一，这意味着通过提高最低工资标准和转移支付来调节收入分配的各项政策将不可避免地受到限制；第二，中产阶级将受到富人为保持地位的压迫、穷人生活的改善以及高薪工作稀缺的挤压；第三，降低收入两极分化现象，增加低收入者收入，将会提高城市服务业的成本。

(IV) Mutual Constraints among Factions within the Party

（四）党内势力相互掣肘

The Workers' Party's pragmatic governing philosophy essentially revealed problems such as a deviation in the party's own identity and mutual constraints among factions within the party. The successful election of Workers' Party chair Lula da Silva had significant repercussions both domestically and internationally. Internationally, the Workers' Party's long-proclaimed opposition to capitalism and neoliberalism aroused concern among foreign neoliberal forces and investors; domestically, Brazil's lower and middle classes were full of expectations for the Workers' Party's rise to power, anticipating the arrival of the fair, democratic, and free world the party had described. However, the Workers' Party did not adopt the radical left-wing policy reforms it had proclaimed before taking office; instead, it partially continued the neoliberal economic policies of the Cardoso government, did not touch the fundamental interests of Brazil's upper class, and did not carry out deep-seated socialist transformations of Brazil's political economy. The Workers' Party "advanced change amid peace," adopting moderate and pragmatic economic and social policies with leftist characteristics. Its series of policies only temporarily eased social contradictions, without fundamentally resolving the fundamental contradictions underlying Brazil's wealth gap and social inequality. Today, Brazil remains one of the countries with the largest wealth gaps in the world. It can be said that the Workers' Party government was a "left-wing government without a left-wing agenda." Some within the Workers' Party itself, as well as radical leftists in Latin America, believed that the Workers' Party government's pragmatic policy positions were a betrayal of leftist principles. The mutual constraints among factions within the Workers' Party ultimately led to a split in the party.

劳工党的实用主义执政理念实质上表明了自身政党身份认同偏差、党内势力相互掣肘等问题。劳工党主席卢拉的成功当选在国际国内都产生了重要影响。从国外来看，劳工党一直所宣称的反对资本主义、反对新自由主义的理念引起了国外新自由主义势力和投资者的担忧；从国内来看，巴西中下层阶级对劳工党的上台充满了期待，期待劳工党描述的公平、民主、自由的世界的到来。但劳工党并没有采取上台之前所宣称的激进左翼的政策改革，反而部分延续了卡多佐政府的新自由主义经济政策，没有触碰巴西上层阶级的根本利益，也未对巴西的政治经济进行深层次的社会主义变革。劳工党在“平和中推进变革”，采取带有左派特征温和务实的经济社会政策。其一系列政策只是暂时缓和了社会矛盾，并未根本上解决巴西贫富差距和社会不公平等所指向的根本矛盾。如今巴西仍然是世界上贫富差距最大的国家之一。可以这样说，劳工党政府是一个“没有左派议程的左派政府”，包括劳工党内部的部分人士以及拉美的激进左派认为，劳工党政府的实用主义政策主张是对左派原则的背叛。劳工党内部势力的相互掣肘，最终导致劳工党出现分裂。

In summary, during the later period of the Workers' Party's governance, the limitations of "Labor Socialism" gradually became apparent. In the middle and later periods of Rousseff's administration, Brazil's structural supply-demand problems became prominent, inflation rose increasingly, and income polarization became severe; at the same time, the Workers' Party faced an identity dilemma. The Brazilian economy, driven by external environmental factors or the boom in private investment, was unsustainable. This was manifested in the following three aspects: first, Brazil's economic growth was based on an increase in foreign trade volume, while growth driven by domestic trade demand was accompanied by low investment and backward productivity; second, given the persistent global economic crisis, Brazil's exports made a limited contribution to economic growth; third, the decline of the Brazilian economy led to the internal disintegration of the Workers' Party itself. Therefore, the concept of "Labor Socialism" fell into a deadlock, and Brazil was unable to achieve sustainable economic growth and social development.

综上所述，劳工党执政后期，“劳工社会主义”的局限性逐步凸显。在罗塞夫执政中后期，巴西结构性供需问题突出、通货膨胀日趋升高、收入两极化问题严重，与此同时劳工党身份认同出现困境。通过外部环境的推动或私人投资的繁荣来推动的巴西经济是不可持续的，具体表现在以下三个方面：第一，巴西经济的增长建立在对外贸易量增加的基础上，且国内贸易需求带动的增长却伴随着低投资和落后的生产率；第二，鉴于持续性的全球经济危机，巴西的出口对经济增长的贡献是有限的；第三，巴西经济的下降导致劳工党自身内部开始瓦解。因此，“劳工社会主义”理念陷入了僵局，巴西也难以实现可持续的经济增长和社会发展。

IV. Reflections on the Rise-and-Fall Logic of the Brazilian Workers' Party's "Labor Socialism"

四、对巴西劳工党“劳工社会主义”兴衰逻辑的反思

At its founding, the Brazilian Workers' Party declared its adherence to socialist principles, but in the process of governing, it deviated from its original founding mission and gradually transformed into a governing philosophy of "Labor Socialism" with leftist overtones. During the 15 years of the Workers' Party's governance, the party government achieved a golden period of economic growth in the first decade of the 21st century and made outstanding contributions to addressing prominent social problems and contradictions such as the severe wealth gap in Brazil. However, behind Brazil's prosperity, seeds and hidden dangers of decline were also left behind. During Rousseff's administration, economic downturn and prominent social contradictions further exposed the limitations of "Labor Socialism," and the achievements made during the Workers' Party's tenure were largely erased. This ultimately led to the Workers' Party losing its governing position amid widespread criticism. Through an analysis of the rise-and-fall logic of "Labor Socialism," we reflect on the reasons for the Workers' Party's loss of governing power as follows:

巴西劳工党在建党之初就宣称要坚持社会主义理念，但在执政过程中却违背了自己的建党初衷，逐步转变成为带有左派色彩的“劳工社会主义”执政理念。在劳工党执政的15年间，劳工党政府实现了巴西经济在21世纪头十年的黄金增长，为巴西解决贫富差距严重等突出社会问题和矛盾做出了卓越的贡献。但是，在巴西繁荣的背后，也留下了衰退的伏笔和隐患。罗塞夫执政期间，经济下滑和社会矛盾凸显的情况，进一步暴露了“劳工社会主义”的局限性，劳工党执政期间取得的成果被消弭殆尽。这也最终导致劳工党在一片嘘声中，失去了执政地位。通过“劳工社会主义”兴衰逻辑分析，我们反思劳工党失去执政地位的原因如下：

First, the Workers' Party's policy reforms were confined to the concept of "Labor Socialism," which is not a scientific socialist theory. "Labor Socialism," as a left-wing trend of thought, adopts a critical stance toward the existing capitalist system and attempts to transform capitalism through moderate means. However, in the process of criticizing capitalism, it cannot scientifically reveal the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, correctly recognize the objective law of socialism replacing capitalism, and thus cannot point out the correct direction and path for transcending and replacing capitalism. When pragmatism had already backfired, the Workers' Party still clung to "Labor Socialism," failed to thoroughly promote political system reform, and attempted to move closer to the far right, leading to the internal disintegration of the party. The Workers' Party was not destroyed because it was too "left"; on the contrary, it fell from power in the process of moving toward the right.

首先，劳工党的政策改革囿于“劳工社会主义”的理念，并不是科学的社会主义理论。“劳工社会主义”作为左翼思潮，对现存的资本主义制度持批判态度，试图运用温和的方式改造资本主义。但在批判资本主义的过程中，不可能科学地揭示资本主义的基本矛盾、正确认识社会主义代替资本主义的客观规律，从而也无法指出超越和替代资本主义的正确方向和道路。劳工党在实用主义已经适得其反的情况下，仍旧执着于“劳工社会主义”，未能彻底的推动政治体制改革，且试图向极右翼靠拢，政党内部开始瓦解。劳工党并没有因为过于“左”而被摧毁，相反在向右翼靠拢的过程中下台。

Second, ideology concerns the banner and the path. Because different "left" and "right" trends of thought clashed in Brazilian society, it was difficult for Brazilian society to form a unified ideology. During the Workers' Party's tenure, capitalism was deeply entrenched and difficult to completely eliminate. The Brazilian Workers' Party relaxed its ideological work, adopted inconsistent positions, and failed to grasp ideological leadership. From the Lula government's implementation of neo-developmentalist policies to the Rousseff government's adoption of state interventionist policies, nothing proved effective. When private investment gradually decreased, public finances deteriorated, inflation rates rose, and GDP growth declined, the Workers' Party turned back to neoliberalism. These factors ultimately led to the diversification of guiding ideologies in Brazil, which allowed the party's positions in public opinion to be breached, and it lost its governing position.

其次，意识形态关乎旗帜，关乎道路，而由于“左”“右”不同的思潮在巴西社会激荡，使得巴西社会难以形成一个统一的意识形态。在劳工党执政期间，资本主义根深蒂固，难以彻底消除。巴西劳工党放松了意识形态工作，采取了反复无常的主张，未能把握意识形态领导权。劳工党从卢拉政府实行新发展主义政策，到罗塞夫政府采取了国家干预政策都无济于事。当私人投资逐渐减少，公共财政恶化，通货膨胀率攀升，GDP增长下滑时，劳工党又转向了新自由主义。这些最终造成巴西指导思想多元化，从而被攻破舆论阵地，丧失了执政地位。

Finally, people-centeredness is the most distinctive character of Marxism. As the international and domestic situation changed, the Brazilian Workers' Party, which at the outset declared its firm solidarity with the lower and middle classes, gradually became detached from the broad masses of the lower and middle classes and even united with right-wing parties. The Workers' Party attempted to use the thorough democracy of a mass alliance to conceal the essence of the absence of a subject, ultimately eroding the foundation of popular support. Therefore, the theory and practice of the Workers' Party, lacking the participation of the people as the subject, often fell into the predicament of multiple self-constructions, thereby deviating from the standpoint of the materialist conception of history.

最后，人民性是马克思主义最鲜明的品格。随着国际国内形势的变化，巴西劳工党从一开始宣称坚定地与中下层人民站在一起，到后期逐步脱离了广大中下层民众，甚至团结右翼政党。劳工党试图用大众联盟的彻底民主掩盖主体缺位的本质，最终瓦解了民众支持基础。因此，缺失人民这一主体参与的劳工党的理论和实践往往陷入多元自我建构困境，从而背离了唯物主义历史观的立场。

To sum up, the Brazilian Workers’ Party raised high the banner of “Labor Socialism” and created the Brazilian miracle; yet after a brief period of prosperity it rapidly declined. Its “rise” was due to its resistance to neoliberalism; its “decline” was due to its failure to thoroughly abandon capitalism, instead attempting through reformist methods to overcome the peripheral and dependent position of Third World countries within the world capitalist system. Analyzed from the perspective of Marxist theory, Lula’s “Labor Socialism” contains numerous unscientific elements. These include, for example, compromise with neoliberalism, a lack of the people’s subjectivity, and the failure to form a clear and firm top-level design [7]7 “Top-level design” (顶层设计) is a term used in Chinese political discourse to refer to comprehensive, systematic planning from the highest leadership level, often applied to reform strategies. ideology. This caused the Brazilian Workers’ Party, after it left office, to be succeeded as president by Jair Bolsonaro, the candidate of the far-right Social Liberal Party. However, during Bolsonaro’s term, owing to the sustained downward pressure of a sluggish economy and the catastrophic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, he did not win the support of the Brazilian people. On the contrary, the Brazilian people began to look back on the economic prosperity and social stability during the Workers’ Party’s period in office, and their identification with socialism continuously strengthened. Although in recent years Brazilian left-wing parties such as the Workers’ Party and the Brazilian Communist Party have been trapped in the vortex of the right, “Labor Socialism” remains highly appealing and still irreplaceable. On the morning of May 7 this year, Lula announced that he would represent the Workers’ Party in the 2022 Brazilian general election. In the latest opinion polls, popular support is concentrated mainly on former President Lula and current President Bolsonaro. With Lula returning to the political arena, Brazil’s center-left parties may win back the reins of government. For the Brazilian Workers’ Party to prevail in its contest against the right-wing conservative forces led by Bolsonaro, it must, while adhering to its original socialist ideals, follow the laws of historical development, continuously adjust, reform, and improve itself in light of world conditions and national conditions, and truly take a firm stand on the side of the people and unite the masses. Only in this way can “Labor Socialism” radiate vigorous vitality and dynamism in the post-pandemic era, further promote the sustainable economic and social development of Brazil, and achieve its own great transcendence.

综上所述，巴西劳工党高举“劳工社会主义”的旗帜，创造了巴西奇迹，然而在经历短暂繁荣后迅速走向衰落。“兴盛”是由于对新自由主义的反抗，“衰落”是由于对资本主义没有彻底抛弃，而是用改良的办法企图克服第三世界国家在世界资本主义体系中的边缘和依附地位。从马克思主义理论视角分析，卢拉“劳工社会主义”存在诸多不科学性。诸如，对新自由主义的妥协、缺乏人民的主体性以及未形成清晰坚定的顶层设计思想。这使得巴西劳工党下台之后，极右翼政党社会自由党候选人博尔索纳罗成为总统。然而，博尔索纳罗任期内，由于受到持续低迷的经济下行压力和灾难性的新冠肺炎疫情的影响，并未赢得巴西人民的支持。相反，巴西人民开始回望劳工党执政期间的经济繁荣和社会稳定，对于社会主义的认同性不断增强。尽管近年来诸如劳工党、巴西共产党在内的巴西左翼政党囿于右翼的漩涡中，但“劳工社会主义”极具号召力，仍旧无可替代。卢拉在今年5月7日上午宣布代表劳工党参加2022年巴西大选。在最新民意调查中，民众支持率主要集中于前总统卢拉和现任总统博索纳罗两人。卢拉回归政治角逐，巴西中左翼政党或将重新赢回执政权。巴西劳工党要想在与博尔索纳罗为首的右翼保守势力对决中获胜，就需要在坚持最初的社会主义理念的同时，遵循历史发展的规律，根据世情和国情不断地进行调整、改革和完善，真正站稳人民立场，团结民众。唯有如此，“劳工社会主义”才能够在后疫情时代焕发蓬勃生机与活力，进一步促进巴西经济社会可持续发展，实现自身的伟大超越。

(Author’s bio: Wang Shaoyuan, Associate Professor, School of Marxism, Shanxi Medical University)

（作者简介：王绍源，山西医科大学马克思主义学院副教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心