The Historical Evolution and “Theoretical Exaggeration” of Western Marxism’s Evaluation of Engels’s Philosophy

Since the publication of Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness* in 1923, Western Marxism has existed for nearly a century. Early Western Marxism, in its interpretation of Marxism, took a path that was different from both the positivism, reformism, and neo-Kantianism of the Second International and from Leninism. As Engels was one of the founders of Marxism, Western Marxism, in its attempt to reinterpret Marxism along a new path, inevitably had to evaluate Engels’s philosophy. Viewed diachronically, Western Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy underwent two shifts.

自1923年卢卡奇的《历史与阶级意识》出版以来，西方马克思主义已经存在近一个世纪之久。早期西方马克思主义在阐释马克思主义时走的是一条既不同于第二国际的实证主义、改良主义和新康德主义，也区别于列宁主义的道路。恩格斯作为马克思主义的创始人之一，西方马克思主义在另辟蹊径重新阐释马克思主义时必然会对恩格斯哲学进行评价。历时态地看，西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价发生了两次转变。

The Evaluation of Engels’s Philosophy by Early 20th-Century Western Marxism

20世纪早期西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价

The First World War brought severe political, economic, and cultural disasters to humanity, and objectively it also exposed the contradictions within capitalism more clearly, thereby further promoting reflection on the capitalist social system. At the same time, the victory of the October Revolution in Russia brought hope to some proletarians and working people in the West, enabling them to see the possibility of escaping exploitation and oppression. However, in the subsequent period from 1918 to 1923, the proletarian revolutions that broke out successively in countries such as Germany and Hungary all ended in failure. After the First World War, the stark contrast between the failure of proletarian revolutions in Western countries and the victory of the October Revolution in Russia prompted early Western Marxists, while examining the Marxism of Soviet Russia—that is, later the Soviet Union, namely Leninism—to reflect on the roots of the revolutionary failures. Since Russia at that time was entirely under the guidance of Leninism in implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Leninist philosophy was also regarded as the only correct ideology dominating the ideological sphere, this prompted early Western Marxists to begin reflecting, recognizing that Lenin-Stalinism was not universal and could not be blindly copied to other European countries. This reflection was embodied in the philosophical thought of early Western Marxists, opening another path for the interpretation of Marxism and forming the first evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by Western Marxism.

第一次世界大战给人类带来了政治、经济、文化上的沉重灾难，在客观上也使资本主义内部的矛盾更清晰地暴露出来，由此进一步促进人们对资本主义社会制度进行反思。与此同时，俄国十月革命的胜利给西方一些无产阶级和劳动人民带来了希望，使他们看到了摆脱剥削和压迫的可能。但是在随后的1918年到1923年间，德国、匈牙利等国家相继爆发的无产阶级革命都以失败告终。第一次世界大战之后，西方国家无产阶级革命的失败与俄国十月革命的胜利之间形成的巨大反差，促使早期西方马克思主义者在考察苏维埃俄国即后来的苏联的马克思主义即列宁主义的同时，不得不反思革命失败的根源。由于此时的俄国完全在列宁主义的指导下实行无产阶级专政制度，并且列宁主义哲学也被当作唯一正确的意识形态主导着思想领域。这就促使早期西方马克思主义者开始反思，认识到列宁—斯大林主义不具有普遍性，不能盲目照搬到欧洲其他国家。这种反思在早期西方马克思主义者的哲学思想中得到了体现，开启了对马克思主义解释的另一条路径，形成了西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的第一次评价。

In terms of dialectics. Early Western Marxists all opposed Engels’s extension of dialectics to nature, that is, they opposed the dialectics of nature founded by Engels. Lukács pointed out: “Engels’s exposition in *Anti-Dühring* … dialectics is a continuous process of transition from one determination to another, a constant sublation of contradictions, a constant reciprocal transformation; therefore, one-sided and rigid causality must be replaced by interaction. But he does not even mention the most fundamental interaction, namely the dialectical relationship between subject and object in the historical process, let alone place it in the central position of methodology that befits it.” Lukács believed that Engels misunderstood Marx’s historical dialectics and mechanically extended historical dialectics to nature. In Lukács’s view, dialectics can only be the dialectics of subject and object, can only be practiced by humans, and dialectics cannot possibly exist in nature. Nature divorced from humans is similar to Kant’s realm of the thing-in-itself, which cannot be understood or grasped. Korsch pointed out: “Lenin and his followers one-sidedly turned dialectics into objects, nature, and history; they depicted cognition merely as a passive mirror-like reflection of this objective existence by subjective consciousness.” Here, Korsch did not directly evaluate Engels, but he likewise opposed applying dialectics to nature, holding that only the dialectical relationship between ‘being’ and ‘consciousness’ exists. Gramsci pointed out: “The causal principle used by natural science to explain human history is in fact an arbitrary hypothesis, if not a return to the interpretation of old ideological systems.” Gramsci believed that the dialectics of nature was an arbitrary hypothesis that could not be applied to the explanation of human historical causality. Gramsci also criticized in his *Prison Notebooks* that Engels’s dialectics was attempting to prove certain cosmic laws.

辩证法方面。早期西方马克思主义者都反对恩格斯将辩证法推广到自然界，即反对恩格斯创立的自然辩证法。卢卡奇指出：“恩格斯在《反杜林论》中的论述……辩证法是由一个规定转变为另一个规定的连续不断的过程，是矛盾的不断扬弃，不断相互转换，因此片面的和僵化的因果关系必定为相互作用所取代。但是他对最根本的相互作用，即历史过程中的主体和客体之间的辩证关系连提都没有提到，更不要说把它置于与它相称的方法论的中心地位了。”卢卡奇认为恩格斯误解了马克思的历史辩证法，并机械地将历史辩证法推广到自然界。在卢卡奇看来，辩证法只能是主客体的辩证法，只能由人来实践，而自然界是不可能存在辩证法的。脱离人的自然界类似于康德的物自体领域，无法进行认识和把握。柯尔施指出：“列宁和他的追随者片面的把辩证法变成了客体、自然和历史，他们把认识仅仅描绘成主观意识对这种客观存在的被动的镜子式的反映。”柯尔施在这里没有对恩格斯进行直接评价，但是一样反对把辩证法应用到自然界，而认为只有“存在”与“意识”之间的辩证关系。葛兰西指出：“自然科学用以解释人类历史的因果原理，实际上是一种武断的假设，如果不说是事实上回到旧思想体系的解释上去的话。”葛兰西认为自然辩证法是一种武断的假设，不能应用于人类历史因果的解释之中。葛兰西也在其《狱中札记》中批评到，恩格斯的辩证法是在试图证明某些宇宙法则。

In terms of ontology. Gramsci did not agree with Engels’s positioning of Marxist philosophy. He believed that Marxist philosophy does not study matter from the perspective of natural science, but rather from the perspective of practice. Gramsci emphasized: “Engels’s statement that ‘the materiality of the world is proven by the long and laborious development of philosophy and natural science’ should be analyzed and made more precise.” Marxist philosophy is a monism of practice based on practice that transcends materialism and idealism, whereas Engels’s philosophy is a crude, closed materialism. In *Marxism and Philosophy*, when analyzing *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Korsch pointed out: “For them, all philosophy is equivalent to bourgeois philosophy”; “Similarly, they are precisely not opposing a particular philosophical system—they want to use scientific socialism to finally overcome and replace philosophy”; “Philosophy itself is not abolished merely by abolishing its name.” Korsch believed that what Engels opposed was always bourgeois philosophy; he did not intend to abolish philosophy. His true thought was both to inherit philosophy and to transcend it. Moreover, like Hegel, he sought to overcome the “contradiction between individual sciences and the philosophy that stands above them”; he wanted to maintain the independence of a limited sphere within philosophy.

本体论方面。葛兰西并不同意恩格斯对马克思主义哲学的定位。他认为马克思主义哲学不是从自然科学的角度来研究物质，而是从实践的角度去研究。葛兰西强调：“对于恩格斯所说‘世界的物质性是由哲学和自然科学的漫长和费力的发展所证明’的说法，应当加以分析和使之更加精确。”马克思主义哲学是以实践为基点的超越唯物与唯心的实践一元论哲学，而恩格斯是一种粗俗的、封闭的唯物主义。柯尔施在《马克思主义和哲学》中分析《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》时指出：“对他们来说，全部哲学等同于资产阶级哲学”，“同样，他们恰恰不是反对特殊的哲学体系——他们要用科学社会主义最终克服和取代哲学”，“哲学自身没有由于只是废除它的名称而被废除”。柯尔施认为恩格斯反对的始终是资产阶级哲学，并没有要废除哲学，其真正思想是既要继承哲学又要超越哲学。而且他和黑格尔一样都是要克服“个别科学和凌驾于其上的哲学之间的矛盾”，他要在哲学内保持一块有限领域的独立性。

In terms of epistemology. Korsch consistently opposed the theory of reflection; he believed that cognition is not a passive “mirror-like reflection.” If cognition is merely described as the reflection of subjective consciousness on objective existence, it destroys the dialectical relationship between being and consciousness. Lukács believed that there were some problems with Engels’s concept of practice: “Engels regards practice as the criterion for testing theory, and takes experiment and industry as typical examples of proving this … Engels’s argument is theoretically incomplete because it ignores the fact that the field of practice (without changing its basic structure) has, in the course of development, become broader and more complex than mere labor, and is mediated by more processes.” Lukács believed that the concept of practice should be broader, and that Engels had narrowed Marx’s concept of practice, confining it to the fields of experiment and industry.

认识论方面。柯尔施一直反对反映论，他认为认识不是被动的“镜子式的反映”。如果把认识仅仅描述成主观意识对客观存在的反映，就破坏了存在与意识之间的辩证关系。卢卡奇认为恩格斯的实践概念存在一些问题：“恩格斯认为实践是检验理论的标准，而把实验和工业看作是证明这一点的典型事例⋯⋯恩格斯的论点在理论上是不完全的，因为忽视了这样一个事实：实践的领域（在不改变其基本结构的情况下），在发展过程中已变得比单纯的劳动更加广泛，更加复杂，并以更多的过程为中介。”卢卡奇认为，实践的概念应该更加广泛，而恩格斯把马克思的实践概念窄化了，把实践概念局限在实验和工业领域。

The main characteristics of early Western Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy. On the one hand, the three representative figures of early Western Marxism generally did not accept Engels’s dialectics of nature. On this point, Lukács provided extensive discussion in his *History and Class Consciousness*. Korsch’s expressions in his works were more implicit; he rarely directly criticized Engels, with the object of his criticism always being the successors led by Lenin. Gramsci also called Engels’s dialectics an attempt to prove a cosmic law. However, the judgment of early Western Marxism on Engels’s philosophy was not a total negation, but a partial negation. They also all affirmed that Engels had made important contributions to Marxist philosophy. Lukács and Korsch also frequently quoted Engels’s words in their works to argue for the correctness of their own views. Gramsci consistently referred to Marx and Engels together as the “founders of the philosophy of praxis.” On the other hand, early Western Marxism always took Marx as its starting point when evaluating Engels’s philosophy. The reason early Western Marxist scholars called for a “return to Marx” was that, in their view, all the errors in Engels’s philosophy lay in his misunderstanding of Marx, which needed to be reinterpreted. However, they also all acknowledged that Marx and Engels could not be separated; their theories were integrated. Lukács believed that, apart from the theory of dialectics, Engels’s theory differed little from Marx’s. In *Marxism and Philosophy*, Korsch also used the combined term “Marx and Engels” to refer to Marxist philosophy. Therefore, in the view of early Western Marxists, understanding Engels’s philosophy could only be based on Marx, starting from Marx; it was impossible to discuss Engels outside the context of Marxism. However, because they did not accept Engels’s dialectics of nature, they inevitably created an opposition between Marx and Engels.

早期西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价的主要特征。一方面，早期西方马克思主义的三个代表人物普遍不认同恩格斯的自然辩证法。对此，卢卡奇在其《历史与阶级意识》中有大段论述。柯尔施在其作品中的表述比较隐晦，很少直接批评恩格斯，批评的对象都是以列宁为首的继承者。而葛兰西也称恩格斯的辩证法是在证明一种宇宙法则。但是早期西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评判并不是全面否定，而是部分否定。他们也都肯定恩格斯对马克思主义哲学作出了重要贡献。卢卡奇和柯尔施在其作品中也多次引用恩格斯的话来论证其观点的正确性。葛兰西一直把马克思和恩格斯合称为“实践哲学的创始人”。另一方面，早期西方马克思主义在评价恩格斯哲学时始终以马克思为基点。早期西方马克思主义学者之所以要求“回到马克思”，是因为在他们看来，恩格斯哲学的所有错误在于误解了马克思，需要对其进行重新解释。但是他们也都承认，马克思与恩格斯是不能分开的，其理论是一体的。卢卡奇认为，除辩证法之外的理论，恩格斯的理论与马克思的理论相差无几。柯尔施在《马克思主义与哲学》中也都是用“马克思和恩格斯”这样的合称来指称马克思主义哲学。因此，在早期西方马克思主义者看来，理解恩格斯哲学始终也只能以马克思为基点，从马克思出发，不可能离开马克思主义的背景去谈论恩格斯。但是，由于他们不认同恩格斯的自然辩证法，因而，不可避免地就制造出马克思和恩格斯的对立。

The main reasons for early Western Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy are as follows. First, the influence of the domestic and international political environment in which individuals were situated. The 1920s and 1930s were the peak period of proletarian revolutions erupting after the end of the First World War. Lukács joined the revolution in 1918 and moved to Vienna after the revolution failed in 1919. Korsch participated in the failed Hamburg Uprising in Germany in 1923. Gramsci was arrested while leading the Italian Communist Party’s struggle against fascism. The repeated failures of actual revolutions made them more willing to seek a theoretical foundation for the path of practice in philosophical theory. Later Western Marxism was called a “revolution in the study,” which is not unrelated to their early experiences of revolutionary failure. Therefore, the characteristic of Western Marxism—valuing theory over practice—was also formed. Second, the individual’s philosophical and cultural background. The philosophical and cultural education an individual received also greatly influenced the development of their theory. In his early years, Lukács came into contact with some ideas of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Kierkegaard, and was also influenced in literature by Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and others. As for Korsch, needless to say, he was German himself, carrying the flavor of classical German philosophy, and Engels’s dialectics of nature seemed to him more like Anglo-American positivism and empiricism. Gramsci, in his early years, was deeply influenced by the Italian idealist philosopher Croce. Third, the early Western Marxists’ affirmation of Marxism. The early Western Marxists believed that Marxism could save society. The victory of the Soviet Union had already confirmed this. Yet the revolutions after World War I had failed; therefore, the “problem” could only lie with subsequent inheritors. Engels was not only an inheritor of Marxism but also one of its important founders; thus, early Western Marxism would not hold a completely negative attitude toward Engels’s philosophy. Fourth, the early Western Marxists’ affirmation of human subjective initiative was reflected in philosophy as their expectation of changing history, hoping that individuals could alter the course of history. In the very first sentence of the main text of *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács quotes a sentence from Marx’s *Theses on Feuerbach*: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” From this, it can be seen that Lukács affirmed human subjective initiative; consequently, he would naturally hold a negative attitude toward Engels’s dialectics of nature, which diminishes human initiative.

早期西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学作出如此评价的主要原因。第一，个人所处的国内外政治环境的影响。20世纪二、三十年代，正是第一次世界大战结束之后的无产阶级革命爆发的高峰期。卢卡奇于1918年投身革命，1919年革命失败后移居维也纳。柯尔施于1923年参加德国汉堡起义失败。葛兰西更是在领导意大利共产党反对法西斯的斗争中被逮捕。现实革命的屡屡失败使他们更愿意在哲学理论上寻找实践道路的理论基础。后来的西方马克思主义被称为“书斋里的革命”，这与他们早期革命的失败遭遇不无关系。因此，也形成了西方马克思主义的重理论轻实践的特征。第二，个人的哲学文化背景。个人所受的哲学文化熏陶对其理论的发展也有很大影响。卢卡奇早年接触过尼采、叔本华、克尔凯郭尔等的一些思想，而且在文学上也受到托尔斯泰、陀思妥耶夫斯基等的影响。柯尔施不必多说，他本身就是德国人，身上带着德国古典哲学的韵味，而恩格斯的自然辩证法在他看来更像是英美实证主义与经验主义。葛兰西则早年受意大利唯心主义哲学家柯罗齐的影响至深。第三，早期西方马克思主义者对马克思主义的肯定。早期西方马克思主义者认为马克思主义是可以拯救社会的。苏联的胜利已经印证了这一点。而一战后的革命却失败了，那只能是后续的继承者出现了“问题”。而恩格斯不仅是马克思主义的继承者，更是重要的创始人之一，因此，早期西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学不会持全然否定的态度。第四，早期西方马克思主义对人的主观能动性的肯定反映在哲学上，也是他们对改变历史的期望，希望个人可以改变历史进程。卢卡奇在《历史与阶级意识》正文的第一句话就引用了马克思《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中的一句话“哲学家们只是用不同的方式解释世界，而重点在于改变世界”。由此可以看出卢卡奇对人的主观能动性的肯定，因而，对于降低人的主动性的恩格斯的自然辨证法就自然会持否定态度。

Mid-20th Century Western Humanist Marxist Evaluations of Engels’s Philosophy

20世纪中叶西方人本主义马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价

As the irresolvable contradictions within the capitalist system became increasingly acute, capitalist countries led by Germany, Japan, and Italy embarked on a path of external expansion, ultimately leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. The Second World War was one of the most severe man-made disasters in human history. Thereafter, Western scholars increasingly criticized capitalism, while also engaging in deeper reflections on human existence itself. In terms of scholarly theory, the public release of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* was hailed as a treasure by Western Marxists. They believed they had discovered a humanistic, humane, and human-scientific Marx, forming a sharp contrast with the “human-science vacuum” of the post-youth Marx. That is, after the young Marx was discovered, Western Marxists began to fabricate two Marxes. Consequently, wave after wave of humanist Marxist thought arose in Western countries, including some scholars from the Frankfurt School, Freudian Marxists, and existentialist scholars, with Merleau-Ponty and Sartre being the most outstanding representatives. They pushed humanist Marxism to its climax. As humanism came to dominate Western Marxism, Western Marxist evaluations of Engels’s philosophy also underwent significant changes.

由于资本主义制度内部不可解决的矛盾越来越尖锐，导致以德、日、意为首的资本主义国家走上了对外扩张的道路，最终爆发了第二次世界大战。第二次世界大战是人类历史上最严重的人为灾难之一。此后，西方学者对资本主义的批判越来越多，同时，对人自身的生存也进行了更加深刻的反思。在学理上，马克思《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的公开发表被西方马克思主义者捧之为瑰宝。他们认为发现了一个人道、人性、人学的马克思，与青年之后的“人学空场”马克思形成了鲜明对比。即青年马克思被发现后，西方马克思主义者就开始制造出两个马克思。由此，在西方国家引发一阵又一阵人本主义马克思主义思潮，其中包括部分法兰克福学派学者、弗洛伊德主义者和存在主义学者，梅洛-庞蒂和萨特就是其中最杰出的代表人物。他们把人本主义马克思主义推向了最高潮。随着人本主义在西方马克思主义中占据主导地位，西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价也随之发生了很大变化。

On the issue of dialectics. Merleau-Ponty believed that Engels’s dialectics of nature was a dialectics of methodology, without ontological significance. “Dialectics is this continuous intuition, a coherent reading of actual history”; “there is a dialectics of nature only in a secondary and derivative sense”; “each science produces its own dialectics, and Engels did not grant philosophy the right to arrange the results of various sciences within a primary dialectics.” Therefore, he believed that Engels’s intention to construct a grand, all-encompassing dialectics of nature was mistaken. In his article “Marxism and Revolution,” Sartre, after analyzing issues in Engels’s *Dialectics of Nature* concerning Darwinian evolution in biology and liquefaction and vaporization in physics, pointed out: “What Engels proclaims as the scientific method is nothing but the simple and pure movement of his own thought: from the world of science to the world of naive realism, and back to the world of science and the world of pure sensation.” In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Sartre further emphasized: “As for the dialectics of nature, it can in any case only be an object posited by metaphysical hypothesis.” Sartre’s evaluation of Engels’s dialectics was thus very sharp; he completely disagreed with Engels’s idea of a dialectics of nature, which he regarded as nothing more than a “metaphysical dream.”

辩证法的问题上。梅洛-庞蒂认为恩格斯的自然辩证法是方法论上的辩证法，并没有本体论的意义。“辩证法就是这种连续的直觉，就是对实际历史的连贯的读解”，“只有在第二位的和派生的意义上才有自然的辩证法”，“每一门科学都产生了它自己的辩证法，恩格斯并没有赋予哲学一种权利，让它把各种科学的成果都安排在一种初始的辩证法中”。因此，他认为恩格斯意欲构造一种庞大的、包罗万象的自然辩证法是错误的。萨特在《马克思主义与革命》一文中通过分析恩格斯《自然辩证法》中的生物学上的达尔文进化论问题以及物理学上的液化汽化问题之后指出：“恩格斯宣称为科学方法的东西，只不过是他思维的简单而纯粹的运动：从科学的世界来到朴素实在的世界，再回到科学的世界和纯粹感觉的世界。”在《辩证理性批判》中，萨特进一步强调：“至于自然辩证法，它在任何情况下都只能是一种由形而上学假设的客体。”萨特对恩格斯辩证法的评价就显得十分尖锐，完全不同意恩格斯关于自然辩证法的思想，在他看来，这只不过是一种“形而上学的梦想”罢了。

On the issue of ontology. Merleau-Ponty quoted a sentence from Engels’s *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*: “Philosophy ‘is both superfluous and impossible,’” intending to show that in Engels’s view there was no philosophy, let alone an Engelsian philosophical system. Even if there were, it would only consist of some immature philosophical ideas. In a letter to Garaudy, Sartre said: “What I understand by Marxism is historical materialism, which presupposes an immanent dialectics of history, and not dialectical materialism, if by dialectical materialism you understand this metaphysical dream that claims to have discovered a dialectics of nature.” Clearly, Sartre was extremely opposed to dialectical materialism, which originated with Engels, believing it was not Marxism but a mistaken metaphysics.

本体论的问题上。梅洛-庞蒂引用恩格斯在《路德维希·费尔巴哈与德国古典哲学的终结》中的一句话“哲学‘即是多余的，又是不可能的’”，是想说明在恩格斯那里没有哲学，更谈不上恩格斯的哲学体系。即使有，也只是一些不成熟的哲学思想。萨特在给加罗蒂的一封信中说：“我所理解的马克思主义乃是以一种历史的内在辩证法为前提的历史唯物主义，而不是辩证唯物主义，如果你们把辩证唯物主义理解为这种自以为发现一种自然辩证法的形而上学的梦想的话。”很明显，萨特对肇始于恩格斯的辩证唯物主义是极其反对的，认为这不是马克思主义，是一种错误的形而上学。

On the issue of epistemology. Merleau-Ponty pointed out: “By grafting dialectics onto the metaphysics of materialism… a non-transparent ‘second nature,’ posited as primary, is substituted for history as the relationship between people embodied in ‘things.’ On the theoretical level, this means sealing off history with all the power of ‘understanding,’ just as on the level of action, it means replacing all practice with a technical activity.” On the surface, Merleau-Ponty is referring here to Lenin’s epistemology, but in reality, it is an evaluation of Engels’s epistemology. Because he opposed the epistemology formed by Engels “grafting” materialism and dialectics together. Sartre said: “Everyone is free to believe that the laws of physics and chemistry exhibit a dialectical reason, or free not to believe so. In short, in the realm of inorganic natural facts, what is asserted is always an extra-scientific affirmation.” Sartre denied the identity of thinking and being; that is, even if science were dialectical, we might not necessarily be able to recognize it; what we can recognize is only the dialectical nature of our own thinking. Thus, while negating Engels’s dialectics, Sartre also negated Engels’s epistemology.

认识论的问题上。梅洛-庞蒂指出：“通过把辩证法与唯物主义的形而上学嫁接起来⋯⋯用一种不透明的、被规定为第一性的‘第二自然’，来代替体现在‘物’中的、作为人与人之间关系的历史。在理论层面，这就是以全部‘理解’的力量来封闭历史，正如在行动层面，则是以一种技术性的活动来代替全部实践。”表面上看，梅洛-庞蒂在这里所指的是列宁的认识论，但是实际上却是对恩格斯认识论的一种评价。因为他反对恩格斯把唯物主义与辩证法“嫁接起来”而形成的认识论。萨特说：“每个人都可以自由的认为物理化学定律展示了一种辩证理性，或者可自由的不这么认为。总之，在无机的自然事实领域内，所作出的都是科学以外的肯定。”萨特否定了思维与存在的同一性，也就是说，即使科学是辩证的，我们也不一定能认识到，我们认识的只能是自己思维的辩证性。由此，萨特在否定恩格斯的辩证法的同时，也否定了恩格斯的认识论。

The main characteristics of Western humanist Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy. First, the critical tone toward Engels’s philosophy has not changed, focusing equally on Engels’s dialectics of nature. However, Western humanist Marxism has transitioned from criticizing Engels’s dialectics of nature to a wholesale critique of Engels’s philosophical thought. They generally believe that Engels had no philosophy, that the dialectics of nature is merely a metaphysical idea, and that dialectical materialism is an extremely erroneous philosophical form. Second, although the evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by Western humanist Marxism appears similar to that of early Western Marxism, the underlying logic has undergone a significant shift. This shift arises from the different “benchmarks” they use to evaluate Engels’s philosophy. They have abandoned the early perspective of examining Engels’s philosophy using Marx as the benchmark, instead turning to existentialism or other philosophical schools to scrutinize Engels’s philosophy. This has led to a collision between Engels’s philosophy and the ideas of other Western philosophical currents. For instance, Sartre consistently evaluated Engels’s philosophy from an existentialist standpoint. In general, the Western humanist Marxist scholars of the mid-20th century, when interpreting Marxism, exhibited vast differences from Engels, one of the founders of Marxism, thus creating a sharp contrast in their evaluations of his philosophy.

西方人本主义马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价的主要特征。第一，对恩格斯哲学批判的基调没有改变，同样集中在恩格斯的自然辩证法上。但是，西方人本主义马克思主义从对恩格斯自然辩证法思想的批判，过渡到对恩格斯哲学思想的整体批判。他们普遍认为，恩格斯没有哲学，自然辩证法只是一种形而上学的思想，辩证唯物主义也是一种极其错误的哲学形态。第二，西方人本主义马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价与早期西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价看似相似，但其中的逻辑却发生了很大转变。这个转变是由他们对恩格斯哲学评价的“基准”不同而带来的。他们抛弃了早期以马克思为基准点来审视恩格斯哲学的视角，转而从存在主义或其他哲学流派的视角来审视恩格斯哲学。这就导致了恩格斯哲学同其他西方哲学流派的思想间的碰撞。如萨特就是始终站在一个存在主义的视角来评价恩格斯哲学。总的来说，20世纪中叶的西方人本主义马克思主义学者在对马克思主义进行阐释时与作为马克思主义创始人之一的恩格斯有着巨大的差异，所以对恩格斯哲学的评价才会形成巨大反差。

The reasons for this contrast are mainly the following four. First, the Western humanist Marxism of the mid-20th century focused primarily on the critical nature of Marxist philosophy, rather than its scientific character. In their view, the most important function of Marxist philosophy was its social critique, often neglecting its scientific aspect. Consequently, Engels, as an interpreter of Marxist philosophy, was seen as having made only an erroneous interpretation, and his philosophy was necessarily wrong. They called themselves Marxists, but only in a socio-historical sense. They borrowed Marx’s theory of social history to critique capitalism, while considering dialectical materialism entirely “unnecessary.” Second, the influence of philosophical culture. The first half of the 20th century witnessed significant developments in philosophy, most notably the linguistic turn and the “phenomenological movement.” These two philosophical currents altered previous philosophical approaches and advocated transcending the modern “dichotomy of philosophy” between materialism and idealism. Therefore, modern philosophers, when reflecting on modern philosophy, often adopted a “condescending” attitude. This is also why, when evaluating Engels’s philosophy, they tended to “completely deny” it, viewing it as merely a “metaphysical dream.” Third, the Western humanist Marxism of the mid-20th century abandoned the early Western Marxist practice of “whenever Engels is mentioned, Marx must be mentioned,” instead shifting their perspective to Engels as an independent individual. Thus, for them, evaluating Engels’s philosophy became “merely” an evaluation of Engels’s philosophy, with no need to link it to Marx. Even a total negation of Engels’s philosophy would not affect the correctness of Marx’s social critique theory. Fourth, the Western humanist Marxist evaluation of Engels’s philosophy was always inseparable from their emphasis on “the human.” Due to World War II, people’s sense of crisis and disillusionment with capitalism deepened once again. “The human” re-emerged as the theme of the times. In their view, Engels’s philosophy, which neglected the human, was precisely an “empty space of humanism.” Based on such a presupposed stance, their negation of Engels’s philosophy was inevitable.

形成这种反差的原因主要有以下四点。第一，20世纪中期的西方人本主义马克思主义重点关注的是马克思主义哲学的批判性，而不是马克思主义哲学的科学性。在他们看来，马克思主义哲学最重要的作用是社会批判功能，往往忽视了马克思主义哲学的科学性。因此，作为马克思主义哲学诠释者的恩格斯只是作了一种错误的诠释，其哲学也必然是错误的。他们自称为马克思主义者，也是在一种社会历史学的立场上承认。他们借用马克思的社会历史理论对资本主义进行批判，而认为辩证唯物主义则完全“没有必要”。第二，哲学文化的影响。20世纪上半叶，哲学经历了一个较大的发展，最为著名的是语言哲学的转向和“现象学运动”。这两股哲学思潮改变了以往的哲学进路，而且主张超越近代的唯物与唯心的“二分哲学”。因此，现代哲学家在反观近代哲学的时候就会“居高临下”。也正是因此，他们在评价恩格斯哲学的时候，往往会“全然否定”恩格斯哲学，认为那只是一种“形而上学的梦想”。第三，20世纪中期的西方人本主义马克思主义放弃了早期西方马克思主义那种“谈及恩格斯必有马克思”的做法，进而把视角转向作为独立个体的恩格斯个人。因此，对他们来说，对恩格斯哲学的评价也就“仅仅”是对恩格斯哲学的评价，无须关联到马克思。即使全盘否定了恩格斯哲学，仍然不影响马克思的社会批判理论的正确性。第四，西方人本主义马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价如此，始终少不了他们对“人”的重视。由于第二次世界大战，人们对于资本主义的危机感和幻灭感又一次加深。“人”又重新出现，成为了时代主题。而在他们看来，恩格斯哲学忽视了人，恰恰是一种“人学的空场”。基于这样的预设立场，他们否定恩格斯哲学也就在所难免。

The evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by scientific Western Marxism

科学主义的西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价

The rise of scientific Marxism is closely related to the development of humanist Marxism. In 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU [6]6 The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), held in 1956, where First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev delivered a secret speech denouncing Stalin’s personality cult and repressive policies, marking a major de-Stalinization campaign. criticized the personality cult around Stalin, exposed his “atrocities,” and attributed all policy errors to him. This unscientific attitude toward Stalin led some scholars to doubt the scientific nature of Marxism. Consequently, more and more scholars in Western countries began to interpret Marxism from a humanist perspective. By the 1960s, humanist Marxism had reached its peak. Scientific Marxism emerged precisely as a reflection on humanist Marxism. Its main representative was Althusser, who sought to restore the scientific character of Marxism. “This trend attempted to combine structuralism with Marxism to complete a new exploration of Marxism, the essence of which was a certain degree of return to the philosophical direction of Engels.”

科学主义马克思主义的兴起与人本主义马克思主义的发展有着莫大的关联。1956年，苏共“二十大”对斯大林的个人崇拜进行了批判，揭露其“暴行”，把所有的政策失误都归于他。这种对待斯大林的非科学的态度，使一些学者对马克思主义的科学性产生怀疑。而西方各国以人本主义来解释马克思主义的学者也就越来越多。20世纪60年代，人本主义马克思主义的发展达到了顶峰。科学主义马克思主义正是在对人本主义马克思主义的反思下兴起的。其主要代表人物是阿尔都塞，他们要恢复马克思主义的科学性。“这一思潮试图把结构主义与马克思主义结合起来，完成对马克思主义的新探索，其实质是对恩格斯哲学路向的某种程度的回归。”

On dialectics. Althusser pointed out: “Although Engels had astonishing genius, his thought still could not compare with Lenin’s. Usually, he merely juxtaposed things rather than thinking about them in a unified relationship.” Althusser did not criticize Engels’s dialectics of nature, but he believed that although Engels was a genius, he still lacked a “relational” philosophical thought and had not escaped positivist methods. Colletti, in *Marxism and Hegel*, stated: “For Engels, however—the word dogmatism is innately (completely) linked to metaphysics—this passage appears in a distorted sense: the cause of metaphysics is none other than science. Therefore, to eliminate metaphysical dogmatism, one must oppose non-contradictory scientific thinking.” “Yet for Engels, scientific non-contradiction is a form of metaphysics, while idealist or metaphysical logic is the logic of the new ‘science.’” Colletti argued that Engels had reversed dialectics and the principle of non-contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction, as a scientific standard, was treated by Engels as metaphysics, while dialectics, as metaphysics, was understood by Engels as a scientific method. Therefore, he believed that Engels had greatly damaged the scientific nature of Marxism.

辩证法方面。阿尔都塞指出：“虽然恩格斯有惊人的天才，但他的思想还是无法与列宁相比。通常他只是把这些并列在一起，而不是把它们放在统一的关系中去思考。”阿尔都塞没有对恩格斯的自然辩证法进行责难，但是他认为恩格斯虽然是一个天才，但还是缺少“联系的”哲学思想，也没有摆脱那种实证的方法。科莱蒂在《马克思主义与黑格尔》中指出：“然而对恩格斯来说——独断论这个词天生地（完全地）与形而上学连接在一起的——这段论述以一种歪曲的意义呈现了出来：导致形而上学的原因不是别的正是科学。因此，为了剔除形而上学的独断论，就必须要反对无矛盾的科学思维。”“然而，对于恩格斯来说，科学非矛盾是形而上学的一种形式，而唯心主义或形而上学逻辑则是新‘科学’的逻辑。”科莱蒂认为恩格斯把辩证法和无矛盾原则弄反了。作为科学标准的无矛盾原则被恩格斯当成了形而上学，作为形而上学的辩证法被恩格斯理解为科学的方法。因此他认为恩格斯使马克思主义的科学性受到了极大的损害。

On ontology. Althusser, in *Lenin and Philosophy*, stated: “He never truly freed himself from the positivist themes of *The German Ideology*. For although he advocated the systematic study of philosophy, for him, philosophy had to disappear, because philosophy was merely the ‘workshop of the artisan,’ where the philosophical categories necessary for past science were formed. Those times are over. Philosophy has completed its work.” Althusser accused Engels of not escaping positivism; for Engels, philosophy was merely the “workshop of the artisan,” ultimately to be transcended. Subsequently, Althusser pointed out problems with Engels’s view of the object of philosophical study: “In fact, if the object of philosophy is pure thought, then Engels would find himself a Kantian without a transcendental subject.” Colletti believed that Engels’s philosophy, like Bergson’s, although differing in purpose, form, and program, shared a common theoretical core: the critique of intellect and the principle of non-contradiction.

本体论方面。阿尔都塞在《列宁与哲学》中指出：“他从未真正摆脱《德意志意识形态》中的实证主义主题。因为尽管他提倡对哲学进行系统的研究，但对他来说，哲学必须消失，因为哲学不过是‘工匠的实验室’，过去科学所必需的哲学范畴就是在这个实验室里形成的。这些时代已经过去了。哲学已经完成了它的工作。”阿尔都塞指责恩格斯没有摆脱实证主义，哲学对于恩格斯来说只不过是“工匠的实验室”，最终是要超越哲学的。随后，阿尔都塞又指出了恩格斯关于哲学的研究对象方面的问题，“事实上，如果哲学的对象是纯粹的思想，那么恩格斯会发现自己是一个没有先验主体的康德主义者”。科莱蒂认为恩格斯的哲学同柏格森的哲学一样，虽然目的、形式、纲领完全不同，但是却有一个共同的理论核心，就是对理智与不矛盾原则的批判。

On epistemology. Althusser said: “Engels indeed elucidated for us one of the conditions for the formation of an event in the history of theory: precisely, a theoretical revolution. We see that only by establishing the concept of theoretical events or facts that appear in the history of knowledge can we establish the history of knowledge.” Althusser affirmed Engels’s contribution to the history of knowledge. At the same time, however, Althusser accused Engels of ambiguity in the concept of the object of knowledge, empirically conflating the object of knowledge with the real object. Colletti carefully examined the philosophies of Hegel and Engels. He believed that Hegel’s entire philosophy “is split and broken by a profound contradiction; its ‘method’ and ‘system’ are forever in conflict.” And Engels precisely inherited this contradiction from Hegel, namely, the identity of thought and being. Therefore, Engels’s epistemology could only be contradictory.

认识论方面。阿尔都塞说：“恩格斯的确为我们阐明了理论史上的一个事件的形成条件之一：准确地说，就是理论革命。我们看到，只有建立起认识史上出现的理论事件或事实的概念，才能够建立认识史。”阿尔都塞肯定了恩格斯在认识史上所作的贡献。但同时，阿尔都塞又指责恩格斯在认识对象概念上的含混不清，他经验主义地把认识对象和现实对象混为一谈。科莱蒂仔细考察了黑格尔和恩格斯的哲学。他认为黑格尔的整个哲学“因一个深刻的矛盾而分裂和断开；它的‘方法’和‘系统’永远是相互冲突的”。而恩格斯恰恰继承了黑格尔的这个矛盾，即思维与存在同一说。因此恩格斯的认识论也只能是矛盾的。

In general, first, scientistic Western Marxism also has many criticisms of Engels’s philosophy, but compared with the total negation by Western humanist Marxism, there is a certain shift. This can also be regarded as a kind of return to Engels’s philosophy. In particular, Althusser’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy contains no small amount of praise for Engels’s genius. Second, the evaluations of Engels’s philosophy by scientistic Western Marxism mostly proceed from the relationship between Engels’s philosophy and science. In their view, Engels’s research spanned the two fields of natural science and philosophy. Engels’s ontology, methodology, and epistemology are all inseparable from the imprint of science. Third, although both raise different voices regarding Engels’s philosophy, the evaluations of Engels’s philosophy by humanist Marxism and scientistic Marxism stand in sharp opposition. Humanist Marxism opposes Engels’s dialectics of nature, holding that Engels severed the connection between Hegel’s dialectics and Marx’s dialectics, thereby scientizing and positivizing Marxism. Scientistic Marxism, on the other hand, criticizes Engels for inheriting Hegel’s erroneous “material dialectics,” which made Marxism metaphysical and ultimately caused Marxism to lose its scientific character.

总的来说，第一，科学主义的西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价也有诸多微词，但相比于西方人本主义马克思主义的全面否定还是有所转变。这也算是对恩格斯哲学的一种回归。尤其是阿尔都塞对恩格斯哲学的评价，其中不乏很多对恩格斯天才的夸赞。第二，科学主义的西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价，大多是从恩格斯哲学与科学的关系着眼。在他们看来，恩格斯的研究横跨自然科学和哲学两个领域。恩格斯的本体论、方法论、认识论，都少不了科学的痕迹。第三，虽然同样是对恩格斯哲学的不同声音，人本主义马克思主义和科学主义马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价却存在着尖锐对立。人本主义马克思主义反对恩格斯的自然辩证法，认为恩格斯割裂了黑格尔同马克思的辩证法之间的联系，使得马克思主义科学化、实证化。而科学主义马克思主义则批判恩格斯继承了黑格尔错误的“物质辩证法”，使得马克思主义形而上学化，最终使马克思主义失去科学性。

The reasons for scientistic Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy are as follows. First, the negation of Western humanist Marxism. The rise of scientistic Marxism is closely related to the rise of Western humanist Marxism. Scientistic Western Marxism emerged precisely as a trend opposing the humanization of Marxism. This opposition to the humanization of Marxism is also reflected in evaluations of Engels’s philosophy. On the surface, like humanist Marxism, they both negate Engels’s philosophy and reinterpret Marxism, but in essence, scientistic Marxism runs counter to humanist Marxism. Second, “abandoning Engels to preserve Marx.” [7]7 “Abandoning Engels to preserve Marx” (弃恩保马): A phrase used in Chinese Marxist scholarship to describe the strategy of some Western Marxists who criticize or set aside Engels’s philosophical contributions in order to defend the core of Marx’s own thought. There are many differences between Western Marxist interpretations of Marxism and orthodox Marxism, yet they believe in Marxism. Therefore, when encountering theoretical problems, they modify the peripheral aspects of Marxist theory (Engels’s philosophy) to avoid modifying the core (Marx’s philosophy). As the logical pragmatist Quine said: “Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.” [8]8 This is a paraphrase of a key thesis from W.V.O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951), which argues for the holistic nature of empirical verification. Third, the development of science and the examination of the relationship between science and philosophy. The immense development of science has brought unprecedented prosperity to people. All disciplines must pass the test of science to have a legitimate basis for existence. Philosophy’s position thus becomes awkward; science, which emerged from philosophy, has in turn become the benchmark for philosophy. Engels’s dual identity as a scientist and philosopher also influenced the evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by scientistic Western Marxism. Fourth, the negation of metaphysics. The metaphysical ideas in Engels’s philosophy are also a key focus of scientistic Western Marxism. Because scientistic Western Marxism must ensure the scientific character of Marxism, it must discard the metaphysical ideas within it.

科学主义马克思主义对恩格斯哲学如此评价的原因。第一，对西方人本主义马克思主义的否定。科学主义马克思主义的兴起与西方人本主义马克思主义的兴起有着莫大的关联。科学主义的西方马克思主义正是以一股反对马克思主义人本化的思潮而出现。这种反马克思主义人本化的思想也反映在对恩格斯哲学的评价上。表面上他们与人本主义马克思主义一样，都否定恩格斯哲学而重新阐释马克思主义，但是实质上科学主义马克思主义是与人本主义马克思主义背道而驰的。第二，“弃恩保马”。西方马克思主义对马克思主义的阐释与正统马克思主义之间存在诸多不同，但是他们相信马克思主义。因此，在遇到理论问题时，他们就会修改马克思主义的理论边缘（恩格斯哲学）而免于核心（马克思哲学）被修改。正如逻辑实用主义者蒯因所言：“在任何情况下任何陈述都可以认为是真的，如果我们在对系统的其他部分作出足够剧烈的调整的话。”第三，科学的发展以及对科学与哲学关系的考察。科学的巨大发展给人们带来前所未有的繁荣。所有的学科都必须经过科学的检验才具有存在的合法性基础。而哲学的处境就显得尴尬，脱胎于哲学的科学反过来成为哲学的标杆。而恩格斯作为科学家与哲学家的双重身份，同样影响了科学主义的西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价。第四，对形而上学的否定。恩格斯哲学中的形而上学思想也是科学主义的西方马克思主义重点关注的对象。因为科学主义的西方马克思主义要保证马克思主义的科学性，就必须摒弃其中的形而上学的思想。

The “Theoretical Predicament” and “Theoretical Exaggeration” of Western Marxist Evaluations of Engels’s Philosophy

西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学评价的“理论之困”与“理论浮夸”

World War I made early Western Marxist scholars aware of many unavoidable problems in the development of the capitalist system, leading them to turn to socialism for a way out. However, while actively seeking a way out, they encountered successive failures. Faced with such failures, they began to reflect on their guiding ideology—Marxism. This gave rise to the early Western Marxist evaluations of Engels’s philosophy in the philosophical domain. When early Western Marxists studied Engels’s philosophy, they primarily based their work on the exposition of Engels’s texts, while simultaneously conducting partial comparative analyses of differences with Marx. Early Western Marxists believed that Engels had misunderstood Marxist philosophy. First, Engels erroneously extended Marx’s historical dialectics to the natural world, arriving at the dialectics of nature. Second, Engels narrowed and weakened Marx’s concept of “practice.” This led to a decline in the status of “man” in Engels’s philosophy, while at the same time, man’s subjective initiative and infinite creativity were not guaranteed. This also opened a door for later humanist Marxism. Third, early Western Marxism did not entirely negate Engels’s philosophy. At the same time, early Western Marxist evaluations of Engels’s philosophy were always inseparable from Marx, always taking Marx as the starting point. Finally, because early Western Marxists did not have access to the first historical-critical edition of the Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA1), [9]9 MEGA1: The first historical-critical edition of the complete works of Marx and Engels (Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe), published in parts from the 1920s to the 1930s, but never completed. It was superseded by MEGA2, which began publication in 1975. their documentary sources were limited. Therefore, before World War II, the West generally did not focus on documentary verification methods. This was also one of the reasons early Western Marxist scholars could not truly separate Marx from Engels.

第一次世界大战使早期西方马克思主义学者意识到了资本主义制度发展中诸多不可避免的问题，进而转向社会主义寻求出路。但是他们在积极寻求出路的时候又遭遇接连失败。面对这样的失败，他们开始对其指导思想——马克思主义进行反思。由此形成了早期西方马克思主义在哲学上对恩格斯哲学的评价。早期西方马克思主义研究恩格斯哲学时主要是基于对恩格斯文本的阐述，同时与马克思进行局部的差异对比分析。早期西方马克思主义者认为，恩格斯误解了马克思主义哲学，首先，恩格斯错误地把马克思的历史辩证法推广到自然界，得出自然辩证法。其次，恩格斯缩小并弱化了马克思的“实践”概念。这就导致“人”在恩格斯哲学中地位的下降，同时，“人”的主观能动性与无限创造性得不到保障。这也为后来的人本主义马克思主义打开了一扇大门。再次，早期西方马克思主义并没有全然否定恩格斯哲学。同时，早期西方马克思主义对恩格斯哲学的评价始终离不开马克思，始终是以马克思为基点的。最后，早期西方马克思主义者由于没有接触到《马克思恩格斯全集》历史考证版第一版（MEGA1），文献有限。因此，第二次世界大战前，西方总体上不关注文献考订法。这也是早期西方马克思主义学者没有办法真正把马克思与恩格斯分开的原因之一。

In the 1950s, after experiencing World War II, Western Marxist scholars realized that the rapid development of capitalist science and industrial technology had not brought happiness to the majority of people. “Especially after World War II… the mode of human existence marked primarily by ‘consumerism’ became prevalent, even gradually spreading from the West to be accepted by other parts of the world. But conversely, some insightful people in the West also engaged in profound reflection from various angles and in various forms: Is this mode of existence the mode of existence that humans need and should have? Are humans truly happy living under this mode of existence? Can humans continue to live according to this mode of existence? Where will this mode of existence lead people? Do we need to seek a new mode of existence? How, after all, can humans live beautifully in this world? What is the necessity and reality of the human pursuit of a better life?” They increasingly focused on man himself and man’s state of existence. This post-war reflection pushed humanist Marxism to its climax. First, their study of Engels’s philosophy was not limited to the exposition of textual ideas; they also placed Engels’s philosophical thought within a philosophical system for analysis. When evaluating Engels’s philosophy, they focused on the wholeness of Engels’s philosophical system and the status of “man” within it. Second, they totally negated Engels’s philosophy, holding that Engels’s philosophical system was a kind of metaphysics, or that there was simply no philosophy in Engels at all. Of course, this is also related to the modern philosophical demand to transcend the “dichotomous philosophy” of materialism and idealism. Finally, from the perspective of an anatomist, they stripped Engels’s philosophy away from Marxism. Although both early Western Marxist scholars and the humanist Marxist scholars of the 1950s raised the issue of “man” in Engels’s philosophy, early Western Marxism raised it from the perspective of “practice,” while humanist Marxism raised it from the perspective of “existence.”

20世纪50年代，经历了第二次世界大战后，西方马克思主义学者意识到资本主义的科学和工业技术的高速发展并没有带来大多数人的幸福。“特别是在二战后⋯⋯以‘消费主义’为主要标志的人的存在方式大行其道，乃至从西方逐步流行而为世界其他地区所接受。但反过来，西方一些有识之士也以各种形式从各个角度进行了深刻反思：这种存在方式是人所需要和应有的存在方式吗？人处在这种存在方式下真的非常幸福吗？人能否继续按照这种存在方式继续生活下去？这种存在方式会把人带到哪里？我们是否需要寻求一种新的存在方式？人究竟如何美好地活在这个世界上？人对美好生活的追求的必然性与现实性何在？”他们越来越关注人本身、人的生存状态。这种战后的反思将人本主义马克思主义推向高潮。首先，他们研究恩格斯哲学不仅局限于对文本的思想阐述，还把恩格斯哲学思想放在一个哲学系统中进行分析。他们评价恩格斯哲学时着重关注恩格斯哲学体系的整体性以及“人”在其中的地位。其次，他们全然否定恩格斯哲学，认为恩格斯哲学体系是一种形而上学，或者在恩格斯那里是根本没有哲学的。当然这与现代哲学要求超越近代的唯物与唯心的“二分哲学”也有一定关系。最后，他们以一个解剖者的视角，把恩格斯哲学从马克思主义中剥离出来。虽然早期西方马克思主义学者和20世纪50年代的人本主义马克思主义学者都提出了恩格斯哲学中“人”的问题，但是，早期西方马克思主义是从“实践”的角度来提出的，而人本主义马克思主义则是从“存在”的角度提出的。

In the 1960s, scientistic Marxism emerged as a current opposing humanist Marxism. First, its proponents held that Marxism possesses not only a value dimension but also a scientific dimension. Humanist Marxism had neglected the scientific character of Marxist philosophy. In interpreting Marxism, scientistic Marxism also represented a kind of return to Engels’s philosophy. As Wang Yuchen emphasizes: “The essence of Althusser’s conception of Marxist philosophy is both to oppose humanist interpretations of Marxism and to oppose determinist and teleological interpretations of Marxism, striving to defend the relationship between the scientific character of Marxist theory and its ideological function.” [10]10 Wang Yuchen, “Althusser’s Conception of Marxist Philosophy and Its Theoretical Implications,” *Philosophical Research*, no. 3 (2002). In studying Engels’s philosophy, Althusser often engaged in a “symptomatic reading” of the texts. Second, although the scientistic Marxism of the 1960s maintained a critical stance toward Engels’s philosophy, it still affirmed certain aspects of Engels’s philosophical thought, including a recognition of Engels’s creativity. Finally, their evaluations of Engels’s philosophy all proceeded from the relationship between philosophy and science. Although the humanist Marxism of the 1950s and the scientistic Marxism of the 1960s both criticized Engels’s philosophy, their internal logics differed considerably. Humanist Marxism held that Engels had severed the connection between Hegel’s dialectics and Marx’s dialectics, thereby scientizing and positivizing Marxism. Scientistic Marxism, by contrast, held that Engels had inherited Hegel’s erroneous dialectics, thereby metaphysicizing Marxism.

20世纪60年代，科学主义马克思主义作为一种反对人本主义马克思主义的思潮而产生。首先，他们认为马克思主义不仅具有价值维度，更具有科学维度。人本主义马克思主义忽略了马克思主义哲学的科学性。科学主义马克思主义在阐释马克思主义时，也算是对恩格斯哲学的一种回归。正如王雨辰强调：“阿尔都塞的马克思主义哲学观的本质是既要反对人道主义的马克思主义解释，又要反对决定论、目的论的马克思主义解释，力图捍卫马克思主义理论的科学性与意识形态职能的关系。”阿尔都塞在研究恩格斯哲学时常常对文本进行“症候式阅读”。其次，20世纪60年代的科学主义马克思主义虽然对恩格斯哲学持批评态度，但是在某些方面还是认同恩格斯的哲学思想，其中不乏对恩格斯创造性的肯定。最后，他们对恩格斯哲学的评价都是从哲学与科学的关系入手。虽然20世纪50年代的人本主义马克思主义同20世纪60年代的科学主义马克思主义同样对恩格斯哲学进行了批判，但是其内在逻辑却存在很大不同。人本主义马克思主义认为恩格斯割裂了黑格尔同马克思的辩证法之间的联系，使得马克思主义科学化、实证化。而科学主义马克思主义则认为恩格斯继承了黑格尔错误的辩证法，使得马克思主义形而上学化。

It can be said that Western Marxist critiques of Engels were more about consolidating their own “variegated” theories—that is, presupposing Engels’s thought as the antithesis of their own theory and affirming themselves by negating the other. For example, to showcase their own “humanism,” they presupposed that Engels’s “nature” was divorced from human practice, one-sidedly emphasizing Marx’s humanism and Engels’s materialism, and severing the connection between the two—a move tinged with exaggeration. In reality, Marx and Engels held consistent views on the dialectics of nature: for Marx, his dialectics and materialism were grounded in the complex interrelationship between society and nature, which together constitute a unified reality requiring a unified scientific explanation. Marx incorporated both society and nature into the system of dialectics; even though he considered the dialectics of nature to be “less” fully and completely developed than the dialectics of society, he did not negate the dialectics of nature. Furthermore, for Engels, our understanding of nature is dialectical and becomes possible only through human practice, including the experimental methods introduced by science and technology. Finally, Western Marxist critiques of contemporary capitalism actually align with Engels’s thought on the dialectics of nature. Engels constructed a dialectical concept of nature through the connection between “nature and society”; it is precisely because the alienated society of capitalism has destroyed the laws of nature’s regeneration and sustainable development, thereby causing a global ecological crisis, that these crises originate precisely from the artificial severance of the relationship between natural reality and human consciousness.

可以说，西方马克思主义对于恩格斯的批判更多的是为了巩固自己“异彩”的理论，即预设恩格斯的思想是自己理论的对立面，通过否定对方的方式来肯定自己。比如，为了展示自己的“人本主义”，预设了恩格斯的“自然”是脱离了人的实践的，并片面强调马克思的人道主义和恩格斯的唯物主义，割裂了两者之间的联系，这带有夸大色彩。实际上，马克思和恩格斯在自然辩证法上的观点是一致的：对于马克思来说，其辩证法和唯物主义是建立在社会和自然之间复杂的相互关系基础上的，这两者构成了统一的现实，需要统一的科学解释。马克思将社会和自然都纳入辩证法体系中，即使他认为自然辩证法发展得“不如”社会辩证法充分和完全，但是马克思并没有否定自然辩证法。另外，对于恩格斯来说，我们对于自然的理解是辩证的，通过人的实践才成为可能的，包括科学技术所引入的实验方法。最后，西方马克思主义对于当代资本主义的批判实际上正契合了恩格斯的自然辩证法思想。恩格斯通过“自然—社会”之间的联系构建了自然的辩证概念，正是由于资本主义的异化社会导致了自然的再生法则和可持续发展法则的破坏，从而造成全球性生态危机，而这些恰恰是来源于人为地割裂自然现实与人类意识之间的关系。

The historical evolution of the evaluations of Engels’s philosophy by the three major schools—early Western Marxism, Western humanist Marxism, and scientistic Western Marxism—reflects the changes in Western capitalism and the internal differentiation of Western Marxism. Among these three schools, the representatives who opposed Engels’s philosophy ostensibly stood on an anti-capitalist position, but whether of the right or the “left,” they were inextricably linked to capitalism and never shed various tendencies of bourgeois thought. Therefore, their theories criticizing Engels’s philosophy fully fit Marx’s assessment of bourgeois politicians in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: “The bourgeois, and above all the bourgeois who has risen to the status of a politician, makes up for his practical baseness by theoretical pompousness.” [11]11 Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 11 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995), p. 139. Conversely, the reason why the Western Marxists who criticized Engels’s philosophy exhibited theoretical “pompousness” is, as Marx said, fundamentally due to their severe deficiency in “practice.” The Western Marxists who criticized Engels’s philosophy, detached from the vivid practice of the proletarian revolution, found it difficult to shed their petty-bourgeois stance, lacked a thorough understanding of historical materialism, and thus indulged in theoretical pompousness, fabrication, and theoretical intimidation, ultimately inevitably moving to the opposite of Marxism and becoming dust of history. Thus, by examining Western Marxist attitudes toward Engels’s philosophy, we can instead further excavate the theoretical depth, rich connotations, and tenacious vitality of Engels’s philosophical thought. (Notes omitted)

早期西方马克思主义、西方人本主义马克思主义、科学主义的西方马克思主义三大流派对恩格斯哲学评价的历史演变反映了西方资本主义的变迁和西方马克思主义内部的分化。这三大流派中，反对恩格斯哲学的代表人物表面上站在反对资本主义的立场上，但无论是右派还是“左”派，都与资本主义有着千丝万缕的联系，始终没有摆脱各种资产阶级思想的倾向。因此，他们批判恩格斯哲学的理论完全适合马克思在《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》中对资产阶级政治家的评价：“资产者，尤其是高升为政治家的资产者，总是用理论上的浮夸来弥补自己实践上的卑下。”反观对恩格斯哲学展开批判的西方马克思主义，之所以出现理论上的“浮夸”，根本原因正如马克思所说的是因其“实践”的严重不足。批判恩格斯哲学的西方马克思主义者，脱离无产阶级革命的生动实践，难以摆脱小资产阶级立场，缺乏对唯物史观的透彻理解，从而在理论上肆意浮夸、编造和进行理论恫吓，最终必然走向马克思主义的反面，成为历史的尘埃。如此，通过考察西方马克思主义对于恩格斯哲学的态度，我们反而能够进一步挖掘出恩格斯哲学思想的理论深度、丰富内涵和顽强生命力。（注释略）

(The author is a professor at the Moral Culture Research Center, Hunan Normal University)

（作者系湖南师范大学道德文化研究中心教授）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑