Monopoly Capitalism over the Past 40 Years

I. Introduction

一、引言

The publication date of K. Cowling’s *Monopoly Capitalism* is close to the period of transition in the way industrialized economies were viewed from the perspectives of Fordism, Keynesianism, social democracy, and the welfare state. This period around 1980 is generally viewed through the lenses of neoliberalism, financialization, and globalization. This shift in direction was marked by the election of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the US in 1981, with deregulation, privatization, and an anti-union agenda as the beginning of this new era. This article examines the relationship between the evolution of neoliberalism, globalization, and financialization since approximately 1980 and the analysis of monopoly capitalism. Monopoly capitalism theory is often linked to the concept of secular stagnation, which the author also explores in this article.

考林（K.Cowling）的《垄断资本主义》一书的出版日期，接近于从福特主义、凯恩斯主义、社会民主主义和福利国家的视角来看待产业化经济的时代转移的时期。人们通常从新自由主义、金融化和全球化的角度来看待1980年前后的这一时期。这一方向的转变以1979年英国撒切尔夫人和1981年美国里根的当选为标志，放松管制、私有化和反工会议程是这个新时代的开端。本文考察了大约1980年以来新自由主义、全球化和金融化的演变与垄断资本主义分析之间的关系。垄断资本主义理论经常与长期停滞这一概念联系在一起，笔者在本文中也有探讨。

II. Neoliberalism and Monopoly Capitalism

二、新自由主义与垄断资本主义

Monopoly capitalism theory regards the oligopolistic and monopolistic industrialized capitalist economy as the dominant industrial structure, accompanied by the exercise of monopoly and oligopoly power. Driven by mergers and acquisitions, there is a clear upward trend in industrial concentration. The analysis of the exercise of monopoly and oligopoly power draws on industrial economics (theoretical and empirical literature, particularly the structure-conduct-performance literature) and Kaleckian economics (the degree of monopoly). M. Kalecki hypothesized that the (industry-level) price-cost margin would be based on the “degree of monopoly” and broader market forces. According to A. P. Lerner, the price-cost margin is related to the elasticity of demand; the degree of monopoly is interpreted in terms of the elasticity of demand. However, Kalecki’s concept of the “degree of monopoly,” and thus the analytical approach of monopoly capitalism researchers, is quite broad. In the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) literature, the price-cost margin is related to the degree of industrial concentration, the extent of effective (if tacit) collusion, and barriers to entry including economies of scale and advertising.

垄断资本主义理论将寡头垄断和垄断的产业化资本主义经济视为占主导地位的产业结构，随之而来的是垄断和寡头垄断权力的行使。在并购的推动下，产业集中有明显的上升趋势。对垄断和寡头垄断权力行使的分析，借鉴了产业经济学（理论文献和实证文献，特别是结构—行为—绩效文献）和卡莱茨基经济学（垄断程度）的理论。卡莱茨基（M.Kalecki）假设，（产业层面的）的价格—成本利润率将基于“垄断程度”和更广泛的市场力量。根据勒纳（A.P.Lerner）的研究，价格—成本利润率与需求弹性有关；垄断程度根据需求弹性来解释。然而，卡莱茨基的“垄断程度”的概念以及由此而来的垄断资本主义研究者的分析方法都相当宽泛。在关于结构—行为—绩效（SCP）的文献中，价格—成本利润率与产业集中度、有效的（如果是隐性的）共谋程度以及包括规模经济和广告在内的进入壁垒有关。

Following the above line of thought, Cowling and M. Waterson proposed a formal oligopoly model, which Cowling largely drew upon. Through informal summation, we can derive an overall price-cost margin from industry-level price-cost margins. More importantly, the price-cost margin can be easily transformed, on the one hand, into the surplus share of output, and on the other hand, into the real product wage. Thus, the “degree of monopoly” provides a theory of income distribution characterized by the exercise of power. Kalecki and others extended this power beyond product markets to include the power of capital over labor. The surplus includes profits and managerial remuneration, which incorporates to some extent elements from managerialist literature, particularly where managers are considered to have some power to appropriate part of the surplus for themselves.

沿着上述思路，考林和沃特森（M.Waterson）提出了一个正式的寡头垄断模型，考林在很大程度上借鉴了这个模型。通过非正式的求和，我们可以从行业水平的价格—成本利润率得出整体的价格—成本利润率。更重要的是，价格—成本利润率一方面可以很容易地转化为产出中的剩余份额，另一方面可以转化为实际产品工资。因此，“垄断程度”提供了一种以权力行使为特征的收入分配理论。卡莱茨基等人将这种权力扩大到产品市场之外，包括资本对劳动的权力。剩余包括利润和管理层的报酬，这与一些管理主义文献有一定程度的结合，特别是在管理者被认为有一定权力为自己谋取部分剩余的情况下。

Clearly, monopoly capitalist analysis depicts the capitalist economy in a way entirely different from neoliberal doctrine. Neoliberal doctrine depicts a world where competition and free markets bring economic and social benefits, believing that these beneficial effects of markets are driven by incentives and the pursuit of profit. Neoliberalism emphasizes the expansion of the market mechanism, extending market transactions to areas previously excluded, and emphasizes the deregulation of markets. As a doctrine, neoliberalism emphasizes the beneficial role of markets and competition, drawing heavily on Austrian school economics and neoclassical economics. The neoclassical tradition leads to the view that perfectly competitive markets are considered efficient and yield (Pareto) optimal outcomes. The assumptions required (e.g., no externalities, no economies of scale) may be considered strong, but are still used to support arguments for removing restrictions and regulations deemed to hinder the achievement of competitive outcomes. The Austrian school approach emphasizes the entrepreneurial discovery process of competition.

显然，垄断资本主义分析是以一种与新自由主义学说完全不同的方式描绘资本主义经济。新自由主义学说描绘了竞争和自由市场带来经济效益和社会效益的世界，认为市场的这些有益影响是由激励和追求利润所推动的。新自由主义强调市场机制的扩展，将市场交易扩展到以往被排除在外的领域，并强调解除对市场的管制。作为一种学说，新自由主义强调市场和竞争的有益作用，这在很大程度上借鉴了奥地利学派经济学和新古典主义经济学。新古典主义传统引出了这样一种观点，即完全竞争的市场被认为是有效的和（帕累托）最优的结果。需要做出的假设（例如不存在外部性、规模经济）可能被认为是强有力的，但还是被用来支持取消那些被认为阻碍实现竞争结果的限制和规定的论点。奥地利学派的方法强调竞争的创业发现过程。

The pursuit of neoliberal economic policies has not been consistent across different periods or countries, nor does it fully conform to so-called neoliberalism. These neoliberal policies include tax cuts, especially on corporate profits, and a shift from direct to indirect taxes based on providing incentives and promoting investment. Privatization and liberalization of product and financial markets are another major factor. Privatization often involves former public monopolies becoming private monopolies, although still subject to some regulation (with the problem of regulatory capture). Another major factor involves the weakening of the role and influence of trade unions. Developments in work, employment, and wages, the growth of precarious work, and zero-hour contracts, among others, are consistent with the neoliberal view of creating so-called competitive labor markets.

在不同的时期或不同的国家，对新自由主义经济政策的追求并不一致，也不完全符合所谓的新自由主义。这些新自由主义政策包括减税，特别是对公司利润进行减税，在提供激励和促进投资的基础上从直接税转向间接税。产品和金融市场的私有化、自由化是另一个主要因素。私有化往往涉及曾经的公共垄断变成私人垄断，尽管还要受一定的管制（有监管俘获的问题）。另一个主要因素涉及工会的作用和影响力的削弱。工作、就业和工资方面的发展，不稳定工作的增长以及零工时合同等，都与新自由主义创造所谓竞争性劳动力市场的观点相一致。

The theoretical models and analyses of neoclassical and Austrian school economists can be contrasted with “actually existing neoliberalism.” As described by monopoly capitalism, in a capitalist economy, there is a tendency for the absolute and relative size of large corporations to increase further. This does not necessarily imply a decline in competition in the sense of competitive behavior between firms or capital mobility, although oligopolistic conditions facilitate tacit collusion and mutual understanding among them.

新古典主义者和奥地利学派的理论模型和分析可以与“实存的新自由主义”进行对比。正如垄断资本主义所描述的，在资本主义经济中，大型公司的绝对规模和相对规模都有进一步扩大的趋势。这并不意味着企业间竞争性行为或资本流动性意义上的竞争必然下降，尽管寡头垄断的情况有助于它们暗中串谋和相互了解。

The hallmark of neoliberalism should be promoting competition and removing barriers to competition. Regulations that make entry into an industry difficult are condemned for entrenching the dominant positions of large corporations, reducing competition, especially in the form of “contestable markets.” In the neoliberal world, competition and monopoly policy present a paradox—seeking to strengthen competition while corporate behavior and characteristics weaken it. The Chicago school argument is that it is government action that restricts competition. The neoliberal era has not been an era of strong competition policy—no company has been “broken up” (except for AT&T), comparable to the antitrust measures in the early 20th century in the United States. Merger policy has blocked some mergers and imposed conditions on others. However, as M. Meagher argues, mergers and acquisitions are an important factor in rising concentration. General evidence suggests that mergers and acquisitions have not improved the overall profitability of the merged firms. Cowling and others argue that while market power tends to increase after a merger, potentially raising profitability, productive efficiency is likely to decline.

新自由主义的标志应该是促进竞争和消除竞争壁垒。人们谴责那些使进入某个行业变得困难重重的法规，认为其巩固了大公司根深蒂固的地位，减少了竞争，尤其是“可竞争市场”形式的竞争。在新自由主义的世界里，竞争和垄断政策是一个悖论——寻求加强竞争，而公司的行为和特性又会削弱竞争。芝加哥学派的论点是，限制竞争的是政府行为。新自由主义时代不是一个强竞争政策的时代——没有哪家公司被“拆分”（美国电话电报公司除外），可与美国20世纪初的反垄断措施相提并论。并购政策阻止了一些兼并，并对其他一些兼并施加了条件。但是，正如米格（M.Meagher）所说，并购是集中度上升的重要因素。普遍的证据表明，并购并没有提高被兼并公司的整体盈利能力。考林等人认为，随着市场力量在兼并后的上升，企业的盈利能力往往会得到提高，但生产效率很可能会下降。

The neoliberal policy agenda is often advocated on the grounds that “economic prosperity will follow.” As outlined above, the general economic outcomes do not support any great success from the neoliberal agenda, although many other policies and structural changes affect economic performance. S. Rosenberg points out: “Overall, over the past 40 years, the neoliberal agenda has had a significant impact on the political economy of the United States.” The resilience of neoliberalism raises questions about the success of the neoliberal agenda itself and its impact on economic well-being. Rosenberg notes that “the increasing importance of firms with monopoly and/or oligopoly power is inconsistent with the essence of neoliberalism, which emphasizes coordinating individual decisions through free and competitive markets,” which is a clear reflection of monopoly capitalism and the absence of free competitive markets. Furthermore, “with such concentrated power in product markets and the workplace, income cannot be assumed, as neoliberalism does, to be primarily distributed based on the productive contributions of factors of production such as labor and capital.” Rosenberg also points out that the expansion of profit margins has not led to high private investment, that economic inequality in American society has intensified under the neoliberal regime, and that the economy has not become more dynamic or efficient.

人们经常以“经济繁荣将随之而来”这一理由来倡导新自由主义政策议程。正如上面概括的那样，一般的经济结果并不支持来自新自由主义议程的任何巨大成功，尽管许多其他政策和结构变化会影响经济表现。罗森伯格（S.Rosenberg）指出：“总的来说，在过去的40年里，新自由主义议程对美国的政治经济产生了重大影响。”新自由主义的韧性提出了新自由主义议程本身是否成功及其对经济福祉有什么影响的问题。罗森伯格指出，“拥有垄断和/或寡头垄断权力的公司的重要性日益增加，这与新自由主义的本质是不一致的，后者强调通过自由竞争市场来协调个人的决策”，这是对垄断资本主义以及不存在自由竞争市场的明确反映。此外，“在产品市场和工作场所的权力如此集中的情况下，不能像新自由主义所假设的那样，认为收入主要是基于劳动力和资本等生产要素的生产贡献来进行分配的”。罗森伯格还指出，利润率的扩大并没有带来高额的私人投资，在新自由主义体制下，美国社会的经济不平等加剧，且经济没有变得更有活力或更有效率。

According to K. Albertson and P. Stepney, citing Margaret Thatcher, the failure of the British neoliberal experiment itself is evident, because “the evidence does not support the claim” that “she improved the economic prospects of Britain and all its citizens through the application of neoliberal policies… Economic growth during Thatcher’s tenure was weaker than under previous governments. If subsequent governments performed poorly, it was not because they fundamentally deviated from her policy prescriptions. The costs of the lack of growth were borne disproportionately by the poor.”

根据阿尔伯森（K.Albertson）和斯特普尼（P.Stepney）引用撒切尔夫人的说法，英国新自由主义试验本身的失败是显而易见的，因为“证据不支持以下主张”，即“她通过应用新自由主义政策改善了英国及其所有公民的经济前景……撒切尔夫人执政期间的经济增长比前几届政府更弱。如果后来的政府表现不佳，那并不是因为它们从根本上背离了她的政策处方。缺乏增长的代价不成比例地由穷人承担了”。

The neoliberal era of the past 40 years has produced increasing inequality, rather than the promised higher growth rates, and has barely reduced unemployment. The reality of “actually existing neoliberalism” has always been monopoly capitalism.

过去40年的新自由主义时代造成了日益严重的不平等，而不是其承诺的提高增长率，且几乎没有降低失业率。“实存的新自由主义”的现实一直是垄断资本主义。

III. Globalization and Monopoly Capitalism

三、全球化与垄断资本主义

In terms of the growth of international trade, foreign direct investment, multinational enterprises, and international supply chains, the period since 1980 has undoubtedly been one of (hyper-)globalization. By indicators such as the scale of international trade and foreign direct investment, the pace of globalization has slowed since the global financial crisis.

从国际贸易、外国直接投资、跨国企业和国际供应链的增长来看，自1980年以来的这一时期无疑是一个（超）全球化的时期。从国际贸易规模和外国直接投资规模等指标来看，自全球金融危机以来,全球化的步伐已经放缓。

The analysis of monopoly capitalism appears to be what is called state monopoly capitalism. At the industry level, profit rates and surplus are considered to be driven by the degree of monopoly, which itself is based on factors such as industrial concentration and barriers to entry. The profit rate at the aggregate level (and the distribution of income between wages and profits) is the sum of profit rates at the industry level. In the 1960s, the U.S. economy had a low degree of participation in international trade (less than 10% of GDP), while the UK had a higher degree of trade participation, but it was mainly an exporter of manufactured goods and an importer of agricultural products and commodities. Cowling has pointed out that there may not be a competitive relationship between foreign and domestic firms; in fact, they may be under the same ownership within a multinational corporation. R. Sugden, Cowling, and others argue that when assessing the impact of international competition reflected in imports, the ownership of the companies providing the imported products must be properly considered. A large portion of international trade takes the form of intra-firm flows of goods within multinational enterprises. Cowling and Sugden argue that multinational enterprises can weaken workers’ rights, leading to lower wages and increased labor intensity. The rise of multinational corporations is likely to lead to an increase in the degree of monopoly, rather than the decrease posited by the theory of international competition.

垄断资本主义分析似乎就是所谓的国家垄断资本主义。在行业层面上，利润率和剩余被认为是由垄断程度所驱动的，而垄断程度本身又基于产业集中度和进入壁垒等因素。总体水平上的利润率（以及收入在工资和利润之间的分配）是基于行业水平上的利润率的总和。1960年代，美国经济在国际贸易中的参与度很低（不到GDP的10%），而英国有着更高的贸易参与度，但它主要是制成品的出口国以及农产品和大宗商品的进口国。考林曾指出，外国公司与国内公司之间也许并不存在竞争关系，事实上它们在跨国公司内部可能处于同一所有权之下。苏格登（R.Sugden）、考林等人认为，在评估进口所反映的国际竞争的影响时，必须适当考虑提供进口产品的公司的所有权。很大一部分国际贸易是以跨国企业内部货物流动的形式进行的。考林和苏格登认为，跨国企业能够削弱工人的权利，导致工资降低和劳动强度提高。跨国公司的崛起很可能导致垄断程度的上升，而非国际竞争论所认为的下降。

As J.B. Foster writes: “Numerous critics of monopoly capital theory claim that the internationalization of capital has destroyed the structure of monopolistic accumulation by breaking U.S. hegemony and making the developed capitalist countries as a whole more vulnerable to foreign trade and capital flows.” Scholars such as Cowling, Foster, and R. McChesney point out: “The reality is the ongoing concentration and centralization of capital on a world scale, or the internationalization of monopoly capital. An increasingly concentrated minority of capital controls the lifelines of national and international economies.”

正如福斯特（J.B.Foster）所写的那样：“垄断资本理论的众多批评者声称，通过打破美国霸权，使发达资本主义国家作为整体更易受到对外贸易和资本流动的影响，资本的国际化已经摧毁了垄断性积累的结构。”考林、福斯特和麦切斯尼（R.McChesney）等学者指出：“现实情况是资本在世界范围内的持续集中化和中心化，或垄断资本的国际化。日益集中的少数资本控制着国家经济和国际经济的命脉。”

The development of multinational corporations, the growth of foreign direct investment, and the expansion of international supply chains over the past 40 years are well known. For example, foreign direct investment grew rapidly, although the increase slowed after the global financial crisis; the stock of foreign direct investment relative to global GDP rose from 9% in 1990 to 42% in 2019. Cowling and P. Tomlinson note that “on the world stage, concentration in the communications, information technology, and media sectors is increasing. Recently, important mergers/acquisitions have also occurred in the privatized public utility sector,” and “there is growing evidence that a small number of large companies are becoming the dominant players in these [public utility] industries at the global level.”

过去40年来，跨国公司的发展、外国直接投资的增长和国际供应链的增长是众所周知的。例如，外国直接投资快速增长，尽管增幅在全球金融危机之后有所放缓；外国直接投资的存量相对于全球GDP的比例，从1990年的9%增长到2019年的42%。考林和汤姆林森（P.Tomlinson）指出，“在世界的舞台上，通信、信息技术和媒体行业的集中度越来越高。最近，私有化的公用事业领域也出现了重要的兼并/联合活动”，“越来越多的证据表明，少数大公司正在成为这些[公用事业]行业在全球层面的主导者”。

Over the past 40 years, the establishment and consolidation of transnational monopoly capitalism have been evident. With the intensification of international competition accompanying the growth of international trade and capital flows, monopoly capitalism has been continuously replicated on a global scale.

在过去的40年里，跨国垄断资本主义的建立及巩固是显而易见的。随着国际贸易的增长和资本流动而出现的国际竞争的加剧，垄断资本主义在全球范围内不断复制。

IV. Financialization and Monopoly Capitalism

四、金融化与垄断资本主义

The period since around 1980 is generally regarded as an era of financialization (there have been previous eras of financialization, and the proliferation of the financial sector emerged gradually in the post-war period). Financialization is a contested concept; this section focuses on the characteristics of financialization and its implications for the analysis of monopoly capitalism.

1980年前后以来的这段时期通常被认为是金融化的时代（以前也有过金融化时代，而金融部门的激增是在战后逐渐出现的）。金融化是一个有争议的概念，本部分重点讨论金融化的特征及其对垄断资本主义分析的影响。

G. Epstein explores financialization from the perspective that “financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international economies.” G. Krippner identifies four broad themes in the literature on financialization, the first of which is particularly relevant to this section: “the ascendancy of shareholder value.” N. van der Zwan, in her survey, points to three approaches to studying financialization: financialization as a regime of accumulation, financialization of the modern corporation, and financialization of everyday life. Among these, the financialization of the corporation includes the pursuit of shareholder value and the extent of non-financial corporations’ participation in financial activities.

爱泼斯坦（G.Epstein）从“金融化意味着金融动机、金融市场、金融行为者和金融机构在国内经济和国际经济运行中发挥的作用越来越大”这一角度来探讨金融化。克里普纳（G.Krippner）在关于金融化的文献中确定了四个宽泛的主题，其中第一个主题与本部分的讨论尤其相关，即“股东价值的优势”。范德兹万（N.Van der Zwan）在其调查中指出了金融化的三种研究方法：作为积累制度的金融化、现代公司的金融化和日常的金融化。其中，公司的金融化包括对股东价值的追求以及非金融公司参与金融活动的程度。

The analysis of monopoly capitalism appears to relate primarily (or exclusively) to non-financial corporations. It is assumed that non-financial corporations engage only in financial transactions that provide funds for production and investment, and hold only financial assets related to production and investment. The literature on financialization indicates that non-financial corporations play an increasing role in financial investment (at the expense of non-financial investment) and in providing funds (e.g., consumer loans for purchases).

垄断资本主义分析似乎主要（或完全）与非金融公司有关。根据人们的设想，非金融公司只从事为生产和投资提供资金的金融交易，且只持有与生产和投资有关的金融资产。关于金融化的研究文献指出，非金融公司在金融投资（以牺牲非金融投资为代价）和提供资金（例如用于购物的消费贷款）方面发挥的作用越来越大。

The relationship between non-financial corporations and the financial sector is typically described as relatively passive, with the financial sector providing funds to non-financial corporations and holding the power to determine which corporations receive funds and at what price. Financialization involves fundamental changes in these relationships. P. Sweezy refers to “the triumph of financial capital,” arguing that “once it has broken away from its original role as a modest assistant to the real economy of production for human needs, it inevitably becomes speculative capital, striving only for its own self-expansion.” He also writes: “A relatively independent financial superstructure has developed, situated above the world economy and most national units. It consists of central banks, regional banks, local banks, and numerous dealers in various financial assets and services. All of these are interconnected through a network of markets, some structured and regulated, others informal and unregulated.” Sweezy argues that current financial expansion relies on a stagnant real economy, and the inverted relationship between the financial sector and the real sector is key to understanding new trends in the global economy.

非金融公司与金融部门之间的关系通常被描述为是相对被动的，金融部门为非金融公司提供资金，并掌握着哪些公司获得资金、以何种价格获得资金的权力。金融化涉及这些关系的基本变化。斯威齐（P.Sweezy）提到了“金融资本的胜利”，认为它“一旦脱离了其最初作为满足人类需求的实体生产经济的适度助手这一角色，就不可避免地成为投机资本，只为自己的自我扩张而努力”。他还写道：“一个相对独立的金融上层建筑的发展位于世界经济和大多数国家单位之上。它由中央银行、地区银行、地方银行以及各种金融资产和服务中的诸多交易商组成。所有这些都通过市场网络相互连接，其中一些是结构化的、受监管的，另一些是非正式的、不受监管的。”斯威齐认为，现在的金融扩张是依靠停滞不前的实体经济，金融部门与实体部门之间的倒置关系是理解全球经济新趋势的关键。

Financialization involves the growth of financial institutions and financial markets (relative to the size of the economy), as well as the development of shadow banking, securitization, and derivatives. It is commonly believed that so-called financial development is positively correlated with economic growth rates, as financial development raises savings rates and guides and supervises funds into investment. However, a large body of evidence from recent decades indicates that this positive correlation has ended. Multiple pieces of evidence can be provided to explain the negative correlation between financial deepening and economic growth. The growth of household debt, including mortgage loans, will be seen as a manifestation of increased financial sector activity and growth in loans and deposits. Household debt may provide short-term stimulus (if unsustainable), but it does not contribute to long-term economic growth. As the financial sector shifts toward the generation and massive trading of derivatives, its role in promoting savings and financing real investment has been displaced.

金融化涉及金融机构和金融市场（相对于经济规模）的增长，以及影子银行、证券化及衍生品的发展。人们通常认为，所谓的金融发展与经济增长率呈正相关，金融发展提高了储蓄率，引导和监督资金进入投资领域。而近几十年来的大量证据表明，这种正相关关系已经结束。我们可以提供多种证据来解释金融深化与经济增长之间的负相关关系。包括抵押贷款在内的家庭债务的增长将被视为金融部门活动的增加以及贷款和存款增长的表现。家庭债务可能会提供短期刺激（如果不可持续），但无助于经济的长期增长。随着金融部门转向衍生品的产生及其大量交易，其促进储蓄和为实际投资融资的作用已经转移。

Baran and Sweezy emphasized that control rests in the hands of the top management of the corporation, including the board of directors, the chief executive officer, and representatives of some external interests, but real power lies in the hands of insiders. Management is viewed as a self-perpetuating group. The pursuit of profit is central to the operation of the corporation. “The large corporation is more completely dominated by the logic of profit-making than the small enterprise.”

巴兰（P.Baran）和斯威齐强调，控制权掌握在公司的最高管理层的手中，包括董事会、首席执行官和一些外部利益的代表，但真正的权力掌握在内部人士的手中。管理层被视为一个自我延续的群体。追求利润是公司运作的核心。“与小企业相比，大公司的经济更多地受到盈利逻辑的支配。”

As noted above, a body of literature on financialization addresses the “pursuit of shareholder value.” Monopoly capital has always been conceived as corporations pursuing profit, and it is assumed to take the form of profit maximization. I say “form” because, in an uncertain world, optimization is difficult to design and achieve. In the formulations of Kalecki and Cowling, it is more akin to surplus, which is maximized and shared between management salaries and reported profits.

如上所述，一系列关于金融化的文献涉及“追求股东价值”。垄断资本总是被设想成为公司追求利润，并假定利润最大化的形式。我之所以说“形式”，是因为在不确定的世界里，优化是很难被设计和实现的。在卡莱茨基和考林的表述中，它更类似于剩余，剩余被最大化，并被管理层的工资和报告利润分享了。

At the ideological level, the impetus for the pursuit of shareholder value comes from figures such as Milton Friedman. They argue that the sole responsibility of managers is to maximize profits. Hence, they condemn any pursuit of corporate and social responsibility, as well as any consideration of the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. Any corporate executive pursuing goals other than profit is “an unwitting puppet of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the foundations of a free society over the past few decades.” [1]1 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” *The New York Times Magazine*, September 13, 1970. However, the main driving force behind the “pursuit of shareholder value” comes from financial institutions as corporate equity owners and the so-called “market for corporate control.” Financial markets and financial institutions exert pressure on corporate managers through various channels, requiring them to implement business practices that enhance shareholder value. The pursuit of shareholder value comes at the expense of other stakeholders of the corporation: workers, customers, and the general public. This focus on the “pursuit of shareholder value” stands in sharp contrast to the literature on managerial control of corporations. In the latter account, corporations are more concerned with pursuing scale, sales volume, and sales growth rates, even at the expense of profits and stock market valuations. In the 1980s, it was widely believed that corporations primarily or entirely relied on internal funds for investment, and that generally adjusting retained earnings/dividend policies and profit rates was sufficient to align internal funds with the corporation’s expected growth and investment rates.

在意识形态层面，追求股东价值的推动力来自弗里德曼（M.Friedman）等人。他们认为，管理者的唯一责任是实现利润最大化。因此，他们谴责任何对企业责任和社会责任的追求，以及任何对股东以外的利益相关者利益的考虑。任何追求利润以外的目标的企业高管都是“过去几十年来破坏自由社会基础的知识力量的不知情的傀儡”。然而，“追求股东价值”的主要动力来自作为公司股权所有者的金融机构和所谓的“公司控制权市场”。金融市场和金融机构通过各种途径对公司管理者施加压力，要求他们实施提升股东价值的商业行为。追求股东价值是以牺牲公司的其他利益相关者、工人、客户和广大民众为代价的。这种对“追求股东价值”的关注与关于管理控制公司的文献形成了鲜明对比。在后者的描述中，公司更注重于追求规模、销售额和销售增长率，即使这有损于利润和股票市场估值。在1980年代，人们普遍认为，公司主要或者完全依赖内部资金进行投资，一般调整留存金/分红政策和利润率就足以使内部资金满足公司的预期增长率和投资率。

The literature on financialization includes studies of its impact on investment, innovation, and income distribution and inequality. I argue that the thrust of these studies is consistent with the analysis of monopoly capitalism. In the article “Financialization, Financial Crisis, and Inequality,” I reviewed empirical research on financialization and income distribution. These studies address different dimensions of financialization and use relatively simple indicators for the chosen dimensions. The general conclusion drawn from these studies is that a range of factors, including financialization, trade unions, and collective bargaining rights, do affect income distribution, particularly the income share between labor and capital. These findings are consistent with the expectations of the financialization literature, namely that financialization increases the profit share and reduces the labor share of income.

关于金融化的文献包括金融化对投资、创新以及收入分配和不平等的影响的研究。我认为，这些研究的主旨与垄断资本主义分析一致。在《金融化、金融危机和不平等》一文中，我回顾了关于金融化和收入分配的实证研究。这些研究涉及金融化的不同维度，并为所选的维度使用了相对简单的指标。从这些研究中得出的一般结论是，金融化、工会和集体谈判权等一系列因素确实会影响收入分配，特别是劳动与资本之间的收入份额。这些研究发现与金融化文献的预期是一致的，即金融化提高了利润份额，减少了收入的劳动份额。

Durand and Gueuder, by discussing four competing hypotheses regarding the impact of financialization, globalization, and monopoly on investment, and by studying the relevant actual conditions in France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, summarize four propositions explaining corporate investment behavior, each with some empirical support. The first proposition is termed “the revenge of the rentier”: increased financial payments by non-financial corporations reduce the funds available for investment. The second proposition relates to changes in management’s preference for financial investment, at the expense of domestic productive investment. The third proposition is that foreign investment substitutes for domestic investment, with cheap inputs from low-wage countries increasing cost premiums. The fourth proposition is that competitive pressure declines and monopoly intensifies, leading corporations to increase profits while reducing investment incentives.

杜兰德（C.Durand）和古德（M.Gueuder）通过讨论四个相互竞争的关于金融化、全球化和垄断对投资的影响的假设，并研究法国、德国、日本、英国和美国的相关实际情况，总结出了解释公司投资行为的四个命题，每个命题都有一定的经验支持。第一个命题被称为“食利者的报复”，非金融公司的金融支付增加，故可用于投资的资金减少。第二个命题与管理层金融投资偏好的变化有关，以国内生产性投资为代价。第三个命题是外国投资替代国内投资，低工资国家的廉价投入使成本溢价增加。第四个命题是竞争压力下降，垄断加剧，这导致公司在提高利润的同时降低了投资动机。

In summary, the process of financialization pushes corporations to further focus on profits and stock market valuations, to the detriment of other stakeholders within the corporation, and also leads to a substantial increase in executive compensation. Financialization exacerbates the tendency toward secular stagnation, which will be discussed further below. The current overall trend is that financialization redistributes income from wages to profits and exacerbates inequality, all of which may reduce the level of demand. The growth of the financial sector is unrelated to the growth rate of output, and the pace of investment and innovation also appears to have slowed due to financialization.

总之，金融化进程推动公司进一步关注利润和股市估值，损害了公司中其他利益相关者的利益，也导致了高管薪酬大幅上涨。金融化加剧了长期停滞的倾向，这将在下文进一步讨论。目前的总体趋势是，金融化使收入重新分配，从工资转向利润，并使不平等加剧，这一切都可能降低需求水平。金融部门的增长与产出的增长速度无关，投资和创新的步伐似乎也因金融化而放缓。

V. Trends in Industrial Concentration and Market Power

五、产业集中和市场力量的发展趋势

The analysis of monopoly capitalism depicts a trend of rising industrial concentration and expanding profit margins. At the industry level, there is a positive correlation between concentration and other measures of market power, on the one hand, and profit margins, on the other. The industrial economics literature attempts to diminish the importance of concentration by developing arguments about “reverse” causality—that high profits imply efficiency, efficient firms expand and crowd out inefficient ones, hence concentration rises. The “contestable markets” view attempts to downplay the importance of concentration.

垄断资本主义分析描绘了产业集中度上升和利润率扩大的趋势。在产业层面，集中度和市场力量的其他衡量标准与利润率之间存在正相关关系。产业经济学文献试图通过“反向”因果关系论证的发展来削弱集中的重要性，即高利润意味着效率，高效的公司进行扩张并排挤低效的公司，因此集中度上升。“可竞争市场”的观点试图削弱集中的重要性。

Over the past few decades, industrial concentration has been rising in many countries. Pryor used weighted concentration ratios to study the entire U.S. economy. He argued that concentration declined from 1960 to the early 1980s, then subsequently rose, and is likely to continue rising in the future. The subsequent rise has been confirmed by Grullon et al. They found that over the previous 20 years, more than three-quarters of U.S. industries experienced an increase in concentration levels.

在过去的几十年里，许多国家的产业集中度不断提高。普赖尔（F.L.Pryor）使用加权集中率对整个美国经济进行了研究。他认为，从1960年到1980年代初，集中度有所下降，随后又有所上升，未来可能会持续上升。随后的上升得到格鲁隆（G.Grullon）等人的证实。他们发现，在之前的20年里，美国超过3/4的行业都经历了集中水平的上升。

Davis and Orhangazi point out: “Between 1997 and 2012, average concentration across U.S. industries increased, with most of this increase occurring in the late 1990s and early 2000s… In fact, a large part of the increase in concentration was driven by the retail trade and information services sectors.” They found no uniform relationship between industrial concentration levels and profitability, markups, or investment rates. “Highly concentrated industries are not the most profitable (instead, moderately concentrated industries earn the highest profit margins), and, except for a few specific industries (e.g., information services), those highly concentrated industries do not have the highest profit margins.”

戴维斯（L.Davis）和奥汉加齐（Ö.Orhangazi）指出：“1997—2012年间，美国各行业的平均集中度有所提高，其中大部分发生在1990年代末和21世纪初……事实上，集中度提高的很大一部分是由零售业和信息服务业推动的。”他们没有发现产业集中水平与盈利能力、加价或投资率之间的统一关系。“高度集中的行业并不是最有利可图的（相反，中度集中的产业赚取的利润率最高），而且，除了几个特定的行业（例如信息服务业）之外，那些高度集中的行业的利润率并不是最高的。”

Mige points out that there is evidence that competition across the economy is giving way to monopoly, that markets are inevitably tending toward concentration, and that we seem unable to impose constraints on this to prevent the accumulation of money and power. Antitrust, competition, and monopoly policies have little practical effect in constraining market power, as exemplified by the weak restrictions on mergers and acquisitions that strengthen market power. The idea that “companies focused on maximizing returns for shareholders through free market competition will somehow benefit the general public” is completely outdated. Moreover, “market outcomes are not ‘natural’; they are chosen by those most favored by the market, through society’s delegation or inaction.”

米格指出，有证据显示，整个经济领域的竞争正在让位于垄断，市场无可避免地趋于集中，而我们似乎无法对此实施约束，以防止金钱和权力的积累。反垄断、竞争和垄断政策在实践中对市场力量的约束作用很小，对加强市场力量的并购的微弱限制就是一个例证。认为“通过自由市场竞争，专注于为股东提供最大回报的公司，会以某种方式使广大公众受益”的想法是完全落伍的。而且，“市场的结果不是‘自然的’，它们是通过社会的委托或不作为，由市场最偏爱的人选择的”。

A blog post on the International Monetary Fund website states: “Since 1980, the global price markup of listed companies in advanced economies has increased by an average of over 30%. Over the past 20 years, the increase in markups in the digital sector has been twice that of the entire economy.” The authors note that there is growing evidence that market power is becoming entrenched in many industries, with dominant firms facing few competitors. The authors further estimate that, in terms of markups, firms exhibit little mobility: the probability that a firm ranked in the top 10% in a given year maintains a high markup the following year is nearly 85%, much higher than in the 1990s. Mergers and acquisitions are considered one of the factors driving these trends. Mergers and acquisitions help increase market power and raise prices; mergers and acquisitions by dominant firms lead to a decline in business dynamism across the industry—because the growth and R&D spending of all competitors are impacted.

国际货币基金组织网站上的一篇博客指出：“自1980年以来，发达经济体上市公司的全球价格加成平均上涨了30%以上。在过去的20年里，数字行业加价的增幅是整个经济增幅的两倍。”作者指出，越来越多的迹象表明，在许多行业中，市场的力量正变得根深蒂固，占主导地位的公司几乎没有竞争对手。作者进一步估计，就加价而言，公司的流动性很小，那些在某一年排名处于前10名的公司在下一年保持高加价的可能性几乎为85%，比1990年代高得多。并购被认为是导致这些趋势的因素之一。并购有助于提高市场力量和提高价格，占主导地位的公司的并购导致整个行业的商业活力下降——因为所有竞争对手的增长和研发支出都受到了冲击。

G. Gutiérrez and T. Philippon argue that, for the United States, concentration and profitability have increased in most industries. Since the beginning of the 21st century, business investment has been weak relative to measures of profitability, financing costs, and market value. It is widely noted that the link between profits and investment has been broken. Through an analysis of four explanations—reduced domestic competition, increased efficient scale of operations, intangible investment, and globalization—they conclude that by 2016, reduced domestic competition had led to a 5%–10% shortfall in non-residential business capital.

古特雷斯（G.Guttiérrez）和菲利蓬（T.Philippon）认为，就美国而言，大多数行业的集中度和盈利能力都有所提高。进入21世纪初以来，相对于盈利能力、融资成本和市场价值的衡量标准，商业投资一直很弱。人们普遍注意到，利润与投资之间的联系被打破了。通过对国内竞争减少、有效经营规模扩大、无形投资和全球化这四种解释的分析，他们得出的结论是，到2016年，国内竞争的减少已经导致非住宅商业资本短缺5%—10%。

F. Diez et al. find that markup increases are widespread across countries and industries, driven by a small number of firms. The increase in markups is mainly due to the growth of average markups among existing firms and the reallocation effect toward new firms that capture market share from incumbent firms.

迪兹（F.Diez）等人研究发现，在少数公司的推动下，加价的增长在各国和各行业中都广泛存在。加价增长主要是由于现有企业平均加价的增长，以及对从现有公司那里获得市场份额的新公司的重新分配效应。

J. Eeckhout lists numerous examples of rising concentration in the United States over the past 40 years. He links this to “the average markup rising from 1.21 in 1980 to 1.54 in 2019. The average markup rose sharply in the 1980s and 1990s, then stagnated for a decade starting in 2000, before rising sharply again after the Great Recession in 2010.” He identifies three main factors driving market power. First, supply-side economies of scale: “New technologies that are difficult to replicate create permanent technological advantages. They typically require large upfront investments, which often lead to economies of scale.” Second, demand-side returns to scale: “Economies of scale are created by usage rather than construction costs.” Third, “learning through economies of scale.” Eeckhout specifically mentions the creation of dominant firms through mergers and acquisitions and “killer acquisitions,” where companies acquire promising startups that could become potential rivals.

埃克霍特（E.Eeckhout）列举了过去40年来美国集中度上升的诸多例子。他将此与“平均加价从1980年的1.21上升到2019年的1.54联系起来。平均加价在1980—1990年代出现了急剧上升，随后在2000年开始出现了为期10年的停滞，然后又在大衰退后的2010年出现了新的急剧上升”。他确定了引发市场力量的三个主要因素。一是供应方面的规模经济。“难以复制的新技术会产生永久的技术优势。它们通常需要大量的前期投资，而这些投资往往导致规模经济。”二是需求回归规模。“规模经济是由使用而不是建造成本创造的”。三是“通过规模经济的学习”。埃克霍特特别提到了创建占主导地位的公司，即通过并购和“杀手级收购”公司收购可能成为潜在对手的有前途的初创公司。

The forces behind the shrinking labor market are the reduction of competition in goods and services markets. From technology to textiles, our era is characterized by rapid technological progress. These technological advances grant enormous power to a few firms. In turn, this, coupled with a lack of competition, generates brutal inequality among workers.

劳动力市场萎缩背后的力量是商品和服务市场竞争的减少。从技术到纺织品，我们的时代以快速的技术进步为特征。这些技术进步赋予少数公司巨大的权力。反过来，伴随着竞争的缺乏，在工人中产生了残酷的不平等。

An early study by A. Henley of over a hundred U.S. industries finds a significant relationship between firm structure and market behavior within an industry and the functional distribution of income within that industry. He also observes that both concentration and advertising intensity are negatively correlated with the labor share, particularly with the share of value added used for production workers’ wages.

亨利（A.Henley）对美国上百个行业进行的一项早期研究发现，一个行业内的企业结构和市场行为与该行业内收入的功能分配有重要关系。他还观察到，集中度和广告强度都与劳动份额呈负相关，特别是与用于生产工人工资的增殖份额呈负相关。

T.E. Lambert, based on principal components analysis (PCA), creates the Big Business Index (BBI) using the four-firm concentration ratio, the capital-to-labor ratio, the number of employees per firm, sales per firm, the asset-to-sales ratio per firm, and a union dummy variable. “The Big Business Index is a consistent, statistically significant independent variable for measuring management and supervision intensity, the average wage of management and supervisory personnel, and the ratio of the average CEO salary to sales,” and it is positively correlated with the first three dependent variables and negatively correlated with the others.

兰伯特（T.E.Lambert）根据主成分分析(principal components analysis, PCA)，以四家公司的集中率、资本与劳动比率、每个企业的雇员人数、每个企业的销售额、每个企业的资产与销售比率和工会虚拟人为基础，创建了大企业指数（Big Business Index, BBI）。“大企业指数是一个一致的、具有统计学意义的自变量，用于衡量管理和监督强度、管理和监督人员的平均工资以及首席执行官的平均工资占销售额的比重”，并与前三个因变量呈正相关，与其他因变量呈负相关。

The shift in production structure has moved from manufacturing to services, especially the information technology sector. C. Rikap notes: “The leading firms of the 21st century are knowledge monopolies. Eight of the top ten firms by market capitalization are knowledge monopolies. They develop by relying on the permanent monopoly and ever-expanding monopoly over part of social knowledge. The private appropriation of knowledge generates intangible assets and so-called intellectual knowledge or techno-scientific rents… The concentration of intangible assets has become the main driver of capital concentration.” She argues that this is “a phase within capitalism in which knowledge monopolies are constantly reinforced, with the result that the link between innovation and growth is broken, due, at least in part, to the persistence of knowledge rentierism and predation.”

生产结构的转变已经从制造业转移到服务业，特别是信息技术产业。瑞卡普（C.Rikap）指出：“21世纪的领先企业是知识垄断企业。市值排名前10的企业中有八家是知识垄断企业。它们依赖于对部分社会知识的永久垄断和不断扩大的垄断而发展。对知识的私人占有产生了无形资产以及所谓的智力知识或技术科学租金……无形资产的集中已经成为资本集中的主要驱动力。”她认为，这是“资本主义内部的一个阶段。在这一阶段，知识垄断不断加强，其结果是创新与增长之间的纽带断裂，其原因（至少部分原因）是知识食利主义和掠夺的长期存在”。

C. Durand and W. Milberg find that “within these [global value] chains, the intensified use of intangible assets creates new sources of monopoly power.” Their analysis builds on the concept of “knowledge monopoly capitalism,” in which government protection of intellectual property rights has the effect of locking in the monopoly power created by intangible assets. We extend this to “information rents,” which arise from the existence of economies of scale and network externalities associated with the production of intangible assets.

杜兰德和米尔伯格（W.Milberg）发现，“在这些[全球价值]链中，对无形资产的强化使用创造了新的垄断力量来源”。他们的分析建立在“知识垄断资本主义”的概念之上，其中，政府对知识产权的保护具有锁定无形资产创造的垄断力量的效果。我们将其扩展到“信息租金”上，它因规模经济的存在以及与生产无形资产相关的网络外部性而产生。

D. Autor et al. focus on the labor share. As they note, the labor share has been declining for decades. They seek to explain the decline in the labor share by the rise of superstar firms. They analyze micro-panel data from the U.S. Economic Census since 1982 and document empirical patterns to evaluate a new explanation based on the rise of superstar firms leading to a declining labor share. They argue: “If globalization or technological change shifts sales toward the most productive firms in each industry, then as industries become increasingly dominated by superstar firms, product market concentration will rise, and these firms will also be characterized by high markups and low labor value-added shares.” “The rise of superstar firms involves a ‘winner-take-most’ mechanism, which may arise from intensified platform competition in many industries, or from scale advantages associated with the growth of intangible capital and advances in information technology.”

奥托（D.Autor）等人的研究聚焦于劳动份额。正如他们所指出的那样，几十年来，劳动份额一直在下降。他们寻求用超级明星公司的崛起来解释劳动份额的下降。他们分析了自1982年以来美国经济普查的微观面板数据，并记录了经验模式，以评估基于超级明星公司的崛起导致劳动份额下降的新解释。他们认为：“如果全球化或技术变革将销售推向每个行业中生产率最高的公司，那么随着行业日益由超级明星公司主导，产品市场集中度将上升，这些公司也将具有高加价和低劳动附加值份额的特征。”“超级明星公司的崛起涉及‘赢家通吃’的机制，这可能是因许多行业的平台竞争加剧，或与无形资本增长和信息技术进步相关的规模优势而产生的。”

C. Rikap and B.-Å. Lundvall argue that “tech giants are active promoters of a globalization phase characterized by the growth of digital services trade combined with a general shift toward intangible assets.” They show that Google, Amazon, and Microsoft “constantly monopolize knowledge while outsourcing innovation steps to other firms and research institutions.” They also characterize tech giants as data-driven knowledge monopolists, arguing that they organize and control the global corporate innovation system.

瑞卡普和伦德瓦尔（B.-ÅLundvall）认为：“科技巨头是全球化阶段的积极推动者，这一阶段的特征是数字服务贸易的增长与向无形资产的普遍转变相结合。”他们表明，谷歌、亚马逊和微软“不断垄断知识，同时将创新步骤外包给其他公司和研究机构”。他们还将科技巨头称为数据驱动的知识垄断者，认为其组织和控制着全球企业创新体系。

A. Coveri et al. note that “market concentration is continuously increasing due to the remarkable rise of platform- and data-related business models.” They attempt “to analyze the dominant role played by giant digital platforms in contemporary capitalism, following the radical perspective proposed by scholars of monopoly capitalism,” and identify “four drivers of the exercise of control and accumulation of power”: growth and diversification, R&D and technological investment, labor fragmentation and surveillance, and government and retaliatory power.

科维里（A.Coveri）等人指出：“由于平台和数据相关商业模式的显著崛起，市场集中度不断提高。”他们试图“遵循垄断资本主义学者提出的激进观点，对巨型数字平台在当代资本主义中承担的主导作用进行分析”，并确定了“施加控制和积累权力的四个驱动因素”，即增长和多样化、研发和技术投资，劳动碎片化和监视，以及政府和报复性权力。

K. Birch and D.T. Cochrane focus on the economic rents obtained by big tech companies. They argue that within the big tech ecosystem, the following four emerging forms of digital rent exist: (1) “enclave rents” created through control of the ecosystem; (2) “expected monopoly rents” created through the performative enactment of future narratives; (3) “engagement rents” created through user participation in digital services and products, which differentiate user rankings and metrics; and (4) “reflexivity rents” obtained through the exploitation of ecosystem rules and norms.

伯奇（K.Birch）和科克伦（D.T.Cochrane）重点关注大型科技公司获得的经济租金。他们认为，在大型科技生态系统中，存在以下四种新兴的数字租金形式：（1）通过控制生态系统创造的“飞地租金”（enclave rents）；（2）通过对未来叙事的表演性实现创造的“预期垄断租金”（expected monopoly rents）；（3）通过用户对数字服务和产品的参与度来区分用户排名和指标构成的“参与租金”（engagement rents）；（4）通过利用生态系统规则和规范获得的“反身性租金”（reflexivity rents）。

Inequality in income and wealth has also generally risen within countries, and the distribution of income between wages and profits has shifted in favour of profits. What contribution (if any) does monopoly-capital analysis make to understanding these trends? This brief overview of tendencies toward concentration (though focused mainly on the United States) will support the general monopoly-capital view that rising industrial concentration tends to have effects on market power, higher profit rates and a lower share of labour income. It should be emphasised that the information-services, digital-technology or “big-tech” industries have driven rising concentration and higher profit rates. These “big-tech” industries have characteristics conducive to high concentration, and aggressive acquisition policies reinforce this trend toward high concentration.

收入和财富的不平等在国家内部也有普遍上升的趋势，收入在工资与利润之间的分配也在向利润转移。垄断资本主义分析对理解这些趋势有什么贡献（如果有的话）？这种关于集中化趋势的简要概述（尽管主要集中在美国）将支持一般的垄断资本观点，即产业集中度趋于上升会对市场力量、较高的利润率和较低的劳动收入份额产生影响。应该强调的是，信息服务、数字科技或“大型科技”产业对集中度上升和利润率提高的推动。这些“大型科技”产业具有有利于高度集中的特性，而积极的收购政策又加强了这种高度集中的趋势。

VI. Monopoly Capitalism and Secular Stagnation

六、垄断资本主义与长期停滞

From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1970s, the Western industrialised countries entered a “golden age of capitalism” of high economic growth rates and low unemployment. During this period, income inequality within countries stabilised or declined, and income distribution tended to tilt in favour of wages. This period ended with the economic crisis of 1973–1974, which included financial collapse and a rapid rise in commodity prices, especially oil prices. The latter half of the 1970s was a period of high unemployment and low growth. Since approximately 1980, economic growth in the Western industrialised countries has generally slowed compared with the period before 1980, especially since approximately 2000. Table 1 and Figure 1 present some aggregate data on output growth and unemployment rates.

第二次世界大战后至1970年代中期，西方工业化国家进入了高经济增长率和低失业率的“资本主义的黄金时代”。在这一时期，各国内部的收入不平等趋于稳定或下降,收入分配也趋于向工资倾斜。这一时期随着1973—1974年的经济危机而结束，危机包括金融崩溃以及商品价格特别是石油价格的快速上涨。1970年代后半期是一个高失业率和低增长时期。自大约1980年以来，西方工业化国家的经济增长较1980年以前普遍放缓，特别是自大约2000年以来。表1和图1列出了一些关于产出增长和失业率的汇总数据。

Li M. and I. Mendieta-Muñoz posed the question “whether long-run output growth rates are declining” and provided an answer. Their research results show that “a permanent decline in long-run output and technological progress growth rates is unrelated to the adverse effects of the Great Recession”. Since 1960, including for the G7 countries (depending on data availability), “long-run output growth rates have been declining since the late 1960s, and long-run technological progress growth rates have been declining since the early 1960s. These findings suggest that the slowdown in productivity is the main driver of the decline in long-run GDP growth”. Unemployment rates have generally remained high (see Figure 1), and these unemployment rates do not reflect the discouraged-worker effect and underemployment.

李（Li M.）和门迪塔-穆诺兹（I.Mendieta-Muñoz）提出了“长期产出增长率是否会下降”的问题，并作出回答。他们的研究结果显示，“长期产出和技术进步增长率的永久性下降与大衰退的不利影响无关”。自1960年以来，包括七国集团国家在内（取决于数据的可用性），“长期产出增长率自1960年代末开始下降，长期技术进步增长率自1960年代初开始下降。这些发现表明，生产率的放缓是长期GDP增长下降的主要驱动因素”。失业率总体上一直保持高位（见图1），而这些失业率并不能反映令人沮丧的工人效应和就业不足。

Monopoly-capital analysis contains substantive elements of the “secular stagnationist” approach. This is clearly evident in the work of J. Steindl and Kalecki and has been adopted by later authors. It is argued that oligopolistic and monopolistic behaviour is detrimental to investment and innovation, and that the shift in income distribution toward profits tends to reduce demand.

垄断资本主义分析具有“长期停滞主义”方法的实质性因素。这在斯坦德尔（J.Steindl）和卡莱茨基的研究中有着明显的体现，并被后来的作者所采纳。人们认为，寡头垄断和垄断行为不利于投资和创新，而收入分配向利润的转移往往会降低需求。

In the last ten years or so, the view of “secular stagnation” has been widely discussed. However, most mainstream economic literature views secular stagnation through the concept of the “natural rate of interest”. Monopoly-capital analysis has long been concerned with “secular stagnation”. A.H. Hansen’s concerns about slowing growth stemmed from the decline in population growth rates, changes in the character of technological progress, and the decline in the supply of new territory for the United States, which he argued would reduce the demand for investment goods.

在过去10年左右的时间里，“长期停滞”的观点受到了广泛讨论。然而，大多数主流经济学文献围绕“自然利率”概念来看待长期停滞。长期以来，垄断资本主义分析一直关注“长期停滞”。汉森（A.H.Hansen）对增长放缓的担忧源于人口增长率的下降、技术进步特征的变化以及美国新领土供应的下降，他认为这些将降低对投资品的需求。

Monopoly-capital analysis focuses on two lines of thought: first, that conditions of oligopoly and monopoly reduce the propensity to invest and innovate; second, that the shift in income distribution from wages to profits, and then to rentier income, tends to depress the level of aggregate demand.

垄断资本主义分析侧重于两条思路：一是寡头垄断和垄断的条件会降低投资和创新的倾向；二是收入分配从工资到利润、再到向食利者收入的转移往往会压低总需求水平。

It is generally believed that the pressure on firms to invest under monopoly capitalism is less severe than under competitive capitalism. Steindl argued that the rise of oligopoly tends to reduce the propensity to invest, thereby affecting output and growth. As the degree of monopoly increases, capacity utilisation declines, which also adversely affects investment. Kalecki argued that the slowdown in capitalist economic growth “may be due, at least in part, to a decline in the intensity of innovation”. This was quite bad at the beginning of the “golden age of capitalism” and has become more relevant over the past 30 years. Steindl attributed one of the reasons for this trend to “the growing monopolistic character of capitalism hindering the application of new inventions”.

人们通常认为，垄断资本主义条件下的企业投资压力没有在竞争资本主义条件下那么严重。斯坦德尔认为，寡头垄断的兴起倾向于减少投资倾向，从而对产出和增长产生影响。随着垄断程度的提高，产能利用率下降，对投资也产生了不利影响。卡莱茨基认为，资本主义经济增长放缓“至少部分原因可能是由于创新强度的下降”。这在“资本主义黄金时代”开始时相当糟糕，在过去的30年里变得更加相关。斯坦德尔把这种趋势的原因之一归结为“资本主义日益增长的垄断性阻碍了新发明的应用”。

Cowling argued that firms “invest in R&D and the like in an attempt to secure their monopoly position, but thereafter they simply shelve inventions”, which may be optimal behaviour for the firms concerned. “All this suggests that defensive R&D may be a widespread and important component of planned excess capacity aimed at maintaining and strengthening monopoly positions.”

考林认为，公司“在试图确保其垄断地位时，会投资于研发等工作，但在此之后，它们只是将发明束之高阁”，这对相关公司来说，可能是其最佳行为。“所有这些都表明，保护性研发可能是旨在维持和加强垄断地位的计划性过剩产能的一个广泛而重要的组成部分。”

The argument about changes in income distribution and their impact on aggregate demand is based on the different propensities to spend out of wages and profits. In recent years, these arguments have occupied an important place in the literature on wage-led versus profit-led regimes. The general (though not universal) conclusion is that economies are wage-led, meaning that the shift in income distribution toward profits over the past few decades has had a negative impact on economic growth and employment rates.

关于收入分配变化和对总需求的影响的论点，是基于工资和利润支出的不同倾向。近年来，这些论点在工资主导型与利润主导型制度中占有重要地位。一般的（尽管不是普遍的）结论是，经济以工资为主导，这意味着，过去几十年来收入分配向利润方向的转变对经济增长和就业率产生了负面影响。

A recent study reached the following conclusion: “Reduced competition, increased market concentration, fewer employment opportunities (though jobs may be more stable for those working in large firms), reduced net business investment, and increased worker productivity (which may reduce the need for more workers while allowing higher profit margins for large firms) may contribute to the current and future stagnation of the US economy.” Furthermore, R&D efforts “have failed to generate a large number of transformative innovations… R&D efforts in terms of job creation, new firm creation, and net business investment have shown mixed or even negative results… These findings also imply that R&D is used to strengthen monopoly under monopoly capital.”

最近的一项研究得出以下结论：“竞争减少，市场集中度提高，就业机会减少（尽管对在大公司工作的人来说，可能工作会更稳定），净商业投资减少，工人生产率提高（这可能会减少对更多工人的需求，同时可以为大公司带来更高的利润率），这些可能导致美国经济目前和未来的停滞。”此外，研发工作“未能产生大量具有变革性质的创新……关于创造就业、创建新公司和净商业投资的研发工作表现出喜忧参半的结果，甚至是负面的……这些发现还暗示，研发是在垄断资本的情况下被用来加强垄断的”。

Lambert explored the relationship between monopoly capital and entrepreneurship. He argued that entrepreneurship in the United States is declining, that “monopoly capital and its attendant features may be stifling entrepreneurship in the United States”, and suggested that “the trend toward secular stagnation in the US economy may intensify”.

兰伯特探讨了垄断资本与企业家精神之间的关系。他认为，美国的企业家精神正在下降，“垄断资本及其附带特征可能正在扼杀美国的企业家精神”，并暗示“美国经济长期停滞的趋势可能会加剧”。

Although there are undoubtedly many factors at play, monopoly-capital analysis finds empirical support from the wage-led versus profit-led literature that the shift from wages to profits, due to rising concentration and market power, slows demand. The effects of monopoly capitalism are slowing effective innovation. As noted above, financialisation has its own related contributions; demand and investment are likely to have been significantly reduced by the effects of the financialisation process.

尽管毫无疑问有许多因素在发挥作用，但垄断资本主义分析从工资主导与利润主导的文献中找到了经验支持，即由于集中度和市场力量的提高，从工资到利润的转变减缓了需求。垄断资本主义的影响正在减缓有效的创新。如上所述，金融化有其自身的相关贡献，需求和投资很可能因金融化进程的影响而大大降低。

VII. Conclusion

七、结语

The neoliberal policy agenda of promoting markets, liberalisation and deregulation pursued over the past 40 years (and earlier) has driven the development of monopoly capitalism. The pursuit of the neoliberal policy agenda has led to slower economic growth than in the “golden age of capitalism”, increased inequality in income and wealth, and a general shift in income from wages to profits. For the United States and the United Kingdom (and some other countries), what was once close to state monopoly capitalism has clearly evolved into transnational monopoly capitalism. Industrial concentration has been on an upward trend, exacerbated by mergers and lax antitrust policies. The so-called “big-tech companies” have largely driven the rise in concentration and profit rates, with various economies of scale, first-mover advantages and aggressive acquisitions of competitors all contributing to rising concentration.

过去40年（以及之前）推行的促进市场、自由化和放松管制的新自由主义政策议程推动了垄断资本主义的发展。对新自由主义政策议程的追求导致经济增长比“资本主义黄金时代”更慢，收入和财富不平等加剧，收入普遍从工资转向利润。对于美国和英国（以及其他一些国家）来说，曾经接近于国家垄断资本主义的东西显然已经演变成跨国垄断资本主义。产业集中度一直呈上升趋势，兼并和松懈的反垄断政策加剧了这一趋势。所谓的“大型科技公司”在很大程度上推动了集中度和利润率的上升，各种规模经济、先发优势和对竞争对手的积极收购都促进了集中度的上升。

Monopoly-capital analysis and financialisation analysis (especially the “pursuit of shareholder value”) provide valuable explanations for the slowdown in growth over the past 20 years to near “secular stagnation”. Future growth rates may need to remain low, for reasons related to the climate crisis and environmental degradation, which are linked to the level and rate of change of GDP. Any future growth will necessarily be structurally very different from past growth, and financialised monopoly capitalism is incapable of making this structural adjustment.

垄断资本分析和金融化分析（特别是“追求股东价值”）为过去20年增长放缓到近乎“长期滞涨”提供了宝贵的解释。未来的增长率可能需要保持在较低水平，其原因与气候危机和环境退化有关，这些都与国内生产总值的水平和变化率有关。未来任何的增长在结构上都必将与过去的增长大为不同，而金融化的垄断资本主义无法进行这种增长结构的调整。

(Authors: Malcolm Sawyer, Leeds University Business School, UK; Translator: Zhao Qingjie, School of Marxism, China University of Political Science and Law)

（作者：马尔科姆·索耶（Malcolm Sawyer），英国利兹大学商学院；译者：赵庆杰，中国政法大学马克思主义学院）

(This article is a phased achievement of the Beijing University Collaborative Innovation Center for the Study of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (China University of Political Science and Law).)

（本文系北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心（中国政法大学）的阶段性成果）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心