Critique and Transcendence of Justice

In recent years, academic circles have engaged in intense debate over the concept of justice, distributive justice, and the relationship between justice (equality) and freedom, with the discussion also touching on important theses such as “whether justice exists in capitalist society” and “whether communist society transcends justice.” It is generally believed that communist society is a fundamentally new type of society entirely heterogeneous to capitalist society, and that the two societies can by no means share the same principles of justice; or, more radically, that communist society should transcend justice. The problem, however, lies in the fact that socialist society, as the first stage of communism, follows the principle of distribution according to work. Particularly for China at present, capital remains an important factor of production in the socialist market economy. Regulating and guiding the healthy development of capital is both a major economic issue and a major political issue. To promote the healthy and sustained development of the market economy, it is necessary to establish a social environment of fairness and justice. This requires us to construct a Marxist theory of justice that “possesses the dual function of both critiquing the logic of capital and providing norms for the market system,” and to respond to Western scholars’ distortions and misinterpretations of Marx’s theory of justice. The Eastern European neo-Marxist theorist Agnes Heller, in works such as *Beyond Justice* and *On Marx’s Idea of Justice*, offers new interpretations of issues including “distributive justice in capitalist society,” “the internal contradictions of Marx’s principle of distribution according to need,” and “whether communist society can transcend justice.” These interpretations contain both distortions of Marx’s theory of justice and useful intellectual resources that can be drawn upon. Given that Heller’s views on justice are somewhat representative in Western academia, distinguishing truth from falsehood and revealing their essence and causes will help in understanding and constructing a Marxist theory of justice suited to China’s national conditions.

近年学界就正义的概念、分配正义、正义（平等）与自由的关系等问题展开了激烈讨论，争论还涉及“资本主义社会是否存在正义”“共产主义社会是否超越正义”等重要论题。一般认为，共产主义社会是一种根本异质于资本主义社会的全新社会类型，两种社会决不可能分享相同的正义原则，或者更极端地说，共产主义社会应该超越正义。但问题在于，社会主义社会作为共产主义的第一阶段，遵循的是按劳分配的原则，尤其对于中国当下而言，资本仍然是社会主义市场经济的重要生产要素，规范和引导资本健康发展，既是重大的经济问题，也是重大的政治问题。促进市场经济健康持续发展，必须建立公平正义的社会环境，这要求我们必须建构一种“兼具对资本逻辑进行批判和为市场制度提供规范的双重功能”的马克思主义正义理论，并回应西方学者对马克思正义理论的曲解和误读。东欧新马克思主义理论家阿格妮丝·赫勒（Agnes Heller）在《超越正义》《论马克思的正义思想》等论著中对“资本主义社会的分配正义”“马克思按需分配原则的内在矛盾”“共产主义社会能否超越正义”等问题做出了新的阐释，其中既有对马克思正义理论的曲解，也有可以利用的有益思想资源。鉴于赫勒在正义问题上的观点在西方学界具有一定代表性，辨明真伪并揭示其实质和成因将有助于理解和建构符合中国国情的马克思主义正义理论。

I. Does Distributive Justice Exist in Capitalist Society?

一、资本主义社会存在分配正义吗？

Marxist historical materialism emphasizes that the mode of production determines the mode of distribution, and the injustice of the capitalist mode of production determines the injustice of the mode of distribution. In Marx’s view, even if capitalist society could distribute wages equally and raise workers’ incomes, it would still be unjust in terms of distribution because the mode of production is unfair. Marx does not emphasize that production determines distribution in a narrow sense, but rather, from a higher and more abstract level, stresses that the socio-economic structure (relations of production) determines the relations of right (relations of distribution). That is, he holds that “right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.” [1]1 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 24, p. 87. On this basis, Marx believes that talking about distributive justice under the capitalist mode of production is misleading, and that any discourse about equality of income or wages is bourgeois ideology. It must be pointed out that Marx is not trying to argue that the bourgeoisie uses false consciousness to cover up facts and truth, but rather to tell people that the injustice of the capitalist mode of production determines the impossibility of distributive justice.

马克思主义的唯物史观强调生产方式决定分配方式，资本主义生产方式的非正义性决定分配方式的非正义性。在马克思看来，即便资本主义社会能够平等分配工资并提高工人收入，仍然在分配上是不正义的，因为生产方式不公平。马克思并不是在狭隘的意义上强调生产决定分配，而是站在更高、更抽象的层面强调社会经济结构（生产关系）决定法权关系（分配关系），即认为“权利决不能超出社会的经济结构以及由经济结构制约的社会的文化发展”。基于此，马克思认为在资本主义生产方式下谈论分配正义具有误导性，任何关于收入、工资平等的言论都是资产阶级的意识形态。必须指出，马克思并不是要强调资产阶级用虚假意识掩盖了事实和真相，而是要告诉人们资本主义生产方式的非正义性决定了分配正义的不可能性。

Heller’s analysis of Marx’s theory of justice proceeds from a special genealogy of the concept of justice. Based on the formal concept of justice, she argues that since the rules of the commodity economy in capitalist society apply to everyone, this indicates that capitalist society has achieved distributive justice. In fact, Marx does not deny “formal justice” in Heller’s sense; what he questions is that market rules, under the influence of an unfair mode of production, inevitably tend toward injustice. This can be seen from his critique of Smith. Smith recognized that self-interested individuals would come into conflict with society and others over issues of interest, but he firmly believed that the market’s automatic regulatory mechanism could coordinate the many different private interests to achieve a universal interest, ultimately realizing market equilibrium and social integration. Society is always “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. … By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.” [2]2 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, vol. 2, p. 27. Marx acknowledges that market rules are an “invisible hand” and have the same effect on every member of society, but he denies that market rules can automatically achieve a good state of society, and opposes the ahistorical treatment of this alienated power, which stands above people, as an eternal natural state of humanity. When discussing market economic relations, Marx says, not without irony, “To use a phrase of an English economist, this relation, like the ancient god of classical antiquity, hovers over the earth, distributing happiness and misery with an invisible hand, creating some kingdoms and destroying others, causing some nations to arise and others to decline; but with the abolition of the basis, i.e., with the abolition of private property, with the communist regulation of production, and with the consequent abolition of the alien relationship of people to their own products, the power of the relationship of supply and demand will also disappear, and people will once again bring exchange, production, and the way they relate to one another under their own control.” [3]3 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5, p. 52. In Marx’s eyes, justice in capitalist society has only a formal appearance and lacks substantive content. Although the norms and rules of justice apply to every member of society in a juridical sense, they are not worthy of people’s expectations. It is not difficult to see that the disagreement between Heller and Marx lies in whether distributive justice exists in capitalist society. From the perspective of formal justice, Heller believes that distributive justice exists in capitalist society; from the perspective that the economic structure determines juridical conceptions, Marx denies that distributive justice exists in capitalist society. The crux of the issue is whether a society that conforms to formal justice can deserve the title of “distributive justice.” In fact, Heller’s affirmation of distributive justice and Marx’s critique of justice in capitalist society are not irreconcilable. On the one hand, we can say that Heller does not deny that production determines distribution; she merely holds that distribution is just as long as it conforms to formal justice. On the other hand, we can say that Marx does not deny that capitalist distribution conforms to formal justice; he merely holds that this justice is merely a facade and is not just in essence.

赫勒对马克思正义理论的分析是从一种特殊的正义概念谱系学出发的，依据形式的正义概念，她认为既然资本主义社会商品经济的规则适用于每一个人，那就表明资本主义社会实现了分配正义。事实上，马克思并不否认赫勒意义上的“形式的正义”，他要质疑的是市场规则在不公平的生产方式影响下必然倾向于不正义，这一点从他对斯密的批判可以看出。斯密意识到自私自利的个人将会因利益问题与社会和他人产生矛盾，但他坚信市场自主调节机制能够协调众多彼此不同的私人利益而达致普遍利益，最终实现市场均衡和社会整合，社会总是“受着一只看不见的手的指导，去尽力达到一个并非他本意想要达到的目的。……他追求自己的利益，往往使他能比在真正出于本意的情况下更有效地促进社会的利益”。马克思承认市场规则是“看不见的手”，且对每一个社会成员都具有同样的效力，但他否认市场规则可以自动实现社会的良善状态，反对非历史地将这种凌驾于人之上的异化力量视为人类的永恒自然状态。在论及市场经济关系时马克思不无讽刺地说道，“用一位英国经济学家的话来说，这种关系就像古典古代的命运之神一样，邀游于寰球之上，用看不见的手把幸福和灾难分配给人们，把一些王国创造出来，又把它们毁掉，使一些民族产生，又使它们衰亡；但随着基础即随着私有制的消灭，随着对生产实行共产主义的调节以及这种调节所带来的人们对于自己产品的异己关系的消灭，供求关系的威力也将消失，人们将使交换、生产及他们发生相互关系的方式重新受自己的支配。”在马克思眼里，资本主义社会的正义仅具有形式化的外观而缺乏实质性的内容，尽管正义的规范和规则在法权意义上适用于每一个社会成员，但却不值得人们期待。不难看出，赫勒与马克思的分歧在于资本主义社会是否存在分配正义，从形式的正义出发，赫勒认为资本主义社会存在分配正义，从经济结构决定法权观念出发，马克思否认资本主义社会存在分配正义。问题的关键在于，一种符合形式的正义的社会能否配享“分配正义”的名号？其实，赫勒对分配正义的确证与马克思对资本主义社会正义的批判并非水火不容，一方面我们说赫勒并不否认生产决定分配，她只是认为分配只要符合形式的正义就是正义的，另一方面我们说马克思并不否认资本主义分配符合形式的正义，他只是认为这种正义徒有其表，本质上并不正义。

Heller’s emphasis on formal justice is primarily directed against the economic determinism of orthodox Soviet Marxism. In her view, distribution is influenced by the dominant values (norms and rules) of society and is not unilaterally determined by production. In some cases, “norms can provide a standard that is entirely different from the rules of production, especially the rules of commodity production.” [4]4 Agnes Heller, *Beyond Justice*, p. 112. Furthermore, Heller argues that orthodox Marxism, and even Marx’s own theory of justice, lacks an ethical foundation. This is prominently manifested in the fact that “social politics has increasingly lost its ethical basis, and the inquiry into social politics has mainly become an economic science, in which the ‘invisible hand’ holds supreme dominance.” [5]5 Agnes Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx*, p. 89. By replacing ethics and morality with productive forces, “Marx designed his ‘city on earth’ without reference to the ‘city of the soul’; in his theory, there is no space provided for the latter.” [6]6 Agnes Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx*, p. 91. These assertions are clearly unfair. On the surface, Heller seems to be opposing economic determinism, but in reality, she falls into the trap of economic determinism. Marx’s political economy is not the national economy of Smith and others, but a critique of national economy. Marx acknowledges that the “invisible hand” “holds supreme dominance” in capitalist society, but he emphasizes that the “invisible hand” is a product of a specific historical stage of human society, and that future communist society will eliminate all rule by alien forces standing above people; at that time, the “invisible hand” will be transformed into a “visible hand.” Marx never denies the counteractive effect of ethical values on politics and economy. The reason he places the determining role of the economy in the first position and limits the role of ethical values is that he is soberly aware that the basis of ethical values is the production of material life and the relations between people formed in production. Heller’s excessive reliance on ethical and moral concepts, once it encounters capital in reality, is bound to suffer a complete defeat—a point easily confirmed by historical experience.

赫勒强调形式的正义主要针对的是苏联正统马克思主义的经济决定论，在她看来，分配受社会主导价值观念（规范和规则）的影响，并非由生产单方面决定，在某种情况下，“准则可以提供一个与生产规则，尤其是与商品生产规则截然不同的标准”。更进一步，赫勒认为正统马克思主义乃至马克思的正义理论缺乏伦理学的基础，这突出表现在：“社会政治已日益丧失其伦理基础，社会政治的探究主要成了经济科学，在其中，‘看不见的手’居于最高统治地位”。由于用生产力代替了伦理道德，“马克思设计他的‘地上之城’，而没有参考‘灵魂之城’，在他的理论中，没有为后者提供空间。”上述论断显然有失公允，表面上看赫勒似乎是在反对经济决定论，但实际上她却落入了经济决定论的窠臼。马克思的政治经济学并不是斯密等人的国民经济学，而是对国民经济学的批判，马克思承认“看不见的手”在资本主义社会“居于最高的统治地位”，但他强调“看不见的手”是人类社会特定历史阶段的产物，未来共产主义社会将消除一切凌驾于人之上的异己力量的统治，那时“看不见的手”将转变成“看得见的手”。马克思从不否认伦理价值观念对政治和经济的反作用，他之所以将经济的决定性作用置于首位并限制伦理价值观念的作用，是因为他清醒地意识到伦理价值观念的基础是物质生活的生产以及在生产中形成的人与人的关系。赫勒对伦理道德观念的过分倚重一旦在现实中遭遇资本，必定会一败涂地，这一点很容易被历史经验所证实。

II. Can Distribution According to Work Transcend Justice?

二、按劳分配能够超越正义吗？

In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx divides communist society into two phases: the first phase implements distribution according to labour, and the second phase implements distribution according to need. Distribution according to labour means that after necessary social deductions, labourers receive remuneration corresponding to the amount of labour they have performed. This implies that “the individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labour.” In Marx’s view, the issue is not whether communist society should involve labour, but whether the quantum of labour is still taken as the sole measure of value. On this point Marx is very clear: “The exchange of living labour for objectified labour—i.e. the positing of social labour in the form of the opposition of capital and wage labour—is the ultimate development of the value-relation and of production based on value. Its presupposition is—and remains—the amount of direct labour time, the quantity of labour employed, as the determinant factor in the production of wealth.” That is to say, future communist society should by no means take labour time as the measure of wealth, but rather disposable free time. “The measure of wealth is then not any longer, in any way, labour time, but rather disposable time. Labour time as the measure of wealth posits wealth itself as founded on poverty, and disposable time as existing in and because of the antithesis to surplus labour time.”

在《哥达纲领批判》中，马克思将共产主义社会分为两个阶段：第一阶段实行按劳分配，第二阶段实行按需分配。按劳分配意指进行必要的社会扣除后劳动者按照劳动的多寡获得相应报酬，这就意味着，“每一个生产者，在作了各项扣除以后，从社会领回的，正好是他给予社会的。他给予社会的，就是他个人的劳动量。”在马克思看来，问题不在于共产主义社会是否应该劳动，而在于是否仍将劳动量视为衡量价值的唯一尺度。关于这一点马克思说得非常清楚，“活劳动同物化劳动的交换，即社会劳动确立为资本和雇佣劳动对立的形式，是价值关系和以价值为基础的生产的最后发展。这种发展的前提现在是而且始终是：直接劳动时间的量，已耗费的劳动量是财富生产的决定因素。”也就是说，未来共产主义社会决不应以劳动时间为衡量财富的标准，而应以可自由支配的时间为标准，“以劳动时间作为财富的尺度，这表明财富本身是建立在贫困的基础上的，而可以自由支配的时间是同剩余劳动时间相对立并且是由于这种对立而存在的”。

According to Marx, in the first phase of communist society “the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, so far as this is exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give anything except his labour, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass to the ownership of individuals except individual means of consumption. But, so far as the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity-equivalents: a given amount of labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another form.” Yet this seemingly equal right is a bourgeois right; the exchange of equivalents exists only on average, not in every individual case. Because equal right is still confined within a bourgeois framework, this communism still bears the birthmarks of the capitalist society from which it emerges; equal right is in fact unequal right, for it “recognises no class differences” and tacitly accepts “unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges.” In essence, Marx holds that distribution according to labour is not the most rational mode of distribution, but he also acknowledges that it is the mode of distribution that must be adopted in the first phase of communism. Heller discovers that if necessary social deductions are unavoidable, there arises the question of who controls distribution, and once deductions become compulsory, unfairness can appear. It is in this sense that Heller once again emphasises the importance of ethical justice. In her view, if deductions are regarded as an equal duty and an obligation that everyone must observe, then the injustice and unfairness brought about by compulsory deductions can be avoided. Heller concludes that distribution according to labour necessarily posits a standard of distributive justice, and therefore it fails to transcend justice.

按照马克思的说法，共产主义社会第一阶段“通行的是商品等价物的交换中通行的同一原则，即一种形式的一定量劳动同另一种形式的同量劳动相交换”，但这种貌似平等的权利却是资产阶级的权利，等价物的交换只是平均来说才存在，并非存在于一切场合。由于平等的权利仍被限制在资产阶级的框框里，这种共产主义就仍然带着它脱胎出来的资本主义旧社会的痕迹，平等的权利不过是不平等的权利，因为它“不承认任何阶级差别”，默认“劳动者的不同等的个人天赋，从而不同等的工作能力，是天然特权”。质言之，马克思认为按劳分配不是最合理的分配方式，但他又承认这是共产主义第一阶段必须采取的分配方式。赫勒发现，如果必要的社会扣除不可避免，就存在一个分配主导权的问题，而一旦扣除带有强制性，便会出现不公平的情形。正是在这个意义上，赫勒再次强调伦理正义的重要性，在她看来，如果把扣除视为每一个人的平等义务和必须遵守的责任，那么就可以避免强制性扣除带来的不公正和不正义。赫勒的结论是，按劳分配必然提出一种分配正义的标准，因此它未能超越正义。

Heller believes that Marx’s reason for saying that equal right is unequal right (justice is injustice) is mainly the diversity of human individuals. Applying the same norms and rules to every member of a particular group is clearly unjust. Communist society does not require everyone to wear clothes of the same colour and style, to say the same things, or to do the same things; simplified equality is precisely inequality. Marx’s goal is to fully realise the freedom of each individual and to enable the comprehensive development of human endowments and potentialities, which necessitates the implementation of distribution according to need. If distribution according to labour has not escaped formal justice, distribution according to need signifies the transcendence of justice, because it distributes products according to the uniqueness of each individual, and no one has the right to obstruct the satisfaction of another’s needs. In a society of distribution according to need, the principle of justice will no longer apply: first, because there are no specific norms and rules; second, because there is no judging, comparing, or ranking. In essence, the fact that no one has the right to interfere with the satisfaction of another’s needs is a negation of the principle of justice, meaning the transcendence of justice.

赫勒认为马克思之所以认为平等的权利即不平等的权利（正义即不正义）主要是鉴于人类个体的差异性，对特定群体的每个成员诉诸相同的规范和规则显然是不正义的，共产主义社会不是要让每个人穿同样花色和款式的衣服、说同样的话、做同样的事，简化的平等恰恰是不平等。马克思的目标是充分实现每一个人的自由，让人的禀赋和潜能得到全面发展，这就必须实行按需分配。如果说按劳分配没有摆脱形式的正义，按需分配则意味着超越正义，因为它将根据每一个人的独特性分配产品，任何人都无权妨碍他人需要的满足。在按需分配的社会里，正义原则将不再适用，一是不存在特定的规范和规则，二是不存在判断、比较和排序。质言之，任何人无权干涉他人需要的满足是对正义原则的否定，意味着超越正义。

We know that Marx criticised the egalitarian conception of justice, but Heller believes that Marx’s rejection of the principle of equality was too radical. In her view, the first phase of communism (distribution according to labour) should not disregard the reasonable value of the principle of equality. Logically, justice and equality are closely linked. If distribution according to labour cannot do without the principle of justice, then it also cannot do without the principle of equality. Equality constitutes the standard of justice in two respects: first, formal justice, which emphasises that the same norms and rules apply to every member of the same group; second, political justice, which emphasises that the value of equality directly constitutes the norms and rules of justice. Heller believes that Marx rejected both kinds of equality. He rejected the second kind because it is an egalitarian conception of justice. In Marx’s view, egalitarianism is a kind of generalised envy and a negative negation of private property, rather than a positive supersession in the full communist sense. Heller agrees with Marx’s critique of the egalitarian conception of justice, but she believes that the first kind of equality should be retained. She even thinks that Marx fell into a contradiction between factual judgment and value judgment, namely, “acknowledging the fact of justice inherent in the rules of the market, but refusing to regard the principle of equality as a potential value.” Confirming that distribution according to labour has not transcended justice not only accords with the original intention of Marx’s theory of justice but also has certain implications for the current construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Today, China’s market-oriented transformation has already entered an advanced stage of comprehensive reform. How to find a theory that confirms the justice of the market system from within the Marxist critique of capital and the market has become the key to constructing the discourse of Marxist political philosophy. So, how can we both retain Marx’s critical dimension of justice and at the same time confirm the justice of the socialist market economy? The key is to have a consciousness of the stage-based development of society, to deeply understand Marx’s discussion of the different phases of communist development, and to approach the issue of justice from the perspective of the primary stage of socialism, which is China’s greatest national condition. Some domestic scholars distinguish Marx’s political philosophy into “social justice” at the realistic level, premised on equal rights, and “freedom” at the ideal level, centred on human self-realisation. This shows that Marx does not reject lower-order justice, even though achieving higher-order justice is the value goal of communist society. Heller’s emphasis that under the system of distribution according to labour one must still follow the norms and rules of justice, while at the same time retaining the belief in transcending justice, is fully consistent with Marx’s basic conception of justice.

我们知道，马克思曾批判过平等主义的正义观，但赫勒认为马克思对平等原则的拒斥过于激进，在她看来，共产主义的第一阶段（按劳分配）不应忽视平等原则的合理价值。从逻辑上看，正义和平等是紧密相连的，如果说按劳分配离不开正义原则，那么它也离不开平等原则。平等在以下两个方面构成正义的标准：一是基于形式的正义，强调相同的规范和规则适用于同一群体的每一个成员；二是基于政治的正义，强调平等的价值直接构成正义的规范和规则。赫勒认为马克思同时拒斥了上述两种平等，拒斥第二种平等是因为它是平等主义的正义观。在马克思看来，平等主义是一种广义的忌妒和对私有财产的消极否定，而不是在共产主义全部意义上的积极扬弃。赫勒赞同马克思对平等主义正义观的批判，但认为应保留第一种平等，她甚至认为马克思在事实判断和价值判断上陷入了矛盾，即“承认了市场规则中固有的正义事实，但拒绝将平等原则视为潜在的价值”。确证按劳分配未能超越正义，这不仅符合马克思正义理论的本意，对当下中国特色社会主义建设也具有一定的启示意义。当今中国的市场化转型已经处于综合性改革的高级阶段，如何从马克思主义的资本—市场批判中寻找到一种确证市场制度正义性的理论，成为马克思主义政治哲学话语建构的关键。那么，如何既保留马克思对正义的批判维度，同时又确证社会主义市场经济的正义性呢？关键就是要有一种社会发展的阶段论意识，要深刻理解马克思关于共产主义不同发展阶段的论述，一切从社会主义初级阶段这个中国最大的国情出发看待正义问题。国内有学者将马克思的政治哲学区分为现实性层面上以权利平等为前提的“社会公正”和理想性层面上以人的自我实现为主旨的“自由”。这就表明，马克思并不排斥低阶正义，虽然实现高阶正义是共产主义社会的价值目标。赫勒强调按劳分配制度下仍然必须遵循正义的规范和规则，同时又保有超越正义的信念，这完全符合马克思关于正义的基本设定。

III. Objections to Marx’s Principle of Distribution According to Need

三、对马克思按需分配原则的诘难

According to Marx, distribution according to need is the principle of distribution that should be followed in the second phase of communism. If distribution according to labour has not transcended justice, then distribution according to need transcends justice. Heller fully endorses the principle of distribution according to need, regarding it as a reasonable hypothesis with important significance and value. At the same time, however, she believes that Marx’s elaboration of this principle contains two contradictions.

按照马克思的观点，按需分配是共产主义第二阶段应该遵循的分配原则。如果按劳分配没有超越正义，按需分配则超越了正义。赫勒完全赞同按需分配原则，认为这是合理的假设，具有重要的意义和价值，但与此同时，她认为马克思对这个原则的阐释存在两个矛盾。

The first contradiction is the contradiction between infinite needs and finite life. Understood literally, distribution according to need means satisfying all the needs of all people. Marx believed that needs are social in nature and will continuously expand with the development of production; the emergence of new needs is a basic fact of human history. As is well known, the structure of needs is not only constrained by the level of development of the productive forces but also influenced by specific value concepts. For example, what was once a luxury may become a daily necessity in the present; this is both a result of production development and a consequence of cultural change. Heller places particular emphasis on the influence of ethical values on needs. She gives the example that a nun needs only a piece of bread and a glass of water each day, indicating that culture can have a decisive impact on the structure of needs. Communist society is a free society with highly developed productive forces, where the quality and quantity of needs have reached their richest extent. However, in Heller’s view, if freedom is understood as absolute, it is impossible for all needs to be satisfied; there will always be a contradiction between infinite needs and finite individual life. Therefore, understanding distribution according to need as satisfying every need of every person is impractical. When the satisfaction of one need hinders the satisfaction of another, there is a priority order for the satisfaction of needs, but in reality it is difficult for people to determine the basis for choice. Heller advocates analyzing the problem of needs from the perspective of a plurality of ethical communities. She emphasizes that each community possesses different value concepts and a specific structure of needs; people can freely choose different communities to live the life they desire and can change the structure of needs and their way of life at any time. The problem is that if the structure of needs is shaped and determined by specific value concepts, and the latter are applicable to every member of society—that is, they conform to the principle of formal justice—then this indicates that justice has not yet been transcended. In other words, if distribution according to need allows individuals to make free choices, it must accept formal justice and its specific norms and rules; justice has still not been transcended. Logically, there is a clear flaw in Heller’s analysis. The finitude of life is undoubtedly ineradicable, but it does not necessarily conflict with infinite needs. The author believes that the key to the problem is to clarify where infinite needs come from and what their essence is. As a fellow student of Lukács, István Mészáros saw more than Heller the manipulation of needs by the logic of capital. He pointed out, “What is now counted as a ‘need’ is not the need of the producer as a human being, but the structural imperative of capital’s price stability and reproduction. Use-value becomes legitimate only in relation to (and strictly subordinate to) the latter.” Mészáros also revealed the secret of the transformation of luxury consumption into universal consumption: the capital system, by declaring that “luxury goods” can be relativized and popularized, deliberately spreads luxury enjoyment to consumers at the next lower level, thereby stimulating and expanding product demand to obtain large profits. Heller’s opposition to the “dictatorship of needs” is correct, but she ignores that capital is precisely the root cause of all dictatorships. When she fantasizes that ethical value concepts can determine people’s needs, she falls into a subjectivist utopia.

第一个矛盾是无限需要与有限生命的矛盾。依照字面意思来理解，按需分配指的是满足一切人的所有需要。马克思认为需要具有社会性，将会随生产的发展而不断扩大，新需要的产生是人类历史的基本事实。众所周知，需要的结构不仅受生产力发展水平制约，还受到特定价值观念的影响，譬如，昔日的奢侈品有可能在当下成为生活必需品，这既是生产发展所致，也是文化变迁的结果。赫勒尤其注重伦理价值观念对需要的影响，她举例说，修女每天只需要一块面包和一杯水，这表明文化对需要结构可以产生决定性的影响。共产主义社会是生产力高度发达的自由社会，需要的质和量均达到了最丰富的程度。但在赫勒看来，如果把自由理解为绝对的，需要就不可能全部满足，无限需要和有限个体生命之间总会存在矛盾，因此将按需分配理解为满足每个人的所有需要不切合实际。当一种需要的满足阻碍另一种需要的满足时，需要的满足就存在一个优先顺序，但在现实中人们很难确定选择的根据。赫勒主张从多元伦理共同体出发分析需要问题，她强调每个共同体都拥有不同的价值观念和特定的需要结构，人们可以自由选择不同的共同体过自己向往的生活，并随时更改需要的结构和生活方式。问题在于，如果需要的结构由特定的价值观念塑造和决定，后者又适用于社会中的每一个成员，即契合形式的正义原则，那就表明还未能超越正义。也就是说，按需分配如果允许个体做出自由的选择，就必须接受形式的正义及其特定的规范和规则，正义就依然没有被超越。从逻辑上看，赫勒的分析存在明显漏洞，生命的有限性无疑无法消除，但它未必同无限需要相冲突。笔者认为，问题的关键是弄清楚无限需要从何而来？它的本质又是什么？同为卢卡奇的学生，梅扎罗斯（István Mészáros）比赫勒更多地看到了资本逻辑对需要的操控，他指出，“现在被算做‘需要’的东西，并不是生产者的人的需要，而是资本稳定价格和再生产的结构性规则。只是在涉及（并严格从属于）后者时，使用价值才变得合法。”梅扎罗斯还揭示了奢侈消费转变为普遍消费的秘密，那就是资本制度通过宣布“奢侈品”可以相对化和大众化，故意将奢侈享受传播到下一层级的消费者，进而刺激和扩大产品需求量以获得大量利润。赫勒反对“需要的专政”是正确的，但她忽略了资本恰恰是一切专政的总根源，当她幻想伦理价值观念可以决定人们的需要时，便倒向了主观主义的乌托邦。

The second contradiction is the confusion of the means of satisfying needs with the satisfaction of needs themselves. Heller believes that communist society can provide the necessary means for the satisfaction of the needs of all its members, but this does not mean that needs are thereby satisfied. For example, if a person demands the satisfaction of the need to develop musical talent, society can provide various musical instruments, but whether the musical talent is fully developed is another matter. Expressed in a general formula: A needs a certain type of knowledge X; society can provide the means to satisfy X, but it cannot satisfy A’s need itself, because the satisfaction of needs “has an inalienable personal and contingent character.” Heller further points out that society’s provision of the means to satisfy needs cannot do without the principle of justice, while the satisfaction of needs implies the transcendence of justice. Starting from the realization of human needs, Heller believes that future society should transcend justice, but if distribution according to need refers to society providing the means to satisfy needs, then this society has not yet transcended justice. Based on this, Heller argues that Marx’s principle of distribution according to need contains a contradiction, which determines that communist society has still not transcended justice. The author believes that Heller’s distinction between the concept of communism and communist society is necessary, but denying the latter’s real possibility is a prejudice, whose philosophical root is Kant’s distinction between constitutive principles and regulative principles. Kant distinguished the two types of principles to limit the function of reason and prevent the intellectual principles of pure reason from overstepping their bounds. In his view, once a concept shifts from a regulative principle to a constitutive principle, it falls into antinomy in theory and brings disaster to reality. For a long time, people have had no objection to the regulative function of the concept of communism, but they hold different views on whether this concept has a constitutive attribute. In Heller’s view, the idea of communism can only play a regulative role and must never become a constitutive principle. If distribution according to need is regarded as a constitutive principle, it means that every member of society’s needs are satisfied, which is impossible to achieve in reality. However, if distribution according to need is regarded as a regulative principle, then it is not necessary to care about whether needs are realized; one only needs to confirm the reasonableness of needs and emphasize that needs should be satisfied. Starting from this, Heller believes that socialist society should accept a regulative concept of justice. If distribution according to need is considered only to concern the satisfaction of needs, then it has nothing to do with justice and points to the transcendence of justice, because here there are neither norms nor rules, nor any problem of ordering or comparison. If distribution according to need is considered a regulative principle, emphasizing that not all needs must be fully realized but should be equally recognized, then when society cannot simultaneously provide the means to satisfy needs, members of society will have to make choices and order priorities, which implies the reconstruction of the norms and rules of justice. In short, Heller believes that distribution according to need cannot be understood in a constitutive sense, because abundance is relative, but as a regulative principle, distribution according to need involves the recognition of human needs and is therefore important and necessary. Once the legitimacy of needs is denied, personality, dignity, and radical democracy are also denied, and such a society would no longer be a socialist society. It is not difficult to see that Heller does not deny the principle of distribution according to need; individual freedom and the all-round development of human beings cannot do without this principle. However, she emphasizes that as a value ideal, distribution according to need cannot be realized in reality and can only function as a regulative principle.

第二个矛盾是将满足需要的手段与需要的满足混为一谈。赫勒认为，共产主义社会可以为全体成员需要的满足提供必要的手段，但这并不意味着需要就得到了满足。譬如，一个人要求满足发展音乐天赋的需要，社会可以提供各种乐器，但音乐天赋是否充分发展起来则是另一回事。用一般化的公式表述就是：A需要某种类型的知识X，社会可以提供满足X所需要的手段，但无法满足A的需要本身，因为需要的满足“具有不可分割的个人性和偶然性”。赫勒进而指出，社会提供满足需要的手段离不开正义原则，而需要的满足意味着超越正义。从人的需要的实现出发，赫勒认为未来社会应该超越正义，但按需分配如果指的是社会提供满足需要的手段，那么这个社会就并未超越正义。基于此，赫勒认为马克思的按需分配原则存在矛盾，这决定了共产主义社会仍然没有超越正义。笔者认为，赫勒区分共产主义观念和共产主义社会是必要的，但否认后者的现实可能性则是一种偏见，其哲学根源乃是康德对建构性原则和调节性原则的区分。康德区分两种原则的目的是限制理性的功能，防止纯粹理性的知性原则僭越界限，在他看来，一旦观念从调节性原则转为建构性原则，就会在理论上陷入二律背反，给现实带来灾难。长期以来，人们对共产主义观念的调节性功能没有异议，但对于该观念是否具有建构的属性持不同看法。在赫勒看来，共产主义理念只能发挥调节性的作用，决不能成为建构性的原则，如果把按需分配视为建构性的原则，就意味着每个社会成员的需要都得到满足，这在现实中无法实现。然而，如果把按需分配视为调节性的原则，就不必在意需要是否实现，而只需确认需要的合理性，强调需要应该得到满足就可以了。由此出发，赫勒认为社会主义社会应该接受一种调节性的正义概念。如果认定按需分配仅仅关乎需要的满足，那它就与正义无关且指向对正义的超越，因为这里既没有规范和规则，也不存在排序和比较的问题。如果认定按需分配是调节性的原则，强调所有需要不一定全部实现但应当被同等地认可，那么当社会无法同时提供满足需要的手段时，社会成员将不得不对优先性做出选择和排序，这就意味着重建正义的规范和规则。总之，赫勒认为按需分配不能从建构的意义上理解，因为富足是相对的，但作为调节性原则，按需分配涉及对人的需要的承认，因此是重要的、必要的，一旦否认了需要的合法性，也就否认了人格、尊严和激进民主，这样的社会就不再是社会主义社会。不难看出，赫勒并没有否认按需分配原则，个性自由和人的全面发展离不开这个原则，但她强调作为一种价值理想，按需分配在现实中不可能实现，只能作为调节性原则发挥作用。

IV. Which is more fundamental: freedom or justice?

四、自由与正义何者更为基础？

Heller emphasizes that Marx’s repeated assertion that “justice is injustice” is not intended to oppose justice, nor to indicate that X society is just, but rather that from the perspective of a higher standard of justice, X society is unjust; the latter view presupposes an absolute, transcendent concept of justice. Marx seeks to challenge the existence and meaning of all norms and standards of action. Since all individuals are unique and incomparable, justice can only become a restriction and a form of unfreedom. In Heller’s view, if equality represents the first phase of communist society, then freedom represents the second phase; the freer a society is, the more it tends toward inequality. Assuming that a future society can achieve absolute freedom, this would necessarily mean the disappearance of equality and justice. Conversely, in a relatively free society, justice and equality will inevitably coexist over the long term. Furthermore, Heller argues that neither justice nor equality is the highest-level category; freedom is the foundation of modern humanity and the ultimate principle of modernity: “Freedom has become the foundation of the modern world. It is the foundation on which nothing else is based.” [13]13 Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx*, p. 87. On the relationship between freedom and justice, Heller both emphasizes their mutual interdependence—neither can exist without the other—and leans toward the side of freedom, stressing that justice cannot provide a standard for freedom, but freedom can (and should) provide value guidance for justice. That is, it is not justice that is superior to freedom, but freedom that is superior to justice. According to Heller’s conception, in a society without domination and oppression, social members possess positive freedom and can reach agreement on certain norms and rules through rational debate. Modern society is a dynamic society, where social norms and rules constantly change; but the problem is that without norms and rules, society cannot exist, and with norms and rules, the problem of injustice arises. Heller acknowledges that in real life there are many situations where justice cannot be applied, because people desire a freely chosen, pluralistic way of life. She firmly believes that no society can completely transcend justice, and a free society without justice is unimaginable. People can rationally imagine a just free society, in which freedom will provide the value standard for justice.

赫勒强调马克思反复声称“正义即不正义”并不是要反对正义，也不是想表明X社会是正义的，但从更高的正义标准观之，X社会是不正义的，后一种观点预设了一种绝对的、超验的正义概念。马克思要对一切行动准则及标准的存在和意义提出挑战，由于所有人都是独特的、不可比较的，因此正义只能成为一种限制和不自由。在赫勒看来，如果说平等代表共产主义社会的第一阶段，自由则代表共产主义社会的第二阶段，越自由的社会就越是倾向于不平等。假设未来社会能够实现绝对自由，那它一定意味着平等和正义的消亡。反之，在一个相对自由的社会里，正义和平等必将长期共存。更进一步，赫勒认为正义和平等均不是最高层级的范畴，自由才是现代人的基础以及现代性的终极原理，“自由成为了现代世界的基础。它是没有什么东西以它为基础的基础”。在自由和正义的关系问题上，赫勒既强调自由和正义相互依存谁也离不开谁，同时又偏向自由的一端，强调正义不能为自由提供标准，但自由可以（应该）为正义提供价值引导。也就是说，不是正义高于自由，而是自由高于正义。按照赫勒的设想，在一个没有统治和压迫的社会里，社会成员拥有积极自由，可以通过理性辩论就某种规范和规则达成一致意见。现代社会是动态社会，社会规范和规则不断变化，但问题在于，没有规范和规则社会便无法存在，有了规范和规则就会产生不正义的问题。赫勒承认现实生活中存在大量正义无法适用的情形，因为人们渴望一种自由选择的、多元化的生活方式，她坚信任何社会都不能完全超越正义，没有正义的自由社会是不可想象的。人们能够理性地想象一种正义的自由社会，在这个社会自由将为正义提供价值标准。

In Heller’s view, measuring and judging whether a society is just depends, first, on whether specific norms and rules exist, and second, on whether those norms and rules are consistently applied to specific groups. Statically, any society that meets the above conditions is just; even if social norms and rules are not frequently or consistently implemented, the society may still be just—one can regard this as a failure of unjust individuals to keep their word. If judged by the strict standard of a just society, norms and rules usually cannot be questioned or tested; historically, such societies belong to pre-modern societies, and in terms of characteristics, they are societies of static justice. Although pre-modern societies are just, they are not good societies, because people cannot even imagine different ways of life, let alone question the norms and rules of society. Capitalist society is a society of dynamic justice: people never take specific social norms and rules for granted. Although it has not transcended justice, it is historically progressive compared with pre-modern societies. Modern people always expect a just society, hoping that the concept of justice can apply to every social member, while at the same time being able to question the specific norms and rules of justice at any time. Heller believes that Western liberal democratic society is the most reasonable society of dynamic justice. She agrees with Rawls’s view that the norms and rules of justice must be accepted by all members of society, but opposes theoretical presuppositions such as the “original position” and the “veil of ignorance,” [14]14 Rawls’s “original position” is a hypothetical initial situation of equality in which parties choose principles of justice behind a “veil of ignorance” that prevents them from knowing their own social position, talents, or conception of the good. arguing that the “original position” is merely a beautiful fantasy and that everyone following the same principles of justice under the “veil of ignorance” is only a utopia. Heller believes that Rawls’s view presupposes that modern people share an identical, unchanging structure of needs, which is taken for granted and cannot be questioned. Starting from the plurality of needs and ways of life, she argues that the need structure of modern people cannot represent the need structure of humanity; modern people must not be bound by the same norms and rules of justice. Justice can only be historical and pluralistic.

在赫勒看来，衡量和判断一个社会是否正义，一要看是否存在特定的规范和规则，二要看规范和规则是否被一致地运用于特定群体。从静态上看，任何符合上述条件的社会都是正义的，即便社会规范和规则没有被经常地、一致地贯彻，这个社会仍然可能是正义的，人们可以认为这是不正义的人失信的结果。如果按照严格的正义社会的标准，规范和规则通常不能被质疑或检验，从历史上看这类社会属于前现代社会，从特征上看则属于静态正义的社会。前现代社会虽然是正义的，但却不是好社会，因为人们根本无法想象不同的生活方式，更不会质疑社会的规范和规则。资本主义社会是动态正义的社会，人们从不把特定的社会规范和规则视为理所当然的，尽管它并未超越正义，但与前现代社会相比却具有历史进步性。现代人总是期望一种正义的社会，期待正义的观念能够适用于每一个社会成员，同时又可以随时质疑正义的特定规范和规则。赫勒认为西方自由民主社会是最合理的动态正义的社会，她赞同罗尔斯关于正义的规范和规则必须被社会全体成员接受的观点，但反对“原初状态”“无知之幕”等理论预设，认为“原初状态”只是美好的幻想，所有人在“无知之幕”下遵守相同的正义原则只是乌托邦。赫勒认为罗尔斯的观点预设了现代人拥有相同不变的需要结构，这个结构被视为理所当然的、不能质疑的，而从需要和生活方式的多元性出发，她认为现代人的需要结构不能代表人类的需要结构，现代人决不能受制于相同的正义规范和规则，正义只能是历史的、多元的。

In terms of basic tendency, Heller agrees with the principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” but she attempts to place freedom above justice and denies that future communist society can transcend justice. This theoretical tendency stems from hostility toward Soviet and Eastern European socialist societies. After experiencing the Holocaust and Soviet political intervention, dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe held no favorable view of either Western capitalism or Soviet and Eastern European socialism. They longed for individual freedom, and in the choice of priority between justice and freedom, they generally tended to lean toward the side of freedom. Heller believes that communist society must allow people to freely choose their way of life and must continuously question and test the norms and rules of justice. This necessarily involves a discussion of the philosophical value of freedom and making deliberation a necessary link in the procedure of justice. Heller calls the justice directed by free deliberation democratic justice (radical democracy) and believes that future society must be based on this. But the problem is: in a capitalist society based on relations of domination and subordination, how is philosophical value discussion possible? A society based on subordination and domination is filled with asymmetrical relations. Although equal symmetrical relations may form within a class, they cannot be extended to the whole of society. It can be seen that in a society based on subordination and domination, philosophical value discussion can only function as a regulative idea, not as a constitutive principle.

从基本倾向上看，赫勒认同“各尽所能，按需分配”原则，但她试图将自由置于正义之上，否认未来共产主义社会可以超越正义，这种理论倾向源于对苏东社会主义社会的敌视。在经历了“大屠杀”和苏联政治干预之后，东欧持不同政见的知识分子对西方资本主义和苏东社会主义都没有好感，他们渴望获得个性自由，在正义和自由的优先性选择上，一般倾向于倒向自由的一端。赫勒认为共产主义社会必须允许人们自由地选择生活方式，并能够不断质疑和检验正义的规范和规则，这就必然涉及自由的哲学价值讨论以及让商谈成为正义程序的必要环节。赫勒把自由商谈指向的正义称为民主的正义（激进民主），认为未来社会必须以此为基础。但问题在于，在一个以统领和依附关系为基础的资本主义社会，哲学价值讨论何以可能？依附和统领为基础的社会充斥着不对称的关系，虽然在阶级内部有可能形成平等的对称关系，但却无法推广至整个社会。可见，哲学价值讨论在依附和统领为基础的社会只能作为调节性的理念发挥作用，而不可能成为建构性的原则。

Heller believes that those who actively engage in philosophical value discussions, although they have particular interests, are willing to work for the overall interests of humanity; such people are called good persons. Heller optimistically believes that good persons exist in modern society. When they engage in philosophical value discussions, they can actively accept the guidance of moral norms and avoid trivial everyday factuality and positivism. Participants in the discussion will take humanity as the highest reference point, suspend their particular interests, and each participant will acknowledge the authenticity of others’ values and regard others as representatives of humanity. The discussion will ultimately form some kind of value priority sequence, at which point the individual must temporarily abandon their original values and abide by the newly established values. However, this does not mean denying the authenticity of the original values, only recognizing that the new values have greater priority than the original ones. In short, Heller believes that contemporary capitalist society remains a society based on relations of dependency and domination, that philosophical value discussion cannot achieve universalization, and that it must therefore turn to socialist society. In the process of transformation, people must maintain their desire for philosophical value discussion; changing the world is impossible without philosophy, and philosophy will provide norms for the world: “All those who want to end a society based on relations of dependency and domination need philosophy. They need norms and ideals that can provide a perspective through which they can change the world.” Philosophical value discussion is an ideal “ought”; it is precisely because of this “ought” that a world conforming to norms can be created. The author does not oppose basing justice on freedom, but the question is: what kind of freedom is being discussed here, and whose justice? Heller’s understanding of freedom has not left the foundation of modern normative political philosophy; for her, justice, rights, and equality are concepts of the same order, sharing the same value orientation. The reason Heller constantly wavers between affirming justice and transcending justice, between liberalism and socialism, is mainly that she fails to understand in what sense Marx’s communism transcends justice. In fact, Marx’s most important vision for the future communist society is the free and comprehensive development of the human person, that is, human self-realization. Therefore, the problem is not whether justice is based on freedom, but what genuine freedom is and how human society can comprehensively transcend civil society. As for whether communist society transcends justice, this question is somewhat similar to whether communist society abolishes the state. We can say that the association of free individuals is not a state, but we can also say it is a new type of state; similarly, we can say that communist society transcends justice, but we can also say it is a new type of justice.

赫勒认为积极进行哲学价值讨论的人虽然具有特殊利益，却愿意为人类的整体利益谋福利，这种人被称为好人。赫勒乐观地认为好人在现代社会是存在的，他们在进行哲学价值讨论时，能够主动接受道德规范的引导，避免日常琐碎的事实性和实证主义。参加讨论的人将以人类为最高参照点，悬置自己的特殊利益，每个讨论者都承认他人价值的真实性，并把他人视为人类的代表。讨论最终会形成某种价值优先序列，这时个体必须暂时放弃自己的原有价值，遵守新确立的价值，但这并不意味着否定原有价值的真实性，只是认可新价值比原有价值更具优先性。总之，赫勒认为当代资本主义社会仍然是一个以依附和统领关系为基础的社会，哲学价值讨论无法实现普遍化，因此必须转向社会主义社会。在转变过程中，人们必须保持对哲学价值讨论的渴望，改变世界离不开哲学，哲学将给世界提供规范，“所有那些想要结束以依附与统领关系为基础的社会的人都需要哲学。他们需要能提供一种视角使他们可以改变世界的规范和理想。”哲学价值讨论是一种理想性的“应该”，正是有了这个“应该”，符合规范的世界才有可能创建。笔者不反对将正义奠基于自由之上，但问题是这里谈论的是何种自由以及谁之正义？赫勒对自由的理解并未离开近代以来规范性政治哲学的基地，在她那里，正义、权利和平等是同等程度的概念，具有相同的价值取向。赫勒之所以在认同正义和超越正义、自由主义与社会主义之间不停摇摆，主要是由于未能理解马克思的共产主义究竟在何种意义上是超越正义的。事实上，马克思关于未来共产主义社会最重要的设想是人的自由全面发展，也即人的自我实现。因此，问题不在于正义是否奠基于自由，而在于何为真正的自由以及人类社会何以全面超越市民社会。至于共产主义社会是否超越正义，这个问题有点类似于共产主义社会是否消灭国家，我们既可以说自由人的联合体不是国家，也可以说它是一种新类型的国家，同样，我们既可以说共产主义社会超越了正义，也可以说它是一种新类型的正义。

V. Brief Comments

五、简短的评论

As discussed above, when interpreting Marx’s theory of justice, Heller incorporates many of her own “private insights.” On the surface, she endorses the principle of distribution according to need, the idea of communism, and the concepts of freedom and justice. However, in her concrete understanding of these concepts, she fails to grasp the true essence of Marxism and instead tends to conflate Soviet orthodox Marxism with Marx’s thought. Whether it is her argument for the existence of distributive justice in capitalist society from the perspective of formal justice, her misinterpretation of the internal contradictions in Marx’s principle of distribution according to need, or her denial that communist society transcends justice, all indicate that she has not correctly understood the unity of the empirical and transcendent dimensions of Marxism, nor the coercive power and role of the logic of capital in modern society. Heller’s theory of justice bears clear liberal and utopian socialist [15]15 Utopian socialism: a term used by Marx and Engels to describe early socialist theories (e.g., those of Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen) that criticized capitalism and envisioned ideal societies but lacked a scientific analysis of class struggle and historical materialism. overtones. Marx did not oppose freedom, but he recognized the illusory nature of freedom in capitalist society. Having long suffered political repression, Heller’s extreme longing for freedom is an important reason for her falling into liberalism and utopian socialism.

如上所述，赫勒在阐释马克思正义理论时带入了不少自己的“私人见解”，表面上看，她赞同按需分配、共产主义理念、自由和正义的观念，但在具体理解这些概念时，却没能把握马克思主义的真谛，反而更多地倾向于将苏联正统马克思主义与马克思的思想混为一谈。无论是从形式的正义出发论证资本主义社会存在分配正义，还是对马克思按需分配原则内在矛盾的误读，抑或是对共产主义社会超越正义的否认，都表明她未能正确理解马克思主义经验性维度和超越性维度的统一，未能理解资本逻辑在现代社会的强制性力量和作用。赫勒的正义理论带有明显的自由主义和乌托邦主义色彩，马克思并不反对自由，但他认识到资本主义社会自由的虚假性，赫勒因为长期受到政治上的压制，对自由极度渴望，这是其陷入自由主义和乌托邦主义的重要原因。

Heller’s interpretation of the problem of justice has positive significance. For example, her analysis of dynamic justice fully conforms to Marx’s judgment on the fluidity of modern society, and her analysis of multiple needs also conforms to Marx’s exposition on the free and comprehensive development of the human person in communist society. Heller’s understanding of justice originates from the special socio-historical and cultural atmosphere of Central and Eastern Europe. She does not propose a refined and rigorous theory of justice like Rawls and others, but her opposition to fixed and unchanging norms and rules of justice is entirely correct. Heller’s greatest theoretical contribution lies in revealing the most intractable problem in current research on theories of justice: “How is it possible, in a pluralistic world, for each culture to be linked to all other cultures through reciprocal ties?” Like mainstream Western theorists of justice, Heller believes that merely appealing to proletarian revolution or demonstrating the inevitability of communism solely at the level of economic laws is unworkable. The correct approach should be to persuade people that the communist ideal possesses not only the historical inevitability of objective laws but also the universally desirable moral legitimacy. The problem is that, under the conditions of modernity, ethical-political justice is increasingly divided into ethical justice and political justice: “The socio-political concept of justice is increasingly unconcerned with the best possible moral world. It advocates a legal-political order that may protect civil rights (freedom), but not their goodness.” This leads to a consequence: people always focus on distributive justice while neglecting the moral attributes of justice. On the issue of justice, Heller disagrees with both Marx and Rawls. Her disagreement with Rawls is expressed in her continued aspiration for a society that transcends justice; her disagreement with Marx is expressed in her persistent skepticism about the realization of communist society. Heller seeks to resolve the problem of plural values and social integration. Unlike Rawls, who establishes a universal normative foundation for the theory of justice through “overlapping consensus” forming public reason, she advocates constructing a common normative foundation for the pluralistic lifestyles of modern people through incomplete ethical-political justice. Regarding Heller’s theory of justice, Jean Louise Cohen’s summary is very apt: in her view, the theory relies heavily on Habermas’s writings, especially discourse ethics; “it focuses on the procedures by which socio-political norms and rules can be legitimately constructed and revised, rather than pretending to be a universal moral theory.” The problem lies in how to reach a value consensus and who ultimately decides the highest value. As Michael Walzer says, “Heller defends a highly idealized version of democratic decision-making; we still have a long way to go before we can claim to have made it a reality.” It can be seen that Heller attempts to reconstruct ethical-political justice under the conditions of modernity by emphasizing the dynamic and incomplete nature of justice. Her theoretical conception of transcending justice is not really about establishing a society that transcends justice, but about constantly subjecting the norms and rules of justice to questioning, maintaining a certain openness and fluidity, allowing people to autonomously choose their own suitable way of life and live the best moral (political) life in their own eyes. Although Heller has not fundamentally ended the debate on justice, she has proposed a different approach from Rawls, inspiring our thinking. This has important reference value for better realizing fairness and justice under the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.

赫勒对正义问题的阐释具有积极的意义。譬如，她对动态正义的分析完全符合马克思关于现代社会流变性的判断，对多元需要的分析也符合马克思关于共产主义社会人的自由全面发展的论述。赫勒对正义的理解源于中东欧特殊的社会历史文化氛围，她并未像罗尔斯等人那样提出一套精致严密的正义理论，但反对凝固不变的正义规范和规则却是完全正确的。赫勒最大的理论贡献在于揭示了当前正义理论研究最棘手的问题，那就是“在一个多元化的世界中，其中每一种文化都是通过彼此互惠的纽带与所有其他文化联结在一起是何以可能的？”与西方主流正义论者一样，赫勒认为仅仅诉诸无产阶级革命以及单纯在经济规律层面上论证共产主义的必然性是行不通的，正确的做法应该是说服人们相信共产主义理想不仅具有客观规律般的历史必然性，同时也具有令人普遍向往的道德正当性。问题在于，现代性条件下伦理政治的正义日益被分割为伦理的正义和政治的正义，“社会政治的正义概念越来越不关心最佳的可能的道德世界。它倡导一个也许可以保护市民权利（自由）的法律政治秩序，但不是它们的善”。这就导致了一个后果，那就是人们总是将目光集中在分配正义上，而忽略了正义的道德属性。在正义问题上，赫勒既不同意马克思也不同意罗尔斯，不同意罗尔斯表现在她仍然向往一种超越正义的社会，不同意马克思则表现在她始终对共产主义社会的实现持怀疑态度。赫勒要努力解决多元价值与社会整合的问题，与罗尔斯通过“重叠共识”形成公共理性为正义理论建立普遍的规范性基础不同，她主张通过不完备的伦理政治正义为现代人多元化的生活方式建构共同的规范化基础。对于赫勒的正义理论，科恩（Jean Louise Cohen）总结得非常到位，在她看来，该理论严重依赖哈贝马斯的著述，尤其是商谈伦理学，“它关注的是社会—政治规范和规则可以合法地构建和修改的程序，而不是冒充为普遍一般的道德理论”。问题在于如何达成价值共识以及最终由谁决定最高的价值？诚如沃尔泽（Michael Walzer）所言，“赫勒捍卫的是一个高度理想化版本的民主决策，在我们可以声称把它变成了现实之前，我们还有很长的路要走”。可见，赫勒试图通过强调正义的动态性和不完备性在现代性条件下重建伦理政治的正义，其超越正义的理论构想并不是要真的建立一个超越正义的社会，而是要让正义的规范和规则不断受到质疑，始终保持某种开放性和流动性，让人们自主选择适合自己的生活方式，过自己心目中的最佳的道德（政治）生活。赫勒虽然没有从根本上终结关于正义的论争，但却提出了不同于罗尔斯的方案，启发了我们的思考，这对在中国特色社会主义制度下更好地实现公平正义具有重要的参考价值。

(The author is a professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Philosophy, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, and a part-time researcher at the Center for Studies of Marxist Social Theory, Nanjing University.)

（作者系中南财经政法大学哲学院教授、博士生导师，南京大学马克思主义社会理论研究中心兼职研究员）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑