Toward a Cultural-Conservative Critique of Modernity

In the history of Western political thought, utopianism and liberalism are usually regarded as irreconcilable adversaries. Liberals believe that utopianism is the embodiment of socialism, and that its beautiful visions of a future society ignore human motives for profit, making them nothing but a moon in a mirror or a flower in water; utopianists, on the other hand, believe that liberalism unhistorically beautifies capitalist society, overestimates the positive value of Enlightenment reason and science and technology, and falls into uncritical positivism. It is noteworthy that Marxists and socialists have also been drawn into this protracted debate, but due to the dogmatic understanding of Marxism and socialism since the Second International, [1]1 The Second International (1889–1916) was an international organization of socialist and labor parties, where orthodox Marxism and reformist tendencies clashed, leading to later dogmatic interpretations. coupled with slander from Western anti-Marxists, a mistaken view has become prevalent in society—namely, that Marxism is a typical form of utopianism. To defend the scientific nature of Marxism, one must reveal the essence of utopianism from a Marxist standpoint while simultaneously criticizing liberal ideology. The Polish neo-Marxist theorist Leszek Kołakowski, [2]2 Leszek Kołakowski (1927–2009) was a Polish philosopher and historian of ideas, initially a Marxist who later became a critic of Marxism from a cultural-conservative and anti-totalitarian perspective. starting from a cultural-conservative perspective, re-examined utopianism and liberalism, arguing that both could lead to totalitarianism, and that the correct approach is to resist the temptation of uniformity and seek balance within the tension of different value positions and viewpoints.

在西方政治思想史上，乌托邦主义和自由主义通常被视为水火不容的冤家对头。自由主义者认为，乌托邦主义是社会主义的化身，其关于未来社会的美好设想忽略了人的谋利动机，只能是镜中月、水中花；乌托邦主义者则认为，自由主义非历史地美化了资本主义社会，高估了启蒙理性和科学技术的积极价值，陷入了无批判的实证主义。值得关注的是，马克思主义者和社会主义者也卷入了这场旷日持久的论战，但由于第二国际以来人们对马克思主义和社会主义存在教条化的理解，加上西方反马克思主义者的污蔑，社会上竟流行一种错误观点，即认为马克思主义就是典型的乌托邦主义。要捍卫马克思主义的科学性，就必须站在马克思主义的立场揭示乌托邦主义的实质，同时批判自由主义的意识形态。波兰新马克思主义理论家莱谢克·科拉科夫斯基从文化保守主义出发重新审视了乌托邦主义和自由主义，认为二者都有可能导致极权主义，正确的做法是抵制一致性的诱惑，在不同价值立场和观点的张力中寻求平衡。

I. A Critique of Utopianism’s “Future Society”

一、对乌托邦主义“未来社会”的批判

Kołakowski is a staunch anti-utopianist, but his attitude toward utopia is fraught with contradiction. At times he regards utopia as a genuine positive force; at other times he sees it as the number one public enemy of modern society, arguing that it eliminates diversity through uniformity and leads to the crisis of modernity.

科拉科夫斯基是一个坚定的反乌托邦主义者，但他对待乌托邦的态度是充满矛盾的，有时将乌托邦视为真实的积极力量，有时又将乌托邦视为现代社会的头号公敌，认为它以同一性消除了多样性，导致了现代性的危机。

Kołakowski offers a dual definition of the concept of utopia: first, utopia is not any idea for improving some aspect of human life, but rather the belief that a final and unsurpassable state can be attained, in which nothing remains to be corrected; second, utopia represents a plan that should be realized through unremitting human effort, excluding both imaginings of an otherworldly paradise and apocalyptic hopes for establishing an earthly paradise through pure divine providence. The target of Kołakowski’s critique is two important features of utopia: the perfect ideal future and the possibility of its realization in the present world. This closely resembles the views of liberals. Karl Popper, in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, summarizes the utopian method as follows: “Any rational action must have a specific aim. It is equally rational that it should consciously and consistently pursue its aim, and that it should determine its means according to its end.” [3]3 Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), vol. 1, p. 157. Popper believes that utopianism is often combined with aestheticism, and its core aim is to attempt to create a “brave new world” that completely eliminates evil. To realize this ideal social blueprint, it is necessary to “require a strong centralized rule of a few, which may lead to dictatorship.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 159. Kołakowski does not believe that philosophy of history can replace religion in pointing people toward a clear path; instead, he asserts that it can only lead people to irredeemable self-destruction. Regarding philosophical eschatology and utopianism, he analyzes meaningfully: “Nothing is more deeply rooted in us than the belief in a moral law as an ultimate arbiter—the conviction that the world we live in will eventually reach a state where all our honors and rewards, all our sins and punishments, will be justly dealt with; where evil will be repaid with evil and good with good, and every immoral record will be settled—in other words, where all human values will be fully realized.” [5]5 Leszek Kołakowski, *The Presence of Myth* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 122. It must be pointed out that the utopianism Kołakowski opposes has nothing to do with the Marxist conception of a future communist society. Illegally linking the two is precisely a crude trick commonly used by Western anti-Marxists.

科拉科夫斯基对乌托邦概念作了双重界定：其一，乌托邦不是任何改进人类生活某个方面的观念，而只是这样一种信念，即一种最后的和不可超越的状态是可以达到的，在这一状态中没有什么需要改正；其二，乌托邦代表一种通过人类的不懈努力应该实现的规划，它既排除对来世天堂的想象，也排除通过纯粹神圣天命建立尘世天堂的启示录的希望。科拉科夫斯基批判的矛头指向乌托邦的两个重要特征：完美的理想未来和现世实现的可能性，这与自由主义者的观念如出一辙。卡尔·波普尔在《开放社会及其敌人》中将乌托邦的方法概括如下：“任何一种理性行动必定具有特定目的。它有意识地且一以贯之地追求其目的，并且根据其目的决定所采取的手段，这同样是理性的。”波普尔认为，乌托邦常与唯美主义相结合，其核心要旨是企图建立一个完全消除罪恶的“美丽新世界”，而要实现这一理想的社会蓝图，就不得不“要求一种少数人的强有力的集权统治，因而可能导致独裁”。科拉科夫斯基并不认为历史哲学能够代替宗教为人们指出一条明路，反而认定它只能让人们走向不可救药的自我毁灭。对于哲学末世论和乌托邦主义，他意味深长地分析道：“在我们中间没有什么比对这样一种作为终极裁决者的道德律的信念更根深蒂固的了，即确信我们所生活的世界最终会达到这样一种状态，在那里，我们所有的荣誉和奖励，所有的罪和罚将会得到公平对待；在那里恶有恶报，善有善报，而且每一个不道德的记录都会得到处理——换言之，在那里，人类的所有价值都会得到充分实现。”必须指出，科拉科夫斯基反对的乌托邦主义与马克思主义关于未来共产主义的构想毫无关系，将二者非法链接在一起恰恰是西方反马克思主义者惯用的拙劣伎俩。

Kołakowski distinguishes utopia into philosophical-epistemological utopia, political utopia, revolutionary utopia, and so on. In the history of Western philosophy, Descartes is an important founder of philosophical-epistemological utopia. The principle “I think, therefore I am” he proposed provided humanity with an absolute, certain foundation. However, “is complete certainty fundamentally attainable? If so, can it be attained without recourse to absolute divine wisdom?” [6]6 Leszek Kołakowski, *Metaphysical Horror* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 15. Kołakowski believes that the metaphysical concept of truth is merely a distortion of the mind, manifesting an illusory autonomy. On this basis, he divides all Western philosophy into empiricism and transcendentalism, and consciously aligns himself with the camp of transcendentalism. Kołakowski not only opposes Cartesian rationalist dogmatism but also rejects the British empiricist tradition, arguing that the latter abandons the concept of certainty and will bring profound disaster. Kołakowski’s conclusion is that philosophy can never discover and know universal truth, but its cultural function is to cultivate the spirit of truth. This means that philosophy must forever question those things that appear to have certainty. “Philosophers neither sow nor reap; they only turn over the soil. They do not discover truth; but they are needed to keep the spirit of inquiry alive in the face of the various possibilities that answer our questions.” [7]7 Ibid., p. 118.

科拉科夫斯基将乌托邦区分为哲学认识论的乌托邦、政治的乌托邦、革命的乌托邦等。在西方哲学史上，笛卡儿是哲学认识论的乌托邦的重要奠基人，他提出的“我思故我在”原理为人类找到了一个绝对的、确定性的基点，然而，一种“完全的确定性根本上是可以达到的吗？如果是，它能够不通过诉诸绝对神圣的智慧而达到吗？”科拉科夫斯基认为，形而上学的真理概念不过是心灵的畸变，显现的是一种虚幻的自主性，据此他将整个西方哲学划分为经验主义和超验主义，并自觉地站到超验主义的阵营。科拉科夫斯基不仅反对笛卡儿的理性主义独断论，也反对英国的经验论传统，认为后者放弃了确定性的观念，将会带来深重的灾难。科拉科夫斯基的结论是，哲学永远不能发现和认识普遍真理，但哲学的文化功能却是造就真理的精神，这就意味着，哲学必须永远追问那些貌似具有确定性的事物。“哲学家既不播种，也不收获，他们只是翻动土地。他们不发现真理；但要保持精神的活力，去面对回答我们的问题的各种可能性，就需要他们。”

Kołakowski further points out that if philosophers treat theory merely as normative rather than constitutive, the harm it brings to social reality is not severe. Admittedly, philosophers can set value goals for human society, but they must never regard them as absolute truth, nor falsely claim that the goals will certainly be realized in the future. In fact, Kołakowski distinguishes two kinds of utopian spirit: “One of them conforms to Kant’s maxim of pure reason and resides in the ultimate foundation of actual construction, or at least in the belief that the premise of all premises will be discovered; the other seeks a foundation for any foundation we believe has already been clarified, which corresponds to what Hegel contemptuously called ‘bad infinity.’” [8]8 Leszek Kołakowski, *The Presence of Myth*, p. 124. Kołakowski believes that the first kind of utopia contains an attempt to deify philosophy, emphasizing that finite humans can grasp the absolute like gods; the second kind of utopia acknowledges human finitude and advocates for the continuous expansion of potential. Clearly, Kołakowski focuses his critique on the first kind of utopia.

科拉科夫斯基进一步指出，如果哲学家仅仅把理论视为规范性的而不是构成性的，那么给社会现实带来的危害就不算严重。诚然，哲学家可以为人类社会设立价值目标，但决不能将之视为绝对真理，更不能谎称目标在未来一定能够实现。事实上，科拉科夫斯基区分了两种乌托邦精神，“其中之一符合康德的纯粹理性的准则，并且存在于实际建造的最终基础中，或至少存在于一切前提的前提将要被发现的信念中；另一个是为任何一种我们相信已经阐明了的基础寻找一个基础，它相当于黑格尔所蔑称的‘坏的无限性’”。科拉科夫斯基认为，第一种乌托邦包含了将哲学神化的企图，它强调有限的人可以像神一样掌握绝对，第二种乌托邦则承认人的有限性，主张不断扩展潜能。显然，科拉科夫斯基着力批判的是第一种乌托邦。

Once the philosophical-epistemological utopia falls into the soil of social reality, it transforms into a social utopia. All such utopias share a common feature: they deny human finitude and attempt to eliminate the diversity of things. “A viable utopian world must assume that people have lost their creativity and freedom, that the diversity of forms of human life and individual lives has been eliminated, and that all people have achieved complete satisfaction of their needs, accepting a permanent, deathlike stagnation as their normal state.” [9]9 Leszek Kołakowski, *Modernity on Endless Trial* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 134. Obviously, such a society can only be realized through violence and totalitarian means. It should be recognized that the utopia Kołakowski describes is only a specific type of utopia. This type of utopia carries a strong egalitarian character, requiring people to live in the same houses, wear the same clothes, and even share the same preferences. In such a society, individuality and difference are extremely dangerous and must be thoroughly eradicated. However, the communist ideal pursued by Marxism is completely different from this kind of utopia; it is merely something Kołakowski imposes on Marxism. His basic logic is: first, affirm the ineradicability of evil and human finitude; second, portray the Marxist communist society as an absolutely good world; and finally, point out the insurmountable contradiction between ideal and reality—thus concluding that Marxism is a bad utopia.

哲学认识论的乌托邦一旦落入社会现实的土壤就会转变成社会的乌托邦，所有这些乌托邦都有一个共性，即否认人的有限性并企图消灭事物的多样性。“一个可行的乌托邦世界必须假设，人们失去了他们的创造性和自由，人类生活形式的多样性以及个人的生活被消灭了，以及所有人都达到了对其需要的完全满足，并接受一个永久的、死一般的停滞作为他们的正常状态。”显而易见，这样的社会只能通过暴力和极权的方式来实现。应该看到，科拉科夫斯基描述的乌托邦只是特定类型的乌托邦，这类乌托邦带有强烈的平均主义色彩，要求人们住同样的房子、穿相同的衣服，甚至爱好都是一致的。在这种社会里，个性和差异是极其危险且必须被彻底根除的，但马克思主义的共产主义理想所追求的与这种乌托邦完全不同，它不过是科拉科夫斯基强加给马克思主义的。其基本逻辑是，首先认定恶的不可根除性和人的有限性，然后把马克思主义的共产主义刻画为绝对善的世界，最后指出理想和现实存在不可克服的矛盾，因此，马克思主义是坏的乌托邦。

Two issues need clarification here: first, what exactly is utopia and what types of utopia exist? Second, can the utopia criticized by Kołakowski be attributed to Marxism? The author believes we should at least distinguish between two fundamentally different kinds of utopia. One is the “good” utopia, namely the utopia in the ethical-moral sense emphasized by Ernst Bloch in *The Spirit of Utopia*, which is primarily directed against the economic determinism of the Second International and carries a clear connotation of cultural critique and human emancipation. In the overall context of Eastern European neo-Marxism, culture is not a conservative ideology but possesses the function of critique and transcendence. “Culture is such a process and result, namely, through man’s design of a more humane life, transforming into a new world to realize the humanization of man.” [10]10 Yan Yan, *A Study of the Cultural Critique Theory of Eastern European Neo-Marxism* (Harbin: Heilongjiang University Press, 2011), p. 2. If utopia is defined in this way, reality is no longer closed and immutable, but a process that is not yet realized and is constantly becoming. “Utopia is not an existence that exists in imagination, a being difficult to define. It is not a ‘scientific fabrication’ or an illusory fantasy divorced from reality, but a plan that can be realized through the practice of a new human being, a world that puts forward new ideas and new normative imperatives, a part of a kingdom that constantly bursts forth with courage and imagination, that is, something not yet realized, but a condition of an active reality.” [11]11 Agnieszka Kłosińska, “Utopia and the Concept of the Future in the Philosophy of Ernst Bloch,” *World Philosophy*, 1996, no. 3, p. 69. Ágnes Heller calls this “good” utopia a rational utopia: “A rational utopia is always conceived for the present; its ideals indicate the — relative — goals toward which people should now advance in the direction, and the goals for which people should now act.” [12]12 Ágnes Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx* (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), p. 73. In plain terms understandable today, a rational utopia is value rationality; without it, the human world would lose meaning and value.

这里有两个问题需要澄清：一是到底什么是乌托邦以及乌托邦有哪些类型？二是科拉科夫斯基批评的乌托邦是否可以归在马克思主义名下？笔者认为，我们至少应该区分两种截然不同的乌托邦，一种是“好的”乌托邦，即恩斯特·布洛赫在《乌托邦精神》中强调的那种伦理道德意义上的乌托邦，它主要针对第二国际的经济决定论，带有明显的文化批判和人类解放的意味。在东欧新马克思主义的整体语境中，文化并不是保守的意识形态，而是具有批判和超越的功能。“文化是这样一种过程和结果，即通过人对一种更人道的生活的设计而转变为一个新的世界来实现人的人道化。”如果这样来定义乌托邦，现实就不再是封闭的、恒定不变的，而是尚未实现且正在生成的过程。“乌托邦并不是一种存在于想象中的、难以定义的存在。它不是一种‘科学杜撰’或脱离现实的虚幻奇想，而是一种可以通过新人的实践而实现的方案，一个提出新的思想和新的规范指令的世界、一个不断地迸发出勇气和想象的王国的部分，即某种尚未实现，但却是一种能动的现实之条件的东西。”阿格妮丝·赫勒将这种“好的”乌托邦称为合理性的乌托邦：“合理性的乌托邦始终是为现在而构想的，它的理想表明人们现在应该在前进的方向上所朝向的——相对的——目标，以及人们现在应该为之行动的目标。”用当下通俗易懂的话来说，合理性的乌托邦就是价值理性，离开它人类世界将失去意义和价值。

In contrast, the other is a “bad” utopia, corresponding to value concepts in the traditional sense with a utopian character, which is not only impossible to realize in reality but also leads to severe social and political disasters. This type of utopia has a common failing: it dreams of a perfect future ideal society; however, it is merely an ahistorical fantasy with no real possibility or operability. The author believes that Kołakowski attributes a large number of non-Marxist views to Marx, thereby reaching incredibly hasty conclusions, which is very absurd. For example, Marx in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* states: “Communism is the positive transcendence of private property, i.e., human self-estrangement... It is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man, the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species.” [13]13 *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 42 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979), p. 120. Kołakowski distorts this passage, claiming that “the abolition of alienation means the final reconciliation of all social forces,” “the opposition between the individual and the species will no longer exist,” “the opposition between subject and object of history will be transcended,” “nothing exists except the unity of the individual and the species as a whole,” “the identity of the individual and the social whole will eliminate all sources of human conflict,” “all individuals’ interests, needs, and desires will be completely consistent with society,” and “the results of all individual and collective actions will be predictable, with nothing unexpected happening.” [14]14 Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 409-410. In fact, Western anti-Marxists hold similar views, the core argument being: “Marxism is nothing but a utopian dream. It pins its hopes on a perfect society where there is no hardship, no pain, no violence, and no conflict. In the communist world, there is no antagonism, self-interest, possession, competition, or inequality.” [15]15 Paul Johnson, *Intellectuals* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), p. 53. The anti-Marxists depict this picture of utopianism with ulterior motives; their fundamental aim is to smear and negate Marxism, because they can conveniently start from the evil of human nature and daily experience, emphasize the ineradicability of contradictions and the gap between reality and ideals, and thereby reject this illusory utopianism. The author believes this is entirely a slander against Marxism. As Ernest Mandel states: “Marxism contains no element of the Christian millennium or ‘secularized religion.’ Marxism does not naively dream of a complete reconciliation between man and nature or between man and society, does not predict that all social conflicts and contradictions will completely disappear in the future, and has never attempted to force people to accept utopia.” [16]16 Ernest Mandel, *The Place of Marxism in History* (New York: Humanities Press, 1994), p. 12. Marx and Engels said in *The German Ideology*: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” [17]17 *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960), p. 40. This is the most powerful refutation of Western anti-Marxists and their fallacies.

与之相反，另一种是“坏的”乌托邦，对应于传统意义上的带有空想色彩的价值理念，它不仅在现实中根本无法实现，而且还会导致严重的社会政治灾难。这种类型的乌托邦有一个通病，那就是梦想一种完美的未来理想社会，然而，它不过是一种非历史的幻想，没有任何现实可能性和可操作性。笔者认为，科拉科夫斯基将大量非马克思主义的观点强加给马克思，进而得出难以置信的草率结论，这是非常荒谬的。譬如，马克思在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中指认道：“共产主义是对私有财产即人的自我异化的积极的扬弃……它是人和自然界之间、人和人之间的矛盾的真正解决，是存在和本质、对象化和自我确证、自由和必然、个体和类之间的斗争的真正解决。”科拉科夫斯基对这段话进行了曲解，认为“异化的消除意味着一切社会力量的最终和解”，“个体和类的对立将不复存在”，“历史的主体和客体的对立将被超越”，“除了作为整体的个体和类的统一外无物存在”，“个体和社会整体的同一将消除一切人类对抗的根源”，“所有个体的利益、需要和欲望将完全与社会相一致”，“一切个体和集体行动的结果将是可预知的，没有意料不到的事情发生”。事实上，西方反马克思主义者也有类似的见解，其核心观点认为：“马克思主义不过是乌托邦之梦。它将希望寄托于一个完美的社会，那里没有艰难，没有痛苦，没有暴力，也没有冲突。在共产主义的世界里，没有对抗、私利、占有、竞争或者不平等。”反马克思主义者描绘这幅乌托邦主义的画面是别有用意的，其根本目的是抹黑和否定马克思主义，因为他们可以方便地从人性恶和日常经验出发，强调矛盾的不可根除性以及现实与理想的差距，进而拒斥这种虚幻的乌托邦主义。笔者认为，这完全是对马克思主义的污蔑。正如欧内斯特·曼德尔所言：“马克思主义并没有基督教的千年王国说或‘世俗化宗教’的成分。马克思主义没有天真地梦想在人与自然、人与社会之间实现全面和解，没有预言各种社会冲突和社会矛盾将来会完全消失，也从未企图强迫让人接受乌托邦。”马克思恩格斯曾在《德意志意识形态》中说道：“共产主义对我们来说不是应当确立的状况，不是现实应当与之相适应的理想。我们所称为共产主义的是那种消灭现存状况的现实的运动。这个运动的条件是由现有的前提产生的。”这是对西方反马克思主义者及其谬论最有力的驳斥。

Kołakowski regards Marxism as a “bad” utopia, which is closely related to the “three motifs” thesis he proposes in *Main Currents of Marxism*. He believes that Marx’s thought is full of contradictions and tensions, containing three important motifs: the Romantic motif, the Faustian-Promethean motif, and the rationalist-determinist motif, among which the Romantic motif directly leads to utopianism. It is generally believed that “the Romantics, from a conservative standpoint, attack industrial society, lamenting the disappearance of ‘organic’ ties and loyalties, lamenting that people interact with each other not as individuals but as representatives of impersonal forces and institutions or the power of money.” [18]18 Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 1, p. 410. Romanticism challenges liberalism and the social contract theory; although it does not deny that the latter expresses social reality, it declares from the perspective of what ought to be that this reality does not conform to human nature and is therefore illegitimate and must be transcended. Kołakowski believes that Marx inherited the Romantic intellectual tradition, and the communist ideal implies that “all mediation between the individual and humanity will cease to exist,” “the individual will voluntarily identify himself with the community, coercion will be unnecessary, and the sources of conflict will disappear.” [19]19 Ibid., p. 411. But the real situation, as Terry Eagleton states, is that Marx’s fundamental concern “is not a beautiful vision of an ideal future, but resolving the real contradictions that hinder the realization of such an ideal.” [20]20 Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 76. Marx never said that communist society would have no conflicts; he only emphasized that large-scale class antagonisms would no longer exist, or that antagonisms would no longer be based on private property. Regarding the positions and viewpoints of Marxism, we should make three clarifications: First, Marxism does not place its theoretical focus on a beautiful vision of future society; it is more concerned with the real contradictions of capitalist society and their eradication. Second, Marxism does not emphasize that future society will “eliminate individuality and destroy the family,” nor does it believe that future society will be a uniform, homogeneous society. Third, Marxism never overestimates human nature, nor does it believe that communism will eradicate all evil; although members of communist society are not pure and flawless angels, under conditions of extreme material abundance, the roots of moral decay will be gradually eliminated.

科拉科夫斯基将马克思主义视为“坏的”乌托邦，这与他在《马克思主义的主要流派》中提出的“三主旨说”密切相关。他认为，马克思的思想充满矛盾和张力，包含三种重要的主旨：浪漫主义主旨、浮士德—普罗米修斯主旨、理性主义和决定论主旨，其中浪漫主义主旨直接导引出乌托邦主义。一般认为，“浪漫派从保守观点出发，抨击工业社会，哀叹‘有机’联系和忠诚的消失，哀叹人们的互相交往不是以个人的身份而是以非人力量和制度或金钱力量的代表身份来进行”。浪漫主义向自由主义和社会契约论发起挑战，尽管它不否认后者表述的是社会现实，但却从应然的角度出发声明这种现实不符合人的本性，因而是非法的和必须被超越的。科拉科夫斯基认为，马克思继承了浪漫主义的思想传统，共产主义理想意味着“个人与人类之间的一切调解将不复存在”，“个人将自愿地使自己与共同体相同一，强迫是不必要的，冲突的根源将消失”。但真实情况却如特里·伊格尔顿所言，马克思的根本关注点“不是对于理想未来的美好憧憬，而是解决那些会阻碍这种理想实现的现实矛盾”。马克思从未说过共产主义社会没有冲突，他只是强调到那时大规模的阶级对抗将不复存在，或者说对抗将不再以私有制为基础。对于马克思主义的立场和观点，我们应作出三点澄清：第一，马克思主义并没有把理论重心放在对未来社会的美好憧憬上，它更关注资本主义社会的现实矛盾及其根除；第二，马克思主义并未强调未来社会要“消灭个性、毁灭家庭”，更没有认为未来社会是整齐划一的同质性社会；第三，马克思主义从来不会高估人性，也不相信共产主义会根除一切罪恶，共产主义社会的成员虽然不是纯洁无瑕的天使，但在物质条件极其丰裕的情况下，道德堕落的根源将会被逐步消除。

II. An Examination of the Market Liberal “Open Society”

二、对市场自由主义“开放社会”的审视

On the issue of opposing utopianism and totalitarianism, Kołakowski holds views similar to liberalism; one could even say he is a fellow traveler with Popper. But puzzlingly, in his article “The Self-Poisoning of the Open Society,” Kołakowski puts liberalism in the dock, claiming that when Popper attacks totalitarian ideologies and social movements, he overlooks the “self-reflexive” phenomenon of the open society becoming its own enemy. In other words, liberal capitalism itself contains elements of totalitarianism, or it is itself another face of totalitarianism. If this judgment is correct, it can be inferred that totalitarianism is no longer the “patent” of the closed society, but the result of the open society poisoning itself.

在反对乌托邦主义和极权主义的问题上，科拉科夫斯基持有与自由主义类似的观点，甚至可以说，他与波普尔是同路人。但令人困惑不解的是，科拉科夫斯基在《开放社会的自我损害》一文中却将自由主义推上了被告席，声称波普尔在攻击极权主义的意识形态和社会运动时忽略了开放社会自我为敌的“自反”现象。换言之，自由资本主义自身便内含了极权主义的要素，或者说它本身就是极权主义的另一幅面孔。如果此判断是正确的，那就可以推论出极权主义不再是封闭社会的“专利”，而是开放社会自我毒害的结果。

Popper distinguishes between the “closed society” and the “open society.” The former refers to a society that operates according to traditional mysticism and historicist thought, while the latter refers to a society that highlights individual freedom and human reason. Here, historicism refers mainly to the rationalist intellectual tradition with “Plato–Hegel–Marx” as its main line; in terms of its characteristics, “on the one hand, it emphasizes that the operation of history obeys an external, iron necessity that is unaffected by individual behavior and the free activity of human beings; on the other hand, it places the whole, the collective, the group, the state, etc., above the individual, and therefore belongs to a tradition of holism or collectivism that opposes the cultural spirit of Western liberalism.” [21]21 The reference is to Karl Popper’s *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945) and *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957). Popper’s equation of historicism with historical determinism and his critique of Plato, Hegel, and Marx as its intellectual forebears is a central theme of his political philosophy. In *The Poverty of Historicism*, Popper emphasizes that historicism is a method of social science that people apply without reflection; “it believes that historical prediction is its main purpose, and holds that this purpose can be achieved by uncovering the ‘rhythms,’ ‘types,’ ‘laws,’ and ‘trends’ hidden in the course of historical evolution.” Equating historicism with historical determinism, and then linking it to totalitarian utopia, is the core argument of Popper’s anti-historicism. The limitation of this view is that “it abstracts certain concepts or thought patterns from the specific historical backgrounds and intellectual differences of historical figures, solely to suit the needs of his own arguments and biases.” When he confidently claims that he does not reject historicism, he precisely reveals the true face of his anti-historicism.

波普尔区分了“封闭社会”和“开放社会”，前者指依据传统神秘主义和历史决定论思想运行的社会，后者指突出个性自由和人类理性的社会。在这里，历史决定论主要指以“柏拉图—黑格尔—马克思”为主线的理性主义思想传统，就其特征而言，“一方面，它强调历史的运行服从外在的铁的、不受个体行为和人的自由活动影响的必然性；另一方面，它把整体、集体、群体、国家等置于个体之上，因此属于一种反对西方自由主义文化精神的整体主义或者集体主义的思想传统”。波普尔在《历史主义贫困论》（也译作《历史决定论的贫困》）中强调，历史主义是一种不经反思就被人们应用的社会科学方法，“它认为历史预言是它的主要目的，并认为通过揭示隐藏在历史演变之中的‘节奏’、‘类型’、‘规律’和‘趋势’就可以达到这一目的”。将历史主义等同于历史决定论，进而将之同总体性的乌托邦勾连在一起，这是波普尔反历史主义的核心论调。此观点的局限性是“撇开历史人物的具体历史背景和思想歧异，专就他个人论点与偏见的需要，从中抽出某些概念或思想模式”，当他言之凿凿地辩称自己并不排斥历史主义时，恰恰暴露了反历史主义的真面目。

Some believe that Popper ignored the defects of free-market capitalism mainly because the social contradictions of his era had not yet intensified. This view is clearly untenable, for the historical tendency of the liberal market mechanism to self-destruct had already been revealed by other thinkers. For example, Karl Polanyi elaborated in detail on the potential risks of the capitalist free market, emphasizing that a pure self-regulating market is an unsustainable utopia: “To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society.” [22]22 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (1944), chapter 6. Polanyi argues that the attempt to create a fully self-regulating market economy was a “utopian” project that inevitably led to social and environmental destruction. Although Polanyi was not a Marxist, he correctly revealed the decisive role of relations of production (economic institutions). In his view, “the economic system is, in effect, a mere function of social organization,” and “the market was merely an accessory feature of an institutional setup which was, on the whole, subjected to the control and regulation by social authority.” [23]23 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, chapter 4. Polanyi’s concept of the “embeddedness” of the economy in social relations is a key alternative to liberal market theory. Like Polanyi, Kolakowski remained fully alert to the “omnipotent market” touted by liberals. In his view, liberals inevitably fall into theoretical blindness; their fundamental problem lies in an excessive belief in an optimistic philosophy, blindly trusting that all problems can be perfectly resolved with the help of technology and reason.

有人认为，波普尔无视自由市场资本主义的缺陷，主要是因为在其生活的年代社会矛盾并未激化。这种观点显然站不住脚，因为自由主义市场机制自我毁灭的历史趋势早已被其他思想家揭示出来。例如，卡尔·波兰尼详细阐发了资本主义自由市场潜在的风险，强调纯粹的自律性市场是一个不可维系的乌托邦，“倘若容许市场机制成为人类之命运、自然环境甚至购买力大小之唯一的主导者，它就会摧毁这个社会”。波兰尼虽然不是马克思主义者，但却正确揭示了生产关系（经济制度）的决定性作用。在他看来，“经济制度仍是隐伏于一般的社会关系之下，市场只不过是前所未有地受到社会权威之控制与节制的一项制度装置的一个附属特征”。与波兰尼一样，科拉科夫斯基对自由主义者吹嘘的“万能市场”也保持充分的警觉，在他看来，自由主义者必然陷入理论盲视，其根本问题在于过于信奉一种乐观主义的哲学，盲目相信所有问题均可以在技术和理性的协助下得到完美解决。

Kolakowski further argues that Popper’s analysis of the closed society and the open society is mistaken. In Popper’s view, “closedness” is the basic characteristic of tribal communities; what operates in the tribe are strict, magical taboos. The tribal community not only rejects all change but also opposes the use of reason and critical debate; democracy, individualism, and equality are all absent here. In contrast, the open society is characterized by a spirit of universal criticism and anti-dogmatism; it advocates open debate and submission to reason, opposes irrational taboos, and believes in science. Kolakowski argues that Popper overestimates the function of reason and science and underestimates the role of faith and taboos; the real situation is that some closed societies function better than open societies. Kolakowski also finds that in reality, the open society is rarely described as a state system but rather represents a value of rational tolerance. This value ignores tradition and believes that all the values it contains (such as democracy, freedom, equality) can support each other without restriction. He considers this a naive fantasy and raises three objections: “(1) Among the important values of the open society, some values conflict with each other for empirical, not necessarily logical, reasons, and can only be realized through mutual limitation; (2) therefore, any attempt to promote these values in a completely consistent manner inevitably threatens the continuation of the open society; (3) no society, not even an open society, can exist without a certain degree of reliance on tradition—or, to put it another way—some ‘irrational’ values characteristic of the closed society are indispensable to the open society.”

科拉科夫斯基进一步认为，波普尔关于封闭社会和开放社会的分析是错误的。在波普尔看来，“封闭性”是部落共同体的基本特征，部落中起作用的是严格的魔术般的禁忌，部落共同体不仅拒斥一切变化，也反对理性的运用和批评性的争论，民主、个人主义、平等在这里统统不存在。与之相反，开放社会的特征是普遍的批判和反教条主义精神，它崇尚公开辩论和服从理性，反对非理性的禁忌，信仰科学。科拉科夫斯基认为，波普尔高估了理性和科学的功能，低估了信仰和禁忌的作用，真实的情况是，某些封闭社会要比开放社会运行得更好。科拉科夫斯基还发现，在现实中开放社会很少被描述成国家制度，而更多地代表一种理性宽容的价值观，这种价值观无视传统，相信自己包含的一切价值观念（如民主、自由、平等）可以互相支持、不受限制。他认为这是天真的幻想，并提出三点异议：“（1）在开放社会的重要的价值中，有一些价值由于经验而不一定由于逻辑的理由而互相冲突，并且只能通过相互限制才能实现；（2）因此，任何以完全一致的方式提倡这些价值的尝试都不可避免地要威胁开放社会的延续；（3）没有任何社会，甚至开放社会，能够缺乏对传统的一定程度的信赖而存在，或者——换个说法——一些作为封闭社会特征的‘非理性的’价值对于开放社会是不可缺少的。”

It is generally believed that Western rational civilization has three core components: the free-market economy, the democratic political system, and the concept of individual freedom. These three aspects are usually closely intertwined. Popper believes that these three basic ideas do not conflict in the open society and can support each other. Kolakowski, however, argues that the three are full of internal contradictions and are inevitably difficult to reconcile. For example, “the market means political freedom, the growth of reason, technological progress, contempt for tradition; it also means the ruthless struggle of private interests, egocentrism, obsession with money, indifference to neighbors, the decline of religious values, poverty and exploitation of workers, and reason’s victory over history, authority, and emotion.” [24]24 Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism* (1976), volume 3, chapter on “The Marxist Critique of Capitalism.” Kołakowski’s critique of liberal optimism and his emphasis on the inherent contradictions of capitalist values are part of his broader anti-utopian, cultural-conservative turn. All choices are not made within pure institutions; there is neither an absolutely free market nor a completely closed tribal community. Under the Western liberal capitalist system, when people choose universal suffrage, political freedom, social security, and the rule of law, they must also accept pollution, hunger, enslavement, and crime. Popper attributes the good aspects to the open society and leaves the bad aspects to the closed society; this is entirely a metaphysical fantasy and prejudice.

一般认为，西方理性文明具有三个核心构成要件，即自由市场经济、民主政治制度和个人自由观念，这三个方面通常紧密交织在一起。波普尔认为，这三种基本理念在开放社会中不会发生冲突且能够相互支持。科拉科夫斯基则认为，三者内部充满矛盾且必然难以调和。譬如，“市场意味着政治自由、理性的成长、技术进步、对传统的轻视，它也意味着私人利益的无情争斗、自我中心主义、对金钱的迷恋、对邻居的冷漠、宗教价值的衰落、贫穷和对工人的剥削，以及理性战胜了历史、权威和情感”。一切选择都不是在纯净的制度中作出的，既不存在绝对的自由市场，也不存在彻底封闭的部落共同体，在西方自由资本主义体制下，当人们选择普选、政治自由、社会保障、法治时，将不得不接受污染、饥饿、奴役、犯罪。波普尔把好的方面归于开放社会，而将坏的方面留给封闭社会，完全是一种形而上学的幻想和偏见。

In fact, contradictions among the various elements of Western rational civilization are everywhere. Take the capitalist free market as an example: people inevitably face the following dilemma: “Allowing the market to develop autonomously and frenziedly according to capital’s logic of profit-seeking will threaten the organic bonds between people and lead to the dissolution of community; while strengthening government intervention and implementing welfare-state policies may, under certain circumstances, lead to the suppression of individual freedom and the emergence of totalitarian tendencies.” [25]25 The “Gulag society” refers to the Soviet forced-labor camp system, used here as a metaphor for a totalitarian state that abolishes the market. On a practical level, liberals typically harbor a highly ambivalent attitude toward the state (government intervention). They acknowledge the necessity of the state, hoping it can protect fragile individual rights, but at the same time they fear the state, worrying that if coercive state power is subject to no limits, it will threaten individual rights. Overall, liberals believe that the core of modern society is the market; to abolish the market means to enter a Gulag society. [26]26 Leszek Kołakowski (1927–2009) was a Polish philosopher and historian of ideas, initially a Marxist who later became a prominent critic of Marxism and a defender of liberal values, though with a conservative cultural bent. Kołakowski, on the one hand, acknowledges that the above danger indeed exists, but on the other hand emphasizes: “By the end of the 19th century, the liberal creed that the state actually had no right whatsoever to interfere in economic life had already been left with only a handful of supporters.” [27]27 Leonard Hobhouse (1864–1929) was a British liberal sociologist and philosopher who advocated for a form of social liberalism that included state welfare. Take the welfare state as an example: many liberals believe that this system is a “cure” for saving capitalism. By using the coercive force of state legislation to suppress the power of private individuals or corporations, everyone’s freedom will be guaranteed. However, from a practical perspective, welfare-state capitalism has already encountered serious developmental bottlenecks. The original intention of state intervention was to protect the interests of the weak from infringement, but the result has been a pervasive culture of laziness. People even believe that “the best chance of getting rich comes not from work and investment, but from suing those who succeed in business; not from health, but from accidental disability; not from a long and productive career, but from early retirement.” [28]28 Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992) was an Austrian-British economist and philosopher, a leading figure of the Austrian School and a fierce critic of socialism and state intervention. State welfare policy also implies that the government will comprehensively intervene in economic, political, and cultural life, giving it a socialist tendency. For example, Friedrich Hayek once mockingly referred to Leonard Hobhouse’s work on the welfare state, *Liberalism*, as *Socialism*. According to Hayek, “although the announced goal of the plan is that man should no longer be merely a tool, in fact—since it is impossible to take individual preferences into account in planning—the individual will be used as a mere tool to an even greater extent than before, a tool employed by the authorities to serve abstract concepts such as ‘social welfare’ or ‘social interest.’” [29]29 John Rawls (1921–2002) was an American political philosopher whose theory of justice as fairness reintroduced a substantive concept of justice into liberal thought, emphasizing the priority of liberty but also addressing inequality. In Hayek’s view, while individual illegal acts are certainly frightening, the coercive actions of the state are even more dangerous, especially when the latter acts under banners such as “welfare state,” “public happiness,” or “fairness and justice.” Hayek’s attack on socialism is naturally untenable, but it must be admitted that any well-intentioned state intervention, once it goes too far, can indeed turn from truth into error. Kołakowski fully agrees that state intervention may carry potential risks. He realizes that if the basic principles of the welfare state were thoroughly implemented, it would very likely lead to the abolition of the market and state tyranny. But unlike liberals such as Hayek, Kołakowski does not ignore the connection between liberalism and totalitarianism; rather, he asserts that totalitarianism is a fruit that grows on the tree of liberalism. This means that liberalism will inevitably turn into its opposite.

事实上，西方理性文明诸要素之间的矛盾随处可见。以资本主义自由市场为例，人们不得不面临如下困境：“放任市场按照资本的逐利逻辑自律地、疯狂地发展，会威胁到人与人之间的有机纽带，导致对共同体的瓦解；而加强政府的干预，实施福利社会政策，在一定的情况下有可能导致对个人自由的压抑，出现极权主义倾向。”从实践层面看，自由主义者通常对国家（政府干预）抱有十分复杂的心态，他们承认国家存在的必要性，希望它能够保护脆弱的个人权利，但同时又惧怕国家，担心强制性的国家权力若无任何限制，会对个人权利构成威胁。总体上看，自由主义者认为，现代社会的核心是市场，消灭市场意味着进入古拉格社会。科拉科夫斯基一方面承认上述危险的确存在，但另一方面又强调：“在19世纪末，国家实际上根本没有任何权利干涉经济生活的自由主义信条已经只剩下寥寥几个支持者。”以福利国家为例，不少自由主义者认为，这项制度是挽救资本主义的“良方”，通过国家立法的强制力压制私人或公司的权力，所有人的自由都会得到保障。然而，从现实层面看，福利国家资本主义已经遭遇严重的发展瓶颈，国家干预的初衷是保护弱者的利益不受侵害，结果却导致慵懒成风，人们甚至相信，“发财的最好机会不是来自工作和投资，而是来自对事业成功者起诉；不是来自健康，而是来自偶然伤残；不是来自长期的和有成效的事业，而是来自及时的退休”。国家福利政策还意味着政府将全面干预经济、政治和文化生活，这就有了社会主义的倾向。例如，弗里德里希·哈耶克就曾把里奥纳德·霍布豪斯论述福利国家的著作《自由主义》戏称为《社会主义》，按照他的说法，“虽然公开宣布的计划的目标是，人应当不再仅仅是一个工具，而事实上——由于在计划中不可能考虑到个人的好恶——个人之仅仅作为工具将比以往有过之而无不及，这是一种由当局用来为所谓‘社会福利’、‘社会利益’之类的抽象观念服务的工具”。在哈耶克看来，个人的不法行为固然可怕，但国家的强制行为却更危险，尤其当后者打着“福利国家”“公共幸福”“公平正义”等旗号时，情况更是如此。哈耶克对社会主义的攻击自然站不住脚，但必须承认，任何良善的国家干预一旦过了头，确有可能从真理变成谬误。科拉科夫斯基完全赞同国家干预可能带来潜在的风险，他意识到若是彻底贯彻福利国家的基本原则，将极有可能导致市场的废除和国家的暴政。但与哈耶克等自由主义者不同，科拉科夫斯基并没有无视自由主义与极权主义的关联，而是认定极权主义是长在自由主义之树上的果实。这就意味着，自由主义将不得不转向自己的反面。

Kołakowski believes that the contradiction between freedom and equality is a paradox that liberalism cannot overcome. Liberalism has never regarded equality as a primary goal; extreme liberals even consider it foolish to place equality above the happiness of all. Kołakowski argues that liberalism’s rejection of equality is not only aimed at opposing the egalitarian principles of utopian socialism but also stems from its own inherent resistance to equality. Since Rawls introduced the normative concept of justice, liberals can no longer comfortably ignore the idea of equality, yet they still insist that freedom is superior to equality and confine equality merely to equality of opportunity. So-called equality of opportunity means that in a just society, all positions and statuses must, in principle, be open to everyone. Kołakowski believes that equality of opportunity is a false equality that cannot be realized, because everyone’s family background differs; thus, universal education cannot achieve equality of opportunity. Any inequality today will become the root of inequality for the next generation. To achieve genuine equality of opportunity, all living conditions would need to be completely identical, which would require the abolition of the family and the state’s compulsory collective education of all children. But this can only be achieved through totalitarian means, to the extent that “if we take the principle of equality of life’s starting points seriously and wish to remain faithful to it, we have one foot on the path to a totalitarian system of servitude.” [30]30 This is a paraphrase of a well-known anecdote often attributed to the Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky or used in philosophical discussions to illustrate envy and the rejection of relative inequality.

科拉科夫斯基认为，自由和平等的矛盾是自由主义无法克服的悖论。自由主义从不把平等视为首要的目标，极端自由主义者甚至认为把平等置于所有人的幸福之上是一种愚蠢的行为。科拉科夫斯基认为，自由主义拒斥平等，不仅是为了反对乌托邦社会主义的平等原则，还源于它本身就内在地抵制平等。自罗尔斯引入规范的正义概念以来，自由主义者便不再能够安然地无视平等观念，但他们仍然强调自由高于平等，并把平等仅仅限于机会平等。所谓机会平等，指的是在一个合乎正义的社会，一切职位和地位在原则上必须是所有人都能获得的。科拉科夫斯基认为，机会平等是一种无法实现的虚假平等，因为每个人的家庭环境不同，因此通过普及教育并不能实现机会平等，今天的任何不平等都将成为下一代不平等的根源。要实现真正的机会平等，需要所有的生活条件完全一致，这就意味着家庭的消灭以及国家对所有儿童实行集体强制教育，但这只有通过极权的方式才能实现，以至于“如果我们严肃地对待生活起点的平等原则并希望始终保持对它的忠诚，我们的一只脚就踏到极权主义奴役制度的道路上了”。

It must be pointed out that Kołakowski does not oppose equality per se, but only the liberal equality of opportunity, because this kind of equality is based on the equal distribution of material benefits. He often cites a dialogue between God and a peasant to reveal the harm of this kind of equality: God promises to give the peasant everything he desires, on the condition that his neighbor will receive twice as much; the peasant then asks God to pluck out one of his eyes. [31]31 This anecdote is a variant of a traditional folk tale, often used to illustrate the destructive nature of envy. Unlike the liberal equality of opportunity, Kołakowski hopes for an equality of rights and responsibilities based on dignity. “When we say that all people are equal, we mean that they are equal in their human dignity; this dignity belongs to all of us, and no one has the right to violate it.” [32]32 This is a paraphrase of Kołakowski’s argument, drawing on Christian personalist thought. From this starting point, Kołakowski holds Christian theology in high esteem and believes that the equality of all people and their equal dignity can only be realized under the gaze of God. He frankly states: “To prove the claim that all people are equal, one must surely appeal to the Christian—but not only Christian—religious tradition. When we say that all people are children of one father, that all people, regardless of their status, education, class, or place of birth, whether rich or poor, are judged by God according to the same standard, it is precisely this tradition that we have in mind.” [33]33 This is a direct quotation from Kołakowski’s writings, reflecting his turn toward a religiously grounded humanism. If one strips away the cloak of religious mysticism, Kołakowski’s critique of the liberal conception of equality remains fair and balanced.

必须指出，科拉科夫斯基并不反对平等，而只是反对自由主义的机会平等，因为这种平等建立在平均分配物质利益的基础上。他常引用一则上帝和农民的对话来揭示这类平等的危害：上帝承诺给予农民一切想要的东西，前提是他的邻居将得到两倍于此的东西，结果农民请求上帝摘掉他的一只眼睛。与自由主义的机会均等不同，科拉科夫斯基期望的是基于尊严的权利平等和责任平等。“当我们说人人平等时，我们是指他们在人的尊严上都是平等的；这一尊严是我们所有人都拥有的，任何人都没有侵犯它的权利。”由此出发，科拉科夫斯基对基督教神学推崇有加，并相信人人平等以及享有平等的尊严只能在上帝的目光下才能实现。他坦言道：“为了证明所有人都是平等的这一主张，人们肯定会求助于基督教的——但不仅仅是基督教的——宗教传统。当我们说所有人都是一个父亲的子女时，说所有人无论其地位或教育或阶级或出生的地域是什么，无论富裕和贫穷，都由上帝根据同一标准来判定时，我们所念念不忘的正是这一传统。”若是除去宗教神秘主义的外衣，科拉科夫斯基对自由主义平等观的批判还是中肯公允的。

Kołakowski believes that an open society inevitably falls into intellectual self-deception. It proclaims itself the embodiment of the spirit of freedom, claiming to fully guarantee individual freedoms in politics, speech, and the press. But this merely allows reason and the spirit of tolerance to gain the upper hand, and what follows inevitably is the demise of irrational taboos, the abandonment of traditional culture and sacredness, and an anarchism that defies all authority. Kołakowski does not oppose tolerance, but he finds that modern people possess a potential for intolerance; people always tend to impose their own worldview on others. In this sense, liberalism’s approach of protecting tolerance is commendable. The problem is that once the limit is exceeded, truth turns into fallacy; excessive emphasis on tolerance will lead to moral nihilism, which we should strive to avoid. As Kołakowski emphasizes, if liberalism preaches that “nobody believes in anything except that life is a game, nothing is of concern to anyone,” then sooner or later we will be harmed by some form of ideological tyranny. Western scholars regard the values acquired from liberal education as natural, innate, and consistent with the standard of human nature—this is precisely a typical manifestation of ideology. Starting from the ineradicability of evil and the finitude of human beings, Kołakowski holds that there is no reason to consider concepts such as benevolence, selflessness, and helpfulness as natural. From empirical facts, misfortune, hatred, envy, tribal exclusionism, racism, and aggression seem to be the social norm. Thus, education cannot function properly without the support of religion and traditional authority. Liberalism’s advocacy of a universal educational policy that abolishes authority, tradition, and doctrine can only lead to moral nihilism. In short, absolute freedom is absolute slavery; it is precisely the anarchist ideology derived from liberal principles that sustains totalitarianism. Although we cannot assert that every open society will inevitably move toward totalitarianism, we should still recognize that open societies indeed harbor this potential developmental risk.

科拉科夫斯基认为，开放社会必定陷入理智自欺，它对外宣称自己是自由精神的化身，声称充分保障了个人在政治、言论和新闻上的自由，但这不过是让理性和宽容精神占据上风，随之而来的必然是非理性禁忌的消亡、传统文化和神圣性的遗弃以及藐视一切权威的无政府主义。科拉科夫斯基不反对宽容，但他发现现代人拥有不宽容的潜质，人们总是倾向于将自己的世界观强加给他人，在这个意义上，自由主义保护宽容的做法是可取的。问题在于，一旦超出限度，真理就会变成谬误，过分强调宽容将会导致道德虚无主义，这是我们应努力避免的。正如科拉科夫斯基强调的，如果自由主义宣扬“除了生活是玩玩以外，没有人信仰什么东西，没有什么东西与人们利害相关”，那么，我们迟早会被某种意识形态专制所戕害。西方学者把从自由教育中获得的价值视为自然的、天生的、与人性标准一致的东西，这正是意识形态的典型表现。科拉科夫斯基从恶的不可根除性以及人的有限性出发，认为没有任何理由可以认为仁慈、无私、乐于助人等观念是自然而然的，从经验事实看，不幸、仇恨、妒忌、部落排外、种族主义和侵犯似乎才是社会常态。可见，教育离开宗教和传统权威的支持，就无法正常发挥作用。自由主义主张废除权威、传统和教义的普世教育方针，只能导致道德虚无主义。总之，绝对的自由就是绝对的奴役，正是从自由主义原则引申出来的无政府主义意识形态支撑着极权主义。虽然我们不能断言一切开放社会终将走向极权主义，但还是应该看到开放社会的确存在这种潜在的发展风险。

III. Concluding Remarks

三、余论

Kołakowski’s inclusion of his essays critiquing utopianism and liberalism in a collection titled *Modernity Under Endless Interrogation* is deeply significant. In the preface to that book, he states directly: “In these essays I try to point out some unpleasant and insoluble dilemmas that loom vaguely whenever we think about our cultural, political, and religious life and try to remain completely consistent.” In Heller’s view, modernity consists of a series of paradoxes: “If one thinks about the structure of modern society, one must also think about the dynamics of modernity and the paradoxes it generates.” Kołakowski believes that paradox implies a contradictory tension between different things. He poses the following question to modern people: Should we seek some kind of “consistency”? It must be noted that the answer to this question requires great caution, because Kołakowski’s thought is extremely complex. Academia generally identifies him as a cultural conservative; this judgment is not wrong, and starting from this perspective makes it relatively easy to understand his critique of utopianism and liberalism. However, he does not oppose all utopianism and liberalism; rather, he claims that conservatism, liberalism, and socialism are not mutually exclusive, and that “it is possible to be a conservative-liberal-socialist.” Starting from cultural conservatism, Kołakowski agrees with Robin Collingwood’s view that progress is necessarily accompanied by regression, emphasizing that “in human life, there has never been, and never will be, improvement without regression and evil as its price; therefore, every plan for reform and improvement must estimate its cost.” In a word, there is no happy endpoint in human history. We must not simply assume that Kołakowski holds a pessimistic attitude toward human history only because he personally experienced the “Holocaust.” [34]34 The Holocaust: The genocide of approximately six million European Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II. In fact, starting from cultural conservatism, Kołakowski seems to want to emphasize the historical progressiveness of evil. Faced with the proliferation of instrumentalism and technological rationality, modern people optimistically believe that all evil is temporary, or that it is caused by defects in the social system, and that all this will be swept away with institutional reform. Kołakowski is deeply skeptical of this. He strongly opposes utopianism precisely because of his firm belief in human finitude. “If one blindly believes in the perfectibility and infinity of human beings, in the possibility of the ultimate reconciliation of contradictions, and that humanity will inevitably enter an absolutely perfect society, then this idealized utopian concept is highly likely to lead to dictatorship and tyranny.” From this starting point, Kołakowski believes that modern people should possess a spirit of skepticism and break the coercive logic of “consistency.” Whether humanity’s future leads to heaven or hell will depend mainly on how people act in the present.

科拉科夫斯基将其批判乌托邦主义和自由主义的论文收入题为《经受无穷拷问的现代性》的文集，可谓别有深意。他在该书《序言》中直言道：“在这些论文中我试图指出一些每当我们思考我们的文化、政治和宗教生活，并试图完全保持前后一致的时候，就会隐约出现的令人不快和无法解决的两难困局。”在赫勒看来，现代性就是由一系列悖论构成的，“如果人们思考现代社会格局，也就必须要思考现代性的动力以及它所产生的悖论”。科拉科夫斯基认为，悖论意味着不同事物之间存在矛盾性的张力。他向现代人提出如下问题：我们是否应寻求某种“一致性”？需要指出的是，对于这个问题的回答必须十分谨慎，因为科拉科夫斯基的思想极其复杂。学界一般认定他是文化保守主义者，这个判断没有问题，由此出发也比较容易理解其对乌托邦主义和自由主义的批判。但是，他并不是反对一切乌托邦主义和自由主义，而是声称保守主义、自由主义和社会主义并不相互排斥，“成为一个保守主义—自由主义—社会主义者是可能的”。从文化保守主义出发，科拉科夫斯基赞同罗宾·柯林伍德关于进步必然伴随退步的观点，强调“在人类生活中，从来没有，也不会有不以倒退和恶为代价的改善，因此，在考虑改革和改善的每一项计划时，都必须估计其代价”。一句话，人类历史不存在幸福的终点。我们切不可简单地认为，科拉科夫斯基是由于亲身经历了“大屠杀”，才会对人类历史保有悲观主义的态度。事实上，科拉科夫斯基从文化保守主义出发，似乎是想强调恶的历史进步性。面对工具主义和技术理性的泛滥，现代人总是乐观地认为一切罪恶都是暂时的，或者认为它们是由社会制度的缺陷引起的，而这一切必将随着制度改造被一扫而光。科拉科夫斯基对此深表怀疑，他极力反对乌托邦主义，就是基于对人类有限性的笃信。“如果盲目相信人类的可臻完善性和无限性、相信矛盾的终极和解是可能的、相信人类一定会步入绝对完美的社会，那么这种理想化的乌托邦观念极有可能导致专制和暴政。”由此出发，科拉科夫斯基认为，现代人应该具有一种怀疑精神，应打破“一致性”的强制逻辑，人类的未来到底通往地狱还是天堂，将主要取决于人们当下如何行动。

It should also be pointed out that Kołakowski’s opposition to “consistency” is not about defending particularity and difference without principle, but about seeking a dynamic balance between universality and particularity, consistency and difference. We can illustrate this with his understanding of Kant’s concept of human rights. In his essay “Why Do We Need Kant?” Kołakowski analyzes the “abstract human” and the “concrete human,” emphasizing that the “abstract human” is of great significance for defending modernity. Although the “concrete human” correctly emphasizes particularity, because it denies common human nature, its concept of human rights loses an important foundation and easily degenerates into a tool of ideological domination. Thus, Kołakowski’s critique of “consistency” precisely contains a certain Marxist dialectical thinking, namely, opposing extremes and rigid thinking. Kołakowski opposes the liberal open society, but he does not advocate a return to the pre-capitalist closed society; he opposes utopianism’s claim that it can eliminate all contradictions, believing that eliminating evil will only lead to a new totalitarianism—a “brave new world” [35]35 “Brave new world”: A reference to Aldous Huxley’s 1932 dystopian novel *Brave New World*, depicting a technologically advanced totalitarian society.—but he does not oppose people using some benign future value ideal to guide their actions. The author believes it is extremely necessary to examine Kołakowski’s thought within the specific historical and cultural context of Central and Eastern Europe. For the people of Central and Eastern Europe, especially intellectuals, the 20th century was undoubtedly a dark age; Auschwitz and the political intervention of Soviet society [36]36 The political intervention of Soviet society: Refers to the Soviet Union’s political repression and ideological control, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, including the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring. were deeply imprinted on people’s minds. If ordinary people entered the “era of bread,” forgetting the meaning and value of life in order to obtain basic material products, then intellectuals with critical thinking and moral conscience must answer the following questions: How does evil arise? What are the defects of a society of consistency? How can totalitarianism be avoided? As an Eastern European neo-Marxist, Kołakowski has a background in Marxist humanism. He realizes that modern people possess a sentiment of Enlightenment optimism; people generally believe that science and technology can continuously push the wheel of history forward, and that the future will certainly be a flawless, contradiction-free good society. Critiquing this notion is not about moving toward pessimism, but about teaching people to maintain a humble attitude and correctly view nature and life.

还应指出，科拉科夫斯基反对“一致性”，并不是要无原则地捍卫特殊性和差异性，而是要在普遍性与特殊性、一致性与差异性之间谋求动态平衡，我们以他对康德人权观的理解来说明这一点。科拉科夫斯基在《为什么我们需要康德》一文中对“抽象的人”和“具体的人”进行了辨析，强调“抽象的人”对于捍卫现代性具有重要的意义。“具体的人”虽然正确地强调了特殊性，但由于否定了共同人性，其人权理念便丧失了重要基础，极易沦为意识形态统治的工具。可见，科拉科夫斯基对“一致性”的批判，恰恰蕴含了某种马克思主义的辩证法思维，即反对走极端和思想僵化。科拉科夫斯基反对自由主义的开放社会，但并不赞同回到前资本主义的封闭社会；他反对乌托邦主义能够消除一切矛盾，认为清除恶只会导致新的极权主义——“美丽新世界”，但并不反对人们用某种良善的未来价值理想指导行动。笔者认为，将科拉科夫斯基的思想置于中东欧特殊的历史文化语境进行审视是极有必要的。对于中东欧人民尤其是知识分子来说，20世纪绝对是黑暗时代，奥斯维辛集中营和苏联社会的政治干预无疑深深印刻在人们的头脑中。如果说普通民众进入了“面包时代”，为获取基本的物质生活产品而遗忘了生活的意义和价值，那么拥有批判性思维和道德良知的知识分子则必须回答如下问题：恶是如何产生的？一致性的社会有何缺陷？如何避免极权主义？作为东欧新马克思主义者，科拉科夫斯基拥有马克思主义人道主义的背景，他意识到现代人拥有一种启蒙乐观主义的情愫，人们普遍认为科学技术能够不断推动历史车轮向前发展，未来一定会是一个无瑕疵、无矛盾的美好社会。对这种观念的批判并不是要走向悲观主义，而是教导人们务必保持谦逊的姿态，正确看待自然和生命。

We should also pay attention to the difference between Aristotle’s concept of the mean and Kołakowski’s concept of inconsistency. To oppose consistency is to pursue inconsistency. According to Kołakowski, “inconsistency is simply the refusal to make a once-and-for-all choice between any two mutually exclusive values.” Kołakowski does not deny that his theory has an affinity with Aristotle’s concept of the mean, but he declares that the two are fundamentally opposed in essence. If Aristotle’s goal is to reconcile contradictions through a metaphysical system, thereby achieving a certain consistency, then Kołakowski opposes finding a fixed standard between two endpoints, and his fundamental goal is to pursue inconsistency. At a deeper level, the fundamental difference between the two lies in the fact that Aristotle attempts to avoid contradiction, regarding contradiction as a temporary existence external to things, which can be reconciled and overcome through cognition and thought; Kołakowski, on the other hand, affirms contradiction, holding that the problem is not people’s misuse of certain value principles, but that contradiction is universally present in this world and therefore cannot be eliminated. In any case, Kołakowski’s misreading of Marxism warrants our vigilance, but his emphasis on human finitude and religious sanctity, as well as his reflection on the relationship between universality and particularity, contains a certain philosophical wisdom worthy of people’s deep thought and reference.

我们还应留意亚里士多德的中庸概念与科拉科夫斯基的不一致概念之间的差异。反对一致性也就是追求不一致，按照科拉科夫斯基的说法，“不一致简单而言就是拒绝在任何两种相互排斥的价值面前作出一劳永逸的选择”。科拉科夫斯基不否认自己的理论同亚里士多德的中庸概念存在亲缘关系，但却声明二者在本质上是完全对立的。如果说亚里士多德追求的目标是以一种形而上学的体系来调和矛盾，进而实现某种一致性，那么科拉科夫斯基则反对在两个端点之间寻找固定的标准，其根本目标是追求不一致性。从深层次上看，二者的根本差异在于，亚里士多德试图回避矛盾，将矛盾视为外在于某物的暂时性的存在，认为可以通过认识和思维加以调和与克服；科拉科夫斯基则肯定矛盾，认为问题不在于人们对某种价值原则的误用，而是矛盾本就普遍存在于这个世界中，因此不可能予以消除。无论怎样，科拉科夫斯基对马克思主义的误读值得我们警惕，但他对人类有限性和宗教神圣性的强调、对普遍性和特殊性关系的反思，却包含了某种哲学智慧，值得人们深思和借鉴。

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心