Left and Right: On the Economic Policy and Party Positioning of the British Labour Party

I

一

The comprehensive defeat of the British Labour Party in the 2019 general election has led to a widespread belief that, in order to regain the opportunity to govern, Keir Starmer will inevitably lead the Party decisively to the right, toward the political centre ground. Many may find this scenario familiar. A clichéd analysis holds that Labour must choose between electoral victory and ideology, a tension reflected in the history of periodic policy shifts. After a frustrating period in opposition, the Party shifts right to win voter support; after a period of compromise and disappointment in government, it retreats back to a more pronounced left-wing ideology. We call this the “electoral-ideological” explanation of Labour’s policy pendulum.

英国工党在2019年大选中的全面落败使人们普遍认为，为寻求重新执政的机会，基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）势必带领工党果断右转，走向政治中间地带。对于这一场景，许多人或许感到似曾相识。有种老生常谈式的分析认为，工党必定要在胜选与意识形态之间作出选择，这种张力体现在周期性政策转变的历史之中。工党在经历了一段令人沮丧的反对党时期后，为寻求选民的支持而右转，而在经历执政期间的妥协和失望后，则又退回到更为明显的左翼意识形态。我们将其称之为对工党政策钟摆的“选举—意识形态”解释。

This article offers an alternative explanation: Labour’s policy swings stem from changes in the external economic environment—a “political economy-policy” approach. When the economy performs well, Labour shifts right and adopts a redistributive economic strategy (emphasising increased spending on public services and welfare); when the economy is perceived to perform poorly or even to be in crisis, Labour shifts left and introduces structural economic reform programmes (emphasising government intervention in investment and ownership).

本文提供了另一种解释，工党政策的摇摆源于外部经济环境的改变，即“政治经济—政策”方法。当经济运行良好时，工党会右转并采取再分配的经济战略（强调增加对公共服务和福利的投入）；当感知到经济表现不佳甚至陷入危机时，工党就会左转并推出结构性经济改革方案（强调政府对投资和所有权的干预）。

The second part of this article provides a general explanation of Labour’s shifts since World War II based on the economic policy approach. The third part explores in more detail the assumptions and claims of the “electoral-ideological” and “political economy-policy” explanations. The fourth part argues that the “political economy-policy” approach offers a more appropriate explanation for the controversial period in Labour history under Harold Wilson from 1960 to 1975. This article focuses primarily on Labour’s history, but the argument is premised on a general question: why and when do parties change their policy positions? The fifth part points out that theories of party positioning must be understood in conjunction with the process by which parties adopt and change their policies—that is, policy deliberation. In terms of economic policy, such policy deliberation focuses on how a party achieves its overarching objectives in light of changing economic conditions. Attention to policy deliberation partially corrects the model of party positioning derived from Anthony Downs’s rational choice theory. Acknowledging policy deliberation, in turn, offers new perspectives for anticipating when political actors and other subjects will change their ideological stance. The final part of this article clarifies how the above situation currently affects Labour’s policy orientation under Starmer.

本文第二部分基于经济政策方法对二战后工党的位移提供了一种一般性解释。第三部分更详细地探讨了“选举—意识形态”和“政治经济—政策”两种解释的假设和主张。第四部分认为，对于1960年到1975年间哈罗德·威尔逊（Harold Wilson）领导下的这一工党历史上颇有争议的时期，“政治经济—政策”方法提供了更为恰当的解释。本文主要关注工党的历史，但论点是以普遍的情况为前提，即政党为何以及何时转变其政策立场。第五部分指出，政党定位理论必须结合政党采纳与改变其政策的过程——即政策酝酿——来理解。就经济政策而言，这种政策考量聚焦于一个政党如何根据不断变化的经济条件实现其总体目标。对政策酝酿的关注，一定程度上校正了源自安东尼·唐斯（Anthony Downs）理性选择理论的政党定位模型。对政策酝酿的承认，反过来又为预判政治家等主体何时改变其意识形态立场提供了新的视角。本文最后一部分阐明了上述情况在当前如何影响斯塔默领导下的工党的政策取向。

II

二

Labour’s history is typically described as a history of swinging between a more left-wing and a more right-wing position.

工党的历史通常被描述为一场在更左翼和更右翼之间摇摆的历史。

In different historical periods, Labour’s left and right wings held differing views on many issues. Membership of the European Economic Community, nuclear disarmament, foreign policy, and views on law and order and the organisation of public services were all areas of conflict. But one ideologically charged point of disagreement—the Party’s economic policy—runs through every historical period. It was the issue of economic policy that prompted the Party’s early position statements, such as *Labour and the New Social Order*. Its analysis of the changing nature of capitalism provided the intellectual platform for the revisionism of the 1950s. Since the 1970s, the struggle between Labour’s left and right has revolved primarily around economic policy issues such as taxation, public ownership, trade unionism, and industrial strategy, and economic issues have consistently been voters’ top priority.

在不同历史时期，工党左右两翼对诸多议题持不同意见。欧洲经济共同体成员资格、核裁军、外交政策、对法律与秩序及公共服务组织的看法等，都是意见冲突的领域。但一个带有意识形态特征的异议即政党的经济政策贯穿于各个历史时期。正是经济政策问题促成了该党早期的立场声明，如《工党与新社会秩序》。它对资本主义变动属性的分析为1950年代的修正主义提供了思想平台。自1970年代以来，工党左右之间的争斗主要围绕诸如税收、公有制、工会主义以及产业战略等经济政策问题展开，而经济问题也始终是选民最优先考虑的事项。

Generally speaking, the Labour right believes that the goals of enhancing social justice, reducing inequality, and improving the situation of the poorest can best be achieved by expanding and improving public services and building a more generous welfare state. To this end, it is necessary to ensure that the capitalist economy functions well, stimulating strong and sustained economic growth, thereby generating sufficient tax revenue to fund redistribution through public services and welfare. We can call this the “redistributive” approach to economic policy. Conversely, the Labour left has always been sceptical of the value of British capitalism, arguing that the British economy is overly dependent on the City of London and its shareholder-oriented corporate governance system, which has led to a chronic lack of investment in productive industries and channelled the returns from growth from labour to capital. Therefore, to achieve the Party’s goals, the left advocates for greater state economic planning, the nationalisation of key sectors, and stronger regulation of labour and financial markets. We can call this the “structural reform” approach to economic policy. Since World War II, although the details of these two approaches have changed, their overall contours have remained the same.

一般来说，工党右翼认为，通过扩大和改善公共服务、打造更慷慨的福利国家，能够最大限度地实现增进社会正义、减少不平等、改善最贫困人群处境等目标。为此，必须确保资本主义经济运行良好，激发强劲且持续的经济增长，由此产生充足的税收，通过公共服务和福利为再分配提供资源。我们可称其为经济政策的“再分配”方案。相反，工党左翼始终对英国资本主义的价值持怀疑态度，认为英国经济过度依赖伦敦金融城（City of London）及其基于股东利益的公司治理体系，这导致了对生产性行业的投资陷入了长期匮乏状态，并使增长回报从劳工转向了资本。因此，为实现工党的目标，左翼主张由国家实施更多的经济计划，将关键部门公有化，加强对劳动力和金融市场的监管。我们可称其为经济政策的“结构性改革”方案。自二战以来，这两大方案尽管在细节上有所变化，但其总体轮廓依然保持不变。

The common historical narrative of Labour’s policy positioning between these two approaches is as follows.

关于工党在这两大方案之间的政策定位，常见的历史叙事如下。

After 1945, the government of Clement Attlee adopted highly interventionist economic policies. It committed to full employment and sought to raise labour productivity and output. The government nationalised 20% of the economy, drew up various industrial plans, and ensured strict controls on imports and capital flows. However, after Attlee stepped down in the 1950s, Labour under Hugh Gaitskell clearly shifted to the right. Influenced by the revisionism of Anthony Crosland, Labour abandoned its commitment to enhanced economic planning and public ownership, instead dedicating itself to reducing inequality through increased spending on public services and the welfare state.

1945年之后，克莱门特·艾德礼（Clement Attlee）政府采取了高度干预主义的经济政策。承诺充分就业，力图提高劳动生产率和产量。政府将20%的经济国有化，制定了各项工业计划，确保对进口和资金流动进行严格控制。然而，1950年代艾德礼下台后，工党在休·盖茨克（Hugh Gaitskell）的领导下明显右转。受安东尼·克罗斯兰（Anthony Crosland）修正主义的影响，工党放弃了对加强计划经济和公有制的承诺，转而致力于通过增加对公共服务和福利国家的支出来减少不平等。

In the 1960s and early 1970s, under Wilson, Labour’s positioning was called into question. Yet by the early 1980s, the Party again shifted markedly to the left, pledging in 1983 to draw up a five-year national economic plan, establish a national investment bank, and renationalise the steel, shipbuilding, and aerospace industries that had been privatised under Margaret Thatcher.

1960年代和1970年代初，在威尔逊领导下，工党的定位遭到质疑。然而到1980年代初，该党再次明显左转，它在1983年承诺制定国民经济五年计划，成立国家投资银行，将玛格丽特·撒切尔（Margaret Thatcher）执政时期已被私有化的钢铁、造船和航空航天工业重新国有化。

After its defeat in the 1983 general election, Labour leader Neil Kinnock once again changed the Party’s direction. After defeating the left wing led by Tony Benn, Kinnock, through extensive policy review, pushed Labour to abandon its earlier commitments to nationalisation and economic planning and to move toward the political centre ground. This shift, begun by Kinnock and completed by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, remade “New Labour” into a party focused on using the fruits of economic growth to increase spending on public services and welfare. After Brown’s defeat in 2010, Labour shifted position again. Edward Miliband distanced himself from “New Labour” and cautiously moved the Party to the left, advocating more interventionist economic policies. After the 2015 general election defeat, his successor Jeremy Corbyn pushed Labour sharply to the left.

在1983年大选中落败后，工党领导人尼尔·金诺克（Neil Kinnock）再次转变该党的前进方向。在击败由托尼·本（Tony Benn）为首的左翼后，金诺克通过广泛的政策讨论，推动工党放弃早先对国有化和计划经济的承诺，转向政治的中间地带。这项由金诺克开启、由托尼·布莱尔（Tony Blair）和戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）完成的转变，将“新工党”打造成一个专注于利用经济增长成果来增加公共服务和福利支出的政党。2010年布朗竞选失败后，工党再次转变立场。爱德华·米利班德（Edward Miliband）与“新工党”保持距离并使该党谨慎地左转，主张采取更多干预主义的经济政策。2015年大选失利后，继任者杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）则推动工党大幅左转。

We acknowledge that this stylised account of Labour’s left-right swings obscures certain important nuances in policy-making. For example, during Attlee’s tenure, the economic agendas of Chancellors Hugh Dalton and Stafford Cripps differed considerably. Blair decisively abandoned Clause IV of the Party’s constitution, yet at one point turned toward a “stakeholder” path that had allegedly made British capitalism sick. [1]1 Clause IV of the Labour Party constitution originally committed the party to common ownership of the means of production. Blair’s successful 1995 revision replaced this with a commitment to a “dynamic economy” and “social justice.” The “stakeholder” approach, briefly advocated by Blair in 1996, proposed a more inclusive form of capitalism but was quickly abandoned. Furthermore, a policy “shift” to the right can make a party more left-wing than before, and vice versa. For instance, Gaitskell downgraded the importance of public ownership but did not oppose all forms of it. Although Kinnock moved Labour to the right, he continued to support an active industrial policy, as reflected in the 1992 election manifesto.

我们承认，对工党政策左右摇摆的程式化表述掩盖了政策制定中某些重要的细微差别。例如，在艾德礼执政期间，财政大臣休·道尔顿（Hugh Dalton）和斯塔福德·克里普斯（Stafford Cripps）的经济议程相差悬殊。布莱尔果断抛弃党章第四条，却一度转向使本国资本主义患上英国病的“利益均沾”路径。此外，政策的向右“转变”会使一个政党较之前更左，反之亦然。例如，盖茨克降低了公有制的重要性，但并没有反对一切形式的公有制。金诺克虽然推动工党右转，但仍然继续支持积极的工业政策，1992年竞选纲领反映了这一点。

We take the Labour Party’s election manifesto as the clearest indicator of its policy positioning. The election manifesto provides a “snapshot” for verifying a party’s stance. Of course, parties do not necessarily adhere to a fixed position: once in government, they may deviate from their campaign platform due to events, or may in practice choose a path markedly different from their previous commitments. But in any case, the election manifesto is the most important text in party positioning. At the critical moment of winning over voters, the election manifesto is the public face of party policy. The manifesto is always the product of internal party consultation, and therefore has reason to represent the party’s position at that time, enabling us to “anchor” a party’s position in an objective sense, setting aside temporary shifts and internal debates.

我们将工党的竞选宣言作为其政策定位的最清晰的指标。竞选宣言为验证一个政党的立场提供了“快照”。当然，政党并不必然固守某个定位：一旦执政，他们可能会因为一些事件而偏离其竞选纲领，也可能在实践中选择与之前的承诺截然不同的路径。但无论如何，竞选宣言是政党定位中最重要的文本。在争取选民的关键时刻，竞选宣言就是政党政策的公共形象。竞选宣言始终是党内协商的产物，因此有理由代表该党在当时的定位，从而使我们能够在客观意义上“锚定”一个政党的定位，将那些暂时的变动和党内争论搁置一旁。

Academic circles usually examine changes in party positioning through expert surveys or manifesto analysis. The “Manifesto Project” provides positioning data for over 1,000 parties in more than 50 countries since 1945. This project breaks down each manifesto into individual statements, categorizing them into 60 different issue categories and their policy stances. It then analyzes the overall content of each manifesto based on the relative importance of each issue. Finally, it adjusts to produce data, thereby determining each party’s position on the left-right spectrum.

学界通常围绕专家调查或宣言分析来考察政党定位的变化。“竞选宣言项目”提供了自1945年以来50多个国家1000多个政党的定位数据。该项目将各宣言拆解为单独的声明，将其归入60个不同的问题类别及其政策立场。然后依据每个问题的相对重要性来分析各个宣言的总体内容。最后调整得出数据，以此判定各政党在左—右光谱上的立场。

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图片

Figure 1 shows the “Manifesto Project’s” estimate of the Labour Party’s position between 1945 and 2019, confirming the stylized history described above. Compared to 1945 and 1951, the Labour Party began a continuous rightward shift from 1955, moving from -38 in 1955 to -26 in 1959, and then under Wilson’s leadership, reaching -10 by 1970. However, the party then experienced a sharp leftward turn, reaching -48 in February 1974. Subsequently, after a rightward shift in October 1974 (-28) and 1979 (-27), the Labour Party again turned markedly leftward, reaching -39 in 1983. Despite some fluctuations in later years, the party overall shifted sharply rightward: in 1997 it even crossed the center line, becoming a center-right party (+8). However, under Miliband’s leadership, the Labour Party turned sharply leftward again, reaching -18 in 2015, and then maintained a leftward turn under Corbyn’s leadership, reaching -28 in 2017 and -32 in 2019.

图1展示了“竞选宣言项目”对1945年至2019年间工党立场的估算，图中证实了上文所述的程式化历史。相较于1945年和1951年，工党从1955年开始持续右转，从1955年的-38达到了1959年的-26，此后在威尔逊的领导下，到1970年达到-10。然而，该党随后出现急剧左转，在1974年2月达到了-48。随后，在1974年10月（-28）和1979年（-27）右转的基础上，工党再次明显左转，1983年达到了-39。后面几年尽管有所摆动，但工党整体上在急剧右转：1997年甚至越过了中间界线，成为一个中右翼政党（+8）。不过，工党在米利班德的领导下又急剧左转，2015年达到-18，继而在科尔宾的领导下维持左转，2017年达到-28，2019年达到-32。

III

三

How to explain the Labour Party’s policy orientation? A view frequently appearing in academic literature and political media commentary is that the Labour Party’s oscillation between left and right is a response to the inevitable tension between ideology and winning elections.

如何解释工党的政策取向？在学术文献和政治媒体评论中频频出现如下观点：工党之所以在左右间交替摇摆，是为了应对意识形态与赢得选举之间不可避免的张力。

At its founding, the Labour Party was an ideologically left-wing party. This is evident from the condemnation of “the degradation and brutality of capitalism” in *Labour and the New Social Order*. However, in a country where most voters do not self-identify as left-wing, how to win enough votes to maintain governance has been a long-standing problem for the party. This exerted continuous pressure on the Labour Party leadership, forcing them to compromise with voters and move rightward to gain power.

工党在成立之初是一个基于意识形态的左翼政党。这从《工党与新社会秩序》对“资本主义的堕落和残暴”的鞭挞中可见一斑。然而，在一个大多数选民自我认同并非左翼的国家里，如何赢得足够的选票以维持执政是该党长期面临的问题。这对工党的领导层施加了持续的压力，他们不得不向选民妥协，为赢得权力而向右翼靠拢。

In academia, the “electoral-ideological” explanation of policy shifts finds its clearest basis in the “median voter theorem” set forth in Downs’s *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. It should be emphasized that Downs’s analysis of party movement is more nuanced than is commonly assumed. In particular, after explaining how parties find it in their interest to move toward the median voter, Downs discusses the ways in which different expectations among voters, voting, and parties can lead to different outcomes. In any case, Downs’s work and its basic argument about the centripetal forces of party competition still exert a huge influence in academia.

在学界，对政策转变的“选举—意识形态”解释在唐斯《民主的经济理论》一书所阐述的“中间选民定律”中找到了最明确的依据。需要强调的是，唐斯对政党位移的分析比人们通常认为的要更细致入微。特别是，当唐斯解释了政党如何发现向中间选民靠拢符合自身利益后，他讨论了选民、投票与政党的不同预判可能导致不同结果的方式。无论如何，唐斯的著作及其对政党竞争向心力的基本论述在学界仍然有着巨大影响。

Downs’s argument is not the only source of the “electoral-ideological” perspective. A distinctly different analytical tradition regarding the Labour Party’s positioning has arrived at a very similar explanation. This tradition begins with Ralph Miliband’s analysis in *Parliamentary Socialism*, and the contemporary critiques of Tom Nairn and Perry Anderson, focusing on the conflict between the Labour Party’s early commitment to a parliamentary political strategy and Marxist socialist ideology. For these scholars and later researchers following the same academic tradition, the Labour Party never was, and never could be, a vehicle for socialism. Its conservative trade union movement base, its anti-theoretical philosophical tradition, and its adherence to parliamentary procedure all prevented it from maintaining a radical policy stance. In the work of Adam Przeworski, this point is indeed linked to rational choice theory.

唐斯的论点并非是“选举—意识形态”视角的唯一来源。关于工党的定位，一种截然不同的分析传统也得出了极为相似的解释。这一传统始于拉尔夫·米利班德（Ralph Miliband）在《议会制社会主义》一书中的分析，以及汤姆·奈恩（Tom Nairn）和佩里·安德森（Perry Anderson）的当代批判，他们的分析聚焦于工党成立初期对议会政治战略的承诺同马克思主义的社会主义意识形态之间的冲突。对于这些学者以及后来循着同样学术传统的研究者而言，工党从来都不是、也不可能是社会主义的载体。它所立足的保守的工会运动、它的反理论的哲学传统，以及它对议会程序的恪守，均使其无法维持激进的政策立场。在亚当·普沃斯基（Adam Przeworski）的著作中，这一点确实与理性选择理论联系在了一起。

Versions of the “electoral-ideological” explanation can also be found in other analyses. Since World War II, there has been a consistent thread in debates within the Labour Party about ideology: the sociological composition of the electorate has changed. The number of blue-collar workers in trade unions has gradually declined, while the size of the “aspirational” middle class has continuously expanded. Crosland, Kinnock, and Blair all warned that the Labour Party could no longer rely on its traditional working-class electorate and socialist tradition. As the number of working-class voters continued to shrink, a rightward shift in economic policy became the only way for the Labour Party to win elections.

“选举—意识形态”解释版本也可以在其他分析中找到。自二战以来，工党关于意识形态的争论中始终存在一条主线，那就是选民的社会学构成发生了改变。工会中蓝领工人的数量逐步下降，“有抱负的”中产阶级的规模持续扩大。克罗斯兰、金诺克和布莱尔都曾告诫工党不能再依赖传统的工人阶级选民和社会主义传统。随着工人阶级选民数量不断减少，经济政策右转成为工党赢得选举的唯一法宝。

However, there is a distinctly different way of explaining changes in Labour Party policy, namely focusing on the economic context of policy-making. The Labour Party was founded to better protect the interests of labor and achieve greater economic equality. As mentioned earlier, at its founding the Labour Party believed that achieving these goals required replacing the capitalist system, or at least fundamentally transforming it. This “democratic socialist” stance was reflected in the Labour Party’s 1945 platform. It was not until the 1950s that Crosland put forward a “revisionist” position, arguing that the Labour Party could achieve its goal of reducing social inequality by raising taxes and increasing public service spending. Crosland’s core argument was that capitalism had changed and was no longer the dysfunctional model of the pre-war period. Future economic growth could now be reasonably expected; corporate ownership and management had separated; managers were willing to negotiate wages with trade unions; and unemployment could be kept low through Keynesian demand management. This meant there was no need to replace capitalism or radically transform it. Instead, the Labour Party could redistribute the benefits of capitalist growth through public spending and taxation.

然而，对工党政策变化还有一种截然不同的解释方式，那就是聚焦政策制定的经济背景。工党的成立是为了更好维护劳工利益，实现更大范围的经济平等。如前所述，工党在成立之初曾认为，要完成上述目标必须实现对资本主义制度的替代，或者至少对其进行根本变革。这一“民主社会主义”立场体现在工党1945年的纲领中。直到1950年代，克罗斯兰提出了“修正主义”立场，认为工党可以通过提高税收、增加公共服务开支来实现其减少社会不平等的目标。克罗斯兰的核心论点是，资本主义已发生变化，不再是战前那种功能失调的模式。现在可以合理地预期未来的经济增长；公司所有权和管理权已经分离；经理们愿意与工会协商薪酬；通过凯恩斯主义的需求管理可将失业率维持在较低水平。这意味着无须取代资本主义或对其进行彻底变革。作为替代，工党可通过公共开支和税收重新分配资本主义增长所带来的收益。

In the 1980s, Kinnock and his deputy Roy Hattersley again turned to a revisionist stance. Later, Blair described “New Labour” as following a “Third Way” between left and right, and Brown further developed this view, defining socialism as equality of opportunity, arguing that globalization and the end of the full-time male employment paradigm had changed the nature of the economy. He therefore proposed an economic program based on full employment, improving labor skills, and reforming the welfare state through progressive taxation, with the ultimate aim of eliminating poverty.

1980年代，金诺克与其副手罗伊·哈特斯利（Roy Hattersley）再次转向修正主义立场。之后，布莱尔将“新工党”描述为遵循左与右之间的“第三条道路”，布朗进一步发展了这一观点，将社会主义界定为机会平等，认为全球化及全职男性就业范式的终结已改变了经济性质，因此提出了一个基于充分就业、提高劳动力技能和通过累进税制改革福利国家的经济纲领，以期最终消除贫困。

The key factor in the Labour Party’s acceptance of revisionist positions was the strong performance of the British economy in each of the above-mentioned periods. The 1983 Labour Party election manifesto was drafted at the peak of the recession and mass unemployment caused by the early economic policies of the Thatcher government, while Kinnock’s rightward shift of the Labour Party occurred after the restoration of economic growth. As Andrew Thorpe has pointed out, Kinnock’s *Policy Review* was “supported, and indeed justified, by the ‘boom’ that was evident from the end of 1985.” This upward trend ended with the sharp recession between 1990 and 1992. It was not until Blair was elected Labour leader in 1994 that the era of the “Great Moderation” began. Between 1992 and 2008, the longest sustained period of economic expansion in over a century occurred. Accompanying low inflation were gradually rising employment levels and increasing household incomes. The increase in household incomes and corporate tax revenues in turn made possible the sustained growth of public services and social security welfare spending. The Labour government did not recognize the fragility of the financial model on which the economic growth of the first decade of the 21st century depended, seeing only the soaring tax revenues brought by the generous profits and bonuses of the City of London.

工党接纳修正主义立场的关键因素是英国经济在上述各个时期的强劲表现。1983年的工党竞选纲领成文于撒切尔政府早期经济政策酿成的经济衰退和大规模失业的峰值期，金诺克带领工党右转则发生在经济增长恢复之后。正如安德鲁·索普（Andrew Thorpe）所指出的，金诺克的《政策回顾》是“以1985年底显而易见的‘繁荣’为支撑，甚至是以其为依据的”。这一上升趋势因1990年至1992年间的急剧衰退而告终。等到布莱尔在1994年当选为工党领袖，才开启了“大缓和”时代。在1992至2008年间，出现了一个多世纪以来持续时间最长的经济繁荣。与低通胀相伴随的，是逐步提高的就业水平和不断增长的家庭收入。家庭收入和企业税收的增加反过来又使公共服务和社会保障福利支出的持续增长成为可能。工党政府并没有意识到20世纪前10年经济增长所依赖的金融模式的脆弱性，只看到伦敦金融城丰厚的利润和奖金带来的税收暴涨。

Therefore, the contemporary performance of the British economy was an important basis for the Labour Party adopting redistributive economic policies in the latter half of the 1950s, the 1980s, and the period from 1994 to 2008. Similarly, economic conditions were also key to the Labour Party turning to structural reform programs of economic policy in other periods.

因此，英国经济的时下表现是工党在1950年代后半期、1980年代以及在1994年至2008年期间采取再分配经济政策的重要基础。同样，经济状况也是工党在其他时期转向经济政策结构性改革方案的关键。

In 1945, the new Labour government faced not only a war-ravaged economy and a national debt amounting to nearly 250% of GDP. It also had to confront an economic system that had proven helpless in the face of the mass unemployment and poverty of the Great Depression. Therefore, economic intervention policies based on planning, market regulation, and nationalization were not only the ideology of the Labour leadership but were also widely regarded as an economic necessity. Only by restructuring British capitalism could Labour hope to create the conditions for sustained economic growth, thereby providing the resources to establish the National Health Service (NHS) and implement the Beveridge Report, which were Labour’s primary political objectives.

1945年，新的工党政府面临的不仅仅是饱受战争摧残的经济和几乎占国内生产总值250%的国债。它还必须面对一个已被证明对大萧条时期大规模失业和贫困问题束手无策的经济体系。因此，基于计划、市场规制和国有化的经济干预政策不仅是工党领导层的意识形态，也被广泛认为有着经济上的必要性。只有通过重组英国资本主义，工党才有希望为持续的经济增长创造条件，从而为创建国民医疗服务体系（NHS）和实施《贝弗里奇报告》（Beveridge Report）提供资源，这正是工党的首要政治目标。

The situation in the early 1980s, though different, was equally crisis-ridden. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the oil price shocks of the early 1970s, and the ensuing “stagflation,” the Labour governments led by Wilson and James Callaghan failed to stabilize the British economy. With a soaring budget deficit, the government was forced to request financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund in 1976. Britain was also labeled the “sick man of Europe” due to poor management, underinvestment in state-owned enterprises, weak manufacturing and export performance, and what was seen as an excessively powerful trade union movement. Between 1980 and 1981, the Thatcher government implemented a series of anti-inflation policies, such as restricting the money supply, cutting public spending, and raising value-added tax. As the exchange rate rose, these policies severely damaged Britain’s competitiveness, not only causing the worst post-war recession and a surge in unemployment but also delivering the first wave of shocks to many of the country’s long-established industries.

1980年代初的形势虽然有所不同，但同样危机重重。在布雷顿森林体系崩溃、1970年代初的石油价格震荡及随之而来的“滞涨”之后，威尔逊和詹姆斯·卡拉汉（James Callaghan）领导的工党政府未能稳定英国经济。因预算赤字飙升，政府不得不在1976年向国际货币基金组织请求金融援助。英国也因管理不善、国有企业投资不足、制造业和出口表现疲软以及明显过于强大的工会而被贴上“欧洲病夫”的标签。1980年至1981年，撒切尔政府出台了诸如限制货币供应、削减公共开支和提高增值税等一系列反通胀政策，随着汇率上升，这些政策使英国的竞争力遭受重创，不仅导致了战后最严重的经济衰退和失业率飙升，而且对该国许多历史悠久的产业造成了第一波冲击。

In this context, it is not surprising that the Labour Party turned to a completely different economic policy focused on structural reform. The cornerstone of the Labour Party’s 1983 election manifesto was the so-called “Alternative Economic Strategy” (AES), the product of a decade of economic reflection by the left. Although the AES had multiple versions, its core analysis identified two root causes of the British economy’s weakness. First was the historical role of the City of London. The City’s interests lay in global financial transactions rather than investment in British industry, and its threat of capital flight imposed a constant constraint on expansionary monetary policy. Second was the changing character of modern capitalist economies. Industrial concentration had created powerful, near-monopolistic companies, many of which had become multinational corporations, no longer bound by market competition or commitments to invest in Britain. The AES proposed that a policy response was necessary: implement an industrial strategy based on expanding public ownership, industrial democracy, and planning agreements with individual companies; coordinate national economic planning with expansionary monetary policy to achieve full employment; and regulate prices, imports, and international capital flows. This program was broadly adopted in the 1983 election manifesto.

在这种情况下，工党转向一种完全不同的、聚焦于结构改革的经济政策，也就不足为奇了。工党1983年竞选宣言的支点是所谓的“替代性经济战略”（AES），这是左翼10年来经济反思的产物。尽管“替代性经济战略”有多个版本，但其核心是分析导致英国经济疲弱的两大根源。一是伦敦金融城的历史作用。伦敦金融城的利益在于全球金融交易，而非对英国产业进行投资，其抽逃资本的威胁对扩张性货币政策施加了持续的限制。二是现代资本主义经济不断变化的特征。产业集中创造了强大的近乎垄断的公司，其中许多业已成为跨国公司，不再受市场竞争和对英国投资承诺的约束。“替代性经济战略”建议，有必要对此作出政策反应：实施一项以扩大公有制、产业民主和与个别公司达成计划协议为基础的产业战略；将国家经济计划与扩张性货币政策相协调以实现充分就业；对价格、进口和国际资本流动进行规制。在1983年竞选宣言中，这一方案大致得到了采纳。

By 2010, the British economy was once again in crisis. The 2008 global financial crisis led to the largest drop in production since the Great Depression, with over a million people losing their jobs. Clearly, the seemingly benign growth of the previous decade had been built on high levels of household and corporate debt, while rising asset prices caused a sharp widening of wealth inequality. In the following years, as the coalition government implemented austerity policies cutting public services and public investment, productivity and wages stagnated, and the number of workers on precarious zero-hour contracts surged. It became evident that the existing growth model was unsustainable. To address the crisis at its roots, the Labour Party once again turned to a structural reform position. Under Miliband’s leadership, the Labour Party advocated an active industrial strategy, including establishing a new state investment bank, formulating regional economic development policies, re-nationalizing the railways, capping energy company prices, and reforming corporate governance by electing workers to company boards. Under Corbyn’s leadership, the Labour Party expanded the re-nationalization plans to many other sectors; its industrial strategy significantly increased public investment, with a particular focus on a “Green Industrial Revolution” to address the worsening climate crisis; and the party also pledged to raise corporate taxes and introduce a financial transaction tax.

到2010年，英国经济再度陷入危机。2008年全球金融危机导致了自大萧条以来最大幅度的生产下降，100多万人失业。显然，此前10年表面上的良性增长是建立在家庭债务和商业债务高企基础上的，不断抬升的资产价格造成财富不平等的急剧扩大。此后几年里，由于联合政府采取了削减公共服务和公共投资的紧缩政策，致使生产力和工资水平停滞不前，签订无保障的零时工作合同的工人数量激增，很明显，现有的增长模式已难以为继。为从根源上应对危机，工党再一次转向结构性改革立场。在米利班德的领导下，工党倡议实施一套积极的产业战略，其中包括设立新的国家投资银行、制定区域经济发展政策、对铁路进行再国有化、对能源公司的价格设置上限，以及推选工人进入董事会以改革公司治理。科尔宾领导下的工党将再国有化计划扩展到更多其他部门；其产业战略大幅增加了公共投资，特别注重“绿色工业革命”以解决日趋严重的气候危机；工党还承诺提高公司税并引入金融交易税。

In each of the above periods, the Labour Party’s policy position shifted leftward for essentially the same reason. The party leadership concluded that only through government-led structural reform could the economic crisis be resolved. Redistributing the fruits of economic growth was insufficient to achieve the egalitarian goals the Labour Party advocated—and besides, the “cake” available for redistribution was not large enough. Therefore, the deep-seated ills within the British capitalist model could only be addressed through systematic government intervention.

在上述每一个时期，工党的政策立场都因本质上相同的原因出现了左转。工党的领导层得出的结论是，只有通过政府主导的结构性改革才能解决经济危机。经济增长成果的再分配并不足以实现工党所倡导的平等目标——况且可供再分配的“蛋糕”还不够大。因此，英国资本主义模式中的深层弊端只能通过系统性的政府干预予以解决。

In summary, this is an alternative explanation for the Labour Party’s policy pendulum, namely the “political economy-policy” approach. The Labour Party’s policy positioning changes in response to changes in the external economic environment: when the economy performs well, the Labour Party shifts rightward and adopts redistributive economic strategies (emphasizing increased spending on public services and welfare). When the economy performs poorly, the Labour Party shifts leftward and proposes structural economic reform programs (emphasizing government intervention in investment and ownership).

总之，这就是对工党政策钟摆的另一种解释，即“政治经济—政策”方法。工党的政策定位因外部经济环境的变化而改变：当经济表现良好时，工党右转并采取再分配的经济战略（强调增加公共服务和福利开支）。当经济表现不佳时，工党则左转并提出结构性经济改革方案（强调对投资和所有权的政府干预）。

It is important to recognize that there is no fixed standard for measuring whether economic performance is good or bad; it is merely a judgment made in comparison with recent experience and expectations. In hindsight, the slowdown in economic growth in the early 1960s and the “stagflation” of the 1970s were not as severe as the Great Recession of the early 1980s and after 2008. Yet, at the time, they were unquestionably regarded as troubling signs of national economic decline, especially when compared with the boom years of the 1950s. In this sense, the perception of economic performance is neither objective nor fixed. This perception merely reflects the prevailing public and political discourse. It is this that determines the economic choices made by politicians. Indeed, this discourse is partly constructed by the politicians themselves, who seek to persuade the public that conditions are improving or worsening. Politicians are usually more responsive to arguments than to simple data.

重要的是要认识到，衡量经济表现得好或坏并没有固定标准，而只是比照近期经验和预期而做出的判断。事后看来，1960年代初经济增长放缓与1970年代的“滞胀”并不像1980年代初和2008年后的大衰退那么严重。然而，在当时却毫无疑问地被当作令人不安的国家经济衰退的迹象，特别是与1950年代的繁荣时期相比照。在这个意义上，对经济表现的认知既不客观，也不固定。这种认知只是对当下公共和政治话语的反映。正是这一点决定了政客们所做的经济选择。事实上，这种话语一定程度上是由政客们自己建构的，他们试图借此说服公众相信形势趋好或是更糟。政客通常更愿意对争论而非简单的数据作出回应。

Four

四

The “electoral-ideological” and “political economy-policy” explanations are not the only two interpretations of Labour Party policy swings. Different scholars have attempted to explain parties’ ideological positioning and the relationship between these positions and policy choices under the influence of multiple factors, including: changes in voter values, changes in organizational membership, the separation of the party from class, the intensification of new policy challenges and the development of new policy ideas, intra-party conflict, the necessity of building coalitions, cognitive capacity, organizational resources and political marketing, and the characteristics of the electoral system.

“选举—意识形态”与“政治经济—政策”这两种解释并不是有关工党政策摇摆的唯二解释。不同学者试图根据一系列其他因素来解释政党的意识形态定位，以及这些定位与多重因素影响下的政策选择之间的关系。这些因素包括：选民价值观的变化、组织成员的改变、党与阶级分离、不断强化的新的政策挑战与新的政策理念的发展、党内冲突、构建联盟的必要性、认知能力、组织资源与政治营销，以及选举制度的特性。

There are two main reasons why we focus on these two broader research approaches. First, as noted above, the “electoral-ideological” explanation is a perennial topic in everyday political debates about winning and losing elections. Currently, anyone who has experienced the Labour Party’s previous left-right struggles knows that the claim of winning elections from the center ground is a key feature of debates about Labour strategy and electoral prospects. In general terms, supporters of “New Labour” insisted that Labour’s electoral victories in 1997, 2001, and 2005 were the result of moving to the center ground, while its defeats in 2015, 2017, and 2019 were due to moving away from it.

我们之所以关注这两种更为宽泛的研究方法，主要原因有二。首先，如上文所述，“选举—意识形态”解释是日常有关选举输赢政治争论中的老话题。目前，任何经历过工党此前数次左右之争的人都知道，声称在中间地带赢得选举，是有关工党战略和选举前景之辩的一个关键特征。统而言之，“新工党”的支持者们坚称，工党在1997年、2001年和2005年赢得选举胜利就是转向中间地带的结果，而2015年、2017年和2019年的选举失利则是其远离中间地带所致。

Second, although both the “electoral-ideological” and “political economy-policy” explanations are consistent with many facts in the history of Labour’s economic policy, this article argues that the latter more accurately explains how policy actually changed in practice.

其次，尽管“选举—意识形态”与“政治经济—政策”两种解释均与工党经济政策史上诸多事实相契合，但本文认为，后者更为精准地解释了政策在实际中是如何变化的。

We will discuss this issue in more depth later. However, before that, it is necessary to examine a period we have so far carefully avoided—1960 to 1975—because this period provides useful clues for our argument. The analysis of the “Comparative Manifestos Project” (Figure 1) shows that the positions expressed in Wilson’s 1964, 1966, and 1970 election manifestos were all more right-wing than those of his predecessors. To this day, Wilson is indeed often regarded as a right-winger within the Labour Party. This is consistent with the “electoral-ideological” explanation of Labour’s policy positioning. After the 1959 general election defeat, Labour moved further right to win votes it had failed to secure in the previous two elections, and won in 1964 and 1966.

我们将在后文更深入地讨论这个问题。不过，在此之前，有必要考察我们迄今一直小心翼翼避开的一段时期——1960年至1975年，因为这段时期为我们的论点提供了有益的线索。“竞选宣言项目”的分析（图1）表明，威尔逊在1964年、1966年和1970年竞选宣言中表达的立场都比其前任更偏向右侧。时至今日，威尔逊也确实常常被视为工党的右翼。这与工党政策定位的“选举—意识形态”解释相一致。1959年大选失败后，工党进一步右转，以争取在之前两次选举中未能赢得的选票，并在1964年和1966年两次获胜。

But this interpretation is barely satisfactory. In 1960, Wilson was not seen as a right-winger in the Labour Party. More importantly, in terms of specific economic policies, Labour’s 1964 and 1966 election manifestos were not more right-wing than its 1959 manifesto. The 1964 manifesto promised to introduce “socialist planning,” proposing the establishment of a new Department of Economic Affairs and a Ministry of Technology, regional planning, a Charter of Rights for all employees, stricter controls on monopolies and mergers, and a national incomes policy. None of these appeared in the 1959 manifesto, whose economic policies were limited to a few vague paragraphs. The 1966 manifesto elaborated further on its economic planning commitments, including the nationalization of ports and the use of a newly established Industrial Reorganisation Corporation to restructure Britain’s major industrial sectors.

但这种解读差强人意。在1960年，威尔逊并不被看作是工党右翼人士。更重要的是，就特定经济政策而言，工党1964年和1966年的竞选宣言并不比1959年的竞选宣言更右。工党1964年竞选宣言承诺引入“社会主义计划”，提议设立一个新的经济事务部和科技部，实施区域规划，为全体雇员制定《权利宪章》实施细则，对垄断和兼并实施更加严格的管控，出台国民收入政策。但这些都没有出现在1959年宣言中，其中的经济政策也仅局限于少许几个并不明确的段落里。工党1966年的竞选宣言更详细地阐述了其经济计划承诺。包括将港口收归国有，利用新设的工业重组集团来重建英国的主要工业部门。

Why did Wilson propose such a radical economic program? In 1955 and 1959, the Conservatives campaigned on their “never had it so good” economic record. However, by the early 1960s, the British economy began to decline. The balance of payments surplus of 1958 turned into a huge deficit by 1960, at a time when a balance of payments surplus was seen as a symbol and prerequisite of economic prosperity. The British economy fell into recession in late 1961 and contracted further in 1962. From around 1960, a growing number of the public believed that Britain was falling behind other economies, especially in manufacturing investment and technological research and development. The debate over Britain’s poor economic performance dominated the 1964 election. Therefore, as Wilson’s biographer Ben Pimlott noted, by 1964, in terms of economic policy, political consensus and public sentiment were both pointing toward Labour’s program of planning and reform.

威尔逊为什么提出如此激进的经济计划？在1955年和1959年，保守党依仗其“从未有过如此亮眼”的经济记录参加竞选。然而，到1960年代初，英国经济开始衰退。1958年的国际收支盈余到1960年变成了巨大亏空，而当时国际收支顺差被视为经济繁荣的象征和前提。英国经济在1961年底陷入衰退，1962年进一步萎缩。大约从1960年开始，越来越多的公众认为英国正在落后于其他经济体，尤其在制造业投资和技术研发领域。有关英国经济表现不佳的争论左右了1964年大选。因此，正如威尔逊的传记作者本·平洛特（Ben Pimlott）指出的，到1964年，在经济政策方面，政治共识和公众情绪都将矛头指向了工党的计划和改革纲领。

Therefore, the “political economy-policy” explanation should not be simply understood as Labour moving left when an economic crisis is perceived or actually occurs. Rather, Labour can win elections in such a shift only when policy changes are synchronized with shifts in public sentiment, and voters are more inclined to support structural economic reform. This is important because it challenges the core assumption of the “electoral-ideological” approach, namely that radical economic policies always repel the majority of voters. This is not the case. Labour won elections in 1945, 1964, and 1966 on a center-left program of structural economic reform precisely because this program convinced a majority of voters that such reform was appropriate and necessary during an economic crisis. Margaret Thatcher also won the 1983 and 1987 general elections on a relatively radical right-wing reform program. In this respect, public opinion and its relationship with parties are far more variable than the “electoral-ideological” approach suggests. Parties do not simply passively cater to fixed electoral preferences. Preferences change constantly, and parties are able to shape them.

因此，不应把“政治经济—政策”解释简单理解为经济危机被觉察及真正发生时工党就会左转。而是当政策变化与公众情绪转变同步，选民更倾向于支持结构性经济改革时，工党才能在这种转变中胜选。这一点很重要，因为它挑战了“选举—意识形态”的核心假设，即过激的经济政策总是排斥大多数选民。事实并非如此。工党在1945年、1964年和1966年凭借中间偏左的结构性经济改革方案赢得选举，恰恰是因为这一方案使多数选民认识到，这种改革在经济危机期间是恰当且必须的。撒切尔夫人也是凭借相对激进的右翼改革方案赢得了1983和1987年大选。就此而言，民意及其与政党的关系远比“选举—意识形态”方法所解释的更加多变。政党不是简单被动地迎合固定的选举偏好。偏好不断变化，而政党也能够塑造偏好。

V

五

For the argument of this article, the significance of the Wilson period lies in reminding us that anchoring economic policy in the center ground does not guarantee Labour will always win elections. However, the validity of the “political economy-policy” approach has other reasons as well. Parties do not simply calculate and predict to identify the median voter and then move toward them. Parties adopt and change policies based on a rational assessment of the effectiveness of different policy choices in achieving party goals—an assessment that depends on the economic context of policymaking and therefore changes with economic conditions.

对本文论点而言，威尔逊时期的重要性在于提醒我们，将经济立场固守在中间位置并不能保证工党始终胜选。不过，“政治经济—政策”方法的合理性还另有他因。政党并非只是简单地计算和预测以识别中间选民然后向其靠拢。政党采纳和改变政策，也是基于不同的政策选择对实现政党目标的有效性进行合理考量后的结果——这种考量取决于政策制定的经济背景，因此会根据经济形势的变化而变化。

Like other rational choice approaches, Downs’s theory of party competition clearly ignores the capacity of actors to judge their own situation and adopt corresponding countermeasures. Starting from its assumptions, this theory would conclude that party positioning will inevitably tend toward the median voter. Later models are not as rigid as the original in some assumptions, offering more complex interpretations of political goals, including policy orientation, ideological consistency, and political survival. But even so, the trade-offs between goals are mechanical, yielding optimal, complex, and utility-maximizing options. The rational choice model of party competition can precisely predict party positioning because the theory effectively excludes any form of inference that is indirect or beyond voter preferences.

与其他理性选择方法一样，唐斯的政党竞争理论显然忽视了实施者对自身处境的判断并采取相应对策的能力。从其假定出发，该理论会得出政党定位必将倾向于中间选民的结论。后期模型的某些假定不像最初那样刻板，而是对政治目标给出了更复杂的阐释，包括政策取向、意识形态的连贯性和政治生存。但即便如此，对目标之间的权衡也是机械式的，据此得出最优的、复杂的和效用最大化的选项。政党竞争的理性选择模型可以精确地预测政党定位，因为该理论有效地排除了间接的、除选民偏好之外的任何形式的推断。

More importantly, the rational choice model ignores the development of policy ideas and the outcomes of debates over them. In practice, all parties engage in policy deliberation: substantive debates over the merits of alternative policies and their ability to achieve party goals. Such debates are the lifeblood of all ideological parties.

更重要的是，理性选择模型忽略了政策理念的发展和争论的输赢。在实践中，各种政党都会进行政策酝酿：就替代政策的优点及其能否成功实现政党目标进行实质性辩论。此类辩论是所有意识形态型政党的命脉所系。

Furthermore, such debates also help explain why specific factions within a party prevail at different times. This is not simply a matter of the number of supporters each faction has, but whether a faction’s views can win over the undecided, whether they are in the leadership with decision-making power or ordinary party members. Effective policy deliberation requires that at least some participants in the debate are not rigidly attached to their ideology on policy lines. Their views should be open to change.

进一步说，此类辩论也有助于解释为什么党内特定的派别会在不同时期胜出。这不仅仅是各派别的拥趸数量多寡那么简单，而是各派的观点能否赢得犹豫不决者的支持，不论这些人是有决策权的领导层还是普通党员。有效的政策酝酿要求至少有部分争论者在政策路线问题上不固守其意识形态。他们的观点应当是可以变通的。

In debates on economic policy, the economic environment is crucial. Economic policy debates always have their historical context: what policies should be introduced according to the economic conditions of the time. It is precisely this that explains not only why the Labour Party shifts between left and right poles, but also when such shifts occur. When the economy is performing well, with sustained growth, high employment levels, and increased public revenue, proposals for simple redistribution are more likely to be accepted. At such times, implementing structural reforms is difficult, because it requires the state to have new capacities to tax vested interests and the time needed for implementation. When the economy is performing well, structural reform is not only difficult but also unnecessary. Similarly, when the economy falls into crisis or is in a downturn that reveals its deep-seated defects, structural reform comes to the fore.

在有关经济政策的辩论里，经济环境至关重要。经济政策辩论总有其历史背景：根据当时的经济情况应出台何种政策。正是这一点，不仅解释了工党为何在左右两极之间位移，还解释了何时会发生位移。当经济运行良好、经济持续增长、就业水平较高并且公共收入增加时，单纯再分配的主张更有可能被认可。而此时要实施结构性改革则是困难的，因为它要求国家有新的能力对既得利益者加税，以及需要施政时间。在经济表现良好时，结构改革不仅有困难而且没必要。同理，当经济陷入危机或不甚景气，反映出其深层弊端时，结构性改革才会脱颖而出。

This process of policy deliberation is clearly revealed in reports on Labour Party policy formulation, which cite policy documents of the time and the memoirs of key participants. From these, it can be seen that lively policy debates were not solely focused on electoral victory, but also on which policies could more effectively address the economic problems of the time and achieve the Labour Party’s egalitarian goals. Three examples can illustrate this.

这一政策酝酿的过程在工党政策制定的报告中被清晰地揭示出来，这些报告援引了当时的政策文件和主要参与者的回忆。从中可见，生动的政策辩论并非只关注能否胜选，还关注什么政策能更有效地解决当时的经济问题和实现工党的平等主义目标。有三个例子可以佐证。

The first example relates to the formulation of the Labour Party’s 1973 election programme, which formed the basis of the 1974 Labour election manifesto. The programme promised to create a National Enterprise Board, which would hold strategic stakes in major enterprises and enter into “planning agreements” with these enterprises and other companies, in exchange for public investment and other support. These proposals indicated a significant leftward shift in the Labour Party’s position from its 1970 election manifesto. Detailed, personalised accounts of the internal policy-making process within the Labour Party show that the new policies originated from the analysis by Stuart Holland, a former economic adviser to Wilson, of the weaknesses of British industry, the growth of multinational corporations, and the reasons for the government’s failure between 1964 and 1970. The Labour right wing believed that broad national economic planning, supplemented by prices and incomes policies, could stimulate sufficient growth. Holland’s prescription differed from both. Research on these debates shows that many important figures within the Labour Party changed their views in response. Tony Crosland was Holland’s main opponent. Although Crosland insisted that Holland’s proposals would be difficult to sell to voters, it was the policy deliberation within the core decision-making circle, rather than electoral considerations, that determined the Labour Party’s change of position.

第一个例子与工党1973年竞选纲领的制定相关，该纲领构成了1974年工党竞选宣言的基础。纲领承诺创建全国企业委员会（National Enterprise Board），在重要企业中持有战略股份，与这些企业和其他公司签订“计划协议”，企业以此换取公共投资和其他支持。上述建议表明工党从1970年开始其竞选宣言的立场大幅度左转。有关工党内部政策制定过程的详细的、个性化的叙事表明，新政策源自威尔逊的前经济顾问斯图尔特·霍兰（Stuart Holland）对英国工业弱点、跨国公司的增长以及1964年至1970年间政府失败原因的分析。工党右翼认为，只要制定广泛的国民经济计划，辅之以价格和收入政策，就能刺激充分增长。霍兰的处方与这两者都不同。对这些争论的研究表明，工党中许多重要人物的都改变了自身观点以作为回应。托尼·克罗斯兰（Tony Crosland）是霍兰的主要反对者。虽然克罗斯兰坚持认为霍兰的主张难以说服选民，但决定工党转变立场的是核心决策层的政策酝酿，而非选举考量。

The formation of the economic policy of “New Labour” in the 1990s was clearly similar. After the 1992 election defeat, Blair, Brown, and their advisers were determined to rid the Labour Party of its image among voters as a high-tax party. But Labour’s economic revisionism went far beyond this. In speeches and pamphlets, Labour leaders argued that contemporary capitalism had fundamentally changed. Globalisation meant that it was no longer possible to regulate enterprises within national borders. To promote economic growth and distribute its benefits more fairly, the primary task of a Labour government was to provide conditions for economic stability, especially controlling inflation; second, to develop the supply side of the economy, particularly in education and skills. The strong economic growth after “Black Wednesday” in 1992, and the policy consensus among macroeconomists on both sides of the Atlantic based on new theories of endogenous growth and central bank inflation targeting, supported their arguments. In advancing these arguments, Blair and Brown engaged with and defeated some within the party who sought a more active Keynesian fiscal policy aimed at full employment. Undoubtedly, during this period, electoral considerations played a significant role in the Labour Party’s rightward shift. However, a debate based on policy deliberation also prevailed within the party, centred on the nature of the economy and how best to manage it.

1990年代“新工党”经济政策的形成过程显然与此类似。1992年败选后，布莱尔、布朗及其顾问决意使工党摆脱在选民中的高税收形象。但工党的经济修正主义远不止如此。在演讲和宣传册中，工党的领导人认为，当代资本主义已发生根本变化。全球化意味着已不可能在国界内对企业进行监管。为促进经济增长，更公平地分配收益，工党政府的首要工作是提供经济稳定的条件，特别是控制通货膨胀；其次是发展经济的供给侧、特别是在教育和技能方面。1992年“黑色星期三”之后经济的强劲增长，大西洋两岸宏观经济学家以内生增长新理论和央行通胀目标为依据形成的政策共识，都为他们的主张提供了支持。在提出这些论点时，布莱尔和布朗与党内部分人士展开交锋并击败对手，这些人寻求以充分就业为目标的更积极的凯恩斯主义财政政策。毫无疑问，在这一时期，选举考量在工党右转中发挥了重要作用。但是，一场基于政策酝酿的辩论也在党内占据了上风，其主题就是关于经济的性质以及如何对经济进行最佳管理。

The third case comes from after the Labour government left office. On the surface, it was Miliband who led the Labour Party leftward after its 2010 election defeat, but in fact it was Peter Mandelson, one of the architects of “New Labour”, who first restored the government’s interventionist industrial strategy while serving as Business Secretary from 2008 to 2010. As his adviser Roger Liddle stated, the financial crisis and the subsequent sharp decline in investment and output convinced Mandelson that the government had to act to revive British industry. Brown and Chancellor Alistair Darling were initially sceptical but were eventually persuaded, so the Labour Party’s 2010 election manifesto proposed an active industrial strategy. This change in policy positioning was driven by three members of “New Labour” who had firmly opposed industrial strategy a decade earlier, because economic conditions had changed and policy deliberation had prevailed. Similarly, Miliband was persuaded by debates within his shadow cabinet and among his advisers that the failure of austerity and persistent weak production meant that the Labour Party after the financial crisis had to implement more government intervention.

第三个案例来自工党政府下台后。表面上，2010年败选后带领工党左转的是米利班德，但实际上却是“新工党”设计师之一彼得·曼德尔森（Peter Mandelson），正是他在2008年至2010年任商务大臣期间首次恢复了政府干预的产业战略。正如他的顾问罗杰·利德尔（Roger Liddle）所说，金融危机及其后的投资和产出锐减使曼德尔森确信，要复兴英国产业，政府必须出手。对此，布朗和财政大臣阿利斯泰尔·达林（Alistair Darling）最初持怀疑态度，但终被说服，于是工党2010年竞选宣言提出了积极的产业战略。此次政策定位的变化是由三位10年前坚决反对产业战略的“新工党”成员促动的，原因是经济条件变了，政策酝酿占据了上风。同样，米利班德也是在其影子内阁成员和顾问们的争论中被说服的，紧缩政策失败和生产持续疲软意味着金融危机后的工党不得不实行更多政府干预。

Not only parties engage in such policy deliberation; public opinion also changes with economic conditions. When the economy performs poorly, more people naturally tend to favour more radical economic policies—various structural reform measures. For example, in 2017, public support for increased public spending and higher taxes rose to its highest level in 15 years, precisely when the Labour Party held the same position. Between 2017 and 2019, public support for the renationalisation of railways, Royal Mail, water, and energy companies increased. There is indeed a reciprocal causation here: the Labour Party both responds to and shapes public opinion. It is for this reason that Labour’s structural reformers could insist that the party’s leftward shift at that time was not electoral suicide, as the right wing claimed, but might instead be more popular with the public. This strategy was evident in Wilson’s rhetoric on technological progress in 1964 and 1966, and in Corbyn’s anti-austerity stance in 2017.

不仅政党有此类政策酝酿，民意也会随经济条件的变化而改变。经济表现不佳时，自然会有更多的人倾向于更激进的经济政策——各种结构性改革措施。比如在2017年，民众对增加公共开支和提高税收的支持上升到15年来的最高点，恰好此时工党也持相同立场。在2017年到2019年间，民众对铁路、皇家邮政、供水和能源公司再国有化的支持率有所上升。这里确实互为因果：工党既回应民意，也塑造民意。正因如此，工党的结构性改革者们才能坚称，此时的工党左转并非右翼所说的选举自杀，相反，可能更受民众欢迎。威尔逊1964年和1966年有关技术进步的言论以及2017年科尔宾的反紧缩立场中，都体现了这种战略。

Voters may not believe that their own positioning has changed. Many may still consider themselves centrist, because they attribute their change to political moderation and a sense of pragmatism. The political centre ground is neither fixed nor exogenous; it is constructed. “New Labour” successfully persuaded voters that policies such as the minimum wage and windfall taxes on utilities were not typical old-style socialism. As Corbyn said at the 2017 Labour Party conference: “It is often said that elections can only be won from the centre ground. To some extent, that is not wrong—only we must understand that the political centre ground is neither fixed nor immovable, nor is it what establishment experts take for granted.”

选民未必认为自己的立场定位发生了改变。许多人或许认为自己仍持中间立场，因为他们把自己的改变归结于政治温和与务实感。政治中间地带既非固定的，也非外生的，而是被建构的。“新工党”说服选民相信诸如最低工资和公用事业暴利税并不是典型的旧式社会主义，这一努力往往很成功。正如科尔宾在2017年工党大会上所说：人们常说只能从中间地带赢得选举。某种程度上，这并没有错——只是要明白，政治中间地带并非固定不变或不可移动，也非建制派专家们想当然的那样。

The rational choice literature on party competition argues that strategies to shape preferences (rather than cater to them) can serve as a means of winning votes. William Riker’s concept of “heresthetics” further emphasises that the selection and framing of issues can create competitive advantages. This suggests that the “electoral-ideological” and “political economy-policy” models intersect. If preference shaping is very successful, the median voter may ally with radical reformers. But regardless, the core insight of the “political economy-policy” model remains viable: the policy ideas that can potentially win elections are at any time determined by and constrained by the prevailing economic conditions, and by the provision of plausible justifications for policies that can promote economic development.

政党竞争的理性选择文献认为，塑造偏好（而非迎合偏好）的策略可以作为赢得选票的手段。威廉·瑞克（William Riker）的“操控游说”（heresthetics）概念进一步强调了议题的选择与设计方式能够产生竞争优势。这表明“选举—意识形态”与“政治经济—政策”这两种模型有交汇处。若偏好塑造非常成功，中间选民有可能与激进改革者联手。但不管怎样，“政治经济—政策”模型的核心观点依然有其生命力：可能胜选的政策观点任何时候都取决并受制于当时的经济条件，取决并受制于对能够促进经济发展的政策给出切实的理由。

Recognizing the role of policy deliberation brings a new perspective to understanding several important debates in Labour Party history. For example, in the late 1990s, Mark Wickham-Jones and Colin Hay engaged in a significant debate over the economic stance of “New Labour.” In brief, Wickham-Jones argued that, given the financial-dominated structure of British capitalism and the weak labor market mechanisms, Blair and Brown effectively adopted a neoliberal attitude toward globalization and the role of government, which had a certain inevitability. Hay disagreed, contending that Labour had choices and that an investment-led industrial strategy was a realistic and preferable option.

认识到政策酝酿的作用，这为理解工党历史上若干重要辩论带来了新视角。例如，1990年代末，马克·威克姆-琼斯（Mark Wickham-Jones）与科林·海（Colin Hay）就“新工党”的经济立场展开了一场重要的辩论。简言之，威克姆-琼斯认为，鉴于英国资本主义的金融主导结构和疲弱的劳动力市场机制，布莱尔和布朗实质上对全球化和政府作用采取了新自由主义态度，这具有某种必然性。海对此并不认同，他认为工党有过选择，投资主导的产业战略就是现实且更可取的选项。

Looking back at the economic background of Britain and the world at the time of this debate, it may now be acknowledged that there was a third option: as Hay argued, Labour did have choices, but under the circumstances of the time, the “New Labour” path was in fact entirely reasonable. By the late 1990s, the British economy had experienced a long period of growth. At that time, few economists pointed out the unsustainability of its foundations, which only became apparent a decade later. Who would have asked back then: why not adopt a redistributive strategy?

回顾这场辩论发生时英国与全球的经济背景，现在可能得承认还有第三种选择：如海所称，工党确有选择，但在当时的境况下，事实上“新工党”道路是完全合理的。到1990年代末，英国经济已经历了长时间的增长。彼时，少有经济学家指出10年后才显露的其基础的不可持续性。当时有谁会发问：为什么不采取再分配策略呢？

Therefore, understanding the role of policy deliberation provides a richer perspective for explaining when and why a party changes its policy stance, and also offers new insights into changes in individual positions. Many political analyses assume that political actors, whether politicians or party members, have fixed positions on the left-right spectrum. They are either “on the left” or “on the right,” and always so. But the policy deliberation model eschews such a static perspective. When economic conditions change, there is no reason for politicians, party members, and the public not to change their minds. In fact, this is very logical. In their view, policies that were correct under benign conditions of economic growth and rising public revenue can appear entirely inappropriate when the economy declines or reveals major structural flaws. In other words, it is entirely possible for someone to be a Blairite in the 2000s and a Corbynite in the 2010s. Under different economic conditions, people committed to egalitarian goals may reasonably support very different policies in two different periods to achieve the same objective.

因此，对政策酝酿之作用的理解为阐释政党何以及何时改变其政策立场提供了更丰富的视角，也为认识个人立场的改变提供了新思路。诸多政治分析假定，政治参与者，无论政治家还是党员，在左—右光谱上都有其固定立场。他们要么“在左边”，要么“在右边”，并总是如此。但政策酝酿模型对此种静态视角敬而远之。当经济状况发生变化时，政治家、党员及公众没有理由不改变想法。事实上，这非常合乎逻辑。在他们看来，原本在经济增长和公共收入增加的良性条件下的正确政策，当经济出现下滑或暴露出重大结构性缺陷时，就会显得完全不合时宜。换言之，完全有可能出现这种情形，某人在2000年代是布莱尔派，而在2010年代却是科尔宾派。不同的经济状况下，秉持平等主义目标的人完全有理由支持两个不同时期里截然不同的政策来实现同一目标。

VI

六

The “political economy-policy” approach to Labour’s positional shifts brings a new perspective to understanding the party’s current predicament. Since the party’s heavy defeat in the 2019 general election, it has been widely assumed that new leader Starmer had to push Labour to the right, returning to the political center ground. Influenced by the “electoral-ideological” narrative, media commentators argue that it is almost clear that Starmer could only do this to win back voters. Starmer’s speech at the 2021 party conference seemed to indicate that he agreed with this.

有关工党立场位移的“政治经济—政策”方法对理解工党当前的困境带来了新视角。自该党在2019年大选惨败以来，人们普遍认为新领导人斯塔默不得不推动工党右转，回归政治中间地带。在“选举—意识形态”叙事的影响下，媒体评论认为，几乎已经很清楚，要赢回选民，斯塔默只能这么做。斯塔默在2021年党代会上的讲话似乎表明他也认可这一点。

The “political economy-policy” analysis takes a different view, arguing that the economic conditions that caused the party to shift left after 2010 have not disappeared. In fact, the COVID-19 pandemic has further worsened the economy. The British economy remains characterized by low investment, low output, and low wages. Millions of workers are flocking to increasingly precarious labor markets such as self-employment, hourly work, and part-time contracts. Severe regional disparities persist across Britain. The British banking system remains unreformed, with a disproportionate share of investment in real estate and companies focused on short-term profits and shareholder dividends. The “cost of living crisis” caused by high inflation is likely to dominate domestic politics from 2022 to 2023, and there is reason to believe that solutions should go beyond centrist “sticking plasters” and move toward deeper structural reforms.

“政治经济—政策”分析对此持不同看法，认为导致该党在2010年后向左转的经济条件并没消失。事实上，新冠疫情使经济进一步恶化。英国经济的特点仍然是低投资、低产出和低工资。数以百万计的工人正涌向个体经营、钟点工和兼职合同工等日益不稳定的劳动力市场。英国各地仍存在严重的地区差距。英国的银行系统未经改革，房地产投资比例失衡，公司更关注短期利润和股东分红。高通胀所导致的“生活成本危机”很有可能主导2022年至2023年的国内政治，有理由相信，解决方案应超越中间派的“狗皮膏药”，转向更深层次的结构性改革。

Clearly, compared to the 2019 manifesto, Labour’s next manifesto will be more centrist. But this by no means implies that the next manifesto will necessarily or will be closer to Blair than to Corbyn. Hardly any economic commentator considers this appropriate. On economic policy, public opinion remains quite left-leaning, supporting many of the policy proposals Labour put forward in 2017 and 2019. And in fact, Shadow Chancellor Rachel Reeves proposed in 2021 a variety of structural reforms, ranging from industrial and procurement policies aimed at revitalizing British industry to collective wage bargaining and corporate governance reform.

显然，较之2019年宣言，工党的下一个宣言将更加向中间靠拢。但这绝不是说下一个宣言必定或将会更接近布莱尔而非科尔宾。几乎没有一个经济评论家认为这是恰当的。在经济政策方面，民意仍然相当偏左，支持工党2017年和2019年提出的许多政策主张。而事实上，影子财政大臣雷切尔·里夫斯（Rachel Reeves）在2021年提出了多种结构性改革，从旨在振兴英国产业的产业和采购政策到集体工资谈判和公司治理改革。

Of course, 2024 is the year of the British general election, and it would be unwise to predict either the economic conditions at that time or Labour’s economic policy stance now. But the kind of policy deliberation on which the party has historically based its policy-making—and which has more than once persuaded the public to follow—suggests that the outcome is still uncertain.

当然，2024年才是英国大选年，现在就预测届时的经济状况或工党的经济政策立场都是不明智的。但该党以往制定政策所依据的那种政策酝酿——不止一次地说服公众追随之——表明，结局尚存变数。

(Authors: Michael Jacob and Andrew Hindmoor, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Sheffield; Translators: Ma Xinru, School of Political Science and Public Administration, Shandong University; Li Hong, Institute of Contemporary Socialism, Shandong University)

（作者：迈克尔·雅各布（Michael Jacob）、安德鲁·欣德莫尔（Andrew Hindmoor），英国谢菲尔德大学政治与国际关系系；译者：马欣茹，山东大学政治学与公共管理学院；李宏，山东大学当代社会主义研究所）

Online Editor: Tongxin

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