Going Beyond “Labeling” – Re-examining Europe’s New Radical Parties

Since 2008, under the combined effect of factors such as the international financial crisis, the refugee crisis, terrorist attacks and riots, political polarisation in Europe has intensified. Represented by the Hungarian Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (hereinafter “Fidesz”), the French National Rally, the Brothers of Italy, and the Sweden Democrats, a group of parties holding radical positions have successively emerged on the European political stage. In addition to the above-mentioned parties, new radical parties within Europe also include: La France Insoumise, the League, the Five Star Movement, the Alternative for Germany, the Left Party, Vox, Podemos, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Dutch JA21, the Czech Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011), Freedom and Direct Democracy, the Hungarian Jobbik, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece, and so on. They have steadily expanded their influence by utilising various elections, powerfully impacting the dominant position of traditional parties in the political arena. In 2022, the Brothers of Italy obtained 26% of the vote in the national parliamentary election; in Hungary, Fidesz’s vote share approached 54%, securing 135 of the 199 seats in parliament; the Sweden Democrats obtained 20.5% of the vote, becoming the second-largest party in parliament and able to influence the policies of the Moderate Party government; the French National Rally received support from 18.7% of voters in the national parliamentary election, ultimately obtaining 89 parliamentary seats. The New Ecological and Social People’s Union (NUPES), led by La France Insoumise, obtained 131 seats, becoming the second-largest bloc in parliament. It should be noted that, due to differences in statistical methodology, the website of *Le Monde* reported the seat count for NUPES as 142 seats, which differs from the Interior Ministry’s data. At the same time, since their inception, these parties have been subjected to fierce criticism from traditional European political forces and mainstream media. The latter frequently use pejorative labels such as “extremist,” “xenophobic,” “populist,” and “racist” to describe the new radical parties, accusing them of inciting the masses, violating the basic values of freedom and democracy, and posing a major threat to democracy. However, why are these new radical parties, so “disreputable,” gaining increasing favour among European citizens?

2008年以来，在国际金融危机、难民危机、恐怖袭击与骚乱等因素的叠加作用下，欧洲政治极化加剧，以匈牙利青年民主主义者联盟(以下简称“青民盟”)、法国“国民联盟”、意大利兄弟党、瑞典民主党为代表，一批持激进主张的政党相继在欧洲政治舞台上崭露头角。除上述政党外，欧洲范围内的新激进主义政党还包括：法国“不屈法国”，意大利“联盟”、“五星运动”，德国选择党、左翼党，西班牙“呼声”、“我们能”，奥地利自由党，荷兰“正确答案2021”，捷克“不满公民行动”（ANO2011）、“自由与直接民主”，匈牙利“约比克”，希腊激进左翼联盟，等等。它们利用各类选举稳步拓展影响力，有力地冲击了传统政党在政坛的主导地位。2022年，意大利兄弟党在全国议会选举中获得26%的选票；在匈牙利，青民盟得票率近54%，获得国会199个议席中的135席；瑞典民主党获得20.5%的选票，成为议会第二大党，能影响温和党政府的政策；法国“国民联盟”在全国议会选举中得到18.7%的选民支持，最终获得89个议会席位。以“不屈法国”为首的“生态和社会人民新联盟”获得131个席位，成为议会第二大集团。需要指出的是，由于统计口径的差异，《世界报》网站对“生态和社会人民新联盟”的议席统计数据为142个议席，同内政部数据有出入。与此同时，它们自创立之始便饱受欧洲传统政治力量、主流媒体的抨击。后者频频用“极端”“排外”“民粹主义”“种族主义”等贬义标签描述新激进主义政党，指责它们煽动民众，违背自由、民主的基本价值，是对民主的重大威胁。然而，如此“不堪”的新激进主义政党缘何获得越来越多的欧洲民众的青睐？

I. The Image of New Radical Parties Beneath the “Labels”

一、“标签”之下新激进主义政党的形象

The origins and developmental trajectories of each new radical party differ; overall, they constitute an ideologically heterogeneous collection. Nevertheless, because they all direct their criticism at social ills within their own countries and even across Europe, put forward policy proposals that differ from those of traditional parties and are even “politically incorrect,” and gradually come to “stand as equals” with traditional parties, they incur the latter’s pejorative “labeling” response.

各新激进主义政党的源起与发展历程不尽相同，总体上看它们是一个意识形态异质化的集合。然而，由于它们均将矛头指向了本国乃至整个欧洲的社会弊端，提出了一些不同于传统政党甚至是“政治不正确”的政策主张，并且逐渐与传统政党“分庭抗礼”，从而招致后者贬义的“标签化”回应。

Traditional parties and politicians generally believe that new radical parties are a force of “heresy,” attempting to challenge or transform mainstream values and institutions in an “aggressive” manner. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: First, new radical parties possess distinctive features such as “extremism,” “hatred,” and “racism.” For example, French President Emmanuel Macron once called National Rally leader Marine Le Pen a “corrupt, dangerous nationalist” and a dangerous liar during a debate. [1]1 “Corrupt, dangerous nationalist” – Macron’s characterisation of Le Pen during the 2022 French presidential election debates. The Progressive Alliance, a joint organisation of social democratic parties from multiple Western European countries, stated that new radical parties are “eager for policies that divide, fan the flames of hatred and fear, and encourage marginalisation and division.” [2]2 “Eager for policies that divide…” – Quotation from the Progressive Alliance, an international network of social democratic and labour parties. Second, new radical parties are contrary to the principles of liberal democracy, possessing traits such as “authoritarianism,” “oligarchy,” and “dictatorship,” as well as a tendency to be “pro-Russia” or “colluding with Russia.” Since 2010, the EU has repeatedly criticised the Hungarian Fidesz government for violating the EU’s fundamental values and principles, undermining freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, leading to a democratic backsliding in Hungary. In 2022, the European Parliament even judged that Hungary is no longer a full democracy but an “electoral autocracy.” [3]3 “Electoral autocracy” – The European Parliament’s 2022 resolution declaring Hungary a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.” Brothers of Italy leader Giorgia Meloni and Le Pen have been repeatedly characterised as “pro-Russia” figures, because they either advocate developing partnership relations with Russia or have publicly praised Putin. [4]4 “Pro-Russia” – A label applied to European politicians who advocate cooperation with Russia or have expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin. Third, new radical parties advocate populism, inciting public anxiety and hostility. For example, Macron stated that populism is spreading across Europe like leprosy, and that Europeans should fight it more actively. [5]5 “Leprosy” – Macron’s metaphor for populism, used in a 2019 speech. European People’s Party leader Donald Tusk believes that two major camps have formed in European politics – irresponsible populist parties and responsible people’s parties – and has vowed to resolutely fight against “populists, manipulators and dictators.” [6]6 “Populists, manipulators and dictators” – Tusk’s characterisation of populist parties, used in his 2019 European People’s Party congress speech.

传统政党和政客一般认为，新激进主义政党是一种“离经叛道”的力量，他们试图以“咄咄逼人”的方式挑战或变革主流价值与制度，这主要表现在以下方面：一是新激进主义政党具有“极端”“仇恨”“种族主义”等鲜明特征。例如，法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙曾在辩论中称“国民联盟”领导人玛丽娜·勒庞是“腐败、危险的民族主义”，是危险的骗子。.西欧多国社会党的联合组织“进步联盟”则称新激进主义政党“汲汲于分裂的政策，点燃仇恨和恐惧之火，鼓励边缘化和分化”。二是新激进主义政党与自由民主原则相悖，具有“威权”“寡头”“专制”等特质以及“亲俄”“通俄”倾向。2010年以来，欧盟多次批评匈牙利青民盟政府违反了欧盟的基本价值原则，破坏了自由、民主与法治，导致匈牙利出现了民主倒退。2022年，欧洲议会甚至判定匈牙利不再是一个完全的民主国家，而是“选举独裁主义”。意大利兄弟党领袖焦尔吉娅·梅洛尼与勒庞则多次被定性为“亲俄”派，因为她们或主张同俄罗斯发展伙伴关系，或曾公开称赞普京。三是新激进主义政党鼓吹民粹主义，煽动民众的不安与敌视情绪。例如，马克龙称民粹主义正像麻风病一样在欧洲蔓延，欧洲人应更加积极地与之抗争。欧洲人民党领袖唐纳德·图斯克认为，欧洲政坛已经形成了两大阵营——不负责任的民粹主义政党和负责任的人民党，并且誓言要同“民粹主义者、操纵者和独裁者”进行坚决斗争。

Similar to traditional parties and politicians, the most common labels used by Western mainstream media in their commentary are “far-left/right” and “populism.” The former is mainly used to indicate that the views and proposals of new radical parties deviate from traditional mainstream values, carrying biased or even extreme sentiments. For example, the media frequently uses “far-left” or “hard left” to refer to La France Insoumise, because the party attempts to “deviate” from the EU’s economic, social, and budgetary policies, challenging the free-market principles upheld by the EU. *The New York Times* translated the party’s name as “Rebellious France,” implying it is a “rebel” against mainstream values. [7]7 “Rebellious France” – *The New York Times*’s translation of “La France Insoumise,” implying defiance of mainstream values. The National Rally is regarded as a typical far-right party in France, because of its intolerant and unfriendly attitude towards immigrants, refugees, and foreign religious cultures, even inciting cultural opposition and conflict. “Populism” is the Western mainstream media’s response to new radical parties’ self-proclamation as representing the will of the people, as “the people’s megaphone.” They note that the rise of the populist phenomenon is related to the current situation of Europe’s numerous problems, but they tend to believe that the charismatic leaders of new radical parties, through “inflammatory” and “deceptive” discourse, distort social issues, incite opposition between the people and elites, and divide society. For example, the BBC claimed that populist forces have brought Europe to a crossroads, and implied that it would lead to a “fragile, fractured Europe.” [8]8 “Fragile, fractured Europe” – BBC characterisation of the potential outcome of populist influence. Euronews similarly believes that populism will seriously erode Europe’s liberal democracy. [9]9 “Erode Europe’s liberal democracy” – Euronews’s assessment of populism’s threat.

与传统政党和政客类似，西方主流媒体在评论中最常使用的标签是“极左/右翼”“民粹主义”。前者主要用于说明新激进主义政党的观点、主张背离传统主流价值，带有偏激乃至极端的情绪。例如，媒体经常使用“极左翼”或者“强硬左派”称呼“不屈法国”，因为该党试图“背离”欧盟的经济、社会和预算政策，挑战欧盟坚持的自由市场原则。《纽约时报》则将其党名翻译为“叛逆的法国”，暗指它是主流价值的“叛逆者”。“国民联盟”被视为法国典型的极右翼，因为它对移民、难民和外来宗教文化的态度不宽容、不友好，甚至鼓动文化对立与冲突。“民粹主义”则是西方主流媒体对新激进主义政党自诩代表人民意志、是“人民的扩音器”的回应。它们注意到民粹主义现象的兴起同欧洲问题迭出的现状有关，但倾向于认为新激进主义政党的富有魅力的领袖通过“煽动性”“欺骗性”的话语，歪曲了社会问题，鼓动了人民和精英之间的对立，分裂了社会。例如，英国广播公司声称民粹主义力量将欧洲带到了十字路口，并暗示它将导致一个“脆弱的、支离破碎的欧洲”。欧洲新闻台同样认为，民粹主义会严重侵蚀欧洲的自由民主。

In addition, regarding some parties that have historical links with fascism, Western mainstream media view them as remnants of fascism. After the Brothers of Italy won the election in 2022, several Western mainstream media outlets called it a “post-fascist” party and predicted that Italy’s future was uncertain due to its victory. Some commentators even believed that Meloni’s victory was a turning point in Italian history, breaking the democratic legacy and developmental trajectory of Italy since the fall of Benito Mussolini. [10]10 “Post-fascist” – A label used by Western media for the Brothers of Italy, referencing its origins in the post-fascist Italian Social Movement. Ezio Mauro, former editor-in-chief of the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica*, similarly worried that Meloni’s rise to power would “change the form of our country” and “mark the end of anti-fascism.” [11]11 “End of anti-fascism” – Ezio Mauro’s comment on Meloni’s victory, published in *La Repubblica*. After the rise of the Sweden Democrats, Deutsche Welle argued that the party cannot shake off the neo-Nazi label, and that many of its members remain racists. [12]12 “Neo-Nazi label” – Deutsche Welle’s characterisation of the Sweden Democrats, noting its roots in neo-Nazi movements. *The Boston Review* stated that, by reviving the promise of a homogeneous nation, the Sweden Democrats have gained the approval of many white people in the country. In the next four years, its influence on policy will exceed that of the past, and it may even become the largest single party – a nightmarish scenario. [13]13 “Nightmarish scenario” – *The Boston Review*’s description of the potential for the Sweden Democrats to become the largest party.

除此之外，对一些曾与法西斯主义有历史关联的政党，西方主流媒体视其为法西斯的余孽。2022年意大利兄弟党胜选后，多家西方主流媒体称之为“后法西斯”政党，并预判意大利的前途因其获胜而未卜。有评论甚至认为，梅洛尼的胜选是意大利历史的一个转折点，它打破了自贝尼托·墨索里尼倒台以来意大利的民主遗产和发展轨迹。意大利《共和报》前主编埃齐奥·毛罗同样担忧道，梅洛尼的上台将“改变我们国家的形态”，“标志着反法西斯主义的终结”。瑞典民主党崛起后，德国之声认为，该党无法摆脱新纳粹标签，其许多成员仍然是种族主义者。《波士顿评论》称，凭借着复活同质化民族的承诺，瑞典民主党得到了许多本国白人的认同。未来四年，它对政策的影响力将超过以往，甚至有可能成为最大的单一政党，那将是噩梦般的景象。

Evaluations in Western academia are slightly more objective, but the phenomenon of “taking sides” also frequently appears. Western scholars commonly use terms such as “Radical Left/Right,” “Far Left/Right,” “Extreme Left/Right,” and “Left/Right Wing Populism” to refer to new radical parties. Behind these concepts still lies their concern about the rise of new radical parties.

西方学术界的评价稍显客观，但也时常出现“拉偏架”的现象。西方学者常用“激进左/右翼”（Racial Left/Right）、“极左/右翼”（Far Left/Right）、“极端左/右翼”（Extreme Left/Right）、“左/右翼民粹主义”（Left/Right Wing Populism）称呼新激进主义政党。这些概念的背后依然是其对新激进主义政党兴起的担忧。

First, new radical parties are divided into left-wing and right-wing categories. The vast majority of research focuses on right-wing radical parties and treats them as an entirely new party family. In the view of scholars, right-wing radical parties possess characteristics such as nationalism, racism, xenophobia, opposition to multiculturalism, and a strong state. For example, Cas Mudde distills the ideology of the radical right party family into nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Among these, the primary point is nativism, namely that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation), while non-native elements (people, ideas, etc.) fundamentally threaten the homogeneous nation-state. In contrast, left-wing radical parties have distinct features such as anti-capitalism, anti-neoliberalism, anti-elite establishment, and internationalism. They uphold the values of social justice and wealth redistribution, demanding thorough socialist-style reforms of the current economic and social system. The left-right dichotomy constitutes the basic approach of current Western academic research on new radical parties. However, its flaw is obvious: it cannot explain why the supporters of both right-wing and left-wing new radical parties mostly belong to the lower-middle strata of society, failing to “reflect the true range of choices available to voters seeking to express their disillusionment with the establishment.” [14]14 The original Chinese text cites a source here; the quotation marks indicate a direct citation from Western scholarship, but the specific source is not provided in the input.

第一，新激进政党被分为左右两类政党。绝大多数研究侧重于右翼激进主义政党，并将它们视为一个全新的政党家族。在学者们看来，右翼激进主义政党含有民族主义、种族主义、排外主义、反对多元文化以及强势国家等特征。例如，卡斯·穆德将激进右翼政党家族的意识形态提炼为本土主义、权威主义和民粹主义。其中，首要的一点是本土主义，即国家应该完全由本土群体(民族)的成员居住，而非本土因素(人和思想等)从根本上威胁着同质民族国家。与之相对，左翼激进主义政党具有鲜明的反资本主义、反新自由主义、反精英建制和国际主义等特征。它们坚持社会正义和财富再分配的价值观，要求对当前的经济和社会体系进行彻底的社会主义性质的改革。左右之分构成了当前西方学术界对于新激进主义政党研究的基本路径。然而，它的缺陷是十分明显的，即无法解释为何右翼和左翼新激进主义政党的支持者大多属于社会的中下层群体，未能“反映选民在寻求表达他们对建制派的幻灭时可选择的真正范围”。

Second, Western academia refuses to equate new radical parties with the remnants of fascism, arguing that they are merely ideologically far removed from mainstream centrist parties, rather than being completely opposed to the existing system. Western academia uses the term “extremist” to distinguish it from “radical.” Mudde and Luke March define “extremist” as thoroughly anti-democratic in ideology and practice, not excluding the use of violent means; “radical” means opposing certain key features or specific elements of liberal democracy, the most prominent of which is opposition to political pluralism and constitutional protection of minorities. New radical parties basically abide by the rules of representative democracy. Hans-Georg Betz, a scholar at the University of Zurich, similarly believes that, unlike past fascist and right-wing extremist parties and movements, the radical populist right hardly seeks revolutionary change to the existing democratic regime or the creation of a “new man.” Therefore, new radical parties such as the “National Rally” and the “Northern League” are basically classified under the “radical” category in the aforementioned studies.

第二，西方学术界拒绝将新激进主义政党等同于法西斯主义的余孽，认为它们只是在意识形态上与持中间立场的主流政党相距甚远，而不是完全反对现有体制。西方学术界使用“极端”一词，以区别于“激进”。穆德和卢克·马奇将“极端”定义为在意识形态和实践上彻底的反民主，并且不排除使用暴力手段；“激进”则是反对自由民主的一部分关键特征或特定要素，其中最显著的是反对政治多元化和宪法保护少数群体。新激进主义政党基本遵守代议制民主的规则。苏黎世大学学者汉斯-格奥尔格·本茨同样认为，与过去的法西斯和右翼极端主义政党和运动不同，激进民粹主义右翼几乎不寻求对现有民主政权进行革命性变革，以及创造“新人”。因此，“国民联盟”“北方联盟”等新激进主义政党在上述研究中基本被划归“激进”范畴。

Third, populism is the most prominent characteristic of current new radical parties, but populism has no fixed ideology and is “hollow.” For example, Paul Taggart believes that populism originally served as an adjective attached to other ideologies, thereby filling its own emptiness. Mudde points out that populism is a thin-centered ideology that needs to attach itself to thick-centered ideologies, such as fascism, liberalism, socialism, etc. Currently, populist forces have split into two “variants”: “left-wing populism,” which merges with left-wing values; and “national populism” or “right-wing populism,” which merges with nationalism, nativism, etc., characterized by defending the country’s cultural traditions and rejecting immigration. Regarding the impact of populism, Western scholars tend to acknowledge that, although it reveals some shortcomings of existing liberal democracy, it divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups – “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” – and its self-proclaimed role as “the true defender of true democracy, capable of considering the concerns and interests of ‘ordinary people,’ daring to speak out against the establishment” poses challenges to the current political operating mechanism and threatens the democratic system.

第三，民粹主义是当前新激进主义政党最显著的特点，但是民粹主义没有固定的意识形态，是“空心”的。例如，保罗·塔格特认为，民粹主义本来是作为一个形容词依附于其他意识形态之上，以此来填充自身的空洞无物。穆德则指出，民粹主义是中心稀薄型的意识形态，它需要依附于中心浓厚型的意识形态，如法西斯主义、自由主义、社会主义等。当前民粹主义力量分化出两个“变种”：与左翼价值观融合产生的“左翼民粹主义”；与民族主义、本土主义等相融合，以捍卫本国文化传统、排斥移民为特点的“民族民粹主义”或“右翼民粹主义”。对于民粹主义的影响，西方学者们倾向于承认它虽然揭示了现存自由民主的一些弊端，但是将社会分成了两个同质且对立的群体——“纯洁的人民”和“腐败的精英”，并且其自诩为“真正民主的真正捍卫者，能够考虑‘普通人’的担忧和利益，敢于直言反对建制”的做法给当前政治运行机制带来了挑战，威胁了民主体制。

In summary, current Western traditional parties and politicians, mainstream media, and academia have affixed a series of labels to new radical parties, such as “populist,” “far-left/right,” “radical,” “extremist,” and “racist.” Among them, traditional parties and politicians harbor the strongest prejudice and hostility toward new radical parties; in the discourse system of the former, the latter are “cancers” of society that need to be eliminated. Although mainstream media have noted the rise of new radical parties in connection with current social problems, they still give thoroughly negative evaluations of the words and deeds of these parties. Comparatively, academic evaluations are slightly more objective. Although the vast majority of Western scholars give negative evaluations to new radical parties, viewing them as challengers to the Western political system, some scholars recognize the real factors behind their emergence – certain drawbacks of Western society. However, it must be pointed out that they still fail to link the rise of new radical parties with the inherent defects of the capitalist system and the basic contradictions of the capitalist political system. In reality, the rise of new radical parties is an inevitable result of the obstruction of interest expression for the lower-middle strata in Western countries due to the insufficient representation of traditional parties.

总之，当前西方传统政党和政客、主流媒体与学术界赋予了新激进主义政党“民粹主义”“极左/右翼”“激进”“极端”“种族主义”等一系列标签。其中，传统政党和政客对新激进主义政党的偏见与敌视情绪最为强烈，后者在前者的话语体系中属于社会的“毒瘤”，需要除之而后快。主流媒体虽然关注到新激进主义政党的兴起与当前的社会问题相关，但是仍然对这些政党的言行给予了彻底的消极评价。比较来看，学术界的评价稍显客观。虽然绝大部分西方学者给予了新激进主义政党负面评价，视其为西方政治体制的挑战者，但部分学者认识到了它们产生的现实因素——西方社会的某些弊端。不过，需要指出的是，他们依然未能将新激进主义政党的兴起与资本主义制度的固有缺陷及资本主义政治体制的基本矛盾联系起来。实际上，新激进主义政党的兴起正是西方国家社会中下层群体因传统政党代表性不足而导致利益表达受阻的必然结果。

II. New Radical Parties’ “Catering to the People”

二、新激进主义政党的“取悦于民”

Since the 1980s, the values and policies of neoliberalism have gradually penetrated every aspect of European society along with the process of European integration. After the 2008 international financial crisis, the drawbacks of the European current system were exposed more fully. Economic growth in various countries was sluggish, unemployment rates remained high for a long time, and some European countries faced bankruptcy due to debt problems. Traditional parties’ attempts to save the economy through austerity policies and drastic cuts to social welfare harmed the rights and interests of ordinary people, further exacerbating the gap between rich and poor. At the same time, due to the massive influx of immigrants and refugees, the social order and cultural traditions of European countries were impacted. A portion of the populace harbored dissatisfaction with various policies led by the European Union, generating sentiments of “Euroskepticism” and “Euro-fatigue.” In response to the above situation, new radical parties put forward unconventional propositions.

20世纪80年代以来，新自由主义的价值与政策伴随着欧洲一体化的进程逐步渗透至欧洲社会的方方面面。2008年国际金融危机后，欧洲现行体制的弊端暴露得更加充分。各国经济增长乏力，失业率长期居于高位，部分欧洲国家因债务问题面临破产。传统政党试图通过紧缩政策挽救经济、大肆削减社会福利的做法，损害了普通民众的权益，导致贫富分化进一步加剧。同时，由于移民和难民大量涌入，欧洲各国的社会秩序和文化传统遭受冲击。一部分民众对欧盟主导的各项政策心怀不满，产生了“疑欧”“厌欧”情绪。针对上述情况，新激进主义政党提出了标新立异的主张。

In domestic affairs, new radical parties attack traditional parties as promoters and defenders of the current system, who have long held power, causing the people’s demands to go unaddressed. For example, the Alternative for Germany claims that actual political power is concentrated in a narrow circle of state and party officials, while ordinary people are almost completely alienated from “politics.” Consequently, most new radical parties advocate for direct democracy in their platforms, providing more opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in political activities. Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon both support introducing citizen-initiated referendums to decide on major issues. Mélenchon even calls for the establishment of a “Sixth Republic,” allowing for recall referendums, whereby collecting enough citizen signatures could recall elected officials, convene a constitutional convention, and propose or repeal laws. Moreover, due to the continuous scandals involving the Spanish royal family in recent years, public opposition to the constitutional monarchy has strengthened. In response, Spain’s “Podemos” clearly opposes the current constitutional monarchy, stating that the people have the right to choose whether Spain implements a monarchy or a republic. Additionally, because of the repeated corruption incidents among traditional elites in some European countries, new radical parties have raised the slogan of “anti-corruption.” For example, Spain’s “Podemos,” Italy’s “Five Star Movement,” and the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left have all expressed an “anti-corruption” stance. Andrej Babiš, founder of “ANO2011,” even claimed that it was the corruption of traditional parties that made him successful.

在内政方面，新激进主义政党抨击传统政党是现行体制的推动者与维护者，长期把持权力，致使人民的诉求得不到申张。例如，德国选择党宣称，实际的政治权力集中在国家和政党官员的狭窄圈子里，而普通人几乎完全疏远了“政治”。于是，多数新激进主义政党在各自纲领中提倡直接民主，为普通民众参与政治活动提供更多机遇。勒庞与让-吕克·梅朗雄均支持引入公民倡议公投来表决一些重大问题。梅朗雄甚至呼吁建立“第六共和国”，允许罢免公投，即收集到足够的公民签名就可以罢免民选官员，召集制宪会议，提议或废除法律。不仅如此，由于近年来西班牙王室丑闻不断，民众反对君主立宪制的声音增强。对此，西班牙“我们能”鲜明地反对当前的君主立宪政体，称人民有权选择西班牙是实行君主制还是共和制。此外，因为部分欧洲国家的传统精英贪腐事件迭出，新激进主义政党打出了“反腐败”的口号。例如，西班牙“我们能”、意大利“五星运动”、希腊激进左翼联盟均表达了“反腐败”的立场。“ANO2011”创始人安德烈·巴比什甚至声称，正是传统政党的腐败成就了他。

On economic issues, the new radical parties, in response to the EU’s long-standing principle of unrestricted free markets, have proposed policy positions that strengthen state intervention. These are mainly reflected in the following: First, due to the severe “hollowing out” of European industry, many new radical parties have incorporated the revitalization of manufacturing into their election platforms. The Brothers of Italy party has put forward the slogan “Made in Italy,” arguing that the government should invest resources to build a secure industrial chain based on the domestic market, thereby enhancing the visibility and competitiveness of national products. In addition, some new radical parties support the nationalization of strategic sectors vital to the national economy and people’s livelihoods, and hope to introduce a package of measures to encourage and support the development of domestic small and medium-sized enterprises, including facilitating financing, simplifying regulations and administrative procedures, and reducing taxes. Second, in the face of competition and acquisitions by foreign capital, new radical parties propose strengthening oversight of large multinational corporations and banks, and cracking down on tax evasion, tax avoidance, and unfair competition. For example, Le Pen proposed during her campaign to establish a “French sovereign wealth fund” to prevent improper foreign acquisitions. Third, within the existing framework of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, new radical parties demand strengthened protection for their domestic agriculture. As a traditionally major agricultural country, France now suffers from problems such as an aging rural labor force and increasing poverty among farmers. In response, Le Pen formulated an independent agricultural development plan during her campaign, whose core proposals include intervening to set minimum price indices for agricultural products to ensure farmers’ incomes, excluding agriculture from multilateral free trade agreements, and setting entry thresholds for imported agricultural products. The Sweden Democrats, meanwhile, advocate always giving priority to domestic agricultural and fishery products in public procurement and hope to establish special funds to attract the younger generation to engage in the forestry and agricultural sectors. Fourth, to address the rising cost of living for the people, new radical parties either suggest increasing wage levels and the minimum wage, or advocate adjusting taxation to benefit the people. Affected by the Ukraine crisis, energy and raw material prices in Europe have soared. In France, the cost of one ton of gasoline rose from €680 before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic to €1,000 in 2022, while diesel prices rose from €650 per ton to €2,400 per ton, sharply increasing the economic pressure on ordinary people. Le Pen accordingly called for energy products (natural gas, electricity, fuel, and heating oil) to be regarded as basic necessities for people’s lives, with their value-added tax reduced from 20% to 5.5%.

在经济议题上，新激进主义政党针对欧盟长期以来无限制的自由市场原则，提出加强国家干预的政策主张，主要体现在：第一，由于欧洲产业“空心化”严重，许多新激进主义政党将重振制造业纳入竞选纲领。意大利兄弟党提出“意大利制造”的口号，认为政府应投入资源打造基于本土的安全的产业链，提升本国产品知名度与竞争力。此外，一些新激进主义政党支持将关乎国计民生的战略性部门国有化，并希望出台一揽子举措鼓励、扶持本国中小企业发展，包括便利融资、简化法规和行政手续、减免税收等。第二，面对外资的竞争与收购，新激进主义政党提出加强对大型跨国企业、银行的监管，打击逃税、漏税及不公平竞争等行为。例如，勒庞在竞选时提出建立“法国主权基金”以避免外资的不正当收购。第三，针对现有的欧盟共同农业政策框架，新激进主义政党要求加强对本国农业的保护。作为一个传统农业大国，法国如今饱受农村劳动力老龄化、农民贫困程度加重等问题困扰。对此，勒庞在竞选中专门制定了独立的农业发展纲要，核心主张包括干预制定农产品最低价格指数以保证农民收入，将农业排除在多边自贸协定之外，设置进口农产品准入门槛等。瑞典民主党则主张在公共采购中始终优先考虑本国的农渔产品，并希望设立专项资金以吸引年轻一代从事农林行业。第四，为了应对民众生活成本提高的问题，新激进主义政党或建议提高工资数额与最低工资标准，或主张通过调整税收的方式让利于民。受乌克兰危机影响，欧洲能源和原材料价格飙升。在法国，一吨汽油的成本从新冠疫情暴发之前的680欧元增长至2022年的1000欧元，而柴油价格则从每吨650欧元上涨到2400欧元，普通民众的经济压力陡增。勒庞据此呼吁将能源产品（天然气、电力、燃料和燃油）视为民众生活的基本必需品，其增值税应从20%降低到5.5%。

In the social sphere, new radical parties hope to reform the existing welfare system to cater to the demands of the lower and middle classes. Their platforms generally cover the following: increasing unemployment benefits, adjusting pension standards, providing more convenient and equal employment opportunities for people with disabilities, and strengthening the fight against violence against women. For example, to boost young people’s willingness to have children, the Brothers of Italy party proposed a package of policies, including increasing childbearing subsidies, reducing the value-added tax on maternal and infant products, and providing free childcare services. After the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, new radical parties have generally increased their focus on the healthcare sector. Both Le Pen and Mélenchon have proposed ideas such as improving conditions in areas with insufficient medical resources and raising the treatment of healthcare workers. On the issue of immigration and refugees, although a few new radical parties, such as France’s La France Insoumise and Spain’s Podemos, hold an inclusive stance, hoping to fully guarantee refugees’ right to asylum and improve their living conditions, most parties adopt a strict attitude, opposing the EU’s multiculturalism. They argue that immigrants are difficult to simply assimilate, and that naturalization requirements need to be tightened and illegal immigration combated. The Sweden Democrats state that new immigrants should demonstrate a willingness to actively integrate into Swedish culture, and that those who do not learn Swedish, do not want to work, or do not want to adapt to Swedish values should be repatriated. Le Pen, meanwhile, hopes to amend the current constitution and laws to raise the immigration threshold in order to protect France’s identity, culture, history, and linguistic heritage. Furthermore, due to the increase in violent incidents in European countries in recent years and the heightened sense of insecurity among native residents, new radical parties have also proposed strengthening security forces and cracking down severely on crime.

在社会领域，新激进主义政党希望改革现存的福利体系，以迎合社会中下层民众的诉求。它们的纲领大多涵盖以下内容：增加失业补贴、调整养老金标准、为残障人士提供更加便利和平等的就业机会、加强打击针对妇女的暴力行为等。例如，为提升年轻人的生育意愿，意大利兄弟党提出了一揽子政策，包括增加生育补贴、降低母婴产品的增值税、免费提供托儿服务等。在经历新冠疫情的冲击后，新激进主义政党普遍增强了对医疗领域的关注。勒庞与梅朗雄均提出改善医疗资源不足的地区状况、提高医护人员待遇等设想。在移民与难民问题上，虽然有法国的“不屈法国”、西班牙的“我们能”等少数新激进主义政党持包容立场，希望充分保障难民的庇护权、改善难民的生活环境，但是大多数政党均持严苛态度，反对欧盟的多元文化主义。它们认为，移民难以简单同化，需要收紧入籍要求，打击非法移民。瑞典民主党称，新移民应展示积极融入瑞典文化的意愿，不学习瑞典语、不想工作、不想适应瑞典价值观的人应该被遣返。勒庞则希望修改现行宪法与法律，提高移民门槛以保护法国的身份、文化、历史与语言遗产。此外，由于近年来欧洲各国暴力事件增多，本国居民不安全感加重，新激进主义政党还提出加强安保力量、严厉打击犯罪等主张。

At the level of foreign relations, new radical parties emphasize prioritizing their own national interests. On the issue of relations with the EU, they all hold a Eurosceptic stance, differing only in degree. For example, Hungary’s Fidesz holds a relatively low degree of Euroscepticism, hoping to be able to say “no” to the EU on policies such as refugees; Le Pen holds a stronger position, insisting on the principle that French law takes precedence over European law, and even once advocated that France should leave Europe or exit the eurozone. On the issue of relations with the United States, the ideas of new radical parties vary according to the different interests of each country. The Brothers of Italy actively maintains close relations with the United States and supports a common EU defense to address “external challenges”; France’s La France Insoumise and the National Rally hope that France will keep its distance from the “Atlantic alliance” and advocate France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command structure; unlike the first two, the Czech Republic’s Freedom and Direct Democracy opposes the Czech Republic’s subservience to the United States within the NATO framework, and advocates maintaining good relations with all three countries—China, the United States, and Russia—seeking and enhancing common interests.

在对外关系层面，新激进主义政党强调优先关照本国利益。在与欧盟关系的问题上，它们均持欧洲怀疑主义立场，只是程度略有不同。例如，匈牙利青民盟持较低程度的欧洲怀疑主义，在难民等政策层面希望可以向欧盟说“不”；勒庞则持有较强硬的立场，坚持奉行法国法律高于欧洲法律的原则，甚至一度主张法国应该脱离欧洲或退出欧元区。在与美国关系的问题上，新激进主义政党因各国利益不同而想法各异。意大利兄弟党积极维护与美国的密切关系，并且支持欧盟共同防务以应对“域外挑战”；法国的“不屈法国”与“国民联盟”则希望法国与“大西洋联盟”保持距离，主张法国脱离北约的综合指挥体系；不同于前两者，捷克的“自由与直接民主”反对捷克在北约体系下对美国亦步亦趋，主张应该同中国、美国、俄罗斯三国均保持良好关系，寻找并增进共同利益。

Viewed from this perspective, the positions of the new radical parties exhibit a clear pragmatic coloration, catering to the tastes of their domestic populations. In recent years, their support rates have grown to varying degrees, and they have successively come to power in countries such as Hungary, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Italy. However, the governing effectiveness of the new radical parties is not uniform, generally displaying the characteristic of “loud thunder, little rain.” [15]15 “Loud thunder, little rain” (雷声大、雨点小) is a Chinese idiom meaning much noise but little action, or a lot of talk but few results.

由此观之，新激进主义政党的主张呈现明显的实用主义色彩，迎合了本国民众的口味。近年来，它们的支持率呈现不同幅度的增长，并且在匈牙利、希腊、捷克、意大利等国相继执政。然而，新激进主义政党的执政效果并不相同，总体上呈现出“雷声大、雨点小”的特点。

Hungary’s Fidesz is a relatively successful case. Faced with an economic situation of high debt and high unemployment, the Fidesz government implemented a package of state interventionist policies known as “Orbanomics,” including reforming the tax system, nationalizing private pension funds and key industries, and introducing a workfare system. In 2011, the Hungarian State Asset Management Company acquired a 22% stake in the energy company Hungarian Oil and Gas Group, and in 2013 it fully acquired the natural gas business of the E.ON Group. At the same time, the Fidesz government adopted pragmatic social security policies to reduce unemployment, aiming to create “a work-based society.” On the one hand, by reducing subsidy amounts and shortening the duration of benefits, it alleviated the dissatisfaction of the working population with government subsidies for the long-term unemployed and those awaiting employment; on the other hand, the government absorbed the unemployed through a large number of public construction projects. In 2013, the number of people engaged in public projects in Hungary reached an average of 129,100 per month, and in January 2016 it reached 197,000. Available data show that the Hungarian economy has improved significantly under Fidesz’s governance. Since 2013, Hungary’s gross national product has grown steadily, the unemployment rate fell from 10.18% in 2013 to 4.05% in 2021, and the youth unemployment rate fell from 26.52% to 13.49% over the same period. [16]16 “Unemployment Rate in Hungary 2021,” source as cited in the original. In the socio-cultural sphere, the Fidesz government did indeed engage in culturally conservative actions, as criticized by traditional parties and the media. For example, Viktor Orbán repeatedly emphasized that “the influx of Muslim refugees poses a threat to Europe’s Christian identity” and that “Hungarians are not a mixed race and do not want to become one,” opposed the EU’s refugee distribution plan, and refused to pay compensation to Roma children who had been illegally segregated. These practices catered to the demands of a considerable portion of the Hungarian public. According to a 2020 report by the Bertelsmann Foundation, 57% of Hungarians still harbored negative feelings toward immigration. In foreign relations, the Fidesz government emphasized conducting an independent foreign policy. After the outbreak of the Sino-US trade friction, Hungary resisted pressure from the United States and insisted on expanding friendly relations with China. In 2020, bilateral trade between China and Hungary reached $11.69 billion, a year-on-year increase of 14.4%, a record high. Currently, Hungary has become China’s logistics center for trade with Europe, with about 15% of European imports passing through Hungary. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Hungary repeatedly opposed sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU on Russia, protecting its own energy security. While energy prices in European countries soared due to the conflict and sanctions, Hungary’s energy price increases were limited. From 2021 to 2022, the increase in household gas prices in Hungary was about 35%, among the lowest in EU countries (the countries with the largest increases were the Czech Republic, Romania, and Latvia, at 230.6%, 165.1%, and 157.2%, respectively). At the same time, in the second half of 2022, Hungary’s household gas price was the lowest among 24 reporting European countries, at €0.0349 per kilowatt-hour (the highest price was in Sweden, at €0.2751 per kilowatt-hour). While other European countries were searching for alternative energy sources, Hungary secured a stable supply of natural gas from Russia and was allowed to defer payments. It is evident that some of the Fidesz government’s policies and actions, which ran counter to the EU, did bring tangible benefits to its citizens. More importantly, although the Fidesz government’s practices drew criticism from domestic opposition parties and the EU, as most scholars have predicted, it only “attacked” or “changed” certain parts of the old systems of Hungary and the EU, while generally still adhering to the Western capitalist system and its operational rules.

匈牙利青民盟是较为成功的案例。面对高债务、高失业率的经济局面，青民盟政府推行了被称为“欧尔班经济学”（Orbanomics）的一揽子国家干预性政策，包括改革税制、私有养老基金与重点行业国有化、推行工作福利制等。2011年匈牙利国家资产管理公司收购了能源企业匈牙利油气工业集团22%的股份，2013年全额收购了意昂集团旗下的天然气业务。同时，青民盟政府还采纳了实用主义的社保政策以降低失业率，希望打造“一个以工作为基础”的社会。一方面，通过减少补贴金额与缩短领取时间缓解了工作人群对于政府补贴长期失业、待就业群体的不满；另一方面，政府通过开展大量公共建设项目吸纳失业人群。2013年，匈牙利从事公共项目者达到月均12.91万人，2016年1月达到19.7万人。现有数据表明，青民盟执政下的匈牙利经济得到明显改善。2013年以来，匈牙利国民生产总值稳步增长，失业率从2013年的10.18%降至2021年的4.05%，同期青年失业率由26.52%降至13.49%。“Unemployment Rate in Hungary 2021”， 在社会文化领域，青民盟政府确实如传统政党和媒体所诟病的那般有文化保守主义的行动。例如，欧尔班·维克托反复强调“穆斯林难民的涌入对欧洲的基督教身份构成威胁”“匈牙利人不是混血儿，也不想成为混血儿”，并且反对欧盟的难民分配方案，拒绝向曾被非法隔离的罗姆人儿童支付赔偿金。这些做法迎合了相当部分匈牙利民众的诉求。根据2020年艾伯特基金会的报告，有57% 的匈牙利人依然对移民抱有抵触情绪。在对外关系上，青民盟政府强调开展独立自主的外交。中美贸易摩擦爆发后，匈牙利顶住美国压力，坚持拓展同中国的友好关系，2020年中匈双边贸易总额达116.9亿美元，同比增长14.4%，创历史新高。目前，匈牙利成为中国对欧经贸的物流中心，约15%的欧洲进口商品需要途径匈牙利。乌克兰危机爆发后，匈牙利多次反对美国和欧盟对俄罗斯实施制裁，保护了本国的能源安全。在欧洲各国能源价格因冲突与制裁而飙升的情况下，匈牙利的能源价格涨幅有限。2021—2022年，匈牙利家庭用气价格涨幅约35%，在欧盟各国中处于较低水平（增幅最大的国家是捷克、罗马尼亚和拉脱维亚，分别为230.6%、165.1%和157.2 %)。同时，2022年下半年匈牙利的家庭用气价格在欧洲24个报告国中最低，为每千瓦时 0.0349 欧元（价格最高的是瑞典，为每千瓦时 0.2751 欧元）。在其他欧洲国家寻找能源替代来源时，匈牙利获得了来自俄罗斯的稳定的天然气供应，并且被允许延期付款。可见，青民盟政府与欧盟相悖的一些政策和行动确实给本国国民带来了实惠。更需要指出的是，青民盟政府的做法虽然招致了国内反对派和欧盟的批评，但是正如大部分学者所预判的那样，它只是“攻击”或者“改变”了匈牙利和欧盟旧有体制的某些部分，在总体上依然遵循了西方资本主义体制和运行规则。

In contrast, the governing journey of some new radical parties has not been so smooth, giving a sense of “dying before achieving victory.” [17]17 A classical allusion to the Tang dynasty poet Du Fu’s “The Prime Minister of Shu,” lamenting that Zhuge Liang died before completing his mission. Taking Greece as an example, against the backdrop of the debt crisis, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) stood out with its anti-austerity and anti-corruption platform. After coming to power, the SYRIZA government attempted to renegotiate with international creditors, but its proposals were rejected by them. To obtain bailout funds and avoid national bankruptcy, the SYRIZA government had to accept an austerity-based bailout agreement. This meant the government had to cut pensions, reduce public spending, and scale back social welfare, making it impossible to fulfill its previous anti-austerity promises. This move caused disappointment among some voters. In the September 2015 parliamentary election, SYRIZA’s votes plummeted from over 2.24 million in the January election to just over 1.92 million, barely maintaining its governing position. In 2019, it lost nearly half of its parliamentary seats again and was ousted from power. In Italy, the Five Star Movement and the League party formed a coalition government after the 2018 election. Then-Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte stated that the new government would be a “government of change” standing “on the side of citizens.” In the early days of its administration, the Conte cabinet approved a series of measures, including the “citizen’s income” plan aimed at eliminating poverty and a new pension scheme. However, many other plans could not be put into practice due to obstruction from other parties. At the same time, as the League party’s popular support continued to rise after joining the government, it developed new demands for power distribution. Ultimately, the ruling coalition fell into internal strife, and the cooperation collapsed the following year, leading to the fall of the coalition government.

与之不同，部分新激进主义政党的执政之旅并不那么顺利，大有“出师未捷身先死”之感。以希腊为例，在债务危机的背景下，激进左翼联盟凭借着反紧缩、反腐败的主张脱颖而出。激进左翼政府上台之后，曾试图与国际债权人重新谈判，但是其方案被后者拒绝。为得到救助资金以避免国家破产，激进左翼政府不得不接受紧缩性救助协议。这意味着政府需要削减养老金、减少公共开支、节省社会福利，无法兑现之前的反紧缩承诺。此举引发部分选民的失望情绪。在2015年9月的议会选举中，激进左翼联盟的选票由1月选举时的224万余张骤减至192万余张，勉强维持了执政地位。2019年则因再次失去近半数议席而黯然下台。在意大利，“五星运动”与“联盟”党在2018年选举后联合组建政府。时任总理朱塞佩·孔特表示，新政府会是“站在公民一侧”的“变革政府”。执政初期，孔特内阁批准了旨在消除贫困的“公民收入”计划、新的养老金方案等一系列举措。然而，更多计划因其他政党的掣肘而无力付诸实践。同时，由于参政后“联盟”党的民众支持率持续走高，“联盟”党对权力分配产生了新的要求，最终执政联盟陷入内耗，次年合作破裂，联合政府垮台。

In response to the above situation, some predict that the experience and lessons of governing will prompt radical forces to return to the establishment. For example, The New York Times stated that no matter how radical a party was before, “once in power, the risk of putting their rebellion into practice may push them away from extremism.” In reality, the setbacks faced by new radical parties in government are not due to defying the establishment, but because their words and deeds are more “down-to-earth” than those of traditional parties, showing a positive attitude toward trying to change the status quo. The problem is that the social issues in European countries are complex and intertwined, and cannot be simply “cured” by a new party coming to power and a series of new policies. The propositions and policies of new radical parties do contain a certain degree of utopianism and narrow-mindedness, either underestimating real-world resistance and thus facing opposition from various sides, or failing to address root causes, offering only palliative measures. The one who tied the bell on the cat must untie it; [18]18 A Chinese proverb meaning that whoever creates a problem should be the one to solve it. can those who created the European crisis solve it? The problem of the new radical parties lies precisely in being “in the midst of the mountain, unable to see its true face.” [19]19 A line from the Song dynasty poet Su Shi’s poem “Written on the Wall of West Forest Temple,” meaning that one cannot see the full picture of a situation because one is too deeply involved in it.

针对上述情况，有预测，执政的经历与教训将会促使激进力量回归建制。例如，《纽约时报》称，无论一个政党之前多么激进，“一旦掌权，将它们的叛逆付诸实践的风险可能会让它们远离极端”。实际上，新激进主义政党执政受挫并非因为违逆建制，而是因为它们的言行比传统政党更“接地气”，展现出试图改变现状的积极姿态。问题在于，欧洲各国的社会问题错综复杂，而非简单地通过一个新政党的上台、一系列新的政策就能“药到病除”。新激进主义政党的主张与政策确实存在一定的空想与狭隘，或是低估了现实阻力，遭致不同方面的反对；或是未触及根本，提出的仅是治标之策。解铃还须系铃人，制造欧洲危机的人能够解决危机么？新激进主义政党的问题恰恰“只缘身在此山中”。

III. The Supporters of New Radical Parties

三、新激进主义政党的支持者

Who supports the new radical parties? The new radical parties’ answer is “the people.” So, which groups does “the people” include? In the 1990s, some scholars analyzing radical right-wing parties such as the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party had already discovered that the voter base of these parties was gradually “proletarianizing,” i.e., they were winning increasing numbers of blue-collar workers’ votes. Today, a large body of academic research suggests that those who have suffered losses and been marginalized in the processes of modernization and globalization—the disaffected, such as workers, peasants, artisans, and even a portion of the middle class—constitute the core support base of the new radical parties. In the first round of the 2017 French presidential election, Le Pen mainly won support from peasants, the self-employed, employees, and blue-collar workers, and her support rate among the latter two groups significantly surpassed that of other candidates. Mélenchon ranked second in support among intermediate professions, employees, and workers. Intermediate professions include school teachers, mid-level civil servants, technicians, and corporate managers. Blue-collar workers and peasants also formed the solid social foundation for the rise of the Sweden Democrats. According to data from Statistics Sweden’s “Party Preference Survey,” as of May 2022, 24.5% of unskilled workers, 27.8% of skilled workers, and 23.3% of peasants and the self-employed favored the Sweden Democrats. During the same period, the support rate for the Democrats among ordinary office workers, mid-level employees, and senior managers was only 13.8%, 11.8%, and 8.3%, respectively. In the most recent survey, the Democrats’ support rate increased to varying degrees across all social occupational groups, with support among unskilled workers and skilled workers rising to 25.3% and 30.5%, respectively.

谁在支持新激进主义政党？新激进主义政党的答案是“人民”。那么，“人民”都包含哪些群体？20世纪90年代，一些学者在分析法国“国民阵线”、奥地利自由党等激进主义右翼时就已发现，上述政党的选民群体逐渐“无产阶级化”，即它们获得了越来越多的蓝领工人的选票。如今，大量学术研究均提出，在现代化与全球化中利益受损、被边缘化的失意者，如工人、农民、手工业者甚至一部分中产阶级，构成了新激进主义政党的核心支持群体。在2017年法国总统选举第一轮投票中，勒庞主要获得了农民、个体经营者、雇员与蓝领工人群体的支持，且她在后两类群体的支持率大幅领先其他候选人。梅朗雄在中级职业、雇员和工人群体中的支持率居于第二。中间职业包括学校教师、中间等级公务员、技术人员、企业主管等。蓝领工人与农民群体同样构成了瑞典民主党兴起的坚实社会基础。根据瑞典统计局《政党偏好调查》的数据，截至2022年5月，有24.5%的非技术工人、27.8%的技术工人以及23.3%的农民与个体经营者更青睐瑞典民主党。同一时期，民主党在普通职员、中间等级雇员以及高级经理人等群体中的支持率仅为13.8%、11.8%与8.3%。在最新一期调查中，民主党在全部社会行业群体的支持率均有不同程度的上涨，其中，在非技术工人与技术工人群体中的支持率分别增至25.3%与30.5%。

According to Ipsos polling data, in Italy, 34.6% of workers voted for the Brothers of Italy in the 2022 parliamentary elections. This figure is twice the 16.4% vote share won by the Five Star Movement, another new radical party. Additionally, 30.2% of small traders and artisans, as well as a large number of housewives and pensioners, also voted for the Brothers of Italy. In contrast, the Five Star Movement attracted the support of most unemployed, job-seeking, and student voters. Shifting to the perspective of voters’ economic income, the majority of Italians with incomes below the median were more inclined to trust new radical parties. 29.9% of those in the low-to-middle income bracket supported the Brothers of Italy, while the Five Star Movement ranked second with an 18.2% support rate. Among low-income groups, the Five Star Movement ranked first with 25% support, closely followed by the Brothers of Italy with 23%.

据益普索的民调数据显示，在意大利，有34.6%的工人在2022年的议会选举中投票支持兄弟党。这一数据是同为新激进主义政党的“五星运动”的得票率16.4%的两倍。此外，有30.2%的个体商贩、手工匠人，大量家庭主妇和养老金领取者也投票支持兄弟党。与之不同，“五星运动”吸引了大部分失业、待业者与学生选民的支持。如果转换至选民经济收入的视角，大多数收入位于中位数以下的意大利民众更愿意信任新激进主义政党。有29.9%的位于中低收入区间的民众支持了兄弟党，而“五星运动”的支持率为18.2%，排名第二。而在低收入群体中，“五星运动”以25%的支持率位居第一，兄弟党凭借23%的支持率紧随其后。

From the perspective of voters’ geographical distribution, new radical parties harvested votes from their countries’ economically backward regions. Le Pen’s stronghold is the traditional industrial belt of northern and eastern France, namely Hauts-de-France, Normandy, Grand Est, and parts of the Mediterranean coast. This overlaps heavily with France’s impoverished areas. Data from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies shows that the poverty rate in the northern region bordering Belgium and the English Channel ranks second in France, after Corsica, with approximately 18.6% of residents (about 1 million people) having incomes below the median level. The poverty rates in Normandy and Centre-Val de Loire are also among the highest in France. In contrast, Macron’s votes were concentrated in the more economically developed Atlantic coast and the affluent regions bordering Germany and Switzerland. In the 2022 presidential election, Le Pen not only maintained her advantage in her traditional stronghold but also continued to gain support in other areas. According to a Guardian survey, Le Pen’s vote share increased across France, particularly in the economically backward, agriculturally dominated Massif Central region, where many rural voters shifted to Le Pen due to the decline of the Republicans. The situation in Central and Eastern European countries is broadly similar. In the last two Czech parliamentary elections, ANO 2011 won over 35% of the vote in most constituencies in the western regions of Karlovy Vary and Ústí nad Labem, and the northeastern Moravian-Silesian region. Since the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe [20]20 The “upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” (苏东剧变) refers to the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries between 1989 and 1991., these areas have experienced significant economic decline. According to a report by the Czech Statistical Office, between 1993 and 2000 alone, the employed population in the Ústí region decreased by approximately 51,000 people, while the Moravian region lost 44,000. In Hungary, Fidesz’s stable support base similarly comes from small towns and rural areas with lower levels of economic development. In 2018, Fidesz’s support rate was 65% in the least developed regions, 58% in underdeveloped regions, 55% in moderately developed regions, 53% in developed regions, and 44% in the most developed regions.

从选民的地理分布来看，新激进主义政党收割了本国经济落后地区的选票。勒庞的票仓是法国北部与东部的传统工业地带，即上法兰西、诺曼底、大东部大区以及部分地中海沿岸地区。这与法国的贫困地区高度重合。法国国家统计与经济研究所的数据显示，位于比利时和英吉利海峡边界的北部地区的贫困率在法国排名第二，仅次于科西嘉岛，约18.6%的居民（约100万人）的收入低于中等收入水平。诺曼底、中央-卢瓦尔河谷等大区的贫困率也位居法国前列。相比之下，马克龙的选票则集中在经济发展水平较高的大西洋沿岸和临近德国、瑞士边境的富裕地区。在2022年的总统选举中，勒庞不仅维持了传统票仓的优势，而且在其他地区继续收揽民意。据《卫报》调查，勒庞在法国各地的得票率都有所提高，特别是在经济水平较为落后、以农业为主要产业的中央高原区域，大量农村选民由于共和党式微转而支持勒庞。中东欧国家的情况也大体类似。在近两届捷克议会选举中，“ANO2011”在西部卡罗维发利、乌斯季与东北部摩拉维亚—西里西亚等地的多数选区获得了35%以上的选票。苏东剧变以来，以上地区均出现大幅度的经济衰退。根据捷克统计局的报告，仅在1993—2000年，乌斯季地区的就业人口就减少了约5.1万人，而摩拉维亚地区则减少了4.4万人。在匈牙利，青民盟的稳定支持来源同样是经济发展水平较低的中小城镇与农村区域。2018年，青民盟在最不发达地区的支持率为65%，不发达地区为58%，中等发达地区为55%，发达地区为53%，最发达地区为44%。

Furthermore, most voters supporting new radical parties have only limited education, placing them at a relative disadvantage in the job market. A 2019 survey of Czech political parties showed that among those with only primary education, approximately 41.4% of respondents tended to support ANO 2011, while this tendency was 33.9% among those with secondary education. Notably, the corresponding figures for ANO 2011’s main rival, the Civic Democratic Party, were only 4.6% and 9.3%, respectively. According to surveys, the Sweden Democrats are similarly favored by the country’s less educated populace, while more highly educated voters tend to support the Swedish Social Democratic Party.

此外，支持新激进主义政党的大多数选民仅接受过有限的教育，他们在就业市场上处于相对劣势的位置。2019年对捷克政党的一项调查显示，在仅接受初等教育的群体中，约有41.4%的受访者倾向于支持“ANO2011”，这一倾向在中等教育水平的受访者中为33.9%。值得一提的是，“ANO2011”的主要竞争对手——公民民主党的对应数据分别仅有4.6%与9.3%。据调查，瑞典民主党同样受到本国受教育程度较低的民众的偏爱，而受教育程度较高的选民更支持瑞典社会民主党。

Viewed in this light, the supporters of new radical parties are not simply confined to a single class or stratum with a fixed ideological goal; rather, they share similar socioeconomic circumstances—low-to-middle income, limited education, and employment in traditional industries or self-employment. In the process of globalization, the situation of these groups has suffered severe shocks. The rise of emerging industries, the relocation of industrial chains, and the spread of automated production have significantly reduced the jobs and incomes of traditional industrial workers, leading to the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions in traditional industrial belts and exacerbating inequality between depressed rural areas and small towns on the one hand and prosperous metropolises on the other. At the same time, the role of the nation-state as a “safety net” sustaining the livelihoods of the lower and middle classes has been weakened in this process. The austerity measures [21]21 “Austerity measures” here refers to policies of cutting public spending and welfare adopted by mainstream parties, often in response to economic pressures such as those from European Union fiscal rules or the 2008 financial crisis. adopted by traditional ruling parties, which cut welfare protections, have caused ordinary people to bear increasingly high living costs. Consequently, the resentment of the lower and middle classes has provided the impetus for new radical parties to move to the center of the political stage.

由是观之，新激进主义政党的支持者不单纯局限于某一个具有固定意识形态目标的阶级或者阶层，而是拥有相似的社会经济处境——中低收入、有限的教育、从事传统行业或个体经营。在全球化进程中，这些群体的境遇承受了严重冲击。新兴产业崛起、产业链转移以及自动化生产的普及，大幅减少了传统产业工人的岗位和收入，导致传统工业地带的社会经济状况恶化，也加剧了萧条的农村、小城镇与繁荣大都市之间的不平等。同时，作为维持社会中下层民众生计的“保护网”的民族国家的作用在此进程中被削弱。执政的传统政党采取的削减福利保障的做法导致普通民众承担了越发高昂的生活成本。于是，中下层民众的愤懑给予了新激进主义政党走向政治舞台中央的动力。

The first layer of resentment among the lower-middle classes stems from a growing sense of insecurity. Due to their relatively low level of education, the lower-middle classes lack the knowledge and social capital for upward mobility and are increasingly uncompetitive in the job market. Despite working hard, they still earn meager incomes, struggle to make ends meet, and lack a sense of fulfillment. A poll conducted ten days before the 2022 French presidential election showed that over half of respondents believed that the primary crisis facing France at the time was social issues, mainly manifested in the declining purchasing power of ordinary people. 74% of respondents believed their purchasing power had decreased over the past five years, while only 7% thought it had improved. In other words, a clear deterioration in living conditions has become the consensus among the majority of French people today. In Italy, the public similarly expects the new government to take action in the socio-economic sphere. The three issues of greatest concern to the public are: subsidies or price caps on oil and gas (43%); tax cuts to increase workers’ wages (25%); and revising or abolishing the “citizen’s income” policy (23%). Against this backdrop, immigration and refugee issues have become a “catalyst” amplifying public anxiety, because immigrants and refugees are seen as competitors for resources such as jobs, social welfare, and social security for the lower-middle classes in Europe. The criminal behavior of some immigrants and refugees has further heightened ordinary Europeans’ concerns about their personal safety, causing people’s sense of insecurity to spread from the economic sphere to the realm of cultural identity. As Benz puts it, at a deeper level, immigrants and refugees are both the embodiment of a rapidly changing world and the embodiment of the nation-state’s growing impotence in the face of that world.

中下层民众的第一层愤懑源自与日俱增的不安全感。由于受教育程度较低，中下层民众缺乏向上跃升的知识与社会资本，在就业市场上日益缺乏竞争力。尽管努力工作，他们依然收入微薄，为柴米油盐疲于奔命，缺乏获得感。2022年法国总统大选前十天的民意调查显示，超过半数的受访者认为，法国当前面临的首要危机是社会问题，主要表现为普通民众购买力下降。74%的受访者认为其购买力在过去五年中有所下降，仅有7%的人认为其购买力有所改善。换言之，生活境遇的明显退化成为当今多数法国民众的共识。在意大利，民众同样期待新政府在社会经济领域有所作为。民众关心度位居前三的议题分别是：油气补贴或限价（43%）；削减税收以增加工人工资（25%）；修订或废除“公民收入”政策（23%）。在此背景下，移民与难民问题成为放大民众焦虑的“催化剂”，因为移民与难民被认为是欧洲本土中下层民众在就业岗位、社会福利与保障等方面资源的竞争者。部分移民、难民的犯罪行为更是加剧了欧洲普通民众对自身人身安全的担忧，致使人们的不安全感从经济传导至文化认同领域。正如本茨所言，在更深刻的层面上，移民和难民既是一个迅速变化的世界的化身，也是民族国家在面对这个世界时日益无能的化身。

The second layer of resentment among the lower-middle classes is directed at the mainstream narratives of traditional political parties and the media, which ignore their plight. For years, the rhetoric of traditional political elites has filtered out the genuine concerns of the lower-middle classes. The former tirelessly promote values such as “human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law,” while the latter focus on oil and gas prices, wage levels, and price fluctuations, hoping the government will take measures to improve their real-life circumstances. However, through multiple cycles of party alternation, the lower-middle classes have seen no hope of change. Therefore, when traditional political parties fail as intermediaries for expressing public opinion, the lower-middle classes have no choice but to seek other channels to voice their demands, including spontaneous political and economic protests—such as the earlier “Yellow Vest movement” [22]22 The “Yellow Vest movement” (Mouvement des gilets jaunes) was a French populist protest movement that began in November 2018, initially against fuel tax increases and the high cost of living, and later broadened to include demands for social and economic justice. or the prolonged French general strike in early 2023—or by choosing new political parties that better represent their interests. In contrast, the new radical parties have keenly captured the shift in public sentiment and responded more directly to the demands of the lower-middle classes. According to polls, 42% of Le Pen’s supporters believe that her positions better represent their views, while 38% of respondents admitted to choosing Le Pen out of dissatisfaction with Macron. Moreover, new radical parties do not merely respond passively to the public; they are adept at “setting the pace” and actively “targeting their audience.” For example, on the issue of income tax, Mélenchon proposed refining the existing five brackets into fourteen, while Le Pen proposed exempting all young workers under 30 from income tax to help them start families. It is evident that through differentiated positions, new radical parties not only distinguish themselves from traditional parties but also segment the “losers” of globalization among themselves, seeking to attract groups in specific geographic, occupational, and economic circumstances.

中下层民众的第二层愤懑直指传统政党和媒体的主流叙事对其处境的忽视。多年来，传统政治精英的主张过滤了中下层民众的真实想法。前者不倦地宣扬“人权、自由、民主、平等和法治”等价值理念，后者却紧盯油气价格、工资水平与物价波动，希望政府采取措施改善现实生活境遇。然而，在多次政党轮替中，中下层民众并未看到变革的希望。因此，当传统政党作为民意表达的政治中介失灵时，中下层民众只能寻求其他途径发出自身诉求，包括自发的政治经济抗争例如先前的“黄马甲运动”，又如2023年初持续数月的法国大罢工。，或是选择更能代表自身利益的新政党。相比之下，新激进主义政党敏锐地捕捉到了舆情风向，更直白地回应了中下层民众的诉求。据民调显示，有42%的勒庞支持者认为，勒庞的主张更代表他们的心声，而有38%的受访者承认选择勒庞是因为不满马克龙。不仅如此，新激进主义政党并非只是被动地回应民众，而是善于“带节奏”、主动“找对象”。例如，同样针对所得税，梅朗雄希望将现有的五个等级细化为14个，而勒庞希望免除所有30岁以下年轻工人的所得税，以帮助他们建立家庭。可见，通过差异化的主张，新激进主义政党不仅与传统政党区别开来，它们彼此之间更是分割了全球化的“失意者”，试图招揽其中处于特定地域、职业与经济状况的群体。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

As Europe’s social crisis deepens, new radical parties have now become a political force that rivals traditional parties. In the eyes of traditional parties, new radical parties stir up and manipulate public opinion, ambitiously challenging the existing order, and are thus labeled as “extremist,” “populist,” “xenophobic,” and so on. Ironically, despite these negative labels, new radical parties are gaining increasing recognition from the lower-middle classes, with their support rates rising. In fact, the narrative discourse of traditional parties is clearly biased. New radical parties are not as “heretical” as mainstream parties accuse them of being; rather, they largely follow the rules of the existing electoral system and do not take the fundamental replacement of the system as an explicit goal. More importantly, the rise of new radical parties reflects the inadequacy of representation in Western representative democracy. The mainstream values and slogans promoted by traditional parties may sound appealing, but because they fail to effectively address real-world difficulties, they fail to move the “disillusioned” lower-middle classes. In stark contrast, although some positions of new radical parties are “heretical,” they cater to the anxieties and demands of the “disillusioned” lower-middle classes and are seen as an alternative for addressing the current social crisis.

随着欧洲社会危机的加深，新激进主义政党如今已成为同传统政党分庭抗礼的政治力量。在传统政党看来，新激进主义政党撩拨并操纵民意，雄心勃勃地对现存秩序展开挑战，因而赋之以“极端”“民粹主义”“排外主义”等标签。反讽的是，在诸多负面标签之下，新激进主义政党却越发得到中下层民众的认可，支持率不断上升。事实上，传统政党的叙事话语带有明显的偏见。新激进主义政党并非像主流政党指责的那般“离经叛道”，而是大体遵循了现有选举制度的游戏规则，不把根本性的制度取代作为明确目标。更重要的是，新激进主义政党的兴起反映了西方代议制民主的代表性不足。传统政党宣传的主流价值和口号看似美好，却因无法有效解决现实困境而未能打动中下层的“失意者”。与之形成鲜明对比的是，新激进主义政党的部分主张虽然“离经叛道”，但是迎合了“失意”的中下层民众的担忧和诉求，被认为是应对当前社会危机的另一种选择。

Online Editor: Tongxin

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