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The Causes and Possible Impacts of the Return of Left-Wing Governments in Latin America

韩琦:拉美国家左翼政府回归的原因及可能影响

· · Marxism Abroad · People’s Tribune, 2023, no. 4 · 23 min read

At the beginning of the 21st century, an unprecedented political phenomenon occurred in Latin America: in most countries across the region, left-wing governments successively came to power. This wave began with Hugo Chávez’s electoral victory in Venezuela in 1998, followed by electoral victories in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti, and other countries. If Cuba is included, by 2010, 13 Latin American countries were considered to have left-wing governments. Although these governments achieved some important successes in the struggle against poverty and inequality, due to multiple factors—such as a new round of U.S. intervention, a sharp drop in international market prices for raw materials in 2014, a new political offensive by the right, and political corruption in some countries—this wave of leftism began to break apart in the second decade of the 21st century. Starting with the 2009 coup against then-Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, right-wing governments successively won elections.

21世纪初,拉丁美洲发生了前所未有的政治现象,即在整个地区的大多数国家,左翼政府纷纷上台执政。这股浪潮始于1998年乌戈·查韦斯在委内瑞拉的选举中获胜,随后在智利、阿根廷、巴西、多米尼加共和国、乌拉圭、玻利维亚、秘鲁、洪都拉斯、厄瓜多尔、巴拉圭、海地等国家获得选举胜利。如果包括古巴,到2010年已经有13个拉美国家被视为左翼政府。尽管这些政府在消除贫困和不平等的斗争中取得了一些重要成就,但由于多种因素,诸如美国新一轮干预、2014年国际市场原材料价格急剧下跌、右翼采取新的政治攻势、一些国家的政治腐败等,这一波左翼浪潮在21世纪的第二个十年开始破裂,从2009年针对洪都拉斯时任总统曼努埃尔·塞拉亚的政变起,右翼政府纷纷在选举中获得胜利。

However, just when people believed that the Latin American left’s challenge to neoliberal ideology had failed and that the “turn to the left” had ended, Latin America unexpectedly began a second wave of “turning to the left.” The turning point was the 2018 electoral victory of López Obrador in Mexico, followed by leftists successively coming to power in Argentina (2019), Bolivia (2020), Peru (2021), Chile (2022), Honduras (2021), Colombia (2022), and Brazil (2023). Adding to these are countries that have long been governed by the left—Venezuela (Maduro’s re-election in 2018), Nicaragua (Ortega’s re-election in 2021), and Cuba—by January 2023, left-wing countries in the region accounted for approximately 90% of the region’s total area and 90% of its total population, exhibiting characteristics of broad scope and large scale.

但是,正当人们以为拉美左翼挑战新自由主义意识形态遭到失败、“向左转”已经结束的时候,拉美出人意料的又开始了第二波的“向左转”,转折点是2018年墨西哥的洛佩斯·奥夫拉多尔赢得了选举,随后,阿根廷(2019年)、玻利维亚(2020年)、秘鲁(2021年)、智利(2022年)、洪都拉斯(2021年)、哥伦比亚(2022年)、巴西(2023年)等国左翼相继执政。再加上长期一直由左翼执政的委内瑞拉(2018年马杜罗连任)、尼加拉瓜(2021年奥尔特加连任)和古巴等国家,到2023年1月,该地区左翼国家约占地区总面积的90%、人口总数的90%,呈现出了范围广、规模大的特点。

The rise of the second wave of left-wing governments in Latin American countries is the result of the combined effect of multiple internal and external factors.

拉美国家第二波左翼政府上台是内外多重因素共同作用的结果

Shortly after the first wave of left-wing governance in Latin America had receded, a second wave of left-wing governance quickly emerged. This situation seems unexpected, but careful analysis reveals it is no accident; rather, it is the result of the combined effect of multiple internal and external factors.

在拉美第一波左翼执政现象刚刚消退不久,很快又出现了第二波左翼执政,这种情况看似意外,但仔细分析发现并非偶然,而是内外多重因素共同作用的结果。

The return of electoral politics to normalcy created conditions for the alternation of left and right in power. As a regional phenomenon, the “pendulum phenomenon” of alternating left- and right-wing party governance in Latin America emerged in the 21st century. In the preceding 20th century, the “pendulum phenomenon” was more often manifested in cycles of dictatorship and democracy. By the mid-1970s, only three Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela) were democracies; the others were military regimes or dictatorships.[1]1 This refers to the period from the 1960s to the 1980s when many Latin American countries were under military dictatorships, such as those in Argentina (1976–1983), Chile (1973–1990), and Brazil (1964–1985). Starting in the late 1970s, Latin America experienced a wave of democratization. By 2000, the transition from military to civilian rule was completed, electoral democratic systems were established, and the alternation of power became normalized. However, before 1998, with the exception of the Cuban government, newly installed governments were uniformly right-wing. Nevertheless, the democratic transition also paved the way for the later emergence of a group of left-wing governments. The first wave of left-wing governments came to power precisely by capitalizing on the majority of voters’ dissatisfaction with neoliberal reforms and the background of U.S. “recognition” of Latin American electoral democratic systems, coupled with a lack of interference. It must be emphasized that the “left” and “right” referred to here are limited to the left and right distinguished within the camp of the bourgeoisie, and left-wing governments are also defined relative to the governments that actively promoted neoliberalism in the 1990s. That is, the criteria for distinguishing “left” from “right” were proposed based on the reality of Latin America at the time, rather than according to some traditional leftist standard. Generally speaking, the right advocates for market allocation of resources, promotes neoliberal economic policies such as privatization, liberalization, marketization, and internationalization, and considers electoral democracy the standard of political freedom; the left insists on the role of state intervention in resource allocation and holds that the meaning of democracy is broader, encompassing citizens’ social rights and the protection of vulnerable groups. Both propositions have a market and appeal in Latin American countries. After experiencing the brief rule of right-wing governments in the second decade of the 21st century, due to a reversal in domestic and international circumstances, a resurgence of the left emerged once again. This is not unrelated to the factor of the “political cycle,” as voters have a psychology of desiring change; as a result of dissatisfaction with the situation, the hope for a new political alternation becomes an expected outcome.

选举政治恢复常态为左右翼交替执政创造了条件。作为一种地区现象,拉美政党左右翼轮流执政的“钟摆现象”是在21世纪出现的。在此之前的20世纪,“钟摆现象”更多地表现在专制和民主周期的更迭。到20世纪70年代中期,拉美国家只有3个国家(哥斯达黎加、哥伦比亚、委内瑞拉)是民主国家,其他国家都是军人政权或独裁政权1。从20世纪70年代末开始,拉美经历了民主化浪潮,到2000年完成了军人政权向文人政权的过渡,实现了选举民主制度,权力交替走向了正常化。但在1998年之前,除了古巴政府之外,新上台的政府是清一色的右翼。不过,民主化转型也为后来左翼政府群体的出现铺平了道路。第一波左翼政府正是利用了多数选民对新自由主义改革的不满,以及美国对拉美选举民主制度的“认可”且不再加以干涉的背景登上历史舞台的。需要强调的是,这里所说的“左”与“右”,只限于在资产阶级阵营内部区分的左翼与右翼,并且左翼政府也是相对于20世纪90年代积极推行新自由主义的政府而言,即根据当时的拉美现实提出来的划分“左”与“右”的标准,而非根据某种传统的左派标准来划分的。通常情况下,右翼主张市场配置资源,推崇私有化、自由化、市场化、国际化等新自由主义经济政策,并认为选举型民主是政治自由的标准;左翼则坚持国家干预在资源配置中的作用,并认为民主的含义更为广泛,包括公民的社会权利、保护弱势群体等。这两种主张在拉美国家均有市场和吸引力。在经历了21世纪第二个十年出现的右翼政府的短暂统治之后,由于国内外形势的逆转,再次出现左翼回潮的局面,这与“政治周期”因素不无关联,因为选民有思变的心理,作为对局势不满的结果,希望出现新的政治交替便成为意料之中的事情。

The pandemic and global inflation created a turning point. In 2020 and 2021, the pandemic spread widely across Latin American countries, with hospitals overcrowded, medical supplies scarce, and healthcare systems on the verge of collapse. In some countries, scenes even emerged of corpses abandoned on the streets and endless queues to obtain oxygen. Due to the massive impact of the pandemic, Latin America’s economy contracted by as much as 7% in 2020, with Peru’s economy contracting by 11.1%, Argentina’s by 9.9%, Mexico’s by 8.2%, Colombia’s by 7%, Chile’s by 6%, and Brazil’s by 0.39%—the worst records since the 20th century.[2]2 These figures are cited from official or widely reported economic data for 2020, reflecting the severe contraction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the social sphere, unemployment rose rapidly, the number of people in poverty increased substantially, the poverty rate rose to 33%, the extreme poverty rate rose to 13%, regressing to levels seen more than a decade earlier, and a large number of middle-income groups slipped into poverty.[3]3 The poverty and extreme poverty rates cited here are based on regional estimates from sources such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which reported a significant increase due to the pandemic. Because demand was suppressed by the pandemic, inflation had already begun to rise; the pandemic also led to supply chain bottlenecks and the depletion of fiscal resources. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 caused a rise in world fuel prices and increased transportation costs, further exacerbating inflation in Latin America. The result was an intertwining of unemployment, inflation, and poverty in Latin America, along with a continuous deterioration of public security. The pandemic stimulated demand for public policies, and pandemic control was closely related to a country’s medical capacity and overall governance level. At this point, the neoliberal advocacy for reducing the role of the state and restricting social rights was rejected by the people. Under the influence of the pandemic and inflation, Latin American voters chose to abandon right-wing ruling parties and instead support left-wing candidates who promised increased social spending.

疫情和全球通货膨胀促成转机。2020年和2021年,疫情在拉美国家大面积蔓延,医院人满为患、医疗物资匮乏,医疗体系面临崩溃。有的国家甚至出现尸体被遗弃在街头以及无休止地排队获取氧气的场面。因受疫情的巨大冲击,2020年拉美经济衰退高达7%,其中秘鲁经济衰退达11.1%,阿根廷经济衰退达9.9%,墨西哥经济衰退达8.2%,哥伦比亚经济衰退达7%,智利经济衰退达6%,巴西经济衰退达0.39%,创下了20世纪以来的最差纪录2。在社会领域,失业率快速增长,贫困人口大幅度增加,贫困率升至33%,赤贫率升至13%,退回到10多年前的水平,大量中等收入群体滑向贫困。3由于需求被疫情抑制,通胀早已开始抬头,疫情也导致供应链出现瓶颈,财政资源耗尽,2022年乌克兰危机的爆发,导致了世界燃料价格上涨,运输成本增加,更加重了拉美的通货膨胀。结果造成拉美失业、通胀、贫困交织在一起,社会治安也不断恶化。疫情刺激了人们对公共政策的需求,疫情的控制与国家医疗能力乃至整体的治理水平密切相关。此时,新自由主义倡导的缩小国家作用,限制社会权利的主张遭到了人们的唾弃。在疫情和通货膨胀的影响下,拉美的选民选择放弃右翼执政党,转而支持增加社会支出承诺的左翼候选人。

The intensification of inequality and social exclusion has increased the discursive power of the left. Latin America is one of the regions with the most severe inequality in the world. Since the 1770s, its high level of inequality has persisted to the present day, with the Gini coefficient remaining around 0.5 for a long time, and Brazil even once exceeding 0.6. Apart from the Gini coefficient, social inequality in Latin America is also manifested in low primary and secondary school enrollment rates, poor educational quality, a high proportion of the population living below the poverty line, and a low proportion of the population entitled to legal guarantees, medical security, and social welfare. Neoliberal reforms pushed Latin American inequality to new heights. In 1990, the proportion of the poor in the total population of Latin America reached 51.2%, the proportion of the extremely poor reached 15.5%, and the Gini coefficient was above 0.51[4]4 The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of income or wealth inequality within a nation or a social group, ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).. In the first decade of the 21st century, left-wing governments increased social spending on healthcare, education, housing, and food, lifting tens of millions of people out of poverty. The Gini coefficient for the entire region fell from 0.52 in 2002 to 0.46 in 2018[5]5 The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of income or wealth inequality within a nation or a social group, ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality)., the poverty rate dropped from 45.4% in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014, and the extreme poverty rate fell from 12.2% to 7.8% over the same period, achieving great success in the fight against poverty. It is precisely because of these achievements that it is easier to evoke voters' fond memories of the first wave of left-wing governance, and people hope that the second wave of left-wing governance can become a continuation of the first wave of left-wing regimes. The hopes held by the populace are all very practical, such as whether their children can attend a nearby public school that provides basic services and quality education, whether they can enjoy free medical care and first-class nursing after falling ill, and whether they can secure a decent pension through their work when they enter old age. The solutions offered by left-wing candidates for inequality and poverty are to "better" distribute wealth, specifically including more tax reforms and more regulations. They often harshly judge the wealth of the rich and private companies, question the effectiveness of the market economy, act as spokespersons for the discourse of "justice," and constantly update the expression of the "justice" discourse. These expressions are very attractive to middle- and lower-class voters.

不平等与社会排斥的加剧增加了左翼的话语力。拉美是世界上不平等现象最严重的地区之一,从18世纪70年代以来,它的高度不平等一直持续至今,基尼系数长期维持在0.5左右,巴西甚至一度达到0.6以上。除了基尼系数之外,拉美的社会不平等还表现在中小学入学率较低,教育质量较差,处于贫困线以下人口所占的比率较高,有权享有法律保障、医疗保障和社会福利人口所占的比例较低等方面。新自由主义改革将拉美不平等推向了新的高峰,1990年,拉美贫困人口占总人口的比例达到51.2%,极端贫困人口占总人口的比例达到15.5%,基尼系数在0.51以上4。21世纪的第一个十年,左翼政府增加了医疗保健、教育、住房、粮食等方面的社会支出,使数千万人成功地摆脱了贫困,整个地区的基尼系数从2002年的0.52下降到2018年的0.46(5),贫困率从2002年的45.4%降至2014年的27.8%,同期极端贫困率从12.2%降至7.8%,在消除贫困的斗争中取得了巨大成就。正是由于这些成就,更容易唤起选民对第一波左翼执政时期的良好回忆,人们希望第二波左翼执政能够成为第一波左翼政权的延续。民众怀抱的都是一些很现实的希望,如他们的孩子能否在附近一所提供基本服务和优质教育的公立学校上学,他们可否在生病之后享有免费医疗和一流的护理,他们能否在进入老年后以他们的工作来保证体面的养老金。而左翼候选人为不平等和贫困提供的解决方案是“更好地”分配财富,具体包括更多的税收改革、更多的法规,他们经常严厉评判富人财富、私营公司,并质疑市场经济的有效性,成为“公正”话语的代言人,并不断更新“公正”话语的表达。这些表达对中下层选民很有吸引力。

The governance crisis of right-wing governments has forced the populace to make new choices. The rise of left-wing governments is linked to the governance difficulties of right-wing governments. In Mexico, without the failure of the National Action Party government (2000-2012) and the disappointing return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (2012-2018), López Obrador's victory would be inexplicable. López suffered defeat in the presidential elections of 2006 and 2012, but it was precisely because the previous governments failed to effectively control drug violence and the corruption of Enrique Peña Nieto's government that López succeeded in his third campaign in 2018. The downfall of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was largely due to his irresponsible management of the pandemic. At the same time, during his tenure, the Amazon rainforest suffered record destruction, and the number of poor people increased by 33 million. In contrast, his election opponent Lula, during his previous presidential term, lifted approximately 29 million Brazilians into the middle-income group.[6]6 Lula da Silva served as President of Brazil from 2003 to 2010; his social programs significantly reduced poverty. In Argentina, without the economic failure of Mauricio Macri's government, the return of Alberto Fernández and Kirchnerism would also be inexplicable. Due to social inequality, poverty, widespread corruption, the increase in organized crime, and the deterioration of the rule of law environment, "what we see in Latin America is people voting against those in power." A Latin American scholar pointed out: "This is a punishment for the existing government. I don't know if it can be said that Latin Americans have become more left-wing, but I am sure they are angrier with their own governments."[7]7 This is a direct quotation from a Latin American scholar, cited by the author. It is precisely because of the failure of right-wing governments, their inability to fulfill their pre-election promises, and their helplessness in the face of crises that new opportunities have been created for the left to reshape itself.

右翼政府的治理危机迫使民众做出新的选择。左翼政府的上台与右翼政府的治理困境是联系在一起的。在墨西哥,如果没有国家行动党政府的失败(2000年-2012年)和墨西哥革命制度党令人失望的回归(2012年-2018年),洛佩斯·奥夫拉多尔的胜利就无法解释,洛佩斯分别在2006年和2012年的总统竞选中遭到失败,但正是由于前几届政府未能有效控制毒品暴力以及恩里克·培尼亚·涅托政府的腐败,洛佩斯才在2018年的第三次竞选中获得了成功。巴西前总统雅伊尔·博索纳罗的下台在很大程度上是由于对疫情管理的不负责任,同时,在其任内,亚马孙雨林遭到了创纪录的破坏,贫困人口增加了3300万。相反,作为他竞选对手的卢拉在之前的总统任期内,大约使2900万巴西人跻身中等收入群体。6在阿根廷,如果没有毛里西奥·马克里政府的经济失败,阿尔韦托·费尔南德斯和基什内尔主义的回归同样无法解释。由于社会不平等、贫困、普遍腐败,有组织犯罪的增加,法治环境遭到破坏,“我们在拉美看到的是人们投票反对当权者”,有拉美学者指出:“这是对现有政府的惩罚。我不知道是否可以说拉美人变得更加左派,但我确信他们对自己的政府更加愤怒。”7正是由于右翼政府的失败,未能兑现其竞选前的承诺,在危机面前束手无策,从而为左翼重塑自己提供了新的机会。

Left-wing forces have adopted flexible and pragmatic political strategies in their election campaigns. Under the new circumstances, the political strategies adopted by left-wing forces have shown greater flexibility and pragmatism. They know how to communicate with the populace and how to maximize the accommodation of the key demands and core interests of various strata.

左翼力量在竞选中采取了灵活实用的政治策略。在新背景下,左翼力量采取的政治策略更显示了灵活性和实用性,他们知道如何与民众进行沟通,如何最大限度迎合各阶层的关键诉求和核心利益。

In terms of election platforms and governance programs, they declare that the left-wing parties they belong to or the left-wing movements they carry out have the mission of seeking benefits for the people, thereby gaining an advantage in public opinion. However, they do not rigidly adhere to traditional left-wing propositions but keep pace with the times, putting forward more inclusive agendas. For example, the left-wing party coalition "Apruebo Dignidad" led by Gabriel Boric of Chile bases its governance philosophy on socialist values, emphasizing universal democracy, progressive change, and pluralistic unity. Its governance agenda includes avant-garde propositions of the global left-wing movement, such as feminism, environmentalism, reproductive rights, and recognition of same-sex marriage. Former Peruvian President Pedro Castillo won the election with a socialist platform. His governance plan included controlling the pandemic, increasing public investment in education and health, raising taxes on domestic and foreign companies, and amending the constitution to increase the state's share of profits from copper mining companies. However, to win the support of business owners, Pedro Castillo stated that he would not establish a radical left-wing government like those in Cuba and Venezuela, and the Castillo government was more moderate. Faced with market failure, the first wave of left-wing governments used the export boom of commodities to promote fairness through greater public spending, while the second wave of left-wing governments seeks to realize the desire to solve inequality by appealing to new agendas such as respect for human rights, indigenous rights, gender and sexual minority rights, attention to climate and environmental protection, and public health.

在竞选和施政纲领方面,他们宣称自己所在的左翼政党或开展的左翼运动负有为民众谋利益的使命,从而占据了舆论上的优势。但他们又不固守左翼的传统主张,而是与时俱进,提出更加具有包容性的议程。如智利加夫列尔·博里奇领导的左翼政党联盟“赞成尊严”,其执政理念以社会主义价值观为基础,强调全民民主、进步变革和多元团结,其执政议程中包含了女权主义、环保主义、生殖权利和承认同性婚姻等一些全球左翼运动的前卫主张。秘鲁前总统佩德罗·卡斯蒂略以社会主义纲领赢得了选举,其执政计划包括控制住疫情的大流行、增加对教育和卫生的公共投资、增加对国内外公司的税收,通过修改宪法,增加国家在铜矿开采公司利润中的份额等。但为了争取企业主的支持,佩德罗·卡斯蒂略表示不会建立类似古巴和委内瑞拉那样的激进左翼政府,卡斯蒂略政府更加温和。面对市场失灵,第一波左翼政府曾借助大宗商品的出口繁荣,以更大的公共开支促进了公平,而第二波左翼政府则通过呼吁尊重人权、土著权益、性别和性少数人权益、关注气候和环保、公共卫生等新议程,以实现解决不平等问题的愿望。

In terms of campaign methods, the left has willingly abandoned radical styles, moved toward the center, and chosen pluralistic alliances. For example, the vote margin by which Lula defeated Bolsonaro was provided by the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement, the party led by Michel Temer, who had used his votes in Congress in 2016 to oust Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff. In his campaign, Lula also united with his former Social Democratic opponent Fernando Henrique Cardoso and chose centrist Geraldo Alckmin as his running mate. Lula also did not hesitate to reconcile with Marina Silva, a former presidential candidate and former environment minister who had challenged him from the left, and sought the votes of evangelicals by promising not to support abortion or drug liberalization. Colombia's Petro participated in left-wing guerrilla groups in his early years. After signing a peace agreement with the government, he ran for president twice in 2010 and 2018, but failed. Petro allied with the Santos faction that supported the former president, maintained close ties with the Liberal Party of former President César Gaviria, nominated environmentalist Francia Márquez as his running mate, formed the electoral coalition "Historical Pact for Colombia," and ultimately won the election. In addition to Brazil and Colombia, the presidential elections in Peru and Chile were also decided in the second round, both undergoing a process of negotiation and compromise with election opponents, ultimately winning the support of floating voters and even voters from the opposing camp.

在竞选方式方面,左翼甘愿放弃激进风格,向中间靠拢,选择了多元联盟。如卢拉击败博索纳罗的票数差是由中间派的巴西民主运动党给出的,这是米歇尔·特梅尔领导的政党,后者曾在2016年利用其在国会的选票将卢拉的继任者迪尔玛·罗塞夫赶下台。卢拉在竞选中还团结了他的前社会民主党对手费尔南多·恩里克·卡多佐,并将中间派杰拉尔多·阿尔克明作为他的竞选搭档。卢拉也毫不犹豫地与曾经在左翼挑战他的前总统候选人和前环境部长玛丽娜·席尔瓦和解,并通过承诺不支持堕胎或毒品自由化来争取福音派的投票。哥伦比亚的佩特罗早年参加过左翼游击队,与政府签署和平协议之后,在2010年和2018年两次参加总统竞选,但未成功。佩特罗与拥护前总统的桑多斯派结盟,并与前总统塞萨尔·加维里亚的自由党保持着密切联系,提名环保主义者弗朗西亚·马克斯作为其竞选搭档,组成竞选联盟“哥伦比亚历史公约联盟”,最终赢得了选举。除了巴西和哥伦比亚之外,秘鲁、智利的总统选举也都是第二轮通过的,都经历了与竞选对手谈判和妥协的过程,最终赢得了浮动选民甚至对方阵营选民的支持。

Changes in the U.S. factor have facilitated the return of left-wing governance. After the Trump administration took office in early 2017, it adjusted its policy toward Latin America. On the one hand, it reduced aid to Latin America, adopted a "zero tolerance" policy toward illegal immigration, withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and signed the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), implementing economic and trade protectionism and unilateralism. On the other hand, it attacked left-wing governments in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, continuously increasing economic sanctions and blockades, and joined with right-wing countries to exert collective pressure on these three nations, undermining Latin American integration and squeezing out China, Russia, and other extra-regional forces in Latin America. This temporarily fueled a "left retreat, right advance" in Latin American regimes. However, the Trump administration's approach at that time—unwilling to offer Latin America "carrots" while brandishing the "big stick"—ultimately harmed the interests of Latin American people and intensified contradictions between Latin American countries and the United States. At the same time, the U.S. failure in Afghanistan conveyed the message that the "Northern Giant" was in decline. With the fall of the Trump administration, right-wing regimes in Latin America were successively replaced by left-wing ones. The Biden administration weakened the international environment of "maximum pressure" on left-wing regimes in Latin America that characterized the Trump era, which was conducive to the political pendulum in Latin America swinging leftward once again.

美国因素的变化助力左翼执政回归。2017年初美国特朗普政府上台后,对拉美的政策进行了调整,一方面,减少对拉美的援助,对非法移民“零容忍”,通过退出跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(TPP)和签署《美墨加协定》,实行经济和贸易的保护主义和单边主义,另一方面,打击古巴、委内瑞拉和尼加拉瓜等左翼政府,不断增加经济制裁和封锁,并联合右翼国家对这三国实行集体施压,破坏拉美地区的一体化,排挤中国、俄罗斯等在拉美的域外力量,从而助长了拉美政权暂时的“左退右进”。但当时特朗普政府的这种既不愿意给拉美“胡萝卜”又要挥舞“大棒”的做法,最终损害的是拉美民众的利益,激化了拉美国家与美国的矛盾。同时,美国在阿富汗的失败也传递了“北方巨人”正在衰落的信息。随着特朗普政府的下台,拉美右翼政权也纷纷被左翼替代。美国拜登政府弱化了特朗普政府时期对拉美左翼政权进行“极限施压”的国际环境,有利于拉美的政治钟摆再次向左转。

From the above, it can be seen that the institutional basis for the return of the left is the normalization of electoral politics, the fundamental cause is the long-standing poverty and inequality, the external causes are the outbreak of the pandemic and economic crisis, and the easing of "maximum pressure" from the United States on left-wing forces. Faced with worsening economic and social crises, right-wing governments were at a loss, while left-wing forces adopted flexible and pragmatic political strategies that adapted to voters' desire for change—this is the short-term internal cause. Looking at the internal logic among these causes, as long as the fundamental cause does not change significantly, a new cycle of alternation between left and right will occur again. The duration of the second wave of left-wing governance depends, in the short term, on its ability to cope with crises, and in the long term, on whether it achieves major breakthroughs in addressing poverty and inequality.

上述可见,左翼回归的制度基础是选举政治的常态化,根本原因是长期存在的贫困和不平等现象,外部原因是疫情和经济危机的发生、美国对左翼力量“极限施压”的减轻,而在不断加重的经济和社会危机面前右翼政府束手无措,左翼力量采取灵活实用的政治策略,适应了选民思变的心理则是短期的内因。从这些原因之间的内在逻辑看,只要根本原因没有较大改变,新的左右翼更替的周期将会再度发生。第二波左翼执政存在的时间长短,从短期看取决于其应对危机的能力,从长期看取决于其在解决贫困和不平等问题上是否有较大突破。

Challenges Facing the Second Wave of Left-Wing Governments in Latin American Countries

拉美国家第二波左翼政府执政面临的挑战

Although the second wave of left-wing governance in Latin America has become a fait accompli, compared with the first wave of left-wing governance, both domestic and international circumstances have changed considerably. As mentioned earlier, the commonality between the two waves is that they were both triggered by crises: the first was due to the crisis of neoliberal reform failures, and the second was due to the crisis caused by countries' poor management of the pandemic. Both crises stirred the desire for change among the middle and lower classes. However, the difference lies in the conditions after the two waves of left-wing governments took office. When the first wave of left-wing regimes emerged, it coincided with the period around the September 11 attacks. The focus of U.S. foreign policy shifted to counterterrorism, leaving it with no time to attend to Latin America. Latin American left-wing forces thus gained a development opportunity. Meanwhile, the acceleration of Chinese-path modernization brought demand for Latin American bulk commodities. Supported by export booms, left-wing leaders in Latin America were able to implement and expand social programs to meet the demands of the lower classes. After this wave of left-wing regimes came to power, Latin American governments face severe fiscal pressure from the pandemic's impact, soaring inflation triggered by the Ukraine crisis, and the threat of a global economic recession. Various uncertainties are increasing. At the same time, the social structure of Latin America has also changed significantly, with a notable increase in the proportion of the middle class, requiring more attention to their demands. Thus, left-wing governance faces more complex challenges:

尽管拉美第二波左翼执政已变为既成事实,但与第一波左翼执政浪潮相比,内外形势都发生了不小变化。如前所述,两波的共同点,都是因为危机而催生,上次是由于新自由主义改革失败的危机,这次是由于各国对疫情管理不善带来的危机,两次危机都激发了中下层民众渴望变革的诉求。但不同的是,两次左翼政府执政之后条件的差异。上一波左翼政权出现的时候,恰逢“9·11”事件前后,美国外交政策的重点转向了反恐,无暇顾及拉美,拉美左翼获得了一个发展机遇,而中国式现代化进程的加速,带来了对拉美大宗商品的需求,拉美左翼领导人在出口繁荣的支持下,能够实施和扩大社会计划,满足下层民众的诉求。而这一波左翼政权上台后,拉美政府面临受疫情打击财政压力大、乌克兰危机引发飙升的通货膨胀、全球经济衰退的威胁,各种不确定性都在增加,同时,拉美的社会结构也发生了明显变化,中间阶层的比重有明显增加,对中间阶层的诉求需要给予更多关注。由此,左翼执政面临着更加复杂的挑战:

Consolidating the foundation of the ruling party and achieving regime stability. In this wave of left-wing parties coming to power, many countries won by narrow margins. For example, Lula won Brazil with 50.8% of the vote against 49.2%; former Peruvian President Castillo won with 50.1% against 49.9%; and Colombia's Petro won with 50.4% against 47.4%. After taking office, many ruling parties do not hold a majority in the legislature. For instance, former Peruvian President Castillo's party won only 37 of the 130 seats in parliament; Boric's coalition held only 37 of 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 of 43 seats in the Senate; and the ruling party in Honduras won only 50 of 128 seats in parliament. This situation typically results in governments being overwhelmed by right-wing obstruction, making it difficult to pass bills and govern with difficulty. For example, Boric, who became president of Chile in March 2022, had an approval rating below 30%. In September 2022, voters overwhelmingly rejected the new draft constitution promoted by the Chilean government. Peru's Castillo faced two impeachment attempts by the opposition after taking office. To avoid further impeachment, he announced the dissolution of Congress on December 7, 2022, and the establishment of a special emergency government, but was subsequently detained by judicial authorities. The Peruvian Congress passed an impeachment motion against him, removing him from the presidency, and then-Vice President Dina Boluarte succeeded him as interim president. In Brazil, however, Lula promised after the election, "I will govern for 215 million Brazilians; there are not two Brazils." [8]8 This is a quotation from Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's victory speech after the 2022 Brazilian presidential election, in which he pledged to govern for all Brazilians, not just his supporters. Lula expressed a commitment to win support from people across social strata with more pragmatic and inclusive policies, striving to build national consensus on development, which is viewed favorably by outsiders. In Colombia, Petro has performed well in many aspects of domestic and foreign affairs. On the 100th day of his administration, a poll by the Colombian National Consulting Center showed that 62% of Colombian respondents approved of the current president's performance. The first two leaders mentioned lacked governing experience, while the latter two were experienced, indicating that governing capacity is crucial.

巩固执政党根基,实现政权的稳定。这一波左翼政党上台,有不少国家是以微弱多数取胜的,如巴西卢拉取胜的选票是50.8%对49.2%,秘鲁前总统卡斯蒂略是50.1%对49.9%,哥伦比亚佩特罗则是50.4%对47.4%。上台之后,不少执政党在立法机构中不占多数,如秘鲁前总统卡斯蒂略所在政党在议会130个席位中仅获37席,博里奇所在的联盟在众参两院分别仅占155席的37席和43席的4席,洪都拉斯的执政党在议会128个席位中仅获50席。这种状况带来的结果通常是政府疲于应付右翼掣肘,议案难以通过,施政举步维艰。例如,2022年3月担任智利总统的博里奇,支持率低于30%。2022年9月,选民普遍否决了智利政府推动的新宪法草案。秘鲁的卡斯蒂略上任后连续遭到两次反对派的弹劾,为避免再次遭到弹劾,他在2022年12月7日宣布解散国会,并建立特殊紧急政府,但随后被司法机构监禁,秘鲁国会通过对他的弹劾动议,解除其总统职务,由时任副总统迪娜·博卢阿特接任临时总统。但在巴西,卢拉在大选之后承诺“我将为2.15亿巴西人执政,不存在两个巴西”8。卢拉表示以更加务实、包容的政策争取跨阶层民众的支持,努力凝聚国家发展共识,被外界看好。在哥伦比亚,佩特罗上台之后,在内政外交方面有诸多良好的作为,在他执政百日之际,哥伦比亚国家咨询中心发布的一项民意调查显示,62%的哥伦比亚受访民众对现任总统的执政表现予以认可。上述前两位领导人缺少从政经验,后两位则经验丰富,这说明执政能力很重要。

Carrying out corresponding social reforms and fulfilling campaign promises. During the pandemic, Latin America experienced the most severe economic and social crisis in its history, with social conditions deteriorating across countries. For example, poverty levels rose sharply, income inequality worsened markedly, and the living conditions of the population, including the middle-income group, declined sharply. To maintain the legitimacy of their regimes, new governments must fulfill campaign promises, strengthen reforms in employment, education, healthcare, and the rights of minority groups, and maintain support for the most vulnerable families. However, to cope with the pandemic crisis and its social impact, governments have depleted their treasuries. The fiscal situation in most countries has deteriorated, with few public resources available. The budgetary room for new governments to implement social reforms is limited. As a Latin American scholar noted, during the first wave of left-wing governance, the prices of raw materials exported by most Latin American countries soared. "This allowed them to increase social spending and significantly reduce poverty. But without this external engine, these policies cannot be sustained." [9]9 This is a quotation from a Latin American scholar cited by the author, referring to the reliance of first-wave left-wing governments on commodity export revenues to fund social programs. Therefore, if left-wing governments want to ensure sustainable public fiscal expenditure, they need to find ways to expand fiscal revenue space, implement tax system reforms, and establish macroeconomic governance mechanisms to shorten the cycle of economic recession.

进行相应的社会改革,兑现竞选承诺。疫情期间,拉美经历了有史以来最严重的经济和社会危机,各国社会状况恶化,比如,贫困水平大幅上升,收入不平等明显加剧,包括中等收入群体人口的生活条件急剧下降。新政府如要维持政权的合法性,就必须兑现竞选承诺,加强对就业、教育、卫生、少数人群权利等方面的改革,保持对最脆弱家庭的扶持。但是,为应对疫情危机及其社会影响,各国政府都动用了国库,大多数国家的财政状况已经恶化,可利用的公共资源已经很少,新政府可用于实施社会改革的预算回旋余地不大,有拉美学者指出,在第一波左翼执政期间,大多数拉美国家出口的原材料价格飞涨。“这使他们能够增加社会支出并大量减少贫困。但是,如果没有这种外部引擎,就无法维持这些政策。”9因此,左翼政府如果要确保可持续的公共财政支出,就需要设法扩大财政收入空间,实施税收制度改革,并建立宏观经济治理机制,缩短经济衰退周期。

Promoting economic recovery and achieving economic growth. An important prerequisite for social reform is achieving economic growth. Although the current global economic situation remains severe and complex, Latin American countries can still hope to restore economic growth if they seize opportunities. First, the Ukraine crisis has caused a sharp rise in global prices of energy, grains, and other raw materials, while Latin America’s main exports are oil, soybeans, beef, coffee, and mineral products such as copper and iron. Some of the raw materials that European and American countries have embargoed from Russia can be replaced by Latin American products. The rise in oil prices has also brought vitality to Venezuela’s economy, even prompting subtle changes in U.S.-Venezuela relations. Second, the adjustment of the global trade pattern brings opportunities to Latin America through “nearshoring.” In April 2022, the U.S. House of Representatives proposed the Western Hemisphere Nearshoring Act. According to estimates by the Inter-American Development Bank, nearshoring could create an annual export value of US$780 billion for Latin America in the short to medium term, with Mexico potentially accounting for nearly half of that.[10]10 The Western Hemisphere Nearshoring Act is a U.S. legislative proposal aimed at encouraging the relocation of supply chains from Asia to Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, whether Latin American countries can keep pace with the current new technological revolution is very important. Latin American countries should reconsider their production policies and adjust their production models in a timely manner to quickly seize the opportunities of the current technological revolution. Particular attention should be paid to sectors that can change the production structure and have significant development potential, such as “energy transition, electric vehicles, circular economy, bioeconomy, healthcare manufacturing, digital transformation, care economy, sustainable tourism, micro, small and medium enterprises, and the social sharing economy.” This recommendation from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) points the direction for economic recovery in Latin American countries.

促进经济复苏,实现经济增长。社会改革的重要前提是实现经济增长,尽管当前全球经济形势依然严峻复杂,但拉美国家只要能够抓住机遇,仍有望恢复经济增长。首先,乌克兰危机使全球能源及谷物等原料价格大幅上涨,而拉美主要出口产品为石油、大豆、牛肉、咖啡,以及铜、铁等矿产品,欧美各国对俄罗斯禁运的原材料产品,部分可由拉美产品取代。石油价格的上涨也使委内瑞拉经济出现生机,甚至促使美委关系出现微妙变化。其次,全球贸易格局的调整通过“近岸外包”的形式为拉美带来机遇。2022年4月,美国众议院提出了《西半球近案外包法案》,据美洲开发银行估算,“近岸外包”在中短期内可为拉美创造价值780亿美元的年出口额,其中墨西哥有可能占近一半10。最后,拉美国家能否跟上当前新技术革命的步伐很重要。拉美国家应该重新考虑生产政策,适时改变生产模式,以迅速抓住当前技术革命的机遇。尤其要注意一些能够改变生产结构和具有较大发展潜力的部门,如“能源转型、电动汽车、循环经济、生物经济、医疗保健制造业、数字化转型、护理经济、可持续发展旅游业、中小微企业以及社会共享经济”等,拉加经委会这一建议为拉美国家的经济复苏指明了发展方向。

Changing the economic structure and social structure to promote the transformation of the development model. The focus of changing the economic structure is on improving productive forces, and the focus of changing the social structure is on breaking inequality. During the first wave of left-wing governance, left-wing politicians in Latin America such as Chávez, Morales, and Correa proposed a comprehensive alternative to neoliberalism, namely “21st-century socialism,” but this led to intense conflicts with conservative forces. The goals proposed by the new wave of left-wing governance are relatively moderate, focusing on promoting the transformation of the development model and advancing sustainable economic and social development. Many left-wing leaders have already paid close attention to how to reduce the environmental costs of economic growth and break away from the economic model of relying on exporting low-value-added products. Bolivia’s Arce government has stated that it will promote the country’s industrialization through import substitution. Argentina’s Fernández government hopes to promote industrial production and raise the level of manufacturing. These left-wing governments have all stated that they will transform the economic and production systems to create more and better job opportunities. In terms of social equality, Latin American left-wing governments have also noted that education should be transformed into a real driver of social mobility and economic growth, that gender inequality should be truly eliminated, and that the social security system should be advanced and improved. However, under the current domestic and international environment, for left-wing governments, achieving these goals is a long-term task, albeit a fundamental one.

改变经济结构和社会结构,促进发展模式的转型。经济结构的改变重在提高生产力,社会结构的改变重在打破不平等。第一波左翼执政时期,查韦斯、莫拉莱斯、科雷亚等拉美左翼政治家曾提出替代新自由主义的整体性方案,即“21世纪社会主义”,但与保守势力发生了激烈冲突。新一波左翼执政提出的目标则相对温和,重点放在了促进发展模式转型,推动可持续的经济和社会发展上。不少左翼领导人已经高度关注如何降低经济增长的环境成本,摆脱依赖出口低附加值产品的经济模式,玻利维亚的阿尔塞政府表示要依托进口替代推动本国的工业化,阿根廷的费尔南德斯政府希望促进工业生产,提高制造业水平。这些左翼政府都表示要改造经济和生产系统以创造更多更好的就业机会。在社会平等方面,拉美左翼政府也注意到,应该将教育转变为社会流动和经济增长的真正驱动力,要真正消除性别不平等,推进和完善社会保障制度。但是,在目前的内外环境之下,对左翼政府来说,这些目标的实现是长期的任务,尽管也是根本性的。

After the second wave of left-wing governance in Latin American countries, because their governance philosophies and policies differ from those of right-wing governments, there will be some different impacts both domestically and internationally.

拉美国家第二波左翼执政之后,由于执政理念与出台的政策与右翼政府的不同,对内和对外都将会产生一些不同的影响

The adjustment of domestic policies by left-wing governance will benefit the middle and lower classes. Left-wing governments usually emphasize the role of the state, advocate for social fairness, promote sustainable development, and stress that the pursuit of economic growth should not be the sole goal; rather, the rational distribution of wealth must also be pursued. One commonality among the second wave of left-wing leaders is their advocacy for addressing severe economic inequality and prioritizing the implementation of poverty reduction measures. Once these policies are implemented, they will improve the welfare of the middle and lower classes in society. For example, Colombian President Petro, in his first 100 days of governance, submitted several important bills to Congress, including the establishment of a Ministry of Equality, tax reform, the creation of land and peasant ownership, and a comprehensive peace law. He delivered 600 hectares of land to 50 peasant families, including land that had been seized by paramilitary groups. To help poor mothers improve their quality of life, he launched the “Mother Head of Household” social assistance program, providing each beneficiary with a monthly subsidy of 500,000 Colombian pesos. Bolivian President Arce made 10 economic commitments during his election campaign. One year after taking office, he had fulfilled three of them. These included, to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic, the government began distributing “hunger relief vouchers” in December 2020, with a standard of 1,000 Bolivianos per person. At the same time, the VAT refund system under Decree No. 1355 took effect, providing tax refunds for low-income individuals with an average monthly income equal to or less than 9,000 Bolivianos. Decree No. 1357 introduced a large wealth tax, covering taxation on high-value real estate, personal property, and income. Other commitments are being advanced. Similar measures by left-wing governments to improve income distribution and expand social rights will improve the situation of the middle and lower classes.

左翼执政对国内政策的调整,将会有利于中下阶层。左翼政府通常重视国家的作用,主张实现社会公平,促进可持续发展,强调不能单纯追求经济增长,更要追求财富合理分配。第二波左翼领导人的共同点之一是主张解决严重的经济不平等问题,并优先实施减贫措施。这一政策落地之后,将会提高社会中下阶层的福利。如哥伦比亚总统佩特罗在百日新政中,向国会提交了设立平等部、税收改革、建立土地和农民所有权、全面和平法等多项重要法案,向50户农民家庭交付了600公顷土地,其中包括被准军事组织剥夺的土地,为帮助贫困母亲改善生活质量,启动了“户主母亲”社会救助计划,每名受益者每月可获得50万比索补贴。玻利维亚总统阿尔塞在大选期间提出了10项经济承诺,上任一年之后完成了三项,包括为减轻疫情的负面影响,政府从2020年12月开始发放“饥饿救济券”,发放标准为每人1000玻利维亚诺,同时,第1355号增值税退税制度生效,平均月收入等于或低于9000玻利维亚诺的低收入人群享受退税;第1357号法规提出了大财富税,涉及对金额较高的房地产、个人财产及收入的征税。其他各项承诺正在推进之中。类似的左翼政府改善收入分配和扩大社会权利的举措将会改善中下阶层的处境。

Left-wing governance will promote regional integration. The first wave of left-wing governance once led to a proliferation of regional organizations, such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (2011), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (2004), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) (2004), and the Pacific Alliance (2011). However, during the subsequent period of right-wing governance, the activities of these regional organizations were greatly reduced. Given the difficulties of domestic governance, the second wave of left-wing regimes may be more inclined to strengthen their own power through regional cooperation. Currently, many left-wing governments have shown strong interest in reorganizing regional integration and promoting regional cooperation. For example, Argentine President Fernández currently holds the rotating presidency of MERCOSUR. In March 2021, President Fernández successfully hosted the 30th anniversary celebration of the founding of MERCOSUR and stated that he would further deepen cooperation within MERCOSUR during his term. In September 2021, Mexico successfully hosted the 6th Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Colombia has proposed revitalizing the Andean Community and allowing two former members that had withdrawn, Venezuela and Chile, to rejoin. Chilean President Boric has indicated that he will place greater emphasis on the Pacific Alliance. Shortly after taking office, at the 7th Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States held on January 24, 2023, Lula announced Brazil’s official return to the CELAC family (Brazil had announced a temporary withdrawal in 2019) and called for building a “regional community with a shared future.”

左翼执政将会促进地区一体化。第一波左翼执政曾经导致了区域性组织的激增,如拉美和加勒比国家共同体(简称“拉共体”)(2011年)、南美国家联盟(2004年)、美洲玻利瓦尔联盟(2004年)、太平洋联盟(2011年)等的建立,但随后的右翼执政期间,这些区域组织的活动大大减少。鉴于国内治理的困境,第二波左翼政权可能更加期待通过区域合作增强自身力量。目前,不少左翼政府对重整区域一体化和促进地区合作表现出浓厚兴趣。如阿根廷总统费尔南德斯现任南方共同市场轮值主席,费尔南德斯总统于2021年3月成功举办了南方共同市场成立30周年庆祝活动,并表示将在自己任内进一步深化南方共同市场内部的合作。2021年9月,墨西哥成功主办了第六届拉美和加勒比国家共同体首脑会议。哥伦比亚倡议重振安第斯共同体,让两个退出的老成员委内瑞拉和智利重新加入。智利总统博里奇表示更加重视太平洋联盟。卢拉上任不久,就在2023年1月24日召开的拉美和加勒比国家共同体第七届峰会上,宣布巴西正式回归拉共体大家庭(2019年巴西曾宣布暂时退出),并呼吁打造“区域命运共同体”。

Left-wing governance will strengthen cooperation with China. Left-wing governments generally have a higher degree of identification with China’s political system, party system, and ideology, and there is more common ground between the two sides. One of the five distinguishing features of Chinese-path modernization is “the modernization of common prosperity for all.” Many Latin American leftists have stated that the most attractive aspect of China’s development path is that it has ended absolute poverty, built a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and elevated the people’s living standards to a new level. Latin American leftists admire China’s achievements and hope to cooperate with China, learning from and drawing on China’s experience.

左翼执政将会加强与中国的合作。左翼政府通常对中国的政治制度、政党制度和意识形态认同程度较高,双方的共同语言更多。中国式现代化五个方面的中国特色之一是“全体人民共同富裕的现代化”,许多拉美左翼人士表示,中国发展道路最具有吸引力的地方就是终结了绝对贫困,全面建成了小康社会,让人民的生活迈上了新台阶。中国取得的成就让拉美左翼感到钦佩,希望与中国合作,学习和借鉴中国经验。

Left-wing governance will make the conditions for China-Latin America cooperation more favorable. In 2021, trade between China and Latin America reached a record US$451.591 billion, a year-on-year increase of 41.1%, and China continued to maintain its position as Latin America’s second-largest trading partner. The number of Latin American countries that have signed cooperation documents with China on jointly building the Belt and Road Initiative has reached 21. However, the coordination mechanisms and strategies between the two sides still need improvement. Left-wing governance will help revitalize Latin American regional integration organizations, thereby strengthening overall cooperation between China and Latin America. Of course, Chinese enterprises should also be fully psychologically prepared for the resource nationalist policies of some left-wing governments.

左翼执政会使中拉合作的条件更加有利。2021年中拉贸易额达到创纪录的4515.91亿美元,同比增长41.1%,中国继续保持拉美第二大贸易伙伴的地位。同中国签署共建“一带一路”合作文件的拉美国家已经达到21个。但是,双方的协调机构和协调战略仍有待完善。左翼执政有助于拉美地区一体化组织的活跃,从而有助于中拉整体合作的加强。当然,中国企业对某些左翼政府的资源民族主义政策也应该有充分的心理准备。

Left-wing governance is conducive to defusing US containment and disruption of China–Latin America relations. Compared with the first wave of left-wing administrations, this wave of left-wing governments adopts a more moderate and pragmatic attitude toward the United States. For example, Mexico’s López Obrador government signed the revised United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement with the US and Canada; Chilean President Boric stated that he would not take sides and would implement a balanced foreign policy in line with national interests; Brazilian President Lula expressed a desire to maintain equally good relations with both the US and China. However, compared with the right wing, the left wing has an anti-US tradition and does not hesitate to criticize US hegemonic foreign policy. For instance, at the Summit of the Americas held in June 2022, because the US did not invite government officials from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, Mexican President López was the first to criticize the US approach, and leaders of Mexico, Bolivia, Honduras, and other countries refused to attend the summit. On the Ukraine crisis, Brazilian President Lula pointed out in a media interview that the US and the European Union also bear responsibility for the outbreak of the crisis. Mexican President López stated that Mexico would remain neutral and criticized the US for being unwilling to allocate funds to support development in the Americas while spending money to support Ukraine, putting the cart before the horse. Colombian President Petro, in order to shake off US influence, announced in August 2022 the restoration of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela and criticized the US for listing Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, calling it “unjust.”

左翼执政有利于化解美国对中拉关系的遏制和破坏。与第一波左翼执政相比,尽管这一波左翼政府对美国的态度更加温和务实,如墨西哥洛佩斯·奥夫拉多尔政府与美国、加拿大签署了修订后的《美墨加协定》,智利总统博里奇表示不会选边站队,将实施符合本国利益的平衡外交,巴西总统卢拉表示希望能同美国和中国保持同样良好的关系。但与右翼相比,左翼具有反美传统,从不顾忌批评美国的霸权主义外交政策。如在2022年6月召开的美洲峰会上,由于美国不邀请古巴、委内瑞拉和尼加拉瓜的政府官员参会,墨西哥总统洛佩斯率先批评美国的做法,墨西哥、玻利维亚、洪都拉斯等国领导人拒绝参会。在乌克兰危机问题上,巴西总统卢拉曾在接受媒体采访时指出,美国和欧盟同样对危机爆发负有责任。墨西哥总统洛佩斯则表示,墨西哥将保持中立,并批评美国不愿意拿出资金支持美洲发展,却拿钱支持乌克兰,本末倒置。哥伦比亚总统佩特罗为了摆脱美国的影响,在2022年8月宣布哥伦比亚与委内瑞拉恢复外交关系,并批评美国将古巴列入支持恐怖主义的国家名单是“不公正的”。

(The author is a professor at the Center for Modern World History and the Center for Latin American Studies, Nankai University.)

(作者系南开大学世界近现代史研究中心、拉丁美洲研究中心教授 )

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑:张剑

Notes

  1. This refers to the period from the 1960s to the 1980s when many Latin American countries were under military dictatorships, such as those in Argentina (1976–1983), Chile (1973–1990), and Brazil (1964–1985). ↩
  2. These figures are cited from official or widely reported economic data for 2020, reflecting the severe contraction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. ↩
  3. The poverty and extreme poverty rates cited here are based on regional estimates from sources such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which reported a significant increase due to the pandemic. ↩
  4. The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of income or wealth inequality within a nation or a social group, ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). ↩
  5. The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of income or wealth inequality within a nation or a social group, ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). ↩
  6. Lula da Silva served as President of Brazil from 2003 to 2010; his social programs significantly reduced poverty. ↩
  7. This is a direct quotation from a Latin American scholar, cited by the author. ↩
  8. This is a quotation from Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's victory speech after the 2022 Brazilian presidential election, in which he pledged to govern for all Brazilians, not just his supporters. ↩
  9. This is a quotation from a Latin American scholar cited by the author, referring to the reliance of first-wave left-wing governments on commodity export revenues to fund social programs. ↩
  10. The Western Hemisphere Nearshoring Act is a U.S. legislative proposal aimed at encouraging the relocation of supply chains from Asia to Latin America and the Caribbean. ↩
  11. The Summit of the Americas is a periodic meeting of heads of state and government from countries in the Americas, organized by the Organization of American States; the 2022 summit was held in Los Angeles, USA.
  12. The US list of state sponsors of terrorism currently includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria; Cuba was added in 1982 and remains on the list despite diplomatic normalization under the Obama administration.