The Current Situation, Challenges and Prospects of the Nepalese Communist Movement as Seen from the 2022 General Election

In the 2022 general election, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (CPN-UML) [hereinafter “CPN-UML”] and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) (CPN-Maoist) [hereinafter “CPN-Maoist”] suffered defeats, placing second and third respectively, while the Nepali Congress became the largest party in parliament. After the election, the CPN-Maoist and the CPN-UML formed an alliance and then parted ways, instead cooperating with the Nepali Congress to form a coalition government. What are the reasons for this? What challenges will the Nepalese communist movement face?

在2022年大选中，尼泊尔共产党（联合马克思列宁主义）（CPN-UML）［以下简称“尼共（联合马列）”］与尼泊尔共产党（毛主义中心）（CPN-Maoist）［以下简称尼共（毛主义中心）］遭遇败绩，分别位列第二位、第三位，尼泊尔大会党（Nepali Congress）成为议会第一大党。大选后，尼共（毛主义中心）与尼共（联合马列）组建联盟后又分道扬镳，转而与尼泊尔大会党合作组建联合政府，内中的原因是什么？尼泊尔共产主义运动将面临哪些挑战？

I. The CPN-UML and the CPN-Maoist Suffer Defeat in the General Election

一、尼共（联合马列）与尼共（毛主义中心）大选遭遇败绩

The 2022 Nepalese general election was the second election held after the promulgation of Nepal’s new constitution. In the first election after the new constitution, held in 2017, the left-wing alliance formed by the CPN-UML and the CPN-Maoist won 174 seats in the House of Representatives, achieving an absolute majority, and came to power on 15 February 2018. In May 2018, the CPN-UML and the CPN-Maoist merged to form the Nepal Communist Party. In the same month, CPN-UML Chairman Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli and CPN-Maoist Chairman Prachanda signed an agreement under which Oli would serve as Prime Minister first and hand the position over to Prachanda after two and a half years. On 20 November 2019, Oli and Prachanda again reached a power-sharing agreement, stipulating that Oli would lead the government for a full five-year term while Prachanda would manage Party affairs as “Executive Chairman,” but Oli did not abide by this agreement. Prachanda then insisted that Oli honour the original agreement and rotate the prime ministerial post, but Oli refused. As intra-party conflict intensified, on 20 December 2020, at Oli’s request in an emergency cabinet meeting to dissolve the House of Representatives, Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari announced the dissolution of the House. On 23 February 2021, the Supreme Court of Nepal ruled that the previous year’s dissolution of the House was invalid and ordered the government to reconvene the House within 13 days. In March 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that, due to duplicate registration names, the Nepal Communist Party registered in May 2018 was invalid, and the Nepal Communist Party split back into the independent CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist, with the communist government reverting to a coalition government of the two parties. In a confidence vote in the House of Representatives on 10 May, Oli failed to secure a majority of support and became caretaker Prime Minister under the constitution. On 12 July, the Supreme Court of Nepal ruled to restore the earlier decision of 22 May to dissolve the House of Representatives, which had been proposed by Prime Minister Oli and approved by President Bhandari, while appointing Nepali Congress Chairman Sher Bahadur Deuba as Prime Minister.

2022年尼泊尔大选是尼泊尔新宪法颁布后举行的第二次大选。在2017年举行的尼泊尔新宪法颁布后的第一次大选中，尼共（联合马列）和尼共（毛主义中心）组成的左翼联盟获得了174个众议院席位，达到了绝对多数，并于2018年2月15日上台执政。2018年5月，尼共（联合马列）和尼共（毛主义中心）合并，组建尼泊尔共产党。同月，尼共（联合马列）主席卡德加·普拉萨德·夏尔马·奥利（Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli）与尼共（毛主义中心）主席普拉昌达（Prachanda）签订协议，奥利先担任总理，在两年半后将该职位交给普拉昌达。2019年11月20日，奥利与普拉昌达再次达成权力分享协议，协议规定奥利将领导政府满五年任期，普拉昌达将以“执行主席”的身份管理党务，但奥利没有遵守这一协议。普拉昌达随后坚持要求奥利遵守最初的协议，实现总理职位的轮换，但遭到了奥利的拒绝。随着党内冲突的加剧，2020年12月20日，应奥利在内阁紧急会议上提请解散众议院的要求，尼泊尔总统班比迪娅·戴维·班达里（Bidhya Devi Bhandari）宣布解散众议院。2021年2月23日，尼泊尔最高法院经裁定宣布，上一年解散众议院的做法无效，命令尼泊尔政府在13天内重启众议院。2021年3月，尼泊尔最高法院裁定，由于注册名称重复的原因，2018年5月注册成立的尼泊尔共产党无效，尼泊尔共产党又分裂回尼共（联合马列）和尼共（毛主义中心）各自独立的状态，尼共政府恢复为尼共（联合马列）与尼共（毛主义中心）两党联合政府。在5月10日举行的众议院信任投票中，奥利未能获得半数以上的支持票，根据宪法规定成为看守政府总理。7月12日，尼泊尔最高法院裁决恢复此前5月22日由奥利总理提请建议、班达里总统批准解散众议院的决定，同时任命尼泊尔大会党主席谢尔·巴哈杜尔·德乌帕（Sher Bahadur Deuba）为政府总理。

On 13 May 2022, according to a decision of the Nepalese cabinet, local elections were held as scheduled. Among 753 local election units, the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML, and the CPN-Maoist won 13,773, 11,929, and 5,045 positions respectively, ranking first, second, and third. On 4 August 2022, the Nepalese cabinet decided to hold federal parliament and provincial assembly elections on 20 November 2022. On 27 April, former ruling coalition members—the Nepali Congress, the CPN-Maoist, the CPN (Unified Socialist), the Lokatantrik Samajwadi Party, and the Rashtriya Janamorcha—formed an electoral alliance before the local elections. On 9 October, the CPN-UML, the Janata Samajwadi Party, and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party formed an electoral alliance. In the direct elections for provincial assemblies, the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML, and the CPN-Maoist placed first, second, and third with 112, 91, and 53 seats respectively. In the House of Representatives elections, the Nepali Congress won 89 seats (57 directly elected seats, 32 proportional representation seats), the CPN-UML won 78 seats (44 directly elected seats, 34 proportional representation seats), and the CPN-Maoist won 32 seats (18 directly elected seats, 14 proportional representation seats), ranking first, second, and third respectively. Looking at the election results, in the local, provincial, and federal elections, the Nepali Congress ranked first, whereas in the 2017 election it had ranked second, third, and second respectively. In the House of Representatives election, the total seats of the CPN-UML and the CPN-Maoist decreased from 174 seats five years earlier to 110 seats, a drop of 23.2 percentage points; among these, the CPN-UML lost 43 seats and the CPN-Maoist lost 21 seats. Meanwhile, the Nepali Congress rose from 63 seats to 89 seats, an increase of 26 seats, rising by nearly 10 percentage points (see Table 1).

2022年5月13日，根据尼泊尔内阁会议决定，尼泊尔地方选举如期举行。在753个地方选举单位中，尼泊尔大会党、尼共（联合马列）、尼共（毛主义中心）分别获得13773个、11929个和5045个职位，分别位居第一名、第二名和第三名。2022年8月4日，尼泊尔内阁会议决定2022年11月20日举行联邦议会和省议会选举。4月27日，原执政联盟成员尼泊尔大会党、尼共（毛主义中心)、尼共(统一社会主义者)（CPN-Unified Socialist）、民主社会党（Lokatantrik Samajwadi Party）、全国人民阵线（Rashtriya Janamorcha）在地方选举前组建了选举联盟。10月9日，尼共（联合马列）、人民社会党（Janata Samajwadi Party）、民族民主党（Rastriya Prajatantra Party）组建了选举联盟。在省议会的直接选举中，尼泊尔大会党、尼共（联合马列）、尼共（毛主义中心）分别以112席、91席、53席居第一名、第二名和第三名。在众议院的选举中，尼泊尔大会党获89席（直接选举议席57席，比例选举议席32席）、尼共（联合马列）获78席（直接选举议席44席，比例选举议席34席）、尼共（毛主义中心）获32席（直接选举议席18席，比例选举议席14席），分别位居第一名、第二名和第三名。从选举结果看，在地方、省和联邦选举中，尼泊尔大会党都位列第一，而在2017年的大选中，尼泊尔大会党则分别位列在第二位、第三位和第二位。在众议院选举中，尼共（联合马列）和尼共（毛主义中心）的总席位相比于五年前的174个席位减少到110个席位，下降了23.2个百分点，其中，尼共（联合马列）减少了43席，尼共（毛主义中心）减少了21席。而尼泊尔大会党则从63席升到了89席，增加了26席，上升到了近10个百分点（见表1）。

II. The CPN-UML and the CPN-Maoist Briefly Cooperate and Then Split Again

二、尼共（联合马列）与尼共（毛主义中心）短暂合作后又再度分裂

Before the general election on 20 November 2022, Deuba and Prachanda reached an agreement to share the post of prime minister. However, after the election, given that the Nepali Congress became the largest party and won far more seats than the CPN (Maoist Centre), Deuba decided to break the power-sharing agreement with Prachanda. The Nepali Congress believed that how the state should reflect the people's wishes was the most important issue. Only by respecting the people's vote could the goals of stability, development, and progress be achieved. Allowing another party or the CPN (Maoist Centre) to lead the next government would go against the will of the voters, because the Nepali Congress had become the largest party in parliament. Leaders close to Deuba also incited him to take a hardline stance; Nepali Congress Vice President Bimalendra Nidhi assured Deuba that if he continued as prime minister, he would receive India's support. Deuba's wife, Arzu, held a similar view. They also told Deuba that it made no sense to let the leader of the third-largest party become prime minister. Moreover, due to the discord between Prachanda and Oli, Deuba and his supporters believed that the CPN (Maoist Centre) could not cooperate again with the CPN (UML) and would have no choice but to accept Deuba's position rather than break with the Nepali Congress. On 25 December 2022, when the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the Nepali Congress still could not reach a consensus on power-sharing, Prachanda, together with leaders of the Rastriya Swatantra Party, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, the People's Socialist Party, the Janamat Party, and the Nagrik Unmukti Party, rushed to the residence of CPN (UML) Chairman Oli to seek support. Oli and Prachanda agreed that Prachanda would serve as prime minister for the first two and a half years, while the CPN (Maoist Centre) would support the CPN (UML)-nominated candidates for president and speaker, and would hand over the prime minister's post to Oli after two and a half years. Ultimately, before the deadline, a seven-party agreement was reached to jointly form a new government led by Prachanda. Prachanda then went to the President's Office with the support of 169 lawmakers, comprising all seven-party MPs and three independent MPs, to claim the post of prime minister.

2022年11月20日大选前，德乌帕与普拉昌达达成分享总理职位的协议。但在大选后，鉴于尼泊尔大会党成为第一大党，且所获议席远多于尼共（毛主义中心），德乌帕决定打破与普拉昌达的权力分享协议。尼泊尔大会党认为，国家应该如何反映人民的愿望是最重要的问题。只有尊重人民的投票，才能实现稳定、发展、进步的目标。允许另一个政党或尼共（毛主义中心）领导下一届政府将违背选民的意愿，因为尼泊尔大会党已经成为议会的第一大党。与德乌帕关系密切的领导人也煽动他采取强硬立场，尼泊尔大会党副主席比马伦德拉·尼迪（Bimalendra Nidhi）向德乌帕保证，如果他继续担任总理，他将得到印度的支持。德乌帕的妻子阿尔祖（Arzu）也持类似的观点。他们还告诉德乌帕，让第三大党领袖成为总理毫无意义。此外，由于普拉昌达与奥利之间的不和，德乌帕及其支持者相信，尼共（毛主义中心）不可能与尼共（联合马列）再度合作，只有接受德乌帕的立场，不会选择与尼泊尔大会党决裂。2022年12月25日，在尼共（毛主义中心）与尼泊尔大会党关于权力分享仍无法达成共识的情况下，普拉昌达与民族独立党（Rastriya Swatantra Party）、民族民主党、人民社会党、民意党（Janamat Party）、人民自由党（Nagrik Unmukti Party）领导人赶到尼共（联合马列）主席奥利的住所寻求支持。奥利与普拉昌达商定，由普拉昌达先担任两年半总理，同时，尼共（毛主义中心）支持尼共（联合马列）提名的总统和议长候选人，并在两年半后将总理职位交给奥利。最终，在最后期限到来之前，七党达成共同组建由普拉昌达领导的新政府的协议，随后普拉昌达在七党全体议员和3位独立议员组成的169位议员的支持下到达总统府，要求担任总理职位。

On 26 December 2022, Prachanda was sworn in as Prime Minister of Nepal for the third time at the President's Office. After Prachanda broke with Deuba, the Nepali Congress lost the opportunity to hold the posts of president, prime minister, and speaker. To break the alliance between the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) and gain an advantage in the subsequent presidential election, on 10 January 2023, the opposition Nepali Congress voted in favour of Prime Minister Prachanda in a confidence vote. Prachanda received the support of 268 of the 270 MPs present in the House of Representatives, winning the confidence vote with more than a two-thirds majority. Prachanda then began to emphasise the election of a new president based on national consensus, and claimed that no agreement had been reached to hand the presidency to the CPN (UML). This intensified the distrust between Oli and Prachanda, causing cracks to appear in the ruling coalition. On 25 February 2023, an eight-party alliance, consisting of the original ruling coalition members—the CPN (Maoist Centre), the Nepali Congress, the CPN (Unified Socialist), the Democratic Socialist Party, the Rastriya Janamorcha—along with the Janamat Party, the Nagrik Unmukti Party, and the Rastriya Swatantra Party, decided to support Nepali Congress candidate Ram Chandra Paudel in the presidential election. That same day, the CPN (UML) nominated its vice chairman, Subas Chandra Nembang, as its presidential candidate. Because Nepal's presidential election follows an electoral college system, with the president decided by a vote of the electoral college, out of 52,628 electoral college votes, the eight parties held 31,821 votes, meaning the eight-party alliance's votes would easily exceed the required number. On 27 February, the CPN (UML), seeing no hope of securing majority support for its presidential candidate, announced its withdrawal from the government and withdrew its support for the government led by Prachanda. On 20 March, the House of Representatives held a second confidence vote for the prime minister. With the support of the eight-party alliance, Prachanda received the support of 172 of the 262 MPs present, exceeding the constitutional threshold of 138 votes, and again won the confidence vote.

2022年12月26日，普拉昌达在总统府第三次宣誓就任尼泊尔总理。在普拉昌达与德乌帕决裂后，尼泊尔大会党失去了担任总统、总理、议长职位的机会。为了打破尼共（毛主义中心）与尼共（联合马列）的联盟，并在随后的总统选举上赢得先机，2023年1月10日，作为反对党的尼泊尔大会党在对普拉昌达总理的信任投票中投了信任票，普拉昌达也获得了出席众议院的270名议员中的268名的支持，赢得了超过2/3多数的信任投票。普拉昌达开始强调在全国共识的基础上选举新总统，并声称没有就将总统职位交给尼共（联合马列）达成协议，这也加剧了奥利和普拉昌达之间的不信任，使执政联盟开始出现裂痕。2023年2月25日，原执政联盟成员尼共（毛主义中心)、尼泊尔大会党、尼共(统一社会主义者)、民主社会党、全国人民阵线与民意党、人民自由党和民族独立党组成的八党联盟决定在总统选举中支持尼泊尔大会党候选人拉姆·钱德拉·保德尔（Ram Chandra Paudel）。当天，尼共（联合马列）也提名该党副主席苏巴斯·昌德·内姆邦（Subas Chandra Nembang）作为总统候选人。由于尼泊尔总统选举遵循选举人团制度，总统由选举人团投票决定，在52628张选举人团选票中，8个政党拥有31821张选票，这样八党联盟的选票将很容易超过要求的票数。2月27日，尼共（联合马列）在争取多数政党支持本党提名的总统候选人无望的情况下，宣布退出政府，撤回对普拉昌达领导的政府的支持。3月20日，尼泊尔众议院举行第二次总理信任投票，普拉昌达在八党联盟的支持下，获得了出席众议院的262名议员中的172名的支持，超过了宪法规定的138票的门槛，再次赢得总理信任投票。

III. Challenges Facing the Nepalese Communist Movement

三、尼泊尔共产主义运动面临的挑战

Since the establishment of the federal democratic republic in 2008, Nepal has held four general elections. This election has revealed that the Nepalese communist movement faces not only the old problems encountered in previous elections but also more severe new challenges.

自2008年实行民主共和制以来，尼泊尔先后举行了四次大选。此次大选暴露出尼泊尔共产主义运动既面临着前几次大选所面临的老问题，同时也要面对更为严峻的新挑战。

(I) The Nepalese communist movement faces the challenge of a fragmented party landscape

（一）尼泊尔共产主义运动面临政党格局碎片化的挑战

The rise and development of the Nepalese communist movement greatly advanced the Nepalese people's struggle for national independence and liberation, enabling Nepal to shake off the rule of feudalism and colonialism. This is also the fundamental reason why the Nepalese communist parties have won broad popular support and become mainstream political forces in Nepal. After the Nepalese parliament abolished the monarchy and adopted a republic in 2008, the broad masses of the Nepalese people also hoped that, under the leadership of the Nepalese communist parties, they could achieve political stability, economic development, and the goal of building a better Nepal. Since 2008, in Nepal's four general elections, the average proportion of total seats won by the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) has exceeded 50%, which is a concentrated reflection of this expectation. However, in the 14 years from the first Constituent Assembly election in 2008 to the present, Nepal has changed eleven governments. Although the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) have led the government several times, none has served a full term of more than one year. The Nepal Communist Party government, which was hailed by all sectors of Nepalese society as the most stable government in nearly 30 years, also collapsed after three and a half years due to the infighting between Oli and Prachanda. During their periods in power, problems such as political instability and lagging economic development were not only fundamentally unresolved, but the two parties were also frequently exposed to negative news, drawing widespread criticism from the Nepalese people. In their election campaigns, the emerging parties emphasised free healthcare, free education, effective implementation of constitutional provisions, full realisation of the fundamental rights stipulated in Nepal's Constitution, elimination of corruption, job creation, and promotion of sustainable economic development. In contrast, the agendas in the election manifestos of the mainstream parties remained consistent from one election to the next; they were always preoccupied with power games and were slow to respond to the people's problems.

尼泊尔共产主义运动的兴起和发展，极大地推动了尼泊尔人民争取民族独立和解放的斗争，使尼泊尔摆脱了封建主义和殖民主义的统治，这也是尼泊尔共产主义政党获得广大民众的支持，成为尼泊尔主流政治势力的根本原因。2008年尼泊尔议会宣布废除君主制、实行共和制后，尼泊尔广大民众也期盼能够在尼泊尔共产主义政党的带领下，实现政局稳定、经济发展、建设一个更加美好的尼泊尔的目标。2008年以来，在尼泊尔的四次大选中，尼共（毛主义中心）和尼共（联合马列）所获得的议席占总议席比例的平均值超过了50%，正是对这种期盼的集中反映。但从2008年第一届制宪议会选举至今的14年间，尼泊尔更换了十一届政府，尽管尼共（毛主义中心）、尼共（联合马列）先后多次领导政府，但都没有超过一年的任期。被尼泊尔各界寄予厚望、被称为近30年来尼泊尔最稳定政府的尼泊尔共产党政府，在维持了三年半后，也因奥利和普拉昌达的内斗而解体。在执政期间，政局不稳、经济发展滞后等问题不仅没有得到根本解决，而且两党被频繁曝光的负面新闻等也饱受尼泊尔民众诟病。在竞选活动中，新兴政党强调免费保健、免费教育、有效执行宪法规定、全面落实尼泊尔《宪法》所规定的基本权利、消除腐败、创造就业机会、推动经济可持续发展等。而主流政党的选举宣言中的议程在一次选举到另一次选举之间保持一致，他们总是忙于权力博弈，对人民的问题反应迟钝。

The growing disappointment of the Nepalese populace with mainstream political parties, including the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML), has led to a sustained decline in voter enthusiasm. In this election, a total of 17,988,570 people were eligible to vote, but only 61.85% actually cast ballots, nearly 9 percentage points lower than expected, and also setting the lowest record for parliamentary election turnout since the restoration of the multiparty system in 1990 (see Table 2). To express dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, on the eve of the provincial and federal parliamentary elections, a “Not, No More” campaign was launched on Nepalese social media, calling on voters to use their voting rights wisely and not to vote for leaders of mainstream parties, in order to elect new, capable leaders to establish a reasonable system. In the general election, the National Independent Party, formed in June 2022 by television star Rabi Lamichhane, won 20 seats, becoming the fourth-largest party. The regional nationalist parties—the People’s Party and the People’s Freedom Party, founded in 2019 and 2022 respectively—also won 6 and 3 seats respectively. Meanwhile, the long-established National Democratic Party, which had been dormant for a time and, due to its advocacy for a return to a Hindu state and monarchy, won only one seat in the 2017 general election, received support from some voters in the 2022 general election, winning 14 seats and becoming the fifth-largest party. As the fragmentation of the party landscape intensifies, the party political pattern dominated by mainstream parties has also begun to differentiate and realign. In this general election, the seats won by the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) in the House of Representatives accounted for only 40% of the total seats, 23 percentage points lower than in 2017 (see Table 3). In the 2017 general election, only nine parties entered the House of Representatives, and five parties received more than 3% of the proportional representation votes, becoming national parties, whereas in the 2022 general election, twelve parties entered the House of Representatives, and seven became national parties. This indicates that the fragmentation of the party landscape has begun to erode the mass base of the two major parties. With the rise of constitutionalist, Hindu nationalist, and regional nationalist parties within Nepal, the future development of the Nepalese communist movement will face severe challenges.

尼泊尔民众对包括尼共（毛主义中心）、尼共（联合马列）在内的主流政党日益失望导致了选民投票热情持续走低。本次选举共有17988570人拥有投票权，但真正参加投票的选民只占61.85%，比预期少了近9个百分点，同时也创下了自1990年恢复多党制以来议会选举投票率最低的纪录（见表2）。为表达对主流政党的不满，在省议会和联邦议会选举即将开始之际，尼泊尔社交媒体发起了“不，不再”运动，呼吁选民明智地使用投票权，不要投票给主流政党的领导人，以选举新的有能力的领导人来建立一个合理的制度。在大选中，由电视明星拉比·拉米哈内（Rabi Lamichhane）在2022年6月组建的民族独立党获得了20个议席，成为第四大党。分别于2019年和2022年成立的地区民族主义政党——民意党、人民自由党也分别获得了6席和3席。而一度沉寂、因主张回归印度教国家和君主制在2017年大选中只获得1个议席的老牌政党民族民主党，在2022年大选中却得到了部分选民的支持，获得了14个议席，成为第五大党。随着政党格局碎片化的加剧，由主流政党主导的政党政治格局也开始分化重组。此次大选，尼共（毛主义中心）和尼共（联合马列）所获得的众议院议席只占总议席40%，比2017年少了23个百分点（见表3）。2017年大选，只有9个政党进入众议院，5个政党获得3%以上的比例代表制选票，成为全国性政党，而2022年大选则有12个政党进入众议院，7个政党成为全国性政党。这表明政党格局碎片化已经开始销蚀两党的群众基础。随着尼泊尔国内宪政主义、印度教民族主义、地区民族主义政党的崛起，尼泊尔共产主义运动的未来发展将面临严峻挑战。

(II) Disputes over Real Interests Continue to Plague the Development of the Nepalese Communist Movement

（二）现实利益纷争继续困扰尼泊尔共产主义运动的发展

The Nepalese communist movement has long been plagued by disputes over real interests. After the first Constituent Assembly election in 2008, on the issue of the presidential election, the CPN (UML) nominated the party’s former General Secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, as its presidential candidate, but the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [hereinafter CPN (Maoist)] first supported and then put forward its own candidate, which led to the successful election of Ram Baran Yadav, nominated by the Nepali Congress. Although the CPN (UML) joined the new government led by the CPN (Maoist) in August 2008, differences arose between the two sides over the integration of the CPN (Maoist)-led People’s Liberation Army with the Nepalese Army and the issue of dismissing the Chief of Army Staff, Katawal, who opposed the integration, ultimately leading to the collapse of the coalition government of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [hereinafter UCPN (Maoist)]. In February 2011, CPN (UML) Chairman Jhala Nath Khanal was elected Prime Minister with the support of the UCPN (Maoist). After taking office, Khanal was unable to reach a consensus with the UCPN (Maoist) on the issue of army integration and had to announce his resignation on August 15. On May 5, 2016, Prachanda and Oli reached an agreement, with both sides agreeing that after the formation of a future national consensus government, Prachanda would serve as Prime Minister. However, because Oli reneged and refused to recognize this agreement, the CPN (Maoist Centre) withdrew from the coalition government led by Oli, triggering the collapse of the Oli government. In May 2018, the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) merged to form the Nepal Communist Party, but the party split due to internal strife between Oli and Prachanda. The struggle over real interests has severely weakened the strength of the Nepalese communist movement and has had a detrimental impact on its further development.

尼泊尔共产主义运动长期以来一直受到现实利益纷争的困扰。2008年第一届制宪议会选举后，在总统选举问题上，尼共（联合马列）提名该党前总书记马达夫·库玛尔·尼帕尔（Madhav Kumar Nepal）作为总统候选人，但尼泊尔共产党(毛主义)［以下简称尼共（毛）］先是支持而后又推出了自己的候选人，这导致了尼泊尔大会党提名的拉姆·巴兰·亚达夫（Ram Baran Yadav）成功当选。虽然尼共(联合马列)于2008年8月加入尼共（毛）领导的新政府，但在双方因在尼共（毛）领导的人民解放军与尼泊尔军队的整合问题以及解除反对军队整合的尼泊尔陆军参谋长卡特瓦尔（Katawal）职务问题上存在分歧，最终导致了尼泊尔联合共产党(毛主义)［以下简称尼联共（毛）］联合政府的垮台。2011年2月，尼共（联合马列）主席贾拉·纳特·卡纳尔(Jhala Nath Khanal)在尼联共(毛)的支持下当选总理。卡纳尔上任后，由于无法与尼联共（毛）在军队整编问题上达成共识，不得不于8月15日宣布辞职。2016年5月5日，普拉昌达与奥利达成协议，双方同意在未来全国共识政府成立后，由普拉昌达担任政府总理。但由于奥利反悔不愿承认这一协议，导致了尼共（毛主义中心）退出奥利领导的联合政府，引发了奥利政府的垮台。2018年5月，尼共（联合马列）和尼共（毛主义中心）合并为尼泊尔共产党，但尼共由于奥利与普拉昌达的内斗而分裂。现实利益之争严重削弱了尼泊尔共产主义运动的力量，对其进一步发展造成了不良影响。

In this instance, the ruling coalition of the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) split again, with Prachanda’s desire for the post of Prime Minister and the CPN (UML)’s desire for the post of President and control of the government still being the main factors of real interest considerations. Since the Speaker of the Nepalese House of Representatives, Devraj Ghimire, and the Chairperson of the National Assembly, Ganesh Timilsina, as well as the heads of the main constitutional bodies—the Election Commission, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, and the National Human Rights Commission—were all nominated by the CPN (UML), while the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, Indira Rana, was nominated by the National Independent Party, considered an ally of the CPN (UML). According to the power-sharing agreement reached between Prachanda and Oli, Oli would serve as Prime Minister after two and a half years. If the CPN (UML) were to also obtain the presidency, it would dominate all important positions, which would severely weaken the dominant position of the CPN (Maoist Centre) in the government. If Prachanda were to disregard the power-sharing agreement with Oli and instead support the candidate of the Nepali Congress for President, the CPN (Maoist Centre) could not only strive to obtain more ministerial positions in key departments within the government but also, with the support of the Nepali Congress during his tenure as Prime Minister, make decisions in line with his party’s interests. Based on considerations of its own interests, Prachanda chose to violate the already-reached agreement with Oli, leading to another split in the ruling coalition. Whether they can proceed from the overall situation of the development of the Nepalese communist movement, strengthen unity and cooperation, and transcend the barriers of real interests will be a major test facing the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML).

此次尼共（毛主义中心）和尼共（联合马列）执政联盟再次分裂，普拉昌达渴望得到总理职位以及尼共（联合马列）想要得到总统职位并掌控政府的现实利益考量仍然是主要因素。由于尼泊尔众议院议长德夫拉杰·吉米雷（Devraj Ghimire）和联邦院主席加内什·蒂米尔西纳（Ganesh Timilsina）以及主要的宪法机构——选举委员会、滥用权力调查委员会、国家人权委员会的主席都是尼共（联合马列）提名的，而众议院副议长英迪拉·拉纳(Indira Rana)则是由被视为尼共（联合马列）盟友的民族独立党提名的。根据普拉昌达和奥利达成的权力分享协议，奥利将在两年半后担任总理。如果尼共（联合马列）再获得总统职位，它将主导所有重要职位，这样将会严重削弱尼共（毛主义中心）在政府中的主导地位。如果不顾及与奥利的权力分享协议转而支持尼泊尔大会党的候选人担任总统，尼共（毛主义中心）不仅可以在政府中争取获得更多重要部门的部长职位，而且普拉昌达在担任总理期间还能够在大会党的支持下作出符合其政党利益的决定。基于对自身利益的考虑，普拉昌达选择了违背与奥利已达成的协议，导致了执政联盟的再度分裂。能否从尼泊尔共产主义运动发展的大局出发，通过加强团结合作跨越现实利益的藩篱，将是尼共（毛主义中心）和尼共（联合马列）所面临的重大考验。

(III) The Nepalese Communist Movement Still Faces Interference from External Forces

（三）尼泊尔共产主义运动仍受到外部势力的干预

As a neighbor of Nepal, India has regarded itself as the hegemon of South Asia since independence and has treated Nepal as its sphere of influence. Since 2008, as the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (Unified Marxist–Leninist) have come to power multiple times, the previously stable Nepal–India relationship has begun to fluctuate. In August 2008, when then-CPN (Maoist) Chairman Prachanda became prime minister, he made his first official visit to China, breaking the convention that a Nepalese prime minister must first visit India after taking office, which aroused strong dissatisfaction in India. During Prime Minister Oli’s tenure from 2015 to 2016, India imposed a border blockade on Nepal because the Oli government refused to amend the constitution to meet the demands of Nepal’s Indian-origin Madhesi people. Oli adopted a tough stance toward India to defend national sovereignty, plunging Nepal–India relations into a state of tension. In contrast, when leaders of the Nepali Congress Party became prime minister, bilateral relations improved. Therefore, India believes that Nepal’s communist parties are pro-China and anti-India, and that only the Nepali Congress Party in power is favorable to India. Consequently, the Indian government has made manipulating the struggles among the top leaders of the CPN behind the scenes and supporting the Nepali Congress Party to take power its main means of influencing Nepal’s political situation. India played a behind-the-scenes role in the fall of the coalition government led by Prachanda’s UCPN (Maoist) and the CPN (UML) in May 2009, the fall of the coalition government led by Oli’s CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) in July 2016, and the victory of the Nepali Congress Party in the election for the second Constituent Assembly in November 2013. [18]18 The UCPN (Maoist) was the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), which later split and renamed itself the CPN (Maoist Centre). The CPN (UML) is the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist). The Nepali Congress Party is a centrist, social-democratic party. From October to November 2020, as the internal struggle among the top leadership of the CPN intensified, the Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau, Samant Goel, the Chief of the Indian Army Staff, MM Naravane, and the Foreign Secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, visited Nepal one after another, accelerating the split of the CPN. After the 2022 general election, India pressured the Nepali Congress Party to prevent Prachanda from becoming the prime minister of the new government as much as possible. After this plan failed, breaking up the ruling coalition between the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) again became India’s primary task in its post-election strategy for Nepal. On February 13 and February 18, 2023, Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra, four former Indian Army Chiefs of Staff, and the current Indian Army Chief of Staff, General Manoj Pande, visited Nepal one after another, ultimately accelerating the dissolution of the ruling coalition between the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML).

作为尼泊尔的邻国，印度独立后一直自认为是南亚霸主，把尼泊尔作为自己的势力范围。2008年以来，随着尼共（毛主义中心）与尼共（联合马列）多次上台执政，一直比较稳定的尼印关系也开始出现波动。2008年8月，时任尼共（毛）主席普拉昌达担任总理后首访中国，打破了尼泊尔总理上任后必先访问印度的惯例，引起了印度的强烈不满。2015年—2016年在奥利担任总理的任期内，印度因奥利政府拒绝尼泊尔的印度裔马迪西人修改宪法的要求，对尼泊尔进行了边境封锁，奥利对印度采取了强硬态度以维护国家主权，使尼印关系陷入了紧张状态。而在尼泊尔大会党领导人担任总理后，双方关系则有所改善。因此，印度认为，尼泊尔共产主义政党是亲中国的和反印度的，尼泊尔大会党执政才有利于印度。印度政府也由此将在幕后操纵尼共高层领导斗争，扶持尼泊尔大会党执政，作为其影响尼泊尔政局的主要手段。2009年5月普拉昌达领导的尼联共（毛）与尼共（联合马列）联合政府和2016年7月奥利领导的尼共（联合马列）与尼共（毛主义中心）联合政府的倒台，以及2013年11月尼泊尔大会党在第二届制宪议会选举中获胜，印度都起到了幕后推手的作用。2020年10月至11月，在尼共党内高层斗争愈发激烈之际，印度情报机构调查分析局局长萨曼特·戈尔（Samant Goel）、印度陆军总司令纳拉瓦内（MM Naravane）、外交秘书哈什·瓦尔丹·什林格拉（Harsh Vardhan Shringla）接连访问尼泊尔，加速了尼共的分裂。2022年大选后，印度又向尼泊尔大会党施压，尽可能不让普拉昌达成为新政府的总理。在这一计划失败后，再度拆散尼共（毛主义中心）与尼共（联合马列）执政联盟便成为印度对大选后尼泊尔谋篇布局的首要任务。2023年2月13日和2月18日，印度外交秘书维奈·莫汉·夸特拉（Vinay Mohan Kwatra）和四位印度陆军前参谋长与印度陆军现任参谋长马努基·潘德上将（Manoj Pande）又接连访问尼泊尔，最终加速了尼共（毛主义中心）与尼共（联合马列）执政联盟的解体。

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the United States has entered a new period of strategic adjustment. To maintain its hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and contain China’s rise, the US has made building a closer partnership with Nepal part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. In February 2022, taking advantage of the fragmentation of Nepal’s communist forces after the split of the Communist Party of Nepal, the US coerced Nepal into ratifying the “Millennium Challenge Corporation” (MCC) agreement, a component of the Indo-Pacific strategy. The agreement stipulates that the US government will “aid” $500 million for infrastructure construction within Nepal, attempting to use economic aid as bait to control Nepal, squeeze the development space of the Belt and Road Initiative, and counterbalance China’s influence in South Asia. Currently, the US strategy toward Nepal focuses on two aspects: First, promoting the implementation of the MCC in Nepal. During her visit to Nepal from January 29 to 30, 2023, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland stated that the US is strengthening cooperation with Nepal and accelerating energy-related projects under the MCC, saying, “We hope to help Nepal become a stronger economic power by leveraging its hydropower potential.” Second, pushing Nepalese communists to accept the Western democratic model and to transform the Nepalese communist movement in a way that serves US interests. During her visit to Nepal, Nuland pointed out that for the US, “it is very important to have partners like Nepal working day in and day out to strengthen your democracy, and we are also working to do that at home.”

进入21世纪以来，美国进入新的战略调整期，为维护美国在印太地区的霸权，遏制中国崛起，美国将与尼泊尔建立更密切的伙伴关系视为其印太战略的一部分。2022年2月，美国趁尼泊尔共产党分裂后尼泊尔共产主义力量处于分散状态的时机，胁迫尼泊尔通过作为印太战略组成部分的“千年挑战计划”协议，协议规定美国政府“援助”5亿美元用于尼泊尔国内基础设施建设，企图以经济援助为诱饵控制尼泊尔，挤压“一带一路”的发展空间，制衡中国在南亚的影响力。当前，美国对尼泊尔战略集中在两个方面：一是推进“千年挑战计划”在尼泊尔的实施。2023年1月29日—30日，美国负责政治事务的副国务卿维多利亚·纽兰（Victoria Nuland）对尼泊尔进行访问时表示，美国正在加强与尼泊尔的合作，加快千年挑战计划下的能源相关项目，“我们希望通过利用水电的潜力，帮助尼泊尔成为一个更强大的经济大国”。二是推动尼泊尔共产党人接受西方民主模式，对尼泊尔共产主义运动进行符合美国利益的改造。纽兰在访问尼泊尔时指出，对美国来说，“让像尼泊尔这样的伙伴日复一日地努力加强你们的民主是非常重要的，我们也在国内努力这样做”。

The core demand of the US and Indian strategies toward Nepal is to control Nepal’s political situation, counterbalance China’s influence in Nepal, and prevent Nepal from leaning toward China. This is also the point of convergence of interests in the US and Indian strategies toward Nepal. The combined effect of US intervention and India’s long-term influence on Nepal’s political situation will have an unprecedented impact on the Nepalese communist movement.

美国和印度对尼泊尔的战略，核心诉求是掌控尼泊尔政局，制衡中国在尼泊尔的影响力，防止尼泊尔倒向中国，这也是美印对尼泊尔战略的利益契合点。美国的介入与印度对尼泊尔政局的长期影响形成的叠加效应，将对尼泊尔共产主义运动造成前所未有的冲击。

IV. The Future Prospects of the Nepalese Communist Movement

四、尼泊尔共产主义运动的未来前景

Judging from the situation of the 2022 general election, the Nepalese communist movement still maintains significant influence in Nepal’s political arena. Developing amidst twists and turns will be the basic trend of its future development. However, whether it can strengthen unity among the various communist factions and properly handle the relationship between preserving each party’s distinct characteristics and advancing party transformation will have a long-term and profound impact on the Nepalese communist movement.

从2022年大选的情况看，尼泊尔共产主义运动依然在尼泊尔政坛保持着重要的影响力，在曲折中发展是其未来发展的基本态势。但能否加强各派共产党之间的团结，处理好保持党的特色与推进党的转型的关系，将对尼泊尔共产主义运动产生长期而深远的影响。

(1) Advancing amidst twists and turns will be the basic trend of the future development of the Nepalese communist movement

（一）在曲折中前进将是尼泊尔共产主义运动未来发展的基本态势

The 2022 Nepalese general election was another test for the Nepalese communist movement. Looking at the election results, the number of seats won by the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) declined sharply, dropping to their lowest level since 2008. However, in terms of seats won, in the 2022 election, five communist parties—the CPN (UML), the CPN (Maoist Centre), the CPN (Unified Socialist), the Rastriya Janamorcha, and the Nepal Workers Peasants Party—together won 122 seats, far exceeding the 33 seats of the largest party, the Nepali Congress. Moreover, among the eleven governments formed since the election of the first Constituent Assembly in 2008, Nepalese communists have led eight. This shows that currently, the Nepalese communist parties remain the largest political force in Nepal and continue to exert a decisive influence on Nepalese society. Lenin pointed out: “Development seems to repeat the stages already passed, but it repeats them differently, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), development proceeds, so to speak, in a spiral, not in a straight line.” [19]19 This is a paraphrase of Lenin’s discussion of the dialectical law of the negation of the negation, found in his philosophical notebooks and works such as *Karl Marx* (1914). Judging from the trajectory since 2008, the development of the Nepalese communist movement will not be smooth sailing. A setback in one or even several elections does not indicate its decline. Developing amidst turbulence and advancing amidst twists and turns will become the basic trend of its future development.

2022年尼泊尔大选是对尼泊尔共产主义运动的又一次检验。从选举结果来看，尼共（联合马列）与尼共（毛主义中心）所获议席严重下滑，占比已降至2008年以来最低。但从所获议席看，在2022年选举中，五个共产主义政党——尼共（联合马列）、尼共（毛主义中心）、尼共（统一社会主义者）、全国人民阵线（Rastriya Janamorcha）、尼泊尔工农党（Nepal Workers Peasants Party）共获得122个席位，远超第一大党大会党33席。而自2008年第一届制宪会议选举以来的十一届政府中，尼泊尔共产党人领导了八届政府。这表明，目前尼泊尔共产主义政党仍是尼泊尔最大的政治力量，在尼泊尔社会仍发挥着举足轻重的影响。列宁指出：“发展似乎是在重复以往的阶段，但它是以另一种方式重复，是在更高的基础上重复（“否定的否定”），发展是按所谓螺旋式，而不是按直线式进行的。”从2008年以来的演进轨迹来看，尼泊尔共产主义运动的发展不会一帆风顺，一次甚至多次选举的失利也不表明其已经衰落，在震荡中发展、在曲折中前进将成为其未来发展的基本态势。

(2) Whether unity among the various communist factions can be strengthened is the key for the Nepalese communist movement to escape its current predicament

（二）能否加强各派共产党之间的团结是尼泊尔共产主义运动摆脱当前困境的关键

When summing up the experience of the First International, Marx pointed out: “One basic principle of the International is unity. If we can firmly consolidate this vital principle among all workers in all countries, we will surely achieve the great goal we aspire to.” The history of the international communist movement proves that any party whose development momentum is continuously improving and whose various undertakings are flourishing must be a party that attaches great importance to unity and solidarity. The Nepalese communist movement also proves that whenever unity and solidarity can be strengthened, the party’s cause develops smoothly. Conversely, the party’s cause will suffer losses, or even severe setbacks. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre), once stated: “If there were only one communist party, we could lead Nepal for 100 years.” Jhalanath Khanal, former Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), also pointed out: “The merger of these two parliamentary democratic parties, the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist), will push the Nepalese communist movement to a new height.” After taking power, in order to strengthen left-wing unity, the CPN (Maoist Centre) actively liaised with other communist parties to jointly discuss plans for cooperation and development. On June 19, 2023, the CPN (Maoist Centre), the CPN (Unified Socialist), the People’s Socialist Party (Rastriya Sabha Griha), and the Communist Party of Nepal (Biplav) led by Netra Bikram Chand announced the formation of the Socialist Front (Samajbadi Morcha). A 15-point commitment document signed by the four parties at the founding meeting stated that the Socialist Front would “continue to be committed to democracy, the republican order, good governance, prosperity, and socio-economic justice, and strive to establish socialism with Nepalese characteristics.” A senior leader of the CPN (Unified Socialist), Khanal, stated: “Unless we bring together progressive and patriotic forces, we cannot bring about revolutionary change. I want to tell all front leaders that this front should not only be a means of retaining power, but should bring about revolutionary change.” Therefore, whether the lessons of the international communist movement and the Nepalese communist movement can be drawn upon, unity and cooperation strengthened, political stability maintained, and economic and social development promoted, becomes the key for the current Nepalese communist movement to emerge from its predicament.

马克思在总结第一国际的经验时指出：“国际的一个基本原则——团结。如果我们能够在一切国家的一切工人中间牢牢地巩固这个富有生气的原则，我们就一定会达到我们所向往的伟大目标。”国际共产主义运动的历史证明，凡是发展势头不断向好，各项事业蒸蒸日上的党，必然是高度重视团结统一的党。尼泊尔共产主义运动也证明，什么时候能够加强团结统一，什么时候党的事业就发展顺利。反之，党的事业就会受到损失，甚至遭受严重挫折。尼共（毛主义中心）主席普拉昌达曾表示：“如果只有一个共产党，我们能领导尼泊尔100年。”尼共（联合马列）前主席卡纳尔也指出：“尼共（联合马列）和尼共（毛）这两个议会民主政党的合并将推动尼泊尔的共产主义运动达到一个新高度。”执政后，为了加强左翼团结，尼共（毛主义中心）与其他共产党积极联络，共商合作发展大计。2023年6月19日，尼共（毛主义中心）、尼共（统一社会主义者）、人民社会主义党(Rastriya Sabha Griha)、内特拉·比克拉姆·昌德（Netra Bikram Chand）领导的尼泊尔共产党（比普拉夫）（NCP-Biplav）宣布成立社会主义阵线（Samajbadi Morcha）。四党在成立大会上签署的15点承诺文件指出：社会主义阵线将“继续致力于民主、共和秩序、善政、繁荣和社会经济正义，努力建立具有尼泊尔特色的社会主义”。尼共（统一社会主义者）高级领导人卡纳尔表示：“除非我们将进步和爱国的力量聚集在一起，否则我们无法带来革命性的变化。我想告诉所有阵线领导人，这个阵线不仅应该是保持权力的手段，而且应该带来革命性的变化。”因此，能否汲取国际共产主义运动和尼泊尔共产主义运动的经验教训，加强团结合作，维护政局稳定，促进经济社会发展，就成为当前尼泊尔共产主义运动走出困境的关键。

(3) Whether the relationship between maintaining the party’s distinctive character and promoting the party’s transformation can be properly handled will directly affect the future direction of the Nepalese communist movement.

（三）能否处理好保持党的特色与推进党的转型的关系将直接影响尼泊尔共产主义运动的未来走向

How a proletarian party that has taken the parliamentary road handles the relationship between maintaining its distinctive character and promoting its transformation is a major theoretical and practical issue in the history of the international communist movement. On this issue, the international communist movement since the 20th century has accumulated relatively rich experience and profound lessons. For example, the Western social democratic parties, which were once Marxist parties, gradually transformed from revolutionary parties outside the capitalist system into reformist parties within the system from the beginning of the 20th century, based on the principle of pragmatism, which led to the gradual decline of their influence. After the Second World War, the communist parties of Western Europe were once an important political force in European politics. However, since the 1970s, due to the spread of reformist ideology, Western European communist parties gradually diluted their party’s distinctive character, becoming vague and wavering on the party’s nature and class policies, which led to their degeneration into second- or third-rate parties in their respective countries and their gradual marginalization. Since the 21st century, the Nepalese communist movement has undergone a transformation from a dogmatic approach to Marxism to a creative localized exploration of Marxism, from advocating violent revolution to advocating a parliamentary democratic development path, from a vanguard party of the proletariat gradually transforming into a mass party of all working people, and from implementing democratic centralism to emphasizing a democratic operational system. In this process, with changes in status and environment, ideological dilution, and tendencies of factionalism, egoism, and anarchism began to spread within the party, which is also an important reason for the setbacks encountered by the Nepalese communist movement. Therefore, whether the relationship between maintaining the distinctive character of the communist party and promoting its transformation into a parliamentary party under the conditions of capitalist multiparty competition can be correctly handled, and whether a socialist development path suited to the country’s own characteristics can be found through continuous exploration, will directly affect the future direction of the Nepalese communist movement.

走上议会道路的无产阶级政党如何处理好保持党的特色与推进党的转型的关系，这是国际共产主义运动史上的重大理论和现实问题。对于这一问题，20世纪以来的国际共产主义运动积累了较为丰富的经验和深刻的教训。如曾经作为马克思主义政党的西方社会民主党，从20世纪初开始，以实用主义为原则，逐步从资本主义体制外的革命党变成体制内的改良党，这导致了其影响力日益式微。第二次世界大战后西欧共产党曾经是欧洲政坛重要的政治力量，但是20世纪70年代以来，由于改良主义思潮的泛滥，西欧共产党逐步淡化党的特色，在党的性质及其阶级政策上模糊不清，摇摆不定，这导致了其沦落为各自国家的二流或三流政党，并逐步走向边缘化。21世纪以来，尼泊尔共产主义运动经历了从教条式的对待马克思主义到创造性地对马克思主义进行本土化探索、从主张暴力革命到主张议会民主的发展道路、从无产阶级先锋队党逐步转变为全体劳动者的群众性政党、从实行民主集中制到强调民主运行体制的转变。在这个过程中，随着地位和面临的环境变化，意识形态淡化，派系主义、利己主义、无政府主义的倾向开始在党内蔓延，这也是尼泊尔共产主义运动遭遇挫折的重要原因。因此，能否正确处理好在资本主义多党竞争条件下保持共产党的特色与推进党向议会政党转型的关系，在不断探索中寻找符合本国特色的社会主义发展道路，将直接影响到尼泊尔共产主义运动的未来走向。

(Author: Yuan Qun, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor, School of Marxism, Yunnan University)

（作者：袁群，云南大学马克思主义学院教授、博士研究生导师）

(Project: This article is a phased result of the Yunnan Provincial Philosophy and Social Science Planning Key Project “Research on the Centennial Spread and Influence of Marxism in South Asia” (ZD202301))

（项目：本文系云南省哲学社会科学规划重点课题《马克思主义在南亚的百年传播及其影响研究》（ZD202301）的阶段性成果）

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