New Developments in the Middle East under Great Changes: Characteristics, Challenges, and Prospects

In recent years, the international landscape has accelerated its evolution, the strategic autonomy of Middle Eastern countries has strengthened, development first has become a regional consensus, and the “wave of reconciliation” among Middle Eastern countries has grown from weak to strong; the status of Middle Eastern countries in the international system has undergone new changes, making them an important force in the “Global South.” At the same time, under the changes unseen in a century, new concepts and solutions for improving global governance and addressing global and regional challenges have continuously emerged. In particular, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative proposed by China, along with their practices, help to push the Middle East out of its security and development dilemmas and shape a “New Middle East” different from the past.

近年来，国际格局加速演变，中东国家战略自主能力增强，发展优先成为地区国家的共识，中东国家间的“和解潮”由弱变强；中东国家在国际体系中的地位出现新变化，成为“全球南方”的重要力量。与此同时，百年变局下，完善全球治理、解决全球和地区挑战的新理念和新方案不断涌现，特别是中国提出的全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议、全球文明倡议等理念及其实践，有助于推动中东地区走出安全困境和发展困境，塑造一个不同于以往的“新中东”。

New Characteristics of Middle East Development

中东地区发展的新特征

The new changes in Middle East development are mainly reflected in Middle Eastern countries making development their top priority, a clear trend of détente among regional countries, and a significant enhancement of national strategic autonomy.

中东地区发展的新变化，主要体现在中东国家将发展作为最优先事务、地区国家间的缓和态势明显、国家战略自主明显提升等方面。

I. At the National Level: Prioritizing Development

一、国家层面奉行发展优先

Reflecting on the negative impacts of the Arab Spring [1]1 The Arab Spring refers to a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Arab world in the early 2010s., grasping the development trend of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and focusing on livelihood and governance issues are the key reasons Middle Eastern countries have adopted a development-first strategy. First, the Arab Spring not only failed to resolve the long-standing development deficits, security deficits, and governance deficits faced by regional countries but further exacerbated their security and development dilemmas. The traditional security situation in the region has continued to deteriorate, exhibiting intense characteristics of camp formation, confrontation, and conflict, while non-traditional security issues such as extremism, food security, and climate disasters have intensified. At the same time, the economic and social factors that triggered the Arab Spring still exist and have even become more severe. Second, with the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Middle Eastern countries urgently need to “hitch a ride” on the new wave of technological revolution. The elites and the public in Middle Eastern countries realize that as human society gradually moves from the information age to the intelligent age, this will inevitably bring profound impacts on productive forces and relations of production, the economic base and superstructure, organizational forms and lifestyles, and so on. If they fail to catch up with this new wave of industrial revolution, it will be difficult for these countries to achieve high-quality and sustainable development. Third, the people of Middle Eastern countries are increasingly concerned about economic livelihood and governance performance, rather than abstract democracy and human rights issues. The *Arab Opinion Index 2022* points out that 60% of Arab citizens believe that the most urgent problems their countries need to solve are economic issues, including high unemployment, high prices, poor economic conditions, and poverty. According to a 2022 report by the polling organization “Arab Barometer,” in 7 out of 9 surveyed Arab countries, over 50% of respondents believed that “(Western-style) democratic systems lead to worse national economic performance.”

反思阿拉伯剧变的消极影响，把握第四次工业革命的发展大势，聚焦民生和治理问题，是中东国家奉行发展优先战略的关键所在。一是阿拉伯剧变非但没有解决地区国家长期面临的发展赤字、安全赤字和治理赤字问题，反而进一步加剧了地区国家的安全困境和发展困局。地区传统安全形势持续恶化，呈现出激烈的阵营化、对抗化、冲突化特征，极端主义、粮食安全、气候灾害等非传统安全问题愈演愈烈。同时，引发阿拉伯剧变的经济和社会因素仍然存在，甚至变得更加严重。二是随着第四次工业革命浪潮的到来，中东国家迫切需要搭上新科技革命的“便车”。中东国家的精英和民众意识到，人类社会逐渐从信息化时代迈向智能化时代，必将对生产力和生产关系、经济基础和上层建筑、组织形态和生活方式等带来深刻冲击，如果不能赶上此次新工业革命的浪潮，国家将很难实现高质量可持续发展。三是中东国家民众愈发关注经济民生和治理绩效问题，而非抽象的民主和人权问题。《阿拉伯舆情指数2022》指出，60%的阿拉伯民众认为，本国最需要解决的问题是与经济相关的问题，包括失业率高企、高物价、恶劣的经济条件和贫困等。根据民调机构“阿拉伯晴雨表”2022年发布的报告，在9个被调查的阿拉伯国家中，有7个国家超过50%的民众认为“（西式）民主制度下的国家经济成就更差”。

Solving development problems and improving national governance capacity have become a broad consensus among both ruling elites and ordinary people in the Middle East. All countries regard promoting economic and social development as a breakthrough to solve domestic problems and enhance regional and international influence, successively proposing medium- and long-term development plans, such as *Turkey Vision 2023*, *Egypt Vision 2030*, *Saudi Vision 2030*, etc. In addition, countries have also proposed development strategies to address the Fourth Industrial Revolution, such as Turkey’s “2023 Industry and Technology Strategy,” Egypt’s “National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence,” and the UAE’s “Industry 4.0 Strategy.”

解决发展问题、提高国家治理能力成为中东地区统治精英和普通民众的广泛共识，各国均将推进经济社会发展视为解决国内问题、提升地区和国际影响力的突破口，纷纷推出中长期发展规划，如《土耳其2023愿景》《埃及2030愿景》《沙特2030愿景》等。此外，各国还提出应对第四次工业革命的发展战略，如土耳其的“2023工业和技术战略”、埃及的“人工智能国家战略”、阿联酋的“工业4.0战略”等。

II. At the Regional Level: Promoting Reconciliation and Détente

二、地区层面推动和解缓和

Since 2019, the camp hostility triggered by the Arab Spring has shown signs of easing, with the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 attracting particular attention. After the Arab Spring, the Middle East region mainly had three major camps: the Shia camp centered on Iran, the pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp led by Turkey, and the anti-Iran, anti-Muslim Brotherhood camp composed of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, etc. The parties engaged in fierce competition, repeated confrontations, and were at daggers drawn. In July 2019, officials from Iran and the UAE met in Tehran, the capital of Iran, to discuss maritime security issues, marking a slight easing of regional camp confrontation. From 2021 onwards, the détente among major regional powers accelerated significantly. On the one hand, the pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp and the anti-Muslim Brotherhood camp achieved reconciliation. On January 5, 2021, the Emir of Qatar attended the 41st GCC [2]2 GCC stands for the Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional intergovernmental political and economic union comprising all Arab states of the Persian Gulf except Iraq. Leaders’ Summit in Saudi Arabia. In November 2021 and June 2022, then-Crown Prince of the UAE Mohammed bin Zayed and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Turkey respectively upon invitation; in the first half of 2022, Turkish President Erdoğan visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia successively. Additionally, relations between Turkey and Israel and Egypt also improved markedly. On the other hand, the camp led by Iran and the anti-Iran camp led by Saudi Arabia accelerated reconciliation. In 2022, Kuwait and the UAE successively restored ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran began contact and negotiations in April 2021 and, through China’s mediation, issued a joint declaration in March 2023 agreeing to restore diplomatic relations. On September 5, the two countries exchanged ambassadors, completing the final step in restoring ties. At the same time, the Saudi-Iran reconciliation also promoted Syria’s return to the Arab League, becoming an important symbol of the ongoing wave of reconciliation in the Middle East.

自2019年开始，由阿拉伯剧变引发的地区阵营敌对出现缓和迹象，特别是2023年3月沙特与伊朗实现和解更加引人关注。阿拉伯剧变之后，中东地区势力主要有三大阵营：以伊朗为核心的什叶派阵营，土耳其领导的亲穆兄会阵营，沙特、阿联酋、以色列等组成的反伊朗、反穆兄会阵营，各方激烈博弈、反复较量、剑拔弩张。2019年7月，伊朗与阿联酋两国官员在伊朗首都德黑兰会面，讨论海洋安全事宜，标志着地区阵营对抗有所缓解。从2021年起，中东地区大国之间的缓和明显加速。一方面，亲穆兄会阵营与反穆兄会阵营实现和解。2021年1月5日, 卡塔尔埃米尔赴沙特出席第41届海合会领导人峰会。2021年11月和2022年6月，阿联酋时任王储扎耶德和沙特王储穆罕默德分别应邀访问土耳其；2022年上半年，土耳其总统埃尔多安先后访问阿联酋和沙特。此外，土耳其与以色列和埃及关系也明显改善。另一方面，伊朗领导的阵营与沙特领导的反伊朗阵营加速和解。2022年，科威特、阿联酋先后同伊朗恢复大使级外交关系。沙特与伊朗从2021年4月开始接触谈判，并通过中国的斡旋于2023年3月发表联合宣言，同意恢复外交关系。9月5日，沙伊两国互派大使，两国复交完成最后一环。与此同时，沙伊和解还推动叙利亚重返阿盟，成为中东和解潮不断持续的重要标志。

The Middle East “wave of reconciliation” is primarily a rational choice by regional countries based on security and economic assessments. In terms of security, the continuous military conflicts and confrontations among major regional powers have not only failed to achieve their political goals and strategic gains but have also worsened security conditions or increased diplomatic isolation. The security situation in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is worrying, with frequent drone and missile attacks on their territories. Meanwhile, Iran and Turkey, while seemingly aggressive in regional affairs, actually face increasingly hostile and isolated regional environments. Economically, the involvement of major Middle Eastern powers in regional conflicts severely drains financial resources and brings a series of negative economic, social, and political impacts. Turkey’s economy continues to decline, and Iran has experienced large-scale popular protest movements, posing severe tests to the political stability of the authorities. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in a critical period of economic diversification transformation, and substantial security expenditures limit the funds that should be used for economic transformation. Therefore, regional countries have chosen to seek reconciliation to create a peaceful environment for development. It is worth noting that due to the US strategic contraction in the Middle East and its declining influence in regional affairs, the rift in relations between the US and its regional allies has widened. In contrast, China’s long-standing efforts to promote peace and dialogue, and its role as a “guarantor” in the Saudi-Iran reconciliation, have become important external driving factors for regional countries seeking reconciliation.

中东“和解潮”主要是地区国家基于安全和经济评估之后的理性选择。在安全方面，地区大国持续的军事冲突和对抗不仅难以实现其政治目标及战略收益，而且使安全状况日益恶化或外交日益孤立。沙特、阿联酋安全状况堪忧，境内屡遭无人机和导弹袭击，而伊朗、土耳其在地区事务上看似咄咄逼人，其实两国面临的地区环境日益敌对和孤立。在经济方面，中东大国介入地区冲突严重耗费财政资源，并带来一系列经济、社会和政治负面影响。土耳其经济持续下滑，伊朗爆发大规模民众抗议运动，对当局政治稳定形成严峻考验。沙特和阿联酋处在经济多元化转型的关键时期，大量的安全支出限制了本应用于经济转型的资金投入。因此，地区国家纷纷选择寻求和解，以便为发展创造和平环境。值得注意的是，由于美国在中东战略收缩以及在地区事务中的影响力下降，美国与地区盟友关系的裂痕增大。与此相反，中国长期劝谈促和并在沙伊和解中充当“担保人”，这成为中东地区国家寻求和解的重要外部推动因素。

III. At the Global Level: Enhancing Strategic Autonomy

三、全球层面提升战略自主

In today’s world, the post-Cold War pattern is accelerating its evolution, the global hegemonic status of the United States is trending towards decline, emerging market countries and developing countries are rising collectively, the trend of “the East rising and the West declining” is evident, the willingness and capability of traditional external powers to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs are gradually decreasing, and Middle Eastern countries have greater space for strategic autonomy. Political elites in Middle Eastern countries generally believe that the world is moving towards multipolarity. For example, Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih stated in an interview that “a multipolar global order has already emerged.” Furthermore, the “global great power competition” marked by the Ukraine crisis has elevated the global status of Middle Eastern countries, making the Middle East region an important alternative to Russian oil and gas resources. The political and economic competition among global powers for Middle Eastern countries has increased significantly, and the strategic maneuvering room for Middle Eastern countries has notably expanded. Consequently, Middle Eastern countries realize that they have more strategic choices and autonomy than before.

当今世界，后冷战格局加速演变，美国的全球霸权地位趋向衰落，新兴市场国家和发展中国家群体性崛起，“东升西降”趋势明显，传统域外大国干预中东事务的意愿和能力逐渐下降，中东国家具有更大的战略自主空间。中东国家的政治精英普遍认为，目前世界正在走向多极化，例如，沙特投资大臣法利赫在接受采访时称“多极全球秩序已经出现”。此外，以乌克兰危机为标志的“全球大国竞争”抬升了中东国家在全球的地位，中东地区成为替代俄罗斯油气资源的重要选项。全球性大国对于中东国家的政治和经济争夺明显上升，中东国家的战略回旋余地显著增加。由此，中东国家意识到自己具有比以往更多的战略选择和自主性。

The strategic autonomy of Middle Eastern countries has strengthened, mainly manifested in two aspects. First, Middle Eastern countries increasingly possess the capacity to bargain with global powers. Traditionally, the strategic autonomy of Middle Eastern countries was limited, and they often chose to follow the policies of external major powers. In recent years, Middle Eastern countries have no longer completely followed the lead of the United States, which was evident in the Ukraine crisis. Saudi Arabia, a traditional US ally, led the "OPEC+" production cuts several times despite US opposition, while Turkey, another US ally, repeatedly contradicted the United States on the issue of NATO expansion. Regarding relations between Russia and Iran, in the past Iran relied more on Russia in political, diplomatic, economic and military terms, but after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russia's demand for Iran increased, making the Russia-Iran relationship more equal. Second, Middle Eastern countries are increasingly pursuing a balanced and diversified foreign strategy. Historically, Middle Eastern countries often chose to fully align and bind themselves with a single external major power. In recent years, Middle Eastern countries have actively developed relations with multiple political forces, which is particularly evident among traditional US allies. For example, Saudi Arabia still values its security and strategic relationship with the United States, while simultaneously enhancing military relations with Russia and strategic ties with the European Union, and actively developing energy, economic and strategic cooperation with China, India and other countries. Furthermore, Middle Eastern countries are attempting to change the Western-dominated international governance system and actively joining multilateral organizations representing the interests of developing countries. In July 2023, Iran officially joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; in August 2023, the BRICS announced the inclusion of six new member states, including four Middle Eastern countries—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. These examples reflect the efforts of Middle Eastern countries to actively participate in shaping the international system, becoming an important force of the "Global South."

中东国家的战略自主增强，主要表现在两个方面。一是中东国家拥有越来越多与全球性大国讨价还价的能力。传统上，中东国家战略自主有限，往往选择追随域外大国的政策。近年来，中东国家不再完全唯美国马首是瞻，这在乌克兰危机中表现明显。美国的传统盟友沙特不顾美国的反对，数次领导“欧佩克+”减产原油，而美国的另一盟友土耳其也在北约扩员问题上屡屡与美国唱反调。在俄罗斯与伊朗关系上，昔日伊朗在政治、外交、经济和军事上有求于俄罗斯更多，而乌克兰危机爆发后俄罗斯对伊朗需求增大，俄伊关系变得更加平等。二是中东国家日益奉行多元平衡的外交战略。历史上，中东国家往往选择完全与某一域外大国结盟和绑定。近年来，中东国家积极与多个政治力量发展关系，这在美国的传统盟友身上表现尤其明显。例如，沙特仍重视与美国的安全和战略关系，同时提升了与俄罗斯的军事关系和欧盟的战略联系，并与中国、印度等国积极发展能源、经济和战略合作。此外，中东国家试图改变西方主导的国际治理体系，积极加入代表发展中国家利益的多边组织。2023年7月，伊朗正式加入上海合作组织；2023年8月，金砖国家宣布吸纳6个新成员国，其中包括沙特、埃及、伊朗、阿联酋4个中东国家，这些事例反映了中东国家正在积极参与塑造国际体系的努力，成为“全球南方”的重要力量。

Challenges Facing the Development of the Middle East Region

中东地区发展面临的挑战

Currently, the Middle East region is experiencing a historic turning point, but it also faces a series of problems and challenges in economic, diplomatic, security and other aspects.

当前，中东地区发展迎来历史性转机，但在经济、外交、安全等方面也面临一系列问题和挑战。

I. Prominent Economic Structural Problems

一、经济结构性问题突出

Since the Arab uprisings, most Middle Eastern countries have faced serious problems such as population expansion, widening inequality, shrinking middle class, high unemployment rates, rampant corruption, low levels of social security, and insufficient economic vitality, which continue to hinder the socio-economic development of Middle Eastern countries. On the one hand, most non-oil-and-gas-rich countries face increasingly heavy fiscal pressure. Since 2019, due to long-term economic structural deficiencies, coupled with a series of major external negative shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine crisis, and the tightening of global credit markets, many Middle Eastern countries have fallen into economic difficulties. For example, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon face severe economic crises, especially debt crises. From 2010 to 2020, the ratio of public debt to GDP in these three countries rose from 40%, 70%, and 130% to 85%, 95%, and 180%, respectively. On the other hand, oil-and-gas-rich countries in the Middle East face pressure for economic diversification and transformation. Currently, driven by the carbon neutrality strategies adopted by many countries globally, the global energy transition is accelerating, and the dividends from oil and gas resources for energy-rich Middle Eastern countries represented by the Gulf Arab states are gradually diminishing. Although these countries have proposed economic diversification strategies, the overall progress has been limited. Taking Saudi Arabia as an example, compared with 2016, the share of Saudi oil and gas revenue in GDP decreased from 40.5% to 37.3%, but this is mainly attributable to Saudi oil production cuts and the decline in international oil prices; the Saudi economy's dependence on oil and gas resources remains very high.

阿拉伯剧变以来，中东多数国家面临的人口膨胀、不平等加剧、中产阶级萎缩、失业率高企、腐败问题猖獗、社会保障水平低、经济活力不足等问题依旧严重，并阻碍着中东国家的社会经济发展。一方面，多数非油气资源富集国面临愈发沉重的财政压力。2019年以来，由于长期的经济结构性缺陷，加之新冠疫情、乌克兰危机和全球信贷市场紧缩等一系列外部重大负面冲击，不少中东国家深陷经济困境。例如，突尼斯、埃及、黎巴嫩面临严重的经济危机，尤其是债务危机，从2010年到2020年，三国的公共债务占国内生产总值的比重分别从40%、70%、130%上升到85%、95%和180%。另一方面，中东的油气富集国面临经济多元化转型压力。目前，在全球多国采取的碳中和战略驱动下，全球能源转型加速展开，海湾阿拉伯国家代表的中东能源富集国的油气资源红利正在逐渐减弱。这些国家虽然提出了经济多元化战略，但是整体进展效果有限。以沙特为例，与2016年相比，沙特油气收入占国内生产总值的比重从40.5%降至37.3%，但这主要归因于沙特石油减产和国际油价下跌导致的，沙特经济对油气资源的依赖程度仍然很高。

In addition, Middle Eastern countries still play the role of followers in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, with a huge capability gap compared to the pioneers. Most Middle Eastern countries have not adapted well to the Fourth Industrial Revolution and are generally in a backward position. In the field of artificial intelligence, the Arab world is below the world average, with most Arab countries ranking at the lowest level; in the field of e-government, Arab countries are far below the world average; in the field of network construction, Arab countries are below the world average but higher than the average of developing countries; in the field of e-commerce, although Arab countries developed rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic, they are still below the world average, roughly equivalent to the average level of developing countries.

此外，中东国家在第四次工业革命中仍扮演追赶者的角色，与先发者存在着巨大的能力差距，多数中东国家并没有很好地适应第四次工业革命，整体上处在落后位置。在人工智能领域，阿拉伯世界低于世界平均水平，大多数阿拉伯国家都在最低水平之列；在电子政务领域，阿拉伯国家远低于世界平均水平；在网络建设领域，阿拉伯国家低于世界平均水平，但高于发展中国家的平均水平；在电子商务领域，阿拉伯国家虽然在新冠疫情期间发展迅速，但仍低于世界平均水平，与发展中国家的平均水平大体相当。

II. Continued External Intervention

二、外部干预仍然持续

Relative to global powers, Middle Eastern countries are in a position of power weakness. The power imbalance between Middle Eastern countries and global powers leads to a lack of sufficient countermeasures by Middle Eastern countries against the intervention of global powers. From the end of the Cold War to the Iraq War, the hegemonic position of the United States in the Middle East reached its peak. In recent years, although US influence in the Middle East has declined, it still strives to maintain its hegemony in the region and has many negative impacts on the development of the Middle East. On the one hand, the United States vigorously suppresses anti-US forces in the region, undermining the development and stability of relevant countries. The United States frequently imposes economic sanctions on Middle Eastern countries and non-state actors, such as Iran, Syria, and the Houthis, which not only hinders the development of regional countries but also brings severe humanitarian disasters. Over the past decade, due to sanctions imposed by the international community led by the United States, Iran has lost approximately $450 billion in oil revenue. It is noteworthy that although the United States no longer easily conducts large-scale direct military intervention in the Middle East, it frequently engages in indirect military interventions such as "proxy wars," drone warfare, and mercenary warfare. The United States has repeatedly launched drone strikes against pro-Iranian armed forces in Iraq and Syria, exacerbating regional tensions, undermining regional stability, and hindering regional peace.

相对于全球性大国，中东国家处于权力弱势地位。中东国家与全球性大国的权力不平衡导致中东国家对于全球性大国的干预缺乏足够反制能力。冷战结束至伊拉克战争期间，美国在中东地区的霸权地位达到顶峰。近年来，美国在中东影响力虽有衰减，但仍竭力维护在中东的霸权，并对中东地区的发展产生诸多消极影响。一方面，美国大力打压地区的反美势力，破坏相关国家的发展和稳定。美国频频对中东国家和非国家行为体，如伊朗、叙利亚、胡塞武装等发动经济制裁，不仅阻碍地区国家发展，而且带来严重的人道主义灾难。过去10年，由于美国主导国际社会施加制裁，伊朗损失了约4500亿美元的石油收入。值得注意的是，美国虽然不再轻易在中东开展大规模直接军事干预，但频频进行“代理人战争”、无人机战争、雇佣军战争等间接军事干预，美国多次对伊拉克、叙利亚的亲伊朗武装力量发动无人机袭击，加剧地区紧张，破坏地区稳定，阻碍地区和平。

On the other hand, the United States promotes great-power strategic competition in the Middle East, obstructing normal cooperation between regional countries and other external major powers. The United States pressures its traditional allies, striving to undermine their military, technological, and economic cooperation with Russia and China. Furthermore, the United States vigorously rallies its allies to establish exclusive small multilateral mechanisms in the Middle East, weakening the influence of China, Russia, and Iran. In March 2022, the foreign ministers of the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt held the Negev Summit in Israel, deciding to hold regular "Negev Forum" meetings and establish working groups on regional security, energy, tourism, health, education, food, and water security. In July of the same year, the United States, together with Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and India, held a summit and established the "I2U2" [3]3 I2U2 is a grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, established in 2021 to promote joint investment and cooperation in areas such as water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. quadrilateral mechanism to strengthen cooperation in water resources, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. At the G20 summit in September 2023, the United States, together with its allies, proposed the "India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor" (IMEC) plan, aimed at strengthening cooperation in infrastructure, energy, data, trade, and other fields among relevant countries, with a clear intention to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. The US actions in promoting exclusive small multilateralism in the Middle East are a form of pseudo-multilateralism that uses the name of multilateralism to practice hegemonism, which is not conducive to normal cooperation in the Middle East region and does not align with the interests of Middle Eastern countries and peoples.

另一方面，美国在中东推动大国战略竞争，阻挠地区国家与其他域外大国正常合作。美国向传统盟友施压，极力破坏他们与俄罗斯和中国进行军事、科技和经济领域的合作。此外，美国大力拉拢盟友在中东建立排他性小多边机制，削弱中俄伊（朗）的影响力。2022年3月，美国与以色列、阿联酋、巴林、摩洛哥和埃及的外长在以色列举行内盖夫峰会，决定六国定期举行“内盖夫论坛”，并组建地区安全、能源、旅游、卫生、教育、食品和水安全工作组。同年7月，美国携以色列、阿联酋和印度举行首脑会议，组建“I2U2四方机制”，加强在水资源、能源、交通、空间、卫生和粮食安全等领域合作。在2023年9月的二十国集团峰会上，美国携盟友提出“印度—中东—欧洲经济走廊”（IMEC）计划，旨在加强相关国家的基础设施、能源、数据、贸易等领域合作，其打压中国“一带一路”倡议的意图十分明显。美国在中东推动排他性小多边主义的行径，是以多边之名行霸权之实的伪多边主义，不利于中东地区的正常合作，也不符合中东国家和人民的利益。

III. Overlapping Multiple Security Risks

三、多重安全风险叠加

At present, although the security situation in the Middle East has improved somewhat, structural security problems have not been resolved. Against the backdrop of development priority, strategic autonomy, and easing of relations among regional countries, the security situation in the Middle East has improved, mainly manifested in three aspects: the threat of popular protests to regime security has declined, the ground battlefield situation in war-torn countries is basically stable, and regional camp confrontation has eased to some extent. However, due to long-term constraints from external intervention, complex internal and inter-state contradictions, and the lack of security cooperation mechanisms and strategic trust, the structural security problems faced by the Middle East region have not fundamentally improved.

目前，中东地区安全状况虽有所好转，但结构性安全问题并未解决。在发展优先、战略自主、地区国家关系缓和的大背景下，中东地区安全形势有所改善，主要表现在三个方面：民众抗议对政权安全的威胁下降、战乱国家地面战场形势基本稳定、地区阵营对抗有所缓解。然而，中东地区由于长期受制于外部干预、国家内部和国家间矛盾复杂、安全合作机制和战略互信缺失，其面临的结构性安全问题并未发生根本性好转。

The Middle East region still faces overlapping traditional and non-traditional security risks. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) analyzed speeches by heads of state, heads of government, defense ministers, foreign ministers, and chiefs of general staff of Middle Eastern countries at the United Nations, the Arab League, the OSCE, and the Manama Dialogue from 2008 to 2021, examining the perceptions of security threats among Middle Eastern security decision-makers. The conclusion drawn was that conflict and instability, terrorism and extremism, attacks on national territory, nuclear proliferation, climate change and natural disasters, organized crime, missiles, maritime security, food-water-energy security, refugee crises, cybersecurity, and public health security are regarded as the most serious security threats in Middle Eastern countries. The top four ranked security threats are all traditional security issues, meaning that the political and military elites of the Middle East still view traditional security problems as the most serious threats. Since 2023, traditional security issues in the Middle East have remained severe. A new round of violent conflict erupted between Palestine and Israel, with Israel launching large-scale military operations in the West Bank city of Jenin, resulting in hundreds of deaths. On October 7, 2023, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) fired a large number of rockets into southern and central Israel, and its armed personnel entered Israeli territory to carry out military operations. On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israel had entered a "state of war." Civil war broke out in Sudan, with fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, causing thousands of deaths. At the same time, non-traditional security issues in the Middle East have become increasingly prominent. In February, a major earthquake struck Turkey and Syria, killing over 50,000 people and causing economic losses amounting to hundreds of billions of US dollars. In September, devastating floods in Libya resulted in more than 10,000 deaths, reflecting both the frequent occurrence of extreme weather in the Middle East and the consequences of inadequate public service provision due to Libya's long-standing civil war.

中东地区仍面临叠加性的传统和非传统安全风险。英国国际战略研究所通过研究2008—2021年中东国家的国家元首、政府首脑、国防部长、外交部长和军队总参谋长等在联合国、阿盟、欧安会和麦纳麦对话会上的讲话，分析了中东国家的安全决策者对于安全威胁的认知，得出的结论是，冲突和不稳定、恐怖主义和极端主义、对本国领土的袭击、核扩散、气候变化和自然灾害、有组织犯罪、导弹、海洋安全、食品—水—能源安全、难民危机、网络安全、公共卫生安全等被视为中东国家最严重的安全威胁。排名最靠前的四项安全威胁都是传统安全问题，这意味着中东地区的政治和军事精英仍将传统安全问题视为最严重的安全威胁。2023年以来，中东地区的传统安全问题依然严峻。巴勒斯坦与以色列爆发新一轮暴力冲突，以色列在约旦河西岸城市杰宁开展大规模军事行动，造成数百人死亡。2023年10月7日，巴勒斯坦伊斯兰抵抗运动（哈马斯）向以色列南部和中部地区发射大量火箭弹，其武装人员进入以境内展开军事行动。同日，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡宣布，以色列进入“战争状态”。苏丹爆发内战，苏丹武装部队与快速支援部队冲突激烈，造成数千人死亡。与此同时，中东地区的非传统安全问题也愈发凸显。2月，土耳其和叙利亚发生大地震，死亡人数超5万，经济损失高达数千亿美元。9月，利比亚发生毁灭性洪水，导致超过万人遇难，这既是极端天气在中东频发的体现，也是利比亚常年内战导致公共服务供应不足的结果。

Prospects for the Development of the Middle East

中东地区发展的前景

From a historical perspective, the Middle East is undergoing profound changes of the times and history. Focusing on development, strategic autonomy, reconciliation, and cooperation is becoming a consensus among a growing number of Middle Eastern countries. This will alter the course of Middle Eastern historical development and contribute to achieving peace and development in the region. However, resolving the long-standing issues of security deficits, development deficits, and governance deficits is by no means an overnight task. The development of the Middle East will proceed amid difficulty and twists and turns.

从历史发展来看，中东地区正在经历深刻的时代之变和历史之变。聚焦发展、战略自主、和解合作正成为越来越多中东国家的共识，这将改变中东历史发展进程，有助于实现中东地区的和平与发展。然而，解决长期存在的安全赤字、发展赤字、治理赤字问题绝非一朝一夕之功，中东地区的发展将在艰难曲折中前行。

In terms of security, the "wave of reconciliation" in the Middle East has only taken an important and positive step toward improving Middle Eastern security. Due to the lack of strategic mutual trust and an institutional foundation for security cooperation, the challenges facing Middle Eastern security remain enormous. Security contradictions between some regional major powers remain acute, the traditional Palestinian-Israeli issue has become more urgent and severe, and non-traditional security issues brought about by extreme weather cannot be ignored.

在安全方面，中东“和解潮”只是为中东安全的改善跨出了重要的积极一步，由于缺乏安全合作的战略互信和制度基础，中东安全面临的挑战仍然巨大。部分地区大国之间安全矛盾依旧尖锐，传统的巴以问题更为紧迫严峻，极端天气等带来的非传统安全问题同样不容忽视。

In terms of development, many long-term and structural problems facing the economies of Middle Eastern countries have not been alleviated. Differences in resource endowments, strategic choices, and governance capabilities have led to varying economic development outcomes among countries. The impact of sudden events such as the Ukraine crisis persists, and the ability of regional countries to adapt to the Fourth Industrial Revolution is not optimistic.

在发展方面，中东国家经济面临的诸多长期性、结构性问题并未缓解，资源禀赋、战略选择和治理能力差异导致各国经济发展成效不一。乌克兰危机等突发事件的冲击效应依然存在，地区国家适应第四次工业革命的能力不容乐观。

Peace and development in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the efforts of Middle Eastern countries and their peoples, nor without the support of external countries and the international community. In the new period of Middle Eastern development, China has played an important constructive role. China and Middle Eastern countries have deepened political communication and mutual trust, strengthened development strategy alignment and economic cooperation, and enhanced security exchanges and cooperation. Relations between China and the Middle East have entered a new stage in the New Era, boosting regional peace and development. The "Three-Circle Summit" [4]4 The "Three-Circle Summit" refers to the simultaneous convening of the China-Saudi Arabia Summit, the China-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit, and the China-Arab States Summit in Riyadh in December 2022. of China-Saudi Arabia, China-Gulf Cooperation Council, and China-Arab States held in December 2022 issued the Riyadh Declaration and joint statements between China and Saudi Arabia and between China and the GCC, relying on strategic cooperation to jointly advance the upgrading of China-Arab relations, unanimously agreeing to make every effort to build a China-Arab community with a shared future for the New Era, and further elevating strategic mutual trust and strategic cooperation between China and Middle Eastern countries. A number of Middle Eastern countries have actively requested to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS cooperation mechanism, demonstrating the willingness of Middle Eastern countries to move from "looking east" to "acting east."

中东地区的和平与发展，离不开中东国家和人民的努力，也离不开域外国家和国际社会的支持。在中东新的发展时期，中国发挥了重要的建设性作用。中国与中东国家深化政治沟通与互信，加强发展战略对接和经济合作，提升安全交流与合作，中国与中东关系在新时代步入新阶段，并助推地区和平与发展。2022年12月召开的中沙、中海和中阿“三环峰会”，发表《利雅得宣言》和中沙、中海联合声明，以战略合作为依托，共同推进中阿关系提质升级，一致同意全力构建面向新时代的中阿命运共同体，进一步推升了中国与中东国家的战略互信和战略合作。一批中东国家积极要求加入上海合作组织、金砖国家合作机制，展现了中东国家从“向东看”到“向东行”的意愿。

The total trade volume between China and Middle Eastern countries continues to rise, investment cooperation has grown against the trend, landmark projects are eye-catching, and cooperation in the entire energy industry chain and new energy sectors between the two sides is constantly improving. China is the largest trading partner of the Middle East. In 2022, trade between China and Middle Eastern countries exceeded US$500 billion, and China has become the largest trading partner for 12 Arab countries. Arab countries exported 271 million tons of oil to China, accounting for 53.31% of China's total global crude oil imports that year. From June 11 to 12, 2023, the 10th China-Arab States Cooperation Forum Entrepreneurs Conference and the 8th Investment Symposium were held in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, where China and Arab states signed more than 30 cooperation projects with a total value exceeding 70 billion RMB.

中国与中东国家贸易总量持续攀升，投资合作逆势上扬，标志性工程和项目引人注目，双方能源全产业链合作和新能源合作不断提升。中国是中东最大的贸易伙伴，2022年中国和中东国家贸易额突破5000亿美元，中国已成为12个阿拉伯国家的最大贸易伙伴。阿拉伯国家向中国出口石油2.71亿吨，占当年中国全球原油进口总量的53.31%。]2023年6月11—12日，中阿合作论坛第十届企业家大会暨第八届投资研讨会在沙特首都利雅得举行，中阿双方签署了总价值超700亿人民币的30多个合作项目。

At the same time, China and Middle Eastern countries have enhanced security exchanges and cooperation, with cooperation in both traditional and non-traditional security fields continuously improving. China is providing an increasing number of public goods to the Middle East region. The Chinese Navy's escort mission in the Gulf of Aden has a history of 15 years, its UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon are widely praised, and it has put forward multiple security initiatives related to Middle Eastern affairs. More importantly, by facilitating the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, China has played a key role as a "Middle East peacemaker," effectively boosting peace and development in the region.

与此同时，中国与中东国家增进安全交流和合作，双方在传统安全和非传统安全领域的合作不断提升。中国为中东地区提供越来越多的公共产品，中国海军的亚丁湾护航行动已有15年历史，在黎巴嫩的联合国维和行动广受赞誉，提出多个与中东事务有关的安全倡议。更为重要的是，中国通过促成沙伊复交，扮演了“中东和平缔造者”的关键角色，有力助推中东地区的和平与发展。

Against the backdrop of the accelerating evolution of the world landscape, the development of the Middle East is ushering in a historic turning point. Facing new historical conditions, China and Middle Eastern countries will be guided by the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind, take the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative as the starting points, deepen exchanges, innovate cooperation, and jointly promote peace and development in the region and the world.

在世界格局加速演变背景下，中东地区发展正迎来历史性转机。面对新的历史条件，中国与中东国家将以共建人类命运共同体理念为引领，以全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议和全球文明倡议为抓手，深化交流、创新合作，共促地区乃至世界的和平与发展。

First, driven by the dual engines of the Global Development Initiative and the Belt and Road Initiative, strengthen shared development. China and Middle Eastern countries have similar economic development concepts, strong complementarity in economic structures, and strong willingness for economic cooperation. The two sides are jointly embracing the development opportunities and challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. China will continue to work with Middle Eastern countries to jointly build the Belt and Road with high quality and implement the Global Development Initiative, deepen cooperation in new technologies, new industries, new infrastructure, and new energy such as big data, artificial intelligence, green energy, aerospace, and genetic engineering, jointly achieve economic development, promote new-type globalization and improve the global governance system, and promote stronger, greener, and healthier global development.

一是以全球发展倡议和“一带一路”倡议双轮驱动，加强发展共享。中国与中东国家经济发展理念接近、经济结构互补性强、经济合作意愿强烈，双方正在携手迎接第四次工业革命的发展机遇和挑战。中国将继续与中东国家一道高质量共建“一带一路”和践行全球发展倡议，在大数据、人工智能、绿色能源、航空航天、基因工程等新技术、新产业、新基建、新能源等领域深化合作，共同实现经济发展，推进新型全球化和完善全球治理体系，推动实现更加强劲、绿色、健康的全球发展。

Second, guided by the Global Security Initiative, strengthen shared security. Against the backdrop of the "wave of reconciliation" in the Middle East and the enhanced strategic autonomy of Middle Eastern countries, China and Middle Eastern countries are continuously promoting the construction of Middle Eastern regional security cooperation mechanisms and security communities. The basic principles can include: regional countries leading, external countries cooperating; non-sensitive issues first, taking into account both traditional and non-traditional security issues; flexible security architecture organization, inclusive membership, and credible commitments, thereby helping to resolve the long-standing structural security problems in the Middle East region.

二是以全球安全倡议为指导，加强安全共建。在中东迎来“和解潮”和中东国家战略自主增强的背景下，中国与中东国家不断推动中东地区安全合作机制和安全共同体建设，其基本原则可包括以地区国家主导、外部国家协作，非敏感议题先行、兼顾传统安全和非传统安全问题，安全架构组织灵活、成员包容、承诺可信等，从而助力解决中东地区长期存在的结构性安全问题。

Third, guided by the Global Civilization Initiative, strengthen mutual learning among civilizations. Adhere to the spirit of "appreciating the beauty of one's own culture, appreciating the beauty of others' cultures, and sharing the beauty of all cultures," [5]5 This is a Chinese idiom promoting mutual appreciation and respect among different cultures, often cited in discussions of intercultural dialogue. excavate the experience and wisdom of fine traditional Chinese culture and Arab-Islamic culture, and endow them with the spirit of the times and universal significance. Strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between Chinese and Middle Eastern civilizations, deepen exchanges on governance experience between China and Middle Eastern countries, join hands on the path of modernization, jointly oppose the civilizational hegemony and discourse hegemony imposed by some Western countries, and advocate the common values of all mankind. Driven by this, Middle Eastern countries will gradually break free from the vortex of "drastic long-wave changes" and shape a prosperous and stable "New Middle East" different from the past.

三是以全球文明倡议为指引，加强文明共鉴。坚持“各美其美，美人之美，美美与共”的精神，挖掘中华优秀传统文化与阿拉伯—伊斯兰文化的经验智慧，赋予其时代精神和普遍意义。加强中国与中东各文明之间的交流互鉴，深化中国与中东国家之间的治国理政经验交流，携手同行现代化之路，共同反对一些西方国家施加的文明霸权和话语霸权，倡导全人类共同价值。以此为推动，中东国家将逐渐摆脱“剧变长波”的旋涡，塑造一个不同以往的繁荣而稳定的“新中东”。

Source: Contemporary World, Issue 10, 2023

文章来源：《当代世界》2023年第10期

Online Editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆