The Evolution of Kishida’s “New Capitalism” Policy: Theory and Practice

In September 2021, Fumio Kishida first proposed the concept of “New Capitalism” while campaigning for the presidency of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party. Thereafter, as the most important economic policy proposition of the Kishida government, the “New Capitalism” policy has been continuously deepened and refined, from its framework design to specific measures, and its policy evolution and adjustments have attracted considerable attention. How is the “New Capitalism” policy being advanced? What are the main changes in its content? What policy characteristics does it exhibit? What background underlies its introduction? What academic significance and policy novelty does it possess? What are its policy effects and prospects? This article will analyze these questions.

2021年9月，岸田文雄在竞选日本自民党总裁时首次提出了“新资本主义”的概念。此后，作为岸田政府最重要的经济政策主张，“新资本主义”政策从框架设计到具体举措，不断得以深化、细化，其政策演进和调整备受关注。“新资本主义”政策如何推进？其主要内容有何变化？显现出哪些政策特点？其政策出台源于何种背景？具有哪些学理意义及政策新意？其政策效果及前景如何？本文将对此进行分析。

I. Overview of the “New Capitalism” Policy

一、“新资本主义”政策概述

(A) The Overall Framework of the “New Capitalism” Policy

（一）“新资本主义”政策的总体框架

In October 2021, in his policy speech, Kishida pointed out the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Japan’s economy, arguing that neoliberal policies had exacerbated problems such as the widening gap between rich and poor, and that “realizing New Capitalism can draw a new economic and social blueprint for Japan’s future.” Its main content is “a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution” and “pioneering a new type of society after the COVID-19 pandemic.”

2021年10月，岸田在其施政演说中指出了新冠疫情对日本经济的影响，认为新自由主义政策导致贫富分化加剧等问题，而“实现新资本主义，可以为日本未来描绘新的经济社会蓝图”，其主要内容是“增长与分配的良性循环”以及“新冠疫情后开拓新型社会”。

To advance the “New Capitalism” concept, in October 2021 the Japanese government newly established the “Headquarters for the Realization of New Capitalism,” with the Prime Minister serving as its head. From October 2021 to the end of September 2023, this headquarters held 22 meetings, formulated implementation plans for the Kishida government’s “New Capitalism” concept, and promoted policy implementation.

为推进“新资本主义”构想，2021年10月，日本政府新设“新资本主义实现本部”，由首相担任本部长。自2021年10月至2023年9月末，该部共召开了22次会议，制定了岸田政府“新资本主义”构想的实施方案，推动政策实施。

Subsequently, the Japanese government convened meetings such as the Conference for the Realization of the Digital Garden City Nation Concept, the Digital Temporary Administrative Investigation Council, the Conference on Building a Social Security System for All Generations, and the Economic Security Promotion Conference, which collaborated with the Headquarters for the Realization of New Capitalism to jointly advance the formulation and implementation of the “New Capitalism” policy.

此后，日本政府召开了数字田园都市国家构想实现会议、数字临时行政调查会议、全年龄层社会保障构筑会议、经济安全保障推进会议等，与“新资本主义”实现会议相互协作，共同推进“新资本主义”政策的制定与实施。

(B) The “New Capitalism” Concept Centered on Growth and Distribution

（二）以增长和分配为主线的“新资本主义”构想

In November 2021, the Headquarters for the Realization of New Capitalism reviewed and approved an emergency proposal titled “Pioneering the Future: ‘New Capitalism’ and Its Launch” (hereinafter referred to as the “Emergency Proposal”), which systematically elaborated the “New Capitalism” policy from the two major directions of growth and distribution. (See Table 1)

2021年11月，“新资本主义”实现会议审议通过了题为“开拓未来的‘新资本主义’及其启动”的紧急提案（以下简称“紧急提案”），从增长和分配两大方向系统地阐述了“新资本主义”政策。（参见表1）

In December 2021, Kishida dissolved the House of Representatives and was re-elected as Prime Minister of Japan. In his address to the Diet, he stated that Europe and the United States had already begun exploring new models of capitalism, such as the Biden administration’s “Build Back Better” and the Eurozone’s “Next Generation EU” visions. Japan would balance both growth and distribution, introducing specific measures of the “New Capitalism” policy to become a leader in responding to global and era challenges.

2021年12月，岸田解散众议院后再次当选为日本首相。他在国会演说中指出，欧美已经开始探索资本主义新模式，如美国拜登政府的“重建美好”（Build back better）、欧元区的“下一代欧盟”（Next Generation EU）等愿景，日本将兼顾增长和分配两方面，出台“新资本主义”政策的具体举措，以成为应对全球和时代挑战的引领者。

(C) The “New Capitalism” Policy Incorporating Distribution into Growth

（三）将分配纳入增长的“新资本主义”政策

In June 2022, the Japanese government issued the “Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2022,” themed “Toward New Capitalism: Turning Problem-Solving into a Driver of Economic Growth and Achieving Sustainable Development,” and passed the “2022 Overall Design and Implementation Plan for New Capitalism.” As the first economic policy program after the Kishida cabinet took office, compared with the “Emergency Proposal,” the above policies were more specific and placed greater emphasis on the “growth” element. Their investment priorities were mainly concentrated in four major areas, with “distribution” incorporated into the area of “investment in people.” (See Table 2)

2022年6月，日本政府出台了主题为“面向新资本主义——将问题的解决转化为经济增长动力，实现可持续发展”的“经济财政运营与改革基本方针2022”，并通过了2022年“新资本主义总体设计及实施计划”。作为岸田内阁执政后的首份经济政策纲领，与“紧急提案”相比，上述政策更加具体，也更加注重“增长”要素，其投资重点主要集中在四大领域，其中“分配”被纳入“对人的投资”领域。（参见表2）

In November 2022, the Headquarters for the Realization of New Capitalism discussed and approved the “Five-Year Plan for Fostering Startups” and the “Plan to Double Asset Income,” focusing on the investment field. The “Five-Year Plan for Fostering Startups” proposed that investment in startups would increase tenfold over five years, reaching 10 trillion yen by 2027. In the future, Japan would have 100 unicorn enterprises (only 10 in 2022) and 100,000 startups, and Japan would be built into the largest startup hub in Asia and a globally leading startup cluster. The “Plan to Double Asset Income” set goals of doubling the number of investors, doubling investment scale, and doubling long-term asset management income, aiming to promote the conversion of savings into investment and increase residents’ financial asset income.

2022年11月，“新资本主义”实现会议讨论通过了“初创企业培育五年计划”和“资产所得倍增计划”，将重点置于投资领域。“初创企业培育五年计划”提出，五年后，对初创企业的投资额将增加10倍，即至2027年达到10万亿日元。未来，日本将拥有100家独角兽企业（2022年仅10家）、10万家初创企业，日本将被打造成为亚洲最大的初创企业中枢，以及位居全球前列的初创企业聚集地。“资产所得倍增计划”则提出了投资者数量倍增、投资规模倍增以及长期资产运营收入倍增的目标，旨在促进储蓄向投资转化，提升居民金融资产收入。

(D) The Continuously Adjusted and Refined “New Capitalism” Policy

（四）不断调整和细化的“新资本主义”政策

Based on the above policies approved by the Headquarters for the Realization of New Capitalism, in June 2023 the Japanese government issued the “Revised Version of the 2023 Overall Design and Implementation Plan for New Capitalism” and passed the “Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2023,” themed “Accelerating New Capitalism: Expanding Investment for the Future and Achieving Structural Wage Increases.” The Japanese government sought to accelerate the “New Capitalism” process through five aspects: first, promoting a three-pronged labor market reform to achieve structural wage increases, strengthen “investment in people,” and form a solid middle class; second, expanding investment and carrying out economic and social reforms; third, strengthening policies on the declining birthrate and child-rearing; fourth, building an inclusive society; and fifth, revitalizing local economies and enhancing the vitality of small and medium-sized enterprises. From the above policy advancement process, it can be seen that the Kishida government has continuously deepened and refined the “New Capitalism” policy, and its adjustments exhibit three characteristics.

在“新资本主义”实现会议通过的上述相关政策基础上，2023年6月，日本政府出台了“2023年新资本主义总体设计及实施计划修订版”，并通过了“经济财政运营与改革基本方针2023”，其主题为“加速进行的新资本主义——面向未来的投资扩张及实现结构性工资上涨”。日本政府力图通过五方面内容来加速推动“新资本主义”进程：一是推进三位一体的劳动力市场改革，实现结构性工资上涨，强化“对人的投资”，形成坚实的中产阶层；二是扩大投资，进行经济社会改革；三是强化少子化和育儿政策；四是构建包容性社会；五是搞活地方经济，提升中小企业活力。从上述政策推进过程可以看出，岸田政府不断深化、细化“新资本主义”政策，其调整呈现出三个特点。

First, emphasis on distribution. Unlike the strategies of “Abenomics” and the Suga administration, which focused on growth, the Kishida government aimed to achieve a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution and, at the beginning of its administration, made distribution a policy highlight. Although the distributional color subsequently faded, it incorporated distribution-related content such as “investment in people,” “achieving structural wage increases,” and “equal pay for equal work” into the growth strategy.

一是重视分配。与“安倍经济学”和菅义伟政府注重增长的战略有所不同，岸田政府以实现增长与分配的良性循环为目标，且在执政之初便将分配作为政策亮点。虽然其后分配色彩淡化，但也将“对人的投资”“实现结构性工资上涨”“同工同酬”等具有分配性质的相关内容纳入增长战略之中。

Second, policy function stacking, deviating from the original goal of “New Capitalism.” While raising the potential economic growth rate, the Kishida government made national security a basic condition for realizing “New Capitalism” and, on the pretext of stabilizing supply chains, followed the United States in continuously strengthening economic security strategies to prevent and suppress Chinese high-tech products. This move not only violates the laws of the market economy but also affects Japan’s own economic development, running counter to the growth strategy goals of “New Capitalism.”

二是政策功能叠加，偏离了“新资本主义”的最初目标。在提升潜在经济增长率的同时，岸田政府将国家安全保障作为实现“新资本主义”的基础条件，并以稳定供应链为由追随美国，不断强化防范打压中国高科技产品的经济安全保障战略。此举不仅违背市场经济规律，也影响了日本自身的经济发展，与“新资本主义”的增长战略目标背道而驰。

Third, expanding the space for public-private cooperation. Within the framework of “New Capitalism,” Japan, on the one hand, further leverages the role of the government, using proactive public investment to call forth autonomous private investment, while focusing on improving the institutional environment, promoting investment, and carrying out related tax system and regulatory reforms. On the other hand, under severe fiscal conditions, Japan seeks to enhance the effectiveness of private funds in areas such as technological innovation, digital transformation, and green transformation, constructing new forms of public-private cooperation.

三是扩大官民合作空间。在“新资本主义”框架下，日本一方面进一步发挥政府的作用，通过先行的公共投资呼唤民间自主性投资，同时注重完善制度环境，促进投资，进行相关税制和规制改革等；另一方面，在严峻的财政状况下，日本在科技创新、数字化转型、绿色转型等领域，力图提升民间资金的效用，构建新型官民合作方式。

II. Background of the Introduction of the “New Capitalism” Policy

二、“新资本主义”政策出台的背景

(A) The Economy Has Fallen into Long-Term Stagnation

（一）经济陷入长期低迷

Since 2019, Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined for two consecutive years, with a 4.1% drop in fiscal year 2020 setting a post-war record high. However, aside from the special short-term factor of the COVID-19 pandemic, structural problems in Japanese society have long constrained its economic development. After the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, Japan’s economy has been in a long-term slump, with an average real GDP growth rate of only 0.8% from 1991 to 2022, far below the 9.1% from 1956 to 1973 and the 4.2% from 1974 to 1990. Japan’s economy has been labeled the “Lost 30 Years.”

自2019年起，日本的国内生产总值（GDP）连续两年下降，其中，2020年度4.1%的降幅创战后历史新高。但除去新冠疫情这一特殊的短期因素之外，日本社会的结构性问题长期制约了其经济发展。1990年代泡沫经济崩溃后，日本经济长期处于低迷状态，1991—2022年平均实际GDP增幅仅为0.8%，远低于1956—1973年的9.1%和1974—1990年的4.2%。日本经济被贴上了“失去的30年”的标签。

The reasons for this are, first, population decline, especially a marked decrease in the working-age population against the backdrop of a declining birthrate and an aging society. According to statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, as of October 1, 2022, Japan’s total population was 125 million, a year-on-year decrease of 556,000, and it has been on a downward trend for 12 consecutive years. Among them, the population under 15 years old hit a record low, the proportion of those aged 65 and over reached a peak of 29%, and the share of the working-age population aged 15–64, after peaking at 69.8% in 1992, has continued to decline, falling below 60% of the total population for two consecutive years since 2021, the lowest level on record. Over the long term, it is projected that by 2070, Japan’s total population will be only 87 million, with those aged 65 and over accounting for 38.7% and those aged 15–64 falling to 52.1%. The rapid decline in population, especially the working-age population, has had a significant impact on the supply-demand structure, fiscal policy, and long-term economic growth.

究其原因，一是人口减少，特别是少子老龄化背景下劳动适龄人口数量明显减少。据日本总务省统计，2022年10月1日时点，日本总人口数量为1.25万亿，同比减少55.6万人，且连续12年呈减少趋势。其中，未满15岁的人口数量创历史新低，65岁以上人口比重达到29%的最高水平，而15—64岁劳动适龄人口占比于1992年达到69.8%的峰值后持续降低，2021年起连续两年不到总人口的六成，为有历史记录以来最低值。长期来看，预计到2070年，日本总人口将仅为8700万人，65岁以上人口占比将达38.7%，而15—64岁人口将降至52.1%。人口数量、特别是劳动适龄人口数量的急速下滑，对供需结构、财政政策和经济长期增长均造成较大影响。

Second, the potential economic growth rate is low. Since the 1990s, Japan’s potential economic growth rate has declined sharply, reaching only 0.4% in 2022, far below the 3.7% in 1990. Among the contributing factors, the contribution of labor and capital inputs has decreased substantially. At the same time, due to slow technological progress, the contribution rate of Japan’s total factor productivity (TFP) has struggled to rise, hovering at only about 0.5% in recent years.

二是潜在经济增长率低下。自1990年代起，日本潜在经济增长率急速下滑，2022年仅为0.4%，远低于1990年的3.7%。其中，劳动和资本投入的贡献度大幅降低。与此同时，由于技术进步缓慢，日本全要素生产率（TFP）的贡献率上升乏力，近年来仅为0.5%左右。

Third, long-term deflation has led to a decline in real income. The Japanese government issued deflation declarations twice, in March 2001 and November 2009. Under the strong stimulus of “Abenomics,” [2]2 “Abenomics” refers to the economic policies advocated by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, centered on “three arrows”: aggressive monetary easing, flexible fiscal policy, and structural reforms. since August 2013, although the Japanese government has stated that “the economy is no longer in a state of deflation,” it has still not fully escaped long-term deflation. Long-term deflation, while bringing about low-level economic operation, has also led to problems such as declining wages and insufficient investment. Since the mid-1990s, wage growth for Japanese employees has stagnated or even contracted. A survey by Japan’s National Tax Agency shows that in 2021, the average annual income of employees who had worked for more than one year was 4.43 million yen, a decrease of 220,000 yen compared to 1998. Globally, Japan’s average wage level has also been low for a long time among major developed countries. According to statistics from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Japan’s hourly wage in 2021, denominated in US dollars, was $24.6, only 58% of that of the United States and 65% of that of the United Kingdom.

三是长期通缩，实际收入下降。日本政府分别于2001年3月和2009年11月两度发表通缩宣言。在“安倍经济学”的强力刺激下，自2013年8月起至今，日本政府虽然表示“经济已不处于通缩状态”，但仍未能完全摆脱长期通缩。长期通缩在带来经济低位运行的同时，也导致了工资水平下降、投资不足等问题。自1990年代中期起，日本员工工资增长处于停滞甚至收缩状态。日本国税厅的调查显示，2021年工作一年以上的员工人均年收入为443万日元，比1998年减少了22万日元。在全球范围内，日本的平均工资水平在主要发达国家中也长期处于低位。根据经济合作与发展组织（OECD）的统计，2021年日本以美元计价的小时工资为24.6美元，仅为美英的58%和65%。

(II) Entering a Stratified Society [3]3 “Stratified society” (kakusa shakai) is a Japanese term for a society with widening disparities in income, wealth, and opportunity.

（二）步入格差社会

In November 1988, the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* published an editorial, first bringing the term “stratified society” into public view. Scholars such as Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Masahiro Yamada have also conducted systematic and in-depth research on this. Japan’s stratified society is mainly reflected in five aspects.

1988年11月，日本《朝日新闻》发表社论，首次将“格差社会”置于公众视野。橘木俊诏、山田昌弘等学者也对此进行了系统深入的研究。日本格差社会主要体现在五个方面。

First, the widening income gap. Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare conducts a “Survey on Redistribution of Income” every three years. The results of the 2021 survey show that Japan’s Gini coefficient reached 0.57, only slightly lower than the 0.5704 in 2014, ranking as the second highest in history.

一是收入差距扩大。日本厚生劳动省每三年进行一次“收入再分配调查”，2021年的调查结果显示，日本的基尼系数达0.57，仅略低于2014年的0.5704，位于历史第二高位。

Second, income inequality. Survey results from Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare show that income levels are significantly affected by factors such as gender, enterprise size, and employment type. In 2022, women’s wages were only 75.7% of men’s; wages in medium-sized enterprises and small enterprises were only 87% and 81.7%, respectively, of those in large enterprises; and the average annual income of non-regular employees was only two-thirds that of regular employees.

二是收入不均衡。日本厚生省的调查结果显示，收入水平受性别、企业规模、就业形态等因素的影响显著。2022年，日本女性的工资仅为男性的75.7%，中型企业、小型企业的工资水平分别仅为大企业工资水平的87%和81.7%，非正式员工的年均收入仅为正式员工的2/3。

Third, the increase in the impoverished population. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Japan’s once-proud social structure of the “100 million total middle class” [4]4 “100 million total middle class” (ichioku sōchūryū) was a widely used phrase in post-war Japan describing a society where the vast majority of the population identified as middle class. has gradually disintegrated. In 2021, the proportion of people in Japan below the poverty line (annual income of 1.27 million yen) was 15.4%, meaning one in every 6.5 people was in a state of poverty, and the relative poverty rate for single-parent families was as high as 44.5%.

三是贫困人口增多。进入21世纪以来，日本引以为豪的“一亿总中流”的社会结构逐步瓦解。2021年，日本低于贫困线标准（年收入127万日元）的人群占15.4%，即每6.5人中就有一人处于贫困状态，单亲家庭的相对贫困率更是高达44.5%。

Fourth, the middle class shows a continuous trend of shrinking. From 1985 to 2000, the proportion of the middle class in Japan’s total population fell from 63.9% to 57.9%. Although it has maintained a certain degree of stability since then, it was still only 58.1% in 2018, below the average of OECD countries.

四是中间阶层呈持续缩小趋势。自1985年至2000年，日本中间阶层在总人口中的占比从63.9%降至57.9%，之后虽保持一定的稳定状态，但2018年也仅为58.1%，低于OECD国家的平均值。

Fifth, the gap between urban and rural areas is widening. Against the backdrop of a declining birthrate and an aging society, compared with the three major metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, local economic areas face problems such as labor reduction, sluggish consumption, and a shrinking economic scale. In 2019, the population of local areas decreased by 2.5%, while the population of the Tokyo metropolitan area increased by 2.2%, highlighting the prominent phenomenon of extreme concentration in the Tokyo area.

五是都市与地方差距扩大。在少子老龄化的背景下，与东京、大阪和名古屋三大都市圈相比，地方经济圈存在劳动力减少、消费低迷、经济规模缩小等问题。2019年，地方人口减少了2.5%，而东京圈人口则增加了2.2%，东京圈一极集中的现象突出。

(III) Insufficient Enterprise Innovation Motivation

（三）企业创新动力不足

Compared with tangible assets such as capital and equipment, Japan’s investment in intangible assets such as information technology assets, innovative assets, and economic competitiveness is insufficient. For example, Japan’s R&D expenditure of 19.7 trillion yen in fiscal year 2021 was far lower than the 82.5 trillion yen of the United States and the 48.5 trillion yen of China.

与资本、设备等有形资产相比，日本对信息化资产、创新性资产和经济竞争力等无形资产的投入不足。例如，2021年度日本19.7万亿日元的研发经费远低于美国的82.5万亿日元和中国的48.5万亿日元研发经费。

The number of unicorn enterprises in a country is an important indicator for cultivating startups and measuring the metabolic capacity of an industry. As of the end of March 2023, there were 1,206 unicorn enterprises globally, with the United States ranking first with 654, China and India following with 169 and 70 respectively, while Japan had only 6, reflecting a significant international gap in technological and service innovation.

一国独角兽企业的数量是培育初创企业、衡量产业新陈代谢能力的重要指标。截至2023年3月末，全球共有1206家独角兽企业，其中美国以654家位居首位，中国、印度分别以169家和70家名列其后，而日本仅有6家，体现了其在技术和服务创新领域存在较大的国际差距。

Japan is also lagging behind in the process of digital transformation. A survey by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Switzerland shows that in the 2022 World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, Japan fell to a record low of 29th place, far behind the United States, South Korea, and China. As an important pillar of Kishida’s “New Capitalism” policy, the Japanese government has introduced policy measures such as the “Digital Garden City Nation Vision,” WEB3.0, and support for startups to enhance the overall level of digital transformation in society.

日本在数字化转型的过程中也处于落后的地位。瑞士洛桑国际管理学院（IMD）的调查显示，在2022年世界数字竞争力排名中，日本跌至29位的历史最低排名，远低于美国、韩国和中国。作为岸田“新资本主义”政策的重要支柱，日本政府推出了“数字田园都市国家构想”、WEB3.0、支援初创企业等政策措施，以提升社会整体的数字化转型水平。

(IV) Weakening Consumption and Investment

（四）消费、投资弱化

For a long time, household consumption and corporate equipment investment, which support Japan’s domestic demand, have been weak, and the willingness to convert household savings and corporate retained earnings into investment has been low. As of the end of June 2023, Japanese household financial assets reached a record high of 2,115 trillion yen. Among them, cash and deposits accounted for as much as 52.8%, while assets such as stocks accounted for only 12.7%. In disposable income, Japan’s property income accounted for only 8.3%, less than half of that in the United States and the United Kingdom. In terms of incremental growth, household financial assets in the United States and the United Kingdom increased by 2 times and 1.5 times, respectively, over 10 years, while Japan increased by only 0.4 times.

长期以来，支撑日本内需的居民消费和企业设备投资乏力，居民储蓄和企业留存收益转化为投资的意愿淡薄。截至2023年6月末，日本家庭金融资产高达2115万亿日元，再创历史新高。其中，现金存款占比高达52.8%，股票等资产仅占12.7%。在可支配收入中，日本财产性收入仅占8.3%，不到英美的一半。从增量来看，10年间美英家庭金融资产分别增加了2倍和1.5倍，而日本仅增加了0.4倍。

Increasing the utilization rate of household savings and corporate retained earnings can help provide a solid financial foundation for business operations, wage increases, and expanding domestic demand. However, most of the profits of Japanese enterprises remain as internal reserves, while investment in wages and equipment has decreased. Compared with 2000, by 2020, the ordinary income of large Japanese enterprises had increased by 91.1%, internal reserves had increased by 175%, while wages and equipment investment had decreased by 0.4% and 5.3%, respectively.

提高居民储蓄和企业留存的利用率有助于为企业经营、工资上涨和扩大内需提供坚实的资金基础。然而，日本企业的收益大多滞留为内部留存，工资和设备的投资减少。与2000年相比，2020年日本大企业经常收益增加了91.1%，内部留存增加了175%，而工资和设备投资却分别下降了0.4%和5.3%。

(V) Changes in the International Political and Economic Environment

（五）国际政治经济环境变化

In recent years, the global political and economic landscape has undergone drastic changes. After Trump took office as US President in 2017, he pursued policy propositions of “America First” and “America First,” [5]5 The original text repeats “America First” and “America First” (the Chinese rendering of the slogan); the translation reflects the intended repetition of the same slogan. advocating trade protectionism and populism, provoking and continuously escalating trade frictions with China. Since the Biden administration took office in 2021, the United States, under the pretext of national security, has continued to regard China as a strategic competitor. Against the backdrop of overlapping factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis, and in alliance with allies such as Japan and Europe, the US has continuously escalated its suppression of China. In this context, Japan has actively joined the US alliance to contain China’s trade, technology, and supply chains, elevating economic security to a national strategy and regarding it as a growth strategy to promote the development of “New Capitalism.”

近年来，全球政治经济格局剧烈变动。2017年特朗普就任美国总统以后，推行了“美国优先”“美国第一”的政策主张，鼓动贸易保护主义和民粹主义，挑起并不断升级与中国的贸易摩擦。2021年拜登政府执政以来，美国以国家安全为名，继续将中国视为战略对手，在新冠疫情、乌克兰危机等影响因素的叠加下，联合日欧等盟友，对华打压不断升级。在此背景下，日本积极加入美国遏制中国贸易、科技和供应链等的联盟，将经济安全上升为国家战略，并将其视为促进“新资本主义”发展的一项增长战略。

In addition, in the face of global common issues such as climate change and sustainable development, the Kishida government, adhering to the green transformation and digital transformation strategies proposed by the Suga government, has taken the green economy and digital economy as the two major engines of economic growth, incorporating them into the policy framework of “New Capitalism.” In July 2022, the “Green Transformation Implementation Council” was established under the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office to oversee the implementation process of green transformation, aiming to achieve Japan’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 46% by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.

此外，面对气候变化、可持续发展等全球共同议题，岸田政府秉承菅义伟政府提出的绿色转型、数字化转型战略，将绿色经济和数字经济作为经济增长的两大引擎，纳入“新资本主义”政策框架。2022年7月，日本首相官邸下设“绿色转型实行会议”，监督绿色转型的实施过程，力图实现日本2030年削减46%的温室气体排放、2050年达成碳中和的目标。

III. A Critical Review of the Theoretical Foundations of the “New Capitalism” Policy

三、“新资本主义”政策的理论基础评述

(I) Reflection on the Contradictions and Defects of Neoliberal Policies

（一）对新自由主义政策的矛盾与缺陷的反思

Kishida pointed out that the concept of “New Capitalism” first stems from correcting the ills of neoliberalism. Some people attribute the two oil crises of the 1970s and the stagflation predicament of the capitalist world to the failure of Keynesianism, believing that excessive government intervention harmed economic efficiency. In the 1980s, under the influence of neoliberalism, then-US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, while implementing tax cuts, vigorously promoted liberalization reforms. During the same period, Japan also implemented privatization reforms in areas such as Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation and Japanese National Railways. On the one hand, under the process of economic globalization, neoliberalism led developed capitalist countries and some global economies to once enter a growth model; on the other hand, the long-term proliferation of neoliberalism globally also brought about problems such as widening economic disparities, social polarization, the rise of populism, threats from climate change, and market failures.

岸田指出，“新资本主义”构想首先源于纠正新自由主义的弊端。一些民众将1970年代的两次石油危机以及资本主义世界陷入滞胀困境的原因归为凯恩斯主义的失败，认为政府的过度干预损害了经济效率。1980年代，在新自由主义的影响下，时任美国总统里根、英国首相撒切尔夫人在实施减税政策的同时，大力推行自由化改革。同一时期，日本也在电信公社、国铁等领域实施了民营化改革。一方面，在经济全球化进程下，新自由主义引领发达资本主义国家及全球部分经济体一度开启了增长模式；另一方面，新自由主义在全球的长期泛滥也带来了经济差距扩大、社会两极分化、民粹主义抬头、气候变化威胁以及市场失灵等问题。

In recent years, many countries around the world have begun to reflect on and criticize neoliberalism, making adjustments at the policy level. For example, scholars such as Thomas Piketty, Michael Jacobs, Mariana Mazzucato, and Joseph Stiglitz have analyzed and attacked neoliberalism from perspectives such as the wealth gap, the role of government, and institutional reform. At the same time, global trends such as digitalization, informatization, and the restructuring of industrial and supply chains have emerged. Economies such as Europe, the United States, and Japan have begun to abandon laissez-faire economic propositions, paying more attention to industrial policy adjustments and promoting cooperation between government and the private sector. After Biden took office as US President in January 2021, he successively introduced four major bills and proposed “Bidenomics,” hoping to re-strengthen the role of government and enhance social welfare through the reorganization of industrial policy. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen provided a systematic theoretical explanation of this, proposing the concept of “modern supply-side economics,” arguing that, compared with traditional supply-side economics, which focuses on deregulation and tax cuts, the Biden administration’s modern supply-side economics pays more attention to investment in key areas such as human capital, public infrastructure, and R&D within a sustainable environment, in order to promote economic growth and address the wealth gap. The Kishida government echoes this, pointing out that capitalism, after undergoing three transformations, is once again at a critical juncture for reform, and needs to solve problems through “New Capitalism,” achieving the sustained happiness of the people in a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution.

近年来，全球多国开始反思和批判新自由主义，并在政策层面进行调整。例如，托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）、迈克尔·雅各布（Michael Jacobs）、玛丽安娜·马祖卡托（Mariana Mazzucato）、约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）等学者从贫富差距、政府角色、制度改良等角度解析和抨击了新自由主义。与此同时，全球兴起了数字化、信息化和产业链供应链重构等浪潮，欧美和日本等经济体开始摒弃自由放任的经济主张，更加注重产业政策调整，并推动政府与民间的合作。2021年1月拜登就任美国总统后，先后推出四大法案，并提出了“拜登经济学”（Bidenomics），期望重新强化政府的作用，通过重整产业政策提升社会福利。美国财长珍妮特·路易斯·耶伦（Janet Louis Yellen）对此进行系统性的理论阐释，提出了“现代供给侧经济学”的概念,认为与传统供给侧经济学注重放松管制和减税相比，拜登政府的现代供给侧经济学更加关注在可持续的环境中对人力资本、公共基础设施和研发等重点领域的投资，以促进经济增长，解决贫富差距问题。岸田政府与之呼应，指出资本主义在历经三次转型后，再次处于改革的关口，需要通过“新资本主义”解决问题，在增长与分配的良性循环中实现国民的持续幸福。

(II) Stakeholder Capitalism Theory

（二）利益相关者资本主义理论

In the 1970s, compared with neoliberalism, which advocates maximizing shareholder interests and market fundamentalism, stakeholder capitalism, which focuses on the long-term development of enterprises and society, began to receive attention. In 1971, Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum, proposed that, in addition to shareholder capitalism and state capitalism, more attention should be paid to a third model of capitalism, namely stakeholder capitalism. Enterprises should not only care about the short-term interests of shareholders but should also pay attention to the needs of all stakeholders and society as a whole, creating long-term value. The four main stakeholders—government, civil society, enterprises, and international organizations—should play a crucial role.

1970年代，与主张追求股东利益最大化和市场原教旨主义的新自由主义相比，注重企业和社会长期发展的利益相关者资本主义开始受到关注。1971年，世界经济论坛创始人克劳斯·施瓦布（Klaus Schwab）提出，在股东资本主义（shareholder capitalism）和国家资本主义（state capitalism）之外，应该更加重视资本主义的第三种模式，即利益相关者资本主义（stakeholder capitalism）。企业不仅要关心股东的短期利益，还应关注所有利益相关者和整个社会的需求，创造长期价值。政府、民间团体、企业和国际组织这四个主要利益相关者应发挥至关重要的作用。

Although this concept has faced some doubts and criticisms, in recent years, more and more transformation results have emerged, centered on American enterprises. To address issues such as income gaps, social division, and climate change, rethinking corporate social responsibility under the capitalist system has become a consensus among some Western individuals. In August 2019, the US Business Roundtable announced that it would adjust the long-standing shareholder-first business paradigm of American enterprises, a move echoed by nearly 200 corporate executives. In January 2020, the Davos World Economic Forum annual meeting set the theme of re-elaborating the new stakeholder concept, and in September 2020, it released a report defining common indicators for measuring stakeholder capitalism, consisting of 21 core items and 34 extended items, based on the Sustainable Development Goals and environmental, social, and governance principles, covering four major areas: governance principles, planet, people, and prosperity. Since January 2021, 61 multinational enterprises have incorporated stakeholder capitalism indicators into their corporate reports, including seven Japanese companies such as Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group.

这一理念虽然受到一定的质疑和批判，但近年来，以美国企业为中心出现了越来越多的转型成果。为应对收入差距、社会分裂和气候变化等问题，在资本主义制度下重新思考企业社会责任成为部分西方人士的共识。2019年8月，美国商业圆桌会议（the United States Business Round Table）宣布将调整美国企业长期遵循的股东优先的经营范式，并得到了近200家企业高管的呼应。2020年1月，达沃斯世界经济论坛年会将重新阐述新型利益相关者理念设为主题，并于2020年9月发布报告，按照可持续发展目标以及环境、社会和治理原则，确定了由21项核心项目和34项扩展项目构成的衡量利益相关者资本主义的通用指标，涵盖治理原则、地球、人类和繁荣四大领域。自2021年1月起，61家跨国企业将利益相关者资本主义指标纳入企业报告，其中，三菱商事、三菱日联金融集团等七家企业为日本企业。

As an important representative of Japan’s business community, the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) has proposed “sustainable capitalism” as a policy recommendation, hoping to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals through Society 5.0. The Federation points out that the Kishida government’s “New Capitalism” is in the same vein as its “sustainable capitalism,” both pointing towards goals such as narrowing the wealth gap, improving welfare levels, raising the level of economic growth, and achieving reasonable value distribution. Compared with European and American countries, which focus on issues such as the environment and equity, Kishida’s “New Capitalism” concept, while mentioning stakeholders, places its emphasis on promoting wage increases for large enterprises. Japan’s 2022 tax reform plan proposed a “Diverse Stakeholders Declaration,” incorporating diverse stakeholders into the operational considerations of large enterprises from the perspective of promoting wage increases.

作为日本经济界的重要代表，日本经济团体联合会以“可持续资本主义”作为政策提议，希望通过社会5.0实现可持续发展目标。该联合会指出，岸田政府的“新资本主义”与其“可持续资本主义”一脉相承，均指向缩小贫富差距、提升福利水平、提高经济增长水平和合理分配价值等目标。与欧美国家注重环境、公平等问题相比，岸田的“新资本主义”构想虽然提及利益相关者，但其重点在于推进大企业工资上涨。2022年的日本税制改革方案提出了“多元化利益相关者宣言”，从促进大企业加薪的角度，将多元化利益相关者纳入其经营考量要素。

(III) “Public Interest” Capitalism Theory

（三）“公益”资本主义理论

Stakeholder capitalism is a reflection on shareholder capitalism, and the principle of prioritizing shareholder interests mainly represents the mainstream business thinking in Europe and the United States. From the perspective of corporate social responsibility, the business philosophy of Japanese enterprises has commonalities with stakeholder capitalism theory, reflecting both Japan’s traditional business thinking and the theoretical connotations of public interest capitalism that reflect the characteristics of the times.

利益相关者资本主义是对股东资本主义的反思，而股东利益优先原则主要代表了欧美的主流经营思想。从企业社会责任的角度来看，日本企业的经营理念与利益相关者资本主义理论有相通之处，既体现了日本传统的经营思想，又包含了反映时代特征的公益资本主义理论内涵。

Unlike the American shareholder-first business model, Japan has always maintained a spiritual culture and tradition that values stakeholders. From the “three-way satisfaction” business philosophy of “good for the buyer, good for the seller, good for society” of the Omi merchants in the Edo period, to the “joint-stock capitalism” and “unity of morality and economy” advocated by Shibusawa Eiichi, the “father of Japanese capitalism,” and the “democratization of stocks” thought of Matsushita Konosuke, the “god of management” in Japan, traditional Japanese-style business models have helped form a modern corporate social responsibility underpinned by an altruistic culture.

不同于美国股东第一的经营模式，日本一直保有重视利益相关者的精神文化和传统。从江户时期近江商人“买方好、卖方好、社会好”的“三方皆好”经营理念，到“日本资本主义之父”涩泽荣一主张的“合本主义”和“道德经济合一说”，以及“日本经营之神”松下幸之助的“股票大众化”思想等，传统的日式经营模式助力形成了以利他文化为底色的现代企业社会责任。

Japanese entrepreneur Genba Taro, who served as a special advisor to the Abe cabinet, put forward the theory of “public-interest” capitalism, providing theoretical support for Kishida’s “New Capitalism” concept. “Public-interest” capitalism theory holds that enterprises, as public instruments of society, are composed of stakeholders such as employees, customers, shareholders, suppliers, surrounding regions, and even the entire planet. Business operators should rationally distribute earnings for the public interest, so as to promote the development of the real economy under capitalism. “Public-interest” capitalism includes three major elements: fair distribution, medium- and long-term goals, and an entrepreneurial spirit of pioneering innovation. Kishida pointed out that, in order to address the impact of neoliberalism on Japanese enterprises and the economy and society following the structural reforms of the Koizumi administration, consideration should be given to “distribution” and “sustainability,” and “New Capitalism” should be developed, which can also be called “public-interest” capitalism.

日本企业家、曾任安倍内阁特别顾问的原丈人以此提出了“‘公益’资本主义”理论，为岸田的“新资本主义”构想提供了理论支持。“公益”资本主义理论是指企业作为社会“公器”，由员工、顾客、股东、供应商、周边地区甚至地球整体等利益相关者组成，企业经营者应合理分配收益，用于公共利益，以促进资本主义实体经济发展。“公益”资本主义包括三大要素，即公平的分配、中长期目标和开拓创新的企业家精神。岸田指出，为解决小泉政府结构改革后新自由主义对日本企业和经济社会的影响，应考虑“分配”和“可持续性”，发展“新资本主义”，也可以称之为“公益”资本主义。

In summary, Kishida’s “New Capitalism” does not signify the negation or end of capitalism. The so-called “new” refers to the fact that, compared with the neoliberal economic stimulus policies promoted by the Koizumi, Abe, and Suga cabinets, the Kishida government places greater emphasis on distribution to stakeholders and investment in people, mainly reflected in three aspects. First, it emphasizes the joint role of market and government, and of the public and private sectors. “New Capitalism” merges some ideas from Keynesian economics with the policy practices of the new supply-side school. On the one hand, in economic policy, “New Capitalism” continues to value the capitalist market mechanism and unleash market vitality; on the other hand, the “new” reflects a certain correction of neoliberalism, rethinking the roles of the public and private sectors while assigning greater social expectations to government functions, in order to address market failures.

综上所述，岸田“新资本主义”并不意味着对资本主义的否定和终结。所谓的“新”是指与小泉、安倍、菅义伟内阁推行的新自由主义经济刺激政策相比，岸田政府更为强调对利益相关者的分配，注重对人的投资，主要体现在三个方面。一是重视市场与政府、公共部门与私人部门共同发挥作用。“新资本主义”将凯恩斯经济学的部分思想与新供给学派的政策实践相融合。一方面，在经济政策中，“新资本主义”继续重视资本主义市场机制，发挥市场活力；另一方面，“新”体现了在一定程度上对新自由主义的纠偏，在重新思考公私部门角色的基础上，为政府功能赋予了更多的社会期待，以应对市场失灵。

Second, it emphasizes primary income distribution. The “distribution” stressed by “New Capitalism” requires enterprises to increase employee wages. Through tax system reform, the Kishida government implements preferential policies of corporate tax reduction for large and mid-tier enterprises on the condition that wages are raised by 3%. As the most important measure of “investment in people,” “New Capitalism” emphasizes that wage increases are a pre-investment to increase enterprises’ future earnings. At the same time, the Kishida government has also introduced measures to encourage workers’ skill learning, capacity development, retraining, and reemployment, in order to raise labor productivity and alleviate problems such as labor market mismatches.

二是注重初次收入分配。“新资本主义”强调的“分配”是要求企业增加员工工资。岸田政府通过税制改革，在工资上调3%的前提下，对大企业和中坚企业实施法人税减免的优惠政策。作为“对人的投资”中最重要的举措，“新资本主义”强调，涨薪是增加企业未来收益的预先投资。与此同时，岸田政府还推出了鼓励劳动者技能学习、能力开发、再培训和再就业等举措，以期提升劳动生产率，缓和劳动力市场错配等问题。

Third, it focuses on sustainable development. Within the concept of “public-interest” capitalism, the “New Capitalism” policy, on the one hand, redefines enterprise value to maximize the common interests of stakeholders, and on the other hand, focuses on addressing negative externalities such as environmental and social issues, in order to create new markets. Facing global problems such as climate change, the government and enterprises form a joint force to promote sustainable development goals and environmental, social, and governance practices. It can be said that “public-interest” capitalism is the Japanese-style corporate culture foundation that “New Capitalism” proposes and hopes will resonate with Japanese society.

三是关注可持续发展。在“公益”资本主义的理念中，“新资本主义”政策一方面重新定义了企业价值，以实现利益相关者共同利益最大化，另一方面注重解决环境、社会等负外部性问题，以创造新市场。面对气候变化等全球问题，政府与企业形成合力，推动可持续发展目标以及环境、社会和治理实践。可以说，“公益”资本主义是“新资本主义”提出并希望得到日本社会呼应的日式企业文化基础。

IV. Effectiveness and Difficulties of the “New Capitalism” Policy

四、“新资本主义”政策的成效和难点

(I) Preliminary Effectiveness

（一）初步成效

Regarding the results of nearly two years of implementing the “New Capitalism” policy, what Kishida most proudly touts is that, after the 2023 spring labor-management negotiations, wages achieved their first increase in 30 years, and GDP in the second quarter of 2023 rose significantly. However, behind these two eye-catching data points, the economic reality described by Kishida—that “a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution, including wages and investment, is accelerating”—has not materialized.

关于“新资本主义”政策实施近两年的成果，最令岸田津津乐道的是在2023年春季劳资谈判后，工资实现了30年来的首次高涨，以及2023年第二季度GDP大幅提升。但在这两个亮眼的数据背后，并未呈现出岸田所描述的“包含工资和投资在内的增长与分配良性循环正在加速”的经济事实。

1. Nominal wages rise, but real income falls

1.名义工资上涨，但实际收入下降

Kishida points out that the effect of the “New Capitalism” policy is first manifested in nominal wage increases. The results of the 2023 spring labor-management negotiations show that wage levels, including base pay and bonuses, rose significantly, with the increase reaching the highest level in 30 years. In terms of the minimum wage, Japan’s national weighted average minimum wage in 2023 was 1,004 yen per hour, with an increase of 43 yen—the highest since records began in 1978—achieving the policy target of a 1,000 yen minimum wage set under the “New Capitalism” framework.

岸田指出，“新资本主义”政策的效果首先表现为名义工资上涨。2023年春季劳资谈判的结果显示，包含基本工资和奖金在内的薪资水平大幅上涨，涨幅达30年来最高值。在最低工资方面，2023年日本全国加权平均最低工资为每小时1004日元，其43日元的涨幅为1978年有此记录以来的最高值，实现了“新资本主义”框架下设定的1000日元最低工资的政策目标。

On the surface, the reason the labor-management negotiations achieved such results seems to be the Japanese government’s tax incentives for enterprises that raised wages. However, the substantive reason is the sustained rise in Japanese prices. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, international market prices of crude oil and other bulk commodities have risen, and Japanese prices have followed suit. In August 2023, the core consumer price index (CPI), excluding fresh food, rose 3.1% year-on-year, maintaining growth momentum for 27 consecutive months. Due to excessively rapid price increases, in July 2023, per capita real wages, adjusted for prices, fell 2.5% year-on-year, recording negative growth for 16 consecutive months. Affected by this, in August 2023, actual household consumption expenditure for two or more persons shrank 2.5% year-on-year, decreasing for six consecutive months. Therefore, although enterprises significantly raised wages for the first time in 30 years, this did not increase employees’ real income, nor could it drive a sustained recovery in personal consumption.

从表面上看，劳资谈判之所以取得这样的成绩，似乎是日本政府对加薪企业实施税收优惠的结果，但其实质原因却是日本物价持续高涨。乌克兰危机爆发以来，国际市场原油等大宗商品价格上涨，日本物价随之攀升。2023年8月，扣除生鲜食品的核心消费者物价指数（CPI）同比上涨了3.1%，连续27个月保持增长势头。由于物价上涨过快，2023年7月，扣除物价因素的人均实际工资同比减少2.5%，出现连续16个月负增长。受此影响，2023年8月，两人以上实际家庭消费支出同比缩水2.5%，连续六个月减少。因此，虽然时隔30年企业大幅加薪，但并未提高员工实际收入，也难以带动个人消费的持续复苏。

2. Economic growth accelerates, but domestic demand weakens

2.经济增速加快，但内需弱化

In terms of economic growth rate, Japan’s GDP in the second quarter of 2023 grew 1.2% quarter-on-quarter, or 4.8% at an annualized rate, maintaining an upward trend for three consecutive quarters. Among this, the contribution rate of external demand on an annualized basis was 7.1%, while domestic demand fell to -2.4%. Corporate equipment investment decreased 1% quarter-on-quarter, and personal consumption decreased 0.6%, far from the virtuous cycle of expanding investment, consumption, and economic growth proposed by the “New Capitalism” policy.

从经济增速来看，2023年第二季度日本GDP环比增长了1.2%，按年率计算增长了4.8%，连续三个季度保持上升态势。其中，外需年率贡献度为7.1%，内需降至-2.4%，企业设备投资环比减少1%，个人消费减少0.6%，与“新资本主义”政策提出的扩大投资消费与经济增长的良性循环相距甚远。

In fact, against the backdrop of corporate tax reductions, the yen’s depreciation in recent years, and increased external demand, Japanese corporate earnings have continued to grow. According to statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Finance, in 2022, Japan’s all-industry ordinary income increased 13.5% year-on-year, reaching 95.3 trillion yen, the highest since records began in 1960. At the same time, undistributed profits, i.e., internal corporate reserves, also hit a record high, reaching 554.8 trillion yen in 2022, an increase of nearly 70% compared with 2013, when “Abenomics” was first implemented. [7]7 “Abenomics” refers to the economic policies of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2012–2020), centered on aggressive monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms. The large amount of internal reserves led to conservative corporate decision-making; in 2022, corporate equipment investment increased only 4.4%. In the second quarter of 2023, Japan’s all-industry ordinary income increased 11.6% year-on-year, setting a record quarterly increase, and although equipment investment increased 4.5% year-on-year, it decreased 1.2% quarter-on-quarter.

事实上，在法人税减税以及近年来日元贬值、外需增加的背景下，日本企业收益持续增长。据日本财务省统计，2022年日本全产业经常收益同比增加了13.5%，达95.3万亿日元，为自1960年有历史记录以来最高值。但与此同时，未分配利润，即企业内部留存也连创历史新高，2022年高达554.8万亿日元，比“安倍经济学”实施之初的2013年增加近七成。大量内部留存资金导致企业决策趋于保守，2022年企业设备投资仅增加4.4%。2023年第二季度，日本全产业经常收益同比增加了11.6%，创季度最高增幅，设备投资虽然同比增加了4.5%，但环比减少了1.2%。

The key reason that high corporate earnings have not been effectively converted into equipment investment is that earnings mainly came from the yen’s depreciation rather than technological innovation. Since 2022, the yen has continued to depreciate significantly. On October 21, 2022, it broke through its lowest level since 1992, depreciating by more than 30% compared with the beginning of 2022. The Bank of Japan’s short-term economic survey shows that, due to the yen’s depreciation, the business confidence index for large Japanese manufacturing enterprises improved for two consecutive quarters, especially for export-oriented industries such as automobiles. At the same time, the yen’s depreciation attracted a large number of foreign tourists, and non-manufacturing enterprises’ earnings rose for six consecutive months. Although the “New Capitalism” policy seeks to raise wage levels and increase consumption through the distribution side, and to stimulate economic growth and expand investment, Japan’s export-dependent economic structure has not changed. According to calculations by the Daiwa Institute of Research, if the yen depreciates by 10%, real GDP will be boosted by 0.1%. Because export-oriented large enterprises have not effectively used their earnings to raise workers’ wages and expand corporate equipment investment, the yen’s depreciation has pushed up prices, harming the earnings of domestic-demand-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises and personal income.

企业的高收益并未有效转为设备投资，其重要原因在于收益主要来源于日元贬值而非技术革新。自2022年起，日元持续大幅贬值，2022年10月21日突破1992年以来最低值，与2022年初相比,贬值幅度超过30%。日本银行短期经济调查显示，由于日元贬值，日本制造业大型企业景气指数连续两个季度有所好转，特别是以出口为主的汽车产业更为明显。与此同时，日元贬值吸引了大量外国游客，非制造业企业的收益连续六个月上涨。虽然“新资本主义”政策力图通过分配端提升工资水平、增加消费，并刺激经济增长、扩大投资，但日本经济的出口依赖型结构并未改变。据大和总研测算，如果日元贬值10%，实际GDP将被拉升0.1%。由于出口型大企业并未将收益有效地用于为工人加薪和扩大企业设备投资，日元贬值推动了物价上涨，内需型中小企业的收益和个人收入受损。

(II) Policy Difficulties

（二）政策难点

Although the Kishida “New Capitalism” policy has clarified five major measures to stimulate economic growth momentum—namely, relying on scientific and technological innovation to cultivate high-value-added industries, revitalizing local economies through the Digital Garden City Nation Concept, increasing green transformation investment to achieve carbon neutrality goals, maintaining technological advantages through economic security policies, and enhancing strategic economic autonomy—and has outlined a beautiful vision of a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution, this policy faces difficult-to-solve policy challenges.

岸田“新资本主义”政策虽然明确了激发经济增长动力的五大举措，即依靠科技创新培育高附加价值产业，通过数字田园都市构想搞活地方经济，增加绿色转型投资实现碳中和目标，经济安全保障政策保持技术优势，提升经济战略自主性等，勾勒出了增长与分配良性循环的美好愿景，但这一政策面临着难以解决的政策性难题。

1. Severe fiscal situation makes fiscal reconstruction goals difficult to achieve

1.财政状况严峻，财政重建目标难以完成

The Japanese government is striving to improve its long-term economic downturn through large-scale public expenditure. Japan’s 2023 budget reached a record high of 114.4 trillion yen. On the revenue side, as the pandemic improved, the business performance of Japanese enterprises recovered, leading to an increase in tax revenues such as corporate tax. However, due to the enormous scale of expenditure, Japan still needs to rely on issuing government bonds to cover the fiscal gap. In 2023, Japan issued 35.6 trillion yen in new government bonds, with a bond dependency ratio as high as 31.1%. At the same time, although the Kishida government has proposed a vision of pursuing both economic growth and fiscal reconstruction, stating in the “Basic Policy” that it will advance according to the existing fiscal reconstruction targets, it also proposed that fiscal reconstruction targets will be verified in 2024, indicating the Kishida government’s lack of confidence in fiscal reconstruction.

日本政府力图通过大规模公共支出来改善长期低迷的经济状况。日本2023年的预算规模达114.4万亿日元，创历史最高记录。在财政收入方面，随着疫情的好转，日本企业的经营状况得到改善，以法人税为代表的税收增加。但由于支出规模巨大，日本仍需要靠发行国债来弥补收支缺口。2023年日本新发国债35.6万亿日元，国债依存度高达31.1%。与此同时，岸田政府虽然提出了经济增长与财政重建并行的构想，在“基本方针”中表示要按照既有的财政重建目标推进，但同时又提出2024年将对财政重建目标进行验证，这表明了岸田政府对财政重建信心不足。

In 2018, the Abe government set a fiscal reconstruction target: achieving a primary balance surplus by 2025 and steadily reducing the ratio of debt balance to GDP. However, the primary balance in Japan’s 2023 budget was -10.8 trillion yen, while the ratios of government bond balance and debt scale to GDP continued to hit new highs, making the fiscal reconstruction target difficult to achieve.

2018年，安倍政府明确了财政重建目标，即2025年实现政府基础财政收支（Primary Balance）盈余，债务余额与GDP之比稳定下降。然而，日本2023年预算案的基础财政收支为-10.8万亿日元，国债余额、债务规模等占GDP比重不断突破新高，财政重建目标难以完成。

In January 2023, the Japanese government released its forecast for medium- to long-term economic and fiscal prospects, indicating that even under a growth scenario—real GDP growth of 2% and nominal GDP growth of 3%—the primary balance in 2025 would still be -1.5 trillion yen, turning into a surplus of 2.5 trillion yen only in 2026. Although the Japanese government aims for fiscal reconstruction, in reality its fiscal expenditure continues to increase, exacerbating the risk of fiscal deterioration.

2023年1月，日本政府公布了其对中长期经济财政前景的预测，指出即使在实现增长的场景下，即实际GDP增长2%、名义GDP增长3%时，2025年的基础财政收支仍将为-1.5万亿日元，2026年将转为2.5万亿日元盈余。日本政府虽然以财政重建为目标，但事实上其财政支出不断增加，财政恶化风险加剧。

2. A Huge Gap in Policy Funding

2.政策资金缺口巨大

The implementation of the “New Capitalism” policy requires large-scale fiscal support. As highlights of “New Capitalism,” the so-called “three brothers of fiscal expenditure”—defense spending, measures to counter the declining birthrate, and green transformation (GX) investment—are expanding. Among them, defense spending will increase by 43 trillion yen from 2023 to 2027; investment in measures to counter the declining birthrate will exceed 3 trillion yen annually from 2024 onward; and green transformation investment will total 20 trillion yen over the 10 years from 2023. These three expenditures are included in the basic budget, i.e., the initial budget, as rigid expenditures to be completed across fiscal years. By 2027, their total expenditure will reach 10 trillion yen, equivalent to the combined current expenditure on public works (6 trillion yen) and education, culture, and science (5.4 trillion yen).

“新资本主义”政策的实施需要大规模财政支持。作为“新资本主义”的亮点，被称为“财政支出三兄弟”的防卫费、少子化对策和绿色转型投资呈扩大态势。其中，防卫费自2023年至2027年将增加43万亿日元；少子化对策投资于2024年起，每年支出将超过3万亿日元；绿色转型投资自2023年起10年间累计支出将达到20万亿日元。这三项支出被纳入基本预算，即最初预算，作为刚性支出跨年度完成，其在2027年的支出将高达10万亿日元，相当于目前公共事业（6万亿日元）和文教科学（5.4万亿日元）支出的总和。

Currently, only green transformation investment has secured funding sources through relevant legislation. In February 2023, the Japanese government released the “Basic Policy for Realizing Green Transformation,” planning to invest 150 trillion yen in the green transformation field over the next 10 years through public-private cooperation, including three specific investment methods. First, issuing 20 trillion yen in green transformation transition bonds, with annual issuance quotas decided by the Diet. Second, establishing a carbon pricing system: officially launching a greenhouse gas emissions trading market in 2026, imposing a surtax on fossil fuel importers based on CO2 emissions from 2028, and starting carbon quota trading from 2033. Third, adopting new financing methods, such as blended finance that channels private funds into social and environmental issues. This public-private cooperation approach offers a solution to break through fiscal difficulties.

目前，仅有绿色转型投资通过相关法案明确了资金来源。2023年2月，日本政府发表了“实现绿色转型的基本方针”，计划在今后的10年间，通过官民合作的方式在绿色转型领域投资150万亿日元，具体包括三种投资方式。一是发行20万亿日元的绿色转型转移债，由国会决定每年的发行额度；二是确立碳定价制度，2026年正式开启温室气体排放量交易市场，自2028年起根据二氧化碳排放量对化石燃料进口企业征收附加税，自2033年起开展碳配额交易；三是采用新型融资方式，例如，将民间资金纳入社会环境议题的混合型金融（blended finance）。这种官民合作方式为突破财政困境提供了解决方案。

Defense budget funding remains unresolved. Under the Kishida government’s economic security policy, Japan has formulated a plan to double defense spending, i.e., raising the defense budget from the current 4 trillion yen to 8 trillion yen by 2027. Japan’s 2024 defense budget reached a record high of 7.74 trillion yen, sparking debate across society and even within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). To secure funding sources, the ruling party has proposed a new idea: selling government-held shares of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), currently valued at approximately 5 trillion yen. However, due to the wide-ranging implications and complex procedures, this plan remains under discussion.

防卫预算资金仍然悬而未决。在岸田政府的经济安全政策下，日本制定了防卫费倍增预算安排，即到2027年防卫预算将在现行的4万亿日元的基础上提高一倍。2024年日本防卫预算高达7.74万亿日元，突破历史新高，引起了社会各界甚至自民党内部的争论。为获得资金来源，执政党内提出了新的设想，即出售政府保有的目前市价约为5万亿日元的日本电报电话公司股票。但由于涉及面广且手续繁杂，这一方案仍处于探讨阶段。

Investment in measures to counter the declining birthrate also faces a huge gap. Although measures such as increasing insurance premiums can secure 1 trillion yen in fiscal funds, a gap of over 2 trillion yen remains. Therefore, whether the measures to counter the declining birthrate can be effectively implemented is still unknown.

少子化对策投资也存在巨大缺口。虽然通过增加保险费等举措可以确保1万亿日元的财政资金，但仍余2万多亿日元的缺口，因此少子化对策能否有效实施尚不得知。

In summary, as the rigid pillars of Kishida’s “New Capitalism” policy, the scale of the “three brothers of fiscal expenditure” continues to expand, but funding cannot be secured as planned, raising questions about the government’s policy implementation capacity. If government bonds continue to be issued, it may not only worsen the already severe fiscal environment and increase intergenerational burdens but also lower the potential economic growth rate, running counter to the growth claims of “New Capitalism.”

综上所述，作为岸田“新资本主义”政策的刚性支柱，“财政支出三兄弟”的规模不断扩大，但资金却无法如期落实，政府的政策执行能力受到质疑。如果继续发行国债，不仅有可能导致本已严峻的财政环境更为恶化，增加代际负担，还会降低潜在的经济增长率，与“新资本主义”增长的主张背道而驰。

3. Excessive Economic Security May Hinder Economic Growth

3.经济安全过度化或阻碍经济增长

Under the guise of economic security, Japan actively participates in and strengthens the U.S.-led “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” catering to the U.S. strategic intent to suppress China in areas such as trade, technology, and supply chains. In April 2020, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) launched a “Supply Chain Reform Plan,” encouraging manufacturing enterprises that heavily rely on products and components from specific countries to relocate back to Japan or shift overseas production bases to Southeast Asia and other regions. The Japanese Diet also passed a supplementary budget allocating 243.5 billion yen to support supply chain adjustments. Additionally, the Kishida government newly established the position of Minister for Economic Security. In May 2022, the Japanese Diet passed the “Economic Security Promotion Act.” In May 2023, METI announced revisions to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, adding six categories of 23 types of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to the list of export control restrictions, forming a technology blockade circle against China in coordination with Western countries such as the United States. Although at the G7 summit in May 2023, Japan and the United States adjusted the term “decoupling” from China to “de-risking,” this did not change the essence of politicizing economic issues and securitizing them excessively.

日本以经济安全为名，积极参与并强化美国主导的“印太战略”，并迎合美国在贸易、科技、供应链等领域打压中国的战略意图。2020年4月，日本经济产业省推出了“供应链改革计划”，鼓励高度依赖特定国家产品和零部件的制造业企业回归本土，或将海外生产网点向东南亚等地转移。日本国会也通过补充预算，将2435亿日元用于支持供应链调整。此外，岸田政府还新设了经济安全保障大臣。2022年5月，日本国会通过了“经济安全保障推进法案”。2023年5月，日本经济产业省公布了修改后的《外汇及对外贸易法》，该法将六类23个品类尖端半导体制造设备列入出口管理限制对象名单，与美国等西方国家形成对华技术封锁包围圈。尽管在2023年5月举行的七国集团峰会上，日美等国将与中国“脱钩”（decoupling）调整为“去风险化”（de-risking），但并未改变其将经济问题政治化、泛安全化的本质。

Although Japanese enterprises have adjusted their strategies in China—through actions such as relocating back to Japan, local production for local sales, and dispersing production bases—due to the Japanese government’s emphasis on geopolitical risks, excessive emphasis on economic security, amid the predicament of population decline and continuously shrinking domestic demand, not only harms Sino-Japanese economic and trade exchanges and undermines the economic environment but also negatively impacts the operations of Japanese enterprises themselves. A survey of enterprises in China published by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China in June 2023 showed that 33.4% of Japanese-funded enterprises plan to expand their business scale in China, 60.3% choose to maintain the status quo, and only 6.3% choose to shrink their business in China or relocate to third countries. This reflects the expectations of Japanese-funded enterprises in China for strengthening economic cooperation and building a mutually beneficial and win-win economic environment.

虽然日本企业因日本政府强调地缘政治风险而通过国内回归、地产地销和分散生产网点等行动调整了在华策略，但在人口减少、国内需求持续萎缩的困境下，过度强调经济安全不仅有损中日之间的经贸往来、破坏经济环境，也对日本企业自身的经营带来了负面影响。2023年6月，中国日本商会发表的在华企业调查报告显示，33.4%的日资企业计划扩大在华经营规模，60.3%的企业选择维持现状，仅有6.3%的企业选择缩小在华业务或将业务转移到第三国。这反映出在华日资企业对加强经济合作、构建互利双赢的经济环境的期待。

Overall, since taking office, Kishida has used the slogan of “New Capitalism” to achieve a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution, attempting to promote solutions to some structural problems in Japan’s economic development. However, judging from actual results, Kishida’s “New Capitalism” policy still continues the main practices of “Abenomics,” remaining confined within Japan’s traditional neoliberal policy framework, focusing on addressing short-term practical issues without truly delving into medium- to long-term problems. On September 13, 2023, the Kishida cabinet was reshuffled again, and it will continue to introduce new economic measures within the framework of “New Capitalism,” including addressing price rises, sustainably raising wages, promoting investment, solving the problem of population decline, and ensuring national security. Facing Japan’s severe fiscal situation and labor shortage, how to strengthen the growth strategy and raise real wage levels? How to increase the potential economic growth rate? How to improve and reform the social security system? These issues are not only the strategic priorities and policy difficulties for the Japanese government but also test the Kishida government’s governance capacity.

总体来看，岸田自执政以来，以实现增长与分配良性循环的“新资本主义”为口号，尝试推动解决日本经济发展过程中存在的一些结构性问题。但从实际效果来看，岸田的“新资本主义”政策仍延续了“安倍经济学”的主要做法，局限在日本传统的新自由主义政策框架内，将重点置于应对短期现实问题，未能真正深入解决中长期问题。2023年9月13日，岸田内阁再次改组，将继续在“新资本主义”框架内推出新的经济对策，包括应对物价上涨、持续性提高工资、促进投资、解决人口减少问题和确保国土安全。面对日本严峻的财政形势和劳动力不足的状况，如何强化增长战略、提升实际工资水平？如何提升潜在的经济增长率？如何完善和改革社会保障制度？这些问题既是日本政府关注的战略重点和政策难点，也考验着岸田政府的执政能力。

(Author’s bio: Liu Rui, Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

（作者简介：刘瑞，中国社会科学院日本研究所）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心