The Re-emergence of Anti-Intellectualism in Contemporary America

After the end of the Cold War, the United States proclaimed itself the “lighthouse of the world,” promoting and exporting the values of “democracy and freedom” abroad. However, due to factors such as the increasingly extreme domestic and foreign policies implemented after Trump took office, American society has become increasingly torn apart, manifested in phenomena such as the worsening of party struggles, tensions in class relations, and frequent social and ethnic conflicts. This has been regarded by academia as the “2017 political crisis.”

冷战结束后，美国自诩为“世界灯塔”，推崇和对外输出“民主自由”价值观。然而，由于特朗普执政后趋于极端的内政外交政策的实施等原因，美国社会日趋撕裂，具体表现为政党斗争恶化、阶层关系紧张、社会与族裔矛盾频发等现象，这被学界视做“2017政治危机”。

Anti-intellectualism originated in the 1960s and received widespread attention from political and academic circles both domestically and internationally after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It can partially explain the chaos within the United States. Its proponent, Richard Hofstadter, took as his object of study “those who disparage the life of reason, reject independent thought, and suspect or even hate the group called ‘intellectuals,’” using it to describe the “anti-intellectual” culture in American life. On this basis, Hofstadter deeply analyzed the causes of anti-intellectualism in the United States from the perspectives of religious tradition, democratic politics, and other fields, providing a new theoretical lens for understanding American social thought and political paradigms. Inspired by this, scholars of the same period, approaching from the angles of ideology and social management, predicted that anti-intellectualism would die out.

反智主义（anti-intellectualism）起源于20世纪60年代，在新冠疫情暴发后受到国内外政界、学界的广泛关注，可以部分解释为美国国内乱象。其提出者理查德·霍夫施塔特以“那些贬低理性生活，拒绝独立思考，怀疑乃至仇视被称作‘知识分子’（intellectuals）的人群”为研究对象，用以描述美国人生活中的“反智”文化。在此基础上，霍夫施塔特从宗教传统、民主政治等领域深入剖析反智主义在美国产生的原因，为理解美国社会思潮与政治范式提供了新的理论视角。受此启发，同时期的学者从意识形态与社会管理角度着手，预测反智主义将走向灭亡。

However, the academic prediction did not come true. Anti-intellectualism did not die out but, in the 21st century, re-emerged on the historical stage alongside populism. Constrained by changes in historical conditions, Hofstadter’s analysis of the causes of “anti-intellectualism” sixty years ago, which focused mainly on the social phenomenon of McCarthyism, can no longer explain the re-emergence of anti-intellectualism in the United States today. In response, the authors attempt to start from meritocracy, characterized by “equality of opportunity” and “the more capable get more,” to explain the reasons for the re-emergence of anti-intellectualism from the perspectives of social systems and ideology, and to clarify the internal connection between anti-intellectualism and meritocracy, in order to better understand the origins of anti-intellectualism and the changes in contemporary American political paradigms.

然而，学界预言并未成真，反智主义并未走向灭亡，而是在21世纪伴随民粹主义重登历史舞台。受制于历史条件的变迁，60年前霍夫施塔特对于以麦卡锡主义为主要社会现象展开的“反智”原因分析，已难以解释当今美国反智主义思潮的再兴起。对此，笔者尝试从以“机会平等”“能者多得”为特征的优绩主义（meritocracy）出发，从社会制度、意识形态等角度解释反智主义再兴起的原因，厘清反智主义与优绩主义的内在联系，以更好地理解反智主义源起与当今美国政治范式的变化。

I. Anti-Intellectualism in the United States: Rise and Manifestations

一、反智主义在美国：兴起与表征

Since Hofstadter, anti-intellectualism has been understood as opposition to intellectuals and the intellect they represent, further extending to disgust and aversion towards elite groups. Its prominent manifestations appear in multiple areas of American politics, society, spiritual culture, and individual citizens’ mentality. At the same time, anti-intellectualism originates from multiple factors, including the ills of the American education system, the “individualization” of the democratic system, and changes in industrial structure.

自霍夫施塔特以来，反智主义被认为是对知识分子及其所代表的智识的反对，进而延伸出对精英群体的厌恶与反感，其突出表现在美国政治、社会、精神文化以及公民个人心智等多个领域。同时，反智主义缘起于美国教育系统的弊病、民主体制的“个人化”以及产业结构变迁等多方面因素。

(1) The Connotation of Anti-Intellectualism

（一）反智主义的内涵

As a theoretical doctrine, anti-intellectualism was synthesized by Hofstadter in his book *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*. The book argues that anti-intellectualism is “resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it”; in other words, what anti-intellectualism opposes is not “intelligence” as a mental excellence, but “intellect,” the critical, creative, and contemplative side of the mind; on this basis, it also opposes intellectuals who possess and enjoy intellect. Hofstadter made anti-intellectualism an academic concept, but this definition is relatively simple and vague. Scholar Daniel Rigney summarized the anti-intellectualism described by Hofstadter into three types: first, anti-rationalism, which originates from religion and upholds religious absolutism and conservative claims that faith is greater than science; second, anti-elitism, a critical view of elite power serving its own class to construct privilege; third, unreflective instrumentalism, manifested as the abandonment of the reflective side of intellect, i.e., “thought that does not bring rewarding value.”

作为一项理论学说，反智主义集大成于霍夫施塔特所撰写《美国生活中的反智主义》一书。该书认为，反智主义是“对理智生活以及那些被认为代表这种生活的人抱有的怨恨和怀疑”；换言之，反智主义所反对的并非是作为心灵优异性的“智力”（intelligence），而是心灵中带有批评性、创造性和沉思性的“智识”（intellect）；在此基础上，其亦反对拥有智识、享受智识的知识分子。霍夫施塔特使反智主义成为一种学术概念，但此定义相对简单且模糊。学者丹尼尔·里戈尼则将霍夫施塔特笔下的反智主义总结为三种类型：一是反理性主义，即起源于宗教且拥护宗教的绝对主义（absolutism）及所持信仰大于科学的保守主张；二是反精英主义（anti-elitism），对精英权力服务于本阶级以构建特权的批评观点；三是非反思性工具主义（unreflective instrumentalism），其表现为对于“不会带来报偿价值的思想”即智识反思性一面的抛弃。

Within the framework of Hofstadter and Rigney, later scholars further summarized anti-intellectualism: First, from the perspective of anti-rationalism, discussions on the anti-rational and anti-intellectual negative attitudes of anti-intellectuals constitute the first layer of the connotation of anti-intellectualism. Second, as a critique of elite politics, anti-intellectualism is “disgust and aversion towards the smugness and condescension of elites”; anti-intellectuals may either turn to populism with right-wing political demands and radical behavior, or hold suspicion and critical attitudes towards experts and scholars in relevant fields. Third, as the rejection of the reflective aspect of intellect, anti-intellectualism is seen as opposition to “the life of the mind,” i.e., valuing practical, utilitarian knowledge while lacking analytical ability, innovative thinking, and critical thinking ability, and is embodied as dogmatism highly dependent on empirical content.

在霍夫施塔特和里戈尼的框架下，此后的学者进一步总结了反智主义：其一，从反理性主义角度出发，对反智者反理性及反知识分子的消极态度等方面展开讨论，构成反智主义内涵的第一层面。其二，作为对于精英政治的批评，反智主义是对精英“自鸣得意与高高在上的反感与厌恶”；反智者或转向怀有右翼政治诉求、行为激进的民粹主义，或对于相关领域专家、学者抱有怀疑与批评态度。其三，作为对智识中反思性观点的摒弃，反智主义被视为对“心灵的生命”的反对，即重视实用性、功利性知识，缺乏分析能力、创新思维以及批判性思考能力，并体现为对经验性内容高度依赖的教条主义。

With the rise of populism in the political arenas of various countries, academic research on anti-intellectualism has achieved new breakthroughs in both quality and quantity: Martin Eigenberger et al., using the “anti-intellectualism scale,” proposed that anti-intellectualism is a form of “closed-mindedness”; and with the advent of the “post-truth” era, academia has extended the connotation of anti-intellectualism to the rejection of truthful information and expert knowledge, prominently manifested in statements and behaviors such as “COVID-19 conspiracy theories.”

随着各国政坛中民粹主义的兴起，学界对于反智主义的研究在质与量上均取得新突破：马丁·艾根伯格等借助“反智量表”，提出反智是一种“心灵的自我封闭”（closed-mindedness）；而伴随“后真相”（post-truth）时代的来临，学界将反智主义的内涵延展至对于真实信息与专业知识的排斥，这突出表现为“新冠疫情阴谋论”等言论和行为。

(2) Reasons for the Rise of Anti-Intellectualism

（二）反智主义兴起的原因

Hofstadter believed that the fervor of Christian Evangelicals, fear of elite rule, the pragmatism of commercial trade, and the defects of the education system caused many American citizens to lack the ability for independent thought and reflection. Additionally, scholars have also sought reasons for the rise of anti-intellectualism from the levels of political operation, cultural education, and even society.

霍夫施塔特认为，基督教福音派（Evangelical）的狂热、对精英统治的恐惧、商业贸易的务实以及教育系统的缺陷使众多美国民众缺乏独立思考与反思的能力。此外，学者亦从政治运行、文化教育乃至社会层面找寻反智主义兴起的原因。

Certain cultural factors in American society have led to anti-intellectualism. Not only did Hofstadter rank religious factors as the primary cause, but some scholars have also proposed connections between Pietism, the doctrine of original sin, and anti-intellectualism. With the popularization of public education, academia has gradually attributed the cause of anti-intellectualism to the absence of the education system—scarcity of books, lack of general education courses, and educational deficiencies caused by the education system’s inability to adapt to the situation after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, improper handling of news by traditional print media, the internet, television, and radio has fueled the spread of anti-intellectualism.

美国社会中的一些文化因素导致了反智主义。不仅霍夫施塔特将宗教因素列为原因之首，部分学者亦提出虔敬主义（Pietism）、原罪说与反智主义的联系。伴随公立教育的普及，学界逐渐将反智的起因归咎于教育系统的缺位——书籍稀缺、缺乏通识教育课程以及新冠疫情暴发后教育系统无法适应形势所造成的教育缺失。此外，传统纸媒、互联网、电视电台等媒体处理新闻不当，助长了反智主义的传播。

At the same time, American political life has triggered the rise of anti-intellectualism. With the departure of America’s first generation of leaders and the election of Andrew Jackson, known for his reckless behavior, as president, mass democracy replaced elite rule. “Jacksonian democracy,” while perfecting the American democratic system, also intensified the public’s aversion to elites. Subsequently, to cater to the preferences of populist voters, anti-intellectualism increasingly became an electoral strategy for many presidents. Since the 1950s, presidential candidates with elite qualities and high educational qualifications have instead lost to candidates with low education levels and anti-intellectual tendencies, causing the top echelons of American democratic politics to gradually shift rightward, becoming more conservative and anti-intellectual. Moreover, historically, right-wing politicians such as Joseph McCarthy, George W. Bush, and Trump have used political agitation to stir up public opposition to intellectuals in order to gain political support.

同时，美国政治生活引发了反智主义的兴起。随着美国第一代领导群体的谢幕以及以行为鲁莽著名的安德鲁·杰克逊当选总统，大众民主取代精英统治，“杰克逊民主”（Jacksonian democracy）在完善美国民主制度的同时也加剧了大众对精英的反感。此后，为迎合民粹主义选民的偏好，反智主义日渐成为诸多总统的选举战略。20世纪50年代以来，具有精英气质、拥有高文凭的总统候选人反而会败给低学历、具有反智倾向的候选人，这使美国民主政治顶层逐渐右转且保守化、反智化。不仅如此，历史上约瑟夫·麦卡锡、小布什、特朗普等右翼政客还通过政治煽动激起民众对于知识分子的反对情绪以获得政治支持。

As research has deepened, social explanations for anti-intellectualism have also gradually emerged. The pursuit of high-income jobs has led college students to study professional knowledge more pragmatically while neglecting the cultivation of intellect; and changes in social structure caused by income changes have led to the loss of the middle class, thereby damaging the intellect of American citizens. Anti-intellectual differences are not only reflected in vertical differences in occupational social structure but also in horizontal urban-rural differences: rural areas rely on acquaintance groups and reject external information, which to some extent also promotes the emergence of anti-intellectualism. With the development of political psychology, academia has debated the question of “whether the social environment affects anti-intellectual tendencies”: Martin Eigenberger et al. explain anti-intellectualism as a personal trait, arguing that the anti-intellectual personality originates from genetic factors; but some scholars believe that anti-intellectualism changes due to environmental and peer factors, rather than being a certain genetic trait.

随着研究的不断深入，反智主义的社会解释亦逐渐兴起。对于高收入岗位的追求使大学生群体更加务实地学习专业知识而忽视了智识的培养；而收入变化引发的社会结构变迁亦使中间阶层缺失进而损害了美国公民的智识。反智差别不仅体现在纵向的职业社会结构差异中，更体现在横向的城乡差异中：乡村地区依赖熟人群体排斥外界信息，某种程度上也助推反智主义的产生。随着政治心理学的发展，学界对于“社会环境是否影响反智倾向”的问题展开论辩：马丁·艾根伯格等将反智主义解释为一种个人特质，认为反智的人格起源于遗传性因素；但有学者认为反智主义因环境、同伴因素而变化，而非某种遗传性特质。

In summary, scholarly explanations for the causes of anti-intellectualism are already relatively mature, yet research blind spots remain. Not only are some studies dated, their views unable to adapt to the anti-intellectualism that now accompanies populism and political polarization; moreover, few scholars have offered a reasoned exposition of the re-emergence of anti-intellectualism from the perspective of the U.S. social distribution system and ideology. With the profound exposure of the defects in the U.S. political and economic system following the 2008 international financial crisis and Trump’s election, the meritocracy imprinted in the American gene can no longer satisfy the American public’s fantasies about the “American Dream,” becoming the main cause of a new wave of anti-intellectualism. Taking this as our point of entry, we attempt to explore the driving role of the social distribution system and ideology in anti-intellectualism.

综上所述，学界对于反智主义成因的解释已较为成熟，但依然存在研究盲区。不仅部分研究时间久远，其观点无法适应当下伴随民粹主义、政治极化而生的反智主义；且鲜有学者从美国社会分配制度与意识形态层面对反智主义再兴起展开合理阐述。伴随2008年国际金融危机、特朗普当选后美国政治经济体制弊端的深刻显露，烙印在美国人基因中的优绩主义已无法满足美国民众对于“美国梦”的幻想，成为引发新一轮反智主义浪潮的主因。笔者以此为切入点，尝试探究社会分配制度与意识形态对于反智主义的推动作用。

II. Meritocracy as System and Ideology

二、作为制度与意识形态的优绩主义

Meritocracy, characterized by equal opportunity and rewarding the able, was recognized and esteemed by American society before the outbreak of the 2008 international financial crisis. This academic concept first appeared in left-wing articles of the 1950s and, through development, became an ideology championed by conservatives. Combined with the capitalist distribution system, it inevitably carries the drawbacks of lacking substantive equality, extreme individualization of contributions, and safeguarding elite interests.

以机会平等、能者多得等为特点的优绩主义在2008年国际金融危机爆发前受到美国社会的认可与推崇。这一学术概念首见于20世纪50年代的左派文章，经过发展成为保守派推崇的一种意识形态，其与资本主义分配制度相结合，不可避免地带有缺乏实质平等、将个人贡献极端化、维护精英利益的弊端。

(I) The Connotation and Development of Meritocracy

（一）优绩主义的内涵与发展

As a distribution system, meritocracy is known for “equal opportunity,” “appointing people on their merit,” and “rewarding the able”; it holds that social and economic rewards should be determined by merit, such as talent, effort, and achievement. It has two core principles: “strictly distributing work according to ‘merit’” and “strictly distributing income according to productive efficiency.” It exists not only in the realms of power status and income distribution but also in everyday areas such as educational resources and job positions. Its emergence can be divided into two stages: before the 1980s, meritocracy was a distinctive distributional concept that valued equality of opportunity rather than substantive equality. It disregarded family background, race, and gender differences, and compared with aristocratic and hierarchical systems that valued birth, it was often seen as a manifestation of civilizational progress and social fairness. After the 1980s, conservatives combined meritocracy with conservative ideology, turning it into a political rhetoric that safeguards elite interests. This doctrine, which emphasizes “struggle and effort” by individuals under the premise of equal opportunity in exchange for “social mobility,” in the process of encouraging social progress and mobility, constitutes an ideology that upholds the legitimacy of the upper elite’s private property and political rule.

作为一种分配制度，优绩主义以“机会平等”“任人唯贤”与“能者多得”闻名；主张社会与经济的奖赏应当依据才能、努力和成就等优绩来决定。它有两项核心原则：“严格根据‘优绩’来分配工作”与“严格根据生产效率来分配收入”。它不仅存在于权力地位、收入分配领域，亦存在于教育资源、工作职务等日常生活领域。其产生可以分为两个阶段：在20世纪80年代前，优绩主义是一种重视机会平等而非实质平等的独特分配观念。它忽视家庭出身、种族以及性别差异，与重视出身的贵族制与等级制相比，它往往被视为文明进步与社会公平的表现。20世纪80年代后，保守主义者将优绩主义与保守主义意识形态结合，成为一种维护精英利益的政治说辞。这一强调机会平等前提下通过个人“奋斗与努力”换取“社会流动性”的学说，在鼓励社会进步与流动的过程中，构成一种维护上层精英私有财产与政治统治合法性的意识形态。

Through the above process, meritocracy has become the “political oxygen” of Western society; people find it hard to perceive its existence yet cannot extricate themselves from it; they take it for granted and find it difficult to question the rationality of its existence, with some conservative scholars even regarding it as a guarantee of sufficient social mobility in modern society.

通过上述过程，优绩主义已然成为西方社会的“政治氧气”，人们难以感知其存在，却无法从其中抽身；人们视其为理所当然，难以对其存在的合理性提出质疑，部分保守派学者更是将其视做现代社会充分社会流动的保证。

(II) The Characteristics and Drawbacks of Meritocracy

（二）优绩主义的特点与弊端

Meritocracy is not the most perfect design of human society. Democratic socialist Alan Fox and British scholar Michael Young were the earliest to critique meritocracy. They argue that meritocracy, which appears to offer equal opportunity, actually becomes an obstacle limiting the working class from achieving class advancement and social mobility; moreover, as a market-oriented distribution system, it is highly likely to cause income inequality and polarization.

优绩主义并非人类社会的最完美设计，民主社会主义者艾伦·福克斯与英国学者迈克尔·扬最早对优绩主义进行批判。他们认为，看似机会平等的优绩主义实际上成为限制工人阶层实现阶层跃升与社会流动的障碍；不仅如此，作为一种市场导向的分配制度，它也极有可能造成收入不均、两极分化。

Meritocracy with an ideological coloring has the following characteristics and drawbacks: First, from its theoretical origins, meritocracy overemphasizes equality of opportunity while concealing substantive inequality. Meritocracy combined with ideology places greater emphasis on equality of opportunity; meritocrats believe that the poor can become rich by displaying talent and working hard: although income may be unequal, everyone has an equal opportunity to get rich. In reality, however, the equality of opportunity advocated by meritocracy conceals substantive inequality: the wealth gap in American society is gradually widening, with the share of disposable wealth held by the top 10% of households increasing from 59.8% in 1992 to 70% in 2019. According to statistics from the World Inequality Database (WID), around 2021, the top 1% of Americans already held nearly 20% of the nation’s wealth. This means that even if the lower and middle classes make tremendous efforts, it is difficult for them to obtain corresponding economic, political, and social returns; the promise of equal opportunity under meritocracy has not achieved substantive equality.

具有意识形态色彩的优绩主义有以下特点与弊端：其一，从其理论源起看，优绩主义过度注重机会平等而掩盖了实质不平等。与意识形态相结合的优绩主义更加注重机会平等，优绩主义者相信穷人可以通过施展才华和努力工作而致富：虽然收入可能是不均等的，但每一个人的致富机会均等。但实际上，优绩主义主张的机会平等之下掩盖着实质不平等：美国社会贫富差距逐渐增大，财富持有量前10%的家庭可用财富占比从1992年的59.8%增加到2019年的70%。根据“世界财富与收入数据库”（WID）的统计数据，2021年前后，收入前1%的美国人已占有社会财富的近20%。这意味着即便中下层民众付出巨大的努力，也难以获得相应的经济、政治与社会回报，优绩主义机会平等的诺言并未实现实质上的平等。

Second, from the evaluation criteria, meritocracy places great emphasis on individual ability and effort. Young, the originator of meritocracy, defined merit as “merit equals intelligence plus effort”; subsequently, conservative politicians also regarded effort as a key factor, with “if you work hard, you can succeed” becoming a favored slogan. In reality, however, whether the contribution and achievement represented by merit possess moral desert related to effort is debatable; opportunity, talent, help from social groups, and market demand all have substantive moral arbitrariness. In other words, personal achievement cannot be entirely attributed to effort and talent; market demand, social assistance, and so on are all foundations of success. The strong individualism of the meritocratic concept, which neglects the role of and return to the community, sows the seeds for anti-intellectual opposition to the elite.

其二，从评价标准看，优绩主义极为重视个人能力及努力。优绩主义提出者扬对优绩的定义为“优绩等于智力与努力之和”；此后保守主义政客亦将努力视为关键因素，“只要你努力，你就可以成功”成为政客青睐的口号。但实际上，优绩代表的贡献与成就是否具有与努力相关的道德应得性（moral desert）有待商榷，机遇、天赋、社会群体对个人的帮助以及市场需求都具有实质上的道德任意性。换言之，个人成就不能完全归功于努力与才能，市场需求、社会帮助等均是成功的基础。而优绩观念强烈的个人主义观念，忽视社群的作用与回馈，为反智者反对精英阶层埋下了隐患。

Third, in terms of outcomes, meritocracy under an ideological background has become a barrier that safeguards elite interests and prevents latecomers from catching up. Meritocracy appears to value talent over birth, but reality is far from the ideal; elites can monopolize channels of individual advancement by monopolizing education. Meritocracy holds that over time, social outcomes such as personal career, class, and wealth are positively correlated with the level of post-secondary education, and not significantly correlated with factors such as social origin, thus linking personal achievement to education. In reality, education is inevitably influenced by family background, meaning that achieving class advancement through effort is difficult. Empirical research shows that non-elite classes find it harder to achieve good grades in basic education, and thus find it harder to enter top universities. This also means it is harder for ordinary people to obtain decent, high-income jobs and to integrate into “elite small circles.” Therefore, by monopolizing high-quality educational resources, meritocracy has degenerated into a tool for elites to safeguard their own interests and consolidate their privileges; ordinary people find it difficult to cross class barriers, let alone truly achieve class mobility.

其三，从结果来看，意识形态背景下的优绩主义成为维护精英利益、阻止后来者居上的藩篱。优绩主义看似重视才能而非出身，但现实与理想相去甚远，精英可以通过垄断教育进而垄断个人跃迁的渠道。优绩主义认为，随时间推移的个人职业、阶层、财富等社会性结果与后天受教育程度成正比，而与社会出身等因素不显著相关，这就将个人成就与教育相联系。实际上，教育不可避免地受到家庭出身的影响，这意味着通过努力实现阶层跃升难以实现。实证研究表明，非精英阶层更难在基础教育中获得好成绩，即更难进入顶尖高校。这也意味着民众更难从事体面且高收入的职业、更难融入“精英小圈子”。因此，通过垄断优质教育资源，优绩主义已沦为精英维护自身利益、巩固自身特权的工具，民众难以逾越阶层的鸿沟，更无法真正实现阶层流动。

Today, meritocracy has become the mainstream ideology and institutional design of American society. Since the 1980s, successive U.S. governments have promoted meritocracy, viewing it as an important foundation for social mobility and constructing a new American Dream that incentivizes work and realizes social mobility. But this American Dream is heading toward disillusionment; the upper elite monopolize wealth, power, and social status within the elite class, forcing ordinary people to bear moral condemnation while being unable to obtain political and economic benefits. It not only harms social justice but also damages American-style democracy, triggering a new wave of anti-intellectualism.

如今，优绩主义已成为美国社会主流思潮与制度设计。20世纪80年代以来，历届美国政府均宣扬优绩主义，视其为社会流动的重要基础，构建激励工作、实现社会流动的新美国梦。但这种美国梦正趋于幻灭，上层精英将财富、权力与社会地位垄断在精英阶层内部，使民众在难以获得政治经济利益的同时无奈承受道德的谴责。它不仅危害社会公正，更有损美式民主、引发了新一波反智主义浪潮。

III. Meritocracy Stimulates the Re-emergence of a New Round of American Anti-Intellectualism

三、优绩主义刺激新一轮美国反智主义再兴起

The classical analytical perspectives — the tradition of pragmatism, ideology, deficiencies in basic education, and religious culture — can explain the formation of several historical waves of anti-intellectualism in the United States, but they struggle to fully account for the rise of the new wave of anti-intellectualism. First, the end of the Cold War relatively eased ideological issues within the United States; Americans’ self-congratulation that liberalism had won “victory” diminished the explanatory power of the traditional view that anti-intellectualism, arising from McCarthyism, gradually turned its矛头 against intellectuals. Second, the influence of religious factors and the American pragmatic tradition on anti-intellectualism has gradually waned: although atheism currently has an extremely limited reach in the United States, the intensity with which anti-intellectuals oppose scientific views such as evolution is far weaker than in any previous period of American history; meanwhile, pragmatic theory cannot explain why anti-intellectuals holding utilitarian positions refused to get vaccinated or wear masks during the COVID-19 pandemic, making the old anti-intellectualism increasingly inconsistent with the current American social reality of anti-science and anti-authority. Third, deficiencies in basic education were an important cause of several historical waves of anti-intellectualism in the United States; yet, catalyzed by meritocracy, the utilitarianization and class-based stratification of American basic education have become factors more worthy of exploration. Finally, mass media and social media are only one cause of the rise of the new wave of anti-intellectualism, and at most a pathway and superficial cause that abets it. The full exposure of American social ills on social media does not mean that mass media is the single factor triggering the new wave of anti-intellectualism; hence some scholars call it a “technological factor” rather than a “fundamental factor.”

经典分析视角下的实用主义传统、意识形态、基础教育缺失以及宗教文化等因素能够解释美国历史上数轮反智主义的形成，但较难全面解释新一轮反智主义的兴起。首先，冷战的结束使美国国内意识形态问题相对和缓，美国人自诩自由主义赢得“胜利”，使传统观点中因麦卡锡主义而起、逐渐将矛头指向知识分子的反智主义解释力有所下降。其次，宗教因素与美国实用主义传统对反智主义的影响逐渐式微：尽管当前无神论在美国的传播范围极为有限，但反智者反对进化论等科学观点的力度远弱于美国历史上的任何时期；而实用主义理论却无法解释为何持功利立场的反智主义者在新冠疫情期间反而拒绝接种疫苗和佩戴口罩，这使旧反智主义逐渐不符合当前美国社会反科学、反权威的现状。再次，基础教育缺失是美国历史上数波反智主义兴起的重要原因，然而在优绩主义的催化下，美国基础教育的功利化、阶级化成为更值得探讨的因素。最后，大众传媒、社交媒体只是新一轮反智主义兴起的原因之一，而且至多是助长新一轮反智主义兴起的途径与表因，美国社会痼疾在社交媒体的充分暴露并不意味着大众传媒是引发新一轮反智主义的单一因素，故有学者称其为“技术因素”而非“根本因素”。

Therefore, the author believes that, in comparison, meritocracy is an important cause that cannot be ignored in explaining the rise of the new wave of American anti-intellectualism. By utilitarianizing and class-stratifying education — which is meant to cultivate citizens’ reflective spirit — meritocracy weakens the cultivation of their capacity for independent thought, triggering anti-science phenomena in American society. On this basis, the elite class, by monopolizing the government and legislature, severing the representativeness of public opinion, and constructing a people-elite opposition, stirs up popular anti-elite sentiment, weakens public political trust in the elite, and triggers anti-elite phenomena in the American political sphere, thereby generating a de-elitization mood. The resulting inequalities in job opportunities and political participation damage citizens’ work dignity and civic spirit, weaken citizens’ capacity for reflection, and induce a “non-reflexivization” of American citizens’ intellect.

因此笔者认为，相比之下，优绩主义是解释新一轮美国反智主义兴起不可忽略的重要原因。优绩主义通过将培养公民反思精神的教育功利化、阶级化，削弱了对其独立思考能力的培养，引发美国社会中的反科学现象。在此基础上，精英阶层通过垄断政府与立法机关、切断民意代表性、构建民众—精英对立进而激起民众反精英情绪、削弱民众对精英的政治信任，引发美国政治领域的反精英现象，进而产生去精英化情绪。而由此产生的工作机会、政治参与方面的不平等损害了公民工作尊严与公民精神，削弱了公民的反思能力，诱使美国公民智识呈现“非反思化”。

(I) The Class-Based Stratification and Utilitarianization of Meritocratic Education Harm the Cultivation of Citizens’ Intellect

（一）优绩教育的阶级化、功利化有损公民智识的培养

From the perspective of education’s social impact, education can enable citizens to recognize their own shortcomings, establish a spirit of lifelong learning and belief in science, and thereby become quality, rational citizens. But in the United States, not only are high-quality higher education resources extremely limited, but its backward basic education also does not support all students in receiving higher education: this tilts high-quality educational resources toward the elite class. The impact of such problems is multifaceted: on the one hand, this phenomenon causes the majority of citizens to have a lower level of intellect and to lack independent thinking ability, thereby stimulating what Hofstadter described as “anti-intellectualism”; on the other hand, this phenomenon also causes American society to need a screening mechanism to select high-caliber students for higher education and thus to become elites. Hence, meritocracy emerged as the times required, making merit an important value valued by American society. In the meritocratic conception, only students with outstanding academic ability and contributions to academic endeavors can enter institutions of higher learning. Top schools tend to select outstanding students, and top students chase so-called prestigious schools; the combination of the two, using academic performance as a reference, not only provides top diplomas for the talented but also further magnifies the value of top-tier education. This seemingly “win-win” design improves individual quality while accelerating the speed of talent cultivation. Therefore, under the premise of equal opportunity, higher education, through means such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), allows the most capable to rise and achieve social mobility.

从教育的社会影响看，教育可以让公民认识到个人不足、树立终身学习与相信科学的精神，进而成为有品质、有理性的公民。但在美国，不仅优质高等教育资源极为有限，且其落后的基础教育亦不支持所有学生接受高等教育：这使优质教育资源向精英阶层倾斜。此类问题的影响是多面性的：一方面，该现象导致多数公民拥有较低智识水平且缺失独立思考能力，进而激发霍夫施塔特笔下的“反智识主义”；另一方面，该现象亦导致美国社会更需要一种筛选机制选拔高水平生源以接受高等教育、进而成为精英。由此，优绩主义应运而生，进而使优绩成为美国社会看重的重要价值。在优绩主义设想中，只有学术能力突出、对学术事业作出贡献的学生才能进入高等学府。顶尖学校倾向于挑选优秀学生，顶尖学生则追逐所谓的名校，二者结合使其以学业成绩为参照，既为英才提供顶尖文凭，又进一步放大顶尖教育的价值。这样看似“双赢”的设计在提高个人素质的同时加快了人才培养速度。因此，在机会平等的前提下，高等教育通过标准学术能力测试（SAT）等手段，让最有才能的人上位并实现社会流动。

But from the perspective of intergenerational transmission, the diplomas that elite children pride themselves on are essentially cultural capital inherited from their parents — a “birth advantage” by which the elite class, under the guise of meritocracy, transmits superior educational conditions to their children intergenerationally. Elite children’s access to high-quality educational resources actually benefits from their parents’ intangible “capital” such as wealth, information, and extensive social networks. This means that elites can, under the pretext of cultural capital, use their connections, wealth, and social status to send their children to expensive academic tutoring classes to obtain training superior to that of ordinary people for college entrance; or they can gain admission through large donations to universities in the name of alumni. In this context, children from high-income families in the top 1% of income are 77 times more likely to enter “Ivy Plus” institutions than children from bottom-tier families; only 0.5% of high-income children end up attending community colleges. Yet among nearly 5,000 universities nationwide, research universities like the “Ivy Plus” are an absolute minority. Although they possess extraordinary resources for cultivating citizens’ independent thinking, they have become exclusive institutions for the elite. The remaining majority of ordinary colleges and community colleges become the main destinations for ordinary students, and the latter, due to the scarcity of educational resources, cannot effectively cultivate citizens’ intellect. Therefore, the elite not only monopolize education but also monopolize the process of cultivating intellect; the gradual trend toward class-based stratification in the educational field exacerbates the scarcity of intellect in American society.

但从代际传承角度看，精英子女引以为傲的文凭本质上是继承自父母的文化资本，是精英阶层假借优绩名义、将优越教育条件代际传递给子女的“先天优势”。精英子女获得优质教育资源实际上得益于父母财富、信息以及广泛的人脉等无形“资本”。这意味着精英可以假借文化资本，通过人脉、财富与社会地位，将子女送入价格高昂的学术补习班以获得优于常人的升学训练；抑或通过向高校大额捐款以校友名义获得入学资格。在此背景下，收入占比前1%的高收入家庭子女进入“常春藤+院校”的可能性是底层家庭子女的77倍，只有0.5%的高收入子女最终进入社区学校接受教育。但全美近5000所大学中，“常春藤+院校”等研究型大学占绝对少数，它们虽具备培养公民独立思考能力的超常规资源，但已成为精英的专属高校。其余居于多数的普通院校与社区学院则成为普通学生的主要去向，而后者则因教育资源的稀缺而无法有效地培养公民智识。因此，精英不仅垄断教育，更垄断智识的培养过程；教育领域逐渐呈现出阶级化的趋势加剧了美国社会智识的稀缺性。

From the perspective of educational purpose and means, against the backdrop of scarce top-tier higher education resources and educational class stratification, receiving top-tier higher education requires undergoing utilitarian academic training. Under this model, basic education institutions are no longer schools that provide general education courses or cultivate citizens’ intellect. Under the meritocratic evaluation system that values outcomes over processes, basic education becomes a utilitarian arena aimed at obtaining a university diploma. Facing the meritocratic-only assessment in college admissions, the purpose of education for applicants to prestigious schools is to gain entry to higher education institutions rather than self-improvement or becoming well-rounded individuals — education is no longer an end but a tool for pursuing a high diploma. Under these conditions, learning is also not for cultivating citizens with independent thinking ability, but for obtaining social recognition through examination forms, and for being fixed and institutionalized through diplomas, making them markers of social recognition and ability. Thus, this brings about a major drawback: “the ability of basic education to cultivate intellect will decrease, and the purpose of schools will become more utilitarian.”

从教育目的与手段看，在顶尖高等教育资源稀缺、教育阶级化的背景下，接受顶尖高等教育需经过功利性学术训练，因此该模式下基础教育机构已非提供通识性课程或培养公民智识的学校。在优绩主义重视结果而非过程的评价体系下，基础教育成为以获得大学文凭为目标的功利场所。面对大学录取中唯优绩论的考核，名校申请者接受教育的目的是获得进入高等院校的资格而非自身提升抑或成为通才——教育不再是目的而是追求高文凭的工具。在此条件下，学习也不是为了培养具备独立思考能力的公民，而是为以考试形式获得社会承认，并通过文凭的方式加以固定化与制度化，使之成为社会认可与能力的标志。由此，其带来“基础教育培育智识的能力将减少，学校的目的将更加功利化”一大弊病。

(II) Meritocracy Triggers a Popular Anti-Elite Wave

（二）优绩主义引发民众反精英浪潮

Meritocracy triggers popular antipathy toward elites through the following two processes. First, the opposition inherent in meritocratic discourse stirs up popular anti-elite sentiment. Meritocracy not only forms monopolistic privileges in various fields but also makes merit the sole standard for judging individual worth. Meritocrats, represented by the elite, treat struggle and effort as a political correctness and moral imperative. Young [n] pointed out the arrogance that merit brings to the elite: “The upper class is no longer weakened by self-doubt and self-criticism; success is seen as the reward for their own ability, effort, and achievement.” This conceit stems from the “struggle morality established on the basis of reserving judgment about the average ability of individuals” inherent in meritocracy: its adherents believe that, under the premise of “equal opportunity,” individuals must undergo society’s examination, everything depends on individual effort, and struggle is regarded as a necessary prerequisite for achieving success.

优绩主义通过以下两个过程引发民众对精英的反感。其一，优绩话语的对立引发民众反精英情绪。优绩主义不仅在各领域形成垄断性特权，更将优绩作为评判个人价值的唯一标准。以精英为代表的优绩主义者将奋斗与努力视为一种政治正确与道德应然。扬曾指出优绩为精英带来的自大：“上层阶级不再被自我怀疑和自我批评削弱，成功就是对他们自己能力、努力及成就给予的回报。”这种自负来自于优绩主义“在对个人平均能力持保留态度基础上建立的奋斗道德观”：其拥趸者认为，在“机会平等”前提下，个人需要接受社会的检验，一切都依赖于个人的努力，奋斗被视为实现成功的必要前提。

However, the consequence of the meritocratic moral outlook “is harmful because it does not adequately explain success and failure, and wrongly elevates the successful while unjustly condemning the failures.” Under this moral outlook, the successful (mostly elites) are seen as “strivers” who meet the demands of meritocratic morality, representing the “correct” trend. In contrast, the failures (mostly ordinary people or industrial workers) are precisely those who, because they are “stupid and lack the qualities of diligence and self-discipline,” lose the possibility of success, producing “the first time in human history that ordinary people have no pillar to support their self-esteem.” The successful, represented by elites, are self-righteous, becoming elites who morally control the masses. The opposition between elites and the masses deepens the resentment of the masses: the masses not only suffer material deprivation because their educational, wealth, and power resources are squeezed by the elites, but also receive unwarranted criticism from the elites. In this context, the division between elites and the masses is severe, making political trust difficult to generate; after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, “post-truth” in American society has intensified, and its mode of thinking that “opposes science and prioritizes emotion over fact” also originates from the “elite-mass” opposition created by meritocracy.

然而，优绩道德观的结果“之所以有害，是因为它没有充分地解释成功与失败，并错误地抬高成功者，同时不公正地谴责失败者”。在此道德观下，成功者（大多为精英）被视为符合优绩道德要求的“奋斗者”，他们代表“正确”的潮流。与之相反，失败者（大多为民众或产业工人）则正是因为“愚蠢而且缺乏勤奋、自律的品质”而丧失成功的可能，产生“人类历史上第一次普通人没有支柱来支撑自己的自尊”的现象。以精英为代表的成功者自以为是，成为在道德上掌控民众的精英。而精英与民众的对立加深了民众的怨恨：民众不仅因教育、财富及权力资源被精英挤占而物质生活匮乏，还因此接受来自精英的无端指摘。在此背景下，精英与民众分化严重且难以产生政治信任；新冠疫情暴发后，美国社会“后真相”愈演愈烈，其“反对科学且情感先于事实”的思考模式亦来自于优绩主义所创造的“精英—民众”对立。

Second, meritocracy triggers a crisis of representation that weakens the masses’ political trust in elites. Another major drawback of meritocracy is that it undermines the original system of elite representation, preventing public opinion from being fully expressed within the existing political framework, thereby weakening the masses’ political trust in elites while pushing anti-intellectualism and anti-elitism to extremes. Generally speaking, the conditions on which American-style democracy relies to function are as follows: first, the belief that all people are born equal and the right to equal political participation; second, regular national and local elections and universal suffrage; third, left- and right-wing parties respectively nominate candidates for government heads and other political officials to represent public opinion in exercising state power; fourth, public opinion is allowed full expression within legal bounds. Among these, the key to determining whether it can operate effectively is the effective representation of the people’s preferences by parties or elites.

其二，优绩主义引发代表性危机削弱民众对精英的政治信任。优绩主义另一大弊端即破坏原有精英代表制，使民意不能在现有政治框架内充分表达，在弱化民众对精英政治信任的同时将反智识、反精英推向极端化。一般而言，美式民主运行所依赖的条件有以下几点：一是人人生而平等的信念及平等的政治参与权利；二是定期的全国性、地方性选举与普选制；三是左右翼政党分别推举政府首脑等政务官候选人代表民意行使国家权力；四是允许民意在合法范围内充分表达。这其中决定其能否有效运行的关键便是政党或精英对于民众偏好的有效代表。

But today’s American-style democracy finds it difficult to truly meet the above requirements. Under the impact of meritocratic ideology, American-style democracy lacks equality of political participation, while elites lack reasonable representativeness and the masses lack legitimate mechanisms for political expression, leading to the re-emergence of anti-intellectualism characterized by anti-elitism. This is manifested in the following three aspects: First, meritocracy obscures the inequality of political participation opportunities for America’s lower-class masses. In a society where meritocracy is mainstream, meritocrats use the belief in equal opportunity to hold political office to conceal the substantive inequality in which elites consolidate their ruling position through money and power. In contemporary American society, the distribution of public office, public power, and legislative positions is by no means based on talent or contribution. On the one hand, from the perspective of the right to vote, there is a world of difference between the influence of elites and the masses on political life: due to disparities in wealth and information, the votes of the masses can hardly achieve truly rational choices, let alone truly influence election outcomes. Wealthy classes and professional politicians can use inequalities in wealth and information to shape citizens’ policy preferences and “manipulate” the electoral landscape. On the other hand, from the perspective of the right to be elected, because they lack the connections, economic strength, education, and background of professional politicians that elites possess, the masses find it difficult to become legislators, governors, or even presidents. From the perspective of the legislative branch, among the 533 members of the current 118th Congress in both chambers, 64% (341 people) have previously worked in local councils or the federal Congress, and 23% (124 people) have had political experience as mayors, governors, or local prosecutors. From the perspective of the federal government, since President Truman, the masses have not elected a president without a higher education. Therefore, the elite monopoly on political power actually increases the difficulty and inequality of the masses’ participation in political life.

但当今美式民主却难以真正达到上述要求。在优绩主义观念的冲击下，美式民主缺乏政治参与的平等，而精英缺乏合理的代表性、民众缺乏合法的政治表达机制，这使得以反精英为特征的反智主义再度兴起。这表现在以下三个方面：首先，优绩主义掩盖了美国底层民众政治参与机会的不平等。在优绩主义居于主流的社会中，优绩主义者利用担任政治职务的机会平等信念掩盖精英借助金钱、权势巩固统治地位的实质不平等。当今美国社会对于公职、公权力以及立法机关职务的分配绝非以才能或贡献为标准。一方面，从选举权角度看，精英与民众对政治生活的影响力存在天壤之别：出于财富、信息的差距，民众选票难以实现真正的理性选择，更难以真正影响选举结果。富有阶层、职业政客可以利用财富、信息的不平等塑造公民政策偏好“操纵”选情。另一方面，在被选举权方面，因缺乏精英所具有的人脉、经济实力、教育、职业政客背景，民众难以成为议员、州长乃至总统。从立法机关角度看，当前第118界国会参众两院533名议员中，64%（341人）曾在地方议会或联邦国会任职工作、23%（124人）曾有过市、州长或地方检察官等从政经历。从联邦政府角度看，自杜鲁门总统以来，民众再未选举出未受过高等教育的总统。因此，精英对参政权力的垄断实际上增加了民众参与政治生活的难度与不平等度。

Second, the difficulty of elites in representing the lower-class masses triggers a crisis of representation and a crisis of trust, becoming a key factor in undermining American-style democracy and inciting anti-elite and anti-intellectual sentiment. In a society that measures by unequal factors such as education and connections and blindly pursues meritocracy, the masses not only find it difficult to hold public office but also lack effective representatives in the legislative branch who come from ordinary backgrounds and can represent them, causing a rupture in the representation of public opinion. In the 118th Congress, no member had ever been an industrial worker or worked in a factory; but in the 109th Congress in 2004, at least 21 members had run for office and succeeded as candidates with grassroots occupations such as steelworkers. Different jobs inevitably bring different positions and interest preferences, meaning that industrial workers, who make up nearly 20% of the employed population in American society, are on the verge of unemployment and receive meager wages, lacking the value of being represented and necessary channels for expression. This causes a severe lack of the representativeness that American democracy prides itself on. Within the elite-centered representative system, the fundamental interests of the masses cannot be understood or responded to by elites, forcing the masses to resort to extra-establishment means to attract political attention. Therefore, once anti-elite, anti-establishment politicians participate in elections under the banner of saving democracy, they can gain popular support.

其次，精英难以代表底层民众引发了代表性危机与信任危机，成为破坏美式民主、引发反精英反智识的关键因素。在以教育、人脉等不平等能力因素为衡量标准且盲目追求优绩的社会中，民众不但难以担任公职人员，在立法机关中也缺乏出身普通、能够代表民众的有效代表，这使民意代表性发生断裂。在第118届国会中，没有议员曾是产业工人或在工厂中工作；但在2004年第109届国会中，至少有21位议员以钢铁工人等基层职业竞选议员并获得成功。工作岗位的不同必然带来所持立场与利益偏好的不同，这意味着美国社会中占据就业人口近20%、濒临失业且待遇微薄的产业工人缺乏被代表的价值与必要的发声渠道。这使美国民主制度中引以为傲的代表性严重缺失，在以精英为核心的代议制体制内，民众的根本利益无法得到精英的理解与回应，民众被迫采用建制外手段吸引政治注意。因此，一旦反精英、反建制政客以拯救民主的旗号参与选举即可获得民众支持。

Finally, the educational gap between the masses and elites causes severe elite-mass polarization. There is a crisis of trust between elites and the masses; elites despise the masses and cannot understand them, while the masses regard elites as a closed group detached from reality. In the 87th Congress in the early 1960s, 24% of members in both chambers did not have a bachelor’s degree, yet they could still perform their legislative duties; this figure is 4% in the current Congress. But in reality, about two-thirds of American citizens do not have a bachelor’s degree. The highly educated elites and the unrepresented masses are severely polarized; the masses do not believe that political agents will fulfill their promises, causing the masses to gradually withdraw from the network of political trust in elites. This crisis of trust leads to huge differences between the masses and elites: in the 2016 election, about two-thirds of white people without higher education supported the highly anti-intellectual Trump, while Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, who ran as an elite, won over 70% of highly educated voters. This problem became more pronounced after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the uneducated masses insisting that the pandemic and vaccines were elite “lies.” Thus, the ideology of meritocracy has dismantled the masses’ political trust in elites, undermined American-style democracy, and intensified the masses’ anti-intellectual and anti-elite sentiments.

最后，民众与精英之间教育水平差异造成严重的精英—民众分化。精英与民众之间存在信任危机，精英蔑视民众更不能理解民众，民众亦视精英为脱离实际的封闭集团。在20世纪60年代初的第87界国会中，24%的参众两院议员不具有本科学历，但依旧可以履行立法者职责；而这一数据在当前国会中为4%。但实际上，约2/3的美国公民未获学士学位。受高等教育的精英与不被代表的民众严重分化，民众不认为政治代理人会兑现其承诺，这使民众逐渐脱离对精英的政治信任网络。这样的信任危机使民众与精英分歧巨大：在2016年大选中，约2/3未受高等教育的白人支持极为反智的特朗普，而以精英身份参选的民主党候选人希拉里·克林顿则赢得超过70%高学历选民支持。这一问题在新冠疫情暴发后愈发明显，未受高等教育的民众坚持认为疫情及疫苗是精英的“谎言”。由此可见，优绩主义意识形态瓦解了民众对于精英的政治信任，破坏了美式民主的同时加剧了民众反智识、反精英的情绪。

(3) The Loss of Work Dignity and Public Spirit Weakens the Masses’ Reflective Spirit

（三）工作尊严与公共精神缺失削弱民众反思精神

The American masses believe that through work they can increase public welfare and through political participation they can improve the functioning of the democratic system, that is, they believe they can influence political and social life through action. But in the discourse of meritocracy, occupations are divided into different grades and rewarded with social status and income, so those who cannot obtain decent jobs are subjected to merciless criticism from elites. On the one hand, in the elite’s perception, only lazy and ignorant people engage in “disrespected” occupations such as assembly line work; not working as legislators, politicians, lawyers, or Wall Street managers means one cannot contribute to public affairs or civic welfare. Therefore, the masses’ work ethic is extinguished, and they are even less able to gain a sense of value from their work in their personal positions. On the other hand, the elite monopoly on public office prevents the masses from accessing public office and public power, frustrating their public spirit to achieve political goals and personal work value. The elites’ unwarranted criticism of their work also causes the lower-class masses to lose the basic dignity of work, recognition of self-worth, and the belief that work creates value. The loss of work dignity and the lack of recognition from others mean that the masses’ work goal is merely to obtain meager income to subsidize their livelihood, with no public spirit left to reflect on the work process or the democratic implementation process, let alone to offer suggestions on work and social phenomena. The masses’ doubt about the value of work and civic politics can lead to political apathy. This lays the groundwork for the degradation of citizens’ reflective intellect.

美国民众相信其可以通过工作增加民生福祉、通过政治参与改进民主体制的作用，即相信自己能够通过行动对政治与社会生活施加影响。但在优绩主义的话语体系中，职业被划分为不同等级并以社会地位、收入作为奖赏，因此无法获得体面职业的人便受到精英无情的指摘。一方面，在精英认知中只有懒惰无知的人才从事流水线工人等“不受人尊敬”的职业；不从事议员政客、律师及华尔街经理等工作便难以为公共事业或公民福祉作出贡献。因此，民众工作精神被磨灭，更无法在个人岗位上获得工作的价值感。另一方面，公共职务被精英垄断使得民众难以接触公职与公权，挫败其实现政治目标与个人工作价值的公共精神。精英对于其工作的无端指责亦使底层群众丧失了工作的基本尊严、对于自我价值的认可以及对工作创造价值的信念。工作尊严的缺失与他人不认可使民众工作目标仅是获取微薄的收入以补贴生计，除此之外并无反思工作过程与民主实施过程的公共精神，更不会对工作与社会现象提出建议。而民众对工作价值与公民政治产生的怀疑会形成政治冷漠。这为公民反思性智识的退化埋下隐患。

In the early period of the founding of the United States, a pluralistic society required diverse citizens to handle public affairs within small spheres and form self-governance. This mode of self-governance helped people cultivate habits of reasoning, persuasion, and mutual respect. These habits enabled people to start from the public affairs of community life, to have the opportunity to think for the progress of small local communities, to develop the ability to think independently for public life, to cultivate a public spirit that reflects on public life, and to produce a spirit of self-governance with a reflective quality. Those with outstanding abilities would then intentionally run for public office such as federal congressional seats. But today, American citizens lack this kind of thinking: the ascending channel through which ordinary people, starting from grassroots affairs, could offer insights for local, state, and federal affairs has been severed. Consequently, it has become difficult for them to become politicians who offer useful insights, and their suggestions are also hard for elites to value and recognize. This has dampened citizens’ desire for political thinking and political expression. In recent U.S. elections, the voter turnout of industrial workers and those with a high school education or less has been far lower than that of white-collar workers and those with a college degree or higher, and this phenomenon is spreading to Western countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom. The cost of meritocracy’s deprivation of citizens’ work value and social participation, its weakening of their independent thinking ability, and its stripping of their reflective capacity is that they become more susceptible to incitement by news media and social software, and more likely to become an anti-democratic force opposing elites and opposing intellect. Therefore, the lack of effective work dignity and participation in public spirit also makes American citizens increasingly deficient in the reflectiveness necessary for constituting intellect.

在美国建国初期，多元社会要求多元化的民众在小范围内处理公共事务、形成自治，这种自治方式帮助人们养成推理、说服以及相互尊重的习惯。这些习惯使人们可以从社区生活的公共事业做起，有机会为小范围居民社区的进步而思考，形成为公共生活而独立思考的能力、培养反思公共生活的公共精神、产生一种具有反思精神的自治精神。能力出众者，便有意竞选联邦议员等公共职务。但现今美国民众缺乏此类思考：普通民众从基层事务入手进而为地方、州以及联邦事务提出见解的上升渠道断裂，进而难以成为提出有益见解的政治家，而其建议亦难以得到精英的重视与认可，这挫伤了民众的政治思考与政治表达愿望。在近几次美国大选中，产业工人、高中及以下学历者的投票率远低于白领人群与大学及以上学历者，并且这一现象仍在向加拿大、英国等西方国家蔓延。优绩主义对于民众工作价值以及社会参与的剥夺、削弱其独立思考能力、使其丧失反思能力的代价是他们更容易受到新闻媒体、社交软件的煽动，更容易成为反对精英、反对智识的反民主力量。因此，缺乏有效的工作尊严与公共精神参与亦使得美国民众愈加缺失构成智识所必要的反思性。

IV. Characteristics and Impact of the New Wave of Anti-Intellectualism

四、新一轮反智主义的特点与影响

Unlike several waves of anti-intellectualism in American history, the new wave of anti-intellectualism triggered by meritocracy has new characteristics and new impacts. It exhibits a strong character of anti-elitism and de-elitization. The means of political participation and political expression of anti-intellectuals have become more extreme and radical, showing a trend toward populist transformation. Furthermore, the new wave of anti-intellectualism not only damages the spiritual life of American society but will also promote a conservative trend in American social issues, undermine the American democratic system, and ultimately accelerate the decline of American hegemony.

不同于美国历史上数波反智主义浪潮，优绩主义所引发的新一轮反智主义具有新特点与新影响。它呈现出强烈的反精英、去精英化的特点，反智主义者政治参与与政治表达手段更加极端与激进，呈现出民粹化转向趋势。此外，新一轮反智主义不仅给美国社会精神生活带来破坏，更将促进美国社会议题的保守化趋向，破坏美国民主制度，最终将加速美国霸权的衰落进程。

(1) New Characteristics of the New Wave of Anti-Intellectualism

（一）新一轮反智主义的新特点

The new wave of anti-intellectualism triggered by meritocracy differs from several historical waves of anti-intellectualism in the following two points: First, the new wave of anti-intellectualism more strongly exhibits the characteristic of de-elitization. From the early founding period of the United States to the end of the Cold War, anti-intellectualism was closer to the concept defined by Hofstadter, that is, citizens’ aversion to excessively high education levels, dislike of reflective thinking, and exclusion of intellectuals due to reasons such as religion and education. But today, due to changes in social structure and the development of higher education, few people hold a critical attitude toward education itself. Current American anti-intellectualism first manifests as the anti-elitism described by Rigney. It more often borrows the name of opposing intellect to express dissatisfaction with the lack of social mobility, elite monopolization of resources, and the failure of American democracy, and further turns its矛头 (spearhead) toward the vested interests—the elites. Starting from an oppositional factual logic, citizens regard elites as a group hostile to themselves, believing that elites have occupied political and economic resources that should belong to the masses, and thus are filled with resentment toward elites. In such opposition, citizens suspect the behavioral motives of elite groups, regard elite claims as lies, delegitimize elites, and thereby deepen their own value orientation of prioritizing emotion over facts and doubting everything. Therefore, in recent years, American public opinion appears anti-science and anti-common sense, for example, giving rise to anti-intellectual behaviors such as refusing to wear masks and refusing to get vaccinated. What lies behind this is citizens’ aversion to and distrust of elite claims and statements.

由优绩主义引发的新一轮反智主义与历史上数波反智主义浪潮的区别在于以下两点：其一，新一轮反智主义更强烈地表现出去精英化的特点。自美国建国初期至冷战结束之间的反智主义更接近霍夫施塔特界定的概念，即民众出于宗教、教育等原因产生的对于过高教育水平的厌恶、对于反思性思维的反感以及对于知识分子的排斥。但时至今日，由于社会结构的变迁和高等教育的发展，鲜有人对教育本身怀有批判态度。当下美国的反智主义，首先表现为里戈尼笔下的反精英主义，它更多假借反对智识的名义，表达对于社会流动性缺失、精英垄断资源以及美式民主失效的不满，并进一步将矛头转向既得利益者——精英。民众从对立的事实逻辑出发，将精英视做与自身敌对的群体，认为精英占据了本该属于大众的政治经济资源，进而对精英充满愤恨。在这样的对立中，民众怀疑精英群体的行为动机，将精英的主张视为谎言，将精英去合法化，进而加深了自身情感先于事实、怀疑一切的价值取向。因此，近年来美国民意看似反科学、反常识，例如衍生出拒绝佩戴口罩、拒绝接种疫苗等反智行为，其背后反映的是民众对于精英主张与言论的反感与不信任。

Second, the mode of expression of the new wave of anti-intellectualism is more extreme and radical, showing a more populist trend. For traditional anti-intellectualism, citizens’ criticism of intellectuals could be expressed within the framework of law and representative democracy: they could use the media or voting to choose more pragmatic candidates; in other words, such modes of expression were at most differences in political views and value orientations among different citizens, with no strict distinction between good and bad. But anti-intellectualism incited by right-wing anti-intellectual politicians has the characteristic of extremism. Under the mobilization of anti-intellectual discourse, radical right-wing conservatism has risen and become an important cause of current extreme political behavior in the United States. On the one hand, anti-intellectuals incited by anti-intellectual politicians attempt to break through the existing democratic legal framework to directly express political demands: the populists born from the incitement of anti-intellectual politicians like Trump have a strong anti-establishment character, even using extreme methods such as violently storming the Capitol to express demands and dissatisfaction. On the other hand, due to the “mandate” of anti-intellectual voters, polarization among anti-intellectual politicians is severe. Within the democratic framework, they use “veto politics” to obstruct and delay normal democratic operating procedures in order to express extreme political demands. Such extreme behavior has become a means of winning votes and entering the White House and Congress, possessing a strong populist character.

其二，新一轮反智主义的表达方式更为极端、激进，呈现出更加民粹化的趋势。对于传统的反智主义，民众对于知识分子的批评均可在法律与代议制民主机制内表达：可以利用媒体抑或投票选择更务实的候选人；换言之，此类表达方式充其量为不同公民政治观念、价值取向的不同，并无严格的优与劣之分。但受右翼反智政客煽动的反智主义则具有极端性的特点。在反智话语动员下，激进右翼保守主义兴起并成为当前美国极端政治行为出现的重要原因。一方面，受反智政客煽动的反智主义者尝试突破现有民主法律框架直接表达政治诉求：因特朗普等反智政客煽动而生的民粹主义者反建制色彩浓厚，甚至采用暴力冲击国会等极端方式表达诉求与不满。另一方面，因反智选民的“授权”，反智政客中极化现象严重，他们在民主框架内利用“否决政治”阻挠、拖延正常的民主运行程序，以表达极端政治诉求。这样的极端行为成为赢取选票、步入府会的手段，具有极强的民粹性特点。

(2) The Impact of the New Wave of Anti-Intellectualism

（二）新一轮反智主义的影响

The new wave of anti-intellectualism triggered by meritocracy has a more profound impact on American society. First, the new wave of anti-intellectualism intensifies the conservative trend in American social issues. Under the influence of rising anti-elite sentiment, opposition to scientific authority claims, and conspiracy theory viewpoints, non-reflective anti-intellectualism is gradually returning. Citizens are increasingly embracing dogmatic claims, which intensifies the conservative trend in American social issues. This is currently manifested in social issues such as gun control, women’s abortion rights, and even climate change. On the one hand, citizens show aversion and disgust toward the policy proposals advocated by elites. This is prominently reflected in the elite-advocated issue of climate change: since 2016, American citizens’ trust in experts on the issue of climate change has shown a declining trend. 31% of citizens believe that climate experts misunderstand the question of “whether climate change exists,” and 36% believe that experts misunderstand the causes of climate change. Furthermore, about 40% of citizens believe that climate change either lacks evidence or is caused by natural factors, and about one-third believe that Congress and the President should not prioritize the issue of climate change. Distrust of experts, elites, and the issues they advocate will inevitably promote a conservative trend on issues such as climate. On the other hand, anti-intellectuals’ adherence to religious absolutism triggers a conservative trend in social issues. Marked by the Supreme Court’s overturning of *Roe v. Wade*, consensus issues such as abortion rights and the establishment clause, which were previously recognized by a majority of voters, are now being challenged and impacted. The counterattack of religious conservative forces is reflected in the extremely conservative ideology and strong religious color of the new Speaker of the House of Representatives. This is also an important manifestation of the bottom-up development of the conservative trend in American social issues.

优绩主义所引发的新一轮反智主义对美国社会有着更为深刻的影响。其一，新一轮反智主义加剧了美国社会议题保守化趋势。在反精英情绪高涨、反对科学权威主张及阴谋论观点的影响下，非反思性反智主义正逐步回归，民众正逐渐拥抱教条主张，这加剧了美国社会议题的保守化趋势。目前这表现在枪支管控、妇女堕胎权乃至气候变化等社会议题上。一方面，民众对于精英提倡的政策主张表现出反感与厌恶态度，这突出体现在精英主张的气候变化议题中：2016年以来，美国民众在气候变化议题上对专家的信任程度呈现下降趋势，有31%的民众认为气候专家对“是否存在气候变化”问题理解有误，36%的民众认为专家对气候变化的成因理解有误。此外，约40%的民众认为气候变化不存在证据或由自然原因造成的，约1/3的民众认为国会与总统不应该将气候变化问题放在重要位置。对专家、精英及其主张议题的不信任势必促成气候等议题上的保守化趋势。另一方面，反智主义者秉持宗教绝对主义引发社会议题保守化。以联邦最高法院推翻“罗伊诉韦德案”（Roe v.Wade）为标志，本受到多数选民认可的堕胎权、立教条款（establishment clause）等共识性问题正受到冲击与挑战，宗教保守势力的反扑体现在新任众议院议长极端保守的意识形态与强烈的宗教色彩上，这也是美国社会议题保守化自下而上发展的重要表现。

Second, the new wave of anti-intellectualism has weakened the American democratic system and delegitimized American politics. The source of legitimacy for the American democratic system lies in the representativeness and compliance created by representative democracy and the nationwide general election system. Regular elections and the one-person-one-vote universal suffrage system are meant to show that election results represent the people, and that public officials elected through this process can represent the people’s interests. But today, on the one hand, the rise of meritocracy has increasingly revealed the American political system’s tendency to defend the interests of elite rule. The universal suffrage system has become a “rubber stamp.” Under conditions of polarized wealth gaps and polarization between the populace and the elite, legislators are more likely to become representatives of elite rather than popular interests, and public distrust of the political system is deepening. On the other hand, existing anti-intellectual politicians incite anti-intellectuals. To win votes, they do not hesitate to publicly question election results, attack the democratic system, and undermine the existing political order, reducing the degree of compliance in democratic operations. The consequence is that the rate of legitimate political participation by the populace declines year by year, public trust in the existing system drops sharply, and people are more inclined to use populist, extreme, and anti-establishment means to express political demands. In current Western democratic political practice, the populace even tends to bypass the legislative body, which holds the highest authority, and instead choose referendums or petitions—which lack legal status but carry the highest representative value—to express demands, forcing the executive branch to listen to public opinion. Therefore, the anti-intellectualism intensified by meritocracy not only harms American intellect at the spiritual level but also negates the legitimacy of American democratic politics at the political level.

其二，新一轮反智主义削弱了美国民主制度，使美国政治去合法化。美国民主制度的合法性来源是代议制民主以及全国普选制创造的代表性与合规性。定期选举、一人一票普选制体现选举结果代表人民，亦体现公职人员经由选举产生可以代表人民利益。但如今，一方面，优绩主义的崛起使美国政治体制日渐显露出维护精英统治利益的一面，普选制成为“橡皮图章”，在贫富差距两极分化、民众与精英两极分化的情况下，议员更可能成为精英而非民众的利益代表，民众对于政治体制的不信任日渐加深。另一方面，现有反智政客煽动反智主义者，为拉拢选票不惜公开质疑大选结果，攻击民主制度，破坏现有政治体制，降低了民主运行的合规程度。这造成的后果是民众合法政治参与率逐年递减，民众对现有制度的信任程度大幅下降，更倾向于采用民粹、极端、反建制的手段表达政治诉求。在当前西方民主政治实践中，民众甚至倾向于绕开具有最高权威的立法机关，选择不具法律地位但具有最高代表价值的公投或请愿方式表达诉求，以迫使行政当局听取民众意见。因此，优绩主义激化的反智主义不仅在精神层面危害美国智识，更在政治层面否定美国民主政治合法性。

Third, the new wave of anti-intellectualism will further weaken American cohesion and international image. Each wave of anti-intellectualism in American history has brought varying degrees of impact. For example, the anti-intellectualism triggered by McCarthyism in the 1960s stifled the atmosphere of free discussion in academia, incited public fear and opposition toward intellectuals, and “drove many thoughtful people into a corner with no way out.” [6]6 McCarthyism refers to the anti-communist political repression led by U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s, which targeted suspected communists and often destroyed careers and reputations through unsubstantiated accusations, creating a climate of fear that extended to academia. The new wave of anti-intellectualism sparked by meritocracy will cause even greater damage to American social cohesion. On the one hand, the new wave of anti-intellectualism will give rise to more extreme social ideologies. Under the insinuation and incitement of anti-intellectual politicians like Trump, who are dissatisfied with election results, voters mobilized by extreme rhetoric generate numerous social ideologies and movements aimed at defending the prestige and correctness of their party leaders. For instance, anti-wokeism, which stands in sharp opposition to the far left, has also become a new extreme social ideology. On the other hand, the new wave of anti-intellectualism weakens the degree of scientific and democratic decision-making, and undermines America’s international leadership over its allies and its own international image. Looking at recent U.S. presidents, the policy positions of anti-intellectual politicians like George W. Bush and Trump are often difficult to predict. They ignore expert advice and frequently make unpredictable and controversial decisions.

其三，新一轮反智主义将更大程度削弱美国凝聚力与国际形象。美国历史上的数波反智主义均带来不同程度的影响，例如20世纪60年代麦卡锡主义引发的反智主义扼杀了学术界自由讨论的氛围，引发了公众对知识分子的恐惧与反对，“把许多有思想的人逼到无路可走的地步”。由优绩主义引发的新一轮反智主义将对美国社会的凝聚力造成更大破坏。一方面，新一轮反智主义将引发更多极端社会思潮。在特朗普等反智政客对大选结果不满的暗示与煽动下，受到极端言论动员的选民为维护其威信与正确性，产生诸多维护党内领袖的社会思潮与社会运动。例如，与极左翼针锋相对的反觉醒主义（anti-wokeism）亦成为新的极端社会思潮。另一方面，新一轮反智主义削弱决策的科学化民主化程度、削弱美国对盟友的国际领导力及自身国际形象。从近几届美国总统来看，小布什、特朗普等反智政客政策主张往往难以被预测，他们无视专家的建议，常常作出难以预料、富有争议性的决策。

Bush’s choice to open a war front in Iraq and Trump’s blind pursuit of “America First” have weakened ties with allies, greatly undermined the stability and consistency of U.S. domestic and foreign policy, damaged America’s image, and eroded the “global leadership” of American hegemony.

小布什选择在伊拉克开启战端以及特朗普盲目追求“美国优先”，削弱了与盟友的联系，很大程度上削弱了美国内外政策的稳定性与连贯性，有损美国形象的同时削弱了美国霸权的“世界领导力”。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

Today, anti-intellectualism has become a problem that American policymakers cannot avoid. Starting from meritocracy as a distributive system and ideology, the authors explore the causes of anti-intellectualism from perspectives including the class-based and utilitarian nature of the education field, public emotional fatigue with elites, the representativeness of the elite class and the populace-elite opposition, and the public’s reflective deficit. Elites use meritocracy to monopolize educational resources, thereby depriving the populace of educational opportunities and weakening the process of cultivating public intellect; elites also construct a discourse system that demeans the populace and defends their own interests, cutting off the representativeness on which the American democratic system depends, and triggering a wave of popular anti-elitism. Furthermore, the deprivation of citizens’ opportunities for political participation weakens civic spirit and further diminishes the public’s capacity for reflection, ultimately harming the independent thinking ability of the American people.

如今，反智主义已成为美国决策者不得不面对的问题。笔者从作为分配制度与意识形态的优绩主义出发，从阶级化与功利化的教育领域、民众对精英的情感厌倦、精英阶层代表性与民众—精英对立以及民众对于公共精神的反思性缺失等角度探寻引发反智主义的原因。精英借助优绩主义垄断教育资源进而剥夺民众受教育机会，削弱民众智识的培养过程；精英还构建贬低民众、维护精英自身利益的话语体系，切断美国民主制度赖以生存的代表性，引发民众反精英浪潮。此外，公民参政机会的被剥夺削弱了公民精神更减弱了民众反思精神，最终有损于美国民众的独立思考能力。

Unlike the several waves of anti-intellectualism in American history, the new wave of anti-intellectualism profoundly exposes the accumulated ills of the American political and economic system. It not only surpasses previous waves in scope and depth but also plunges America into an unprecedented social division that will be difficult to bridge in the short term. At the same time, the new wave of anti-intellectualism first manifests as an extremely intense anti-elitism. Anti-intellectuals reject elites who lack representativeness, and it also exhibits various characteristics of the “post-truth” era, manifesting as groundless questioning and criticism of truth and facts. The harm and destructive power of this type of anti-intellectualism are further amplified by the rise of the internet, short videos, and self-media. American citizens lacking judgment, independent thinking, and reflective capacity are highly likely to be incited by public opinion of uncertain authenticity, triggering a series of violent conflicts, undermining the democratic system while weakening America’s leadership in the international community.

有别于美国历史中数波反智主义浪潮，新一轮反智主义深刻暴露了美国政治经济体制积弊，不仅在影响范围及深度上超过以往，更让美国陷入前所未有的社会分裂之中，这样的社会分裂短时间内难以弥合。同时，新一轮反智主义首先表现为极度强烈的反精英主义，反智主义者排斥缺乏代表性的精英，亦呈现出“后真相”时代的种种特点，表现为对于真理、事实的无端质疑与批判；而此类反智主义的危害性与破坏力更因互联网、短视频与自媒体的兴起而增加，缺乏判断能力、独立思考和反思能力的美国民众极有可能被不明真假的舆论煽动、从而引发一系列暴力冲突，破坏民主体制的同时削弱美国在国际社会中的领导力。

Anti-intellectualism is only one consequence of the tyranny of meritocracy. The widening wealth gap, the decline of the middle class, and the resulting political and social inequality are also closely related to meritocracy. But as a belief, meritocracy is deeply imprinted in the minds of most Americans, making endless academic competition and the primacy of performance part of the social ills. The re-emergence of anti-intellectualism has lifted the illusory veil of the American Dream, revealing the chasm of income disparity in American society. But America cannot completely abandon meritocracy and retreat to other, even more unequal systems like hereditary rule or aristocracy. Through reflection on meritocracy and anti-intellectualism, it must be recognized that meritocracy’s harm to America lies not only in the material dimension of economic and political inequality but also in the spiritual dimension of popular sentiment. Whether America can appease the emotions of its anxious, angry, anti-establishment, and anti-elite populace is a question that requires ongoing attention.

反智主义仅仅是优绩主义暴政带来的后果之一，贫富差距增大、中产阶级衰落以及由此带来的政治、社会不平等与优绩主义也息息相关。但作为一种信念，优绩主义深深烙印在多数美国人的观念中，使得无休止的学业竞争、绩效至上理念成为社会弊端的一部分。反智主义的重新兴起揭开了美国梦的虚幻面纱，展现了美国社会收入差距的鸿沟。但美国不可能完全抛弃优绩主义、退回至世袭制抑或贵族制等其他更加不平等的体制中去。通过对于优绩主义与反智主义的反思必须认识到，优绩主义对美国的危害不仅体现在经济、政治不平等的物质层面，更体现在民众情感的精神层面，而美国是否能够安抚好焦躁愤怒、反建制、反精英民众的情绪，是需要持续关注的问题。

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心