The Establishment and Collapse of the Japanese Communist Party’s United Front in the 21st Century

Under the guidance of the Marxist theory of the united front, the Japanese Communist Party (hereinafter “JCP”) has always regarded the united front as the basic method for assembling revolutionary forces and seizing political power. It does not pursue a one-party regime, but takes the establishment of a democratic coalition government based on the united front as the phased objective of the current revolutionary struggle. JCP Chair Shii Kazuo, in his speech commemorating the centenary of the Party’s founding, emphatically pointed out that the JCP is determined, no matter what difficulties it encounters, to win the support of the majority of the people through elections in order to promote social change, and at every stage of social development, to take the common strength of the people (the united front) as the general policy for promoting social change. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the JCP has made many new efforts to establish a united front, and once successfully built a united front with opposition parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan. However, after two defeats in national elections, the united front quickly collapsed. Why was the united front established and why did it collapse? Exploring this from both internal and external aspects helps to gain a deeper understanding of the reasons for the twists and turns in the development of the JCP’s united front, and to scientifically forecast its future direction.

在马克思主义统一战线理论的指导下，日本共产党（以下简称“日共”）始终将统一战线作为集结革命力量和掌握政权的基本方式，不追求一党政权，以建立统一战线基础上的民主联合政府为当前革命斗争的阶段性目标。日共中央委员长志位和夫在纪念日共建党百年的讲话中着重指出，日共决心无论遇到什么困难都通过选举争取多数国民的支持来推动社会变革，并在社会发展的各个阶段，都以国民的共同力量（统一战线）推动社会变革为大方针。21世纪以来，日共为建立统一战线付出了许多新的努力，一度成功建立起同立宪民主党等在野党的统一战线，然而，两次国政选举失败后，统一战线旋即走向破裂。统一战线何以建立又何以破裂？从内外两个方面加以探讨有助于更深刻地认识日共统一战线发展曲折的原因，并科学展望其未来走向。

I. The Process from the Establishment to the Collapse of the United Front

一、统一战线从建立走向破裂的过程

“The JCP has attached great importance to united front work since the end of World War II, because developing the united front is of great significance for the victory of the proletarian revolution.” [1]1 This is a quotation from a JCP document or statement, cited by the author. The JCP, which actively promoted the united front, faced an unfavorable situation on the eve of the 21st century, being marginalized, isolated, and even blockaded by various Japanese political parties. The opposition parties, in order to confront the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and establish a “two-party system,” frequently split, reorganized, gathered, and separated, building an invisible “anti-communist barrier.” [2]2 “Anti-communist barrier” (hakyō no kabe) is a term used in Japanese political discourse to describe the informal exclusion of the JCP from coalitions and cooperation by other parties. To break the deadlock in united front work, the JCP continuously adjusted its policies in the early 21st century, proposing new united front strategies and propositions, and ultimately achieving a united front for joint struggle with center-left political parties.

“日共从第二次世界大战结束以来一直十分重视统一战线工作，其原因在于发展统一战线对于无产阶级革命取得胜利具有重要意义。”积极推进统一战线的日共在进入21世纪前夕，面临被日本各政党排挤、孤立乃至封锁的不利境地，各在野党为对抗自民党和建立“两大政党制”而频繁分化重组、聚散离合，构筑起一堵无形的“反共壁垒”。为打开统战工作局面，日共在21世纪初期不断调整政策，提出新的统一战线策略和主张，最终实现与中左翼政党联合斗争的统一战线。

(A) The JCP Adjusts Policies to Seek the Establishment of a United Front

（一）日共调整政策以求建立统一战线

First, the JCP continuously adjusted its own positioning to find a suitable foothold. In December 2002, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 22nd JCP Central Committee proposed the positioning of “a party that acts with integrity from its original party standpoint,” [3]3 “Standing on the party’s original standpoint” (tō no hontai ni tatta katsudō) is a JCP self-characterization from its 22nd Congress. criticizing other parties for lacking political strategy and organizational construction, thereby losing the original party standpoint, and asserting that only the JCP could shoulder the party responsibility of speaking for the people. In August 2005, the JCP further proposed the positioning of “a reliable opposition party that resolutely confronts LDP politics,” [4]4 “Reliable opposition party” (shinrai dekiru yatō) is a JCP slogan from 2005. criticizing the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) claims of being “not an opposition party” and “not anti-LDP,” and emphasizing the JCP’s opposition party stance against the LDP. In July 2009, facing the situation where the DPJ was about to achieve a change of government, the JCP regarded the then DPJ government as “a transitional new government,” [5]5 “Transitional new government” (kateiteki na shin seiken) is the JCP’s characterization of the DPJ government formed in 2009. positioning itself as a “constructive opposition party,” [6]6 “Constructive opposition party” (kensetsuteki yatō) is a JCP self-positioning from 2009. with the task of promoting the DPJ government’s development in a democratic, reformist, and progressive direction. However, because the DPJ’s strength was surging at the time and it disdained to pay attention to the JCP, whose parliamentary seats were stagnant, the united front advocated by the JCP still did not achieve substantial progress.

首先，日共不断调整自身定位，找寻合适的立足点。2002年12月，日共二十二届五中全会提出“站在政党本来的立场上堂堂正正进行活动的党”的定位，批判其他政党无政治战略和组织建设，失去了政党的本来立场，只有日共能担当起为国民代言的政党责任。2005年8月，日共又提出“坚决与自民党政治对决的可靠的在野党”的定位，批判了民主党“非在野党”“不反自民”的主张，强调了日共反自民党的在野党立场。2009年7月，面对民主党即将实现政权更替的情势，日共将当时的民主党政权视为“具有过渡性的新政权”，将自身定位为“建设性在野党”，其任务是促进民主党政权向民主、革新、进步的方向发展。不过，由于当时民主党实力突飞猛进，不屑于关注议席徘徊不前的日共，日共所主张的统一战线仍没有取得实质性的进展。

Second, the JCP innovated its united front strategy, reducing the difficulty of establishing a united front. After the DPJ came to power in Japan in 2009, in order to break the deadlock in united front work, Shii Kazuo first proposed the concept of “point-based joint struggle” (itten kyōtō) in November 2011: [7]7 “Point-based joint struggle” (itten kyōtō) is a JCP strategy of cooperating on specific issues rather than a full common program. in various fields, transcending differences in political positions and party barriers, expanding cooperation based on points of agreement, and striving for multifaceted and rich development of struggles based on popular demands and for promoting real politics. Compared with previous united front strategies, the new strategy had two differences. First, the political foundation of the united front was no longer a systematic and complete common program, but any point of agreement in any field. Previously, the united fronts formulated by the JCP all had systematic and complete common programs; “point-based joint struggle” broke the common program into struggle tasks and objectives involving different fields, using these as the basis for uniting with other parties and organizations. This theoretically expanded the scope of the united front and increased opportunities for cooperation with other parties and organizations. Second, the united front movement was no longer a single-level movement, but a multi-directional, multi-layered rich movement. Because the political foundation of the united front was refined, it actually produced multiple political foundations at different levels, thereby providing the possibility of establishing multiple united fronts. The united front changed from the original “single line” to a “network,” producing the effect of promoting the overall advancement of the cause of reform and democracy and the democratic reform movement. “Point-based joint struggle” played a certain role in helping the JCP break the deadlock in united front work, sending a positive signal to the outside world.

其次，日共创新了统一战线策略，降低了建立统一战线的难度。2009年日本民主党执政后，为打开统战工作局面，志位和夫于2011年11月首次提出了“一点共斗”的概念：在各个领域，跨越政治立场的不同、党派的隔阂，扩大基于一致点的合作，为多面、丰富地发展基于国民要求的斗争和推动现实政治而奋斗。与此前的统一战线策略相比，新策略具有两点不同：一是统一战线的政治基础不再是系统、完整的共同纲领，而是任何领域任何可能的一致点。此前日共制定的统一战线都有系统、完整的共同纲领，“一点共斗”则将共同纲领拆分成涉及不同领域的斗争任务和目标，以此作为联合其他政党和组织的基础。这在理论上扩大了统一战线的范围，增加了与其他政党和组织合作的机会。二是统一战线运动不再是单一层面的运动，而是多方位、多层次的丰富运动。由于统一战线的政治基础被细化，实际上产生出不同层面的多个政治基础，从而提供了建立多条统一战线的可能。统一战线由原来的“一条线”变为“一张网”，产生整体推进革新民主事业和民主改革运动的效果。“一点共斗”在帮助日共打开统战工作局面方面发挥了一定的作用，向外界释放了积极的信号。

Finally, it timely proposed a new common program for the united front, calling for the establishment of a coalition government. In September 2015, in order to oppose the Abe cabinet’s forced passage of the new security legislation, the JCP urgently convened a Central Committee plenary session, formally issuing a call for “overthrowing the Abe cabinet and establishing a national coalition government that abolishes war legislation.” [8]8 This refers to the JCP’s September 2015 call in response to the Abe cabinet’s passage of security legislation allowing the Self-Defense Forces to exercise collective self-defense. The “national coalition government” took “abolishing war legislation and restoring constitutionalism” as its basic concept and political foundation, pointing out that both the form and content of the Abe cabinet’s forced passage of the war legislation violated the constitution and trampled on the principles of democracy and constitutionalism, “destroying the democratic foundation of the Japanese Constitution, which is based on popular sovereignty.” [9]9 This is a quotation from the JCP’s 2015 call. It called for overthrowing the Abe cabinet, dissolving the House of Representatives, and holding a general election, urging opposition parties to implement unified elections and form a coalition government. The JCP called on opposition parties to cooperate and unify their campaigns in the general election, in order to further realize the goal of establishing a national coalition government. Although this task was limited, as long as this step consistent with the spirit of the constitution was taken, it would be a great feat for the people, as sovereigns, to use their own strength to drive national politics, and it would undoubtedly open a new chapter in Japanese politics. The JCP’s “national coalition government” call still only aroused suspicion and vigilance among other opposition parties in the political world, but it received praise from the intellectual community and well-known democrats, providing positive factors for opening up the united front work situation in the subsequent period.

最后，适时提出新的统一战线共同纲领，呼吁建立联合政府。2015年9月，为反对安倍内阁强行通过新安保法案，日共紧急召开中央全会，正式提出“打倒安倍政权、建立废除战争法案的国民联合政府”呼吁。“国民联合政府”以“废除战争法案、恢复立宪主义”为基本理念和政治基础，指出安倍政权强行通过战争法案的形式及内容都是违反宪法和践踏民主主义、立宪主义原则的，“破坏了国民主权这一日本国宪法立足的民主主义根基”；要求打倒安倍政权、解散众议院并举行大选，呼吁各在野党实行统一选举、成立联合政府。日共呼吁各在野党在大选中进行合作、统一竞选，以进一步实现成立国民联合政府的目标。这一任务虽然是有限的，但是只要踏出符合宪法精神的这一步，那就是作为主权者的国民用自身的力量推动国政的大壮举，毫无疑问会打开日本政治的新局面。日共的“国民联合政府”呼吁在政界仍然只引起了其他在野党的怀疑和警惕，但得到了知识界和知名民主人士的赞扬，为其后一个时期打开统战工作局面提供了积极因素。

(B) The Formal Establishment of the “Opposition Parties’ Joint Struggle”

（二）“在野党共斗”的正式建立

On the eve of the 2016 House of Councillors election, in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of internal friction among opposition parties in the 2013 House of Councillors election, the leaders of five opposition parties—the Democratic Party, the JCP, the Japan Innovation Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Party for Japanese Kokoro—held a summit on February 19 and reached a consensus: to make the abolition of the security legislation and the withdrawal of the cabinet decision permitting the exercise of the right to collective self-defense a common goal; to strive to overthrow the Abe cabinet; in national elections, to force the ruling party and its supplementary forces into a minority; and to cooperate as much as possible in Diet struggles and national elections. [10]10 The Party for Japanese Kokoro (Nihon no Kokoro) was a small conservative party that existed from 2014 to 2018. On May 19, the leaders of four parties—the Democratic Party, the JCP, the Social Democratic Party, and the Party for Japanese Kokoro—held another summit, again reaching a consensus: to oppose the consumption tax increase, confirming and continuously accumulating other points of agreement; to achieve unified candidacies in all single-member districts for the House of Councillors election and to do their utmost for victory; to cooperate as much as possible in the House of Representatives general election and accelerate consultations on various specific matters; and to study jointly submitting a no-confidence motion against the Abe cabinet. These consensuses confirmed the common goals and direction of cooperation among the opposition parties, but did not address issues such as what kind of government would be established in the future or whether the JCP’s participation in the government would be recognized.

2016年参议院选举前夕，为避免重蹈2013年参议院选举中在野党内耗的覆辙，民主、共产、维新、社民、生活在野五党于2月19日举行党首会谈并达成共识：将废除安保法制和撤回允许行使集体自卫权的内阁决定作为共同目标；争取打倒安倍政权；在国政选举中，迫使现执政党及其补充势力成为少数；在国会斗争及国政选举等方面进行尽可能的协作。5月19日，民进、共产、社民、生活四党举行党首会谈，再次取得共识：反对提高消费税，确认并不断积累在其他一致点；参议院一人区全部实现统一立候，并为胜利而竭尽全力；尽可能在众议院大选中进行合作，加速各项具体事宜的协商；研究共同提出对安倍内阁的不信任案。这些共识确认了在野党之间的共同目标和合作方向，但并未涉及未来要建立什么样的政府、是否认可日共参加政府等问题。

In the July 2016 House of Councillors election, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) voluntarily withdrew the vast majority of its own candidates and achieved unified opposition candidacies in all 32 single-member districts. As a result, unified opposition candidates won in 11 districts, a significant advance from the two seats won in the previous election. The JCP focused its efforts on the proportional representation district, increasing its seats from 11 to 14. Thereafter, opposition cooperation continued, with electoral campaigns experiencing both victories and defeats. In November of the same year, the Democratic Party, the JCP, the Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the “Citizens’ Association for the Repeal of the Security Legislation and the Restoration of Constitutionalism” (abbreviated as “Citizens’ Association”) reached principled agreement on common policies. In the October 2017 House of Representatives general election, the newly formed Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) cooperated with the JCP, the Social Democratic Party, and forces opposing the ruling party, fielding unified candidates in a total of 249 small electoral districts. As a result of the election, the JCP failed to achieve its pre-election target of maintaining 21 seats, falling to 12 seats. The CDP won 55 seats, becoming the largest opposition party with the fewest seats in history, and recognition of the “JCP-CDP joint struggle” greatly increased, with the united struggle continuing to deepen.

2016年7月参议院选举，日共主动撤下绝大多数本党候选人，在32个一人区全部实现在野党统一立候；其结果，在野党统一候选人在11个选区获得胜利，比上次选举的2席前进了一大步；日共主攻比例区竞选，议席由11个增至14个。此后在野党继续合作，选战有胜有败。同年11月，民进、共产、自由、社民四党与“要求废除安保法制和恢复立宪主义的市民联合”（简称“市民联合”）就共同政策达成原则性一致。2017年10月的众议院大选，新成立的立宪民主党与日共、社民及反对执政党的势力达成合作，在总计249个小选区拥立了统一候选人。选举结果，日共未能实现选举前设定的维持21席的目标，减少至12席；立宪民主党获得55席，成为史上议席最少的第一在野党，并对“民共共斗”的认可度大大提高，联合斗争继续深入发展。

On September 15, 2019, the landscape of Japan’s opposition parties was reshuffled and largely finalized, producing three new parties: the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (second iteration), the Democratic Party for the People (third iteration), and Reiwa Shinsengumi. Initially, each party’s attitude toward the JCP differed, but due to the Suga cabinet’s weak COVID-19 prevention measures and the steady decline of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in opinion polls, the opposition parties judged that the time for a change of government had arrived, thereby strengthening their alliance. In June 2021, the four opposition parties—the CDP, the JCP, the Democratic Party for the People, and the Social Democratic Party—jointly demanded an extension of the Diet session to formulate effective pandemic control strategies, and subsequently jointly submitted a no-confidence motion against the cabinet. This joint struggle in the Diet became a precursor to electoral joint struggle. In July of the same year, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election saw the JCP and the CDP conduct a joint electoral campaign. The JCP’s seats increased from 18 to 19, and the CDP’s seats rose from 7 to 15, a result that greatly alarmed the LDP.

2019年9月15日，日本在野党格局经过重新洗牌后基本定格，产生立宪民主党（第二次）、国民民主党（第三次）、令和新选组三个新党。各党起初对日共的态度不一，但由于菅义伟内阁的疫情防控措施乏力，自民党民调不断下跌，各在野党认为实现政权交替的时机已到，从而加强联合。2021年6月，立民、共产、国民、社民在野四党联名要求延长国会会期，以制定疫情防控的有效策略，随即又联合提出对内阁的不信任案。这次国会共斗成为选举共斗的先声。同年7月，东京都议会举行选举，日共和立宪民主党实行联合竞选，日共议席从18席增至19席，立民议席从7席增至15席，这一结果使自民党大为慌张。

On September 8, 2021, the four parties—the CDP, the JCP, the Social Democratic Party, and Reiwa Shinsengumi—together with the Citizens’ Association, signed a policy agreement for the 2021 general election. Among its provisions, “abolishing the unconstitutional parts of the security legislation” and “opposing constitutional amendments taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic” aligned with the JCP’s “National Coalition Government” concept. The Democratic Party for the People, disagreeing with some of the policies, did not participate in the signing. On September 30, Yukio Edano and Kazuo Shii held a party leader meeting, and the two parties reached an agreement on common policies, unified candidacies, and governmental cooperation, marking the formal establishment of the united front. The JCP stated that if a change of government were achieved, it would engage in “limited cooperation outside the cabinet” for the realization of common policies within the new government. This was the first time in JCP history that it had reached a governmental agreement with another party, implying the potential birth of Japan’s first new government involving Communist Party participation, which had a significant impact. The 49th House of Representatives general election was held in October 2021, with the opposition alliance fielding unified candidates in 214 electoral districts. This was the first “general election of a truly united struggle” in JCP history.

2021年9月8日，立民、共产、社民、令和四党与市民联合签订关于2021年大选的政策协议，其中“废止安保法制的违宪部分”“反对乘新冠疫情之机修改宪法”等主张符合日共“国民联合政府”构想。国民民主党因不赞同其中部分政策，未参与签署。9月30日，枝野幸男与志位和夫举行党首会谈，两党就共同政策、统一竞选和政权合作达成协议，标志着统一战线的正式建立。日共表示如能实现政权交替，将在新政权中为共同政策的实现而进行“有限的阁外合作”。这是日共历史上首次与其他政党达成政权协议，意味着日本将有可能诞生首次有共产党参与的新政权，引起很大影响。日本第49届众议院大选于2021年10月举行，在野党联盟在214个选区拥立了统一候选人，这是日共历史上“首次真正联合斗争的总选举”。

(III) The United Front Moves Toward Rupture

（三）统一战线走向破裂

The results of the House of Representatives general election caused cracks in the united front. On November 1, 2021, the results of the House of Representatives general election were announced: the JCP fell from 12 seats to 10; the Social Democratic Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi saw no change in their seat numbers; the CDP dropped from 109 seats to 96; and among the 214 districts with unified candidacies, only 62 districts were won. Japanese society widely regarded this as a “failure of the opposition joint struggle.” Yukio Edano resigned on November 2, taking responsibility, and voices within the CDP opposing cooperation with the JCP grew stronger. All four candidates in the party leadership election opposed cooperation with the JCP. On November 30, 2021, Kenta Izumi was elected as the new leader of the CDP, and on January 31 of the following year, he announced that “the cooperation up to now with the JCP will be voided.” The united front faced the danger of rupture.

众议院大选的结果使统一战线出现裂痕。2021年11月1日，众议院大选结果出炉：日共从12席降为10席；社民党和令和新选组的议席数量没有变化；立宪民主党从109席降为96席；在统一立候的214个选区中，仅有62个选区取胜。日本社会普遍认为“在野党共斗失败”，枝野幸男于11月2日引咎辞职，立宪民主党内反对与日共合作的声音越来越强，参加党首竞选的四名候选人都不赞成与日共合作。2021年11月30日，泉健太当选为立宪民主党新党首，次年1月31日宣布与日共“迄今为止的合作将作废”。统一战线面临破裂的危险。

To maintain the united front, the JCP comprehensively elaborated on the effectiveness of the “joint struggle.” First, the seats lost by both the JCP and the CDP were all proportional representation seats, while in the small electoral districts where unified candidacies were conducted, the JCP held onto one seat, and the CDP even gained 23 seats. Moreover, electoral contests in many districts were extremely close; although the unified candidates lost, they were revived in the proportional representation districts with very high rates of narrow defeat. This showed that without the “joint struggle,” even more seats would have been lost. Second, the joint opposition campaign led to the defeat of LDP Secretary-General Akira Amari and veteran politician Nobuteru Ishihara (son of Shintaro Ishihara). The defeat of a sitting LDP Secretary-General was an unprecedented failure for the LDP, and the defeat of a veteran politician and faction leader by a newcomer carried symbolic significance far greater than the gain or loss of seats themselves. Finally, the “opposition joint struggle” ignited voters’ political enthusiasm and raised hopes for changing real-world politics. According to statistics, in districts where unified opposition candidates were established, both the overall voter turnout and the turnout among unaffiliated voters exceeded those in previous elections and other districts, indicating that the implementation of the “opposition joint struggle” allowed voters to see hope for changing LDP politics, thereby increasing their enthusiasm for political participation.

为维持统一战线，日共全面阐述了“共斗”的成效：首先，日共和立民丢失的均为比例代表区议席，而在进行统一竞选的小选区，日共保住了一个席位，立宪民主党还增加了23个席位。并且，许多选区的竞选状况极其胶着，统一候选人虽然败选，但是以极高的惜败率又在比例代表区复活。可见如果没有“共斗”，只会丢失更多议席。其次，在野党联合竞选使自民党干事长甘利明和资深政客石原伸晃（石原慎太郎之子）败选。自民党现任干事长落选是自民党破天荒的失败，资深政治家和派阀领袖选战败给新人，其象征意义远比议席本身的得失要大得多。最后，“在野党共斗”点燃了选民的政治热情，提高了改变现实政治的希望。据统计，在确立了在野党统一候选人的选区，总投票率和无党派阶层的投票率都要超过以往和其他选区，这表明由于实行“在野党共斗”，选民看到了改变自民党政治的希望，从而提高了参政的热情。

At the JCP’s urging, in May 2022, the secretaries-general of the two parties reached a consensus to continue coordinating candidacies in single-member districts, but the previously signed governmental agreement was voided, weakening the united front. Due to the CDP’s persistent lack of enthusiasm for the “joint struggle,” unified candidacies were ultimately realized in only 11 single-member districts. On July 11, the results of the House of Councillors election were announced. The JCP fell from 13 seats to 11, the CDP dropped from 45 seats to 39, and only 2 of the 11 unified candidates were elected. This led to forces favoring constitutional revision exceeding two-thirds of the seats in the House of Councillors. The JCP pointed out that the failure to achieve unified opposition candidacies and coordinated action was the main cause of this situation, and therefore continued to advocate for opposition cooperation. The CDP acknowledged its defeat and became passive toward the “joint struggle.” In May 2023, Kenta Izumi publicly stated that in the next House of Representatives general election, the CDP would not cooperate with the JCP, “striving independently without relying on other parties,” effectively declaring the previous policy and electoral agreements void. Apart from maintaining limited cooperation with the JCP within the Diet, the united front had in fact ruptured. Kazuo Shii continued to reiterate the effectiveness of the “joint struggle” and emphasized that forces favoring constitutional revision were building a four-party alliance, reviving the danger of a “Imperial Rule Assistance Association” [11]11 The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (翼赞体制) was a wartime mass mobilization organization established in Japan in 1940 under Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, effectively merging the state with a single-party-like structure to support the war effort. The JCP uses this historical reference to warn against a similar concentration of power by conservative forces today. system, making it even more necessary for opposition parties to replace quarrels with unity.

在日共的呼吁下，2022年5月，两党书记长达成共识，继续协调一人区的立候问题，但此前签订的政权协议作废，统一战线遭到削弱。由于立宪民主党对“共斗”始终不积极，最终只实现了11个一人区的统一立候。7月11日，参议院选举结果揭晓，日共从13席减为11席，立宪民主党从45席减为39席，11个统一候选人仅有2人当选，这导致了改宪势力超过参议院三分之二议席。日共指出，未实现在野党统一立候和步调一致是造成这种局面的主要原因，因此仍主张在野党的合作。立宪民主党承认失败，并对“共斗”转向消极。2023年5月，泉健太公开表示，下次众议院大选将不与日共合作，“不依赖他党而独自奋斗”，等同于宣告此前政策协议和选举协议作废；除仍在国会内与日共保持有限合作外，统一战线事实上已破裂。志位和夫继续重申“共斗”的成效，并强调改宪势力正在建立四党联合，有复活“翼赞体制”的危险，更需要在野党以联合代替争吵。

II. Exogenous Factors in the Rupture of the JCP’s United Front

二、日共统一战线破裂的外源性因素

The Democratic Party and others actively embracing the JCP was the main reason for the establishment of the united front, and their declaration of no further cooperation directly led to its rupture. Therefore, exogenous factors were the primary factors in the rupture of the JCP’s united front, specifically including three aspects: the form of cooperation, its purpose, and the environment.

民主党等主动接纳日共是统一战线得以建立的主要原因，也是他们声明不再合作直接导致了统一战线的破裂。因此，外源性因素是日共统一战线破裂的主要因素，具体包括合作形式、目的和环境三个方面。

(I) Form of Cooperation: The “Opposition Joint Struggle” as the Main Form

（一）合作形式：以“在野党共斗”为主要形式

The “opposition joint struggle” is a form of Japanese party alliance. It is an alliance relationship maintained through agreements signed by opposition parties based on certain common policies. Inter-party agreements include both informal oral agreements and formally signed policy agreements, electoral agreements, and governmental agreements. The stability of the alliance depends on the form, content, and number of agreements. The “opposition joint struggle” is a form of united front in which the JCP began participating from the mid-1960s onward. As the JCP increasingly affirmed the parliamentary electoral path and increasingly made elections the center of its work, this gradually became the main form of the united front.

“在野党共斗”是日本政党联盟的一种形式，它是靠各在野党基于一定的共同政策而签订的协议来维持的联盟关系。政党间协议既包括非正式的口头协议，也包括正式签订的政策协议、选举协议、政权协议等，联盟的稳固程度取决于协议的形式、内容和数量。“在野党共斗”是日共从20世纪60年代中期开始参与的统一战线形式，随着日共对议会选举道路越发肯定、越发以选举为工作中心，其逐渐成为统一战线的主要形式。

From the perspective of Marxist united front theory, the “united struggle of opposition parties” is a lower-level form of united front organization, because its scope of activity is limited, mainly revolving around parliament; its organizational content is limited, mainly involving relations among opposition parties; the alliance is relatively loose, lacking organizational structures, etc. In particular, the alliance relationship between parties is maintained solely by a written agreement signed by party leaders, which may not necessarily gain the support of both parties’ voters and social bases, and the cost of tearing up the agreement is not high, so it is not stable. Changes in party leadership or shifts in circumstances can render the cooperation agreement void. The JCP is helpless when allies leave; all it can do is appeal and criticize. Therefore, the “united struggle of opposition parties” is essentially a path that focuses on cooperation among party elites while neglecting or downplaying the development and advancement of a lower-level united front, turning the united front into a “castle in the air” lacking a foundation, constantly at risk of rupture.

从马克思主义统一战线理论的角度来看，“在野党共斗”是一种较低级的统一战线组织形式，因为它活动范围有限、主要围绕议会，组织内容有限、主要是在野党之间的关系，联盟较松散、缺乏组织机构等。特别是政党间的联盟关系仅靠党首签订的一纸协议维持，未必能得到双方选民及社会基础的支持，撕毁协议的成本不高，所以并不稳固。党首轮换、形势变化，都有可能使合作协议作废。日共对盟友的离去无可奈何，所能做的也只是呼吁和批判。因此，“在野党共斗”本质上是一条关注政党上层合作而轻视或忽视以下层统一战线的发展推进上层合作的道路，这就使统一战线成为缺乏基础的“空中楼阁”，随时面临破裂的风险。

For example, the supporting forces of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan not only failed to take a stance of maintaining the “united struggle” but instead obstructed it. The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (commonly known as “Rengo”) is the largest supporting force for the CDP and the Democratic Party for the People. In April 2021, Rengo explicitly stated that it did not want the CDP and the DPFP to cooperate with the JCP, and the two party leaders immediately promised not to form a coalition government with the JCP. Even after the “united struggle of opposition parties” was established in the 2021 general election, Rengo continued to obstruct, repeatedly expressing opposition to joint struggle with the JCP after the election and constantly issuing anti-communist rhetoric, claiming that “the Communist Party’s way of thinking is completely opposite to ours, the democrats.” When the CDP began to doubt cooperation with the JCP, Rengo also reiterated its anti-communist stance in a timely manner, to some extent reinforcing the CDP’s inclination to reject cooperation with the JCP. This shows that the cooperation between the JCP and its friendly parties does not receive recognition from their respective supporting forces, and the “united struggle of opposition parties” is in a dangerous state of being “rootless duckweed,” making the united front prone to rupture.

如立宪民主党一方的支持力量非但不采取维护“共斗”的立场，反而加以阻挠。“日本工会总联合会”（简称“联合”）是立宪民主党和国民民主党最大的支持力量。2021年4月，“联合”就明确表示不希望立宪民主党和国民民主党与日共合作，两党党首当即承诺不会与日共建立联合政权。在2021年总选举已建立“在野党共斗”的情况下，“联合”继续横加阻挠，于选举后多次表示反对与日共联合斗争、不断发表反共言论，宣称“共产党的思考方式与我们民主主义者是完全相反的”。立宪民主党对与日共的合作产生怀疑之际，“联合”也适时重申反共立场，一定程度上强化了立宪民主党拒绝与日共合作的想法。这表明日共与友党的合作得不到各自支持力量的认可，“在野党共斗”处于“浮萍无根”的危险状态，从而导致统一战线易于破裂。

(2) Purpose of Cooperation: Focusing on Winning Votes and Seats as Key Objectives

（二）合作目的：以争取选票和议席为重点目标

In the 20th century, the main target of the JCP’s united front was the Japan Socialist Party. Although there were differences in specific policies between the two parties, they shared a common long-term goal—overthrowing capitalism and achieving socialism—so theoretically, the prospects for cooperation between the two parties were relatively broad. However, the parties that can currently establish cooperation with the JCP are almost all based on considerations of practical interests, namely, gaining support from each other’s voters in joint elections to increase votes and seats. It is precisely for this reason that the Democratic Party (Democratic Progressive Party) chose to contact the JCP when its seats declined, and the CDP chose to part ways with the JCP after electoral defeat.

20世纪日共统一战线的主要对象是日本社会党，两党虽在具体政策上存在分歧，但具有共同的长远目标，即推翻资本主义、实现社会主义，因此从理论上讲，两党合作的前景较为广阔。但目前能与日共建立合作的政党，几乎都是基于现实利益考虑，即在联合竞选中得到对方选民支持，从而增加选票和议席。正因此，民主党（民进党）才会在议席下跌时选择与日共接触，立宪民主党才会在选举失利后选择与日共分道扬镳。

The parties within the united front only have a limited degree of political consensus, and the policy agreements signed by each party are based on the common policies proposed by the “Citizens’ Union.” Kazuo Shii once said that the old model, where parties or traditional mass organizations first issued calls and then the masses began to act, has changed; now it is citizens’ movements that drive party activities. The citizens’ movement in the summer of 2015, opposing the Abe administration’s forced passage of the new security legislation, gave rise to the “Citizens’ Union,” which took this as its political demand. Its basic political stance had many points in common with the JCP and the CDP, so it actively sought cooperation with powerful parties. Therefore, under the mediation of the “Citizens’ Union,” the main opposition parties, including the JCP, formally cooperated twice in 2016 and 2021, carrying out the “united struggle of opposition parties,” and the political demands of the “Citizens’ Union” became the basis for cooperation and the common election platform of the opposition parties.

处于统一战线中的各党仅具有程度有限的政治共识，各党所签订的政策协议以“市民联合”提出的共同政策为基础。志位和夫曾说，过去由政党或传统群众组织先行号召，群众才开始行动起来的旧模式已发生改变，现在是市民运动推动政党活动。2015年夏天反对安倍政府强行通过新安保法案的市民运动，产生了以此为政治诉求的“市民联合”。其基本政治主张与日共、立宪民主党等具有许多一致点，从而努力谋求与实力强大的政党合作。因此，在“市民联合”的牵线搭桥下，包括日共在内的主要在野党于2016年、2021年两次达成正式合作，开展“在野党共斗”，“市民联合”的政治诉求便成为在野党的合作基础和共同竞选纲领。

However, the common platform did not reflect the core positions of each party, and differences still existed beneath the surface. The JCP’s platform calls for “regulating unbridled capitalism” and changing the state of subordination to big business interests and the United States, so the JCP’s general election policy demands “eliminating tax breaks for big corporations” and “correcting the abnormal state of being subservient to the United States.” But the CDP recognizes the Japan-U.S. alliance, only hoping for a more “healthy” and “equal” alliance; the two parties’ positions are fundamentally different. Although the JCP increased flexibility in the united front, accepting the common platform as the greatest common denominator for cooperation and proposing a form of extra-cabinet cooperation, due to fundamental differences in viewpoints among the parties and a lack of common ideological foundation, the foundation of the united front was not stable.

但共同纲领并未反映各党的核心主张，内里仍存在分歧。日共纲领要求“规制无秩序的资本主义”，改变维护大企业利益和对美从属的状态，因此日共的总选举政策要求“消除对大企业的税收优待”和“纠正异常的对美国惟命是从的政治”。但立宪民主党认可日美同盟关系，只是希望同盟关系更加“健全”和“平等”,两党主张在根本上不同。尽管日共提高了统一战线中的灵活性，以认可共同纲领为合作的最大公约数，且提出阁外合作的方式，但由于各方在根本观点上存在分歧，缺乏共同的思想基础，统一战线的基础并不稳固。

(3) Cooperation Environment: Deep-Seated Prejudices of the Japanese Public Against the JCP

（三）合作环境：日本民众对日共根深蒂固的成见

For the Japanese people, the long-term opposition JCP can play a certain political role, such as criticizing government failures, expressing public demands, and investigating political scandals among officials, but acceptance of the JCP actually participating in government is low. Tomoko Tamura, chair of the JCP’s Policy Committee, once said: “‘The Communist Party as an opposition party is not bad, but what about when it comes to political power?’ This unease exceeds our imagination.” This is because, on one hand, the ruling authorities have long engaged in anti-communist propaganda, subtly fostering deep-seated prejudices among the Japanese public against the JCP, making them worry and doubt the outcome of the JCP governing or participating in government. For example, in September 2021, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato publicly stated that the government believed the JCP’s theory of “depending on the enemy’s attitude” had not changed its policy of violent revolution. In December 2022, the Kishida Fumio cabinet passed a written reply still asserting that the JCP’s “policy of violent revolution has not changed.” In October 2021, Komeito party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi slandered the JCP in a speech, claiming it advocated that “the emperor system violates the constitution and should be abolished,” and that the JCP should be banned. These slanders and defamations have become invisible obstacles to the JCP’s development of its own strength and the united front. On the other hand, once a long-term opposition party gains power, it is difficult to fully fulfill its campaign promises, and its governing capacity is no match for the Liberal Democratic Party, as the precedents of the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party have shown. Moreover, the JCP has long participated in national politics as an opposition party, often expressing its views by voting against, giving the public the impression of a “party that opposes everything,” and it is questionable to what extent such a party has practical governing ability. Therefore, the Japanese public’s recognition and acceptance of the JCP participating in government is relatively low.

对日本国民来说，长期在野的日共能发挥一定政治作用，如批判政府过失、表达民众诉求、调查官员政治丑闻方面等，但对于日共真正参与政权的接受度不高。日共政策委员长田村智子曾说：“‘作为在野党的共产党还算不错，但是涉及到政权的话会怎样呢？’这种不安，超出了我们的想象。”这是因为，一方面，执政当局长期进行反共宣传，潜移默化地使日本民众对日共产生了根深蒂固的成见，令他们担忧和怀疑日共执政或参政的结果。如2021年9月，内阁官房长官加藤胜信公开指出，政府方面认为日共“根据敌人的态度”论并未改变暴力革命的方针。2022年12月，岸田文雄内阁通过答辩书，仍认为日共“暴力革命的方针没有改变”。2021年10月，公明党党首山口那津南在讲话中污蔑日共主张“天皇制违反宪法，应予废止”，应该将日共取缔。这些诬陷和污蔑，无形中成为日共发展自身实力和统一战线的障碍。另一方面，长期在野的政党一俟获得政权，很难完全兑现竞选承诺，执政能力不敌自民党，这已有社会党和民主党的前车之鉴。况且日共长期以在野党的身份参与国政，多以投反对票的方式表达见解，给民众留下了“什么都反对的党”的印象，这样的政党究竟在多大程度上具有实干能力是令人怀疑的。所以，日本国民对日共参加政权的认可度和接受度比较低。

The Japanese public’s “unease” about the JCP’s participation in government directly affects the JCP’s votes and seats, and also indirectly affects allies’ evaluation of the JCP and the development of the united front. The government agreement between the JCP and the CDP stipulated that “the Japanese Communist Party will engage in limited extra-cabinet cooperation within the scope of achieving common policies,” which caused an uproar in Japanese society. This was because before the election, the CDP had a very high chance of achieving a change of government, which would have possibly produced the first government in Japanese history with Communist Party participation—a highly shocking prospect. Yoshihiko Noda stated publicly that the new government would be a one-party government of the CDP, implicitly indicating that the other three opposition parties would not only receive no cabinet posts but would also have little influence on policy, which to some extent aimed to allay voter concerns. However, some CDP members and social figures still believed that the CDP’s defeat in the 2021 general election was because voters did not want to see the party cooperate with the JCP and form a coalition government. This public opinion trend inevitably influenced the CDP’s decision-making.

日本民众对日共参与政权的“不安”直接影响着日共的选票和议席，也间接影响到盟友对日共的评价和统一战线的发展。日共与立宪民主党的政权协定规定“日本共产党将在实现共同政策的范围内进行有限的阁外合作”，这在日本社会引起轩然大波。因为选举前立宪民主党可能实现政权更替的呼声极高，由此将可能诞生日本历史上第一个有共产党参加的政权，这是极富冲击性的。枝野幸男在公开场合表示，新政权将是立宪民主党的一党政权，暗指其他三个在野党不但不会得到内阁职位，而且不会对政策有过多影响，这多少有打消选民顾虑的涵义。但仍有立宪民主党的部分党员和一些社会人士认为，该党在2021年总选举中失利是因为选民不希望看到该党与日共合作并建立联合政权。这种舆论倾向不能不对立宪民主党的决策造成影响。

III. Endogenous Reasons for the Rupture of the JCP’s United Front

三、日共统一战线破裂的内生性原因

The transition of the JCP’s united front in the 21st century from establishment to rupture is due not only to ally factors and objective obstacles but also to the JCP’s own reasons. First, the class interests represented by the JCP, along with its revolutionary theory and basic policies, differ significantly from those of other center-left parties. Second, compared to the 20th century, although the JCP has lowered its posture, no longer insisting on leadership, and increased strategic flexibility, it also faces new difficulties.

21世纪日共的统一战线从建立走向破裂，除盟友因素和客观障碍之外，日共自身的原因也很关键。首先是日共所代表的阶级利益及其革命理论、基本政策与其他中左翼政党存在较大差异和分歧。其次，相较于20世纪，日共虽然放低姿态，不再一味争取领导权，提高了策略的灵活性，但是也面临新的难题。

(1) Continuous Decline in Party Strength, Reduced Attractiveness to Allies

（一）党势不断衰退，对盟友的吸引力下降

Since other parties’ alliances with the JCP focus primarily on winning votes and seats, if the JCP lacks a sufficient membership base, a sufficient number of branches to carry out actual election work, and a certain number of support groups to provide stable votes, it cannot attract the attention and alliance of other parties; even if an alliance is temporarily achieved, it will ultimately rupture because it fails to meet the allies’ expected goals. The JCP’s party strength since the 21st century has been in a basically continuous decline. Generally speaking, party strength is evaluated from both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Important quantitative indicators include the number of party members, the number of readers of *Akahata* (including daily and weekly editions), the number of branches, and the number of seats in the national Diet and local assemblies; qualitative aspects include the leadership capacity of local party organizations (the number of full-time standing committee members), the composition of party members, and financial conditions. The changes in the main indicators of JCP party strength since the 21st century are shown in Table 1.

既然其他政党与日共的联合以争取选票和议席为重点目标，那么，如果没有足够的党员基数、没有足够数量的支部进行实际的选举工作，没有一定数量的后援会提供稳定选票，日共就不可能得到其他政党的重视和联合；即使一时实现了联合，最终也会因为无法达成盟友的预期目标而使联盟破裂。而日共21世纪以来的党势基本上处于不断下滑的态势。一般来说，党势强弱主要从量和质两个方面进行评价。量的重要指标包括党员人数、《赤旗报》读者人数（包括日刊和周刊）、支部数量、国会和地方议席数量等，质的方面则包括地方党组织的领导力（专职常委的数量）、党员结构、财政状况等。21世纪以来日共党势主要指标的变化情况见表1。

Clearly, since the 21st century, especially since 2010, except for a few indicators that have fluctuated, the vast majority of indicators show that JCP party strength has been gradually declining. Issues not listed in the table, such as the aging of party members and the reduction of full-time cadres, have also persistently plagued the JCP. After the 2022 House of Councillors election, the JCP Central Committee’s Executive Committee summarized the lessons of the election and publicly acknowledged that the decline in the party’s own strength was the main reason for the electoral defeat. Compared with the previous House of Councillors election, over three years, the JCP’s membership shrank to 92.5%, and the readership of the daily and Sunday editions of *Akahata* shrank to 92% and 91.4%, respectively. The JCP Central Committee called on the entire party to contribute wisdom, offer frank opinions and suggestions, and work together to build a strong party. The Central Committee plenum on June 24, 2023, reiterated that the decline in its own strength was the main reason for the defeat in the unified local elections and pointed out that over the four years since the last unified local elections, membership had shrunk to 91%, and the readership of the daily and Sunday editions of *Akahata* had shrunk to 87% and 85%, respectively. This indicates that the problem of party decline facing the JCP has reached a relatively serious level, and efforts to reverse the trend have not yet achieved significant results; under these circumstances, it becomes even more difficult for the JCP to attract other parties to form alliances.

显然，21世纪以来，特别是2010年以来，除少数指标起伏波动外，绝大多数指标都表明日共党势呈逐渐衰落的趋势。表中未列出的党员老龄化、专职干部减少等问题也始终困扰着日共。2022年参议院选举结束后，日共中央干部会总结选举教训，公开承认党自身实力的衰落是选举失利的主要原因。与上届参议院选举相比，三年间，日共的党员人数萎缩至92.5%，《赤旗报》日刊读者和周日版读者分别萎缩至92%和91.4%。日共中央号召全党贡献智慧，提出坦率的意见和建议，齐心协力建设强大的党。2023年6月24日的中央全会重申自身实力的衰落是统一地方选举失利的主要原因，并指出自上次统一地方选举以来的四年间，党员人数萎缩至91%，《赤旗报》日刊读者和周日版读者分别萎缩至87%和85%。这表明日共所面临的党势衰颓问题已达到较严重的地步，扭转颓势的努力尚未获得显著效果，这种情况下日共就更难吸引其他政党与之联合。

(2) Weak Mass Work, Neglect of the Lower United Front

（二）群众工作乏力，忽视下层统一战线

Compared with the 20th century, the JCP has devoted most of its energy to electoral struggle, while its mass work has been relatively weak, objectively resulting in the neglect of the lower united front, an overemphasis on cooperation among party elites, and the use of emerging civic organizations merely as bridges and ties. Due to weak mass work, since the 21st century, the traditional mass organizations that the JCP can control have increasingly diminished, and its leadership and organizational capacity over the masses have gradually declined, which in turn has affected the recovery and development of JCP party strength.

与20世纪相比，日共将大部分精力用于选举斗争，在群众工作方面相对乏力，客观上产生了忽视下层统一战线、只重政党上层合作、将新兴市民组织作为桥梁和纽带的结果。由于群众工作乏力，21世纪以来，日共能够掌握的传统群众组织日益减少，对群众的领导力和组织力逐渐降低，这又影响了日共党势的恢复和发展。

Traditional mass organizations are those organized by class, stratum, or sector; they generally were established earlier and have closer relationships with political parties. Currently, mass organizations that openly or actually accept JCP leadership include the National Confederation of Trade Unions (Zenroren), the National Federation of Farmers’ Movements (Nominren), the National Federation of Small Business Associations and local Democratic Chambers of Commerce and Industry (collectively referred to as Minsho-Zenshoren), the Japanese Democratic Youth League (Minsho), the New Japan Women’s Association (Shin Fujin), and the Women’s Democratic Club (Fumin), as well as the united front organization with these groups as its main member organizations, the National Congress for Peace, Democracy, and Innovation in Japan (Zenkoku Kakushin Kon). These mass organizations historically played a united front role in uniting the masses of various classes and strata, giving the JCP’s united front a basic structure of “party—mass organizations—masses,” but they now universally face difficulties in organizational development.

传统群众组织即以阶级、阶层或界别为标准组织起来的群众组织，它们一般成立时间较早，与政党关系较密切。目前，公开或实际接受日共领导的群众组织包括“全国劳动组合总联合会”（全劳联）、“农民运动全国联合会”（农民联）、“全国商工团体联合会”及各地民主商工会（并称民商·全商联）、“日本民主青年同盟”（民青）、“新日本妇女会”（新妇女）和“妇女民主俱乐部”（妇民）等，此外还有以这些组织为主要加盟团体的统一战线组织“争取和平、民主、革新的日本全国大会”（全国革新恳）。这些群众组织在历史上曾发挥了团结各阶级阶层群众的统一战线作用，使日共的统一战线呈现出“政党——群众组织——群众”的基本结构，但是目前它们都普遍面临着组织发展的困境。

First, regarding trade unions: Zenroren, established in 1989, had 1.53 million members in 1998, but has since declined year by year. From 2012 to 2020, Zenroren aimed to “build a Zenroren with 1.5 million members” and implemented two “four-year plans” to expand and strengthen the organization, yet it still could not curb the trend of organizational contraction; instead, membership fell from 1.137 million in 2012 to 1.017 million in 2020. The situation for other traditional mass organizations is also not optimistic. Membership in Minsho-Zenshoren fell from 370,000 in 1985 to 200,000 in 2016, and further to 160,000 in 2021. The Minsho Youth League has maintained a scale of around 10,000 people in recent years; except for 2022, its annual recruitment targets have generally been difficult to meet. The New Japan Women’s Association reportedly has 200,000 members, while the Farmers’ Federation has not disclosed its membership numbers. Furthermore, the membership of the National Congress for Peace, Democracy, and Innovation has not been updated since it was reported as 4.5 million in 2007; based on the situation of its member organizations, it can be inferred that its total membership has also declined.

首先是工会，1989年成立的全劳联在1998年拥有153万会员，此后逐年萎缩。从2012年到2020年，全劳联以“建设拥有150万会员的全劳联”为目标，实施两个“四年计划”来实现组织的扩大和强化，然而仍以难遏制组织萎缩趋势，会员数反而从2012年的113.7万人下降到2020年的101.7万人。其他传统群众组织的情况也不容乐观。民商·全商联的会员人数从1985年的37万人降至2016年的20万人，2021年又降至16万人。民青同盟近年来始终维持1万人左右规模，除2022年外，年度发展盟员计划通常难以完成。新妇女的会员人数据称为20万，农民联则没有公布会员人数。此外，全国革新恳的会员人数自2007年公布的450万人之后没有再更新，根据其加盟组织的情况，可以推断其会员总数也有所下降。

Except for the Minsho Youth League, which explicitly acknowledges accepting JCP leadership, the other organizations are nominally independent, but judging from their platforms and actions, they actually accept the JCP’s political leadership. Because of this relationship, the JCP historically could recruit party members and promote cadres from these organizations, using the development of mass organizations to drive party organization development, and using party organization development to drive mass organization development, achieving a positive interaction. However, since the 21st century, both the JCP and these organizations have actively sought development paths, but the results have been unsatisfactory. This has further led the JCP to focus its attention mainly on emerging civic organizations, to some extent neglecting traditional mass organizations and departing from the mass line, becoming overly focused on “opposition party joint struggle,” resulting in the coexistence of a decline in its own strength and a lack of a solid foundation for the united front. Moreover, the decline of mass organizations manifests in elections as a weakened ability to gather votes, which also diminishes the JCP’s attractiveness to other parties.

除民青同盟明确承认接受日共领导外，其他组织名义上是独立的，但从纲领和行动来看，其实际上接受日共的政治领导。由于这种关系，历史上日共可从这些组织中发展党员和提拔干部，以群众组织的发展推动党组织发展，以党组织的发展带动群众组织发展，实现良性互动。然而，21世纪以来，日共与各组织都积极寻求发展道路，效果却不尽如人意，这进一步导致日共将关注重点主要放在新兴市民组织上，一定程度上忽略了传统群众组织并离开了群众路线，过于专注“在野党共斗”，使自身力量不断衰落和统一战线缺乏坚实基础的困境并存。此外，群众组织的衰落在选举中表现为集票能力减弱，同样削弱了日共对于其他政党的吸引力。

(3) Unresolved Internal Party Problems Causing Negative Social Impact

（三）党内问题未决，引起负面社会影响

While the prejudice of the Japanese public against the JCP is certainly the result of long-term distorted propaganda by the ruling authorities, the targets of anti-communist attacks are usually the unresolved problems within the JCP itself. For example, the anti-communist upsurge in early 2023 targeted the problems existing within the JCP itself.

日本民众对日共的成见固然是执政当局长期歪曲宣传的结果，但反共攻击的靶点通常是日共党内悬而未决的问题。例如，2023年初的反共高潮就指向日共自身所存在的问题。

On January 19, 2023, JCP member and journalist Matsunobu Nobuyuki published *The New Japanese Communist Party Manifesto: A Reason for an Ordinary Party Member to Demand and Run in a Party Leadership Primary Election*. The book openly proposed that the JCP should adopt a party leadership primary election system, like other Japanese parties—that is, the party leader should be publicly elected by party members through voting—thereby challenging the JCP’s current leadership system. In addition, the book also presented the author’s dissenting views on security policy issues such as constitutional revision and the Self-Defense Forces. Matsunobu stated that he publicly expressed his views because the channels for inner-party democracy were not smooth, and opinions submitted to superiors and the central committee had not received responses. Kyoto Prefectural Committee Standing Committee member Suzuki Gen also published *A Letter to Chairman Shii Kazuo* in January 2023, openly demanding that Shii Kazuo take responsibility for the party’s decline and resign, and that a party leadership primary election system be implemented. On February 6 and March 16, 2023, the JCP expelled Matsunobu and Suzuki, respectively, from the party. On June 6, 2023, the JCP also expelled Ebisu Tomohiko, a member of the Minami-Awaji City Assembly who held similar views to the previous two.

2023年1月19日，日共党员、记者松竹伸幸所写的《新日本共产党宣言——一个普通党员要求党首公选并参选的理由》出版发行，该书公开提出，日共应与日本其他政党一样实行党首公选制，即党首公开竞选，由党员投票选举产生，对日共现行领导体制提出挑战；此外，该书还提出了作者对改宪、自卫队等安保政策问题的异论。松竹伸幸表示，他之所以公开表达观点，是因为党内民主的渠道不畅通，向上级和中央递交的意见未得到回应。京都府委常任委员铃木元同样在2023年1月出版了《致志位和夫委员长的信》，公开提出志位和夫要为党势衰退引咎辞职以及实行党首公选制的要求。2月6日和3月16日，日共分别开除了松竹伸幸和铃木元的党籍。6月6日，日共又开除了与前二者有相似观点的南淡路市议员蛭子智彦。

This incident has attracted significant attention in Japanese society. After Matsunobu Nobuyuki was expelled, the Japanese bourgeois media widely sensationalized the JCP as a “terrorist party that does not permit dissenting opinions.” On the day of the disciplinary action, Tamaki Yuichiro, leader of the Democratic Party for the People, stated, “One can only regard it (referring to the JCP—author’s note) not as a democratic party but as a totalitarian party.” Baba Nobuyuki, leader of Nippon Ishin no Kai, also said, “Rejecting opinions that should undergo democratic selection is exactly the opposite of the stance the Communist Party takes in the Diet.” The party’s former leader, Matsui Ichiro, similarly remarked on the same day that the JCP is “a frightening party that deprives people of freedom of speech.” Motegi Toshimitsu, Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party, also commented, “In our party, the sudden expulsion of a member is not a common occurrence,” implicitly criticizing the JCP’s disciplinary measures as excessive. Many Japanese citizens have also expressed confusion over the JCP’s opposition to the party leader public election system and the expulsion of the three members. At a press conference on February 10, Kenta Izumi of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan tactfully stated that while each party may have its own organizational structure, democratic centralism is not adopted by any other party, “so it feels like there is a cultural difference from us.” This statement itself already reveals implicit criticism of the JCP and democratic centralism.

该事件受到日本社会很大关注。松竹伸幸被开除后，日本资产阶级媒体大肆渲染日共是“不允许不同意见的恐怖政党”。国民民主党党首玉木雄一郎在处分当天就说，“只能认为它（指日共——引者注）不是民主主义的政党，而是极权主义的政党”；日本维新会党首马场伸幸也说，“排斥应该进行民主遴选的意见，与共产党在国会的姿态是正好相反的”，该党前党首松井一郎也在同日表示，日共“是剥夺言论自由的可怕政党”。自民党干事长茂木敏充也提出，“在我们党，突然开除党员的处分是不多见的”，暗指日本共产党的处分过分。许多日本民众也对日共反对党首公选制和开除三人表示不解。立宪民主党泉健太则在2月10日的记者会上委婉表示，虽然各党可以有自己的组织机构，但民主集中制是其他政党都未采用的，“所以感觉还是和我们在文化上有不同”。这一表态本身已显示出对日共和民主集中制的微词。

Originally an internal affair of the JCP, why has it drawn societal attention and some malicious attacks? The reason lies in the attempt to use this incident to attack the JCP’s democratic centralism. As for the JCP itself, on the one hand, insufficient intra-Party education failed to resolve internal issues properly, making it a target of attack; on the other hand, the JCP’s usual inadequate propaganda and explanation of democratic centralism has led to public confusion and misunderstanding. These internal problems or shortcomings, after being exaggerated and amplified by bourgeois parties and the media, have produced negative results that further affect public perception and the willingness of allies to form coalitions.

原本只是日共党内事务，为何会引起社会的关注和一些别有用心的攻击呢？原因在于他们试图通过此事攻击日共的民主集中制。就日共自身而言，既因为日共党内教育不足，未能将党内问题解决好，使其成为被攻击的靶子；又因为日共平时对民主集中制的宣传阐释不够，引起民众的不解和误解。这些自身的问题或不足，经过资产阶级政党和媒体的渲染和放大，产生了进一步影响民众观感和盟友结盟意愿的消极结果。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

The united front is not only a persistent pursuit of the JCP since its founding but also a phased goal of its current party platform, as well as one of the “century-long experiences” of the JCP’s development. On July 15, 2022, Shii Kazuo, in his speech commemorating the JCP’s centenary, summarized several characteristics of the JCP over the past century, one of which was its consistent adherence to the united front strategy of standing with the people. The united front is an important manifestation of the JCP’s practice of the “majority revolution” and the “people’s democratic revolution,” highlighting its democratic character and distinguishing it from the one-party dictatorship of the Soviet Communist Party. Therefore, the JCP will continue to uphold the strategy and tactics of the united front in the future, striving unremittingly to achieve the goal of establishing a democratic coalition government. On June 24, 2023, the Eighth Plenary Session of the 28th Central Committee of the JCP established a strategy of “going it alone” in the next general election, requiring a shift in electoral tactics, expanding party influence, developing young party members, and completing generational turnover. Since then, signs of a re-coalescence among opposition parties have emerged, but taking history as a mirror, Japan’s center-left parties may still waver before the general election. Whether or not the “opposition party joint struggle” is reconstructed, the JCP should maintain the initiative, learn from historical lessons, on the one hand restore a certain degree of revolutionary character and principled stance, put forward clearer policies, and win the support of progressive forces; on the other hand, humbly accept suggestions from inside and outside the party, promote inner-party democracy, consolidate the mass line, and build itself stronger.

统一战线既是日共建党以来的不懈追求，也是现行党纲的阶段性目标，同时还是日共发展至今的“百年经验”之一。2022年7月15日，志位和夫在纪念日共建党百年的讲话中总结了百年来日共的几个特点，其中之一就是始终坚持与国民站在一起的统一战线战略。统一战线是日共践行“多数人革命”和“人民的民主革命”，彰显民主主义底色和区别于苏联共产党一党专政的特色的重要体现。因此，未来日共仍将继续坚持统一战线的战略策略，为实现建立民主联合政府的目标而不懈奋斗。2023年6月24日，日共二十八届八中全会确立了在下次总选举中“单打独斗”的策略，要求转变选举战术，扩大党势，发展青年党员，完成世代交替。此后在野党出现重新联合的迹象，但以史为鉴，日本中左翼政党在大选前仍有摇摆的可能。不论“在野党共斗”是否重构，日共都应保持主动，总结历史教训，一方面恢复一定程度的革命性和原则性，提出更加明确的政策，争取进步力量的支持；另一方面虚心接受党内外建议，发扬党内民主，巩固群众路线，将自身建设得更加强大。

(Author’s bio: Li Ming, Assistant Professor at the School of Marxism, Shenzhen University, and part-time researcher at the World Political Parties Research Center, Guangdong Provincial Social Science Research Base)

（作者简介：李明，深圳大学马克思主义学院助理教授，广东省社会科学研究基地世界政党研究中心兼职研究员）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心