An Analysis of the Contemporary Virtual Economy from the Perspective of Lenin’s Critique of Finance Capital

Lenin’s critical theory of finance capital is concentratedly embodied in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (hereinafter referred to as *Imperialism*). In this work, Lenin reveals the process of the formation and expansion of finance capital, systematically analyzes the essence of finance capital, and provides theoretical support for correctly understanding finance capital. In the 1950s and 1960s, the economies of capitalist countries represented by the United States and Western Europe developed rapidly. However, with the occurrence of the “oil crisis,” these countries successively fell into “stagflation.” To cope with this predicament, Western economists represented by Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweezy put forward the theory of “finance as a response to stagnation,” attempting to rely on large-scale financialization to address economic stagnation. Consequently, the virtual economy based on financial transactions expanded rapidly. Yet the excessive expansion of the virtual economy not only failed to resolve the problem of slowing economic development but instead exacerbated the destructive severity of events such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 international financial crisis. Faced with the risks brought by the expansion of the contemporary world’s virtual economy, revisiting *Imperialism* and reviewing Lenin’s critical theory of finance capital is of great significance for us in seeking the key to resolving the risks of the virtual economy and responding to the challenges of the virtual economy.

列宁金融资本批判理论在《帝国主义是资本主义的最高阶段》（以下简称《帝国主义论》）中得到了集中体现。在这部著作中，列宁揭示了金融资本形成和扩张的过程，系统分析了金融资本的本质，为正确认识金融资本提供了理论支撑。20世纪五六十年代，以美国西欧为代表的资本主义国家经济得到迅速发展，但随着“石油危机”的发生，这些国家纷纷陷入“滞胀”。为应对这一困境，以哈里·马格多夫（Harry Magdoff）和保罗·斯威齐（Paul M. Sweezy）为代表的西方经济学家提出了“以金融对停滞”的理论，试图依靠大规模金融化应对经济停滞。由此，以金融交易为基础的虚拟经济迅速膨胀。但虚拟经济的过度膨胀不仅没有解决经济发展放缓的问题，反而加剧了诸如1997年亚洲金融风暴、2008年国际金融危机的破坏程度。面对当今世界虚拟经济膨胀带来的风险，重温《帝国主义论》，回顾列宁金融资本批判理论，对我们探寻破解虚拟经济风险之钥、应对虚拟经济挑战意义重大。

I. The Generative Logic and Core Content of Lenin’s Critical Theory of Finance Capital

一、列宁金融资本批判理论的生成逻辑与核心内容

After the 1870s, capitalist countries represented by the United States and Germany initiated the Second Industrial Revolution, which further stimulated industrial development and the concentration of production. “Concentration, at a certain stage of its development, leads, so to speak, straight to monopoly.” [1]1 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in *Collected Works*, vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 192. During this period, banks gradually transformed from intermediaries into monopolists, and finance capital subsequently came to control a large number of productive enterprises. Lenin profoundly grasped the epochal change from “the rule of general capital to the rule of finance capital” and, on this basis, deepened the understanding of Marx and Engels’s views on finance capital, analyzed the conditions for the generation of finance capital in the era of monopoly capitalism, its essential characteristics, and the social crises it triggered, thereby founding the critical theory of finance capital.

19世纪70年代后，以美国和德国为代表的资本主义国家掀起第二次工业革命，进一步刺激了工业发展和生产集中，“集中发展到一定阶段，可以说就自然而然地走到垄断”。这一时期，银行逐步由中介人转化为垄断者，金融资本随之控制了大量生产性企业。列宁深刻把握“一般资本统治到金融资本统治”的时代变化，并以此为基础深化了对马克思恩格斯关于金融资本的认识，分析了垄断资本主义时代金融资本的生成条件、本质特征及其引发的社会危机，创立了金融资本批判理论。

(I) The Generative Logic of Lenin’s Critical Theory of Finance Capital

（一）列宁金融资本批判理论的生成逻辑

Before the birth of Lenin’s critical theory of finance capital, Marx had already conducted a systematic study of fictitious capital. In *Capital*, Marx explained the generation of fictitious capital, arguing that “with the development of interest-bearing capital and the credit system, all capital seems to double itself, and sometimes even treble itself… The greatest part of this ‘money capital’ is purely fictitious.” [2]2 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3 (London: Penguin Classics, 1991), p. 601. It can be seen that interest-bearing capital and the credit system are important preconditions for the emergence of fictitious capital. At the same time, the fictitious capital understood by Marx is actually “a form of capital existing independently of real assets, such as stocks, government bonds, corporate bonds, bank bonds, real estate mortgage notes, and financial derivatives.” [3]3 This is a paraphrase of Marx’s concept; see *Capital*, vol. 3, ch. 29. This fictitious capital cannot exist apart from real capital, but it enables its holders to obtain a higher value than the real capital it represents, thereby driving profit-seekers to “favor” fictitious capital, which then develops rapidly. Lenin fully absorbed Marx’s theory of fictitious capital, clearly pointing out that finance capital is parasitic, and held that “finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks that has merged with the capital of the industrialist monopolist associations,” [4]4 Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 226. and therefore it cannot exist apart from real capital. However, it is worth noting that in Marx’s era, fictitious capital had not yet achieved substantive domination over the real sector, but by the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, this substantive domination had basically taken shape. Lenin accurately grasped the new changes in capitalism at the end of the 19th century. In *Imperialism*, he analyzed the situation of imperialist powers carving up the world during this period, the concentration of production in Germany and the United States, and the number of institutions owned by the six largest banks in Berlin, ultimately concluding that “monopoly is precisely the ‘latest achievement’ of the ‘latest stage of capitalist development.’” [5]5 Ibid., p. 200. Where did monopoly come from? Lenin gave the answer: “Monopoly has grown out of the banks.” [6]6 Ibid., p. 218. Banks are in fact financial monopolists; they control industrial capital, implant their agents into government institutions, and, relying on capital export, spread the financial net over the colonies of capitalist countries. At this point, finance capital was no longer content to operate within the circle of the financial aristocracy but sought to control everything. As Lenin pointed out, “the financial oligarchy throws a close network of dependence over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society,” [7]7 Ibid., p. 226. and “the financial capital network is indeed spread over the whole world.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 234. Based on the changes of the times, Lenin regarded modern fictitious capital as a financial monster, studied the fictitious capital of financial imperialism, analyzed the changes of fictitious capital in different fields such as production and circulation, revealed the essential characteristics of fictitious capital under financial imperialism, and founded the critical theory of finance capital.

在列宁金融资本批判理论诞生以前，马克思曾对虚拟资本进行过系统研究。马克思在《资本论》中阐释了虚拟资本的生成，认为“随着生息资本和信用制度的发展，一切资本好像都会增加一倍，有时甚至增加两倍……这种‘货币资本’的最大部分纯粹是虚拟的”。由此可见，生息资本和信用制度是虚拟资本产生的重要前提。同时，马克思所理解的虚拟资本实际上是“以股票、公债券、企业债券、银行债券、不动产抵押单、金融衍生品等形式独立于实际资产之外的资本存在形式”。这种虚拟资本不能脱离实体资本而存在，但却能使持有者获得比其代表的实体资本更高的价值，由此驱使着逐利者“青睐”虚拟资本，虚拟资本随之得到快速发展。列宁充分吸收了马克思虚拟资本理论，明确指出金融资本具有寄生性，并认为“金融资本就是和工业家垄断同盟的资本融合起来的少数垄断性的最大银行的银行资本”，因而它不能脱离实体资本而存在。但值得注意的是，在马克思所处的时代，虚拟资本尚未实现对实体行业的实质性统治，而到19世纪末20世纪初，这种实质性统治已基本形成。列宁准确把握了资本主义在19世纪末出现的新变化，在《帝国主义论》中分析了这一时期帝国主义国家瓜分世界的情况、德国和美国生产集中的情况、柏林6家大银行拥有的机构数量等，最终得出“垄断正是‘资本主义发展的最新阶段’的最新成就”的结论。垄断从何而来？列宁给出了答案，即“垄断是从银行生长起来的”。银行实际上是金融垄断者，它们控制着工业资本，同时将自己的代理人植入政府机构，并依托资本输出将金融大网撒向资本主义国家的殖民地。此时的金融资本已不满足在金融贵族的圈子里活动，而是想要控制一切，正如列宁所指出的，“金融寡头给现代资产阶级社会中所有一切经济机构和政治机构罩上了一层依附关系的密网”，“金融资本的密网可以说确实是布满了全世界”。基于时代之变，列宁认为现代虚拟资本已成为金融怪物，并对金融帝国主义的虚拟资本进行了研究，分析了虚拟资本在生产、流通等不同领域的变化，揭示了金融帝国主义虚拟资本的本质特征，创立了金融资本批判理论。

(II) The Core Content of Lenin’s Critical Theory of Finance Capital

（二）列宁金融资本批判理论的核心内容

The core content of Lenin’s critical theory of finance capital includes the following aspects. First, finance capital is the product of the merging, or growing together, of bank capital and industrial capital under monopoly conditions. Lenin pointed out: “Concentration of production; monopoly arising out of concentration; the merging or growing together of banks with industry—this is the history of the rise of finance capital and the content of this concept.” [9]9 Ibid., p. 226. To fully reveal the conditions for the generation of finance capital, Lenin explained the concentration of production and monopoly: “the combination of different branches of industry in a single enterprise” [10]10 Ibid., p. 192. promoted the concentration of production, “and the concentration of production, at a certain stage, leads to monopoly.” [11]11 Ibid., p. 192. Under monopoly conditions, the degree of socialization of production is significantly enhanced, but “the socialized means of production remain the private property of a few,” [12]12 Ibid., p. 205. and “the lion’s share of the profits goes to the ‘geniuses’ engaged in financial manipulation.” [13]13 Ibid., p. 205. Under monopoly conditions, ultra-large enterprises, in order to consolidate their monopoly position, often have a huge demand for large amounts of capital. As the entire banking industry becomes increasingly dominated by a few large banks, large enterprises have to rely on large banks to obtain substantial funds. At this point, bank capital already “controls almost all the money capital of all capitalists and small proprietors,” [14]14 Ibid., p. 215. and industrial capital and bank capital achieve a deep fusion. This fusion, under monopoly conditions, gives rise to finance capital.

列宁金融资本批判理论的核心内容包括如下几个方面。其一，金融资本是在垄断条件下由银行资本和工业资本长合起来的产物。列宁指出：“生产的集中；从集中生长起来的垄断；银行和工业日益融合或者说长合在一起，——这就是金融资本产生的历史和这一概念的内容。”为充分揭示金融资本的生成条件，列宁阐释了生产集中和垄断，“把不同的工业部门联合在一个企业中”推进了生产集中，“而生产集中发展到一定阶段就导致垄断”。在垄断条件下，生产社会化程度显著提升，但“社会化的生产资料仍旧是少数人的私有财产”，“大部分的利润都被那些干金融勾当的‘天才’拿去了”。在垄断条件下，超大规模的企业为了巩固垄断地位往往对大额资本有巨大需求。随着整个银行业日益被几个大规模银行支配，大企业不得不依赖大银行以获取大额资金，此时，银行资本已然“支配着所有资本家和小业主的几乎全部的货币资本”，工业资本与银行资本实现了深度长合，这种长合在垄断条件下催生了金融资本。

Second, the monopoly of finance capital exacerbates the polarization between rich and poor. For individuals, capitalists can exploit the public by virtue of the monopoly of finance capital. This exploitation is more severe than before, as large amounts of social wealth are concentrated in the hands of the financial oligarchy, while ordinary workers are even repeatedly exploited and fall into extreme poverty, thereby creating a huge gap between the financial oligarchy and the workers. For industries, the trusts controlled by the financial oligarchy constantly oppress small and medium-sized enterprises, causing a “wealth gap” within the industry. Lenin, using the example of the balance sheets compiled by the financial oligarchy, elaborated on the “difference in fate” between the financial oligarchy and small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. He pointed out: “The latest technique of compiling balance sheets… enables the principal parties, in the event of failure in risky ventures, to evade responsibility by selling shares in time, whereas the private entrepreneur has to answer for everything with his own life.” [15]15 Ibid., p. 230. For countries, Lenin deeply analyzed the economic conditions of the major imperialist powers and their colonies at the time, and through comparative analysis, fully elucidated the polarization between rich and poor brought to the entire world by the monopoly of finance capital, accurately pointing out the serious consequence of this polarization: “what other way out is there except war?” [16]16 Ibid., p. 276.

其二，金融资本垄断加剧了贫富分化。对单个人而言，资本家凭借金融资本垄断可以盘剥公众。这种盘剥相较以往更为严重，大量社会财富集中到金融寡头手中，普通劳动者甚至被反复盘剥，陷入赤贫，由此造成了金融寡头与劳动者之间巨大的贫富分化。对行业而言，由金融寡头掌握的托拉斯不断压迫中小企业，造成行业内部的“贫富差距”。列宁以金融寡头编制的资产负债表为例，阐述了金融寡头与中小企业家的“命运之差”，他指出：“编制资产负债表的最新技术……使主要的当事人在冒险失败的时候，能够用及时出卖股票的办法来推卸责任，而私人企业家却要用自己的性命来为自己所做的一切事情负责”。对国家而言，列宁深入分析了当时主要帝国主义国家和殖民地的经济状况，并通过对比分析充分阐明了金融资本垄断给整个世界带来的贫富分化，准确指出了这种分化的严重后果，即“除了用战争以外，还能有什么其他办法呢”。

Third, parasitism is the essential characteristic of finance capital in the era of monopoly capitalism. From the perspective of its genesis, Lenin held that finance capital is formed under the condition that “bank capital and industrial capital have already merged,” [17]17 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in *Collected Works*, vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 226. [Translator’s note: The English translation of Lenin’s text is from the standard edition; the Chinese text cited by the authors is from the *Selected Works of Lenin*, vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012), p. 613.] and therefore finance capital cannot exist independently of real industry. This means that from its very inception, finance capital carries the parasitic features characteristic of capitalist monopoly conditions. From the perspective of its operation, finance capital must rely on parasitic expansion to sustain its own functioning. This expansion is manifested in two aspects: first, expansion into various industries, where financial oligarchs control different sectors through means such as share participation. Generally speaking, “possessing 50% of the capital is often sufficient to control an entire joint-stock company.” [18]18 Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 234. [Chinese ed., p. 619.] Second, expansion across the entire world, where financial oligarchs rely on capital export to incorporate colonies and semi-colonies into the parasitic sphere, thereby expanding the scope of parasitism. From the perspective of its impact, finance capital under monopoly conditions breeds a parasitic stratum. According to data collected by Lenin, these parasitic groups “take no part whatsoever in any enterprise management and are idle all day long,” [19]19 Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 277. [Chinese ed., p. 660.] and the essential characteristics of finance capital are continuously exposed through the activities of such groups, making the parasitic features of finance capital even more apparent.

其三，寄生性是垄断资本主义时代金融资本的本质特征。从产生角度看，列宁认为，金融资本是在“银行资本和工业资本已经融合起来”的条件下形成的，因此，金融资本不能脱离实体工业而独立存在，这就使得金融资本自产生时就带有资本主义垄断条件下的寄生特征。从运转角度看，金融资本要依靠寄生扩张来维持自身的运转，这种扩张体现在两个方面：一是向各个行业扩张，金融寡头通过股份参与等方式控制各个行业，一般而言，“拥有50%的资本，往往就能控制整个股份公司”。二是向整个世界扩张，金融寡头依靠资本输出将殖民地、半殖民地纳入寄生范畴，由此扩大了寄生的范围。从影响角度看，垄断条件下的金融资本滋生了寄生群体。据列宁搜集的资料，这些寄生群体“根本不参与任何企业经营、终日游手好闲”，而金融资本的本质特征也通过这类群体的行为活动而不断暴露，使金融资本的寄生特征更为外显。

II. Lenin’s Critical Theory of Finance Capital Is the “Scalpel” for Dissecting the Virtual Economy

二、列宁金融资本批判理论是解剖虚拟经济的“手术刀”

The academic community generally agrees that the virtual economy is very closely linked to finance. For example, Cheng Siwei believes that the virtual economy refers to various activities of virtual capital primarily based on financial platforms. [20]20 Cheng Siwei, *The Virtual Economy* (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2018), p. 1. Zhang Junshan argues that the virtual economy first manifests itself in the activities of the financial sector. Since the price inflation of virtual capital represented by securities stimulates active trading in the financial sphere, correspondingly increasing the profitability of the financial sector, people can profit not only from the buying and selling of securities but also from services related to securities trading—such as securities transactions, accounting settlement, securities business consulting, and even related printing and security services—all of which flourish and generate profit income. [21]21 Zhang Junshan, “The Essence of the Virtual Economy and Its Relationship with the Real Economy,” *Nankai Economic Studies*, no. 6 (2002), p. 27. Therefore, understanding the virtual economy must be closely tied to finance. The virtual economy is an economic form that takes finance as its core, accompanies the real economy, follows the logic of virtual capital, and is easily integrated with modern technology. Since the essential characteristic of finance capital within the framework of monopoly capitalism is parasitism, understanding the virtual economy, which is centered on finance capital, also requires starting from this essential characteristic of parasitism. This involves an in-depth analysis of the factors generating the parasitism of the virtual economy, the parasitic expansion of the virtual economy, and the harms it causes, thereby achieving a profound understanding of the virtual economy. Lenin’s critical theory of finance capital provides a scientific exposition of the parasitism of finance capital and offers a sharp “scalpel” for dissecting the virtual economy.

学界普遍认同虚拟经济与金融联系十分紧密。例如，成思危认为，虚拟经济是指虚拟资本以金融平台为主要依托的各种活动。张俊山认为，虚拟经济首先从金融部门活动中表现出来，由于以证券为代表的虚拟资本价格膨胀会引起金融领域交易的活跃，相应地增加金融部门的赢利，人们不仅可以从证券的买卖中获利，而且与证券买卖相关的服务，例如，证券交易、会计结算、证券业务咨询，甚至相关的印刷、安保等都会繁荣起来，同样获得利润收入。因此，理解虚拟经济必须紧扣金融。虚拟经济是一种以金融为核心，与实体经济相伴随，遵循虚拟资本逻辑，且易与现代科技相融合的经济形态。由于在垄断资本主义框架内金融资本的本质特征是寄生性，因此，理解以金融资本为核心的虚拟经济，也需要从寄生性这一本质特征入手，深入分析虚拟经济寄生性的生成因素、虚拟经济的寄生性扩张及其造成的危害，以此达到深刻认识虚拟经济之目的。列宁金融资本批判理论对金融资本的寄生性进行了科学阐述，为解剖虚拟经济提供了锐利的“手术刀”。

(I) The Generation of the Parasitism of the Virtual Economy

（一）虚拟经济寄生性的生成

Financial monopoly creates the necessary preconditions for the generation of the parasitism of the virtual economy. On the one hand, under the influence of monopoly, the financial magnates at the apex of monopoly adopt the “system of participation” to continuously absorb and control more capital, providing the necessary economic strength for parasitism. Lenin explained this system of participation: “Big banks not only directly swallow up small enterprises, but also ‘associate’ themselves with them by ‘participating’ in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by means of a system of credit relations, etc.” [22]22 Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 233. [Chinese ed., p. 618.] In other words, big banks manipulate or gobble up other small and medium-sized real enterprises or small banks through a system of debt relations, thereby expanding their financial power and turning small and medium-sized enterprises into parasitic grounds. Through the system of participation, financial magnates can use tools such as stocks and bonds to extract profits from the real economy, and the conditions for parasitism are already in place. On the other hand, finance capital is not satisfied with controlling just one area of society; it eagerly seeks to penetrate all aspects of social life, which provides more convenient conditions for the generation of the parasitism of the virtual economy. For example, financial oligarchs engaged in the virtual economy often cooperate with the government, influence presidential elections, or send their agents into parliament, thereby tightening their control over political power. Through the power of the state, they penetrate finance capital into multiple industries such as media and education. In its interactions with multiple social relations, the virtual economy gains more power to engage in parasitism. However, this does not mean that the parasitic activities of the virtual economy stop there, because the nature of capital to expand and seek profit drives the virtual economy to expand its parasitic scope in order to obtain more benefits, and so it sets its sights on the entire world.

金融垄断为虚拟经济寄生性的生成创造了必要前提。一方面，在垄断的影响下，处于垄断顶端的金融巨头采取“参与制”的方式不断吸纳和控制更多的资本，为寄生提供必要的经济实力。列宁对这种参与制作出过解释，“大银行，不仅直接吞并小企业，而且通过‘参与’它们的资本、购买或交换股票，通过债务关系体系等等来‘联合’它们”。换言之，大银行通过债务关系体系操纵或鲸吞其他中小实体企业或小银行，进而扩充金融势力，以便将中小企业变为寄生地。通过参与制，金融巨头可以借助股票、债券等工具从实体经济中赚取利益，寄生产生的条件已经具备。另一方面，金融资本不满足控制社会的某一领域，而是急切地要渗透到社会生活的各个方面，这为虚拟经济寄生性的生成提供了更多便利条件。例如，从事虚拟经济的金融寡头，往往和政府合作，影响总统选举或将自己的代理人送入议会，以此加紧对政权的控制，并通过政权的力量，将金融资本渗透到媒体、教育等多个行业。虚拟经济在与多重社会关系的交往中，获得了更多进行寄生的权力。但这并不意味着虚拟经济的寄生活动就此停止，因为资本的增殖性、逐利性驱使着虚拟经济扩大寄生范围，从而获取更多利益，于是它们把目光瞄向了全世界。

(II) The Parasitic Expansion of the Virtual Economy

（二）虚拟经济的寄生性扩张

The capital export of imperialist countries inevitably leads to the parasitic expansion of the virtual economy. Since the virtual economy must expand parasitically across the world, it has no choice but to board the “express train” of capital export. In *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin focused his analysis on capital export, arguing that capital can be exported because, first, “a great deal of ‘surplus capital’ has accumulated in the advanced countries”; second, “in the advanced capitalist countries, capitalist monopolies have come into being”; and third, capital is “exported to backward countries, where profits are high.” [23]23 Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 240. [Chinese ed., p. 627.] Generally speaking, the forms of capital export mainly include loan capital export, productive capital export, and commodity capital export. Among these, loan capital export has played an important role in promoting the parasitic expansion of the virtual economy on a global scale. This driving force has continuously strengthened with the development of capitalism. At the beginning of the 20th century, virtual economy products such as options, hedging, and asset securitization had not yet emerged, but the advanced capitalist countries successively established banks and other institutions on a large scale in the colonies and semi-colonies, making large-scale investments. Thus, the parasitic expansion of the virtual economy took an important step forward. In this regard, in the “Export of Capital” section of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin provided statistics on the distribution of investments by imperialist countries across the world’s continents around 1910. Major imperialist countries such as Britain, France, and Germany made large-scale capital exports to relatively backward regions such as Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Americas. France’s investments, in particular, “were mostly loan capital, i.e., government bonds, rather than investments in industrial enterprises.” [24]24 Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 243. [Chinese ed., p. 630.] It can be seen that at the beginning of the 20th century, the virtual economy centered on finance capital was already engaging in parasitic expansion in the colonies and semi-colonies. However, because a considerable portion of the natural economy still existed in the colonies and semi-colonies, the parasitic expansion of the virtual economy was not entirely smooth. Moreover, since virtual economy products were still relatively scarce during this period, the application of capital exported by developed countries in the virtual economy sphere was relatively limited. After the Second World War, the traditional colonial system collapsed, and the newly independent Asian, African, and Latin American countries began their path of national construction. At this time, the natural economy in these countries tended to disintegrate. The major Western capitalist countries gradually set off a wave of financial liberalization and, relying on the international financial hegemonic order including the Bretton Woods system, exported large amounts of finance capital to the entire world. For example, with the support of powerful finance capital and the international financial hegemonic order, the United States continuously exported capital globally. U.S. private direct investment abroad increased from $11.788 billion in 1950 to $168.081 billion in 1978, a 13.26-fold increase over 28 years. [25]25 See Song Guoyou, *The Evolution of American Hegemony and the International Order* (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2021), p. 82. Additionally, the number of branches of U.S. banks in Europe increased from 31 in 1965 to 170 in 1978, and the proportion of investment in the financial and insurance industries reached 27% in 1978, with the overseas investment of the U.S. financial industry continuously expanding. [26]26 See Song Guoyou, *The Evolution of American Hegemony and the International Order*, p. 82. Another example: after the Second World War, France forcibly imposed the “CFA franc” in Africa and required the central banks of participating countries to deposit most of their foreign exchange into “operational accounts” set up by the French Treasury, thereby controlling the financial systems of Central and West African countries. [27]27 See Zhang Hongming, “The CFA Franc: A Tool of French Neocolonialism,” *World Affairs*, no. 22 (2011), p. 42. Under the influence of the frenzied capital export by imperialist countries such as the United States, and with the continuous development of financial innovation and financial technology—such as the constant integration of futures contracts and option contracts with new technologies, and the endless emergence of innovative financial derivatives—the parasitic expansion of the virtual economy has intensified, and its influence worldwide has further increased.

帝国主义国家的资本输出必然导致虚拟经济的寄生性扩张。既然虚拟经济要向全世界进行寄生性扩张，那就不得不乘坐资本输出的“快车”。列宁在《帝国主义论》中着重分析了资本输出，认为资本之所以能够输出，一是“在先进的国家里出现了大量的‘过剩资本’”，二是“发达的资本主义国家都有了资本家的垄断同盟”，三是资本“输出到落后的国家去，以提高利润”。一般而言，资本输出的形式主要包括借贷资本输出、生产资本输出和商品资本输出，其中借贷资本输出对虚拟经济在世界范围内的寄生性扩张起到了重要推动作用。这种推动作用是随着资本主义的发展而不断增强的，在20世纪初，期权、对冲、资产证券化等虚拟经济产品尚未产生，但发达资本主义国家先后在殖民地、半殖民地大肆开办银行等机构，并进行规模化投资，虚拟经济的寄生性扩张由此迈出了重要一步。对此，列宁在《帝国主义论》的“资本输出”部分对1910年前后帝国主义国家在世界各洲的投资分布做了统计，其中英国、法国、德国等主要帝国主义国家对亚洲、非洲、大洋洲、美洲等较为落后地区进行了大规模资本输出，而法国的投资“多半是借贷资本即公债，而不是对工业企业的投资”。由此可见，在20世纪初以金融资本为核心的虚拟经济已然在殖民地、半殖民地进行寄生性扩张。但由于殖民地、半殖民地还有相当分量的自然经济存在，这使得虚拟经济的寄生性扩张并不完全顺利，加之这一时期虚拟经济产品尚不丰富，发达国家输出的资本在虚拟经济领域的运用相对有限。第二次世界大战后，传统的殖民体系瓦解，新兴独立的亚非拉国家开始走上国家建设之路。此时，自然经济在这些国家趋向瓦解，西方主要资本主义国家逐步掀起金融自由化浪潮，并依靠包括布雷顿森林体系在内的国际金融霸权秩序，将大量金融资本输出到全世界。例如，美国在强大的金融资本和国际金融霸权秩序的加持下，持续向全球输出资本，其中，私人对外直接投资由1950年的117.88亿美元增加到1978年的1680.81亿美元，28年间增长了13.26倍。另外，1965年美国银行在欧洲的分支机构只有31处，到1978年增加到170处，金融业与保险业投资比例也于1978年达到27%，美国金融业海外投资不断扩大。再如，第二次世界大战后法国在非洲地区强制推行“非洲法郎”，并要求各参加国的中央银行将大部分外汇存入法国财政部设立的“业务账户”内，从而控制了中非和西非国家的金融系统。在美国等帝国主义国家疯狂进行资本输出的影响下，加之金融创新与金融科技不断发展，如期货合约、期权合约不断与新技术融合，创新性金融衍生工具层出不穷，虚拟经济的寄生扩张呈加剧态势，在世界范围内的影响进一步增强。

(III) The Consequences of the Parasitic Expansion of the Virtual Economy

（三）虚拟经济寄生性扩张的后果

The root cause of periodic financial crises is the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, and this fundamental contradiction cannot be eradicated within the framework of capitalist private ownership, which makes the occurrence of periodic financial crises inevitable. The parasitic expansion and excessive inflation of the virtual economy further exacerbate periodic financial crises. Under the conditions of capitalist private ownership, the parasitic virtual economy continuously squeezes the development space of the real economy, causing the economy to become excessively virtualized, which not only intensifies the destructive power of financial crises but also expands their scope. In this process, the parasitic virtual economy itself also suffers a heavy blow, resulting in financial storms, stock market turmoil, and the collapse of financial order. Such harm is inevitably global and periodic. For example, in 1929, the crash of the US Wall Street stock market triggered a worldwide Great Depression. The “oil crisis” of the 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, and the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s all caused severe damage to world economic development and the stability of the international financial order. With each round of financial crisis, the bubble of the virtual economy bursts, and it is severely hit. But after the crisis eases, the virtual economy begins a new round of expansion. As the virtual economy detaches from the real economy and continues its self-circulation and inflation, coupled with the increasing sharpening of the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, the crisis eventually intensifies again, in a vicious cycle. Therefore, under the domination of the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, periodic financial crises are inevitable, and as the expansion of the virtual economy intensifies, the destructiveness of periodic financial crises will inevitably increase—this is the unavoidable consequence of the parasitic expansion of the virtual economy.

周期性金融危机的产生根源是资本主义基本矛盾，且这种基本矛盾在资本主义私有制的框架内无法得到根除，这就使得周期性金融危机的发生具有必然性。虚拟经济的寄生性扩张和过度膨胀则进一步加剧了周期性金融危机。在资本主义私有制的条件下，带有寄生性特征的虚拟经济不断挤占实体经济的发展空间，使经济过度虚拟化，不仅加剧了金融危机的破坏力，也扩大了金融危机的波及范围。在此过程中，以寄生为特征的虚拟经济自身也会受到沉重打击，造成金融风暴、股市震荡、金融秩序崩溃等。这种危害必然是世界性的、周期性的。例如，1929年，美国华尔街股市崩盘引发世界范围内的经济大萧条。20世纪70年代出现的“石油危机”、80年代的拉美债务危机、90年代的亚洲金融危机等，均给世界经济发展和国际金融秩序稳定带来了严重破坏。随着一轮金融危机的发生，虚拟经济的气泡破灭，自身受到严重打击。但在危机得到缓解后，虚拟经济又开始新一轮的扩张。随着虚拟经济脱离实体经济而继续进行自我循环和膨胀，加之资本主义基本矛盾日益尖锐化，危机最终再度加剧，周而复始、恶性循环。因此，在资本主义基本矛盾的支配下，周期性金融危机不可避免，且随着虚拟经济扩张的加剧，周期性金融危机的破坏性也必然会加剧，这是虚拟经济寄生性扩张造成的不可避免的后果。

III. The Contemporary Capitalist Virtual Economy Has Not Escaped the Scope of Lenin’s Critique of Finance Capital

三、当代资本主义虚拟经济没有跳出列宁金融资本批判理论

In the 21st century, the virtual economy of capitalist countries has undergone enormous changes different from those of the 19th and 20th centuries. These changes are concentrated in the following: first, the degree of integration between the virtual economy and digital technology is deepening, and the profitability of finance capital increasingly relies on digital technology; second, the excessive inflation of the virtual economy has caused it to become increasingly detached from the real economy, with the divergence between the virtual and the real continuously intensifying; third, the integration of the virtual economy with economic globalization is deepening, and the international mobility of virtual capital has further increased. However, these new changes do not mean that the contemporary capitalist virtual economy has escaped the scope of Lenin’s critique of finance capital. On the contrary, this theory remains the “scalpel” for dissecting the contemporary capitalist virtual economy.

在21世纪，资本主义国家的虚拟经济出现了不同于19世纪和20世纪的巨大变化。这些变化集中表现为：一是虚拟经济与数字技术的融合程度日益深化，金融资本获利越来越依靠数字技术；二是虚拟经济的过度膨胀使之与实体经济日渐脱离，虚实背离不断加剧；三是虚拟经济与经济全球化的交融不断加深，虚拟资本的国际流动性进一步增强。但这些新变化并不意味着当代资本主义的虚拟经济跳出了列宁金融资本批判理论的范畴，恰恰相反，这一理论仍是解剖当代资本主义虚拟经济的“手术刀”。

(I) The Virtual Economy under Digital Technology Intensifies Financial Monopoly

（一）数字技术下的虚拟经济加剧了金融垄断

With the development of digital technology, data has increasingly become an indispensable part of the factors of production. In order to pursue more surplus value, capital engages in large-scale data extraction, and “competes with technology giants that control digital platforms to meticulously construct ‘walled gardens’ through operating system authorization, application programming interfaces, and standard development toolkits, thereby forming data flows and data pools exclusively enjoyed by capital,” [28]28 “Walled garden” refers to a closed platform ecosystem controlled by a single company, restricting user access and data flow to external competitors. and digital monopoly capitalism has also taken shape in developed capitalist countries. The application of digital technology has brought about changes in the form of the capitalist economy, and these changes have also profoundly affected the virtual economy. On the one hand, the finance-based virtual economy begins to use digital technology to obtain asymmetric information and maintain its information advantage. The giants of the virtual economy themselves possess vast amounts of wealth, and the technology giants that control digital platforms, in order to gain profits, inevitably ally with the giants of the virtual economy. Thus, monopoly companies integrating finance and technology continue to develop, such as Amazon, Microsoft, Meta, and Google. Among them, Amazon held over 40% of the market share in global retail activities in 2019, while Google holds 90% of the global internet search market. On the other hand, driven by the desire for data possession, the giants of the virtual economy further consolidate their monopoly position through large-scale mergers. In the era of digital monopoly capitalism, having only capital advantages is not enough to obtain more benefits; only by mastering data and possessing algorithmic power can one truly secure stable and enormous profits. In response, the giants of the virtual economy have launched large-scale acquisitions. For example, Facebook acquired the social software giant WhatsApp for $19 billion in 2014, and Microsoft acquired the information services giant LinkedIn in 2016, thereby obtaining more data flows, achieving large-scale data possession, and strengthening their monopoly position. Furthermore, digital technology, leveraging its technological advantages, deeply integrates with the virtual economy, giving rise to internet finance companies, which typically rely on online lending businesses to earn high profits. For example, the cash loan interest rates of US internet finance companies are generally high and opaque, and these platforms usually charge borrowers various management fees, service fees, handling fees, etc. If these fees are converted into loan interest, the interest rate will rise significantly, even exceeding the highest red line of private lending interest rates. In the digital age, a large number of young people have become the most proficient users of digital technology, which not only brings huge profits to internet finance companies and enhances platform monopoly but also easily tempts young people to become addicted to the “economic opium.” [29]29 “Economic opium” is a metaphorical term used here to describe the addictive and harmful nature of high-risk financial products or practices, particularly among young people. Thus, the virtual economy under digital technology has not only failed to weaken monopoly but has intensified it in various ways. This is consistent with Lenin’s analysis over 100 years ago. The era Lenin lived in was the era of the Second Industrial Revolution, when the technological level of capitalist countries further improved, and monopoly capitalists used their technological advantages to intensify monopoly and oppression. Today, Western developed capitalist countries use their digital technology advantages to intensify the monopoly of the virtual economy, and their purpose remains to earn monopoly profits. This means that the virtual economy of 21st-century capitalist countries has not escaped the scope of Lenin’s critique of finance capital.

随着数字技术的发展，数据越来越成为生产要素中不可或缺的部分。资本为了追逐更多的剩余价值，展开大规模数据攫取，并与“掌握数字平台的科技巨头竞相通过操作系统授用、应用程序编程接口和标准开发工具包等，精心构筑‘带围墙的花园’（walled garden），用以形成资本独享的数据流和数据池”，数字垄断资本主义也在发达资本主义国家形成。数字技术的运用带来了资本主义经济形态的变化，这种变化也深刻影响了虚拟经济。一方面，以金融为基础的虚拟经济开始借助数字技术获取不对称的信息，保持其信息优势。虚拟经济巨头本身掌握了大量的财富，而那些掌握数字平台的科技巨头为了获取利益，必然会与虚拟经济巨头联合，于是集金融与科技于一体的垄断公司不断发展，如亚马逊、微软、Meta、谷歌等，其中亚马逊公司在2019年全球零售活动中拥有的市场份额超过40%，而谷歌更是在全世界拥有90%的互联网搜索市场。另一方面，在数据占有的驱使下，虚拟经济巨头通过大规模兼并以进一步巩固其垄断地位。在数字垄断资本主义时代，仅具有资本优势还不足以获取更多利益，只有掌握数据，拥有算法权力，才能真正获得稳固且巨大的利益。对此，虚拟经济巨头展开大规模收购，例如，脸书在2014年以190亿美元收购了社交软件巨头瓦茨普，微软在2016年收购了信息服务业巨头领英，以此获得更多的数据流，实现规模化的数据占有，强化其垄断地位。此外，数字技术凭借其技术优势与虚拟经济进行深度融合，衍生出了互联网金融公司，这些公司通常依靠网贷业务赚取高额利润。例如，美国互联网金融公司的现金贷利率普遍较高且不透明，而且这些平台通常向借贷者收取各种管理费、服务费、手续费等，这些费用如果折合为贷款利息，那么其利率也将大幅上升，甚至会超过民间借贷利率最高档的红线。在数字时代，大量青年人成为数字技术最熟练的使用者，这不仅给互联网金融公司带来了大量利润，增强了平台垄断，而且容易诱使青年人沾染“经济鸦片”。由此可见，数字技术下的虚拟经济不仅没有减弱垄断，反而以各种方式加剧垄断，这和列宁在100多年前的论述是一致的。列宁当时所处的时代是第二次工业革命的时代，资本主义国家的科技水平进一步提升，垄断资本家凭借所掌握的科技优势加剧垄断和压迫。当今，西方发达资本主义国家凭借数字技术优势加剧虚拟经济垄断，其目的仍然是为了赚取垄断利润。这意味着21世纪资本主义国家的虚拟经济并没有跳出列宁金融资本批判理论的范畴。

(II) The Virtual Economy under the Divergence between the Virtual and the Real Has Not Shed Its Parasitic Nature

（二）虚实背离下的虚拟经济未曾褪去寄生性

Lenin once emphasized the parasitic nature of monopoly capitalism in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. So, today, under the condition of the divergence between the real and the fictitious, has the parasitic nature of the fictitious economy changed? The so-called divergence between the real and the fictitious means that the fictitious economy, originally based on the real economy, is increasingly detaching itself from the real economy, and the boundary between the two is becoming ever more distinct. Under the influence of this divergence, many real economies have begun to “shift from real to fictitious,” with a large amount of real economic activity turning toward the fictitious economy. The fictitious economy continuously expands, while the quantity of the real economy decreases, giving the impression that the fictitious economy can exist independently of the real economy and even dominate its fate. But in reality, the fictitious capital contained in the fictitious economy must interact with functioning capital; otherwise, fictitious capital itself would find it difficult to exist. In other words, the fictitious economy cannot completely detach from the real economy. The decrease in the quantity of the real economy does not mean that its capacity to support the fictitious economy has weakened; rather, it indicates that this scale of the real economy is already sufficient to meet the parasitic needs of the fictitious economy. If this portion of the real economy did not exist, the “shift from real to fictitious” could not continue. Therefore, under the “shift from real to fictitious,” the fictitious economy has not shed its parasitic character. Moreover, the parasitic nature of the fictitious economy has never weakened. Under the effect of the divergence between the real and the fictitious, the fictitious economy continuously annexes the real economy, with specific manifestations being the prevalence of financial investment and the generation of large financial bubbles. Between 1960 and 2020, the share of the U.S. financial sector increased from 14% to 21%, while the manufacturing sector’s share fell from 27% to 11%; financial sector profits rose from 17% to over 30%, while manufacturing profits fell from 49% to 10.6%, a reduction of more than two-thirds. During Japan’s bubble economy era, the financial sector expanded even more wildly. These examples precisely illustrate that the parasitic nature of the fictitious economy in developed capitalist countries is continuously strengthening, because the fictitious economy can only maintain the expansion it requires by intensifying its parasitic grip on the real economy. At the same time, under the influence of the divergence between the real and the fictitious, inequality in capitalist society has further intensified. For instance, the rapid expansion of the fictitious economy has accelerated the decline in the profit rate of the real economy, forcing the real economy to persistently suppress workers’ wages, creating a situation where profits squeeze wages. According to statistics, “by 2006, the real hourly wage of non-agricultural workers in the United States had fallen to the level of 1967,” and “millions of low- and middle-income families in the United States had to rely on credit to support their household expenditures.” Meanwhile, financial magnates amassed enormous wealth. Furthermore, inequality between developed capitalist countries and developing countries has also expanded with the development of the fictitious economy. Traditional “rentier states” reap greater benefits, while developing countries find themselves in a position exploited by finance capital. This inequality between individuals and between nations all indicates that, under capitalist conditions, the fictitious economy has not escaped its parasitic nature. Lenin’s exposition on the parasitic nature of finance capital remains applicable to the fictitious economy under the divergence between the real and the fictitious, because the fictitious economy under capitalist private ownership can never shed the parasitic trait it has carried since its inception.

列宁曾在《帝国主义论》中强调垄断资本主义的寄生性，那么，时至今日，在虚实背离之下，虚拟经济的寄生性是否发生改变？所谓虚实背离，就是原本以实体经济为基础的虚拟经济越来越脱离实体经济，两者之间的界限越来越明显。在虚实背离的影响下，不少实体经济开始“脱实向虚”，大量实体经济转向虚拟经济，虚拟经济不断膨胀，实体经济数量减少，似乎虚拟经济也能摆脱实体经济而存在，甚至能主宰实体经济的命运。但实际上，虚拟经济所蕴含的虚拟资本必须与职能资本发生作用，否则虚拟资本也将难以存在。换言之，虚拟经济不能完全脱离实体经济。实体经济数量的减少，并不意味着它支撑虚拟经济能力的减弱，而是说这样规模的实体经济已然可以满足虚拟经济的寄生需要，倘若没有这部分实体经济的存在，“脱实向虚”则难以继续。因此，“脱实向虚”下的虚拟经济没有摆脱寄生的特质。另外，虚拟经济的寄生性也从未减弱。在虚实背离的作用下，虚拟经济不断吞并实体经济，其具体表现是金融投资的盛行和大量金融泡沫的产生。1960年至2020年间，美国金融业占比从14%增加到21%，制造业占比从27%下降到11%，金融业的利润从17%增加到高于30%，制造业的利润从49%降至10.6%，缩减了2/3以上。日本在泡沫经济时代金融业更是疯狂扩张。这些例证恰恰说明，发达资本主义国家的虚拟经济的寄生性在不断加强，因为虚拟经济只有加大对实体经济的寄生力度，才能维持扩张所需。与此同时，在虚实背离的影响下，资本主义社会的不平等进一步加剧，如虚拟经济快速膨胀加速了实体经济利润率的下滑，实体经济不得不持续压低工人工资，造成利润挤压工资的局面。据统计，“到2006年，美国非农业工人的真实小时工资已经降低到1967年的水平”，“美国数百万中低收入家庭不得不依靠信贷去支撑他们的家庭开支”，与此同时，金融巨头却获得了巨额财富。此外，发达资本主义国家和发展中国家的不平等也随虚拟经济的发展而不断扩大，传统的“食利国”所获得的利益更多，而发展中国家处于被金融资本剥削的地位。这种人与人、国与国之间的不平等，都表明了资本主义条件下虚拟经济并未摆脱寄生性。列宁关于金融资本寄生性的论述，对虚实背离下的虚拟经济依然适用，因为资本主义私有制下的虚拟经济始终无法摆脱其产生以来便带有的寄生特质。

(III) Under the Background of Economic Globalization, the Fictitious Economy Has Strengthened the Financial Hegemony of Imperialist Countries

（三）经济全球化背景下虚拟经济强化了帝国主义国家的金融霸权

Lenin, in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, analyzed the domination of the world by financial hegemony at the beginning of the 20th century. He pointed out that “the supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital… means that a few states with financial ‘power’ occupy a special position distinct from all other states,” and that “finance capital also leads to the direct division of the world.” Entering the 21st century, economic globalization has become an irreversible tide, and the intertwining of economic globalization with the fictitious economy has increasingly strengthened. For a long time, Western developed capitalist countries, represented by the United States, have dominated the process of globalization, while the vast number of developing countries, due to capital scarcity, technological backwardness, heavy debt burdens, and other factors, have always been in a relatively passive position. Developed capitalist countries, led by the United States, use the international economic systems and rules they themselves have established, leveraging transnational financial organizations and military hegemony, to vigorously develop the fictitious economy, promote industrial hollowing-out at home, and continuously drive the global expansion of finance capital. According to statistics, the ratio of global liquid financial assets to global GDP was 109% in 1980 and 350% in 2013, an increase of nearly 250 percentage points in just 33 years. At the same time, the United States uses the U.S. dollar, bonds, and various financial innovation products to continuously expropriate the actual resources (labor resources, natural resources, etc.) of developing countries, and relies on its powerful military forces to pave the way for the expansion of finance capital. Thus, it is evident that Western countries, led by the United States, are precisely using the opportunity of the intertwining of economic globalization and the fictitious economy to continuously consolidate their financial hegemony and construct international financial monopoly capitalism.

列宁曾在《帝国主义论》中分析了20世纪初金融霸权对世界的统治，他指出，“金融资本对其他一切形式的资本的优势……意味着少数拥有金融‘实力’的国家处于和其余一切国家不同的特殊地位”，“金融资本还导致对世界的直接的瓜分”。进入21世纪，经济全球化已成为不可逆转的大潮，经济全球化与虚拟经济的交融日益增强。一直以来，以美国为代表的西方发达资本主义国家主导着全球化进程，而广大发展中国家由于资金匮乏、技术落后、负债沉重等始终处于相对被动的地位。以美国为首的发达资本主义国家利用自己制定的国际经济制度与规则，借助跨国金融组织和军事霸权等，大力发展虚拟经济，在本国推行产业空心化，并不断推动金融资本的全球性扩张。据统计，全球流动性金融资产与全球GDP之比在1980年为109%，2013年为350%，仅33年间就增加了近250个百分点。同时，美国运用美元、债券和各种金融创新产品不断剥夺发展中国家的实际资源（劳动力资源、自然资源等），并依靠强大军事力量为金融资本的扩张铺路。由此可见，以美国为首的西方国家俨然利用经济全球化和虚拟经济交融之机，不断巩固其金融霸权，构建国际金融垄断资本主义。

Compared with Lenin’s era, 21st-century international monopoly capitalism has pushed financial hegemony to an extreme, with financial hegemony being unprecedentedly strengthened. First, the rapaciousness of financial hegemony has unprecedentedly increased. Against the background of the close intertwining of economic globalization and the fictitious economy, financial hegemony not only controls production, sales, and other aspects of the economic sphere but also uses the U.S. dollar to exploit the people of the entire world, reap the world’s wealth, and control the political life, cultural life, social life, etc., of the world, attempting to extract benefits from an ever-wider range of fields. Second, the destructive power of financial hegemony has unprecedentedly intensified. On the one hand, imperialist countries represented by the United States continuously bind military hegemony, cultural hegemony, and political hegemony together with financial hegemony. Once certain countries resist their financial hegemony, what follows is political bullying, cultural infiltration, and military intervention. For example, the Iraq War and the Libya War launched by the United States are concentrated manifestations of its “financial hegemony + military hegemony + political hegemony.” On the other hand, financial hegemony has exacerbated the destructive power of financial crises. The 2007 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis triggered a world financial crisis, causing a series of disastrous consequences, such as prolonged global economic downturn, intensified polarization between rich and poor, and the rise of terrorism. And the United States, the initiator of this crisis, used the opportunity of the deep integration of economic globalization and the fictitious economy to shift the crisis onto the entire world, which directly enhanced the scope and intensity of the destruction of financial hegemony. Under the background of capitalist globalization, the fictitious economy has strengthened the financial hegemony of imperialist countries. Its rapaciousness, destructiveness, cunning, exploitativeness, and moribund nature have not weakened but have instead intensified. This is consistent with Lenin’s exposition from over 100 years ago and also means that the fictitious economy under contemporary capitalist conditions has not escaped the scope of Lenin’s critique of finance capital.

相比列宁所处的时代，21世纪的国际垄断资本主义把金融霸权推向了一个极端，金融霸权得到空前强化。一是金融霸权的贪婪性空前提升。在经济全球化和虚拟经济紧密交融背景下，金融霸权不仅对经济领域的生产、销售等进行控制，还利用美元对整个世界的民众进行剥削、收割世界财富，对世界的政治生活、文化生活、社会生活等进行控制，企图在更广泛的领域攫取利益。二是金融霸权的破坏力空前强化。一方面，以美国为代表的帝国主义国家不断将军事霸权、文化霸权、政治霸权与金融霸权捆绑起来，一旦某些国家对其金融霸权进行抵制，随之而来的便是政治霸凌、文化渗透、军事干预，如美国发动的伊拉克战争、利比亚战争都是其“金融霸权+军事霸权+政治霸权”的集中体现。另一方面，金融霸权加剧了金融危机的破坏力。2007年美国次贷危机引发了世界金融危机，造成了一系列灾难性后果，如世界经济持续低迷、贫富分化加剧、恐怖主义抬头等。而这场危机的始作俑者美国，利用经济全球化与虚拟经济深度融合之机，将危机转嫁给全世界，这直接增强了金融霸权的破坏范围和破坏强度。资本主义全球化背景下，虚拟经济强化了帝国主义国家的金融霸权，其贪婪性、破坏性、狡诈性、剥削性、垂死性等不仅没有减弱，反而更加强化，这与列宁100多年前的论述是一致的，也意味着当代资本主义条件下的虚拟经济没有跳出列宁金融资本批判理论的范畴。

IV. The Enlightenment of Lenin’s Critique of Finance Capital for China’s Response to the Challenges of the Fictitious Economy

四、列宁金融资本批判理论对我国应对虚拟经济挑战的启示

Finance is the lifeblood of the national economy and an important component of national core competitiveness. Precisely for this reason, under the conditions of the socialist market economy, in promoting the development of the national economy, China must attach great importance to and scientifically address the various risks and challenges posed by the fictitious economy. At the end of October 2023, General Secretary Xi Jinping clearly pointed out at the Central Financial Work Conference: “Economic and financial risk hazards are still numerous, the quality and efficiency of financial services to the real economy are not high, financial chaos and corruption problems persist despite repeated prohibitions, and financial supervision and governance capacity are weak.” [30]30 Xi Jinping’s speech at the Central Financial Work Conference, October 30-31, 2023. The Central Financial Work Conference is a high-level meeting of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council that sets the direction for financial policy. This judgment accurately grasps the challenges that China’s fictitious economy urgently needs to address, and we can still draw many beneficial insights and countermeasures from Lenin’s critique of finance capital.

金融是国民经济的血脉，是国家核心竞争力的重要组成部分。正因如此，在社会主义市场经济条件下，我国推进国民经济发展，必须高度重视和科学应对虚拟经济存在的各种风险挑战。2023年10月底，习近平总书记在中央金融工作会议上明确指出：“经济金融风险隐患仍然较多，金融服务实体经济的质效不高，金融乱象和腐败问题屡禁不止，金融监管和治理能力薄弱。”这一论断精准把握住了当前我国虚拟经济亟需应对的挑战，而我们仍然可以从列宁金融资本批判理论中汲取诸多有益启示和应对之法。

(I) Various Risks and Challenges in the Field of China’s Fictitious Economy Are Intertwined

（一）当前我国虚拟经济领域各种风险挑战相互交织

Preventing and controlling risks is the eternal theme of financial work. Currently, the risks and challenges China faces in the field of the virtual economy mainly include the following aspects. First, there is insufficient coordination between the virtual economy and the real economy. At present, due to the accelerated pace of technological renewal, continuously rising labor costs, and increasingly diverse consumer demands, the profit rate of the real economy represented by manufacturing has declined to some extent. Moreover, it has deficiencies in innovating development methods and resisting development risks. Coupled with the inherent profit-seeking nature of capital itself, funds are more easily concentrated in the virtual economy, which has a higher profit rate, thereby increasing the difficulty of financing for the real economy. Under these circumstances, signs of “shifting from real to virtual” [31]31 “Shifting from real to virtual” (脱实向虚) refers to the tendency of capital and economic activity to flow away from the real economy (manufacturing, agriculture, services) into the virtual economy (finance, real estate speculation), a term used in Chinese policy discourse. have emerged in some areas of the real economy. At the same time, the high-quality services provided by the financial industry to the real economy are not sufficiently efficient and precise, and the coordinated development of the virtual economy and the real economy has been impacted to a certain degree. Second, the external risks and challenges facing economic and financial development have increased. Since the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008, the world economic recovery has been weak. Western developed countries, represented by the United States, have acted as important drivers of the excessive virtualization and financialization of the global economy. They have continuously transferred manufacturing industries to developing countries, accelerated the economy’s “shift from real to virtual,” and intensified the implementation of multiple rounds of quantitative easing policies, thereby exacerbating global financial risks. At the same time, continuous regional wars and conflicts have also increased the factors of instability in the international financial market. Against this backdrop, China will be impacted to a certain extent in the field of the virtual economy, and financial opening-up also faces challenges such as an unjust international financial order and financial hegemony. Third, the regulation of the virtual economy, especially financial regulation and governance, faces challenges. On the one hand, as the integration of new technologies with the virtual economy deepens, some internet finance businesses attempt to evade regulation by leveraging their data technology advantages, further increasing the concealment and harmfulness of financial crimes. On the other hand, some financial institutions have problems such as weakened self-regulation awareness, non-compliant transactions, and unscientific risk disposal. At the same time, they have deficiencies in areas such as honesty and trustworthiness, seeking profit through righteousness, being prudent and cautious, upholding integrity and innovation, and acting in accordance with laws and regulations, which further increases the complexity of financial regulation.

防控风险是金融工作的永恒主题。当前，我国在虚拟经济领域面临的风险挑战主要包括以下方面。第一，虚拟经济与实体经济之间协调性不足。当前，由于技术更新速度加快、劳动力成本不断提升、消费需求日益多样，以制造业为代表的实体经济利润率有所下降，且在创新发展方式和抵御发展风险方面存在不足，加之资本自身带有逐利的特性，资金更易向利润率较高的虚拟经济聚集，从而增加了实体经济的融资难度。在此情况下，实体经济的部分领域出现“脱实向虚”的苗头，同时金融业为实体经济提供的高质量服务不够高效精准，虚拟经济与实体经济协调发展受到一定程度的冲击。第二，经济金融发展面临的外部风险挑战增多。自2008年国际金融危机发生以来，世界经济复苏乏力，以美国为代表的西方发达国家充当了全球经济过度虚拟化、金融化的重要推手，它们不断将制造业转移到发展中国家、加速经济“脱实向虚”、变本加厉推行多轮量化宽松政策，从而加重了世界金融风险。与此同时，地区战争冲突不断，也使得国际金融市场的不稳定因素增多。在此背景下，中国在虚拟经济领域会受到一定程度的冲击，金融对外开放也面临诸如不公正的国际金融秩序、金融霸权等挑战。第三，虚拟经济监管特别是金融监管和治理面临挑战。一方面，由于新技术与虚拟经济的结合程度不断加深，部分互联网金融业务凭借数据技术优势试图逃避监管，金融犯罪的隐蔽性和危害性进一步加大；另一方面，部分金融机构存在自我监管意识弱化、交易不合规、风险处置不科学等问题，同时其在诚实守信、以义取利、稳健审慎、守正创新、依法合规等方面存在不足，进一步增加了金融监管的复杂程度。

(II) Responding to China’s Virtual Economy Risks and Challenges Based on Lenin’s Critique of Finance Capital

（二）基于列宁金融资本批判理论应对我国虚拟经济风险挑战

1. Upholding the Party’s centralized and unified leadership over financial work

1. 坚持党对金融工作的集中统一领导

Looking at *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* [32]32 *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917) is Lenin’s major work analyzing finance capital, monopoly, and imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism., it can be seen that the fundamental reason why finance capital triggers various crises is that, under the conditions of capitalist private ownership, finance capital is in the hands of the bourgeoisie, and the chaos in the virtual economy, represented by the financial industry, is the result of manipulation by capitalists. For China’s current stage of developing the virtual economy, strengthening the Party’s centralized and unified leadership over financial work can provide a strong political guarantee for China’s financial development. Since its founding, the Communist Party of China has established financial institutions during the period of the New Democratic Revolution, built a financial system during the period of socialist revolution and construction, promoted financial reform during the period of reform and opening up and socialist modernization, and driven high-quality financial development in the New Era of socialism with Chinese characteristics. These historical facts have already proven that only by adhering to the Party’s centralized and unified leadership over financial work can the financial cause achieve steady and long-term development. Currently, strengthening the Party’s centralized and unified leadership over financial work means, under the Party’s leadership, advancing Party building in the financial field, strengthening financial security capacity building, enhancing the effectiveness of financial reform, scientifically responding to external financial risks and challenges, and integrating Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, the Party’s latest theoretical achievement, into all aspects and links of financial work, always ensuring that financial work develops in the correct direction, thereby comprehensively enhancing China’s ability to respond to challenges in the virtual economy.

纵观《帝国主义论》可以看出，金融资本之所以会引发各种危机，归根结底是因为在资本主义私有制条件下，金融资本掌握在资产阶级手中，以金融业为代表的虚拟经济的乱象是资本家操纵的结果。就我国现阶段发展虚拟经济而言，加强党对金融工作的集中统一领导可以为我国金融发展提供强有力的政治保障。中国共产党自成立以来，在新民主主义革命时期创办金融机构，在社会主义革命和建设时期建立金融体制，在改革开放和社会主义现代化建设新时期推进金融改革,在中国特色社会主义新时代推动金融高质量发展。这些历史事实已然证明,只有坚持党对金融工作的集中统一领导,金融事业才能行稳致远。当前,加强党对金融工作的集中统一领导,就是要在党的领导下推进金融领域党的建设、强化金融安全能力建设、提升金融改革实效、科学应对外部金融风险挑战等,并将习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想这一党的最新理论成果贯穿到金融工作的各个方面和各个环节,始终保证金融工作沿着正确的方向发展,以此全面增强我国应对虚拟经济挑战的能力。

2. Adhering to a people-centered approach in advancing financial work

2. 坚持以人民为中心推进金融工作

Lenin once pointed out: “As long as capitalism remains capitalism, surplus capital will never be used to raise the living standards of the masses of the people in the country (for that would mean a fall in profits for the capitalists).” [33]33 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Chapter 7, “Imperialism as a Special Stage of Capitalism.” Recognizing this, Lenin believed that no matter how developed finance might be under monopoly capitalism, it would only intensify the exploitation of the people, because capitalism inverts the relationship between the people and finance capital, making the people subordinate and finance capital the center. In fact, the masses of the people are the creators of society’s material wealth. Only by adhering to a people-centered approach can economic activities overcome numerous challenges and enhance the momentum and vitality of development. Regarding the challenges currently faced by China’s development of the virtual economy, only by consistently adhering to a people-centered approach can various risks and challenges be effectively addressed, and can the advantages of the virtual economy be transformed into benefits serving the people. On the one hand, the virtual economy, based on finance, must meet the multiple needs of the people, such as investment needs and wealth management needs, providing the people with higher-quality financial services. On the other hand, the virtual economy can also fully leverage its own advantages to assist in the revitalization of rural industries, the coordinated development of urban and rural areas, the development of the digital economy, and provide financial support for the masses engaged in rural industrial revitalization. Guided by the people-centered value concept, the level of coordinated development between the virtual economy and the real economy will also continuously improve, and the ability to withstand external financial shocks will be significantly enhanced.

列宁曾指出：“只要资本主义还是资本主义,过剩的资本就不会用来提高本国民众的生活水平(因为这样会降低资本家的利润)”，正是认识到这一点,列宁认为垄断资本主义条件下的金融即便再发达,也只会加剧对人民的剥削,因为资本主义颠倒了人民与金融资本的关系,即人民成为附庸,金融资本成为中心。事实上,人民群众才是社会物质财富的创造者,只有坚持以人民为中心,经济活动才能克服重重挑战,增强发展的后劲与活力。就我国当前发展虚拟经济面临的挑战而言,只有始终坚持以人民为中心,才能有效应对各种风险挑战,才能将虚拟经济的优势转化为服务民众的福社。一方面,以金融为基础的虚拟经济要满足人民的多重需要,如投资需要、理财需要等,为人民提供质量更优的金融服务。另一方面,虚拟经济也可以充分发挥自身优势,助力乡村产业振兴、城乡区域协同发展、数字经济发展等,并为从事乡村产业振兴的群众提供资金支持。在以人民为中心的价值理念指引下,虚拟经济与实体经济的协同发展水平也将不断提升,应对外来金融冲击的能力也将显著增强。

3. Promoting the coordinated development of the real economy and the virtual economy

3. 推进实体经济与虚拟经济协调发展

The virtual economy arises on the basis of the real economy; separated from the real economy, the virtual economy can hardly survive. China should further develop the real economy, promote the concentration of resource factors towards the real economy, ensure that policy measures serve the real economy, and rely on intelligent technologies to drive the development of the real economy, thereby increasing the profit rate of the real economy. On the basis of consolidating the real economy, further promote the integrated development of the real economy and the virtual economy. It is necessary both to leverage the role of the virtual economy in invigorating the real economy, ensuring that finance always serves the real economy, and to leverage the supporting role of the real economy for the virtual economy, using a strong manufacturing industry to provide a guarantee for the development of the financial industry.

虚拟经济是在实体经济的基础上产生的,脱离了实体经济,虚拟经济就难以生存。我国应当进一步发展实体经济,推动资源要素向实体经济聚集,确保政策措施为实体经济服务,并依靠智能化技术推动实体经济发展,提升实体经济的利润率。在夯实实体经济的基础上,进一步推进实体经济和虚拟经济融合发展,既要发挥虚拟经济活跃实体经济的作用,确保金融始终为实体经济服务,也要发挥实体经济对虚拟经济的支撑作用,以强大的制造业为金融业发展提供保障。

4. Effectively strengthening financial regulation

4. 切实加强金融监管力度

In *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin mentioned measures for financial regulation, such as “the publication of balance sheets, the establishment of a definite form for balance sheets, the setting up of supervisory bodies,” [34]34 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Chapter 3, “Finance Capital and the Financial Oligarchy.” which precisely illustrates that financial regulation is necessary, although under the conditions of capitalist private ownership these regulatory measures are difficult to implement effectively. For China, however, effectively strengthening financial regulation is both practically feasible and very necessary. On the one hand, China implements a basic economic system with public ownership as the mainstay and diverse forms of ownership developing together. Under these conditions, promoting financial regulation can ensure the effectiveness and authenticity of regulation. On the other hand, China needs to effectively strengthen financial regulation to resist various risks and challenges, including financial crimes, and should strengthen financial regulation from the following aspects: First, strengthen and improve legislation concerning the virtual economy, including finance, promote the regulation and governance of the virtual economy through the rule of law, severely crack down on all types of financial crimes according to law, and ensure that the virtual economy always operates within the legal framework; second, promote the organic integration of new technologies with financial supervision, be adept at using big data for financial supervision, thereby gradually improving the modern financial regulatory system and expanding the scope of financial supervision; third, strengthen the internal governance of financial institutions, form a mutual supervision mechanism among the management within the institution, and foster a cultural atmosphere within the entire institution of preventing financial risks and consciously accepting supervision, thereby forming a synergy with external regulation. Under the premise of continuously strengthening financial regulation, the security of China’s virtual economy development will be significantly enhanced, and its ability to invigorate the real economy will also be significantly strengthened.

列宁在《帝国主义论》中提到了金融监管的举措,如“公布资产负债表、规定一定的资产负债表格式、设立监察机构”等,这恰恰说明了金融监管是必要的,只不过在资本主义私有制条件下这些监管举措难以发挥真正的作用。但对我国而言,切实加强金融监管既现实可行,也十分必要。一方面,我国实行以公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度,在此条件下推进金融监管，能够保证监管的有效性和真实性。另一方面，我国需要切实加强金融监管以抵御包括金融犯罪在内的各种风险挑战，并从如下方面加强金融监管：一是加强并完善关于金融在内的虚拟经济的立法工作，以法治推动虚拟经济监管治理，对待各类金融犯罪要依法进行严厉打击，使虚拟经济始终在法律范围内活动；二是推进新技术与金融监督的有机结合，善于运用大数据进行金融监督，以此逐步完善现代金融监管体系和扩展金融监督范围；三是加强金融机构的内部治理，在机构内部的管理层之间形成相互监督机制，在整个机构内部营造防范金融风险和自觉接受监督的文化氛围，以此与外部监管形成合力。在不断增强金融监管力度的前提下，我国虚拟经济发展的安全性必将得到显著提升，对实体经济的活跃力度也将显著增强。

(Author profiles: Wang Danzhu, 2022-level doctoral candidate, School of Marxism, Central China Normal University; Chen Jisheng, Associate Professor, School of Marxism, Central China Normal University)

（作者简介：王丹竹，华中师范大学马克思主义学院2022级博士研究生；陈吉胜，华中师范大学马克思主义学院副教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心