Deleuze’s Theory of Affect and His Critique of Capitalism

In 1995, the publication of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins” and Brian Massumi’s “The Autonomy of Affect” announced the affective turn in twentieth-century Western academia. Today, almost all fields of the humanities engage with discussions of affect. In the introduction to *The Affect Theory Reader*, Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth summarize eight main research directions of affect theory: philosophy of technology, biotechnics, gender studies, psychoanalysis, political studies, language studies, critique of the history of emotions, and philosophy of science, demonstrating the interdisciplinary and multidimensional character of affect theory. Affect theory stands in opposition to nearly all mainstream paradigms: it not only opposes traditional rationalism and the philosophy of subjectivity but also refuses to align itself with various postmodern paradigms that likewise oppose traditional philosophy (such as structuralism, linguistic semiotics, and psychoanalysis). Precisely for this reason, it provides contemporary critical theorists with a new weapon, awakening the body and life that have been deliberately suppressed by the machinery of Western capitalist production.

1995年，伊芙·塞吉维克的《控制论褶皱中的羞耻：阅读西尔文·汤姆金斯》和布莱恩·马苏米的《情动的自治》两篇文章发表，宣告了20世纪西方学界的情动转向。当今几乎所有的人文领域都涉及对情动（affect）问题的讨论，梅利莎·格雷格和格里高利·塞格沃斯在《情动研究读本》的导论中总结了情动理论的八个主要研究方向，即技术哲学、生命技术、性别研究、精神分析、政治研究、语言研究、情感史批评和科学哲学，展现了情动理论跨学科和多维度的特点。情动理论几乎与所有主流范式相对抗，它不仅反对传统的理性主义和主体性哲学，而且不与同样反对传统哲学的各种后现代范式（结构主义、语言符号学以及精神分析等）为伍。正因如此，它为当今的批判理论家提供了全新的武器，唤醒了被西方资本主义生产机器刻意压抑的身体与生命。

This article focuses on the most important theoretical source of the affective turn—Gilles Deleuze’s theory of affect. It will first follow Deleuze’s unique reading of the history of philosophy, examining his core project of opposing Hegelian philosophy through Spinozist philosophy. To construct a world different from Hegel’s totalizing dialectics, it is necessary to simultaneously account for the ground of the world and the becoming of the world. Deleuze uses Spinoza’s “theory of expression” to explain the former, while the theory of affect provides a detailed elaboration of the latter. Next, the article will take “force, affect, and desire” as its thread, offering a detailed interpretation of the world-picture depicted by Deleuze’s theory of affect, and how he develops a new philosophy with clear political implications based on the concept of affect, ultimately pointing toward the fundamental question of political liberation. Finally, through Deleuze’s interpretation of works such as *Anti-Oedipus*, the article will demonstrate how his theory of affect critiques contemporary capitalism. While affirming that affect theory provides a new theoretical horizon for understanding the novel forms of control in contemporary capitalism, it will also point out the gap between it and genuine Marxism.

本文关注的是情动转向最为重要的理论来源——吉尔·德勒兹的情动理论。文章将首先跟随德勒兹独特的哲学史解读，检视其以斯宾诺莎哲学反对黑格尔哲学的核心议题。为了构造一个不同于黑格尔总体辩证法的世界，需要同时说明世界之根据和世界之生成，德勒兹以斯宾诺莎的“表现学说”解释前者，而情动理论则是对后者的详尽阐发。接着，文章将以“力量、情动和欲望”为线索，详细解读德勒兹的情动理论所描绘的世界图景，以及他如何基于情动概念发展出具有明显政治意涵的全新哲学，最终指向根本性的政治解放问题。最后，文章将通过德勒兹对《反俄狄浦斯》等作品的解读，展示其情动理论对当代资本主义的批判，并在肯定情动理论为我们理解当代资本主义的全新控制形式提供了新的理论视野的同时，也指出其与真正的马克思主义之间的差距所在。

I. The Origin of Affect: Hegelianism and Spinoza

一、情动的源起：黑格尔主义与斯宾诺莎

Michael Hardt once noted: “Baruch Spinoza is the thinker who pushed the theory of affect the furthest. Directly or indirectly, his thought is the source of most contemporary work in this field.” In the 1960s, a surge of Spinoza studies emerged in France and quickly spread to other countries on the European continent. Deleuze’s first work on Spinoza, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, was published during this period. Around the same time, Martial Gueroult, Bernard Rousset, Alexandre Matheron, and others also published monographs on Spinoza. This phenomenon was no accident; it was the result of a collective turn in French theoretical circles in the late 1960s against Hegelianism. Michel Foucault explained this issue in an interview: in the 1960s, the philosophies available to young people were either the officially recognized systematic philosophy of Hegel or the phenomenology and existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty outside the academy. Hegelianism permeated all theories, but this theory ultimately led to an acceptance of historical reason, a conservative and passive philosophy that the new generation of scholars did not want. Ultimately, the social movements of 1968 [1]1 The social movements of 1968: A series of protests and general strikes in France, led by students and workers, that nearly toppled the government and profoundly challenged traditional authority, including academic and political institutions. hastened the demise of Hegelian philosophy, and the emerging philosophers turned their gaze toward difference and rupture, yearning “to become completely different others in a completely different world.”

迈克尔·哈特曾经指出：“巴赫鲁·斯宾诺莎是将情动理论推进得最远的思想家。直接地或间接地，他的思想是大多数当代这一领域的源泉。”1960年代，斯宾诺莎研究热潮在法国出现，并迅速蔓延至欧洲大陆的其他国家。德勒兹的首部斯宾诺莎研究著作《斯宾诺莎与表现问题》就出版于这一时期。几乎在同一时期，马夏尔·盖鲁、伯纳德·鲁塞、亚历山大·马瑟隆等人也推出了斯宾诺莎研究专著。这一现象并非偶然，而是1960年代末期法国理论界集体转向对黑格尔主义的反抗的结果。米歇尔·福柯在一次访谈中解释过这个问题：在1960年代，年轻人能够选择的哲学要么是官方承认的黑格尔的系统哲学，要么是校园之外的让-保罗·萨特和莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂的现象学和存在主义。黑格尔主义弥漫在所有的理论中，但这种理论最终导向了对历史理性的承认，而新一代学者并不想要这种保守消极的哲学。最终，1968年的社会运动加速了黑格尔哲学的寿终正寝，新兴的哲学家把目光投向了差异与断裂，他们渴望“在完全不同的世界成为完全不同的他者”。

Hegelianism occupied an absolutely dominant position in post-war France. It is generally believed that this stemmed mainly from Alexandre Kojève’s seminar on *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the 1930s, whose participants later became prominent figures in French intellectual circles. Kojève’s greatest legacy to French academia was his anthropological interpretation of the evolution of Hegel’s absolute spirit. By focusing on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Kojève interpreted Hegel’s adventure of consciousness as the real historical development of master and slave. This interpretation set the goal of the “end of history”: the self-perfection of humanity in time would ultimately overcome the negativity of history and enter a classless society of mutual recognition. In this “universal and homogeneous state,” there would no longer be struggles between master and slave, affirmation and negation; hence it was an ultimate state, the ideal and goal that the philosophy of “our time” proposed for politics. In reality, the Hegelian philosophy of history could serve to defend the post-war Soviet Union, which aligned with the political ideals of French leftist intellectuals at the time. However, as the outcome of the Cold War between the Eastern and Western blocs became increasingly clear, this defense was challenged. In short, a totalizing historical dialectic enveloped the entire mentality of post-war European intellectuals. One need only look at Sartre, famous for emphasizing individual absolute freedom, to see how individual action ultimately forms a totalized historical dynamic within organic groups, and thus understand the immense influence of Hegel’s philosophy of history. Merleau-Ponty also believed: “In the past century, Hegel was the source of all the great things accomplished by philosophy… He opened up an exploration that detailed how to integrate the irrational into an expanded reason, which remains the task of our century… To interpret Hegel is to take a stand on all the philosophical, political, and religious problems of our century.”

黑格尔主义在战后法国占据了绝对主流的地位。一般认为，这主要源自亚历山大·科耶夫在1930年代开设的《精神现象学》研讨班，参加过这个研讨班的人日后大都成了法国思想界中响当当的人物。科耶夫留给法国学界的最大遗产是对黑格尔的绝对精神的演化做了人类学解读，通过关注黑格尔的《精神现象学》，科耶夫将黑格尔笔下意识的冒险解读为主人与奴隶的真实历史发展。这一解读为“历史的终结”设定了目标，人在时间中的自我完善最终克服了历史的否定性，进入到相互承认的无阶级社会。在这个“普遍的、同质的国家”中，不再有主人与奴隶、肯定与否定的斗争，因而是一种终极的国家，是“我们这个时代”的哲学为政治提出的理想和目标。从现实来看，黑格尔主义的历史哲学能够为战后的苏联进行辩护，这符合彼时法国左翼知识分子的政治理想。但是，随着冷战中东西方阵营的胜负日趋明显，这种辩护受到了挑战。总之，一种总体性的历史辩证法笼罩了战后欧洲知识分子的全部心智，我们只需看看在以强调个人绝对自由而闻名的萨特笔下，个人行动最终在有机群体中形成了总体化的历史动力，就可以了解黑格尔的历史哲学所产生的巨大影响。梅洛-庞蒂也认为：“在过去的一个世纪中，黑格尔是所有哲学所实现的伟大事情的源头……他开启了一种探索，详细探索了如何将非理性整合进一种扩大了的理性之中，这仍然是我们这个世纪的任务……解释黑格尔就是我们的世纪中解决所有的哲学、政治和宗教问题所采取的立场。”

Deleuze’s teacher, Louis Althusser, was the first to use Spinoza to oppose Hegel, an approach that broadened Deleuze’s theoretical horizons. The difference is that Althusser’s critique of Hegelianism was limited to historicism, whereas Deleuze, through Spinoza, subverted the entire philosophical foundation of Hegel. The theory of affect he derived via Spinoza simultaneously opposed dialectics and negativity, constructing a new, affirmative, non-dialectical philosophy. Deleuze was not a traditional historian of philosophy; the history of philosophy he engaged in did not follow any great tradition. Instead, through the reinterpretation of thinkers often regarded as “outsiders”—such as Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Henri Bergson—he demonstrated his own philosophical creation of concepts. Therefore, whether Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of affect follows Spinoza himself is unimportant; what matters is how this interpretation endows Spinoza with the vitality to oppose traditional philosophy (especially Hegelianism), thereby “producing a profound affirmation of life, a cultivation of joy, and an appreciation of capacity.”

德勒兹的老师路易·阿尔都塞是第一个站出来用斯宾诺莎反对黑格尔的人，这一做法拓宽了德勒兹的理论视野。不同的是，阿尔都塞对黑格尔主义的批判仅限于历史主义，德勒兹则通过斯宾诺莎对黑格尔的整个哲学地基进行了颠覆。他经由斯宾诺莎得出的情动理论同时反对了辩证法与否定性，构造了一种全新的、肯定的非辩证哲学。德勒兹不是传统意义上的哲学史研究者，他所从事的哲学史研究并未遵循任何伟大的传统，而是通过对尼采、斯宾诺莎和亨利·柏格森等这些常常被视为“局外人”的思想家的再阐释，展现出自身哲学的概念创造。因此，德勒兹基于斯宾诺莎的情动概念的解读是否遵循了斯宾诺莎本人并不重要，重要的是此种解读如何赋予了斯宾诺莎对抗传统哲学（尤其是黑格尔主义）的生命力，从而“生产出深刻的对生命的肯定、对快乐的培育以及对能力的赞赏”。

Deleuze first regards Spinoza as a critic of René Descartes; only after resolving Descartes’s difficulties does he open the path to overturning Hegel. In *Spinoza and the Problem of Expression*, Descartes’s difficulty begins with the problem of God’s “self-cause” (causam sui). The most famous aspect of Cartesian philosophy is its principle of subjectivity, but this principle is not self-sufficient; the existence of God as the ultimate ground still requires proof. This is the fundamental crux of modern philosophy, which Martin Heidegger calls “onto-theology.” In the “Third Meditation” and the “Fifth Meditation,” Descartes offers two proofs of God. The former is based on God as the efficient cause of all things—a causal proof; the latter is based on God as an absolute power beyond causality. However, this precisely exposes the contradiction between God as creator and nature as created. For if God also exists within the causal sequence of nature, this negates His supernatural essence. The doctrine of the “creation of eternal truths” that Descartes proposes most clearly embodies this paradox: he holds that eternal truths such as mathematics are equally valid in all worlds God creates, but also acknowledges that God has the power to render mathematical truths invalid. Descartes is forced to maintain the fragile balance of the world-picture with the assertion that “the cause of God’s existence comes from itself” (i.e., “self-cause”). Deleuze points out that Descartes’s concept of “self-cause” is contradictory: God is self-cause only in an analogical sense, not as a necessity within the natural sequence. Deleuze explains: “God is self-cause in the sense that God’s essence is its formal cause; its essence is considered a formal cause—this is an analogical expression, not a direct equivalence, meaning that the role God plays in its own existence is analogous to the role an efficient cause plays in its effect.”

德勒兹首先将斯宾诺莎视作勒内·笛卡尔的批评者，在解决了笛卡尔的难题后，才通向了颠覆黑格尔的道路。在《斯宾诺莎与表现问题》中，笛卡尔的难题起始于上帝的“自因”（causam sui）问题。笛卡尔哲学中最为出名的是其主体性原则，但是该原则并不是自足的，上帝之存在作为最终根据的问题仍需得到证明，这是现代哲学的根本症结所在，马丁·海德格尔称其为“本体论神学”。笛卡尔在“第三沉思”与“第五沉思”中给出了两个关于上帝的证明。前者基于上帝是万物的动力因，这是一种因果性证明；后者基于上帝是超越因果的绝对权能。但是，这恰恰暴露了上帝作为创生与自然作为被造之间的矛盾。因为，如果上帝也存在于自然的因果序列中，便会否定其超自然的本质。笛卡尔提出的“永恒真理的创造”学说最为明显地体现了这一悖谬，他认为诸如数学这样的永恒真理在上帝创造的所有世界中同等有效，但也承认上帝有权使数学真理失效。笛卡尔不得不以“上帝存在的原因来自自身”（即“自因”）这一论断来维系世界图景的脆弱平衡。德勒兹指出，笛卡尔的“自因”概念是矛盾的，上帝只有在类比的意义上是自因，而非自然序列之中的必然性。德勒兹解释道：“上帝是自因，这是在上帝本质就是其形式因的意义上来说的；它的本质被认为是形式因，这是一种类比的说法，而不是直接的等同，意即上帝在其自身存在所扮演的角色类同于动力因在其结果上所扮演的角色。”

In Deleuze’s view, Spinoza resolves the problem Descartes opened up through the doctrine of “expression” (exprimer). In Spinoza’s philosophy, “to say that God is the cause of itself is the same as saying that God is the cause of all things.” Deleuze depicts Spinoza’s expressionism as a world of immanence where causality and self-cause are completely fused: God as the expresser and all things as the expressed have no essential difference. God necessarily expresses itself in attributes, and attributes in turn express themselves in modes; therefore, the existence of God as self-cause and God’s production are one and the same. Formal cause and efficient cause thus coincide. “This expression provides a proof, namely, the direct manifestation of the absolutely infinite substance.”

在德勒兹看来，斯宾诺莎以“表现”（exprimer）学说解决了笛卡尔所开启的问题，在斯宾诺莎的哲学中，“说上帝是自己的原因与说上帝是所有事物的原因是一回事”。德勒兹将斯宾诺莎的表现主义描绘为一个因果性与自因完全融合的内在性世界，作为表现者的上帝与作为被表现者的万物没有本质差别：上帝必然表现于诸属性之中，诸属性又表现于样式之中，因此自因的上帝之存在与上帝之产生就是一回事。形式因与动力因就此重合。“这个表现提供了一个证明，亦即绝对无限实体的直接具显。”

However, the real problem is only just beginning. Resolving Descartes’s problem of self-cause is merely the first step. What Deleuze truly confronts is Hegel, who established a complete philosophical system. If Descartes’s problem is the ground of the world, then Hegel’s problem is the subject; “substance is subject” is the entire principle of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel places Spinoza within the rationalist tradition, holding that although Spinoza resolved the problem of the ground of God’s existence, he did not unfold the self-movement of self-cause—that is, the other side of Hegel’s “substance is subject”: the negative dialectical movement of the world. Hegel criticizes Spinozism as “acosmism,” i.e., “a philosophy that insists on the existence of God, insists that only God exists.” Since “Spinoza does not define God as the unity of God and the world, but rather recognizes God as the unity of thought and extension (the material world),” his system “only recognizes this world as appearance, without actual reality.” That is, the existing world does not “reflect” absolute spirit. Seen in this light, in Spinoza’s metaphysics, only the universal and unspecialized is real; the subjective and individual has no reality. “Only God is the sole substance; nature, the world, in Spinoza’s words, are merely modifications and modes of substance, not substantial things,” hence they are “without individuality.”

不过，真正的问题才刚刚开始，解决笛卡尔的自因问题只是第一步。德勒兹真正要面对的是建立了完善哲学体系的黑格尔。如果说笛卡尔的问题是世界之根据，那么黑格尔的问题则是主体，“实体即主体”正是黑格尔哲学的全部原则。黑格尔将斯宾诺莎放置在理性主义传统中，认为斯宾诺莎虽然解决了上帝存在的根据问题，但并没有展开自因的自我运动，即黑格尔的“实体即主体”的另一面——世界的否定性的辩证运动。黑格尔批评斯宾诺莎主义是“无世界论”，即“一个坚持上帝存在，坚持唯有上帝存在的哲学”，由于“斯宾诺莎并没有把上帝界说为上帝与世界的统一，而是认上帝为思想与形体（物质世界）的统一”，因此他的体系“只是认这世界为现象，并没有现实的实在性”。也就是说，现存的世界并没有“反映”绝对精神。依此视之，在斯宾诺莎的形而上学中，只有普遍的、未特殊化的东西是实在的，主观的、个体性的东西并没有实在性，“只有神是唯一的实体；自然、世界用斯宾诺莎的话来说只不过是实体的变相、样式，并不是实体性的东西”，故而是“无个体性的”。

As mentioned above, resisting Hegel’s suffocating doctrine is the mission of Deleuze and a generation of scholars. To resolve Hegel’s difficulty, Deleuze deepens Spinoza’s “doctrine of expression” and unfolds his theory of affect. Standing on the opposite theoretical ground from Hegel, Deleuze’s theory of affect attempts to construct a non-dialectical, affirmative world of becoming and change.

如前所述，反抗黑格尔令人窒息的学说是德勒兹等一代学人的使命。为了解决黑格尔的难题，德勒兹继续深化了斯宾诺莎的“表现学说”，展开了他的情动理论。站在与黑格尔相反的理论立场上，德勒兹的情动理论试图构造一个非辩证的肯定性世界的生成与变化。

II. The World-Picture of Affect: Force, Affect, and Desire

二、情动的世界图景：力量、情动和欲望

The first step toward a theory of affect is “to interpret the absolute substance as an infinite force possessing both infinite activity and infinite passivity.” Only thus can Deleuze coherently explain the essential reality of modes through immanence. Deleuze’s world of affect takes “theory of force” as its ontological foundation. Spinoza says: “God’s power (potentia) is God’s essence itself.” Martin Saar summarizes: “To know what something is is to know its force. Its force belongs to it, because force is precisely what it is. In this sense, force is an ontological concept.” That is, force is not something that beings possess, but the sole essence that defines and elucidates existence. However, to a certain extent, Hegel’s externalization of absolute spirit can also be explained as the externalization of force; therefore, a more crucial question is: how does this externalization open up a positive world without teleology, rather than the negative movement of spirit?

迈向情动理论的第一步是“把绝对实体解释为兼具无限主动性与无限受动性的无限力量”。如此，德勒兹才能以内在性融贯地解释诸样式的本质实在。德勒兹的情动世界以“力论”为其本体论基础。斯宾诺莎说：“神的力量（potentia）就是神的本质本身。”马丁·萨尔概括道：“知道某物是什么，就是去知道它的力量。它的力量属于它自己，因为力量正是它之所是。在此意义上，力量是一个本体论概念。”也就是说，力量不是存在者所拥有的东西，而是界定和阐明存在的唯一本质。不过，在一定程度上，黑格尔的绝对精神之外化也可以以力的外化来解释，因此一个更加关键的问题便是：此种外化如何开显出一个无目的论的肯定世界，而非精神的否定性运动？

The decisive step comes from the foundation of force: regarding all things and modes as “the self-affections (affectiones) of infinite force.” In this way, Deleuze enters the world of affect. Deleuze is fully aware of Hegel’s reproach against Spinoza. In a seminar in 1974, he asks: “If I say that being is univocal, then what is the difference between beings?” His answer is: the difference of univocal being can only be measured by degrees of force. This is a novel way of thinking: the difference between a table, a girl, and a train lies only in the difference of force, not in categories, genera, or functions. For Deleuze, what matters is not to seek the essence behind something, because the magnitude of force is always changing. Just as the protagonist in Franz Kafka’s *The Metamorphosis* can also turn into a beetle, what matters is to explore the intensive difference between one thing and another in a fluid and relational sense.

决定性的步骤来自力量之基础，将万物、样态视为“无限力量的自身感触（affectiones）”。这样，德勒兹就进入了情动的世界。对于黑格尔对斯宾诺莎的责难，德勒兹有着充分的认识。他在1974年的一次研讨会上问道：“如果我说的存在是单义的，那么存在者之间有什么区别呢？”他的回答是：单义性存在的差异只能以力量的程度来衡量。这是一种新奇的思考：一张桌子、一个女孩、一辆火车的差异只在于力量的不同，而非范畴、种属和功能的差别。对于德勒兹而言，重要的并非探寻某物背后的本质，因为力量的大小总在改变。正如弗兰兹·卡夫卡《变形记》中的主人公也可以变成甲虫，重要的是在流动性和关系性的意义上探寻一物与另一物的强度差异。

Intensive difference is manifested as the difference in the capacity to be affected (i.e., affection). Deleuze distinguishes two kinds of “force” from Spinoza: he holds that all power (potentia) necessarily corresponds to a capacity to be affected (potesta). The distinction between “potentia” and “potesta” receives little attention in Spinoza, but Deleuze uses these two to understand the fundamental difference between things. The essence of a thing is force; force is “active and actual action,” but it is limited by the corresponding capacity to be affected. Since things are constantly in relation to others, the capacity to be affected increases or decreases the power of action in different modes of affection. Therefore, although the quantity of bodily force cannot be determined, according to the stipulation that “a mode at any given moment is all that it can do,” Deleuze holds that the intensive difference between different things can be understood through the capacity to be affected that is actualized in different configurations. It is precisely in the comparison and change of intensive differences among things that the whole of nature displays infinite possibilities.

强度差异体现为受影响（即感触）的能力的不同。德勒兹从斯宾诺莎那里区分了两种“力量”，他认为一切力量（potentia）都必然对应着能够接受影响的能力（potesta）。“potentia”与“potesta”的区别在斯宾诺莎那里并未受到过多关注，但是德勒兹却用这两者理解事物之间的根本区别。一物的本质是力量，力量是“主动而现实的行动”，但会受到相对应的被影响的能力的限制。由于事物无时无刻都处在与它者的关系中，因而受影响的能力在不同情状（affection)的样式中就会增加或减少行动的力量。因此，虽然身体力量的多寡无法确定，但是根据“样式在任一时刻都是一切的所能为者”这一规定，德勒兹认为可以通过在不同配置中得以现实化的受影响的能力来了解不同事物所具有的强度差异。正是在事物强度差异的比较与变化中，整个自然展现出无尽的可能。

Therefore, the movement of intensity is affect. Affect is the change in state when different objects/bodies with differing capacities to be affected encounter one another. Such an encounter produces two outcomes: the body either fuses with the external thing or repels it. The former produces joyful affect, the latter painful affect; both are passions. Emotion and affect are often conflated in contemporary research, but Deleuze once pointed out that they are not the same. Affect operates at a more fundamental level, a level that cannot be known or grasped, like a kind of raw material awaiting processing; emotion is the product of social processing. To borrow Kantian language, the relationship between the two is that all emotion is always accompanied by affect. Just as infrared light is not opposed to red light, non-ideational affect is not in conflict with ideational emotion; affect indicates the intensive limit of emotion. In this sense, Spinoza is the first philosopher to question the concept of the subject. Deleuze points out: “Spinoza in fact wanted to define the essence of man in terms of intensity, as a certain quantity of intensity.” [3]3 Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), p. 128. [Translator’s note: The English translation of Deleuze’s text reads: “Spinoza wanted to define the essence of man as a quantity of intensity.”] Life is affect filled with intensity.

因此，强度的运动就是情动。情动是受影响能力不同的物体/身体相互遭遇时的状态变化。此种相遇会造成两种后果，身体与外物要么融合，要么相互排斥，前者产生快乐的情动，后者产生痛苦的情动，两者都是激情。情绪（emotion/feeling）与情动在当今的研究中常被混为一谈，但德勒兹曾指出两者并不相同。情动是在更加根本的层面运作的，此一层面无法被认识和掌握，就像某种有待加工的粗糙材料；情绪则是经过社会加工后的产物。两者的关系借用康德的语言来说，就是所有情绪总是伴随着情动。正如红外线与红色并不对立一样，非观念的情动与观念的情绪并不冲突，情动暗示了情绪的强度界限。从这个意义上看，斯宾诺莎是首个对主体概念提出质疑的哲学家。德勒兹指出：“斯宾诺莎实际上正是想要以一种强度的方式来界定人的本质，将其视为一定量的强度。”生命就是充满强度的情动。

Spinoza further describes affect as “the affections of the body,” holding that “these affections increase or diminish, assist or hinder the power of acting of the body, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.” [4]4 Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Definition 3. [Translator’s note: The standard English translation reads: “By affect I understand affections of the body, by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.”] Affect is passively synthesized at the unconscious level, and then forms representations at the level of active synthesis. When the mind experiences joyful affect, it produces a more perfect idea, thereby increasing the body’s power of acting; when the mind experiences painful affect, it produces a less perfect idea, thereby decreasing the body’s power of acting. We call the idea aroused by joy love, and the idea aroused by pain hate. Joy appears better than pain, but since we are constantly in relation to other things, passivity always accompanies us. Thus, the question of what the body can actively do becomes the central problem of Spinoza’s *Ethics*.

斯宾诺莎将情动进一步描述为“身体的情状”，认为“这些情状使身体的行动的力量增加或减少、顺畅或阻碍，同时此情状的观念亦然”。情动在无意识层面被动地综合，进而在主动综合的层面形成表象。当心灵感受到快乐的情动时，就会产生更完满的观念，进而增加身体行动的力量；而当心灵感受到痛苦时，就会产生不完满的观念，从而导致身体的行动力量降低。我们将快乐引发的观念称作爱，将痛苦引发的观念视为恨。快乐看起来好于痛苦，但由于我们无时无刻都处在与它物的关系之中，因此被动性总是伴随着我们。于是，身体能主动做什么的问题成为斯宾诺莎《伦理学》的核心问题。

To answer this question, we need to understand that Deleuze’s affect is influenced in two dimensions—longitude and latitude. “Latitude is composed of intensive parts falling under a capacity, just as longitude is composed of extensive parts falling under a relation.” [5]5 Gilles Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 256. Longitude implies the transindividuality and sociality of the body; latitude implies the possibility of the body’s intensity increasing or decreasing. Therefore, genuine active affect requires change in both aspects simultaneously: on the one hand, people must recognize their own specific intensities, or their distinctive particular forces. In Spinoza’s view, this belongs to the third kind of knowledge, i.e., knowledge obtained through direct cognition of one’s own inner essence. Deleuze believes this means that knowledge is not merely knowledge, but a mode of existence and a way of life. On the other hand, people must also strive to create new connections, allowing the body to transcend the limitations of the capitalist state apparatus and shape new relations. Deleuze calls this “becoming-animal.” It does not mean that humans actually become animals, but rather that it breaks down anthropocentric modes of thinking, thereby providing a new way of thinking. Deleuze’s philosophy develops both of these perspectives simultaneously.

为了回答这个问题，我们需要了解德勒兹的情动在两个向度——经度与纬度——上受到的影响。“纬度是由归于一种能力之下的强度性的部分所构成，正如经度是由处于一种关系之中的广延性的部分所构成。”经度意味着身体的跨个体性和社会性，纬度意味着身体具有强度增减的可能性。因此，真正的主动之情动需要在两个方面同时改变：一方面，人要认识自身所具有的特异性强度，或者说与众不同的特殊力量，这在斯宾诺莎看来属于第三种知识，即人通过对自身的内在本质的直接认知而获得的知识，德勒兹认为这意味着知识不仅仅是知识，而且是生存方式和生活方式；另一方面，人也要努力创造新的连接，让身体超越资本主义国家机器的限制，形塑新的关系，德勒兹称之为“生成动物”（becoming-animal），它不是要人真的变成动物，而是要打破人类中心主义的思维方式，从而提供一种新的思考方式。德勒兹的哲学同时发展出上述两种视角。

From this, it can be seen that the subject–object problem in the narrative of the history of philosophy is replaced by Spinoza’s problem of affect–becoming. The unity of subject and object, thought and extension, in the sense of psychophysical parallelism, means “the continuous variation of the force of existing or the force of acting.” [6]6 Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 217. The constant encounters of the body with various objects constitute the world; the body’s change from state I to state II breaks through the limitations of subjectivity and essentialism. The body has no essence, only a process of variation in force and intensity. The body is affect; therefore, affect is another name for becoming. If Hegel represents the logical endpoint of rationalism, Spinoza completely opens up the world of non-determinate difference.

由此可以看出，哲学史叙事中的主体—客体问题被斯宾诺莎的情动—生成问题所取代。主体与客体、思想与广延的统一在身心平行论的意义上意味着“存在之力或行动之力的连续流变”。身体与诸物体的不断相遇形成了世界，身体从状态I向状态II的改变打破了主体性和本质主义的局限。身体没有本质，只有力量强度的变化过程。身体就是情动，因此情动就是生成的另一个名称。如果说黑格尔代表了理性主义的逻辑终局，斯宾诺莎则彻底敞开了非限定性的差异世界。

At this point, the world-picture of affect is largely complete; the final piece is “desire.” Our state of maintaining our own power of acting is conscious action. Without the concept of desire as the driving force of our action, affect would become entirely passive. To borrow Kant’s famous phrase: desire without affect is empty; affect without desire is blind. The concept of desire comes from Spinoza’s concept of *conatus*, defined as: “The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing other than the actual essence of the thing.” [7]7 Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Proposition 7. When a person becomes conscious of this deep driving force from within themselves, striving is called desire. If affect and force depict the formal cause of the world’s existence, then desire is the efficient cause of the world’s existence. As Deleuze says, the doctrine of desire is a doctrine of force that has removed all ultimate referents. Unlike the concepts of desire in Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, Deleuze regards desire as tireless self-revolution, rather than lack. Of course, this does not mean that desire always gets what it wants; the production of desire must align with social production, because it is determined within concrete social assemblages. Therefore, the contradiction between the revolutionary nature of desire and the territorialization of the capitalist production machine becomes the fundamental principle of Deleuze’s analysis of capitalist social reality.

至此，情动的世界图景基本完成，最后一块拼图是“欲望”。我们维持自身行动力的存在状态是有意识的行动，如果没有欲望概念作为我们行动的驱力，情动就会成为全然被动的，借用康德的名言来理解，没有情动的欲望是空，没有欲望的情动则是盲。欲望概念来自斯宾诺莎的“努力”概念，被定义为：“一物竭力保持其存在的努力不是别的，即是那物的现实本质。”当人意识到来自自身的深层动力时，努力就被称为欲望。如果说情动和力量描绘了世界存在的形式因，那么欲望则是世界存在的动力因。正如德勒兹所言，欲望学说是去除了一切终极指涉的动力学说。与西格蒙德·弗洛伊德和雅克·拉康的欲望概念不同，德勒兹将欲望视为孜孜不倦的自我革命，而非匮乏。当然，这并不意味着欲望总会得偿所愿，欲望的生产不得不与社会生产保持一致，因为它是在具体的社会配置中被决定的。因此，欲望的革命性与资本主义生产机器的辖域化之间的矛盾就成为德勒兹分析资本主义社会现实的基本原则。

Force, desire, and affect present the basic model of Deleuze’s world-picture. In this world, we see no subject, only intensity; no reason, only passion; no analogy, only relation; no negation, only affirmation; no dialectics, only becoming. Clearly, Deleuze’s theory of affect not only responds to Hegel’s critique but also constructs an entirely new philosophical form. For Deleuze, the question of the ground of the world is far less important than the question of the becoming of the world. The negativity and transcendence upheld by Hegel’s philosophy are replaced by an affirmative, non-dialectical world. Hegel’s question is: How is the world sublated? Deleuze’s question is: How does the world generate new things?

力量、欲望和情动展现了德勒兹的世界图景的基本模型。在这个世界中，我们看不到主体，而只有强度；看不到理性，而只有激情；看不到类比，而只有关系；看不到否定，而只有肯定；看不到辩证，而只有生成。显然，德勒兹的情动理论不仅回应了黑格尔的批评，而且还构建出一种全新的哲学样态。对于德勒兹而言，关于世界之根据的问题远不如关于世界之生成的问题重要，黑格尔哲学所坚持的否定性和超验性被一个肯定的非辩证世界所取代。黑格尔的问题是：世界怎样被扬弃？德勒兹的问题是：世界如何生成新事物？

First, in ontology, Deleuze replaces the operation of negative dialectics with affirmative, non-dialectical becoming, standing entirely in opposition to Hegel’s critique. Hegel criticized Spinoza’s attributes and modes as “emerging” [*herausspringen*], lacking an immanent developmental order from substance to modes. [8]8 G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 257. Deleuze, using the theory of affect, emphasizes the necessity and openness of becoming, holding that affect is the movement of force and intensity, and that all things in the world are processes. Therefore, there is no need for negation, because negation is nothing more than what fills my capacity to be affected when my power of acting decreases. Hegel’s world is driven by the negativity of the master–slave dialectic, meaning that difference is destined to be resolved by contradiction, thereby excluding, at the level of essentialism, things that do not belong to the movement of reason. But Deleuze’s world has only potentiality, not identity; it affirms the potentiality of life itself, thus pointing toward a “line of flight” from the totalizing system of dialectics.

首先，在本体论上，德勒兹用肯定的非辩证法的生成取代了否定的辩证法的运作，全然站在了黑格尔的批评的反面。黑格尔批评斯宾诺莎的属性和样式是“冒出来”的，从实体到样式缺乏内在的发展顺序。德勒兹则用情动理论强调了生成的必要性和开放性，认为情动就是力量强度的运动，世界万物都是过程，因此没有被否定的必要，因为否定无非就是当我的行动力降低时用来充实我的受影响能力的东西。黑格尔的世界被主奴辩证法的否定性驱动，意味着差异注定要被矛盾所解决，这便在本质主义的层面排除了不属于理性运动的事物。但是，德勒兹的世界只有潜在性而没有同一性，它肯定生命本身的潜在性，因而指向了对辩证法总体性体系的“逃逸线”（ligne de fuite）。

Thus, the world of affect sheds all predetermined teleology; the Hegelian philosophy of history established by Alexandre Kojève is replaced by an open philosophy oriented toward the future. It requires neither a metaphysics of essences nor a mechanism of phenomena. In the various modes, we see no finality or pre-established harmony of moral meaning, but rather “the necessary connection between different results produced by one immanent cause.” [9]9 Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, p. 171. Therefore, many French scholars regard Spinoza as an important precursor of materialism. In such a world, there is nothing other than the actual encounter of things and the effects it produces. Ideas do not take priority over the body, nor does the body determine ideas. In Marx’s words, thought and being are always identical. Only materialism can adequately explain the expressivity and sufficiency of the world of affect.

于是，情动的世界摆脱了所有预定的目的论，科耶夫奠定的黑格尔主义的历史哲学被朝向未来的开放哲学所取代。它不需要诸本质的形而上学或者有关现象的机械论，我们在各样式之中看不到终极性，或者道德意义的前定和谐，而是“一内在原因所产生的不同结果之间的必然连接”。因此，诸多法国学者将斯宾诺莎视为唯物主义的重要先驱者。在这样的世界中，除了事物的实际相遇及其所造成的效果之外，再无其他。观念并不优先于身体，身体也不决定观念，用马克思的话说，思维与存在总是同一的。只有唯物主义才能恰当地说明情动世界的表现性和充足性。

Secondly, Deleuze’s world of affect emphasizes the relationality of the world. The world of affect abolishes all of Hegel’s determinations and categories, while also eliminating the closure of structure. For Deleuze, relation is primary; it opposes traditional philosophy while also opposing structuralism, which had a profound influence in France. In the world of affect, there is no thing that is not affected, nor any thing that does not exert influence; all solid things dissolve into infinite relations. As Deleuze says: “What I can know is always only mixed bodies.” The body is a composite, like a spider’s web extending in all directions of the world; the vibration of each thread brings about a change in the whole. Because the threads of the web are infinite in number, the rhythm of their vibrations also has infinite possibilities; the body without organs thus replaces Hegel’s organism. The relational world provides a new perspective for thinking about the operation of society. In terms of the relational world, our subjectivity and free will are merely a social illusion; they are secondary concepts formed after affect occurs. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau said, we are free, yet we are in chains. Therefore, what is important is not to analyze society with some fixed structure, but to consider the possibility of an open, constantly changing, transindividual passionate society.

其次，德勒兹的情动世界强调了世界的关系性。情动世界取消了黑格尔的一切规定和范畴，同时也消除了结构的封闭性。对德勒兹而言，关系是首位的，它在反对传统哲学的同时，也反对在法国具有深远影响的结构主义。在情动的世界中，不存在不被影响的事物，也不存在不施与影响的事物，所有坚固的东西都融化在无限的关系之中，正如德勒兹所说：“我所能认识的，永远只能是混合的物体/身体。”身体乃是一个复合体，它像一张蛛网伸向了世界的各个方向，每一根线条的震动都带来整体的改变。由于蛛网的线条无穷多，其震动的节奏也具有无限可能，无器官的身体因此取代了黑格尔的有机体。关系性的世界为思考社会的运作提供了新的视角。就关系性的世界而言，我们的主体性、自由意志不过是一种社会性幻觉，它乃是情动发生后所形成的次级观念，正如让-雅克·卢梭所言，我们虽自由，但却在枷锁之中。因此，重要的不是用某种固定的结构分析社会，而是思考一个开放的、不断变化的、跨个体的激情社会的可能。

The ethical picture of affect ultimately points to a critique of contemporary politics. Deleuze’s political philosophy differs from the rationalist tradition inaugurated by Thomas Hobbes and others. From Hobbes to Rousseau to Hegel, all emphasize the suppression of natural rights by law, viewing it as achieving moral universality through violence, intimidation, and prohibition. But Spinoza is different; he opposes moral politics with ethics. He believes that the less one understands the laws of life, the more willing one is to restrict life with legal rules and obligations; in fact, our political experience is not in conflict with affect. A political system that allows us to pursue pleasure and enhance our capacity to act is a good polity; such a politics only concerns the movement, rest, speed, and slowness of bodies. If Hegel sees tragedy as the fundamental experience of the world, Spinoza, on the contrary, holds that everything that causes us pain, sorrow, envy, and hatred is bad, so tragedy is tyranny. Ethics and politics thus share the same origin in this sense; Spinoza can therefore also be regarded as the source of Nietzsche’s doctrine of beyond good and evil. So-called moral evaluations of good and evil are merely value orientations within specific social configurations; the difference between the weak and the strong lies only in the strength of their capacity to act.

情动的伦理学图景最终指向了对当今政治的批判。德勒兹的政治哲学与托马斯·霍布斯等人所开创的理性主义传统不同，从霍布斯到卢梭、再到黑格尔，都强调法律对自然权利的压制，视其为通过暴力、恐吓、禁止而达到道德的普遍性。但是，斯宾诺莎不同，他以伦理学反对道德政治。他认为，对生命规律了解得越少，就越是愿意用法律的规则和义务限制生命；而事实上，我们的政治经验与情动并无抵触，允许我们追求快乐，增强自我行动能力的政制就是好的政体，这样的政治只关注身体的动静、快慢和运动。如果说黑格尔视悲剧为世界的基本经验，斯宾诺莎恰恰相反，他认为一切使我们痛苦、忧愁、嫉妒、仇恨的东西都是坏的，所以悲剧是暴政。伦理学与政治学在此意义上同出一源，斯宾诺莎因此亦可被视为尼采的超善恶学说的源头，所谓善与恶的道德性评价只是特定社会配置中的价值取向，弱者与强者的区别只在于行动能力的强弱。

Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of affect ultimately converges on a fundamental political question: “Why do people stubbornly fight for their servitude as if it were their salvation?” This is the political version of the question “What can a body do?” Spinoza points out in the *Theological-Political Treatise* that the excitation of painful passions is necessary for the exercise of power; tyrants, like priests, need the sorrowful affects of the common people. The current capitalist mode of production is both priest and tyrant. If one truly wants to create an ideal city-state, it is necessary to use the theory of affect to deterritorialize the territorializations of capitalism, liberating the control society into a nomadic radical becoming.

德勒兹对斯宾诺莎的情动理论的解读最终归结为一个根本的政治性问题：“为什么人们要顽固地为他们的奴役状况而战，仿佛那就是他们的救赎？”这是“身体能做什么”这一问题的政治学版本。斯宾诺莎在《神学政治论》中指出，激发痛苦的激情对于施行权力是必须的，暴君与神父一样，都需要庶民的悲苦情动，当今资本主义的生产方式既是神父也是暴君，若想要真正地创制一个理想的城邦，就要通过情动理论对资本主义的辖域化进行解域操作，将控制社会解放为游牧的激进生成。

III. An Affective Critique of Capitalism

三、对资本主义的情动批判

The capitalism described by Deleuze is the new form of capitalism since the second half of the 20th century. Due to the development of post-Fordism, compared with Marx’s era, non-material production such as images, signs, and emotions has become an important object of production under the logic of capital. In the words of Antonio Negri, capital’s formal subsumption of labor has become real subsumption. In this context, “cynicism” and “piety” are two main affects, representing two contradictory aspects of contemporary capitalism.

德勒兹笔下的资本主义是20世纪下半叶以来资本主义的新形态。由于后福特制的发展，与马克思所处的时代相比，图像、符号和情感等非物质生产成为了当今资本逻辑的重要生产对象，用安东尼奥·奈格里的话说，资本对劳动的形式吸纳变成了实质吸纳。在这种背景下，“犬儒主义”与“虔诚”是两种主要的情动，它们代表了当今资本主义相互矛盾的两方面。

On the one hand, contemporary capitalism liberates the coded flows of desire. Deleuze points out: “This cynical age is the age of capital accumulation—an age that means bringing together all decoded and deterritorialized flows.” As Marx and Engels said in the *Communist Manifesto*: “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.” In the cynical age, capital’s sole concern is its own self-expansion; as the universal equivalent, money possesses only an abstract value form, and the qualitative differences of things are forcibly leveled under exchange value. To achieve total domination over society, new forms of production draw energy from personal life; everyday domains such as emotions are also permeated by production. In the universality of production, life and work are indistinguishable; everyone is an exploited proletarian. Any subjective characteristic that manifests what it means to be human is ultimately directed into the production trap of “the consumer person.” Therefore, desire is not a product of individual fantasy but a collective investment of social production. In today’s consumer society and biopolitics, people no longer care about anything except profit and accumulation. Desire becomes numb; pleasure and pain become insignificant in the new social spectacle; nothing novel can escape being incorporated into the everyday game of consumption. If the body once could feel changes in affect, in the current capitalist society it has lost this fundamental potential. The seemingly open, constantly changing connections of the body have not created objects or lives different from commodified ones; the body’s power to act has not been liberated but has fallen into complete indifference.

一方面，当今资本主义解放了被编码的欲望流。德勒兹指出：“这个犬儒的时代是资本积累的时代——这个时代意味着将所有解码和解辖域化的流结合在一起。”正如马克思恩格斯在《共产党宣言》中所说：“一切等级的和固定的东西都烟消云散了，一切神圣的东西都被亵渎了。”在犬儒的时代，资本唯一关注的就是自身的增殖，作为一般等价物的货币只拥有抽象的价值形式，事物所具有的质性差异在交换价值之下被强行敉平。为了实现对社会的总体性占有，新的生产形式从个人生活中汲取能量，情感等日常生活领域也被生产所渗透。在生产的普遍性中，生活与工作无法区分，每个人都是被剥削的无产阶级，任何彰显人之为人的主体性特征都最终被导向了“消费的人”这一生产陷阱。因此，欲望不是个人幻想的产物，而是社会生产的集体性投资。在如今的消费社会与生命政治中，除了利润和积累之外，人们不再关注任何事情。欲望变得麻木不仁，快乐与痛苦在新的社会景观中变得毫不起眼，没有什么新奇的东西不能被纳入消费的日常游戏之中。如果说曾经的身体还能够感受情动的变化，那么在当下的资本主义社会，它丧失了这一根本的潜能。看似开放的、不断变化的身体连接并没有创造出不同于商品化的物品和生活，身体的行动力量没有得到解放，而是陷入了彻底的漠不关心。

On the other hand, the affect of piety sets up new territorializations in society to capture the flows of desire liberated by the affect of cynicism. Piety is the result of the family machine in capitalist society, and the family machine follows the Oedipal structure of “father—mother—I.” In Deleuze’s view, the private reproduction carried out by the family depoliticizes and privatizes the fluidity of social production. The family is an artificial god; it replaces mystical religion as the religion of modern people, and the father becomes a dictator. Deleuze analyzes a classic case of Freudian psychoanalysis, arguing that psychoanalysis deliberately erases the social and historical field, eternalizing the historical family. In the famous case of Judge Schreber, “the delirium is entirely expressed in race, history, and war, but Freud does not analyze these things and reductively confines Judge Schreber’s delirium exclusively to his relationship with his father.” Anti-Oedipus means opposing the false repression brought by psychoanalysis; private individuality and the desire for the mother are merely false representations caused by the affect of piety.

另一方面，虔诚这种情动在社会中设置了新的辖域，用以捕获被犬儒这种情动所解放的欲望流。虔诚是资本主义社会中家庭机器导致的结果，而家庭机器遵循着“父亲—母亲—我”这一俄狄浦斯结构。在德勒兹看来，家庭进行的私人化的再生产对社会生产的流动性进行了去政治化和私有化的再现。家庭是一个人造神，它取代了神秘宗教成为现代人的宗教，父亲成为独裁者。德勒兹分析了弗洛伊德精神分析的一个经典案例，认为精神分析刻意抹除了社会和历史场域，将历史性的家庭永恒化了。在史瑞伯法官这一著名病例中，“谵妄完全表现在种族、历史和战争之中，而弗洛伊德对这些事物则不加分析，并将史瑞伯法官的谵妄排他性地约简到他和他父亲的关系上来”。反俄狄浦斯便是反对精神分析带来的虚假压抑，私人的个体性与对母亲的欲望都只是虔诚这一情动所引发的错误表象。

Thus, the tension between indifferent cynicism and emotional piety shapes modern capitalism; all intensities dissolved in social production are rediscovered within the family. Modern capitalism is a strange combination of extreme indifference and extreme hedonism; the two seemingly contradictory affects are actually six of one and half a dozen of the other—piety defends cynicism. In the Oedipus complex, the exaltation of personal matters creates a false subjectivity; capitalism, in the name of defending individual values, cuts off truly common affairs, so desire can only be directed toward the superficial spectacles of profit and consumption. The intensity of our bodily affects is thus determined by the attraction and repulsion within these two desire machines. Paolo Virno gives a vivid example: a film projectionist, after a hard day’s work, goes to see a movie and then cries bitterly. Capitalism’s unique mode of organization constantly provokes its own limits while simultaneously introducing new axioms; complete deterritorialization is always out of reach. Therefore, although capitalism is its own gravedigger, it continuously delays this event.

于是，漠不关心的犬儒主义与充满情感的虔诚之间的张力形塑了现代资本主义，所有在社会生产中被消解的强度都在家庭之中重新被找回。现代资本主义是极端冷漠与极度享乐主义的奇怪结合体，两种看似矛盾的情动实际上半斤八两，虔诚保卫了犬儒主义。在俄狄浦斯情结中，对个人事物的推崇塑造了虚假的主体性，资本主义借捍卫个人价值之名割断了真正的共同之事，于是欲望只能被导向利润和消费的肤浅景观。我们身体之情动的强度便被这两种欲望机器之中的引力和斥力所决定。保罗·维尔诺举了一个生动的例子：电影放映员在结束了一天的辛苦工作后跑去看电影，然后大哭一场。资本主义独特的组织方式在不断挑衅自身界限的同时，又不断引入新的公理，完全的去辖域化总是可望而不可及。因此，资本主义虽然是自己的掘墓人，但又在不断地延迟这种情况的发生。

When the religion of the family is seen through, capitalism develops new means of delay. Deleuze, in “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” calls such a society the “society of control.” *Anti-Oedipus* was published in 1972, and “Postscript on the Societies of Control” was written in 1992. The twenty years of capitalist development and change led Deleuze to a new judgment: if the opposition between the family and capital constituted the disciplinary society, where the continuity of capital was segmented into concrete social spaces such as prisons, reformatories, and families, then in the neoliberal society of control, the control of mobility becomes the core of the operation of the production machine. In fact, in Foucault’s discussion of biopolitics in the late 1970s, we can also see a similar shift. Foucault believed that the contemporary configuration of power greatly encourages the circulation of goods and populations. The society of control discovers that the affect of “cynicism” is irresistible, and that the family has long since integrated into the process of globalization. So it turns around and hypocritically embraces mobility, using digital technology and computers to transform capitalism from a mole stably dwelling in its burrow into a snake moving everywhere. Deleuze says: “People are no longer confronted with the pair individual–mass; the individual becomes a ‘dividual,’ and the mass becomes samples, data, markets, or ‘banks.’” The “dividual” is the new mode of the individual. In the past, capitalism, in order to clamp down on the production of desire, had to use the family to create a false individuality. The development of information technology makes the surveillance of mobility possible. Data, samples, markets, and banks are all divisible forms of the person. Thus, no matter how the flow of desire creates new connections, the society of control can “determine each person’s legitimate or illegitimate position and carry out universal modulation.” Therefore, punishment is replaced by modulation, the factory becomes the enterprise, and flexible working methods replace fixed spatial segmentation. The Oedipal family has not so much disappeared as reappeared in another guise. If the family shaped piety, then the society of control, as Foucault says, triggers the affect of “fear.” The neoliberal society of control is a mixture of arrogance and caution: on the one hand, it incites the game of freedom; on the other, it informs the world of danger. It appears to encourage laissez-faire, but in reality it is merely following the rules of economic rationality. Apart from continuously increasing investment in the capital market, people no longer have any truly courageous actions. The only way the world encounters us is through probability. In uncertain encounters, people are filled with a pre-empirical fear of this world. Fear is the precondition for the establishment of the neoliberal society of control.

当家庭这种宗教被看穿，资本主义又发展出新的手段进行拖延。德勒兹在《控制社会后记》中称这样的社会为“控制社会”。《反俄狄浦斯》出版于1972年，《控制社会后记》写于1992年，资本主义20年的发展变化让德勒兹作出了新的判断：如果说家庭与资本之间的对立是规训社会，资本的连续性被分割为监狱、教养所、家庭等具体的社会空间，那么在新自由主义的控制社会中，对流动性的控制成为生产机器运作的核心。其实，在1970年代末期福柯关于生命政治的论述中，我们也能看到类似的转向。福柯认为，当今的权力配置极大地鼓励了货物与人口的流通。控制社会发现，“犬儒主义”这种情动势不可当，家庭早已融入到全球化的进程中，于是它转过头来虚情假意地拥抱流动，利用数字技术和计算机使资本主义从稳定居住于巢穴中的鼹鼠转变为四处流动的蛇。德勒兹说：“人们不再面对整体—个体这一偶对，个体变成了‘可分体’，整体变成了样品、数据、市场或‘银行’。”“可分体”是新的个体模式，从前资本主义为了钳制欲望的生产，不得不用家庭创造虚假的个体性，信息技术的发展则使得对流动的监视变为可能，数据、样品、市场和银行都是人的可分形态。于是，无论欲望的流动如何创造新的连接，控制社会都可以“测定每个人合法或不合法的位置，进行着普遍调制”。因此，惩罚被调制取代，工厂变为企业，灵活的工作方式代替了固定的空间分解。俄狄浦斯的家庭与其说消亡了，不如说以另一种样貌重新出现。如果说家庭塑造了虔诚，那么控制社会则如福柯所言，引发了“恐惧”这种情动。新自由主义的控制社会是自大与谨慎的混合体：一方面煽动自由的游戏，另一方面则告知世界的危险；看似鼓励放任自由，实际上不过是遵循经济理性的照章行事。除了不断在资本市场加大投资，人们再也没有任何真正的勇敢之举。世界与我们的唯一相遇方式就是概率，在不确定的相遇中，人们对这个世界充满前经验性的恐惧。恐惧是新自由主义的控制社会成立的前提。

In order to completely break free from the capitalist production machine, Deleuze believes it is necessary to find affects that do not limit our joy, such as turning the body into a war machine, maximizing the power of existence and the power of action of the self. Deleuze summarizes: “The mechanism of the war machine is the mechanism of affect; it relates only to moving bodies themselves, to speeds, and to the compositions of speeds among elements. … Affects, like weapons, are projective, while emotions, like tools, are introjective.” In history, the war machine is the nomad opposing the state apparatus; in life, the war machine is the schizophrenic always outside the discourse system; in the society of control, the war machine is the minority of the destitute. “Capitalism retains the extreme poverty of two-thirds of humanity as a constant: control will not only have to confront the erosion of borders but also the eruption of slums or ethnic enclaves.” The affect of the war machine summons the multitude.

为了彻底摆脱资本主义的生产机器，德勒兹认为需要找到使我们的快乐不受限制的情动，比如把身体变为战争机器，将自身的存在之力和行动之力最大化。德勒兹总结道：“战争机器的机制是情动的机制，它只与运动的物体自身、速度以及元素之间的速度的复合相关。……情动如武器，是投射性的，而情感则如工具，是内投性的。”在历史中，战争机器是与国家机器对抗的游牧民；在生活中，战争机器是始终在话语体系之外的精神分裂者；在控制社会中，战争机器是少数的赤贫者。“资本主义将三分之二的人类的极端贫困作为常数保留下来：控制不仅将要面对边界的消耗，还将要面对贫民窟或少数民族集中区的爆发。”战争机器的情动召唤诸众。

In sum, Deleuze’s critique of capitalism is closely linked to his theory of affect. From his analysis of affect, we can discover the hidden dimension of contemporary capitalist production. Cynicism, piety, and fear are not the results of production but the political ontology of capitalism. Through the absorption of pre-subjective affects, capital forms a fundamental state of submission of the body. The critique of capitalism by the theory of affect makes us aware of the importance of developing a materialist theory of desire. This is a creative interpretation of Marxism; it impels us to explore the state apparatus that regulates desire and to attempt to understand the falsity of the worldview we take for granted, thereby helping us to recognize the new forms of contemporary capitalist development, whether we call such a society biopolitics or consumer society. However, it should also be noted that Deleuze’s critique of capitalism is clearly too abstract. Without touching on ownership and the relations of production based on wage labor, all liberation is out of the question; fundamental change will only degenerate into an aesthetic pursuit of art and literature. How a society full of difference can be organized, and how the body without organs can answer questions of intersubjectivity and social norms—these are our questions regarding Deleuze’s theory of affect.

总之，德勒兹的资本主义批判与其情动理论紧密相联，我们可以从其情动分析中发现当代资本主义生产的隐秘维度。犬儒主义、虔诚和恐惧并非生产的结果，而是资本主义的政治本体论。资本通过对前主体的情动的吸纳，形成了身体根本上的屈从状态。情动理论对资本主义的批判使我们意识到发展一种唯物主义的欲望理论的重要性。这是对马克思主义富有创造力的解读，它促使我们探求规制欲望的国家机器，并尝试理解我们视之为理所当然的世界观的虚假性，进而有助于我们认清当下资本主义发展的新样态，不论我们将这样的社会称为生命政治还是消费社会。但是，也应当看到，德勒兹的资本主义批判显然过于抽象，如果不触及所有制以及以雇佣劳动为基础的生产关系，一切解放都无从谈起，根本性的变革只会沦为对艺术和文学的美学化追求。一个充满差异的社会如何组织，无器官的身体如何能够回答主体间性和社会规范问题，这是我们对德勒兹的情动理论的质疑。

(Author’s bio: Hu Yaohui: School of Marxism, Renmin University of China)

（作者简介：胡耀辉：中国人民大学马克思主义学院）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心