Breaking the Predicament of Social “Institution”: Castoriadis’s Critical Interpretation

Cornelius Castoriadis was a Greek-French thinker filled with intense revolutionary passion, once called “the last Western Marxist” by Axel Honneth. Starting from the practical dimension of Marxism, he resisted theoretical dogma and sought an autonomous project of liberation. The trajectory of Castoriadis’s thought is not a purely philosophical reflection moving from theory to theory; rather, it uses practice to open the door to the deconstruction and construction of theory, ultimately hoping to return through this door to the real picture of “changing the world.” The entire development of his theory can be unified through the concept of “institution” (jianzhi).

科内利乌斯·卡斯托里亚迪斯是一位充满强烈革命激情的希腊裔法国思想家，曾被阿克塞尔·霍耐特称为“最后的西方马克思主义者”。他从马克思主义的实践向度出发，抗拒理论教条，谋求自主的解放规划。卡斯托里亚迪斯的思想脉络并不是单纯从理论到理论的哲学思考，而是以实践开启了对理论进行解构与建构的大门，最终希望通过这扇门回到“改变世界”的现实图景中。其全部理论发展过程可以通过“建制”（institution）概念来统领。

I. The Logic of the Emergence of “Institution”

一、“建制”的出场逻辑

The concept of “institution” holds an important position in Castoriadis’s theory. In his view, only by deeply examining social institutions and elucidating their imaginary characteristics can people truly engage in sustained and effective practice, thereby criticizing already solidified social beliefs and ultimately proposing new “figures of the thinkable.” In a general sense, “institution” in the Chinese context refers to systems and organizations, and most domestic scholarship on Castoriadis’s concept also follows this usage. However, the author believes that understanding it as “jianzhi” (institution as a process) better highlights its original meaning. The reason is that jianzhi emphasizes a dynamic, sustainable process of construction, displaying agency and temporality; whereas “system” (zhidu) more reflects a ready-made, passively implemented result, displaying passivity and rigidity. The French sociological tradition and Marx’s theory of alienation are important intellectual resources and dialogical content for Castoriadis’s turn to the study of institution.

“建制”概念在卡斯托里亚迪斯的理论中具有重要地位。在他看来，只有深刻审视社会建制并阐明其想象特征，人们才能真正进行持续有效的实践，从而对已经固化的社会信仰予以批判，最终提出崭新的“可思的指象”（figures of the thinkable）。一般意义上，“institution”在中文语境中指的是制度、机构，国内学界对卡斯托里亚迪斯这一概念的理解大多亦沿用此意。但是，笔者认为，将其理解为“建制”更能凸显其原意。原因在于，建制强调的是一种动态的、可持续的建构过程，显示出能动性、暂时性；而制度则更多地体现既成的、消极执行的结果，显示出被动性、固化性。法国的社会学传统和马克思的异化理论是卡斯托里亚迪斯转向建制研究的重要思想资源和对话内容。

The core foundation and original contribution of Émile Durkheim’s sociological theory are embodied in the concept of “institution,” which is also an important theme in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophical reflections. In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim first defines “social facts.” He points out that not all social phenomena can be subsumed under “social facts”; otherwise, sociology would have no object of study of its own. “Social facts” are actually “a class of facts of a very special nature. These facts consist of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling that exist outside the individual but possess a coercive power that compels the individual to obey.” Durkheim calls these forms, which are independent of human will and yet constrain human thought and behavior, “institution”: “There is a word which, if its general meaning is slightly extended, can precisely express this extremely special mode of existence, and that is the word ‘institution.’ In fact, without distorting the original meaning of the word, we can call all beliefs and modes of behavior established by the collective ‘institutions.’ Sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis, and their functioning.” For Durkheim, using “social” as the qualifier fundamentally highlights the universality and coerciveness of institution. However, Castoriadis transforms this qualifier into “imaginary,” emphasizing the illusory and changeable nature of institution, much like the slogan “All power to the imagination” in the May 1968 movement. Similarly, in this sense (that institutions created by humans ultimately turn against humans), Castoriadis turns his attention to Marx’s theory of alienation.

埃米尔·涂尔干社会学理论的内核基底及原创贡献即体现在“建制”概念上，该概念也是莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂晚期哲学反思的重要主题。在《社会学方法的准则》中，涂尔干首先对“社会事实”进行了界定。他指出，并不是一切社会现象都可以用“社会事实”统括之，否则社会学就没有自己的研究对象了，“社会事实”实际上是“一类具有非常特殊性质的事实。这类事实由存在于个人身体之外，但又具有使个人不能不服从的强制力的行为方式、思维方式和感觉方式构成”。涂尔干将这种不以人的意志为转移、同时又制约着人的思想行为的诸多形式称为“institution”：“有一个词只要把它的一般含义稍微扩大，就可以确切表达这个极其特殊的存在方式，这就是‘institution’（制度）一词。实际上，我们可以不曲解这个词的原意，而把一切由集体所确定的信仰和行为方式称为‘institution’。这样就可以把社会学界定为关于制度及其产生与功能的科学。”在涂尔干那里，以“社会的”作为定语从根本上凸显了建制所具有的普遍性和强制性。然而，卡斯托里亚迪斯却将这一定语转换为“想象的”，强调建制的虚幻性和可变性，就像1968年五月风暴运动中的口号“一切权力归于想象”一样。同样是在这个意义上（即由人创造的建制最终会反制人），卡斯托里亚迪斯将目光转向了马克思的异化理论。

Castoriadis argues: “Institution is a socially sanctioned symbolic network in which functional and imaginary parts combine in varying proportions. When the imaginary element within the institution becomes autonomous and plays a dominant role, alienation arises, leading the institution to occupy an autonomous and dominant position relative to society.” This autonomization process of institution manifests in social life as a powerful “material force” in the Marxian sense, thereby reversing the roles of host and guest so that society is unaware that it is merely its own product. Marx undoubtedly recognized this as well. When he elucidated commodity fetishism and its importance to the operation of capitalism, he clearly transcended a purely economic perspective to reveal the alienating consequences of imaginary institution. In concretely exposing that Germany suffered both from the development of capitalist production and from its lack of development, Marx further pointed out: “Besides modern disasters, we are oppressed by many inherited disasters arising from the survival of antiquated modes of production, along with their anachronistic social and political relations. Not only the living make us suffer, but the dead also make us suffer. The dead seize the living!” From this perspective, Georg Lukács’s “reified consciousness,” Antonio Gramsci’s “cultural hegemony,” Theodor Adorno’s logic of “identity,” and Henri Lefebvre’s “mystified consciousness” all become concrete alienated institutions under capitalism. At the same time, the solutions they respectively proposed—proletarian consciousness, positional warfare, negative dialectics, and the critique of everyday life—are essentially, in Castoriadis’s sense, various possibilities for renewing existing institutions from the imaginary dimension. As Hans Joas also points out, Castoriadis did not set aside Marx’s thought; his theory of institution directly confronts the concept of alienation. However, “what is decisive for the problem of alienation is not the nature of the institution itself, but the relationship between society and its institutions.” Joas not only grasps the practical interest behind the phenomenon of institution from a holistic perspective of internal relations—that is, seeking to establish a new relationship between society and institution—but also thereby regards Castoriadis as an “anti-structuralist.” In short, what Castoriadis seeks to accomplish is the continuous reshaping of all existing human institutions. Institution is not determined once and for all; it always exists as a present reality and must be constantly scrutinized. On this basis, Castoriadis follows psychoanalytic theory, dialogues with Marx’s thought, inherits the French sociological tradition, and constructs a unique theoretical logic concerning the concept of institution.

卡斯托里亚迪斯认为：“建制是一种被社会认可的象征网络，其中的功能性部分和想象性部分会以不同的比例关系结合。当建制中的想象元素变得自主且发挥主导作用时，便产生了异化，从而导致建制相对于社会而言具有自主的和主导的地位。”建制的这种自主化过程在社会生活中呈现为强烈的、马克思意义上的“物质力量”，从而反客为主地使社会意识不到其不过是它自身的产物。马克思无疑也认识到了这一点。当他阐明商品拜物教及其对资本主义经济运行的重要性时，显然已经超越了纯粹的经济视域，为的是揭示想象性建制的异化后果。在具体揭露德国既苦于资本主义生产的发展、又苦于它的不发展时，马克思更是进一步指出：“除了现代的灾难而外，压迫着我们的还有许多遗留下来的灾难，这些灾难的产生，是由于古老的、陈旧的生产方式以及伴随着它们的过时的社会关系和政治关系还在苟延残喘。不仅活人使我们受苦，而且死人也使我们受苦。死人抓住活人！”从这个角度来说，格奥尔格·卢卡奇的“物化意识”、安东尼奥·葛兰西的“文化霸权”、西奥多·阿多诺的“同一性”逻辑以及亨利·列斐伏尔的“神秘化意识”，都成了资本主义背景下具体的异化建制。与此同时，他们分别提出的无产阶级意识、阵地战、否定辩证法以及日常生活批判等解决途径，在本质上也都是卡斯托里亚迪斯意义上从想象维度去更新既往建制的诸多可能。亦如汉斯·约阿斯所指出的，卡斯托里亚迪斯并没有撇开马克思的思想，其关于建制的理论直面的正是异化概念，然而“对异化问题具有决定性作用的，并非建制本身的性质，而是社会与其建制之间的关系”。约阿斯不仅从一种整体性的内在关系视域中，即谋求建立社会与建制的新型关系中，抓住了建制现象背后的实践旨趣，也由此将卡斯托里亚迪斯视为一名“反结构主义者”。概言之，卡斯托里亚迪斯想要完成的是对一切人类既存建制的不断重塑。建制并不是被一劳永逸地决定了的，而总是作为当下而存在的，也是需要被不断审视的。基于此，卡斯托里亚迪斯遵循精神分析理论，对话马克思的思想，传承法国社会学的传统，构建了独特的关于建制概念的理论逻辑。

II. Significations, Meaning, and Language

二、意指、意义和语言

In Castoriadis’s view, “institution” is actually condensed from social imaginary significations. In *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, Castoriadis regards signification as “an indeterminate mass of references directed toward some other, an infinity of references.” The emphasis here lies in the terms “indeterminate” and “infinity,” because they indicate the continuous flow of meaning. In fact, significations and meaning both denote a symbolic function and can sometimes be used interchangeably. However, significations are closer to the ontological level of meaning than meaning is. If meaning is a concrete meaning, then significations are meaning itself, or meaning in general. Meaning is a static object temporarily halted at a certain point of suture, while significations always remain in Ernst Bloch’s state of “not-yet”—that is, always in a state before “suture,” yet possibly undergoing suture at any moment. From Jacques Lacan’s perspective, it better fits the characteristic of a “floating signifier.” Literally, significations can be directly seen as “the pointing of meaning”; it is a state in the process of occurring. We focus on the present moment, but the present moment immediately becomes the past. From the four-directional flow of time, one can perceive the flow of significations. Therefore, contrary to the principles of structuralism, significations do not provide a series of fixed relations; instead, they erupt like a “magma” that carries neither obvious elements nor clear limits. It constitutes a key term for Castoriadis’s opposition to holism through an open totality.

在卡斯托里亚迪斯看来，“建制”实际上由社会想象意指（social imaginary significations）凝结而成。在《社会的想象性建制》中，卡斯托里亚迪斯把意指看作“一团不确定的、面向某个他者的无穷性指向”。这里的重点体现在“不确定的”和“无穷性”这两个术语上，因为它们表明的是意义（meaning）的不断流动过程。实际上，意指和意义都表示一种象征作用，甚至有时候可以互换。但是，意指较意义更接近意义的本体层面。如果意义是一种具体的意义，那么意指就是意义本身，或者一般的意义。意义是在某个缝合点上暂时停留下来的静态物，而意指则始终处在恩斯特·布洛赫的那种“尚未”状态中，即始终处于“缝合”前的状态，却也可能立即会发生缝合。从雅克·拉康的角度讲，它更符合一种“漂浮的能指”的特质。就字面意义来说，可以直接把意指看作“意义的指向”，它是一种处于正在发生之中的状态。我们现在关注着此刻，但此刻又马上成为了彼刻。从时间的四向流动中，可以体察到意指的流动。因此，与结构主义原理相对，意指并不能提供一系列固定关系，却会喷发出一种既不带明显要素、也不含明确限制的“熔岩”（magma）。它构成了卡斯托里亚迪斯以开放的总体性反对整体主义的关键术语。

The fundamental reason Castoriadis introduces the concept of the signifying into theoretical analysis is a return to revolutionary Marxism and a refutation of dogmatized Marxism. The signifying functions to combine imaginary signification with social institution, thereby helping Castoriadis complete the following shift: from a perspective of political economy and sociological analysis within the overall framework of Marxism to an interpretation of the rational construction of society through psychoanalysis, so that the signifying process of the subject's psyche is presented at the social level in the form of the signifying, and then turns toward "post-Marxism." In Castoriadis's view, "history is that domain in which meaning is 'presented' and things become meaningful. Yet these meanings can never be exhausted or closed in on themselves; each meaning points elsewhere, and no thing or particular historical fact can convey a meaning entirely on its own. No unique thing can generate an interpretable meaning detached from the social context that produces it, nor can it impose a single and inevitable meaning on human activity." This interpretation and affirmation of indeterminacy is rooted both in classical discourse analysis theory and, through the signifying, advances a decentered viewpoint.

卡斯托里亚迪斯之所以把意指概念引入理论分析中，从根本上来说是对革命性的马克思主义的一种回归，也是对教条化的马克思主义的反驳。意指充当着把想象表意与社会建制相结合的功能，从而帮助卡斯托里亚迪斯完成了如下转变：从马克思主义整体框架内的政治经济学和社会学分析视角转向通过精神分析对社会的合理建构进行解读，使主体心灵的表意过程在社会层面以意指的形式呈现出来，进而转向“后马克思主义”。在卡斯托里亚迪斯看来，“历史是这样一种领域，其中意义得以‘呈现’，而事物也变得有意义了。然而，这些意义从来不能就其自身而穷尽或封闭起来；每一种意义都在指向别处，没有任何事物或特殊的历史事实能够完全基于自身而传递出一种意义。没有任何独特的事物能够脱离产生它的社会背景而生发出可解读的意义，它也不可能对人类活动强加出单一的和不可避免的意义”。这种对不确定性的解释和肯定，既根植于经典的话语分析理论中，同时又通过意指提出了一种去中心化的观点。

The signifying has two inseparable functions: finitude and infinitude. The dialectical relationship between the two enables the signifying to encompass all things within its own horizon in a commensurable way, allowing them to be grasped and developed on the same dimension. Finitude and infinitude can also be understood as concreteness and abstractness: the concrete presents reality, the abstract reflects essence, and their mutual transformation is the operative mechanism of the signifying in society. Analogous to Marx's explanation of the commensurability of value (i.e., the homogenization of all commodities through the mediation of abstract labor), the signifying primarily accomplishes this process through language.

意指具有两种不可分割的作用，即有限性与无限性。两者之间的辩证关系使意指能够以可通约的方式把一切事物囊括到自身的视域中，令其得以在同一个维度上进行把握和发展。有限性与无限性实际上也可以理解为具体性与抽象性：〖JP+1〗在具体中呈现出现实，在抽象中反映出本质，它们之间的相互转化即为意指在社会中的运作机制。类似于马克思说明价值的通约性（即以抽象劳动为中介使一切商品同质化），意指主要通过语言来完成这一过程。

Castoriadis points out that the process by which society presents and organizes the world is actually a process of "saying" (legein), namely "distinguishing—choosing—positioning—assembling—calculating—saying." Language, as a system of aggregation or a relation of aggregation, refers on the one hand to saying, and on the other hand to the magma of the signifying. These two aspects correspond precisely to finitude and infinitude. "The aggregation of the world by society through institution is not simply accomplished by language as a code, as 'legein'—that is, not by language as a tool acting upon external things. On the contrary, it is embodied and realized in language itself; it presents itself in 'legein' as the product of a self-mechanism. Only through such aggregation can language become a code." That is, language itself reflects the social process of aggregation; as a self-mechanism, it reflects the self-construction of the human world. This is highly consistent with Martin Heidegger's later understanding of logos. According to Heidegger's investigation, "logos" evolved from "legein." Aristotle defined man as a speaking animal, which is the most basic and most important definition of man, because truth must be expressed through "legein." "Legein" first takes up the function of revealing truth. "Human existence is also the activity of revealing truth, i.e., the activity of unconcealment, and unconcealment is realized through language. The way language reveals truth is first of all the saying (logos) of things." This basically reflects Heidegger's early interpretive perspective on logos, but in his later period he no longer emphasized logos's capacity for "synthesis" and unconcealment, instead regarding logos as the capacity for "gathering" and "collecting." "Since early thought, 'Being' has meant the presencing of what is present in the sense of a clearing-concealing gathering, and logos (logos) has been thought and named as this gathering." This process of moving Being from "manifest" to "concealed" is also the transition from the natural world to human society: the former clears Being through unconcealment, the latter gathers Being through concealment. Castoriadis believes that this gathering is precisely the signifying function that "legein" itself exerts from the linguistic dimension.

卡斯托里亚迪斯指出，社会呈现和组织世界的过程实际上是一个“言说”（legein）的过程，即“区分—选择—定位—装配—计算—言说”。语言作为一种聚合的体系或者聚合的关系，一方面指的是言说，另一方面则指向意指的熔岩。这两方面实际对应的就是有限性与无限性。“社会通过建制而对世界的聚合，并不是简单地由语言作为一种代码、作为‘legein’来完成的，也就是说，不是由语言作为一种作用于其外部事物的工具来完成的。相反，它是在语言本身中化身和实现的；它在‘legein’中得以作为一种自我机制的产物而呈现。只有通过这样的聚合，语言才能成为一种代码。”也就是说，语言本身反映着社会的聚合过程，它作为一种自我机制反映着人类世界的自我构造。这与马丁·海德格尔晚年对逻各斯（logos）的理解高度一致。经海德格尔考证,“logos”是从“legein”演变而来的。亚里士多德把人定义成一种会说话的动物，这是对人最基本的、也是最重要的规定，因为真理要靠“legein”来表现。“legein”首先接过了揭示真理的功能。“人的存在同时也是揭示真理的活动，即解蔽活动，而解蔽又是通过语言来实现的。语言揭示真理的方式首先就是事物的言说（logos）。”这基本上反映出海德格尔早期对逻各斯的解读视角，但他后期却不再强调逻各斯这种“综合”与解蔽的能力，而把逻各斯视为“聚集”“采集”的能力。“自早期思想以来，‘存在’就是指澄明着—遮蔽着的聚集意义上的在场者之在场，而逻各斯（logos）就是作为这种聚集而被思考和命名的。”这种令存在从“显”到“隐”的过程，也是从自然世界向人类社会过渡的过程，前者以解蔽的方式澄明存在，后者以遮蔽的方式聚合存在。卡斯托里亚迪斯认为，这种聚合恰恰是“legein”本身从语言维度发挥出的意指功能。

Therefore, Castoriadis not only opposes the view that the signified can only present a dimension of meaning through the "real," but also opposes the deterministic structuralist framework presented in the relations among a series of signifieds. Language as a code cannot endow itself with signifying content, nor can objects exist outside symbolic relations. Contrary to the purpose of meaning, an object can neither be fully determined by nor completely identical to its reference; this is the manifestation of the signifying. The object is not instituted as a universal form that can fully master what it points to. On the contrary, relative to its reference, it will present itself as "something less," or as a simple point of reference (point de repérage), in order to properly serve its use. However, it is precisely due to this looseness that it can also indicate "something more" beyond its reference, or indicate what cannot be directly spoken and the intentional object. Castoriadis explains the signifying from the perspective of language:

因此，卡斯托里亚迪斯不仅反对所指只能借助“真实”（real）才能呈现出意义向度的观点，更反对在与一系列所指的关系中所呈现出的确定性的结构主义框架。语言作为代码不能赋予自身以意指内容，对象也不能在符号关系之外存在。与意义的目的相反，对象既不能完全决定于、也不能彻底同一于它的指向，这就是意指的表现。对象并不会被建制为一种普遍的形式，能够完全掌握它所指向的东西。相反，较其指向而言，它将呈现为“更少的所在”（something less），或者呈现为一种简单的指向点（point de reperage），以期恰如其分地发挥它的用途。然而，也正是由于这种松散性，使它亦能够表明超越其指向的“更多的所在”（something more），或者表明不可直接言说之物以及意向物。卡斯托里亚迪斯从语言的角度对意指进行了解释：

In the fundamental sense, language always offers the possibility of taking the meaning it conveys as a whole, and this whole is composed of terms with the following properties: determinate, strictly limited, identical to themselves and different from others, separable, and independent. Equally important, it always offers the possibility of the emergence of new terms and the redefinition of relations among existing terms, thereby enabling these existing terms to be redefined without detaching from their relations. Conversely, the realization of this possibility depends on the fact that the relations among many previously given terms are inexhaustible, and these terms themselves are indeterminate. Because at any moment, the emergence of a new signifying cannot be represented as an external addition that leaves the already existing intact. Significations are not a set apart from any set that can be extracted or constructed from them; their mode of existence resides in another dimension, namely magma.

在根本的意义上，语言总会提供出这样一种可能性，即把它所传达的意义视为一个整体，而这个整体又由具有如下性质的术语组成，即确定的、保持严格限定的、同一于自身又异于他者的、可分离的以及独立性的术语。同样重要的是，它会始终提供新术语出现的可能性，并重新定义现有术语之间的关系，进而使得这些现有术语在不脱离其关系的前提下也获得了重新定义。反过来说，这种可能性的实现有赖于这样的事实，即先前诸多既定术语之间的关系是取之不尽、用之不竭的，而这些术语本身也是不确定的。因为在任何时候，一个崭新意指的出现都不能被表示为一种外部加成，从而留下完整的、已经存在的东西。除了可以从中提取或构造出的任何集合之外，意指都不是一个集合；它们的存在方式寓于另一种维度中，即熔岩。

Therefore, the magma of the signifying contained in language presupposes such plasticity: the impetus to see more than a thing in a thing. This is the capacity to shape new significations, or the possibility of shaping new connections among inexhaustible significations. Castoriadis points out: "Every signification in language is analogous to the signification of the psyche, referring to an infinity of other significations or other significations. Here, this referential structure is fundamental; it obtains effective expression in the psyche and in the field of psychoanalysis, although this is the process of free association." From the perspective of discourse analysis, language establishes a discourse, similar to Jacques Derrida's claim that "there is nothing outside the text." Everything must be analyzed within the relational existence of discourse, just as everything must be analyzed within the referentiality of the signifying. As a direct manifestation of the universal characteristic of human beings, linguistic capacity makes infinite creation possible.

因此，语言中所蕴含的意指熔岩预设了这样的可塑性，即从某一事物那里看到了多于这一事物的动力。这是一种塑造新的表意的能力，或者说在不可穷尽的表意之间塑造新的连结的可能。卡斯托里亚迪斯指出：“语言中的每一种意指都与心灵的表意类似，即指涉着无限的其他意指或者其他表意。在这里，这种指涉性的结构才是根本所在，它在心灵中以及在精神分析的领域内获得了有效表达，尽管此乃自由结合的过程。”从话语分析的角度来说，语言建立起来的是一种话语，类似雅克·德里达宣称的“文本之外一无所有”。一切都要在话语的关系性存在中进行分析，就好像一切都要在意指的指向性中分析一样。作为人类普遍特征的直接表现，语言能力使得无限的创造得以可能。

Ralph Obernauer argues: “The term ‘discourse’ refers not only to linguistic and speech structures in the narrow sense but also to the overall structure of representational and affective references that constitute the socialized world of the mind.” Therefore, Castoriadis’s “linguistic” turn was not merely due to the popularity of semiotics and structural linguistics in France at the time, but, as Merleau-Ponty pointed out, language provides an opportunity to fully transcend the classic dichotomy of subject and object, thereby offering a path of thought toward the problem domain of social institution. Regarding what Castoriadis considers the most important aspect of “institution”—namely, its capacity to produce signification—language can establish a priority relationship with it. This possibility of using language to indicate signification will lead us to a key zone: signification exists as the hinge of the social-historical and its theory, enabling the former to look back upon itself in the reflection of the latter. Thus, signification can provide a common foundation upon which society, social theory, and reflection on theory itself can achieve multiple forms of communication. It is in this sense that Castoriadis holds: “Language does not enslave me, but liberates me.”

拉尔夫·奥贝瑙尔认为：“‘话语’一词不仅指狭义的语言和言语结构，还指构成心灵社会化世界的表征性和情感性指称的整体结构。”所以，卡斯托里亚迪斯的“语言”转向并不仅仅是因为当时在法国流行起来的符号学以及结构语言学，而是像梅洛-庞蒂指出的，语言能够为完全超越主体与客体的经典二分提供契机，进而为通往社会建制的问题域提供思考路径。就卡斯托里亚迪斯所认为的“建制”中的最重要方面——即其产生意指的能力——而言，语言能够与之优先建立关系。这种用语言表明意指的可能性，将把我们带到一处关键地带，那就是意指作为社会—历史及其理论的铰链而存在，它使前者能够在后者的反思中回望自身。由此，意指便能够提供一种共同的基础，在这一基础之上，社会、社会理论以及对理论本身的反思就能够达成多重交流。卡斯托里亚迪斯正是在此意义上认为：“语言并不会奴役我，而是会解放我。”

Although Castoriadis’s analysis of the signification of language resembles the correspondence between signifier and signified in linguistics or discourse analysis, he reveals at a deeper level why the signified constantly slides beneath the signifier—namely, the imagination. Therefore, if language provides us with the material of reality, then imagination manifests as its indeterminate category. Our analysis of material is meant to define the form of the category. Kevin Olson summarizes: “Castoriadis carefully shows that the imagination must be seen as interwoven with the symbolic. For the imagination is a non-linguistic mode of thought, while the symbolic is its linguistic counterpart. The imagination alone lacks the capacity for articulation and also lacks the dimension of intersubjectivity. Language can provide a solution to this. Thus, these two modes will jointly generate a shared field of meaning in a given society—a field that connects words and imagination.” Therefore, through the openness and creative dimension that the imagination exhibits via language, Castoriadis helps us break the enslavement of fixed meaning.

虽然卡斯托里亚迪斯对语言的意指性分析，与语言学或话语分析中能指与所指的对应关系相类似，但他却在更深层次表明了所指为什么会在能指之下不断滑动——那就是想象。因此，如果语言为我们提供了现实质料的话，那么想象则体现为它的不定范畴。我们对质料的分析是为了规定范畴的形式。凯文·奥尔森总结道：“卡斯托里亚迪斯谨慎地表明，想象必须被视为与象征的交融。因为想象是一种非语言性的思想模式，而象征则是它的语言对应物。想象单靠自身并不具备接合能力，同时也缺乏主体间性的维度。语言却能够为此提供解决之道。所以，这两种模式在某个既定的社会中将共同生发出一种共享的意义领域——将语词与想象连结起来的领域。”因此，凭借想象透过语言而表现出的开放性和创造性维度，卡斯托里亚迪斯帮助我们打破了固定意义的奴役。

III. The Essence of Institution: Social Imaginary Signification

三、建制的本质：社会想象意指

Although language shows importance at the level of the occurrence and manifestation of signification, linguistics cannot replace the analysis of signification. For, in the final analysis, language is the result and application of signification; to fundamentally understand the structure of society itself, one must uncover the hidden “signifying force.” Thus, although Castoriadis’s philosophical reflection underwent a “linguistic” turn, this does not mean that linguistic analysis becomes the ultimate goal, nor can signification be reduced to language. Olson objectively points out: “Castoriadis proposes a flexible and non-dogmatic way of reading the foundations of our collective beliefs. He carefully delineates the lines of continuity among the shared forms of thought, intuition, and practice, emphasizing their common imagistic, linguistic, and material characteristics. In this sense, he does not uphold viewpoints derived solely from words or solely from practice. On the contrary, his viewpoint integrates words, imagination, and practice, ultimately providing a reasonable explanation for all complex forms of thought.” When we perceive from language the cohesive force of signification and the many meanings it evolves, we have in fact entered the level of social imaginary signification. Signification both depends on reality and transcends it; it both relies on logic and transcends it. We intuitively believe that social discourse, historical laws, symbolic signifiers, linguistic rules, and economic structures are at work, but in the final analysis, it is human imagination that makes them so. On this, Suzi Adams notes: “Castoriadis’s point is that unless the imagination is fully brought into play, the role of meaning in social life is incomprehensible.” Therefore, in Castoriadis’s view, all forms of existence of the social-historical are the result of social imagination, and the historicity, temporality, and indeterminacy of this result highlight the role of signification. Conversely, the expansive tendency of signification is also driven by the imagination. Thus, social imaginary signification can explain the existence and development of society from a more universal perspective, rather than forcibly constructing a social plane in a linear manner solely from the perspectives of economics, history, or anthropology.

尽管语言在意指的发生和表现层面显示出重要性，但却不能以语言学代替对意指的分析。因为，语言归根结底是意指的结果和应用，要想从根本上了解社会本身的构造，就必须了解背后隐藏的“意指力”。所以，卡斯托里亚迪斯的哲学反思虽然出现了“语言”转向，但并不意味着语言分析就成为最终目的，也绝不能把意指还原到语言当中。奥尔森客观地指出：“卡斯托里亚迪斯为我们的集体信仰根基提出了一种灵活而又非教条的解读方式。他慎重地描绘出思想、直观以及实践这些共享形式间的连续性线路，强调它们所共同具有的形象性的、语言性的以及物质性的特征。在这个意义上，他并不秉持单靠语词或单靠实践所得出的思想观点。相反，他的观点整合了语词、想象以及实践，并最终为一切复杂的思想形式提供了一种合理解释。”当我们从语言中体察到意指的聚合力及其演化出的诸多意义时，实际上就已经进入到了社会想象意指层面。意指既依赖现实又超脱于现实，既依靠逻辑又超脱于逻辑。我们在直观上以为社会话语、历史规律、象征能指、语言法则以及经济结构在发挥作用，但归根结底是人的想象使然。对此，苏茜·亚当斯指出：“卡斯托里亚迪斯的观点在于，除非充分发挥想象，否则意义的角色在社会生活中就是无法理解的。”因此，在卡斯托里亚迪斯看来，社会—历史的一切存在形式都是社会想象的结果，而这种结果的历史性、暂时性以及不确定性又凸显了意指的作用。从反面来看，意指的扩张趋势也正是想象促成的。所以，社会想象意指可以从更普遍的角度解释社会的存在和发展，而不是单纯从经济学、历史学以及人类学的角度以线性方式强力构造出一个社会平面。

Feuerbach once revolutionarily pointed out that it is not God who creates man, but man who creates God. Castoriadis then specifically analyzes how man creates God—namely, through social imaginary signification, which is conveyed by institutional structures such as the church. From this perspective, all social existences—politics, economy, culture, and so on—are the same. Marx commensurated the sphere of economic production from abstract labor; Castoriadis commensurated the entire society from social imagination. As John Arnason states: “Introducing imaginary signification into the social-historical world means raising questions and expressing viewpoints from a broader ontological, even cosmological, level of analysis.” Social imaginary signification establishes, in the broadest form, numerous signifying supports; these are both the creation of signification and the creation of images that support these significations. Castoriadis believes that the society we live in presents a totality of institutions; the reason these institutions can cohere is that they always present a magma of social imaginary signification.

费尔巴哈曾经革命性地指出，不是上帝创造人，而是人创造上帝。卡斯托里亚迪斯则具体分析了人是如何创造上帝的，那就是通过社会想象意指，它由教堂这种建制机构获得传达。从这个角度出发，政治、经济、文化等一切社会存在都是如此。马克思从抽象劳动出发对经济生产领域进行通约，卡斯托里亚迪斯则从社会想象出发对整个社会进行了通约。正如约翰·阿纳森所说：“把想象意指引入到社会—历史世界中，就是从更广泛的本体论甚至宇宙论的分析层面去提出问题并表达观点。”社会想象意指以最广泛的形式奠定了诸多表意性的支撑，它们既是意指的创造，也是对这些意指起着支撑作用的影像的创造。卡斯托里亚迪斯认为，我们生活的社会呈现出的是一种建制的总体性，这些建制能够凝结在一起的原因，在于它们总能够呈现出一种社会想象意指的熔岩。

This magma, in a gelatinous, scorching form, gushes outward and flows wantonly; its pervasive momentum ultimately congeals into all the institutions of society, and these institutions constitute society itself. Thus, it is the institution of the social-historical that presents social imagination and makes it possible:

这种熔岩以胶状的、炙热的形态向外喷涌并肆意流淌，其无孔不入的态势最终凝结成了社会的一切建制，而这些建制构成的则是社会本身。所以，正是社会—历史的建制得以把社会想象呈现出来并使之成为可能：

Every aspect of social institution is nothing but the institution of the magma of social imaginary signification, which we can and must call a world of signification. This is equivalent to saying that society institutes the world as its world, or institutes its world as the world; it is also equivalent to saying that it institutes a world of signification, or that in the process of instituting a world of signification, it institutes itself. In this regard, a world can and indeed does exist solely facing it. In the pre-social state of nature, the occurrence of a radical break, that is, the emergence of a social-historical alternative form of representation, is the positing of representation or a world of representation. Society makes a world of representation possible, and it itself exists closely around such a world. Thus, without relation to that world of representation, nothing exists for society; anything that appears is something directly graspable by this world—and only by being grasped by this world can it appear. The existence of society lies in taking signification as its universal and total requirement, and in presenting a world of signification as the satisfaction of this requirement.

社会建制的每一方面都不过是社会想象意指熔岩的建制，我们能够并且也必须将其称作一种意指的世界。这等于说，社会把世界建制为它的世界，或者把它的世界建制为世界；也等于说，它建制了一个意指的世界，或者它在建制意指世界的过程中建制了它自己。就此而言，一个世界才可以并且也确实可以独自面向它而存在。在前社会的自然状态下，一种激进断裂的发生，即表意为社会—历史的替代形式的出现，就是提出了表意或者一个表意的世界。社会令一种表意的世界得以可能，它自身也紧密围绕着这样一个世界而存在。由此，如果不与那个表意世界相关，任何事物对社会而言都是不存在的；任何显现出来的事物都是能够直接被这一世界把控的事物——也只有被这一世界把控，它才能够显现。社会的存在，在于把意指作为其普遍的和全部的要求，并把呈现出一个意指世界作为对这一要求的满足。

Identifying society with the world is not a mere application, nor is it an enlargement of society or a reduction of the world; rather, it equates society with the world through the mode of social imaginary signification. From this perspective, what we have is a social world or a world society. It both explains how society or the human world is formed and embeds this mode of formation within social imaginary signification. Although social imaginary signification fundamentally explains this generativity, when we enter a concrete society, what we face are various institutions.

将社会与世界进行同一并不是一种套用，也不是把社会扩大化或者把世界缩小化，而是以社会想象意指的方式把社会与世界等同。从这个角度来看，我们拥有的就是一个社会性的世界或者世界性的社会。它既说明了社会或人类世界如何形成，也把这种形成方式寓于社会想象意指中。虽然社会想象意指从本质上解释了这种生成性，但进入具体社会时，我们面对的却是各类建制。

Castoriadis endows “institution” with a rich connotation. In his view, the social-historical projects numerous social imaginary significations as well as the relations among these “figures,” and of course also the relation between the social-historical itself and these figures, and this figure is precisely institution. It is that which binds society together, and can also be understood as the total composite of all particular institutions within society; Castoriadis calls this “the institution of society as a whole.” In the broadest sense, institution encompasses all social things, whether at the hardware level or the software level, including “norms, values, language, tools, and procedures and methods for handling and transforming things.” Rather, institution is a product intimately related to society as a whole and to every aspect within it; it constitutes the sum total of all social relations of human beings as a species.

卡斯托里亚迪斯赋予了“建制”丰富的内涵。在他看来，社会—历史会影射出诸多社会想象意指以及这些“指象”（figures）之间的关系，当然也包括社会—历史本身与这些指象之间的关系，而这种指象就是建制。它是将社会凝结为一体的东西，也可以理解成社会内部一切特殊建制的总复合，卡斯托里亚迪斯将此称作“社会作为一个整体的建制”。建制在最宽泛的意义上囊括了“规约、价值、语言、工具以及处理事物和改造事物的程序和方法”等一切社会性事物，无论是硬件层面还是软件层面上的。毋宁说，建制是与社会整体及其内部各个方面都息息相关的产物，它构成了人在类上的一切社会关系的总和。

For Castoriadis, institution, in its most original and fundamental sense, is an irreducible mode of being—creation, that is, a mode of social being that is both within institution and has already completed institution. In other words, institution is presupposed in everything, and in every thing we care about, but it must be that institution which makes institution possible. This statement is undoubtedly a circular expression, but what it emphasizes is precisely the irreducible character of institution, namely, that it is a creation “out of nothing.” It is both its own cause and its own effect. To some extent, this parallels Alain Badiou’s “being and event.” We always trace back to causes after an event occurs, attempting to restore the “incubation” before the event’s formation based on the temporal order of succession; but from a logical perspective, it is precisely after the event occurs that we thereby infer the corresponding causes. From this angle, which is truly the cause and which is the effect? However, Castoriadis’s view is more radical: the emergence of any institution in the true sense is a process from nothing to something; this “something” is not a recombination of matter, but an innovation in form. Although “nothing” represents emptiness, it can be understood as the radical imagination, for it is precisely imagination that makes this process of creation out of nothing occur, or rather, it is through imagination that we can witness “something.” Imagination thereby becomes the source of institution and manifests an unprecedented sacredness. It is the “creator” of Castoriadis’s conceptual system.

对于卡斯托里亚迪斯而言，建制在最原始、也最根本的意义上是一种不可还原的存在模式——创造，即一种既在建制中、也已完成建制的社会存在模式。换句话说，建制被预设在一切之中，以及我们所关心的每一个事物之中，但它必须是令建制得以可能的那种建制。这句话无疑是一种循环表述，但它所强调的正是建制不可还原的特征，即它是一种“无中生有”的创造。它既是自己的原因，也是自己的结果。在某种程度上，这是阿兰·巴迪欧意义上的“存在与事件”的并行。我们总是在事件发生后去回溯原因，企图基于时间维度的先后顺序还原出事件形成前的“酝酿”；但从逻辑上来看，恰恰是事件发生后，我们才由此归结出相应的原因。从这个角度来说，究竟谁才是原因、谁又是结果呢？然而，卡斯托里亚迪斯的观点更为彻底：任何真正意义的建制的发生都是从无到有的过程，这个“有”并不是质料上的重组，而是形式上的创新。“无”虽然代表着空无，但可把它理解成原初性想象，因为正是想象令这种无中生有的过程发生，或者说，正是通过想象，我们才能见证“有”。想象随之成为建制的源泉，并表现出一种前所未有的神圣性。它是卡斯托里亚迪斯概念体系的“造物主”。

If society is regarded as an already constituted whole, then institution becomes the concrete link connecting imagination and society. In other words, the objectified result of imagination is institution. Castoriadis once said: “When we discuss the state, we are also discussing an institution activated by imaginary significations.” Here, “activated,” although not as purposive as “objectified,” nonetheless highlights a dynamic process. Imagination does not consist in making humans into things, but in making things human, that is, making institution operate according to the meaning bestowed upon it. From this perspective, although the imagination, signification, and institution we have been discussing seem abstract and float above reality, they are in fact highly materialist in nature. Castoriadis always emphasizes the material character of social imaginary significations; they include both material objects in everyday practice and the verbal signs that endow them with social meaning. We not only bestow meaning on objects and practices within shared institutions; conversely, the objects and practices within institutions condense the meanings they present for us to reflect upon. Therefore, social imagination is originally material, and the material world is generated by the joint action of imagination. Castoriadis’s theory of imagination fundamentally follows the Marxist materialist perspective, except that he expands that materiality from the sphere of production and need to the entire social level. Of course, this does not represent a “pan-materiality,” but rather a vitality of objectification, which plays a significant role in our social interactions. Hence, we can also understand institution as the most important aggregation of materiality and imagination at the level of constituting the collective.

如果将社会看作一个既成的整体，那么建制就成了连接想象与社会的具体纽带。换句话说，想象的对象化结果就是建制。卡斯托里亚迪斯曾说：“当我们讨论国家时，我们也就是在讨论一种被想象意指激活了的建制。”在这里，“激活”虽不像“对象化”那样目的明确，却也凸显出一种动态活动过程。想象不在于使人物化，而在于使物人化，即令建制按照被赋予的意义运作起来。从这个角度来说，虽然我们一直在谈论的想象、意指以及建制等看似抽象，浮动于现实之上，但实际上却是高度唯物主义性质的。卡斯托里亚迪斯始终强调社会想象意指的物质特征，它既包括了日常实践中的物质对象，也涵盖了赋予其社会意义的语词符号等。我们不仅在对共享建制中的对象与实践赋予意义，反之，建制中的对象与实践又凝结了它们所呈现出的意义供我们反思。因此，社会想象本来就是物质性的，而物质世界乃是由想象的联合行动所生成的。卡斯托里亚迪斯的想象理论从根本上遵循的是马克思主义的唯物主义视角，只不过他把那种物质性从生产和需要的角度扩张到了整个社会层面。当然，这并不代表一种“泛物质性”，而是指一种对象性的活力，这样的活力在我们的社会交往中发挥着显著作用。所以，我们也可以把建制理解成物质性与想象在构成集体的意义上发生了最为重要的聚合。

Castoriadis describes the values shared by the collective and its members as the institution of our collective imagination, and regards society as an important instance of this total institution. “In this sense, institution becomes an important part of the social and material characteristics of our collective imagination. Institution connects the social aspect of imagination with the material aspect, and gathers people into symbolic networks of communication, which to some extent exert great efficacy on the goals people aspire to, and at the same time become, to a considerable degree, the expression of society’s shared imagination. People establish communication networks in a certain form, and this form is shaped by the shared vision of an existing society—the widely accepted imagination.” A particular function of society cannot by itself determine what operational form it will take; to invigorate this creation and to bring it into the life of a specific society, it is necessary for members of that society to make the richness of signification play its corresponding practical role. This in turn illustrates the irreducibility and self-causality of institution, and further reflects that no institution can be immutable; it is always self-changing. However, institution itself, in the absence of activation by imagination, will maintain an inert and stable structure, displaying the characteristics of the instituted and the instituting.

卡斯托里亚迪斯把集体及其成员所共享的价值描绘为我们集体想象的建制，并将社会视为这一总体建制的重要实例。“在这个意义上，建制就成为了我们集体想象的社会特征和物质特征的重要部分。建制将想象的社会方面与物质方面连结在一起，并把人们聚拢在交往的象征网络中，而这些网络在某种程度上对人们所期求的目标发挥着巨大功效，同时也在相当程度上成为了社会的共享想象的表达。人们以一定的形式建立起交往网络，这一形式乃是被一种既存社会的共享愿景——被广泛接受的想象——所塑造的。”社会的某一功能本身并不能单独决定它会采取何种运作形式，而为了给这一创造增添活力，为了令其进入特定社会的生活之中，就需要社会内部人员使意指的丰富性发挥对应的实际作用。这就反过来说明了建制的不可还原性以及自我因果性的特征，更反映出任何建制都不可能是一成不变的，而始终是自我变动的。然而，建制本身在缺乏想象激活的情况下又会保持惰性的稳固结构，显示出建固性（instituted）和建构性（instituting）的特征。

IV. The Instituted and Instituting Characteristics of Institution

四、建制的建固性、建构性特征

From the perspective of institution, the generation and change of the social-historical is a result of imagination. The possibility of this self-change lies in the fact that society does not reduce to fixed institutions, but constantly transcends them. In other words, society, as that which is instituted, must always rely on its instituting capacity, which places society in a state of permanent self-transformation. Therefore, if Marx to some extent explained the direction of social development, then Castoriadis emphasizes social development itself. Although this may seem not to set a clear goal like the former, it stimulates more possibilities from a revolutionary perspective. Perhaps we can say this: rather than explaining the rationality of revolution by the necessity of the future, it is better to explain the rationality of the future from revolution itself. For the radical imagination can not only continuously create new institutions, but also needs to continuously break old ones; this creation itself implies destruction, and destruction represents revolution. In this way, the existence of society completely escapes the level of determinism: in its fundamental temporality and historicity, it is not determined, but constantly impacts other determining factors. Castoriadis points out that society does not “contain” a system of interpretation of the world; on the contrary, “every society is itself a system of interpretation of the world.” While society creates its own world, it is also the product of that world. As mentioned earlier: “Society institutes the world as its world, or institutes its world as the world.”

从建制的角度来说，社会—历史的生成和变动是一种想象的结果。这种自我变动得以可能的原因在于，社会并不会还原为固定的建制，而是会不断超越它。换言之，社会作为被建制的东西，总要依赖其建制能力，这就使得社会处于一种永久的自我转变中。因此，如果说马克思在某种程度上说明了社会的发展方向，那么卡斯托里亚迪斯强调的是社会发展本身。虽然这看上去未像前者那样设立明确的目标，但却从革命的角度激发了更多的可能。或许我们可以这样说：与其以未来的必然性说明革命的合理性，不如从革命本身出发说明未来的合理性。因为，原初的想象既能不断创造新的建制，也需要不断打破旧的建制，这种创造本身即意味着破坏，而破坏则代表着革命。这样，社会的存在就完全跳出了决定论的层面：在其根本的暂时性和历史性中，它并不是被决定的，而是不断冲击着其他决定因素。卡斯托里亚迪斯指出，社会并不“包含”对世界的解释体系，相反，“每一种社会本身就是解释世界的体系”。社会在创建自己的世界的同时，也是那一世界的产物。如前文所说：“社会把世界建制为它的世界，或者把它的世界建制为世界。”

In reality, the dynamic dimension of the existence of the institution is the lava-like momentum possessed by the social imaginary signification. According to this continuous generativity, Andrew Edgar and Peter Sedgwick further point out: “The lava of social imaginary signification contains not only these already manifested institutions, but also a surplus, which can be reduced neither to consciousness nor to biological or natural functionality.” From the perspective of ontology and within Castoriadis’s context, this assertion by Edgar and Sedgwick indicates that every social existence creates a world of its own in its own mode. Therefore, this surplus, on the one hand, embodies the infinite potential and immense energy of imaginary signification, and on the other hand, it also explains that it must inevitably undergo a transformation from “void” to “presence,” because the quest for meaning will continuously propel this surplus forward. Edgar and Sedgwick further distinguish this surplus at the individual and collective levels: “At the individual level, it is the radical imagination of the psyche; at the collective level, it is the instituting imagination of society.” The psyche is a naturally growing, continuously flowing signifying existence, while society, through socialization, forcefully restricts the flow of the psyche within the foreseeable scope of imaginary signification and norms. This reveals a conflict between the psyche and society. However, the surplus of social imaginary signification does not become an immutable institution at the collective level, because the surplus of radical imagination does not vanish through the socialization of the individual. Castoriadis appeals to the creative dimension of the conflict between the psyche and society; this creativity enables social individuals to no longer be confined to a repressed state, but also to generate a new self through self-revolution. This dimension becomes the foundation for his practical reflection, integrating social development and psychoanalysis.

实际上，建制的动态存在维度就是社会想象意指所具有的熔岩态势。根据这种不断的生成性，安德鲁·埃德加和彼得·塞奇威克进一步指出：“社会想象意指的熔岩不仅包含这些已经呈现出的建制，也包含着一种剩余（surplus），而这样的剩余既不能被还原为意识，也不能被还原为自然或生物意义上的功能性。”从本体论的视角以及卡斯托里亚迪斯的语境来看，埃德加和塞奇威克的这一论断表明：每一种社会存在都是以该社会自己的模式创造一个属于它自己的世界。因此，这样的剩余一方面体现了想象意指的无限潜力和巨大能量，另一方面也说明了它必然会经历从“空场”到“在场”的转变，因为对意义的寻求将不断推动这些剩余向前流走。埃德加和塞奇威克进一步对这种剩余进行了个体与集体的区分：“在个体层面就是心灵的原初想象，在集体层面就是社会的建制想象。”心灵是自然生长出的不断流动的表意性存在，而社会将在可预见到的想象意指与标准范围内通过社会化而强力限制心灵的流动。这里体现出了心灵与社会之间的冲突。但是，社会想象意指的剩余并不会在集体层面成为不变的建制，因为原初性想象的剩余不会由于个体的社会化而消逝。卡斯托里亚迪斯诉诸于心灵与社会之冲突的创造维度，这种创造性使社会个体不再局限于被压抑的状态，也会通过自我革命生成新的自我。这一维度成为他结合社会发展和精神分析进行实践反思的基础。

Society-history, due to the creation of the imagination, manifests as a temporality, which is primarily reflected in the temporary fixation and condensation of social imaginary signification, as well as in the process of humans founding, transforming, and sublating institutions. Therefore, temporality can also be regarded as the instituting character that is always within the institution. This state of existence reflects the general development of society, or can be understood as an ideal type of society, because radical imagination is always preserved, causing social change to proceed continuously and spontaneously. However, when we focus our attention on a specific historical period, or reflect on our actual society, this is often not the case. Although the institution is always its own creation, once created, it often appears as a given classical paradigm, such as the disciplines left by ancestors or gods, or objective knowledge evolved in the name of reason and historical laws, thereby becoming rigid, ossified, or even fetishized. That is to say, although the institution is objectified into a natural dimension, it does not manifest in the authentic normative dimension. It negates and rejects temporality, attempting to disguise itself as permanence. This precisely embodies the institutionalized character of the institution, i.e., the institution has become a rigidified thing. John Thompson believes that “social imaginary signification necessarily escapes a self-enclosed system; it contains a lava of signification and therefore cannot be organized by a logically constructed totality”; however, “when we examine the core imaginary significations of a society, we cannot think of them in terms of their mutual references, because it is precisely in their mutual ‘reference’ that these significations make their relations possible.” Thompson here raises a paradoxical viewpoint: social imaginary signification possesses both a lava-like dimension and the ability to center on itself, thereby extinguishing the lava’s fervor.

社会—历史由于想象的创造而表现为一种暂时性，这主要体现为社会想象意指的暂时固定和凝结，也体现在人对建制的创立、改造和扬弃的过程中。所以，暂时性也可以被视为一直处于建制中的建制性。这种存在状态反映了社会的一般发展，或者可以理解为一种理想型的社会，因为原初性想象始终得以保存，致使社会变动也在不断自发地进行着。然而，当我们把目光集中于某一历史时间段内，或者反观我们的现实社会时，却往往并非如此。虽然建制总是其自身的创造，可它被创造出来之后，就常常显示为一种被给予的经典范式，如先祖、神明等留下来的规训，或者以理性和历史规律的名义演化出来的客观知识等，从而变得固化、僵化、甚至膜拜化。也就是说，尽管建制被客观化为自然维度，它却没有显示在本真的规范维度中。它对暂时性进行了否定和拒绝，试图将其伪装成永久性。这恰恰体现出建制的建固性特征，即建制成了僵固之物。约翰·汤普森认为，“社会想象意指必然要逃离自我封闭的体系，它包含着一种意指熔岩，因而不能被以逻辑建构出的大全组织起来”；然而，“当我们考察一个社会的核心想象意指时，却无法以它们相互指涉的关系思考之，原因在于这些意指恰恰是在彼此的‘指涉’中才使它们的关系得以可能”。汤普森在这里提出了一个悖论的观点，那就是社会想象意指既具有熔岩的维度，但也能以自我为中心，从而熄灭熔岩的热情。

So, does this mean that the theory of self-altering social institution contains an internal contradiction? Certainly not, because the instituting character is more essential than the institutionalized character. The failure of past thought lies in “its inability to grasp the institutionalized character of society. But this is only one aspect, for behind this institutionalized character lies precisely the instituting character of history. If Castoriadis speaks of ‘society-history,’ then he is emphasizing the inseparability of synchronicity and diachronicity, of institutionalized character and instituting character. The problem with past thought is: how can society be seen as a determinate whole whose internal structure and mode of existence are in continuous flux? The question then becomes how to understand stability within change, i.e., how to grasp the cohesion of society amidst the disorder of time.” The institution, as the actual carrier of signification and signifying relations, thus becomes the presupposition of society-history. The emergence of instituting things does not depend on, nor can it be explained by, a holistic logic. Therefore, the institution can neither be seen as a logical relation, because it is a “thing” presented in a disorderly manner; nor as a “real” relation, because it is a signifying positing. At the same time, it is neither a necessary nor a contingent relation in any determinate sense, nor can it be reduced to any “rationality.” If one must explain this irreducibility and essential character of the institution, one must conversely recognize that it is instituting, i.e., the creation ex nihilo of radical imagination.

那么，这是否意味着自我变动的社会建制理论存在内部矛盾呢？当然不是，因为建制性较建固性更具本质维度。既往思想的失败之处在于“没能抓住社会的建固性特征。但这只是其中一个方面，因为这种被建固的特征背后恰恰是历史的建构性特征。如果卡斯托里亚迪斯言及‘社会—历史’的话，那么他就是在强调共时性与历时性、建固性与建构性的不可分割。既往思想的问题在于：社会如何能被看作一个其内部构造及其存在模式都在持续不断地流动着的确定整体。问题进而变成了怎样理解变化中的稳定性，即如何在时间的乱序中把握社会的凝聚性”。建制作为意指以及意指关系的现实载体，因而也成了社会—历史的预设前提。建构性之物的出现并不有赖于、也不能被解释为整体主义的逻辑。所以，建制既不能被看作逻辑关系，因为它是以乱序方式而呈现的“事物”；也不能作为“实在的”关系，因为它是一种表意的设定。同时，它既不是任何确定意义上的必然关系或偶然关系，也不能被还原为任何“合理性”。如果非要说明建制的这种不可还原性和本质特征，就必须反过来认识到它是建构性的，即原初性想象的无中生有的创造。

In summary, the institutionalized and instituting characters of the institution not only indicate the inevitability of change manifested in this dialectic, but also affirm the revolutionary character at the level of society-history through participation in this inevitability.

总体来说，建制的建固性与建构性特征，不仅表明了这种辩证中体现的变化的必然性，更是从这种对必然性的参与中肯定了社会—历史层面的革命性。

(Author bios: Qi Chuang, School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China; Zhao Hu, School of Marxism, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture)

（作者简介：齐闯，中国人民大学哲学院；赵虎：北京建筑大学马克思主义学院）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心