On the Conservative Elements in Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness*

Introduction

引 言

In 1923, Lukács published *History and Class Consciousness*, emphasizing that to grasp Marx’s historical dialectic one must “return to Hegel” and “smash the ‘dead’ edifice of the system in its historical form, in order to rescue the most relevant tendencies of his thought and make them once again a living and effective force.”[[1]1 Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2003), p. 24. [Hungary] Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi, Ren Li, and Yan Hongyuan (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1999), p. 45.] The author has no doubt whatsoever about Lukács’s good intentions in rescuing the revolutionary dialectic of Marxism; in the book he indeed clarifies the principled differences between Hegel’s dialectic and Marx’s dialectic, and his critique of positivist philosophy and economics from a methodological level once again confirms that his core theoretical concern is to restore the critical and revolutionary character of Marxism. The problem, however, is whether Lukács succeeded in thoroughly eliminating the conservative elements within Hegelianism. Was the revolutionary nature of the Marxist dialectic truly fully restored? Given the important position and enormous influence of *History and Class Consciousness* in the history of the development of Western Marxism, clarifying these questions is not only key to a reasonable assessment of Lukács’s thought but also necessary for correctly grasping the overall trajectory and theoretical essence of Western Marxism. Lukács later deeply reflected on the theoretical errors present in the book (idealist ethical prejudice, the elimination of natural ontology, an idealist conception of practice, revolutionary utopianism, etc.) and warned that “the theoretically erroneous parts often have the greatest influence.”[[2]2 Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right*, trans. Li Yang, Ren Wenke, and Zheng Yi (Beijing: New Star Press, 2011), p. 62. [Hungary] Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi, Ren Li, and Yan Hongyuan (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1999), p. 23.] The author believes that these errors are not Lukács’s self-deprecating modesty but are genuinely present; if not carefully analyzed, they will lead to theoretical ambiguity and even policy mistakes, and therefore must be treated with caution.

1923年，卢卡奇出版了《历史与阶级意识》，强调要弄清马克思的历史辩证法就必须“回到黑格尔”，“砸碎那座以其历史形式存在的体系的‘死’建筑，以便救出他的思想的最有现实意义的倾向，使它们在现在能够再次成为充满活力和有效的力量”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《历史与阶级意识》，杜章智、任立、燕宏远译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第45页。]。笔者丝毫不怀疑卢卡奇拯救马克思主义革命辩证法的良善动机，他在书中也的确阐明了黑格尔辩证法与马克思辩证法的原则性差别，而从方法论层面对实证主义哲学和经济学的批判再次确证了其核心理论关切是恢复马克思主义的批判性和革命性。但问题在于，卢卡奇是否成功地将黑格尔主义中的保守主义元素彻底剔除出去？马克思主义辩证法的革命性是否真的得以完全恢复？鉴于《历史与阶级意识》在西方马克思主义发展史中具有重要地位和巨大影响，澄清上述问题就不仅是合理评估卢卡奇思想的关键，也是正确把握西方马克思主义整体走向以及理论本质的需要。卢卡奇后来深刻反省了书中存在的理论错误（唯心主义的伦理偏见、取消自然本体论、唯心主义的实践观、革命乌托邦主义等），并警示说“理论上错误的部分往往影响最大”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《历史与阶级意识》，杜章智、任立、燕宏远译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第23页。]。笔者认为上述错误并非卢卡奇的自谦之辞，而是实实在在存在的，若不加以认真辨析将会导致理论含混乃至政策上的失误，因此必须审慎对待。

Weber’s important influence on the formation of Lukács’s thought is an indisputable fact, but the question is whether, when Lukács observed Marx through the lens of Weber’s methodology, he consciously screened out the “conservative elements” contained within it. Lukács never avoided acknowledging his academic connection with Weber, and Weber greatly admired Lukács’s talent. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Weber’s theory of rationalization is the most important supporting background for understanding the concept of reification, but scholarly attention has generally focused on how Lukács transformed and absorbed Weber’s thought, without fully realizing that the conservative elements in Weber’s thought might have permeated Lukács’s thought, thereby frustrating his good intentions of restoring Marx’s revolutionary dialectic. Fundamentally, the standpoint of Weber’s thought is bourgeois civil society, which means that his theory inevitably contains negative conservative components. Lukács was undoubtedly a steadfast Marxist; after turning to Marxism in 1918, he “wholeheartedly recognized communism as a moral, spiritual, and political solution. Despite undergoing various philosophical adventures, he devoted the rest of his life entirely to the communist movement.”[[3]3 Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right*, trans. Li Yang, Ren Wenke, and Zheng Yi (Beijing: New Star Press, 2011), p. 63. [Poland] Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Vol. 3, trans. Hou Yilin and Zhang Lingxia (Harbin: Heilongjiang University Press, 2015), p. 244.] Clearly, there is a tension between Lukács’s Marxist revolutionary stance and Weber’s bourgeois civil society standpoint, but Lukács did not fully realize this, and his appropriation of Weber’s thought ultimately fell into a paradox. This article, drawing on the commentary on *History and Class Consciousness* by Lukács’s student István Mészáros, focuses on analyzing the negative components of Hegel’s philosophy of history and Weber’s theory of rationalization (bureaucracy), thereby revealing the conservative elements latent in *History and Class Consciousness* and providing a new approach for correctly evaluating Lukács’s thought.

韦伯对卢卡奇思想的形成产生了重要影响，这是一个不争的事实，但问题是当卢卡奇通过韦伯的方法论眼镜观察马克思时，是否有意识地屏蔽掉了其中内含的“保守主义元素”？卢卡奇从不避讳自己同韦伯的学术联系，韦伯也非常欣赏卢卡奇的才华。在《历史与阶级意识》中，韦伯的合理化理论是理解物化概念最重要的支援背景，但学界一般将研究重心置于卢卡奇如何改造和吸收韦伯思想这一点上，未能充分意识到韦伯思想中的保守主义成分有可能渗透到卢卡奇思想中，进而挫败其恢复马克思革命辩证法的良善愿望。从根本上说，韦伯思想的立足点是资本主义市民社会，这就意味着理论中必然带有保守主义的消极成分。卢卡奇无疑是一位坚定的马克思主义者，自从1918年转向马克思主义之后，他便“全心全意地承认共产主义是一种道德的、精神的和政治的解答。尽管经历了多种不同的哲学冒险活动，但他还是使自己把余生完全置身于共产主义运动。”[ [波兰]莱泽克·科拉科夫斯基：《马克思主义的主要流派》（第3卷），侯一麟、张玲霞译，哈尔滨：黑龙江大学出版社，2015年，第244页。]显然，在卢卡奇的马克思主义革命立场和韦伯的资本主义市民社会立场之间存在张力，但卢卡奇并未充分意识到这一点，因此他对韦伯思想的挪用最终陷入了悖论。本文借助卢卡奇的学生梅扎罗斯（István Mészáros）对《历史与阶级意识》的评论，重点剖析黑格尔的历史哲学以及韦伯的合理化（官僚制）思想的消极成分，进而揭示《历史与阶级意识》中潜藏的保守主义成分，为正确评价卢卡奇思想提供新的思路。

I. Why Is Hegel Called “Uncritical Positivism”?

一、为什么说黑格尔是“非批判的实证主义”？

Marx pointed out in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* that although Hegel’s thought in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* already had a completely negative and critical appearance, his later works constitute an uncritical positivism and an equally uncritical idealism, and this conservative element already existed in a latent form, as a germ, a potentiality, and a secret, within his early thought. This shows that Hegel’s thought inherently contains conservative elements; it is not so much that the idealist system strangled the revolutionary nature of the dialectic, but rather that the narrow standpoint of civil society determined that the idealist system would inevitably triumph over the dialectic. In his late autobiography, Lukács emphasized that Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx were truly incomparable thinkers, which shows the high regard Hegel held in his mind. For this reason, scholars usually regard Lukács as a Hegelian Marxist.

马克思在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中指出，黑格尔思想虽然在《精神现象学》中已经有了一个完全否定的和批判的外表，但晚期著作却是一种非批判的实证主义和同样非批判的唯心主义，并且这种保守主义成分已经以一种潜在的方式，作为萌芽、潜能和秘密存在于早期思想中了。这就表明，黑格尔思想内在地具有保守主义的元素，与其说是唯心主义体系扼杀了辩证法的革命性，不如说是狭隘的市民社会立场决定了唯心主义体系必然战胜辩证法。在晚年自传中，卢卡奇强调亚里士多德、黑格尔和马克思是无人能比的真正思想家，足见黑格尔在其心中的地位。正因如此，学界通常将卢卡奇视为黑格尔主义的马克思主义者。

Although Mészáros was Lukács’s student, he adhered to the principle “I love my teacher, but I love truth more.” In *Beyond Capital*, he uses no fewer than five full chapters to assess Lukács’s intellectual legacy, with the basic conclusion that Lukács unfortunately became infected with the conservative elements of Hegelianism and thus fell into a theoretical paradox. Mészáros takes a sharply critical stance toward the conservative elements in Hegel’s philosophy, arguing that Hegel’s philosophy “suppresses people with objective historical laws” and always “grasps history as a relentless objective movement, which possesses its own coercive logic that cannot be tamed by illusory subjective designs or corresponding voluntarist interventions.”[[4]4 Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2003), p. 31. [UK] István Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003), p. 22.] If Hegel believed that the true progress of history lies in the supersession of civil society and humanity’s entry into communist society, then emphasizing the objective necessity of historical laws would be reasonable. But Hegel intended to reconcile the contradictions of civil society through the ethical state, emphasizing that “the state in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom,”[[5]5 G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 210. [Germany] G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 258.] which deviates from Marx’s idea of a free association of individuals, falls into the narrow horizon of civil society, and creates the myth of the universal and eternal rule of capital. Like Smith and other national economists, Hegel recognized that the self-interested individuals of civil society would inevitably treat others as means, but he fully affirmed the positive aspects and necessity of civil society, asserting that “the life and welfare of the individual and the existence of his rights are interwoven with the life, welfare, and rights of others, and can only be established on the basis of this system.”[[6]6 G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 210. [Germany] G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 198.] Although Hegel did not, like Smith, believe that the “invisible hand” could automatically maximize social benefits, he did believe that the ethical state could regulate the contradictions of civil society and achieve overall social harmony. Thus, both Smith and Hegel proclaimed the “end of history” and fell into the ideological illusion of the “eternity of capital.”

梅扎罗斯虽然是卢卡奇的学生，却奉行“吾爱吾师但更爱真理”的原则，在《超越资本》中竟使用整整五章篇幅的内容来评估卢卡奇的思想遗产，其基本结论是：卢卡奇不幸沾染了黑格尔主义的保守主义成分，因此在理论上陷入了悖论。梅扎罗斯对黑格尔哲学中的保守主义成分持尖锐的批判态度，认为黑格尔哲学“以客观历史规律压制人”，总是“把历史作为一种无情的客观运动来把握，这种运动自身具有不会被幻想的主观设计和相应的唯意志干预所驯服的强制逻辑。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第22页。]如果说黑格尔认为历史的真正进步在于扬弃市民社会，人类进入共产主义社会，那么强调历史规律的客观必然性就有合理性，但黑格尔是要用伦理国家调和市民社会的矛盾，强调“自在自为的国家就是伦理性的整体，是自由的现实化”[ [德]黑格尔：《法哲学原理》，范扬、张企泰译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年，第258页。]，这就背离了马克思自由人联合体的思想，陷入了市民社会的狭隘视界，塑造了资本普遍永恒统治的神话。与斯密等国民经济学家一样，黑格尔意识到市民社会自私自利的个人一定会把他人视为手段，但他对市民社会的积极面和必然性给予充分肯定，认定“个人的生活和福利以及他的权利的定在，都同众人的生活、福利和权利交织在一起，它们只能建立在这种制度的基础上”[ [德]黑格尔：《法哲学原理》，范扬、张企泰译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年，第198页。]。黑格尔虽然没有像斯密那样认为“看不见的手”可以自动实现社会利益的最大化，但却相信伦理国家能够调节市民社会的矛盾，实现社会的总体和谐。可见，斯密和黑格尔均宣告了“历史的终结”，陷入了“资本永恒论”的意识形态幻想。

As is well known, Hegel was not an optimist; he emphasized the universal existence of evil in history, that Enlightenment reason inevitably falls into difficulties in civil society, and therefore it is necessary to resolve the problems of the age with supra-individual absolute reason. In Hegel’s eyes, although Napoleon was a world-historical figure, he was merely an instrument for the world spirit to realize its own ends. History is the process of the world spirit’s self-realization, which will ultimately conclude in the order of universal eternal capital. Marx parted ways with Hegel on issues such as “the eternity of capital” and “the end of history.” He did not “regard capital as an unchangeable ultimate in the historical process, but rather as a dynamic movement, which, even with its apparently irresistible logic of global expansion, should be seen as temporary.”[[1]1 Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2003), p. 24. Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2003), p. 24.] Marx fully recognized the severe consequences of capital’s self-expansion, and therefore acknowledged that “the development of human capacities is at the cost of the majority of individuals and even of classes.”[[2]2 Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right*, trans. Li Yang, Ren Wenke, and Zheng Yi (Beijing: New Star Press, 2011), p. 62. Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right*, trans. Li Yang, Ren Wenke, and Zheng Yi (Beijing: New Star Press, 2011), p. 62.] There is an essential difference between Marx’s philosophy of history and Hegel’s: the latter has a strong teleological character, while the former is not teleological. As Eagleton states: “Teleological theory holds that every historical stage of human society is the necessary product of the preceding historical process. In this process, each stage itself is necessary, and all these historical stages are indispensable conditions for realizing some specific goal. This goal itself is necessary; it is the driving force hidden behind the entire historical process.”[[3]3 Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right*, trans. Li Yang, Ren Wenke, and Zheng Yi (Beijing: New Star Press, 2011), p. 63. Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right*, trans. Li Yang, Ren Wenke, and Zheng Yi (Beijing: New Star Press, 2011), p. 63.] The reason Hegel set a goal for history was mainly to pursue the identity of thought and being and the reconciliation of concept and reality. As a result, historical development becomes a closed circle, and the “end of history” thesis is its inevitable outcome.

众所周知，黑格尔并非乐观主义者，他强调历史中普遍存在恶，启蒙理性必然在市民社会陷入困境，因此必须用超个体的绝对理性解决时代的难题。在黑格尔眼里，拿破仑虽然是世界历史人物，但也不过是世界精神实现自身目的的工具，历史是世界精神自我实现的过程，终将在普遍永恒资本的秩序中落下帷幕。马克思是在“资本永恒”“历史终结”等问题上与黑格尔分道扬镳的，他并没有“把资本视为历史过程中的一种难以改变的终极，而是视为一种动态的运动，这种运动即使有其明显的不可抗拒的全球扩张逻辑，也应该看成是暂时的。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第24页。]马克思充分意识到资本增殖的严重后果，因此承认“人类能力的发展是以占大多数的个人甚至阶级为代价的。”[ [英]特里·伊格尔顿：《马克思为什么是对的》，李杨、任文科、郑义译，北京：新星出版社，2011年，第62页。]马克思的历史哲学与黑格尔的历史哲学存在本质差别，后者带有强烈的目的论色彩，而前者并不是目的论，正如伊格尔顿（Terry Eagleton）所言：“目的论的理论认为人类社会的每个历史阶段都是之前历史进程的必然产物。在这个过程中，每个阶段本身都是必需的，而所有这些历史阶段都是实现某种特定目标所必不可少的条件。这个目标本身是必然的，它是隐藏在整个历史过程背后的驱动力。”[ [英]特里·伊格尔顿：《马克思为什么是对的》，李杨、任文科、郑义译，北京：新星出版社，2011年，第63页。]黑格尔之所以为历史设定目的，主要是为了追求思维和存在的同一以及概念和现实的和解，这样一来，历史发展就变成了一个封闭的圆圈，“历史终结论”是其必然结果。

Hegel earlier proposed the concept of the globe in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, viewing the developmental process of world history as a necessary process and believing that humanity would inevitably reach the “absolute end of history.” According to this logic, European colonial rule is an unchangeable rational fate, and people can only act along the predetermined trajectory of world history. Mészáros believes that Hegel was correct in emphasizing that world history has its own objective laws of development, but because he ignored the decisive role of capital in the modern world, he failed to see that “the process of globalization is characterized by strengthening the most dynamic centers of capital’s domination (and exploitation), so that the vast majority of people become aware of growing inequality and extreme suffering.”[[4]4 Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2003), p. 31. Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2003), p. 31.] Hegel’s problem is: if the world spirit bestows upon humanity a brutal order of capital exploitation, does that mean humanity will live forever under the global rule of capital? Just as Smith believed that the “invisible hand” was morally wholly good, Hegel also believed that the world spirit would inevitably lead humanity to a good society. But this philosophical value presupposition does not conform to social reality; both take as their premise the non-alteration of the basic structure of civil society and capitalist private property. The reason Hegel ignored the negative side of capital is mainly that he spoke from the standpoint of the national economist. Starting from the universally existing relations of dependence among people in civil society, he emphasized that the division of labor “completes the dependence and mutual relationship among people in satisfying other needs, and makes it a complete necessity.”[[5]5 G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 210. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 210.] That is to say, Hegel believed that people form inseparable connections with each other through things. This is not only natural and justified but also greatly beneficial to both the individual and society, because “each person, in acquiring, producing, and enjoying for himself, also produces and acquires for the enjoyment of all others. The necessity contained in the comprehensive interweaving of mutual dependence now appears to each person as universal and enduring wealth.”[[6]6 G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 210. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 210.] Here, “universal and enduring wealth” does not refer generally to material wealth, but specifically to the mode of production and distribution of wealth in capitalist society, which implicitly contains the universality and eternity of capital’s rule. It is not difficult to see that Hegel did not directly argue for the eternity of capital, but rather indirectly argued for the eternal presence of capital relations by revealing the universally existing relations of dependence among people in capitalist society and emphasizing that individuals should submit to a universal entity—the ethical state. In the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), Marx emphasized that capitalist society is a society where abstraction holds sway. But unlike Hegel, he opposed all abstract forces that tower above people, believing that the rule of abstraction is merely a product of a specific stage of human social development and therefore historically transitory. That is to say, while Marx factually acknowledged that different individuals in capitalist society form universal connections mediated by things, and even regarded this as a historical progress from the perspective of “creating the material preconditions for communist society,” he nonetheless determined in terms of value that this is a false universality, and that only the association of free individuals possesses true universality.

黑格尔较早地在《历史哲学》中提出全球的概念，他将世界历史的发展进程视为必然过程，认为人类一定会抵达“历史的绝对终点”。依此逻辑，欧洲的殖民统治就是不可改变的理性命运，人们只能按照世界历史的既定发展轨迹展开行动。梅扎罗斯认为黑格尔强调世界历史具有自身的客观发展规律是正确的，但由于忽略了资本对现代世界的决定性作用，他未能看到“全球化的过程是以加强资本的最富动力的统治（和剥削）中心、以使绝大多数人意识到不断增长的不平等和极度苦难而自称的”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第31页。]。黑格尔的问题是，如果世界精神给予人类的是残酷的资本剥削秩序，是否意味着人类将终日生活在资本的全球统治之下呢？与斯密相信“看不见的手”在道德上代表全善一样，黑格尔也认为世界精神一定会将人类带往美好的社会，但这一哲学价值预设并不符合社会现实，二者都是以不改变市民社会的基本结构和资本主义私有制为前提的。黑格尔之所以忽视资本的消极面，主要是因为他是站在国民经济学家的立场上言说的，从市民社会普遍存在的人与人的依赖关系出发，他强调分工使“人们之间在满足其他需要上的依赖性和相互关系得以完成，并使之成为一种完全必然性。”[ [德]黑格尔：《法哲学原理》，范扬、张企泰译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年，第210页。]也就是说，黑格尔认为人与人之间通过物结成密不可分的联系，这不仅天经地义，而且对个人和社会都大有裨益，因为“每个人在为自己取得、生产和享受的同时，也正为了其他一切人的享受而生产和取得。在一切人相互依赖全面交织中所含有的必然性，现在对每个人说来，就是普遍而持久的财富。”[ [德]黑格尔：《法哲学原理》，范扬、张企泰译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年，第210页。]在这里，“普遍而持久的财富”并不是泛指一般物质财富，而是特指资本主义社会的财富生产方式和分配方式，这就暗含了资本统治的普遍性和永恒性。不难看出，黑格尔并没有直接论证资本的永恒性，而是通过揭示资本主义社会普遍存在的人与人的依赖关系，强调个人应服从一种普遍物——伦理国家，进而间接论证资本关系的永恒在场的。在《1857-1858年经济学手稿》中，马克思强调资本主义社会是一个抽象占统治地位的社会，但与黑格尔不同，他反对一切凌驾于人之上的抽象力量，认为抽象的统治只是人类社会发展特定阶段的产物，因而具有历史暂时性。也就是说，马克思在事实层面虽然承认资本主义社会的不同个体以物为中介形成了普遍联系，甚至从“为共产主义社会创造物质前提条件”出发认定这是一种历史进步，但却在价值立场上认定这是虚假的普遍性，而只有自由人联合体才具有真正的普遍性。

Going further, Mészáros pointed out incisively that Hegel’s dialectics is an apologetic “pseudo-dialectics.” In his view, the particularity of egoism cannot be reconciled with the universality of the ethical state, because “in our existing world, universality cannot emerge if the antagonistic contradiction of the capital/labor relation — in which particular individuals are embedded and through which they are dominated — is not overcome.” [7]7 István Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003), p. 33. That is to say, without abolishing capital, universality can only form a relationship of domination and oppression over the subject; the essence of modern society lies precisely in the domination of people by the false universality created by capital. The greatest conservatism of Hegel’s philosophy lies not only in indirectly arguing for the “theory of the eternity of capital,” but also in inherently propagating a “theory of the virtue of capital,” namely, the belief that the rule of capital can ensure the realization of people’s diverse needs and therefore possesses great virtue. Like Smith, Hegel mistakenly regarded the compulsion of capital as comprehensive mutual benefit among individuals, but in fact this mutual benefit does not exist and is fictitious. The core issue is “which class the individual belongs to actually creates the ‘wealth of the nation,’ and which class appropriates the benefits of this production; or, more precisely, which class the individual belongs to must be confined to a forced subordinate function, and which particular individuals — in Marx’s terms, the ‘personification of capital’ — perform the controlling function.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 34. By retaining egoistic individuals and emphasizing the reciprocal interaction between people, Hegel declared that the capital system possesses unparalleled rationality and justice. Admittedly, Hegel identified the harm of egoism, emphasizing that particularity, lacking moderation and measure, would lead desire into an evil infinity: “In these opposites and their complex interrelations, civil society provides a spectacle of extravagance and poverty as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to both.” [9]9 G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Fan Yang and Zhang Qitai (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1961), p. 199. But like Smith, Hegel preferred to regard danger as an indispensable basic condition for the development of human society and believed that “in promoting my own purpose, I also promote the universal, and the universal in turn promotes my purpose.” [10]10 Ibid., p. 199. Hegel’s overall logic is that particularity necessarily leads to universality, and universality can achieve the overall harmony of society; therefore, even if civil society may lead to human alienation, it has natural legitimacy. This is clearly a conservative ideology.

更进一步，梅扎罗斯一针见血地指出，黑格尔的辩证法是辩护式的“伪辩证法”。在他看来，利己主义的特殊性不可能与伦理国家的普遍性相调和，因为“在我们的现存世界中，如果不能克服资本/劳动关系——特殊的个人被嵌入这种关系并借助它而受到统治——的对抗性矛盾，普遍性就不可能出现。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第33页。]也就是说，不消灭资本，普遍性就只能对主体形成统治和压迫关系，现代社会的实质恰恰在于资本制造的虚假普遍性对人的统治。黑格尔哲学最大的保守性不仅在于间接地论证了“资本永恒论”，还在于内在地宣扬一种“资本德性论”，即认为资本统治能够确保人的多元需要的实现，因而具有伟大的德性。与斯密一样，黑格尔错误地将资本强制视为个人间的全面互惠，但事实上这种互惠是不存在的、虚构的，核心问题在于，“个人所属的哪个阶级实际上创造了‘国家的财富’，哪个阶级窃取了这种生产的利益；或者更准确地说，个人所属的哪个阶级必须被限制在强制的从属功能，哪些特殊的个人——用马克思的术语是‘资本的人格化’——实行着控制的功能。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第34页。]通过保留利己主义的个人以及强调人与人的互惠交往，黑格尔宣称资本制度具有无与伦比的合理性和正义性。诚然，黑格尔指认了利己主义的危害，强调特殊性没有节制和尺度，将会把情欲导入恶的无限，“市民社会在这些对立中以及它们错综复杂的关系中，既提供了荒淫和贫困的景象，也提供了为两者所共同的生理上和伦理上蜕化的景象。”[ [德]黑格尔：《法哲学原理》，范扬、张企泰译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年，第199页。]但与斯密一样，黑格尔宁愿将危险视为人类社会发展不可或缺的基本条件，并相信“我在促进我的目的的同时，也促进了普遍物，而普遍物反过来又促进了我的目的。”[ [德]黑格尔：《法哲学原理》，范扬、张企泰译，北京：商务印书馆，1961年，第199页。]黑格尔的总体逻辑是，特殊性必然走向普遍性，而普遍性能够实现社会的总体和谐，因此即便市民社会有可能导致人的异化，也具有天然的合法性。这显然是一种保守主义的意识形态。

In summary, Hegel’s philosophy, especially his philosophy of right and philosophy of history, carries a strong conservative color. It is not only idealism in the general sense but also “uncritical positivism.” As for why Hegel’s philosophy is conservative, I fully agree with Mészáros’s following analysis: “What corrupts Hegel’s philosophy is not merely its idealism, but the fact that he holds a ‘position of political economy,’ which means a general uncritical attitude toward capital as the metabolic control of society.” [11]11 Mészáros, *Beyond Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 53. Unlike Hegel’s dialectics, Marx’s dialectics directly confronts the rule of capital, scientifically reveals the material basis and general laws of the development of capitalist society, and provides a fundamental solution for transcending capital.

综上，黑格尔哲学尤其是法哲学和历史哲学带有浓厚的保守主义色彩，它不仅是一般意义上的唯心主义，也是“非批判的实证主义”。至于黑格尔哲学缘何具有保守性，笔者完全赞同梅扎罗斯的如下分析，“败坏黑格尔哲学的不仅仅是它的唯心主义，而在于他持有‘政治经济学的立场’的事实，这意味着对作为社会新陈代谢控制的资本抱一种总的无批判的态度。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第53页。]与黑格尔的辩证法不同，马克思的辩证法直面资本的统治，科学地揭示了资本主义社会发展的物质基础和一般规律，并为超越资本提供了根本性的解决方案。

II. The Negative Influence of Hegelianism on *History and Class Consciousness*

二、黑格尔主义对《历史与阶级意识》的消极影响

It was not only in *History and Class Consciousness* that Lukács acquired Hegelian habits; according to the generally accepted view in academic circles, he had already moved from Kant to Hegel in *The Theory of the Novel* (1916). Lukács himself confirmed this in the new preface to *History and Class Consciousness*, stating: “During the First World War, I took up the study of Marx again, but this time … under the influence of Hegel.” [12]12 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 2. [György Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi, Ren Li, and Yan Hongyuan (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1999), 2.] *The Theory of the Novel* was completed in a mood of permanent despair over the world situation; at that time, his greatest concern was the question “Who will save us from Western civilization?” Lukács attributed the crisis of Western civilization to the “loss of totality,” pointing out that “our world has become infinitely large, and in every corner it hides gifts and dangers richer than those of the Greek world, yet this richness negates the basic and positive meaning of its existence: totality.” [13]13 Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, 25. [György Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Yan Hongyuan and Li Huaitao (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2012), 25.] Although in *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács no longer emphasized the individual but rather the class, his reliance on totality remained consistent; at root, this can be traced back to Hegelianism. Although Mézáros acknowledges that *History and Class Consciousness* signifies a great rupture in Lukács’s thought, he is convinced that “an intellectual of substance cannot simply empty himself every time a cultural-political wind changes direction.” [14]14 Mézáros, *Beyond Capital*, 341. [István Mézáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2003), 341.] In terms of research themes, the continuity of Lukács’s thought is mainly manifested in his concern for the possibility of culture; “culture was the ‘sole’ idea in Lukács’s life.” [15]15 Heller, *Lukács Revalued*, 5. [Ágnes Heller, ed., *Lukács Revalued*, trans. Yi Junqing et al. (Harbin: Heilongjiang University Press, 2011), 5.] In terms of research method and theoretical substance, the continuity of Lukács’s thought is mainly manifested in his inheritance of Hegelianism. The progressive aspect of *History and Class Consciousness* lies in its weakening of the transcendental nature of “soul” and “form,” emphasizing that they are products of the capitalist social structure. From a Marxist standpoint, Lukács realized that capitalist society, as a totality, is imposing an objective structural compulsion on individuals; therefore, Kantian abstract forms alone cannot eliminate alienation in reality. This means that the early individualist perspective must be abandoned in favor of class discourse: “The individual can never become the measure of things, because the individual confronts objective reality as a collection of rigid things. The individual finds these things already existing and immutable. Faced with such things, the individual can only make subjective judgments of acceptance or rejection. Only the class (and not the ‘species,’ which is merely a mystified individual shaped by intuitive spirit) can relate to the totality of reality and play a practical transformative role.” [16]16 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 294. [Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 294.] It must be pointed out that emphasizing class does not mean Lukács escaped Hegelianism; his theory of the proletariat as the “identical subject-object of history” is precisely a replica of Hegelianism. In his own words, “To regard the proletariat as the identical subject-object of truly human history is not a materialist realization that overcomes the idealist system, but an attempt to out-Hegel Hegel.” [17]17 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 19. [Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 19.]

卢卡奇并不是在《历史与阶级意识》中才沾染上黑格尔主义习气的，按照学界公认的说法，他在《小说理论》（1916）中便从康德走向了黑格尔。卢卡奇本人在《历史与阶级意识》新版序言中确证了这一点，他说：“第一次世界大战期间，我再次着手研究马克思，不过这次……是受黑格尔的影响。”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《历史与阶级意识》，杜章智、任立、燕宏远译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第2页。]《小说理论》是在卢卡奇对世界局势的永久绝望的心绪中脱稿的，当时他最关心的是“谁把我们从西方文明中拯救出来”这个问题。卢卡奇将西方文明的危机归结为“总体性的丧失”，他指出，“我们的世界变得无限之大，它在每一个角落里都隐藏着比希腊世界更丰富多彩的礼物和危险，然而，这种丰富多彩却扬弃它生存的基本的和积极的意义：总体。”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《小说理论》，燕宏远、李怀涛译，北京：商务印书馆，2012年，第25页。]虽然卢卡奇在《历史与阶级意识》中不再强调个人而是强调阶级，但他对总体性的倚重却是一以贯之的，从根源上看这可以追溯至黑格尔主义。梅扎罗斯尽管承认《历史与阶级意识》意味着卢卡奇思想发生了巨大断裂，但他深信“有分量的知识分子不可能简单地在每次文化—政治风向发生转变之时清空自己” [ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第341页。]。从研究主题上看，卢卡奇思想的连续性主要表现为对文化可能性的关注，“文化就是卢卡奇生命中‘唯一的’思想”[ [匈牙利]阿格妮丝·赫勒主编：《卢卡奇再评价》，衣俊卿等译，哈尔滨：黑龙江大学出版社，2011年，第5页。]。而从研究方法和理论实质上看，卢卡奇思想的连续性主要表现为对黑格尔主义的继承。《历史与阶级意识》的进步性在于弱化了“心灵”和“形式”的先验性，强调它们是资本主义社会结构的产物。从马克思主义立场出发，卢卡奇意识到资本主义社会作为总体性的存在正在对个人施加客观的结构性强制，因此仅凭康德主义的抽象形式是不能消除现实中的异化的。这就意味着必须放弃早期秉持的个人主义视角，转向阶级话语，“个体决不能成为事物的尺度，这是因为个体面对的是必定作为僵化事物的集合体的客观现实。个体发现这些事物是已经存在的、一成不变的。面对这样的事物，个体只能作出承认或者拒绝的主观判断。只有阶级（而不是‘类’，类只是按照直观的精神塑造出来的神秘化的个体）才能和现实的总体发生关系并起到实际上的改造作用。”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《历史与阶级意识》，杜章智、任立、燕宏远译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第294页。]必须指出，强调阶级并不意味着卢卡奇摆脱了黑格尔主义，他的无产阶级“历史主客体同一论”恰恰是黑格尔主义的翻版，用他自己的话说，“将无产阶级看作真正人类历史的同一的主体—客体并不是一种克服唯心主义体系的唯物主义实现，而是一种想比黑格尔更加黑格尔的尝试。”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《历史与阶级意识》，杜章智、任立、燕宏远译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第19页。]

At root, Lukács’s problem lies in his optimistic assessment of the European revolutionary situation after the October Revolution, which led him to underestimate capital and overestimate class consciousness. Around 1858, Marx held an optimistic attitude toward revolution, but he also revealed a certain “uncertainty.” In a letter to Engels, he wrote: “The real task of bourgeois society is to establish the world market (at least in outline) and production based on this market. Since the earth is round, this process seems to have been completed with the colonization of California and Australia and the opening of China and Japan. The difficult question for us is this: revolution on the continent is imminent and will immediately assume a socialist character. But since in an extremely vast domain bourgeois society is still on the rise, will revolution in this little corner not necessarily be suppressed?” [18]18 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, vol. 29, 348. [*Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, vol. 29 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972), 348.] Here, “little corner” refers to Western Europe; Marx’s inner worry was that the capitalist mode of production was expanding globally and was still on the whole in its ascendant phase—under these circumstances, could it be overthrown? Although the 1920s differed greatly from the mid-19th century, the general trend of capitalist global expansion had not changed; the adjusted capitalist relations of production could still, to a certain extent, promote the development of productive forces. This means that simply and crudely declaring the imminent demise of capitalism was bound to fail. In this regard, the following judgment by Lukács’s student Ferenc Fehér is not without reason: “The hope contained in this book for the imminent return of the messiah—the conception of a swift and thorough redemption through the conscious action of the international proletariat—disappeared without a trace in the late 1920s.” [19]19 Heller, *Lukács Revalued*, 98. [Heller, *Lukács Revalued*, 98.] In Mézáros’s view, although in *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács moved from the individual to the class, he simplistically reduced the crisis of capitalism to a “crisis of proletarian consciousness,” believing that as long as the proletariat shed its reified consciousness, it could once again transform the world as a revolutionary subject and overthrow capitalist society. This voluntarism determined that Lukács would inevitably adopt an uncritical attitude toward the proletariat and ultimately fall into subjectivism.

究其根本，卢卡奇的问题出在十月革命后对欧洲革命形势的乐观估计，这使得他低估资本，高估阶级意识。马克思在1858年前后曾对革命保有乐观主义态度，但同时也透漏出某种“不确定性”，在一封写给恩格斯的信中他指出，“资产阶级社会的真实任务是建立世界市场（至少是一个轮廓）和以这种市场为基础的生产。因为地球是圆的，所以随着加利福尼亚和澳大利亚的殖民地化，随着中国和日本的门户开放，这个过程看来已完成了。对我们来说，困难的问题是：大陆上革命已经迫于眉睫，并将立即具有社会主义的性质。但是，由于在极为广阔的领域内资产阶级社会还在走上坡路，革命在这个小小角落里不会必然被镇压吗？”[ 《马克思恩格斯全集》第29卷，北京：人民出版社，1972年，第348页。]在这里，“小小角落”指的是西欧，马克思内心的担忧是，资本主义生产方式正在向全球范围扩展，在总体上仍然处于上升期，那么在这种情势下它能够被推翻吗？20世纪20年代虽然与19世纪中叶存在较大差异，但资本主义全球扩张的总趋势并未发生改变，调整后的资本主义生产关系仍能在一定程度上促进生产力的发展，这就意味着简单粗暴地宣称资本主义即将灭亡必然失效。就此而言，卢卡奇的学生费赫尔（Ferenc Fehér）的如下判断不无道理，“这本书中所蕴涵的关于救世主即将再次降临的希望，即通过国际无产阶级自觉行动来获得迅速而彻底的救赎的构想，在20世纪20年代后期消失得无影无踪。”[ [匈牙利]阿格妮丝·赫勒主编：《卢卡奇再评价》，衣俊卿等译，哈尔滨：黑龙江大学出版社，2011年，第98页。]在梅扎罗斯看来，卢卡奇在《历史与阶级意识》中虽然从个体走向阶级，但却简单地将资本主义危机归为“无产阶级的意识危机”，认为只要无产阶级摆脱物化意识，就可以重新以革命主体的身份改造世界，推翻资本主义社会。这种唯意志论决定了卢卡奇必然对无产阶级采取非批判的态度，并最终陷入主观主义。

The manifest paradox of *History and Class Consciousness* lies in the fact that, on the one hand, proceeding from the Marxist theory of class revolution, Lukács must appeal to a strong Hegelian philosophy of history in order to demonstrate the historical inevitability of proletarian revolution; on the other hand, proceeding from a metaphysical-ontological analysis of culture, Lukács must appeal to individual autonomous consciousness in order to eliminate the alienation of everyday life, exploring the selectivity of ethical morality rather than the inevitability of objective laws. Influenced by the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Lukács began to reflect on the utopianism in *History and Class Consciousness* in the 1930s, but he did not turn back to his earlier focus on the individual and abstract forms; instead, he turned to the species [Gattung], emphasizing that the unity of the individual and the species is the key to resolving the social crisis. Furthermore, Lukács also placed his hopes in aesthetic activity, holding that it is precisely in the process of appreciating and understanding works of art that individuals can become aware of their species-essence and elevate themselves to the level of the species. But no matter what, in *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács did not transcend Hegel’s philosophy of history; the conservative elements in the philosophy of history were also inherited, which is indeed ironic for a Marxist theorist and revolutionary. In Mészáros’s view, Lukács’s greatest tragedy is his excessive emphasis on the importance of class consciousness; he assumes that the working class is the true possessor of the total perspective, but starting from this situation, “there is no way out except to leap from rule to rule” [20]20 István Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003), p. 383. [István Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, Vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003), p. 383.]. By retaining Hegel’s idealist discourse, Lukács implies that the proletariat can overcome capitalist society merely through acts of consciousness—that is, it can achieve liberation without changing the capital-labor relations of domination. Here, the Marxist principle of the primacy of the material (the economic) is pushed to the margins, and Lukács is deeply trapped in the labyrinth of conceptual mythology, unable to extricate himself.

《历史与阶级意识》的明显悖论在于，一方面，从马克思主义的阶级革命理论出发，卢卡奇要论证无产阶级革命的历史必然性，就必须诉诸黑格尔主义强势的历史哲学；另一方面，从对文化的形而上学存在论分析出发，卢卡奇要消除日常生活的异化，就必须诉诸个体的自主意识，探讨伦理道德的选择性而不是客观规律的必然性。受《1844年经济学哲学手稿》影响，卢卡奇在20世纪30年代开始反思《历史与阶级意识》中的乌托邦主义，但并没有转向早期对个人和抽象形式的关注，而是转向类，强调个体和类的统一是解决社会危机的关键。此外，卢卡奇还将希望寄托在审美活动上，认为正是在对艺术品的欣赏和理解过程中个体能够意识到自己的类本质，并擢升到类的层级上来。但无论怎样，在《历史与阶级意识》中卢卡奇并没有超出黑格尔的历史哲学，历史哲学中的保守主义因素也被继承下来，作为马克思主义理论家和革命家这确有反讽的意味。在梅扎罗斯看来，卢卡奇最大的悲剧是过于强调阶级意识的重要性，他假定工人阶级是总体观点的真正拥有者，但从这种情境出发，“除了从规则跳到规则，不可能有任何出路”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第383页。]。由于保留了黑格尔的唯心主义话语，卢卡奇暗示无产阶级战胜资本主义社会仅靠意识行动就能实现，即不改变资本—劳动统治关系就能获得解放。在这里，马克思主义的物质（经济）首要性原则被排挤到边缘位置，卢卡奇也深陷概念神话的迷宫中无法自拔。

III. The Latent “Weberian Burden” in *History and Class Consciousness*

三、《历史与阶级意识》中潜藏的“韦伯包袱”

Mészáros emphasizes that the reason Lukács became “more Hegelian than Hegel” also stems from the heavy “Weberian burden” he carried. Lukács never avoided acknowledging Weber’s influence, frankly admitting that Weber’s methodological works “clarified issues and opened up new lines of thought” for reading and understanding Marx’s *Capital* [21]21 Du Zhangzhi, ed., *Lukács’s Autobiography*, trans. Li Zhuqing et al. (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1986), p. 206. [Du Zhangzhi, ed., *Lukács’s Autobiography*, trans. Li Zhuqing et al. (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1986), p. 206.]. But the problem is that it was precisely the most conservative and destructive views in Weber’s thought that influenced the conceptual framework of *History and Class Consciousness*, mainly reflected in Lukács’s appropriation and evaluation of Weber’s concepts such as “rationality” and “calculability.”

梅扎罗斯强调，卢卡奇之所以会“比黑格尔更黑格尔化”，还源于其身上背负着沉重的“韦伯包袱”。卢卡奇从不避讳韦伯思想的影响，坦承韦伯的方法论著作对阅读和理解马克思的《资本论》“起了澄清问题和开拓思路的作用”[ 杜章智编：《卢卡奇自传》，李渚青等译，北京：社会科学文献出版社，1986年，第206页。]。但问题在于，恰恰是韦伯思想中最保守和最具破坏性的观点影响了《历史与阶级意识》的概念框架，这主要体现在卢卡奇对韦伯“合理性”“可计算性”等概念的挪用和评估上。

In 1917, in his essay “The Meaning of ‘Value Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” Weber argued that social science research should not only distinguish between factual judgments and value judgments, but that researchers should also maintain value neutrality. In his view, capitalism is a process of development from irrationality to rationality; market capitalism operating according to the principle of calculability is rational capitalism, which politically manifests as bureaucracy. Weber did not consider rational capitalist society to be perfect; bureaucratic society could also become an “iron cage” imprisoning humanity, reducing individuals to insignificant cogs in a machine. But on the whole, he believed that the ills of capitalist society could be eliminated through democratization. Like Weber, Lukács also criticized capitalist bureaucracy on the level of value, holding that it leads to one-sided division of labor, destroys human nature, invades the psyche, and gives rise to reified consciousness. But on the level of fact, Lukács basically agreed with Weber’s judgment that capitalist bureaucracy brings high efficiency. For example, when discussing judges’ verdicts, he quotes Weber at length: “Here the judge is, more or less, an automatic statute-dispensing machine, into which one throws the case file along with the necessary fee, and from which one receives a judgment that is more or less convincingly reasoned; thus, the judge’s exercise of duty is at least largely calculable” [22]22 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi, Ren Li, and Yan Hongyuan (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999), p. 165. [Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi, Ren Li, and Yan Hongyuan (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999), p. 165.]. From the perspective of reification, Lukács opposes all systems’ encroachment on individuality; he mocks journalists for lacking “integrity” and betraying their convictions, and opposes the separation of workers’ labor power from their personality, because this turns the worker into a thing. But from the perspective of the laws of historical development, Lukács also holds that these reified phenomena are products of the specific relations of production of capitalist society, and therefore possess a certain historical inevitability.

1917年，韦伯在《社会和经济学中价值中立性的意义》一文中提出社会科学研究不仅应该区分事实判断和价值判断，而且研究者更应该保持价值中立性。在他看来，资本主义是一个从非理性向合理性发展的过程，依据可计算性原则运行的市场资本主义就是合理性的资本主义，这种资本主义在政治上表现为官僚制。韦伯并不认为合理性的资本主义社会就是完美的，官僚制社会也可以成为囚禁人类的“铁笼”，并将个人变成微不足道的机器齿轮，但从总体上看，他认为资本主义社会的弊病可以通过民主化的方式予以消除。与韦伯一样，卢卡奇在价值层面上也批判资本主义官僚制，认为它导致片面分工、破坏人性、侵入心灵衍生出物化意识。但在事实层面上，卢卡奇基本认同韦伯关于资本主义官僚制带来高效率的判断，譬如，在谈到法官判案时，他大段转引韦伯的论述，“在这里，法官像在具有合理法律的官僚国家中那样或多或少是一架法律条款自动机，人们在这架机器上面投进去案卷，再放入必要的费用，它从下面就吐出或多或少具有令人信服理由的判决：因此，法官行使职责至少大体上是可以计算出来的。”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《历史与阶级意识》，杜章智、任立、燕宏远译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第165页。]从物化角度看，卢卡奇反对一切系统对个性的侵凌，他嘲讽新闻工作者“没有气节”，出卖信念，反对工人的劳动力同个性相分离，因为这让工人变成物。但从历史发展规律的角度看，卢卡奇又认为这些物化现象是资本主义社会特定生产关系的产物，因此具有一定的历史必然性。

An important theoretical contribution of Weber lies in distinguishing between early capitalism and modern capitalism; the greatest difference between the two is the degree of connection between economy and politics. In modern capitalist society, people are controlled by mysterious “entrepreneurs” and “politicians,” and the rule of capital is established through the personification of capital. Mészáros believes that Weber’s theory has two fatal flaws: first, it ahistorically and infinitely expands the concept of capitalism, blurring the essential differences between capitalism and pre-capitalism; second, it dissolves the specific antagonisms and contradictions of capitalist society into illusory systems such as “rational technology,” “rational legal system,” and “rational management.” Taking bureaucracy as an example, although Weber acknowledges that bureaucracy may evolve into bureaucratic rule, he still believes that the high efficiency brought by bureaucracy can bring liberation to humanity, and that the capitalist system is the best political system. According to Weber’s conception, bureaucracy uses the principle of calculability to depersonalize people; although it eliminates individual personality, it greatly improves work efficiency. “Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.” [23]23 Zheng Leping, ed. and trans., *Economy, Society, Religion: Selected Works of Max Weber* (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1997), 180. Weber not only affirms bureaucracy but also, in an ahistorical manner, regards bureaucracy and the principle of calculability as basic features of modern society that cannot be transcended, thus indicating that abolishing bureaucracy is an “impossible task.” Weber does not believe that abolishing capitalist private property will end bureaucracy; he points out, “If those who are controlled by the bureaucratic system attempt to escape the influence of the existing bureaucratic organization, generally speaking, the only possibility is to establish another organization. Yet this organization will also become equally bureaucratized.” [24]24 Zheng Leping, ed. and trans., *Economy, Society, Religion: Selected Works of Max Weber* (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1997), 181. It is precisely in the sense of emphasizing that bureaucracy and the principle of calculability cannot be eradicated that Mészáros believes Weber has fallen into a conservative ideology, and that his theory “leaves no room for the action of antagonistic social classes, let alone for the feasibility of any rationally viable strategy for turning the subordinate class into the class that controls the social order.” [25]25 István Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003), 399. As in the earlier example of the judge deciding a case, if the judge in a bureaucracy is merely an “automatic machine for issuing legal provisions” and cannot provide any reasonable interpretation of decrees beyond routine tasks, then “calculability” will not only bring “high efficiency” but also lead to terrible consequences, namely, concealing the interests of the ruling class and consolidating the rule of capital.

韦伯的一个重要理论贡献在于区分了早期资本主义和现代资本主义，二者最大的区别是经济和政治的关联度不同，在现代资本主义社会，人们被神秘的“企业家”和“政治家”控制，资本统治是通过资本人格化确立的。梅扎罗斯认为韦伯的理论存在两个致命缺陷：一是非历史地无限拓展资本主义的概念，混淆资本主义与前资本主义的本质差别；二是将资本主义社会特有的对抗和矛盾消解在“合理的技术”“合理的法律体系”“合理的管理”等幻想体制中。以官僚制为例，尽管韦伯承认官僚制有可能演化为官僚统治，但他还是相信官僚制带来的高效率能够为人类带来解放，资本主义制度是最佳的政治体制。按照韦伯的设想，官僚制运用可计算性原则将人非人格化，虽然取消了人的个性，但却大大提高了工作效率，“到处的经验都显示，纯粹官僚型的行政组织——即一元化的官僚制——由纯技术的观点来看，可能获得最高的效率。就此意义而言，它乃是对人类行使支配的已知方式中，最理性者。在明确性、稳定性、纪律的严格性、及可依赖性诸方面，它都比其他形式的组织优越。”[ 郑乐平编译：《经济·社会·宗教——马克斯·韦伯文选》，上海：上海社会科学院出版社，1997年，第180页。]韦伯不仅肯定官僚制，而且还以非历史的态度将官僚制和可计算性原则视为现代社会无法超克的基本特征，这就表明废除官僚制是一项“不可能的任务”。韦伯并不认为废除资本主义私有制将会终结官僚制，他指出，“如果为官僚系统所控制的人们，企图逃避现存官僚组织的影响力，则一般而言，只有建立另外一个组织才有可能。然而这个组织也将同样地官僚化。”[ 郑乐平编译：《经济·社会·宗教——马克斯·韦伯文选》，上海：上海社会科学院出版社，1997年，第181页。]正是在强调官僚制和可计算性原则不可根除这个意义上，梅扎罗斯认为韦伯陷入了保守主义的意识形态，其理论“没有为对抗的社会阶级的行动留下余地，更不用说为将从属阶级变成控制社会秩序的阶级的任何合理可行战略的可行性留下余地”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第399页。]。就像前面提到的法官判案的例子，如果法官在官僚制中只是“颁布法律条款的自动机器”，除例行公事外不能对法令做出任何合理的解释，那么“可计算性”将不仅带来“高效率”，而且还会导致可怕的后果，那就是掩盖统治阶级的利益和巩固资本的统治。

Mészáros’s analysis of the “Weberian baggage” fails to perceive the high complexity of Lukács’s thought; he only sees Lukács’s “affirmation” of rationality and the principle of quantification at the factual level, while ignoring that, as a Marxist, Lukács’s “negation” of Weber’s theory of reification at the value level. Overall, Weber’s theory of reification is non-critical and affirmative; its core crux lies in the “principle of value neutrality,” which leads to a bias toward and affirmation of instrumental rationality, and this line of thinking further leads to the “suspension” and “ignorance” of the reification of capitalist relations of production. However, Marx’s mature theory of reification has two different levels: one is the reification of relations of production, which Marx negates and criticizes; the other is the reification of the production process, that is, objectification, which Marx affirms. Weber mainly discusses reification at the second level, so he affirms the principle of calculability and quantification. Lukács’s problem lies in confusing these two levels of reification, which inevitably leads to a paradox: sometimes he affirms Weber’s reification, and sometimes he stands on a critical position to oppose the principle of calculability and quantification. But fundamentally, Weber’s understanding of reification still gains the upper hand, ultimately leading to a peculiar phenomenon: Lukács always substantively affirms Weber within the superficial discourse of opposing Weber. Zhang Yibing correctly restores the social background of Lukács’s theory of reification, namely, that it “describes not the inversion of social relations in the capitalist market exchange of the 19th century that Marx faced, but the rationalization (the standardized process of quantifiable calculability) in the objectifying technological process of 20th-century industrial civilization since Taylorism that Weber described.” [26]26 Zhang Yibing, *Deep Plowing of the Text*, vol. 1 (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2004), 50. In short, although Lukács opposes instrumental rationality in *History and Class Consciousness*, which is clearly different from Weber, his understanding of reification is precisely built on the basis of Weber’s theory of reification, and therefore can still be called “Weberian baggage.”

梅扎罗斯关于“韦伯包袱”的分析未能洞察到卢卡奇思想的高度复杂性，他只看到了卢卡奇在事实层面上对合理性和量化原则的“肯定”，而忽略了作为马克思主义者的卢卡奇在价值层面上对韦伯物化理论的“否定”。从总体上看，韦伯的物化理论是非批判的、肯定性的，其核心要害在于“价值中立原则”导致了对工具合理性的偏袒和肯定，这一致思趋向又进一步导致对资本主义生产关系物化的“悬置”和“无视”。然而，马克思成熟期的物化理论存在两个不同层面：其一是生产关系的物化，马克思对此持否定和批判态度；其二是生产过程的物化，也就是对象化，马克思对此持肯定态度。韦伯主要是在第二个层面探讨物化的，因此他肯定可计算性原则和量化。卢卡奇的问题在于混淆了物化的上述两个层面，这就必然陷入悖论，有时肯定韦伯的物化，有时又站在批判的立场上反对可计算性原则和量化。但从根本上说，韦伯对物化的理解还是占据了上风，这最终导致一种奇特的现象，那就是卢卡奇总是在反对韦伯的表层话语中实质性地肯定韦伯。张一兵正确还原了卢卡奇物化理论的社会背景，即它“描述的不是马克思面对的19世纪的资本主义市场交换中的社会关系的颠倒状况，而是韦伯所描述的从泰勒制以来的20世纪工业文明对象化技术进程中的合理化（量化的可计算的标准化进程）。”[ 张一兵：《文本的深度耕犁》（第一卷），北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年，第50页。]质言之，卢卡奇虽然在《历史与阶级意识》中反对工具理性，这一点与韦伯明显不同，但他对物化的理解恰恰是建立在韦伯物化理论基础上的，因此仍可以被称为“韦伯包袱”。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

It must be pointed out that there is a fundamental difference between Lukács and Weber on how to view the “ultimate ends of humanity.” Lukács opposed Weber’s “principle of value neutrality.” In *What Is Orthodox Marxism?* he unequivocally opposed “scienticity,” “factuality,” and “purely objective laws,” stating: “When ‘science’ maintains that the manner in which the given facts directly manifest themselves is the basis of its own real scientific validity, and that their form of existence is the starting point for the formation of scientific concepts, it simply and dogmatically takes its stand on the basis of capitalist society and uncritically accepts its essence, its objective structure, and its laws as the immutable foundation of ‘science.’” [27]27 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi, Ren Li, and Yan Hongyuan (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1999), 56. Lukács also realized that formalized mathematical methods cannot solve the problem of human existence; therefore, epistemology must return to ontology and accept the guidance of practice and values. However, Lukács did not believe that Kant’s categorical imperative or Hegel’s cunning of reason had successfully resolved the problem. What he sought was a non-formalized, collectivist solution, namely, an appeal to the class consciousness and revolutionary activity of the proletariat. But Mézáros was not satisfied with Lukács’s solution. In his view, *History and Class Consciousness* inevitably fell into Hegelian idealism as a logical consequence of its theoretical framework: since Lukács identified the crisis of capitalist society as an ideological crisis, he was bound to rely heavily on the class consciousness of the proletariat, thereby weakening the Marxist principle of the primacy of the material (economic). That is, as long as Lukács failed to examine the secret of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of a critique of political economy, he could only remain within Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness, carrying the “Weberian burden” forward. Fundamentally, Mézáros believed that Lukács’s basic predicament was “his lifelong attempt to resolve the contradictions he had discovered and to find a path to liberation through the direct intervention of social consciousness.” [28]28 István Mézáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*, vol. 1, trans. Zheng Yiming et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003), 466. But the problem is that forms of social consciousness can neither directly intervene in the rule of capital nor reshape the productive order of social metabolism. In desperation, Lukács could only resort to the redemption of intellectuals, but he overlooked the fact that the masses cannot escape reification and the rule of capital merely through the “external inculcation” of intellectuals, because “‘solving’ these problems from the ‘outside’ (which means from the standpoint of the ruling class that benefits from the eternal existence of society) is doomed to fail; the power of capital, which continues to exist in a disguised form, cannot be eliminated; as long as capital (in whatever form) remains the lever controlling social metabolism, the danger of restoring capitalism on a hereditary basis cannot be eliminated either.” [29]29 Ibid., 482. Furthermore, Lukács’s turn to ethics and aesthetics in his later years also had a certain inevitability. The stark contrast between theory and reality forced him to abandon the class theory of *History and Class Consciousness* and instead appeal to the universality of the species and morality, emphasizing that individuals with a higher moral level and aesthetic ability can realize the unity of the individual and the species, thereby escaping reification. Although Lukács always aroused people’s revolutionary enthusiasm with an optimistic attitude throughout his life, he had to face the reality of the rule of capital. Mézáros argued that once one accepts Lukács’s philosophical ontology, one can only agree that the contradictions and tragedies in reality are an irreversible stage in the realization of “humanity-for-itself.” This, like Smith, Hegel, Weber, and others, once again confirms at the factual level that the rule of capital has no alternative. But the real situation is that capital inevitably influences politics, and politics inevitably influences morality. Therefore, the key issue is how to make ethics actively intervene in politics, rather than abstractly declaring that morality and politics are identical. In short, Mézáros believed that Lukács’s fundamental problem was “an attempt to solve acute political and socio-economic problems at the level of abstract methodology and abstruse ontology, without pointing out the material and institutional mediations necessary to critically and strategically overcome the difficulties and contradictions that have now been identified.” [30]30 Ibid., 497. If this judgment is accurate, then it is not surprising that *History and Class Consciousness*, a work that should have been the most revolutionary and critical, contains conservative elements. The analysis of the Chinese scholar Zhang Yibing hits the mark. He points out that although Lukács was fortunate enough not to be poisoned by the dogmatized Marxism of the Second International and directly grasped the scientific critical spirit of Marxism, “he still failed to realize that his dependence on the Hegelian logic of totality and the Weber-Simmelian critique of reification would still turn his wish to reawaken the revolutionary class will of reified workers into a mirage.” [31]31 Zhang Yibing, *Deep Plowing of the Text*, vol. 1 (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2004), 1.

必须指出，卢卡奇与韦伯在如何看待“人类终极”的问题上存在根本差异，卢卡奇反对韦伯的“价值中立原则”，在《什么是正统马克思主义？》中他旗帜鲜明地反对“科学性”“事实性”“纯粹客观规律”，并指出：“当‘科学’认为这些‘事实’直接表现的方式是科学的重要真实性的基础，它们的存在形式是形成科学概念的出发点的时候，它就是简单地、教条地站在资本主义社会的基础上，无批判地把它的本质、它的客观结构、它的规律性当作‘科学’的不变基础。”[ [匈]卢卡奇：《历史与阶级意识》，杜章智、任立、燕宏远译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第56页。]卢卡奇还意识到形式化的数学方法不能解决人的存在问题，因此认识论必须返回本体论，接受实践和价值的引导。然而，卢卡奇并不认为康德的道德命令或黑格尔的理性的狡计成功解决了问题，他要努力寻求的是一种非形式化的、集体主义的解决方案，即诉诸无产阶级的阶级意识和革命活动。但梅扎罗斯并不满意卢卡奇的解决方案，在他看来，《历史与阶级意识》陷入黑格尔的唯心主义是理论逻辑的必然，既然卢卡奇认定资本主义社会的危机是意识形态危机，就必然会倚重无产阶级的阶级意识，进而削弱马克思主义的物质（经济）首要性原则。也就是说，只要卢卡奇未能从政治经济学批判的角度审视资本主义生产方式的秘密，就只能停留在黑格尔的意识哲学之内，背负“韦伯包袱”前行。从根本上看，梅扎罗斯认为卢卡奇的基本困境是“毕生试图通过社会意识的直接干预来解决他所发现的矛盾以寻求解放之道”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第466页。]，但问题在于，社会意识形式既不能直接干预资本统治，也不能重塑社会新陈代谢的生产秩序。卢卡奇在无奈之下只能求助于知识分子的救赎，但他忽视了仅仅依靠知识分子的“外部灌输”，群众是不可能摆脱物化和资本统治的，因为“‘从外部’（这意味着从有利于社会永远存在的统治阶级的立场出发）来解决这些问题注定要破产，以改头换面的形式继续存在的资本的力量将无法消除；只要资本（无论以何种形式）仍然是控制社会新陈代谢的杠杆，在世袭的基础上维护资本主义复兴的危险性也将无法消除。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第482页。]此外，卢卡奇晚年的伦理学和美学转向也具有一定的必然性，理论与现实的强烈反差迫使他不得不放弃《历史与阶级意识》中的阶级理论，转而诉诸类的普遍性和道德，即强调具有较高道德水平和审美能力的人能够意识到个体和类的统一，进而摆脱物化。尽管卢卡奇一生总是以一种乐观的态度唤起人们的革命热情，但他却不得不面对资本统治的现实。梅扎罗斯认为一旦人们接受卢卡奇的哲学本体论，就只能赞同现实中的矛盾和悲剧是实现“自为人性”的不可逆转的阶段，这就与斯密、黑格尔、韦伯等人一样，在事实层面上再次确证了资本统治的别无选择性。但真实情况却是，资本不可避免地影响政治，政治必然影响道德，因此问题的关键是如何让伦理学积极地干预政治，而不是抽象地宣称道德和政治是同一的。总之，梅扎罗斯认为卢卡奇的根本问题是“试图在抽象的方法论和玄妙的本体论层次上解决尖锐的政治和社会经济问题，而没有指出要批判地从战略上来克服现在已经看出的困难和矛盾所必需的物质和制度中介。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第497页。]如果这个判断是准确的，那么《历史与阶级意识》这部本应最具革命性和批判性的著作带有保守主义色彩便不足为奇了。国内学者张一兵的分析一语中的，他指出，卢卡奇虽然有幸未被第二国际的教条化马克思主义所毒化，并且直悟到了马克思主义的科学批判精神，但“他还是没能意识到，对黑格尔式的总体逻辑张力和韦伯—席美尔式的物化批判的依存，仍然会使他重新唤起物化劳动者革命阶级意志的愿望变成镜花水月。”[ 张一兵：《文本的深度耕犁》（第一卷），北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年，第1页。]

Finally, it should be noted that neither Mézáros nor Lukács’s other students (the Budapest School) completely rejected *History and Class Consciousness*. Although Fehér believed that the conception in *History and Class Consciousness* had collapsed by the late 1920s, he claimed that “both friends and enemies alike acknowledge that the publication of *History and Class Consciousness* was the most important event in the history of Marxist philosophy after the death of Marx.” [32]32 Ágnes Heller, ed., *Lukács Revalued*, trans. Yi Junqing et al. (Harbin: Heilongjiang University Press, 2011), 97. Mézáros held a reserved attitude toward *History and Class Consciousness*, but emphasized that it was a very important work of the transitional period, “a key reference point throughout its author’s life… playing a watershed role in Lukács’s theoretical development.” [33]33 Mézáros, *Beyond Capital*, 416.

最后要指出的是，无论是梅扎罗斯还是卢卡奇的其他学生（布达佩斯学派），均没有完全拒斥《历史与阶级意识》，费赫尔虽然认为《历史与阶级意识》中的构想在20世纪20年代末便崩溃了，但却声称，“无论是朋友还是敌人都同样承认，《历史和阶级意识》一书的出版是马克思逝世之后马克思主义哲学史上最重要的事件。”[ [匈牙利]阿格妮丝·赫勒主编：《卢卡奇再评价》，衣俊卿等译，哈尔滨：黑龙江大学出版社，2011年，第97页。]梅扎罗斯对《历史与阶级意识》持保留态度，但却强调这是过渡时期的一部非常重要的著作，“在其作者的一生中都是一个关键的参考点……在卢卡奇的理论发展中起到一个分水岭的作用。”[ [英]梅扎罗斯：《超越资本——关于一种过渡理论》上册，郑一明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003年，第416页。

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑

*Additionally, although Mézáros provides a precise analysis of the conservative elements in the intellectual legacies of Hegel and Weber, he neglects the positive influence of the Marxist historical method on *History and Class Consciousness*. The author believes that Lukács’s thought is highly complex and full of contradictions. Perhaps, as he himself said, any ordinary person harbors two souls in their breast. It is precisely the Marxist historical method that keeps him constantly vigilant, so that critical and revolutionary elements do not completely disappear into the ideological torrent of conservatism.

*另外，梅扎罗斯虽然对黑格尔和韦伯思想遗产中的保守主义成分有精准的分析，但却忽视了马克思主义的历史性方法对《历史与阶级意识》的积极影响。笔者认为，卢卡奇的思想是高度复杂和充满矛盾的，或许正如他自己所言，任何常人的胸中都藏着两个灵魂，正是马克思主义的历史性方法让他时刻保持警醒，因此批判性和革命性的成分并没有完全消失在保守主义的意识形态洪流之中。