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A Critique of the Political Economy of Capitalism from the Perspective of Parallax Dialectics

史凤阁:视差辩证法视域下的资本主义政治经济学批判

· · Marxism Abroad · School of Marxism, Tianjin University · "World Social Sciences" 2024, no. 2 · 28 min read

The critique of political economy is an important perspective for analyzing capitalist society. Slavoj Žižek, a leading figure of contemporary Western left-wing theory, recognized the importance of political economy early in his theoretical construction. In the preface he wrote for *The Žižek Reader*, co-edited by Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright, he stated: “For my project, it is crucial to re-center the Marxist critique of political economy.” [1]1 Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright, eds., *The Žižek Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. ix. In his systematic exposition of his philosophical views, *The Parallax View*, Žižek borrowed Kojin Karatani’s concept of “parallax” and gave it a Lacanian interpretation, constructing a new philosophy of “parallax dialectics.” This new philosophy is grounded in ontological difference and minimal difference. Refracted through the prism of “parallax dialectics,” the systemic antagonism of the capitalist economy is revealed, concretized as the parallax split among three pairs: the “real” economy versus the actual economy, the depoliticization of the economy versus the primacy of the political, and material labor versus immaterial labor. The critique of political economy from the parallax perspective differs from the traditional path of critique that Marx revealed in *Capital*—the extraction of surplus labor by capital—but it equally attests to the inherent internal antagonism of the contemporary capitalist economic system. It provides a new theoretical lens for focusing on the logic of capital and deeply analyzing the ills of the global capitalist system, while also offering a new possibility for the contemporary left to reshape emancipatory politics.

政治经济学批判是剖析资本主义社会的一个重要视角,当代西方左翼理论旗手齐泽克(Slavoj Žižek)在其理论建构早期就意识到政治经济学的重要性,他在为伊丽莎白·赖特(Elizabeth Wright)和埃德蒙·赖特(Edmond Wright)合编的《齐泽克读本》撰写的序言中指出:“对我的计划来说,重新将马克思主义的政治经济学批判置于中心地位,是关键所在。”1在系统阐释其哲学观的著作《视差之见》中,齐泽克借用柄谷行人的“视差”概念并予以拉康化解读,建构了“视差辩证法”的新哲学,这一新哲学奠基于存有论差异以及最小差异的基础之上。在“视差辩证法”棱镜的折射下,资本主义经济的体系性对抗得以呈现,并具象化为“真实”经济与现实经济、经济去政治化与政治的优先性、物质劳动与非物质劳动三者之间的视差分裂。视差视域下的政治经济学批判不同于马克思在《资本论》中揭示出的资本剥削剩余劳动这一传统的政治经济学批判路径,但同样指证了当代资本主义经济体系固有的内在对抗,为我们聚焦资本逻辑、深入剖析全球资本主义体系的弊病提供了新的理论视角,同时也为当代左翼重塑解放政治提供了某种新的可能性。

I. The Basic Connotations of Parallax Dialectics

一、视差辩证法的基本内涵

“Parallax” is an important concept proposed by the Japanese philosopher Kojin Karatani (hereafter “Karatani”) in his representative theoretical work *Transcritique: On Kant and Marx* (hereafter *Transcritique*). Its standard definition is: “the apparent displacement of an object (the change in its position against a background) caused by a change in the observer’s position that provides a new line of sight.” [2]2 Kojin Karatani, *Transcritique: On Kant and Marx*, trans. Sabu Kohso (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 1. However, this perspectivist principle based on the subject’s side is not Karatani’s core insight regarding “parallax.” In *Transcritique*, he creatively interprets Kant’s “transcendental turn” on the problem of “antinomies,” revealing the critical potential of “the parallax view.” Drawing on Karatani’s interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy, Žižek, invoking Lacan’s concept of the Real, gives “parallax” a deep theoretical elaboration, advancing it from a difference in the subject’s cognitive perspective to an ontological difference in the object, thereby completing the construction of parallax dialectics.

“视差”是由日本哲学家柄谷行人(下文简称“柄谷”)在他的代表性理论著作《跨越性批判:康德与马克思》(下文简称《跨越性批判》)中提出的重要概念,其标准定义:“一个客体显而易见的位移(在某个背景的位置变化),这一位移是由能够提供新视线的观察者位置的变化所导致的。”2然而,这种基于主体一方的视角主义原则并非柄谷关于“视差”的核心洞见,在《跨越性批判》中,他创造性地解读了康德对“二律背反”问题的“超验转向”,揭示了“视差之见”的批判潜能。在借鉴柄谷对康德批判哲学解读的基础上,齐泽克诉诸拉康的实在界概念对“视差”进行了深度理论化阐释,将“视差”由主体认识视角的差异推进到客体存有论的差异,完成了视差辩证法的建构。

First, Žižek interprets “parallax” through the “transcendental” turn in Kant’s philosophy, treating it as an ontological difference based on the non-all of reality. In *Transcritique*, Karatani links the concept of “parallax” to Kant’s “antinomies.” He argues that parallax means “in confronting an antinomy in the strict Kantian sense, we should abandon the effort to reduce one aspect to another, or even to achieve a ‘dialectical synthesis’ of the two opposing sides”; [3]3 Ibid., p. 3. we should insist on the irreducibility of the antinomy and conceive the radical critical point “as an irreducible split between different positions, as a pure structural gap between different positions.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 4. Building on Karatani’s insight into the critical potential of parallax, Žižek offers a deeper interpretation of the revolutionary nature of Kant’s “transcendental” turn. He argues that Kant’s “transcendental” turn, based on the distinction between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenal world, reveals a fundamental limitation of the human condition—“finitude.” That is, both our sensory cognition and rational thought have limitations; these two modes of thinking, rooted in different aspects of human experience, cannot be reduced to each other. Thus, in the process of understanding the world, we can rely neither entirely on sensory experience nor entirely on rational thought. Therefore, in Žižek’s view, “the Kantian ‘transcendental’ is far from marking a ‘synthesis’ of two dimensions; on the contrary, it represents the irreducible split ‘itself’ between the two dimensions”; [5]5 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 22. the ensuing Kantian lesson demands that we “observe not from our own perspective nor from another’s perspective, but directly confront the ‘reality’ exposed by the difference (parallax).” [6]6 Ibid., p. 29. This means that to grasp the revolutionary philosophical成果 of the Kantian parallax, we must “go a step further” and advance the cognition of parallax from an epistemological difference to an ontological difference.

第一,齐泽克通过康德哲学的“超验”转向来解读“视差”,将其视为一种基于现实非全性的存有论差异。在《跨越性批判》中,柄谷将“视差”概念与康德的“二律背反”相关联。他认为,视差意味着“在面对严格的康德意义上的二律背反的姿态时,我们应该放弃把一个方面化约为另一个方面,甚至对相互对立的两方进行‘辩证的综合’的努力”;3我们应该坚持二律背反的不可化约性,并将激进的批判点“设想为不同位置之间的不可化约的分裂,设想为不同位置之间的纯粹结构性裂缝”。4基于上述柄谷有关视差批判潜能的洞见,齐泽克对康德哲学“超验”转向的革命性给予进一步深度解读。他认为,康德在物自体与现象界区分基础上的“超验”转向揭示了人类生存状况的某种根本局限性——“有限”,即无论是我们的感性认知还是理性思维均有局限性,这两种思维方式因根植于人类经验的不同方面而无法彼此化约,由此,在对世界的认识过程中,我们既无法完全依赖感性经验,也不能完全依赖理性思维。因而,在齐泽克看来,“康德式‘超验’远远不是标明两个维度的‘综合’,相反,它代表着两个维度的不可化约的分裂‘本身’”;5随之而来的康德式教益便要求我们“并非从自己的视角也不是从他人的视角来观察,而是直接面对因差异(视差)而暴露出来的‘现实’”。6这意味着,如果要获知康德式视差导致的哲学革命性成果,我们还需要“百尺竿头,更进一步”,将对视差的认知由认识论差异推进到存有论差异。

Ontological difference is a focal point of Heidegger’s thought; it refers to the difference between beings and Being, that is, the difference between the existence of an entity and the horizon of meaning of that entity. However, Žižek does not intend to systematically expound on Heidegger’s thesis; rather, he aims to link it to Kant’s resolution of antinomies, thereby endowing “parallax” with a more radical critical connotation. Žižek points out that Kant already saw the crack in the ontological “edifice” of reality, but for structural reasons of theoretical system construction, Kant ultimately remained within the epistemological horizon in resolving antinomies. Yet Žižek argues that the crucial step is to advance “finitude” from the epistemological horizon to Being itself. That is to say, “the limitations of our knowledge (knowledge cannot grasp the totality of Being, hence our knowledge becomes entangled in contradictions and inconsistencies) are also simultaneously the limitations of the object of our knowledge; that is, the gaps and voids in our knowledge of reality are also the gaps and voids in the ontological edifice of the ‘Real.’” [7]7 Ibid., p. 27. Thus, the aforementioned Kantian parallax is transformed into an ontological difference, which leads to the first connotation of ontological difference: “Reality is ‘non-all,’ yet there is nothing outside it; this Nothing is Being itself.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 26. That is to say, ontological difference is not the difference between the totality of beings and their external manifestation; there is no “super-foundation of the All.” “It is in this sense that ontological difference is related to ‘finitude.’” [9]9 Ibid. The connection between Heidegger’s ontological difference and the Kantian parallax is embodied in this “finitude,” meaning that Being itself is finite; ontological difference “introduces” a crack into Being itself, making the realm of beings itself not-all. That is, the facts perceived by the subject from a transcendental perspective are never complete. So, does this ontological difference refer to the difference between the totality of beings and some transcendent, more fundamental thing? In response, Žižek gives a negative answer by stating that ontological difference is a minimal difference, which constitutes the second connotation of ontological difference. The so-called minimal difference refers to the constitutive non-coincidence of a thing with itself; that is, the difference and split of a thing are internal to itself. This minimal difference places an internal split within each being, thereby making the totalization of beings impossible. Therefore, “the difference between beings and their Being is also the difference internal to beings”; [10]10 Ibid., p. 27. this minimal difference indicates that “Being” is cut out from within beings, i.e., “the difference between beings/existents and their openness/horizon of meaning is always already inscribed into the domain of Being itself, rendering it incomplete/finite.” [11]11 Ibid., p. 28.

存有论差异是海德格尔思想的焦点,它是指存在者与存在之间的差异,也就是一个实存物的存在与这个实存物的意义视域之间的差异。但齐泽克并非要就海德格尔的这一论题进行系统阐述,他意在将其与康德对二律背反的解决相关联,以赋予“视差”更为激进的批判内涵。齐泽克指出,康德已经看到了现实之存有论“大厦”中的裂痕,出于理论体系建构的结构性原因,康德最终对二律背反的解决驻留于认识论视域。但齐泽克认为,关键的一步是将“有限”由认识论视域推进到存在自身,也就是说,“我们知识的局限(知识无法掌握存在的整体,我们的知识因而纠结在矛盾与前后不一贯之中)同时也正是我们知识对象的局限,亦即,我们对于现实知识当中的鸿沟与空缺,同时也是‘真实’的存在论大厦中的鸿沟与空缺”。7由此,上述的康德式视差便转换成一种存有论差异,而这就导向了存有论差异的第一重意蕴:“现实‘并非全部’(non-all),但在它之外又别无他物,这种空空如也(Nothing)就是存在(Being)自身。”8这就是说,存有论差异并非各存在实体(beings)之整体与其外在显现的差异,即并不存在“全部这一超级根基”;“正是从这个意义上说,存有论差异与‘有限’有关”。9海德格尔存有论差异与康德式视差的关联,便体现于这一“有限”上,这意味着存在本身是有限的,存有论差异将一道裂缝“引入”存在内部,从而使得诸存在实体之领域本身并非全部,也就是说,主体基于先验视角所感知的事实从来都不是完整的。那么,这种存有论差异是指各存在实体之全部与某种超越性、更为根本之物的差异吗?对此,齐泽克以存有论差异是最小差异给出了否定性的回应,这种最小差异构成了我们把握存有论差异的第二重意蕴。所谓最小差异是指事物与其自身的构成性非重合,也就是说事物之差异、分裂是内在于自身的。这种最小差异将一种内在的分裂置于各存在实体中,并由此使得各存在实体的整体化变得不可能。因此,“各存在实体与其存在之间的差异,同时也是各存在实体内部的差异”,10这种最小差异表明“存在”是由各存在实体内部切割出来的,即“各种存在/实存物与其开放性、意义视域之间的差异,总是早已切入了存在自身的领域,使之成为不完整的/有限的”。11

Second, by elucidating the “non-all” of the phenomenal-ontic domain inherent in parallax, Žižek points out that parallax marks the internal split and negativity of reality, pointing to the dimension of the antagonism of the Real. As a core concept of Lacan’s later thought, the “Real” refers to the domain that cannot be fully symbolized, the point where symbolization fails, the hard kernel resistant to symbolization. Žižek borrows Lacan’s concept of the Real, endowing parallax with radical connotations, identifying it as “the inherent antagonism that precedes the multiple/failed reflections on the transcendent/impossible Thing.” [12]12 Ibid., p. 29.

第二,通过阐明视差内蕴的现象—存有性之域的“非全性”,齐泽克指出,视差标示着现实内在的分裂与否定性,它指向的是实在界对抗之维。作为拉康晚期思想的核心概念,“实在界”意指无法完全被象征化的领域,即象征化运作失败的点位,它是抵制象征化的硬核。齐泽克借用了拉康的实在界概念,赋予视差激进性内涵,将其指认为“先于对超验/不可能原质进行多元/失败反思的内在对抗”。12

Regarding this antagonism of the real to which parallax points, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of the spatial layout of the village inhabited by the Winnebago tribe in North America, as presented in *Structural Anthropology*, provides an exemplary illustration. This tribe consists of two subgroups: one from the upper part and the other from the lower part. If one person is selected from each to draw a floor plan of the village they inhabit, we would obtain two completely different drawings.[13]13 Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 131-137. On this point, Slavoj Žižek argues that we cannot simply draw a conclusion of cultural relativism—namely, that the perception of social space depends on the group to which the observer belongs. Here, the parallax split is evident; it points to a certain constant, and “this constant is not the objective, ‘actual’ layout of the buildings, but the traumatic kernel, the fundamental antagonism that the villagers cannot symbolize, cannot explain, cannot ‘internalize,’ cannot bear—the imbalance in social relations that prevents the community from becoming a harmonious whole and achieving long-term stability.”[14]14 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 26. The two different perceptions of the village floor plan are precisely the efforts of people from the two subgroups to impose a balanced symbolic structure in order to heal the traumatic antagonism—that is, “first we have the ‘actual,’ ‘objective’ layout of the houses, and then we have two different symbolizations.”[15]15 Ibid. Here, we can see how the real intervenes in reality through the distortion of images; as the traumatic kernel of a certain social antagonism, it distorts the tribal members’ observation of the actual layout of the houses.

对视差指向的这种实在界对抗,列维-斯特劳斯(Claude Levi-Strauss)在《结构人类学》中对北美温贝尼戈部落所居住空间布局的分析为我们提供了典范性的说明。这一部落存在两个子群:一个来自上层,而另一个则来自底层。如果分别从中挑出一个人绘制其所居住村庄的平面图,那么我们会得到两个完全不同的绘图。13对此,齐泽克认为,我们不能仅仅简单得出文化相对主义的结论,即对社会空间的感知取决于观察者所属的群体。在此,视差的分裂是显而易见的,它指向了某个常数,而“这个常数不是建筑物的客观、‘实际’的布局,而是创伤性的内核(traumatic kernel),是村舍居民难以符号化、无法解释、不能‘内在化’、不堪忍受的基础性对抗,是社会关系中阻止共同体成为和谐整体并长期稳定的不平衡”。14对居住村落平面图的两种不同感知,正是两个子群的人们尝试强加均衡的符号结构治愈创伤性对抗的努力,即“我们先有房屋的‘实际’‘客观’的布局,然后才有两种不同的符号化”。15在此,可以看到实在界如何通过图像歪曲的方式对现实进行干预,它作为某种社会对抗的创伤性内核,对部落成员对房屋实际布局的观察造成了扭曲。

In summary, parallax is closely related to the antagonism of the real. The real, as the kernel of a certain social impossibility and social antagonism, is both the impossibility of social totalization itself and the obstacle that prevents social totalization. Moreover, we can call the real the parallax real, that is, “the real is purely parallactic and therefore non-substantial: it has no substantial density of its own; it is merely the split between two points of perspective, and its existence can only be detected when shifting from one point of perspective to another.”[16]16 Ibid., p. 27. This is diametrically opposed to the Lacanian real that “always returns to its place”; the parallax real can explain “why the same potential real can have multiple and diverse appearances.”[17]17 Ibid., p. 28. Thus, “it is not an unchanging hard kernel, but a hard core of contention that decomposes identity into multiple appearances.”[18]18 Ibid. In essence, the antagonism of the real triggers multiple symbolic constructions of reality, giving rise to a parallax split regarding reality; without doubt, the parallax views of the same reality also mark the dimension of antagonism of the real.

概而论之,视差与实在界对抗密切相关,实在界作为某种社会不可能性、社会对抗性的内核,既是社会整体化之不可能性本身,又是阻止社会整体化的障碍,而且我们可以将实在界称为视差实在界,即“实在界纯粹是视差性的,因而也是非实体性的(non-substantial):它本身没有实体性的密度(substantial density),它只是两个透视点(points of perspective)的分裂,只有从一个透视点转向另一个透视点时才能觉察其存在”。16这与拉康式的“总是回到它的位置”的实在界截然相反,视差实在界可以解释“何以同一个潜在的实在界却具有多种多样的表象”,17因而,“它并非一成不变的硬核,而是将同一性分解成多重表象的坚硬的争议核心”。18质言之,实在界对抗引起我们对现实的多重符号化建构,形成了关于现实的视差分裂;毋庸置疑,关于同一现实的视差之见也同样标识了实在界的对抗之维。

II. The Parallax Debate between the “Real” Economy and the Actual Economy

二、“真实”经济与现实经济的视差之辩

Through the prism of parallax dialectics, Žižek first dissects the concept of “economy” itself. He divides the economy into the “real” economy at the authentic level[19]19 The “real” economy (真实经济) here refers to the economy as a Lacanian real, an absent cause that determines social structure, not to be confused with the common usage of “real economy” as opposed to finance. (the “cause” that determines the functioning of society) and the actual economy at the symbolic level[20]20 The actual economy (现实经济) refers to the economy as a symbolic subsystem of society, including institutions and practices. (a “subsystem” of the actual functioning of society—substantive factors such as economic institutions and systems). Through the parallax debate between these two, Žižek identifies the decisive significance of the “real” economy in social functioning and elaborates on it from three aspects: the “real” economy as the “quasi-cause” of social operation, the “real” economy manifesting in displaced and distorted forms, and the “real” economy functioning as object a.[21]21 Object a (对象a) is a Lacanian concept denoting the object-cause of desire, an unattainable surplus that drives the subject’s desire.

透过视差辩证法的棱镜,齐泽克首先对“经济”概念本身进行了剖析,他将“经济”分为本真层面的“真实”经济19(对社会的运转起决定作用的“原因”)与象征层面的现实经济20(作为社会现实运转的一个“亚系统”——经济制度、体制等实体因素)。透过这两者的视差之辩,齐泽克指认了“真实”经济在社会运转的决定性意义,并从三方面进行了说明:“真实”经济作为社会运行的“准原因”、“真实”经济以置换扭曲的形式显现、“真实”经济作为对象a 21起作用。

First, Žižek distinguishes between the “real” economy, which plays a decisive role in the social field, and the actual economy, which is one of the constituent factors of the overall functioning of society. The former is “the economy as virtual X, the absolute point of reference of the social field”;[22]22 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 61. the latter is “the economy in reality, a factor within the totality of actual society, a ‘subsystem.’”[23]23 Ibid. This distinction by Žižek is closely related to the parallax real. In his view, the “real” economy functions as the Lacanian real; it is the hard kernel around which the social system revolves. The actual economy, on the other hand, is the reality of the economy that has already been “mediated” by the symbolic order; it is a symbolic representation of the antagonistic kernel of the real economy from a certain perspective. Therefore, in different regions or at different stages of development within the same region, the actual economy appears in diverse and varied forms, presenting itself to people in a direct and obvious manner. The “real” economy, as the hard kernel of the real, functions as a “quasi-cause” of society. Here, “quasi-cause” refers to a virtual, hidden, and indirect form—that is, “the determining economy never directly manifests itself as an actual agent in a causal relationship… Strictly speaking, it is precisely the absolute, non-relational, absent cause, something that is never ‘in its place.’”[24]24 Ibid., p. 62. This means that the determining “real” economy does not have concrete entities and institutions like the economic institutions and systems of the actual economy, nor does it occupy a specific position within the social system. Instead, it shapes and determines the entire social structure in an indirect and anonymous manner, through interaction with other factors. For this reason, within the normal functioning system of the actual economy, we cannot find a suitable place for the “real” economy; it intervenes only at the points of rupture in direct social causality, as an obscure cause.

首先,齐泽克区分了在社会领域起决定性作用的“真实”经济以及作为社会总体运转的构成因素之一的现实经济,前者“即作为虚拟X的经济,它是社会领域绝对的参照点”;22后者是“现实中的经济,它是现实社会总体性中的一个因素,是一个‘亚系统’”。23齐泽克的这一区分与视差实在界密切相关,在他看来,“真实”经济作为拉康式的实在界在发挥功能,它是社会系统所围绕运转的硬核;而现实经济是已然被符号界“中介”过的经济之现实,它是对真实经济对抗性内核的某种视角的符号化再现,因而,在不同的区域或者同一区域的不同发展阶段,现实经济呈现为繁复多样的形态,它以一种直接、显见的方式呈现在人们面前;而“真实”经济作为实在界的硬核,是以社会的“准原因”形式在起作用,这里的“准原因”意指一种虚拟的、隐藏的、间接的形式,也就是说,“起决定作用的经济从未直接表现为一个现实的、处于因果关系中的代理……严格来说,它恰恰就是绝对的、非关系性的、不在场的原因,是某种从未‘在其位置’上的东西”。24这意味着起决定作用的“真实”经济并不像现实经济中的经济制度、体制一样有着具体的实体与机构,并在社会系统中占据特定的位置,它以间接匿名的方式,通过与其他因素的互动,塑造和决定整个社会的结构。正因如此,在现实经济的正常运转体系中,我们无法为“真实”经济找到合适的位置,唯有在直接的社会因果关系裂隙之处,作为隐约原因的“真实”经济才介入其中。

Second, Žižek argues that the determining role of the “real” economy does not manifest directly, but rather in a displaced and distorted form. Through an analysis of the triad of social politics, economy, and culture, Žižek reveals that the determining role of the economy is embodied in the process of transformation from political struggle to cultural struggle. In Žižek’s view, we cannot conceive of the economy as a “meta-essence” hidden behind politics and culture, and thereby explain its determining role through a double distance of economy determining politics and politics determining culture. On the contrary, what he truly seeks to reveal is the form of the displacement of political struggle into cultural struggle; it is precisely in this displacement, which always appears as a form of misalignment, that the economy is “inscribed.” Žižek uses the example of the 1959 televised presidential debate between Kennedy and Nixon to further illustrate how the determining role of the economy operates through the displacement from politics to culture. In this election, Kennedy represented the progressive liberal middle class, while Nixon represented the right-wing conservative upper class. However, the effect presented in the debate was precisely the opposite: Kennedy displayed an upper-class lifestyle, while Nixon appeared more populist. Here, “the ‘class’ meaning encoded in cultural ‘lifestyle’ transformed the explicit political meaning.”[25]25 Ibid., p. 66. In this process of displacement from political stance to cultural lifestyle, the paradox of Kennedy’s ideology and political position was exposed. “And it is precisely here that the determining position of the economy intervenes: the economy is an absent cause that explains the displacement in representation, the asymmetry between the ‘progressive/conservative’ political pair and the ‘upper/middle class’ class pair (in this example, manifesting as an inversion).”[26]26 Ibid., p. 67.

其次,齐泽克认为“真实”经济决定作用的呈现并非直接的,而是以一种置换和扭曲的形式展现出来。齐泽克通过对社会政治、经济、文化三元组的分析,呈现出经济的决定作用体现在政治斗争向文化斗争的转换过程中。在齐泽克看来,我们并不能将经济设想为隐藏在政治、文化背后的“元本质”,并由此以一种经济决定政治、政治决定文化的双重间距来阐释其决定作用;相反,他真正要揭示的是政治斗争向文化斗争转置这一形式,正是在这种总是呈现为错位形式的转置中,经济“铭刻”其间。齐泽克以1959年肯尼迪与尼克松的总统大选电视辩论为例,进一步说明经济的决定作用如何通过政治向文化的转置而得以运作。在这场大选中,肯尼迪代表进步的自由主义中产阶层,而尼克松代表的则是右翼保守主义上层,然而,这场辩论呈现的效果却恰恰相反,肯尼迪展现了上流社会的生活方式,尼克松却显得更为平民化,在此,“文化‘生活方式’中编码的‘阶级’含义转变了明确的政治含义”。25在这种政治立场向文化生活方式的置换过程中,肯尼迪的意识形态和政治立场的悖论性暴露出来了,而“正是在此,经济的决定地位就介入了:经济是一个不在场的原因,它解释了表征中的置换、解释了‘进步/保守’政治对子与‘上层/中产’阶级对子这两个系列之间的不对称性(这个例子就体现了一种颠倒性)”。26

Finally, the determining role of the “real” economy in society operates according to the logic of “object a.” Object a is a core concept in Lacan’s theoretical construction. As an important heir to the Lacanian tradition, Žižek defines object a as “a little piece of the Real,” that is, the residue of the Real that cannot be digested by the symbolic order in the process of symbolization. Regarding the theoretical implications contained in object a, Žižek explained as early as *The Sublime Object of Ideology* that “every symbolization of the Real produces a surplus, and it is precisely this surplus that serves as the object-cause of desire”;[27]27 Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, trans. Ji Guangmao (Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2002), p. 231. [Original English edition: Verso, 1989.] at the same time, confronting this object a as a residue “means acknowledging that there is a fatal deadlock, an ‘antagonism,’ a kernel that resists symbolic integration-dissolution.”[28]28 Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, trans. Jiang Hui and Song Wenwei (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2005), p. 248. [Original English edition: Verso, 1999.] This points us toward the logic of desire and the logic of antagonism contained in object a. But why does the determining role of the “real” economy operate according to the logic of object a? We can analyze this from the following two dimensions.

最后,“真实”经济对社会的决定作用是以“对象a”的逻辑运转的。对象a是拉康理论建构中的核心概念,作为拉康传统的重要继承人,齐泽克将对象a界定为“一小片实在界的碎片”,即实在界在象征化过程中无法被象征秩序消化的剩余物。对于对象a所蕴含的理论含义,齐泽克早在《意识形态的崇高客体》中就给予了说明,他提到“实在界的每一次象征化都会产生剩余(surplus),正是这种剩余充当着欲望的客体成因(object-cause of desire)”;27与此同时,正视这种作为剩余物的对象a, “意味着承认,存在着致命的僵局,存在着‘对抗’(antagonism),存在着内核,它抵制象征性整合—消解(symbolic integration-dissolution)”。28这为我们指明了对象a所蕴含的欲望逻辑与对抗逻辑,但“真实”经济的决定作用何以遵循对象a的逻辑运转呢?对此,我们可以从如下两重维度展开分析。

First, the “real” economy determines social operation according to the logic of “object a,” mainly manifested in the political struggle between the left/right opposition. Combining the above distinction between the “real” economy and the actual economy, and corresponding to the basic definition of the concept of object a, we can regard the “real” economy as the Real and the actual economy as the symbolic operation of the “real” economy. Due to differences in class interests and ideologies, any group, in the process of constructing the actual economy, will certainly be unable to satisfy the economic interest demands of all groups. That is to say, within the actual economy, the economic interest demands of some groups are necessarily suppressed. These suppressed economic interest demands are precisely the residue excluded by the actual economic system. Corresponding to Lacan’s object a, they function as a symptom of the actual economic system, revealing the internal split and antagonism of the “real” economy. Around this excluded residue, various political forces in contemporary capitalist countries “take turns on stage,”[n] striving for the economic interests of the groups they represent, divided along left/right lines. This irreducible residue and antagonistic hard core within the “real” economy sustains a series of political struggles.

其一,“真实”经济以“对象a”的逻辑决定社会运转,主要体现在左/右对立的政治斗争中。结合上述对“真实”经济与现实经济的区分,对应于对象a概念的基本界定,我们可以将“真实”经济视作实在界,将现实经济视作对“真实”经济的象征化运作;由于阶级利益诉求以及意识形态的不同,任一群体在建构现实经济的过程中,肯定无法满足全部群体的经济利益诉求,也就是说,在现实经济中,必然有部分群体的经济利益诉求被压抑。这种被压抑的经济利益诉求即是被现实经济体系所排斥的剩余物,它与拉康的对象a相对应,作为现实经济体系的症状,体现了“真实”经济内在的分裂与对抗。围绕这一被排斥的剩余物,当代资本主义国家内的各方政治势力“你方唱罢我登场”,他们以左/右立场之分致力于争取所代表群体的经济利益。“真实”经济中这一无法化约的剩余和对抗性硬核,支撑着一系列的政治斗争。

Second, the “real” economy determines people’s theoretical understanding of the economy according to the logic of “object a,” which is manifested in the diverse theoretical expressions of the economy by economic pluralism. The internal split between the “real” economy and the actual economy—that is, the residue of the “real” economy that cannot be eliminated in the process of symbolization—gives rise to pluralistic interpretations within economics of what the “real” economy is. Applying the perspective of parallax dialectics, “we should understand economic pluralism as an incomplete view of reality—a symbolic order imposed on reality, full of parallax gaps, as a series of different perspectives that, through the gaps they create, expose the Real as the inherent impossibility of symbolization.”[29]29 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, trans. Hu Daping and Xia Ke (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2006), p. 296. [Original English edition: MIT Press, 2006.] Economic pluralism reveals the impossibility of fully grasping the “real” economy. The views of these schools only express “truth” from a distorted perspective; “they are untranslatable among themselves.”[30]30 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 296. That is to say, although each economic theory reveals certain aspects of economic reality, they all possess a degree of subjectivity and limitation. Therefore, no single theory can claim to possess a deeper truth than another. Centered on the core of antagonism and the irreducible residue (object a) within the “real” economy, various economic schools, in their continually failed attempts to grasp the totality of the “real” economy, shape economic pluralism.

其二,“真实”经济以“对象a”的逻辑决定着人们对经济的理论认知,这体现在多元经济主义对经济的多样化理论表达中。“真实”经济与现实经济之间的内在分裂,即“真实”经济在象征化过程中无法被消解的剩余物,引起了经济学内部对何为“真实”经济的多元主义阐释。运用视差辩证法的观点,“我们应该将经济多元主义理解对现实的不完整观点——一种强加在现实之上的象征秩序,充满了视差裂隙,作为一系列不同的视角,通过它们所造成的间隙,揭露了实在界作为象征化的内在不可能性”。29多元经济主义揭示了完全把握“真实”经济的不可能性,这些流派的观点只是以扭曲的视角表达了“真理”,“它们之间是不可转译的”,30也就是说,尽管每种经济学理论都揭示了经济现实的某些方面,但它们都存在着一定程度的主观性和局限性,因此,没有哪一种理论可以声称比另一种拥有更深层的真理。围绕着“真实”经济中对抗的核心以及不可化约的剩余(对象a),各经济流派在尝试把握“真实”经济整体的不断失败的尝试中,塑造了多元经济主义。

Through parallax dialectics, we distinguish between the “real” economy in the dimension of the Real and the actual economy in the dimension of the Symbolic. The separation between these two reveals the internal split of the economy itself. However, it must be noted that this determining “real” economy is by no means a pure economy stripped of all political dimensions; it is always dialectically linked to politics. Based on this, in the face of mainstream capitalist economics that actively advocates for a purely objective free-market economy, we should, through a parallax shift, expose the political priority hidden behind its depoliticization of the economy.

透过视差辩证法,我们区分了实在界维度的“真实”经济以及象征界维度的现实经济,这两者的区隔揭示了经济本身的内在分裂。然而,需要注意的是,这种决定性的“真实”经济绝非那种去除一切政治面向的纯粹经济,它总是辩证地与政治相关联。基于此,面对积极鼓吹纯粹客观自由市场经济的资本主义主流经济学,我们应该透过视差转换,揭露其经济去政治化背后的政治优先性面向。

III. The Parallax Debate between the Depoliticization of the Economy and the Priority of Politics

三、经济去政治化与政治优先性的视差之辩

In contemporary capitalist society, liberal market economics, which claims to reflect “objective” laws, occupies the mainstream. This economics opposes all political intervention in the economy and demands the establishment of an objective, value-neutral, purely free-market economy. Regarding this economics, Žižek once commented that the greatest news of our era is “the thorough depoliticization of the economic sphere,”[31]31 Slavoj Žižek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*, trans. Wang Jun (Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House, 2014), p. 7. [Original English edition: Verso, 2012.] that is, “the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is widely accepted as a profound insight into the objective state of things.”[32]32 Slavoj Žižek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*, p. 7. Situated within the global capitalist economic system, we find that the economy is always embedded in a complex system interwoven with politics and culture. Therefore, liberal market economics concerning the “pure economy” is undoubtedly an ideological fantasy. Through a parallax shift, Žižek reveals the hidden political dimension behind the “pure economy,” powerfully critiquing the depoliticized operation of the capitalist economic system.

在当代资本主义社会,标榜反映“客观”规律的自由主义市场经济学占据了主流,这种经济学反对针对经济的一切政治干预,要求建立客观的、价值中立的纯粹自由市场经济。对于这种经济学,齐泽克曾评判道,我们这个时代“最大的新闻就是经济领域的彻底去政治化”,31即“经济运作的方式(必须削减社会福利等等)被广为接受为一种对事物客观状态的深刻洞察”。32置身全球资本主义经济体系,我们发现经济总是处在与政治和文化相互交织的复杂体系之中。因而,关于“纯粹经济”的自由主义市场经济学无疑是一种意识形态幻象。透过视差转换,齐泽克揭示了“纯粹经济”背后隐匿的政治之维,有力地批判了资本主义经济体系的去政治化运作。

First, based on the characteristics of the economy itself, such as its “non-all” and internal split, Žižek identifies politics as the naming of the gap between the economy and itself, and further regards class struggle as the key intermediary linking politics and the economy.

首先,齐泽克基于经济本身的“非全”、内在分裂等特性,将政治指认为对经济与其自身之间隔的命名,并由此进一步将阶级斗争视作政治与经济相关联的关键中介。

First, in Žižek’s view, “politics exists because the economy is a ‘non-all.’”[33]33 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 103. The so-called “non-all” of the economy means that the economy is not a single, unified entity but contains various internal contradictions and conflicts. As mentioned above, any actual economic system that attempts to fully grasp the “real” economy is doomed to “return in defeat.”[n] Thus, the gap between this “real” economy as the Real and the actual economy as the “symbolic order” becomes prominent, exposing the inherent antagonistic tension within the economy itself. The economy itself is not omnipotent; it cannot explain or encompass all aspects of society. Politics, on the other hand, is a mechanism for handling this antagonism and contradiction at the social level. From this perspective, the space of politics “is opened by the gap that separates the ‘economy’ as an absent cause from the economy as one of the elements of the social totality, existing in its ‘opposed determination.’”[34]34 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 103.

其一,在齐泽克看来,“之所以存在着政治,是因为经济是一个‘非全’”。33所谓经济的“非全”,就是指经济并非单一、统一的实体,而是包含了各种内在的矛盾和冲突。如上文所提到的那样,任何试图全面把握“真实”经济的现实经济体系注定“铩羽而归”,由此,这种作为实在界的“真实”经济与作为“象征秩序”的现实经济的裂缝便凸显出来,这揭露了经济本身内在的对抗性张力。经济本身并非万能的,它并不能解释和包容社会的所有方面;而政治则是在社会层面对这种对抗和矛盾的一种处理机制。由是观之,政治的空间“是由将作为缺席原因之‘经济’与以其‘对立的规定性’而存在的、作为社会总体性要素之一的经济分离开来的间隙所打开的”。34

Second, Žižek holds that the economy and politics are not directly linked but are mutually embedded through the mediation of “class struggle”; class struggle becomes the key point of interaction between the economy and politics. In his discussion of the complex interactive relationship between the economy and politics, Žižek criticizes two different interpretive logics regarding the motive force of social progress in Marxism (the economic class struggle). One interpretive logic regards the development of the economy or productive forces as the motive force of social development, while the other interpretive logic regards politics as the motive force of social development. However, in Žižek’s view, these two interpretive logics respectively fall into the traps of “vulgar economism” and “ideological-political idealism,” both of which neglect the mutual influence and interaction between politics and the economy. To this end, Žižek proposes an inward circulation mediated by class struggle to understand the complex interaction between the economy and politics, namely, that the core of the economy contains the essence of politics; at the same time, class struggle, as the political struggle within the economy, embodies the inherent contradictions and conflicts in the economic structure. Furthermore, class struggle, as a unique mediation, fixes politics within the economy; that is, all political struggles are ultimately expressions of “class struggle” at the core of the economy. And this mediation of class struggle “also simultaneously represents the irreducible political moment at the core of the economy,”[35]35 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, p. 62. “one can reduce all political, juridical, and cultural content to the economic base, that is, as an expression of the economy, thereby deciphering the economy, but class struggle is an exception.”[36]36 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 62. This indicates that economic activities are not merely matters of market mechanisms; they inherently contain political issues such as power struggles, conflicts of interest, and social justice, and class struggle is precisely the embodiment of these political issues within the economic structure. Perhaps we can say that there is no pure economy based solely on technological and market logic, because the economy is always-already intervened in by politics.

其二,齐泽克认为经济与政治并非直接相关联,而是经由“阶级斗争”这一中介而相互内嵌,阶级斗争成为经济与政治相互作用的关键点。在有关经济与政治复杂互动关系的相关论述中,齐泽克批评了对马克思主义社会进步动力(经济的阶级斗争)的两种不同阐释逻辑。一种阐释逻辑是将经济或生产力的发展视为社会发展的动力,另一种阐释逻辑则将政治视作社会发展的动力。然而,在齐泽克看来,这两种阐释逻辑分别落入了“庸俗经济论”和“意识形态—政治的唯心主义”的圈套,都忽略了政治与经济之间的相互影响和相互作用。为此,齐泽克提出以阶级斗争为中介的向内循环来认识经济与政治之间的复杂互动,即经济的核心处内蕴着政治的本质;与此同时,阶级斗争作为经济内部的政治斗争,体现了经济结构中的内在矛盾和冲突。此外,阶级斗争作为一个独特的中介,它将政治固定于经济之内,也就是说,所有的政治斗争最终都是经济核心处“阶级斗争”的表达;而阶级斗争这个中介“也同时代表了发生在经济核心处那无法还原的政治时刻”,35“人们可以将所有的政治内容、司法内容、文化内容都还原为经济基础,即作为经济之表达,从而解密经济,但阶级斗争是个例外”,36这表明经济活动不仅仅是市场机制的问题,它们内在地包含了权力斗争、利益冲突、社会公平等政治议题,而阶级斗争正是这些政治性问题在经济结构中的体现,或许我们可以说,并不存在那种仅仅基于技术与市场逻辑的纯粹经济,因为经济总是已经(always-already)被政治所介入。

Second, based on the complex interaction between the economy and politics, Žižek points out that the depoliticization of the economy advocated by contemporary capitalism is itself an operation of political ideology, whose aim is to ensure the unrestricted flow of capital. Regarding the depoliticization of the economy, Žižek argues, “If one emphasizes the depoliticized ‘objective’ economic logic against the so-called ‘outdated’ forms of ideological passion, then this itself is the dominant ideological form, because ideology is always self-referential, that is, it always defines itself by maintaining a distance from another Other denounced as ‘ideological.’”[37]37 Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso, 1999, p. 199. Thus, in Žižek’s view, the depoliticized economy is the political ideological fantasy of the post-political era. Influenced by this, no one questions the anonymous logic of global capitalism and marketization; it is increasingly accepted as a natural, neutral logic. Simultaneous with the depoliticization of the economy is the prevalence of pluralistic democracy. But paradoxically, the issues discussed or set by this democratic apparatus are confined to cultural topics such as religion, race, and gender differences, while the economy has been excluded from politics. The depoliticization of the economy brings about two strange political spectacles: “On the one hand, some ‘pure politicians’ no longer regard the economy as a site of struggle and intervention; on the other hand, some ‘economists,’ mesmerized by the operation of the current global economy, exclude all possibility of political intervention.”[38]38 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 313. These partisans pursuing pure politics enthusiastically advocate the repoliticization of civil society, yet the other side of this fervent scene is the unchanging nature of global capitalist market relations. The depoliticization of the economy is itself a political ideological fantasy of contemporary post-politics, because there is no purely objective economy; thus, the fundamental purpose of the depoliticization of the economy is to better serve the global expansion of capital.

其次,基于经济与政治的复杂互动,齐泽克指出,当代资本主义所宣扬的经济去政治化本身已经是一种政治意识形态化的运作,它所要确保的是资本无限制的流动。对于经济的去政治化,齐泽克认为,“如果去强调去政治化的‘客观’经济逻辑,来对抗所谓‘过时’的意识形态激情的形式,那么这本身就是主流的意识形态形式,因为意识形态总是自我指涉的,也就是说,它总是透过与另一个被斥为‘意识形态’的他者保持距离,借此来界定自己”。37因而,在齐泽克看来,去政治化的经济是后政治时代的政治意识形态幻象。受此影响,没有人再去质疑全球资本主义与市场化的匿名逻辑,它越来越成为一种自然的、中性的逻辑而被人们接受。与经济的去政治化同时出现的是多元民主的大行其道。但是吊诡的是,这种民主设置或讨论的议题都被局限在宗教、种族、性别差异等文化议题,经济已然被排除在政治之外。经济的去政治化带来两种奇怪的政治景观:“一方面,一些‘纯粹的政治家们’ 不再把经济作为斗争和干预的场所;另一方面,一些‘经济学家们’被当前全球经济的运行所迷惑,排除了一切政治干预的可能。”38这些追求纯粹政治的党徒,热烈地提倡公民社会的再政治化,然而这种热切场景的另一面则是全球资本主义市场关系的一成不变。经济的去政治化本身即是当代后政治的一种政治意识形态幻象,因为并不存在一种纯粹客观的经济,因而,经济去政治化的根本目的是更好地服务于资本的全球扩张。

Finally, the depoliticization of the economy leads to the semi-monopoly power of private enterprises, which, while threatening people’s basic social network of existence, also reshapes the space for political activity and brings new challenges to social fairness and justice. Adhering to Marx’s spirit of critical justice, we must never abandon the critique of the unfair and unreasonable old global economic order, nor the examination of the logic of capital pursuing excess profit.[39]39 See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, London: Penguin Books, 1976, p. 926. In this regard, we need only examine the pervasive infiltration of new media into daily life and the claims of gene patent rights by emerging genetic engineering projects to glimpse the “irrational” prospects resulting from the depoliticization of the economy. Internet giants represented by Microsoft, Twitter, and Facebook have mastered the basic structures of communication and interaction in people’s daily lives; they not only control people’s connections with the outside world but also increasingly influence people’s perceptions and experiences of life. At the same time, these new media have reshaped the modes of participation in political activities, “fundamentally shortening the distance between voters and candidates, achieving a genuine sense of media interaction, and breaking the one-way communication model of traditional media.”[40]40 [Source not provided in original text.] During the U.S. presidential election, interacting and debating on social media became a widespread form of political participation, and these internet giants gained a power surpassing that of government in the process of political participation. Furthermore, another absurd scenario of the semi-monopoly power of capital resulting from the depoliticization of the economy is that some biogenetic companies claim patent rights over genes, meaning that the secrets deep within our bodies are unknowingly owned by some corporation. The gene patent rights of large biotech companies are obtained precisely with the aid of the state apparatus, and their market competitive advantages established through intellectual property rights are already stamped with the traces of political operation. The rapid development of genetic engineering may also break down the natural equality of human beings and bring about issues such as medical injustice; these issues, accompanied by their public nature, will inevitably become focal points of political controversy.

最后,经济的去政治化导致了私人企业的半垄断权力,在对人们基本的社会存在网络构成威胁的同时,亦重塑了政治活动的空间,并对社会公平正义带来了新的挑战。秉承马克思的正义批判精神,我们始终不能放弃对不公平不合理的全球旧经济秩序的批判,始终不能放弃对追求超额利润的资本逻辑的检视。39对此,我 们只需考察日常生活中新媒体对生活无孔不入的渗透以及新兴的基因编辑工程对基因专利权的主张,便可一窥经济去政治化导致的“非理性”前景。以微软、推特、脸谱网等为代表的互联网巨头掌握了人们日常生活中基本的沟通与交流结构,它不仅仅控制着人们与外界的联系,而且也愈益影响着人们对生活的感知与体验。同时,这些新媒体也重新形塑了政治活动的参与方式,“从根本上缩短了选民与候选人的距离,实现了真正意义上的媒体互动,打破了传统媒体的单向传播 模式”,40在美国大选期间,在社交媒体上进行互动、论战成为广泛的政治参与方式,而这些互联网巨头则在政治参与的过程中获得了某种超越政府的权力。此外,经济去政治化导致资本半垄断权力的另一荒谬情境是部分生物基因企业宣称拥有基因的专利权,即我们身体深处的秘密已经在浑然不知的情况下被某个企业所拥有,大型生物公司的基因专利权正是借助国家机器获得的,其因知识产权所建立的市场竞争优势,已然烙上了政治运作的痕迹。基因工程的快速发展亦有可能打破人类的自然平等,并带来医疗不公等问题,这些问题也必然伴随着其公共属性成为政治争议的焦点。

From the above discussion, it is clear that the depoliticized “pure” economy clearly does not match the characteristics of economic reality; this view of the economy is a political ideological fantasy constructed through the intervention of the state apparatus and political decision-making. Behind the depoliticization of the economy is precisely the bourgeoisie, starting from “political priority,” comprehensively using policy tools to “unbind” capital, allowing capital to comprehensively penetrate and rapidly advance into various substantive fields. This phenomenon also prompts us to consider a deeper issue, namely, the antagonistic relationship contained in the concept of “possessing scientific knowledge.” Due to the neutral nature of knowledge dissemination, knowledge is not exhausted by widespread dissemination and use. However, capital’s control of knowledge through patent rights and market relations runs counter to the essence of knowledge. Thus, whether knowledge, as a typical form of immaterial labor, its relationship with material labor, and whether it can be grasped by the masses and become a new tool of liberation, becomes another key issue in our analysis of the contemporary capitalist economic system.

由以上论述可知,去政治化的“纯粹”经济与经济现实的特性明显不符,这种经济观是经过国家机器和政治决策的介入而建构的一种政治意识形态幻象。经济去政治化的背后,正是资产阶级从“政治优先性”出发综合运用政策工具对“资本”的解缚,使资本得以对各种实体领域进行全面渗透和快速推进。这一现象也促使我们去思考一个更深层的问题,即“拥有科学知识”这个观念所包含的敌对关系。由于知识传播的中立本质,知识并不会因为广泛传播和使用而耗尽。而资本以专利权与市场关系来控制知识,则有悖于知识的本质。因而,知识作为一种典型的非物质劳动,它与物质劳动的关系,以及它能否为大众掌握并成为一种新的解放工具,便成为我们剖析当代资本主义经济体系的又一关键问题。

IV. The Parallax Debate between Material Labor and Immaterial Labor

四、物质劳动与非物质劳动的视差之辩

“Immaterial labour” is a concept opposed to “material labour,” which transforms, creates and produces various material products through the transformation of nature; it refers mainly to cognitive activity, knowledge creation and other forms of mental labour. The introduction of this concept is closely related to Marx’s discussion of “general intellect” in the *Fragment on Machines*. Immaterial labour manifests as intellectual labour, a form of objectified knowledge-power. At the same time, Marx also predicted the significant role that immaterial labour might play in the development of the productive forces of future society. Among contemporary left-wing scholars, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have fully explored “immaterial labour,” viewing it as a cognitive power generated in communication and cooperation, and identifying it as the dominant form of power in contemporary capitalist production. At the same time, they regard “capital” as a decadent parasitic force, and on the basis of “immaterial labour” they propose “exodus” as a strategy of “liberation” from capital. Žižek critically inherits Negri and Hardt’s view of immaterial labour. While acknowledging its “common” character, he uses “parallax” to refract the dual split in substance between immaterial labour and material labour under the global capitalist system, thereby identifying the powerful aggregative function of “capital.” Consequently, he argues that “exodus” cannot bring about genuine liberation; only through the realisation of collective ownership of “the common” is the liberation of “the multitude” possible.

“非物质劳动”是与通过对自然界改造、创造和生产各种物质产品的“物质劳动”相对的一个概念,它主要指向认知活动、知识创造等脑力劳动,这一概念的提出与马克思在《机器论片段》中谈及的“一般智力”密切相关。非物质劳动体现为智力劳动,是一种对象化的知识力量。同时,马克思也预言了非物质劳动对于未来社会生产力发展可能起到的重大作用。在当代左翼学者中,奈格里(Antonio Negri)与哈特(Michael Hardt)充分探讨了“非物质劳动”,将其视作沟通、协作中产生的认知力量,并将其指认为当代资本主义生产的支配型力量;同时,他们将“资本”视作腐朽的寄生性力量,他们基于“非物质劳动”提出了“出走”作为摆脱资本的“解放”策略。对于奈格里和哈特的非物质劳动观,齐泽克予以批判性继承,在承认其“共有”属性的同时,他以“视差”折射出全球资本主义体系下非物质劳动与物质劳动在实体的双重分裂,因而指认了“资本”强有力的聚合作用。由此,他认为“出走”并不能带来真正的解放,唯有通过实现对“共有”的集体所有,“诸众”的解放才是可能的。

Negri and Hardt, by demonstrating the dominant position of “immaterial labour” in contemporary capitalist production, identify capital as a decadent parasitic force, and then propose a strategy of liberation through “exodus” from the enslavement of capital. The immaterial labour to which Negri and Hardt refer denotes a society-wide collaborative relationship based on communication, cooperation and coordination. They name the products of this collaborative relationship “the common.” On this basis, they point out that the stratum to which today’s cognitive workers belong possesses a productive freedom: human intellect becomes fixed capital in production, and the cognitive stratum thereby holds the means of production in its own hands. Here, we can readily see these two scholars’ celebration of mental labour and the expectation they place on mental labour to bring people freedom. As Negri states: “The subaltern stratum is already the stratum that possesses fixed capital richer than that of the employer, a spiritual wealth more important than anything others boast of—this is an absolute weapon: knowledge is the most fundamental thing for the reproduction of the world.” [41]41 Antonio Negri, *Marx oltre Marx: Quaderno di lavoro sui Grundrisse* (Rome: Manifestolibri, 1998), p. 142. [Translator’s note: The English translation of this source is not directly available; the citation is rendered from the Chinese text.] From this, Negri further argues that immaterial labour already occupies a dominant position in contemporary capitalist production, which means that “when immaterial labour and cognitive labour directly present themselves as productive attributes, intellectual labour power frees itself from its subordinate relationship, and the producing subject appropriates for itself those instruments of labour that previously constituted capital.” [42]42 Ibid., p. 143. In other words, because of the hegemonic dominance of immaterial labour, capital has lost its function in organising socialised production, since through the self-organisation of the multitude, social production and life can be continuously organised. In this situation, capital becomes a purely parasitic entity, and therefore it is entirely possible for us to get rid of it.

奈格里和哈特通过论证“非物质劳动”在当代资本主义生产中的支配性地位,将资本指认为一种腐朽的寄生性力量,进而提出以“出走”摆脱资本奴役的解放策略。奈格里和哈特所指涉的非物质劳动意指一种以沟通、合作、协力为基础的全社会范围的协作关系,他们将这种协作关系所生产的产品命名为“共有”。在此基础上,他们指出,当今的认知工作者所属的阶层拥有一种生产性的自由,即人的智力成为生产中的固定资本,认知阶层因此将生产工具掌握在自己手中。在此,我们不难看出两位学者对于脑力劳动的颂扬以及赋予脑力劳动带给人们自由的期望。正如奈格里所说:“属下阶层已然就是那些拥有比雇主更为丰富的固定资本的阶层,一种比别人所吹嘘的东西更为重要的精神财富,这是一件绝对的武器:知识对于世界的再生产而言是最为根本的。”41由此,奈格里进一步指出,非物质劳动在当代的资本主义生产中已经居于支配性地位,这就意味着“当非物质劳动和认知劳动直接呈现为生产性的属性之时,智力劳动力就将自身从其臣属关系中解放出来,生产主体就自为地占有了那些先前构成资本的劳动工具”。42换言之,由于非物质劳动霸权性的支配地位,资本已经在组织社会化生产方面失去了作用,因为借由诸众的自我组织工作,社会的生产生活就可以不断地被组织起来。在这种情形下,资本变成了纯粹寄生性的实体,因而我们摆脱它是完全有可能的。

Since this is the case, under conditions where immaterial labour occupies the dominant position, how does capital continue to exploit workers? Negri and Hardt provide an answer in the final volume of the “Empire” trilogy, *Commonwealth*: “In fact, rather than capital providing cooperation, it is more accurate to say that capital expropriates cooperation.” [43]43 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 139. Negri further explains this expropriation. He argues that with the development of network information technology, the main mode of profit creation is no longer the exploitation of labour, but the collection of network information. This mode of production makes it possible for labour to be liberated from capitalist production. Against the backdrop of the rise of global interactive media, creative invention no longer belongs to individuals; it exists as a common. Negri points out that the most absurd thing about contemporary capitalism is the privatisation of the “common” produced by general intellect through so-called copyright protection. In response, Negri proposes a counter-strategy: “Capital needs to be made to understand the common interest; if it does not want to understand, it must be forced to understand.” [44]44 Negri, *Marx oltre Marx*, p. 145. In Negri’s view, “immaterial labour” is the product of workers’ cooperation, and capital merely uses force to expropriate this product of production. Therefore, to regain this control, what is needed is the withdrawal of workers, that is, “biopolitical labour power must withdraw from its relationship with capital, and must discover and construct new social relations, new forms of life in which their productive capacity can be realised.” [45]45 Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, p. 153. The strategy of “exodus” must necessarily be collective, because no single individual can escape the control of capital; only through such collective action is it truly possible to break free from the control of contemporary capitalism.

既然如此,在非物质劳动占据主导地位的情况下,资本如何继续盘剥工人?奈格里和哈特在“帝国三部曲”终篇《大同世界》中给出了回答,他们指出:“事实上,与其说资本提供协作,不如说是剥夺协作。”43对于这种剥夺,奈格里做出了进一步说明,他认为随着网络信息技术的发展,利润创造的主要方式不再是剥削劳动,而是对网络信息的采集,这种生产模式使得劳动从资本主义生产中解放出来成为可能。在全球式交互媒体兴起的背景下,创造性发明不再属于个人,它作为一种共有而存在。奈格里指出,当今资本主义最为荒谬的就是通过所谓的版权保护来使一般智力生产的“共有”私有化。对此,奈格里提出了应对策略,即“需要使资本知晓共同利益,如果它不想理解的话,就必须要强迫它理解”。44在奈格里看来,“非物质劳动”是工人协作的产物,而资本只是借助强力来对这一生产结果进行剥夺。那么,要夺回这种掌控权,就需要劳动者的退出,即“生命政治劳动力从其与资本形成的关系中退出,也必须发现并建构可以让他们的生产能力得到实现的新的社会关系、新的生命形式”。45“出走”的策略必然是集体性的,因为单个个体无法摆脱资本的掌控,唯有通过这种集体的行动,才有可能真正摆脱当代资本主义的控制。

For Žižek, however, the “exodus” strategy of Hardt and Negri is overly optimistic. He believes they neglect the indispensable and important role that material labour still plays in the contemporary capitalist production system. Žižek uses parallax dialectics to conduct an in-depth analysis of the global operation of capital, thereby pointing out the differences in labour entities and the geographical separation of labour spaces under the contemporary capitalist system, revealing that capital still plays a powerful organisational and aggregative role in globalisation. He refutes Negri and Hardt’s assertion that capital is purely parasitic, pointing out that capital is playing an increasingly important role in the contemporary era. Žižek argues that in contemporary capitalist society, we face a dual split: on one side is the realm of freedom in cognitive work, on the other the realm of necessity in material production; due to the intervention of capital, the two are physically separated. Negri’s prediction that immaterial labour would directly become the social productive force has not been realised. On the contrary, the implementation of knowledge-based labour still requires the organisation of material means of production through capital. Consequently, a unique spectacle facing humanity today is that the separation of mental labour and intellectual labour has become more thoroughgoing. This separation is not only split in substance, but is increasingly separated by space. This leads to global outsourcing becoming a rule of distribution in contemporary capitalist economy: on one side are typical “postmodern” companies in Negri’s sense, which mainly manifest as free communities of creative, knowledge-based multitudes; on the other side is the material production process, far from being automated, which still organises “sweatshops” along traditional Fordist assembly lines, extracting profit through the direct exploitation of workers’ labour. Ironically, each side regards the other as the representative of capital. “For the masses in the sweatshops, capital is the power that represents ‘cognitive work,’ driving them to concretely manifest the results of ‘cognitive work’; for the ‘cognitive workers,’ capital is the power that drives them to turn their results into blueprints for material production.” [46]46 Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 310. Here, we do not see the success of the “exodus” strategy; what occurs in reality is the deep integration of capital and knowledge. Capital has not, as Negri claims, become purely parasitic and thereby been rendered impotent; on the contrary, it plays an even more crucial aggregative role in the global division of labour, and thereby gains an even more critical dominant position.

然而,对齐泽克而言,哈特和奈格里的“出走”策略显得过于乐观,他认为他们忽略了物质劳动在当代资本主义生产体系中仍发挥着不可或缺的重要作用。齐泽克以视差辩证法对资本的全球化运营进行深入剖析,进而指出当代资本主义体系下劳动实体的差异与劳动空间的地理区隔,揭示了资本在全球化中仍然发挥着强有力的组织和聚合作用。他驳斥了奈格里和哈特有关资本纯粹是寄生性的论断,指出资本在当代正发挥着愈益重要的作用。齐泽克认为,在当代资本主义社会,我们面临着二元分裂:一边是认知工作领域的自由王国,一边是物质生产领域的必然王国,由于资本的介入,二者被物理地分开。奈格里对非物质劳动直接成为社会生产力的预言并没有实现,相反,知识型劳动的落实仍然需要借助于资本对物质性生产资料的组织。因而,在当代,人类所面临的一个独特景观就是脑力劳动和智力劳动的分离更为彻底,这种分离不仅在实体上被分开,而且它们越来越被空间所阻隔。这就导致全球性的业务外包成为当代资本主义经济分配的一种规则:一边是典型的奈格里意义上的“后现代”公司,它们主要表现为富有创造力的、知识型的诸众之自由共同体;而另一边则是自动化远未实现的物质生产过程,它仍然以传统的福特制流水线组织“血汗工厂”,靠着对工人直接劳动的榨取谋取利润。颇具讽刺意味的是,双方均视对方为资本的代表。“对于血汗工厂中的群众而言,资本就是代表着‘认知工作’的权力,役使着他们将‘认知工作’的成果具体地表现出来;对于‘认知工作者’而言,资本就是为了使他们的成果成为物质生产蓝图而役使他们的权力。”46在此,我们并没有看到“出走”策略的成功,现实中发生的是资本与知识的深度融合。资本也并没有如奈格里所说,纯粹寄生并因而被架空,它反倒在全球性的分工体系中发挥着更为关键的聚合作用,并由此获得了更为关键的支配性地位。

In this regard, Žižek believes that although Negri’s interpretation has recognized the growing importance of the general intellect in value production, he has not fully and accurately understood Marx. In his understanding of the general intellect, Negri posits a direct fusion, namely that the social relations directly generated by cognitive labor are the ultimate object of production and the direct productive force; Marx, however, posits an irreducible split, namely that the development of the general intellect leads to the complete exclusion of workers from the production process, and the result of this process is fully automated production. This automated production process is fundamentally different from the traditional production process: “Labor no longer appears so much to be included in the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself.” [47]47 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 592. [Translator’s note: The English translation follows the standard English edition, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 705.] Based on the above analysis, Žižek believes that in the automated production process, the worker becomes an intelligent operator who supervises and regulates the production process from a safe distance. He further analyzes and points out that Marx’s use of the singular “human being” and “worker” here “clearly indicates why the ‘general intellect’ is not intersubjective but ‘monological.’ Therefore, this is why, in Marx’s view, the object of the production process is precisely not social relations themselves: this separates the ‘administration of things’ (control and domination of nature) from the relations among people, constituting a sphere of ‘administration of things’ that no longer needs to rely on the domination of people.” [48]48 Slavoj Žižek, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012), p. 280. This means that within the capitalist system, the “administration of things” is separated out and shows an increasingly automated tendency, while at the same time, relations among people become increasingly marginalized. Therefore, in Žižek’s view, immaterial labor is often one-way and self-centered, not necessarily involving intersubjective interaction or cooperation. From this, we can derive a revolutionary conclusion: for workers to achieve genuine freedom, they must take control of the administration of things, and this can only depend on a fundamental transformation of private property, achieving genuine control over capital through the implementation of collective ownership by the workers.

对此,齐泽克认为,奈格里的解读虽然看到了一般智力在价值生产中与日俱增的重要作用,但是他没有完整、准确地理解马克思。在对一般智力的理解上,奈格里设定了一种直接的融合,即认知工作直接产生的社会关系就是生产的最终对象与直接的生产力;而马克思却设定了一个不可化约的分裂,即一般智力的发展导致工人被完全排除出生产过程,这一过程导致的结果就是完全自动化的生产。这种自动化的生产过程与传统的生产过程有着根本性的差异,“劳动表现为不再像以前那样被包括在生产过程中,相反地,表现为人以生产过程的监督者和调节者的身份同生产过程本身发生关系”。47基于以上分析,齐泽克认为在自动化的生产过程中,工人变成了一个在安全距离之外监管与调节生产过程的智慧操作者。他进一步分析指出,马克思在此使用单数的“人”和“工人”的表述,“鲜明地指出了‘一般智力’何以不是主体间性的,而是‘独白的’原因。因此,这就是为什么在马克思看来,生产过程的对象恰恰并非社会关系自身:这就将‘物的管理’(控制和支配自然)从人们的关系中分离出来了,它构成了一个‘物的管理’ 的领域,这个领域不必再依赖于对人的统治”。48这意味着在资本主义体系中,“物的管理”被分离出来且呈现出日益自动化的倾向,与此同时,人与人的关系也愈益边缘化。因此,在齐泽克看来,非物质劳动往往是单向的、以自我为中心的,不一定涉及主体间的互动或协作。由此,我们可以引申出一个革命性的结论:工人要实现真正的自由,就必须掌控对物的管理,而这只能依赖于对私有制的根本性变革,通过实行工人的集体所有制而实现对资本真正的掌控。

Negri and Hardt, with an optimistic attitude, predicted the liberating effects of “immaterial labor” represented by cognitive labor, thereby asserting the parasitism and decay of capital and attempting to use the strategy of “exodus” to escape the enslavement of capital. However, Žižek, from the “real” organization of the global capitalist production system, reveals for us the deep parallax between “immaterial labor” and “material labor”: they are torn apart in substance, manifesting as a split between mental workers and manual workers on a global scale; they are also separated in space, manifesting as a regional division between high-end research and design centers represented by developed countries and regions and “world processing centers” represented by the Third World. Behind the irreducible parallax split between these two types of labor lies the ubiquitous specter of capital. It is precisely in this context that Žižek believes that only by collectivizing the “common” can we break free from the “spell” of global capitalism and secure a possibility for human liberation.

奈格里和哈特以一种乐观主义的态度预言了以认知劳动为代表的“非物质劳动”带来的解放效应,他们由此断言资本的寄生与腐朽,并尝试以“出走”的策略谋求摆脱资本的奴役。但是,齐泽克却从全球资本主义生产体系组织的“真实”中,为我们揭露了“非物质劳动”和“物质劳动”间的深度视差:它们在实体上被撕裂,呈现为全球范围内的脑力劳动者和体力劳动者的撕裂;在空间上它们也被阻隔,呈现为以发达国家和地区为代表的高端研究设计中心和以第三世界为代表的“世界加工中心”的区域分离。这两种劳动之间不可还原的视差分裂背后隐匿的却是那无所不在的资本幽灵,也正是在这种情境下,齐泽克认为唯有通过将“共有”集体化,我们才能摆脱全球资本主义的“符咒”,为人类的解放谋得一种可能性。

V. Conclusion

五、结 语

Žižek’s parallax dialectics, as a philosophical methodology of internal negation, provides us with a unique theoretical perspective for deeply analyzing and critiquing the contemporary capitalist economic system. By returning to the Marxist tradition of critiquing political economy, Žižek identifies the symptoms of internal antagonism in the contemporary capitalist economic system, thereby offering a new path for the contemporary Left to return to the critique of political economy. However, we must also note that this theoretical reflection of Žižek’s, characterized by the deduction of philosophical concepts, is in fact a line of thought that resembles but is not truly “Marxist,” deviating from Marx’s historical materialist interpretation of the development of the capitalist economy. Compared with Marx’s scientific analysis of the capitalist mode of production, which takes the “commodity”—the most universal and common element—as the cell of capitalism, Žižek’s understanding of capitalism easily detaches itself from the historical and realistic context of economic development, thereby falling into the quagmire of idealist speculation. In summary, we should both draw on Žižek’s critique of political economy using parallax dialectics as a methodology, recognizing its importance for in-depth analysis of contemporary capitalist society, and at the same time adhere to the Marxist historical materialist interpretation of the development of the capitalist economy, avoiding falling into the ideological traps hidden within capitalist academic discourse.

齐泽克的视差辩证法以一种内在否定性的哲学方法论,为我们深入剖析和批判当代资本主义经济体系提供了独特的理论视角。通过重返马克思主义政治经济学批判传统,齐泽克指认了当代资本主义经济体系内在对抗的病症,进而为当代左翼回归政治经济学批判提供了一条新的路径。但我们同样要注意到,齐泽克这种以哲学概念演绎为特征的理论反思实际上是一种似“马”非“马”的致思路径,偏离了马克思对资本主义经济发展的历史唯物主义阐释。与马克思将“商品”这种最普遍、最常见的元素作为资本主义细胞,以此对资本主义生产方式所做的科学分析相比,齐泽克对资本主义的认识极易脱离经济发展的历史与现实语境,从而陷入唯心主义思辨的泥沼之中。综合而言,我们既要借鉴齐泽克以视差辩证法为方法论的政治经济学批判,看到其对深入分析当代资本主义社会的重要性,同时又要坚持马克思主义对资本主义经济发展的历史唯物主义阐释,避免坠入资本主义学术话语所暗藏的意识形态陷阱。

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑:张剑

Notes

  1. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright, eds., *The Žižek Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. ix. ↩
  2. Kojin Karatani, *Transcritique: On Kant and Marx*, trans. Sabu Kohso (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 1. ↩
  3. Ibid., p. 3. ↩
  4. Ibid., p. 4. ↩
  5. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 22. ↩
  6. Ibid., p. 29. ↩
  7. Ibid., p. 27. ↩
  8. Ibid., p. 26. ↩
  9. Ibid. ↩
  10. Ibid., p. 27. ↩
  11. Ibid., p. 28. ↩
  12. Ibid., p. 29. ↩
  13. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 131-137. ↩
  14. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 26. ↩
  15. Ibid. ↩
  16. Ibid., p. 27. ↩
  17. Ibid., p. 28. ↩
  18. Ibid. ↩
  19. The “real” economy (真实经济) here refers to the economy as a Lacanian real, an absent cause that determines social structure, not to be confused with the common usage of “real economy” as opposed to finance. ↩
  20. The actual economy (现实经济) refers to the economy as a symbolic subsystem of society, including institutions and practices. ↩
  21. Object a (对象a) is a Lacanian concept denoting the object-cause of desire, an unattainable surplus that drives the subject’s desire. ↩
  22. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 61. ↩
  23. Ibid. ↩
  24. Ibid., p. 62. ↩
  25. Ibid., p. 66. ↩
  26. Ibid., p. 67. ↩
  27. Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, trans. Ji Guangmao (Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2002), p. 231. [Original English edition: Verso, 1989.] ↩
  28. Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, trans. Jiang Hui and Song Wenwei (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2005), p. 248. [Original English edition: Verso, 1999.] ↩
  29. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, trans. Hu Daping and Xia Ke (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2006), p. 296. [Original English edition: MIT Press, 2006.] ↩
  30. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 296. ↩
  31. Slavoj Žižek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*, trans. Wang Jun (Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House, 2014), p. 7. [Original English edition: Verso, 2012.] ↩
  32. Slavoj Žižek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*, p. 7. ↩
  33. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 103. ↩
  34. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 103. ↩
  35. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, p. 62. ↩
  36. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 62. ↩
  37. Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso, 1999, p. 199. ↩
  38. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, p. 313. ↩
  39. See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, London: Penguin Books, 1976, p. 926. ↩
  40. [Source not provided in original text.] ↩
  41. Antonio Negri, *Marx oltre Marx: Quaderno di lavoro sui Grundrisse* (Rome: Manifestolibri, 1998), p. 142. [Translator’s note: The English translation of this source is not directly available; the citation is rendered from the Chinese text.] ↩
  42. Ibid., p. 143. ↩
  43. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 139. ↩
  44. Negri, *Marx oltre Marx*, p. 145. ↩
  45. Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, p. 153. ↩
  46. Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 310. ↩
  47. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 592. [Translator’s note: The English translation follows the standard English edition, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 705.] ↩
  48. Slavoj Žižek, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012), p. 280. ↩