Raymond Aron’s Reflections on Marxist Philosophy of History and Their Limitations

During the May 1968 protests in Europe, a popular slogan ran: “Better to be wrong with Sartre than right with Aron.” This was a true depiction of the French intellectual scene at the time. French intellectuals of that era were largely confronted with an either-or choice: first, whether to support the communist Soviet Union or capitalist America; second, whether to sign petitions in solidarity with the independence of France’s colony Algeria; third, whether to join social movements or endorse the suppression of revolution. The choices intellectuals made split them into different camps: Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and others became the left, while Raymond Aron became the right. It can be said that for a considerable period after World War II, left-wing intellectuals represented by Sartre held the dominant position in intellectual circles, and it was not until the 1980s that Aron returned to public view. In his early years, Aron called himself a socialist, but not a Marxist. Nevertheless, his understanding of history did not contradict Marx’s; both sought to explore the relationship between man and history between absolute fatalism and historical relativism. Judging from Aron’s academic trajectory, he was deeply influenced by Marx and explicitly stated that all his works “are a reflection on the 20th century inspired by Marxism, an attempt to reveal various aspects of modern society, including the economy, social relations, class relations, political systems, state relations, and ideological debates.” Moving from a Marxist philosophy of history to a German-style critical philosophy of history became the starting point for Aron’s analysis of political phenomena and even all social issues.

在1968年的欧洲五月风暴中流行着这样一句口号：“宁可跟着萨特犯错，也不跟着阿隆正确。”这是当时法国知识界的真实写照。那个时代的法国知识分子大都面临着非此即彼的选择：其一，是支持共产主义的苏联还是资本主义的美国；其二，是否在声援法国殖民地阿尔及利亚独立的请愿书上签名；其三，是投身社会运动还是赞同镇压革命。知识分子们作出的选择将他们分裂为不同的阵营，让-保罗·萨特、路易·阿尔都塞、莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂等人成为左派，雷蒙·阿隆则成为右派。可以说，在二战后相当长的一段时间里，以萨特为代表的左派知识分子在知识界一直占据优势，直至1980年代，阿隆才回到人们的视线中。早期的阿隆自称社会主义者，但并非马克思主义者。不过，他对历史的理解与马克思并不矛盾，他们都试图在绝对宿命论与历史相对主义之间探寻人与历史的关系。从阿隆的学术历程看，他深受马克思的影响，并明确表示自己的所有著作“都是在马克思主义的启迪下对20世纪作的一种反思，是揭示现代社会各个方面的一种尝试，其中包括经济、社会关系、阶级关系、政治制度、国家关系以及意识形态争论”。从马克思主义历史哲学走向德国式的批判的历史哲学研究，成为阿隆分析政治现象乃至所有社会问题的出发点。

I. Marxism and Metascience

一、马克思主义与元科学

A question in the philosophy of history that Aron pondered throughout his life was: “How can people simultaneously know the society in which they live and themselves? Or, how does the dialectic unfold between the society that makes me ‘me’ and the ‘me’ that wants to define myself in relation to society?” Aron believed that the essence of this question is the basic problem in Marxist philosophy of history concerning historical knowledge and historical action, namely, the dialectical relationship between the historical subject and the historical object. Aron’s exploration of this question began with Kant’s inquiries and reflections. Kant believed that philosophy must address three questions: “What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for?” His three critiques (Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, Critique of Judgment) are answers to these three questions. Aron added the qualification “in history” to Kant’s three questions and took studying and answering these three questions as “the starting point of his intellectual work,” that is, “the starting point of epistemological reflection on nature and on historical knowledge or knowledge of history and society.” Although he started with Kant, Aron believed that “all those who analyze society wish to achieve the same degree of precision as Marx,” and that “critical analysis is first and foremost an examination of different parts of the Marxist interpretation of society.” To this end, he turned to the study of Marxism, attempting to use Marxist critical analysis to answer the above questions. He divided his reflections on Marxism into two levels: “one is the transcendental level, accompanied by reflection on what people can know and what they ought to do; the other is the level of discussion of the theories or analyses explicitly put forward by Marx himself.”

阿隆毕生都在思考的一个历史哲学问题是：“人们如何能够同时认识他们所生活于其中的社会与他们本身？或者说，使我成为‘我’的社会”，与“我想要相对社会而自我定义的‘我’之间的这种辩证是如何展开的？”阿隆认为，这一问题的实质就是马克思主义历史哲学中关于历史认识与历史行动的基本问题，即历史主体与历史客体之间的辩证关系问题。阿隆对这一问题的探讨始于康德的追问和思考。康德认为哲学要解决三个问题：“我能知道什么？我应该做什么？我有权渴望什么？”而他的三大批判（《纯粹理性批判》《实践理性批判》《判断力批判》）就是对这三个问题的回答。阿隆在康德的三个问题中加入了“在历史中”这一限定，并将研究和回答这三个问题作为他的“知识分子工作的开端”，即“对于自然以及历史认识或者说历史社会认识的认识论思考的起点”。虽然始于康德，但阿隆认为，“所有分析社会的人都希望达到马克思的那种精确程度”，“批判分析首先就是对于社会的马克思主义诠释的不同部分进行审视”。为此，他转向马克思主义研究，试图运用马克思主义的批判分析方法来回答上述问题。他将自己对马克思主义的思考分为两个层次：“一个是先验的层次，同时伴随着对人们所能知道的以及人们所应该做的进行思考；另一个是对马克思本人明确提出的理论或分析的讨论层次。”

From the perspective of intellectual history, Aron early on advocated distinguishing Marx from Marxism and focused his study of Marxist philosophy of history on Marx’s own works, that is, “understanding the author as the author understood himself.” This reflects Aron’s advanced theoretical vision; he sought to grasp Marx’s thought more scientifically. In his view, the existence of various Marxisms stems, on the one hand, from the fact that Marx’s own philosophy of history contains two different tendencies, subjectivization and objectivization, and, on the other hand, from the differences in the disciplinary foundations and theoretical interpretation paradigms of Marx’s successors or interpreters.

从思想史的视角来看，阿隆很早就主张把马克思与马克思主义区分开来，并将其研究马克思主义历史哲学的重点放在马克思本人的著作上，即“像作者自己理解自己那样理解作者”。这体现了阿隆超前的理论视野，他试图更加科学地把握马克思的思想，在他看来，之所以存在各种各样的马克思主义，一方面源于马克思本人的历史哲学思想具有主观化和客观化等两种不同倾向，另一方面源于马克思的后学或诠释者们各自的学科基础和理论解读范式存在差异。

Starting from classical texts, Aron elaborated on the dilemmas inherent in the basic propositions of Marxism itself, namely, what he saw as the two tendencies of subjectivization and objectivization in Marx’s philosophy of history. Regarding the objectivizing tendency in Marx’s philosophy of history, Aron believed that Marx’s philosophy of history is “a theory of the evolution of macro-historical development,” “an objectification of historical reality,” and “a strict determinism.” This theory holds that humanity is “driven, directed, and manipulated” by the laws of history and is “powerless to change the laws.” He used three classical texts by Marx as examples to analyze this objectivizing tendency: first, Marx’s classic exposition of historical materialism in the “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” which reveals the laws of evolution of human society through the contradictory movement of productive forces and relations of production, and economic base and superstructure; second, Marx’s analysis in the preface to the first edition of Capital of England as a typical representative of the capitalist mode of production, arguing that this mode of production applies to all countries;

阿隆从经典文本出发阐述了马克思主义基本命题本身存在的困境，即他认为的马克思的历史哲学中存在的主观化和客观化等两种倾向。对于马克思历史哲学中的客观化倾向，阿隆认为马克思的历史哲学是“一种关于宏观历史发展演进的理论”，“一种对于历史现实的客体化”，“一种严格的决定论”，这种理论认为人类受历史规律的“带动、指挥、操纵”，“无力改变规律”。他以马克思的三个经典文本为例分析了这种客观化倾向：其一，马克思在《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》中对唯物史观做了经典阐释，通过生产力与生产关系、经济基础与上层建筑的矛盾运动揭示了人类社会发展的演进规律；其二，马克思在《资本论》第一版序言中对英国这一资本主义生产方式的典型代表进行了分析，并认为这种生产方式适用于所有国家；

third, Marx’s citation in the afterword to the second edition of Capital of a Russian reviewer’s interpretation of his theory, intended to illustrate that social movement is “a natural-historical process governed by definite laws.” Regarding the subjectivizing tendency in Marx’s philosophy of history, Aron believed that Marx interprets the evolution of human history from the side of the historical subject—that is, from the perspective of class struggle—as reflected in the opening sentence of the Manifesto of the Communist Party: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” After analyzing these two tendencies, Aron posed the question: “How can the objectivizing interpretation in terms of relations of production and productive forces be reconciled with the interpretation of historical evolution starting from class struggle?” “What relationship is established between objectivized history subject to laws and human consciousness or human will? How can the notion of immutable laws of historical development and the history of class struggle be combined?” In Aron’s view, “these two interpretations are of course perfectly reconcilable,” but “this can only be achieved starting from a certain metascience.”

其三，马克思在《资本论》第二版跋中引用了俄国评论者对他的理论的诠释，旨在说明社会运动是“受一定规律支配的自然史过程”。对于马克思历史哲学中的主观化倾向，阿隆认为，马克思是从历史的主体方面——即从阶级斗争出发——来诠释人类历史的演进的，这体现在《共产党宣言》开篇提出的那句话中：“至今一切社会的历史都是阶级斗争的历史。”在分析了这两种倾向后，阿隆提出的问题是：“用生产关系和生产力来做出客体化诠释，和从阶级斗争出发来诠释历史的演进，两者间如何协调？”“服从规律的客体化历史和人类意识或人类意志之间，究竟建立了什么关系？历史发展之不变规律的说法和阶级斗争史，如何能合起来？”在阿隆看来，“这两种诠释当然完全可以调和”，但“只能从某一种元科学出发来达到这一点”。

The so-called “metascience” is “the analytical reflection on science itself”; “the central problem of metascience is to know whether there is a single scientific model.” In examining Marx and Marxism, Aron discovered that theoretical traditions such as historicism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and existentialism have influenced people’s understanding of history and their interpretations of Marxism. Due to “transcendental” or “empirical” factors, Marx’s later followers or interpreters, each starting from their own total philosophy, have produced different schools of Marxism through different interpretations of the basic propositions of Marxism. First, “‘existentialist’ or ‘phenomenological’ Marxism.” The basic characteristic of this interpretation is that it “places human action at the center of historical reality,” “presents historical reality or developing human reality as a reality mainly composed of human actions or intentional actions,” and then examines the dialectical relationship between the individual’s situation and their actual experience. Aron believes the dilemma this interpretation faces is: how to “find the overall movement from a historical interpretation centered on individual action”? That is, how to reproduce the totality and inevitability of historical development? Second, Althusser’s “structuralist Marxism.” Unlike phenomenological and existentialist interpretations, in Althusser’s interpretation, what stands at the center of historical reality is not the acting person; historical reality is not constituted by individual actions but by objectified social relations external to individuals. Therefore, “the mode of production appears as an objective reality whole that reproduces itself infinitely.” The problem this interpretation raises is: how to view “the transition from the mode of production that reproduces itself to historical development”? In Aron’s view, Althusser’s interpretation can only present Marxism as “something non-humanist and non-historicist” by resorting to “overdetermination.” Third, classical or orthodox “Marxism-Leninism.” This interpretation highlights the affirmative aspect of the objective laws of human historical development in Marx’s thought, that is, “thinking in totality in a total manner” about the scientific laws of human development and evolution. “According to this interpretation, Marxism is merely a theory of laws.”

所谓“元科学”，“就是对科学本身的分析思考”，“元科学的中心问题就是要知道是否有唯一的科学模式”。阿隆在考察马克思和马克思主义时发现，历史主义、解释学、现象学以及存在主义等理论传统影响了人们对历史的认识以及对马克思主义的诠释。由于“先验”或“经验”的因素，马克思的后学或诠释者们各自从自己的总体哲学出发，通过对马克思主义基本命题的不同诠释而产生了不同派别的马克思主义。第一，“‘存在主义的’或‘现象学的’马克思主义”。这种诠释的基本特征是，“把人类行动置于历史现实之中心”，“把历史现实或者发展中的人类现实当作主要是由人类动作或者意向动作组成的现实来呈现”，进而考察个人的处境与其实际经验之间的辩证关系。阿隆认为，这种诠释面临的困境是：如何“从以个人行动为中心的历史诠释中找出总的运动”？即如何再现历史发展的总体性和必然性？第二，阿尔都塞的“结构主义的马克思主义”。不同于现象学和存在主义的诠释，在阿尔都塞的诠释中，处于历史现实之中心的不是行动的人，历史现实并非由个人行动构成，而是由客体化的、外在于个人的社会关系构成。因此，“生产模式就表现为自身无限再生产的客观现实整体”。这种诠释带来的问题是：如何看待“从自身再生产的生产模式向历史发展的转变”？在阿隆看来，阿尔都塞的诠释只能借助“多元决定”将马克思主义呈现为一种“非人本主义、非历史主义的东西”。第三，经典的或正统的“马克思列宁主义”。这种诠释突出了马克思的思想中对人类历史发展客观规律的肯定方面，即“在总体性中以总体方式”思考人类发展演进的科学规律。“根据这种诠释，马克思主义只是一种关于规律的理论。”

Besides the above three interpretations, there are also other schools such as Hegelian Marxism, Kantian Marxism, and analytical Marxism. In short, on the basis of distinguishing between Marx and Marxism, Aron analyzes the gains and losses of different interpretations of Marxism, and then points out: “Marx’s own Marxism… is certainly a combination of these three interpretations.” However, his attribution of the emergence of various schools of Marxism to the existence of two tendencies in Marx’s thought, such as subjectivization and objectivization, is clearly a misreading of Marx’s philosophy of history. Marx’s texts constitute a totality of thought that continuously develops and perfects with the evolution of history; texts from different periods cannot be separated and examined in isolation. As Georg Lukács pointed out, Marx’s method and system are “an interconnected unity that must be preserved,” the core of which is correctly handling “the dialectical relationship between subject and object in the historical process,” rather than the two tendencies of subjectivization and objectivization as Aron claims.

除了以上三种诠释外，还有黑格尔主义的马克思主义、康德式的马克思主义、分析哲学的马克思主义等其他派别。总之，阿隆在区分马克思与马克思主义的基础上分析了对马克思主义的不同诠释的得与失，进而指出：“马克思本人的马克思主义……肯定是这三种诠释的结合。”然而，他将出现各种派别的马克思主义的原因归结为马克思的思想中存在着主观化和客观化等两种倾向，这显然是对马克思历史哲学的误读。马克思的文本是一个思想总体，是随着历史的发展而不断发展完善的，不能将不同时期的文本割裂开来，孤立地予以考察。正如格奥尔格·卢卡奇所指出的，马克思的方法和体系是“一个相互联系的统一体，这个统一体必须加以保持”，其核心是正确处理“历史过程中的主体和客体之间的辩证关系”，而非阿隆所谓的主观化和客观化等两种倾向。

II. How the Philosophy of History Became a Specific Science

二、历史哲学何以成为一门特定的科学

It is generally believed that the publication in 1725 of the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico’s *The New Science* marked the birth of the philosophy of history as an independent discipline. Some scholars trace the origin of the philosophy of history further back to Saint Augustine, a representative of medieval “patristic philosophy,” or even to certain parts of the *Old Testament*. The recognition of the philosophy of history as a separate discipline for the first time is attributed to the first volume of the four-volume masterpiece *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity* published in 1784 by Johann Herder, a pioneer of German Romanticism. Meanwhile, the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, compiled from Hegel’s lecture manuscripts and student notes by his students and friends and published in 1837, is widely regarded as the pinnacle of the development of the philosophy of history. Thinkers of that era were mainly devoted to achieving an understanding of the totality of the historical process through metaphysical speculation, in order to reveal the stages, laws, purpose, and meaning of history. The technological revolution of the mid-18th century impacted traditional, speculative philosophy of history. The German historian Leopold von Ranke proposed writing history objectively and impartially, faithfully recording authentic and reliable primary sources, thereby inaugurating a new method for modern historical research. The objectivist historiography he represented profoundly influenced historical research from the second half of the 19th century through the entire 20th century. However, the fundamental problem faced by empirical historiography based on scientific methods is: does a purely objective, impartial narrative exist?

一般认为，1725年意大利哲学家乔巴蒂斯特·维科的《新科学》的出版标志着历史哲学作为一门独立学科的诞生。也有学者将历史哲学的源头向前追溯至中世纪“教父哲学”的代表人物圣奥古斯丁，甚至《旧约全书》的某些部分。历史哲学作为一门单独的学科第一次得到承认，则要归功于德国浪漫主义的先驱约翰·赫德尔于1784年出版的四卷本名著《人类历史哲学的观念》第一卷。而由黑格尔的学生和友人根据他的授课原稿和听讲者笔记整理并于1837年出版的《历史哲学讲演录》则被普遍视为历史哲学发展的顶峰。当时的思想家主要致力于通过形而上学的思辨达到对历史过程整体性的理解，以揭示历史的发展阶段、发展规律及其目的和意义。18世纪中叶的科技革命冲击了传统的、思辨的历史哲学，德国史学家利奥波德·冯·兰克提出要客观公正地书写历史，照录真实可信的第一手资料，从而开启了近代史学研究的新方法，他所代表的客观主义史学深刻影响了19世纪下半叶乃至整个20世纪的史学研究。然而，以科学方法为基础的实证史学面临的根本问题是：是否存在纯粹客观的、不偏不倚的叙述？

Marx’s era happened to be situated in the process of transition from abstract narratives based on traditional speculative philosophy to social science research based on scientific methods. Against the backdrop of intellectual fragmentation and academic shifts, the historical materialism jointly founded by Marx and Engels made the science of history “the only science.” In *The German Ideology*, they criticized “speculative philosophy of history” and “empirical historiography,” pointing out that history is neither “the imaginary activity of imaginary subjects” nor “a collection of dead facts,” but something we live within while simultaneously creating and narrating. Therefore, historical research must treat people “as both the authors and the actors of their own drama.” On the basis of criticizing and transcending “the idealist conception of history” and “all previous conceptions of history,” Marx and Engels grounded themselves in reality, followed people’s material productive practices and the social material relations of production established on this basis to determine the path of theoretical research, and applied “the summary of the most general results abstracted from the investigation of the historical development of mankind” to specific socio-historical research, thereby making the philosophy of history a science. As Engels pointed out: “Since history also received a materialist explanation, a new path of development was opened up here as well.”

马克思所处的时代恰好处于从以传统的思辨哲学为基础的抽象叙事转向以科学方法为基础的社会科学研究的过程中。在思想分裂和学术转向的背景下，马克思与恩格斯共同创立的唯物史观使得历史科学成为“一门唯一的科学”。在《德意志意识形态》中，他们批判了“思辨的历史哲学”和“实证史学”，指出历史不是“想象的主体的想象活动”，也不是“一些僵死的事实的汇集”，而是我们一边生活于其中、一边创造和叙述的东西，因此历史研究要把人们“既当成他们本身的历史剧的剧作者又当成剧中人物”。在批判和超越“唯心主义历史观”以及“迄今为止的一切历史观”的基础上，马克思和恩格斯立足现实，依循人们的物质生产实践以及在此基础上建立的社会物质生产关系确定理论研究进路，将“从对人类历史发展的考察中抽象出来的最一般的结果的概括”运用于具体的社会历史研究，使历史哲学成为科学。正如恩格斯所指出的：“自从历史也得到唯物主义的解释以后，一条新的发展道路也在这里开辟出来了。”

However, due to ideological and other reasons, Marxist historical materialism has long been challenged by Western scholars, most notably Friedrich Hayek and Karl Popper. Hayek used economic individualism to refute historical holism, arguing that history is entirely determined by individual intentions; Popper used logic to explain history, equating social science with the scientism of natural science. What both opposed was the determinist thought based on history as ontology. Aron believed that this historical ontology was essentially the Marxism interpreted by the Second and Third Internationals, not the original meaning of Marx’s thought. To this end, he abandoned strict historical inevitability and historical determinism, attempting to build a bridge between historical determinism and historical relativism, and to explore a reasonable historical objectivity.

然而，由于意识形态等原因，长期以来马克思主义的唯物史观一直受到西方学者的诘难，其中以弗里德里希·哈耶克和卡尔·波普尔最具代表性。哈耶克用经济学个人主义反驳历史总体论，主张历史完全是由个人意向决定的；波普尔则用逻辑解释历史，把社会科学等同于自然科学的科学主义。两人共同反对的都是以历史为本体的决定论思想。阿隆认为，这种历史本体论实质上是第二国际和第三国际所诠释的马克思主义，而非马克思思想的本来之义。为此，他摒弃了严格的历史必然性和历史决定论思想，试图在历史决定论与历史相对论之间架起一座桥梁，探寻一种合理的历史客观性。

In 1938, the publication of Aron’s doctoral dissertation *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* and Maurice Mandelbaum’s *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* marked the modern turn in the philosophy of history. Facing the challenges of the doctoral dissertation committee, which was heir to the empirical historiography school of Auguste Comte and Émile Durkheim, Aron began his dissertation defense with a frontal attack: “Why am I a socialist? What does it mean to have a political stance? These are the questions I asked myself when studying Marxism and political economy.” It can be said that Marxism laid the methodological foundation for Aron to open up new directions in the study of the philosophy of history, leading him to emphasize the limitations of historical knowledge and to stress a plurality of historical perspectives. However, compared with historical materialism’s focus on exploring macro-methodological principles of historical knowledge, Aron focused on examining the overall problem of historical knowledge from a concrete, micro-level perspective.

1938年，阿隆的博士论文《历史哲学导论》和莫里斯·曼德尔鲍姆的《历史知识问题》相继出版，标志着历史哲学的现代转向。面对师承实证主义史学派的奥古斯特·孔德和埃米尔·涂尔干的博士答辩委员会的诘难，阿隆以正面进攻开始自己的论文答辩：“为什么我是社会主义者？有政治立场意味着什么？这是我学习马克思主义和政治经济学时向自己提出的问题。”可以说，马克思主义为阿隆开拓历史哲学研究的新方向奠定了方法论基础，让他重视历史认识的局限性，强调多元化的历史视角。不过，与唯物史观侧重于对历史认识的宏观方法论原则的探讨相比，阿隆侧重于从具体的、微观的层面透视历史认识的总体问题。

III. The Overall Problem of Historical Knowledge

三、历史认识的总体问题

As Aron states: “To reflect on one’s own historical consciousness in the present is a way of reflecting on the history in which we are living.” Therefore, whether it is simply reproducing the past or narrating the facts of the present and attempting to grasp the future, one cannot obtain complete knowledge or achieve absolute certainty. So how can the science of history attain objectivity? And within what scope is it universally valid? Aron focuses on the nature of historical knowledge and historical laws, synthesizing the German historicist tradition with Anglo-American analytical methods, thereby opening a new direction for unlocking the door to historical knowledge.

如阿隆所言：“思考自己当下的历史意识，是思考我们正在生活的历史的一种方式。”因此，无论是简单地重现过去，还是叙述当下的事实并尝试把握未来，都无法获得完整的认识，达到绝对的确定性。那么，历史科学如何才能具有客观性？又在何种范围内普遍有效？阿隆聚焦历史认识的性质和历史规律，将德国的历史主义传统与英美的分析方法综合起来，为打开历史认识的大门提供了新的方向。

First, concerning the connections, distinctions, and characteristics of historical science versus natural science. Aron points out: “In what considerations does historical knowledge, or knowledge of certain human realities, constitute a specific science? Does this science have the same style as knowledge of natural realities? This historical knowledge can be defined either by individual attention, or by narration, or by the meaning of known phenomena.” Nature is external and objective to humans; without humans, nature still exists objectively. But humans live in history; history is both the object of human study and humanity itself. Therefore, in Aron’s view, historical science cannot, like natural science, appeal to a series of causal sequences to form an absolutely objective theoretical system. Instead, it must rely on explanation and interpretation based on the understanding of the subject. This explanation and interpretation can be defined by three situations: “individual attention,” “narration,” and “the meaning of known phenomena.” Historians’ attention to individuals, and their narration of past events along a timeline, are the means by which people obtain historical knowledge. Thus, when historians confront cultural or spiritual works (meaningful phenomena) that condense human thought, they cannot abstract away the meanings imparted by the experiencers or creators of those works; it is these meanings that allow people to gain historical knowledge from them. Hence, historical narration is the main characteristic that distinguishes historical science from natural science.

其一，关于历史科学与自然科学的联系、区别及其特性。阿隆指出：“在怎样的考量中，历史认识，或关于某些人类现实的认识，构成了一种特定的科学？这种科学和那些关于自然现实的认识有同样的风格吗？这种历史认识或者可以由个体关注来定义，或者可以由叙述来定义，或者还可以由已知现象的意义来定义。”自然对人来讲是外在的和客观的，离开了人，自然依旧客观存在；而人生活在历史中，历史既是人的研究对象，也是人类自身。因此，在阿隆看来，历史科学无法像自然科学那样诉诸一系列因果序列，进而形成一套绝对客观的理论体系，而是必须依赖主体理解基础上的说明和解释，这种说明和解释可以由“个体关注”“叙述”“已知现象的意义”等三种情况来定义。历史学家对个体的关注，以及他们沿时间线对过去事件的叙述，是人们获取历史认识的途径。因此，当历史学家面对凝结人类思考的文化或精神作品（有意义的现象）时，不能抽象掉那些作品的经验者或创造者所赋予的意义，正是这些意义使人们可以从中获得历史认识。所以说，历史叙述是历史科学区别于自然科学的主要特征。

So what constitutes scientific historical narration? Does objective historical narration exist? Aron believes that the fundamental method of historical research is understanding, and establishing the objectivity of history cannot be separated from the cycle between understanding and explanation. Historical events cannot bypass human action, and historical knowledge aims to concretely understand and explain the purposes, causes, and effects of human action. Therefore, the primary prerequisite for narratives presenting historical events (such as various historical works) is that, whether it be the motives of actors within a small historical event or the “objective spirit” of an entire historical era, they are all comprehensible, and historical knowledge is established through explanation. Understanding and explanation are two indispensable and inseparable links. However, for individuals, due to the complexity of motives (understanding intentional actions, or the plurality of intentions that can be attributed to the same action, making it difficult to reach a conclusion) and psychological motivations (understanding the psychological or irrational factors that produce individual behavior, including intuition, emotion, etc.), complete and objective understanding is very difficult to fully achieve. Even setting aside the great difficulty of understanding others’ behavior, understanding one’s own behavior cannot guarantee that an individual can provide a complete explanation of the events they have experienced. This is the particularity of historical knowledge, because we, as the subjects of historical knowledge, are in constant flux. Therefore, Aron believes that the historical conclusions obtained through the interaction of explanation and understanding can only be a historical view of “probabilistic determinism” with a degree of uncertainty.

那么，何谓科学的历史叙述？是否存在客观的历史叙述？阿隆认为，历史研究的根本方法是理解，确立历史的客观性离不开理解与说明之间的循环。历史事件绕不开人的行动，而历史认识是要具体理解和说明人的行动的目的、原因及其影响。因此，呈现历史事件的叙述（如各种历史作品）的首要前提是，无论是小到历史事件中行为者的动机，还是大到整个历史时代的“客观精神”，都是可被理解的，并藉由说明来建立历史认识，理解与说明两个环节缺一不可、密不可分。然而，对于个人来讲，由于动机（对有意图的行为的理解，或因同一行为可被赋予的意图具有多元性而难以定论）和心理动因（理解个体行为产生的心理因素或非理性因素，包括直觉、情感等）的复杂性，完整客观的理解又很难完全实现。姑且不论理解他人行为困难重重，即使理解自身行为，也难以保证个体对于其所经历的事件能够给予完整说明。这就是历史认识的特殊性，因为作为历史认识之主体的我们处于不断的变动中。因此，阿隆认为，依靠说明与理解的互动所得到的历史结论只能是一种带有不确定性的“或然决定论”的历史观。

Second, concerning the relationships between the individual and the whole, the micro and the macro, and the part and the whole in the historical process. First, the relationship between the individual and the whole. Aron uses the example of a battle to explore the oscillation, or uncertainty, of historical knowledge between the individual and the whole: “Even if a historian is interested in the individuality of the Battle of Marathon, he cannot understand this battle without using general concepts—such as the general concept of ‘battle.’” The individual and the whole are a pair of complementary and contradictory-unified concepts. Studying an individual event (a battle) must take the whole as a reference object; one cannot understand the individual apart from the whole, nor can one study only the whole while ignoring the individual. Second, the relationship between the micro and the macro. Aron also takes economics as an example, arguing that the distinction in political economy between “microeconomic theory—tracing back to economic agents and establishing market equilibrium starting from individual consumers or individual producers” and “macroeconomic theory—adopting basic concepts and applying them holistically to national production or the conditions for the development of national production” reflects the relationship between the micro and the macro. Similarly, when narrating history, we also encounter the relationship between micro-events and macro-events; the two are interconnected, mutually transformative, and mutually influential. “No narrative fails to replace the intricate description of the micro-world with some kind of more or less panoramic overview of history.” Third, the relationship between the part and the whole. Aron believes that historians have always written only concrete “histories of something,” such as literary history, economic history, military history, etc., but cannot write a “total history.” Even if a “total history” is written, its substance, relative to the entire history of humanity, represents only a part of history. In addition to these three relationships, Aron argues that the relationship between events and works must also be emphasized, because “the explanation or interpretation of events is not carried out in the same way as the explanation or interpretation of works,” and the meaning and significance of historical events change with the passage of time—they may rise, fall, or be negated.

其二，关于历史过程中个体与总体、微观与宏观、部分与整体之间的关系。一是个体与总体的关系。阿隆举了一个战役的例子，以探讨历史认识在个体与总体之间的摇摆，或者说不确定性：“即便历史学家对马拉松战役的个体性发生兴趣，他也无法不用那些总体概念——比如总体上的‘战役’这个概念——来理解这场战役。”个体与总体是一组相辅相成、对立统一的概念，研究事件（战役）个体必须以总体为参照对象，无法离开总体去理解个体，同样也无法只研究总体而无视个体。二是微观与宏观的关系。阿隆还以经济学为例，认为政治经济学领域对“微观经济学理论——追溯到经济主体并从个体消费或个体生产者出发来建立市场平衡的理论”与“宏观经济学理论——采用基本概念并且把基本概念总体性地运用到国家生产或者国家生产的发展条件上的理论”的区分，就反映了微观与宏观之间的关系问题。同样，在叙述历史时，我们也会遇到微观事件和宏观事件之间的关系问题，二者相互联系、相互转化、相互影响，“没有一种叙述不用某种或多或少对历史的全景概观来取代微观世界的繁杂描述”。三是部分与整体的关系。阿隆认为，历史学家们一直以来所写的只是具体的“某样事物的历史”，比如文学史、经济史、战争史等，但无法写出一部“总体历史”，即便写出了“总体历史”，其实质相对于整个人类历史而言也仅代表着部分历史。除上述三种关系外，阿隆认为还必须重视事件与作品之间的关系，因为“对事件的解释或诠释与对作品的解释或诠释并不以相同的方式进行”，而且历史事件的意义和重要性会随时代的变迁而变迁，或提升，或降低，或被否定。

Third, concerning the objectivity of historical knowledge. The “objectivity of historical knowledge” that Aron speaks of is not the “objectivity” opposed to subjectivity, but rather “universality.” What he seeks to elaborate is: what kind of science of universality is historical knowledge? Historical science is, in the final analysis, a discipline concerning humanity itself, inseparable from human consciousness, and is therefore a science different from natural science. Aron delimits the scope of application of historical science and specifies three questions: What is the difference between human history and natural history? What is the relationship between what we call historical society and historical knowledge? What is the essential difference between the “chronicle” of events and historical knowledge? Aron states that his investigation of historical science adopts a descriptive method, i.e., the phenomenological method. In his view, the problem of the objectivity of historical knowledge ultimately manifests as the problem of the scientificity of historical explanation. In the post-war English-speaking world, a debate on the nature of historiography unfolded around this issue, namely the “Hempel-Dray debate.” [4]4 Ibid., p. 40. Carl Hempel attempted to show that “historical explanation is a modality of scientific explanation,” while William Dray argued that “historical explanation is essentially different from scientific explanation.” The Hempel model is the “deductive model,” also known as the “covering law model,” i.e., historical explanation is scientific explanation “only if the connection between unique events can be subsumed under a universal proposition.” The Dray model is the rationality model, i.e., “when one grasps the goal aimed at by the agent, and explains the means adopted in terms of the goal aimed at, an event is explained, becoming an event that can be understood.” Compared to the Hempel model, Aron is more in agreement with the Dray model, arguing that “the Dray model implies the particularity of human history relative to natural history,” and that “his reconstruction of explanation through reason is very enlightening.” However, Aron simultaneously believes that due to the limitations of human historical knowledge and the diversity of historical experience, there is no universally valid historical knowledge. Therefore, his reflection on historical determinism inevitably falls into historical skepticism.

其三，关于历史认识的客观性。阿隆所说的“历史认识的客观性”并不是与主观性相对的“客观性”，而是指“普遍性”，他想要阐述的是：历史认识是一种具有何种普遍性的科学？历史科学归根结底是关于人自身的学科，与人类意识密不可分，因此是一门不同于自然科学的科学。阿隆限定了历史科学的适用范围，并明确为三个问题：人类历史与自然历史的区别是什么？我们所谓的历史社会与历史认识之间的关系是什么？事件的“编年史”与历史认识有什么本质区别？阿隆表示，自己对历史科学的考察采取的是一种描述性的方法，即现象学的方法。在他看来，历史认识的客观性问题归根结底体现为历史解释的科学性问题，战后英语世界曾围绕这一问题展开了关于历史学性质的争论，即“亨佩尔—德雷论战”。卡尔·亨佩尔试图说明“历史解释是科学解释的一种模态”，威廉·德雷则认为“历史解释在本质上不同于科学解释”。亨佩尔模型是“演绎模型”，又称“涵盖律模型”，即历史解释“只有在独特事件之间的联系能划归为一种普遍命题的情况下”才是科学解释。德雷模型是合理性模型，即“当人们把握住了行动者所瞄准的目标，根据所瞄准的目的来解释人们采取的手段时，一个事件便是被解释了，成为能被人理解的事件了”。相比于亨佩尔模型，阿隆更加认同德雷模型，认为“德雷模型暗示了人类历史相对于自然历史所具有的特殊性”，“他通过理性来重建解释，很有启迪性”。但是，阿隆同时认为，由于人类历史知识的局限性和历史经验的多样性，并不存在普遍有效的历史认识，因此他对历史决定论的反思不可避免地陷入了历史怀疑论。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

As a non-Marxist who systematically studied Marx and Marxism for decades, Aron sharply criticized Marxism on many occasions, yet this does not prevent his view of history from sharing many commonalities or even identities with Marx’s. Both hold that history is not a history of pure ideas, nor an analytical history, but a history of action, a history of reality, a history of practice, and a history of human beings. Historical materialism elucidates the general laws of the development of human history, reveals the dialectics of history, and establishes a scientific view of history. Aron’s some objective and reasonable interpretations of the “general problem of historical knowledge” can be said to be a concrete embodiment and enriched development of the disciplinary nature and methodology of historical materialism.

作为系统研究马克思和马克思主义几十年的非马克思主义者，阿隆曾在很多场合激烈地批评马克思主义，但这并不妨碍他的历史观与马克思有很多相通甚至相同之处。他们都认为，历史并非纯粹理念的历史，也不是分析的历史，而是行动的历史、现实的历史、实践的历史、人的历史。唯物史观阐明了人类历史发展的一般规律，揭示了历史的辩证法，确立了科学的历史观。阿隆关于“历史认识总体问题”的一些客观合理的诠释可以说是对唯物史观学科性质和方法论的具体体现和丰富发展。

First, Aron’s exposition of the relationship between historical science and natural science reflects the disciplinary nature of historical materialism. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx pointed out that “history itself is a real part of natural history” and that “history is the true natural history of man.” [1]1 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3, p. 304. In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels criticized the view that opposes nature to history, arguing that this view implies that “there is never a historical nature or a natural history before people”; however, natural history and human history are “inseparable” and “mutually condition each other.” [2]2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5, p. 40. Therefore, historical narrative cannot exclude the relationship between humans and nature; “all historical writing must start from these natural foundations and their modification in the course of history through the activity of men,” [3]3 Ibid., p. 31. achieving the unity of the history of nature and the natural history of humanity. But “because almost the whole ideology either distorts human history or completely abstracts from it,” [4]4 Ibid., p. 40. it is necessary to study human history in depth. It is precisely from this dimension that Engels regarded historical materialism as essentially “the science of real human beings and their historical development,” [5]5 Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 26, p. 387. which “was a discovery of revolutionary significance not only for economics but for all historical sciences (all sciences that are not natural sciences are historical sciences),” [6]6 Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 25, p. 129. because it thoroughly negated “all the traditional and customary views of everything historical,” [7]7 Ibid. overturned “the previous idealist narrative of history,” [8]8 Ibid. established a “real narrative of history,” [9]9 Ibid. and became the guiding science in the field of society and history.

其一，阿隆对历史科学与自然科学关系的阐述体现了唯物史观的学科性质。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思指出，“历史本身是自然史的一个现实部分”，“历史是人的真正的自然史”。在《德意志意识形态》中，马克思恩格斯批判了将自然与历史对立起来的观点，认为这种观点意味着“人们面前始终不会有历史的自然和自然的历史”；但是，自然史与人类史是“不可分割”且“彼此相互制约”的。因此，历史叙述不能排除人与自然的关系，“任何历史记载都应当从这些自然基础以及它们在历史进程中由于人们的活动而发生的变更出发”，实现历史的自然与自然的历史的统一。但是，“因为几乎整个意识形态不是曲解人类史，就是完全撇开人类史”，因此需要深入研究人类史。正是从这一维度出发，恩格斯认为唯物史观本质上是“关于现实的人及其历史发展的科学”，它“不仅对于经济学，而且对于一切历史科学（凡不是自然科学的科学都是历史科学）都是一个具有革命意义的发现”，因为它彻底否定了“一切历史的东西的全部传统的和习惯的观点”，颠覆了“历来的观念的历史叙述”，确立了“现实的历史叙述”，成为指导社会历史领域的科学。

Second, Aron’s reflections on the relationship between the individual and the totality, the micro and the macro, the part and the whole, and events and works in the historical process present the holistic methodology of historical materialism. Although Marx did not focus on the theoretical problem of “the objectivity of historical knowledge” as Aron did, the general principles and concrete applications of the methodology of historical materialism all embody these relationships and views. Marx clearly stated that the correct scientific method is that “abstract determinations lead to the reproduction of the concrete in the course of thinking,” and “the concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis of many determinations, hence the unity of the manifold.” [10]10 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 28, p. 38. As Lukács said, Marx advocated “understanding society as a totality,” holding that “only when the isolated facts of social life are grasped as moments of historical development and subsumed under a totality does knowledge of facts become knowledge of reality.” [11]11 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 8. Taking capitalist society as a totality for reflection, and on this basis finding the necessary path to “human freedom and liberation,” is the consistent theoretical theme of Marx. It is in this sense that Aron considered *Capital*, the peak of Marx’s theory, to be not only “a great project” but also “a genius project,” and that true Marxists should use the standpoint, viewpoint, and method of *Capital* to analyze our era and write the *Capital* of our time. Aron also highly praised Marx’s historical works on the recording and narration of historical events. For example, he believed that *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* is not only a great historical work but also a typical narrative history, where the actors are sometimes individuals and sometimes classes. As a witness to the European revolutions of 1848–1849, Marx’s understanding and narration of historical events were remarkably calm and objective precisely because he adhered to historical materialism, proceeded from objective reality, and followed the dialectical unity of fact and value, conformity to law and conformity to purpose, thereby transcending the limitations of his era and gaining a universal understanding of history.

其二，阿隆对历史过程中的个体与总体、微观与宏观、部分与整体以及事件和作品的关系的思考呈现了唯物史观的总体性方法论。马克思虽然没有像阿隆那样聚焦“历史认识的客观性”这一理论问题的探讨，但唯物史观方法论的一般原则及具体应用无不体现了这些关系和观点。马克思明确指出，正确的科学方法是“抽象的规定在思维行程中导致具体的再现”，而“具体之所以具体，因为它是许多规定的综合，因而是多样性的统一”。如卢卡奇所说，马克思主张“把社会作为总体来认识”，认为“只有在这种把社会生活中的孤立事实作为历史发展的环节并把它们归结为一个总体的情况下，对事实的认识才能成为对现实的认识”。把资本主义社会作为一个总体进行思考，在此基础上找到“人类自由解放”的必由之路，是马克思一以贯之的理论主旨。正是在此意义上，阿隆认为代表马克思理论高峰的《资本论》不仅“是一项伟大的工程”，而且“是一项天才的工程”，真正的马克思主义者应该用《资本论》的立场、观点和方法分析我们所处的时代，并撰写我们时代的资本论。对于马克思关于历史事件记录和叙述的历史作品，阿隆同样给予了高度评价。比如，他认为《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》不仅是一部伟大的历史作品，而且是典型的叙事性历史，行动者时而是人，时而是阶级。作为1848—1849年欧洲革命的亲历者，马克思之所以对历史事件的认识和叙述异常冷静客观，就在于他坚持唯物史观，从客观现实出发，遵循事实与价值、合规律性与合目的性的辩证统一，从而超越了时代的局限性，获得了对历史的普遍性认识。

Third, Aron’s analysis of the relationship between historical society and historical knowledge embodies the core idea of historical materialism, namely, correctly handling the dialectical relationship between subject and object in the historical process. Marx and Engels abstracted from the development of human history objective laws that are independent of people’s subjective will (purposes) and called them historical necessity. However, they did not stop there. Because the necessity of historical development is endogenous to people’s concrete practical activities and is manifested through them. “History does nothing; it ‘possesses no immense wealth,’ it ‘wages no battles.’ It is rather man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights; ‘history’ is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.” [12]12 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 4, p. 93. Human activity has subjective selectivity, but the direction of human historical development is determined by objective laws. “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please.” [13]13 Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 11, p. 103. In exploring the relationship between humans and history in the historical process, Aron also tried to adhere to the dialectics of history like Marx, calling himself an “engaged spectator” and advocating the use of theory to guide (engage in) practice.

其三，阿隆关于历史社会与历史认识之关系的分析体现了唯物史观的核心思想，即正确处理历史过程中主体与客体的辩证关系。马克思恩格斯从人类历史发展中抽象出不以人的主观意志（目的）为转移的客观规律，并称之为历史的必然。但是，他们并没有停留于此。因为历史发展的必然性内生于人的具体实践活动，并通过人的实践活动体现出来。“历史什么事情也没有做，它‘不拥有任何惊人的丰富性’，它‘没有进行任何战斗’！其实，正是人，现实的、活生生的人在创造这一切，拥有这一切并且进行战斗。并不是‘历史’把人当作手段来达到自己——仿佛历史是一个独具魅力的人——的目的。历史不过是追求着自己目的的人的活动而已。”人的活动具有主观选择性，但人类历史发展的方向由客观规律决定。“人们自己创造自己的历史，但是他们并不是随心所欲地创造。”在探寻历史过程中人与历史的关系时，阿隆也试图像马克思一样坚持历史的辩证法，并自称为“介入的旁观者”，主张用理论指导（介入）实践。

Aron’s reflections on Marxist philosophy of history undoubtedly have a certain rationality and reference value, but they also inevitably contain many limitations.

阿隆对马克思主义历史哲学的思考无疑具有一定的合理性和可借鉴性，但也不可避免地存在着诸多局限性。

First, Aron’s choice of historical subject is filled with doubt and pessimism, and his view of history as “probabilistic determinism” inevitably falls into historical nihilism. Aron believed that the human being as the historical subject is influenced by subjectivity, making some events inexplicable by causal relations, and thus history is uncertain. As he pointed out: “Men make history, but they do not know the history they make. They can only know it afterwards, and even afterwards, they still have difficulty understanding the history they have made.” [14]14 Raymond Aron, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectivity*, trans. George J. Irwin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), p. 37. Based on this understanding, Aron focused more on the impact of specific micro-events on history, failed to grasp the general trend of human social development, denied the subjectivity of history, and thus could not articulate the meaning and ultimate value of history. In contrast, Marx always firmly believed that the proletariat bears the great historical mission of liberating all humanity. This stance prompted Marxism to pursue truth on the basis of following the objective laws of historical development and to use it to guide the social movement to transform reality. The firm proletarian stance enables Marxism to fully satisfy the fundamental interests of the masses, thereby inspiring the revolutionary fighting spirit and will of the historical subject, and ultimately promoting the realization of the goals of socialism and communism.

其一，阿隆对历史主体的选择充满怀疑和悲观，其“或然决定论”的历史观必然会陷入历史虚无主义。阿隆认为，作为历史主体的人受主观性影响，使得部分事件不能被因果关系解释，因此历史具有不确定性。如他所指出的：“人们造就了历史，而他们却不知道他们所造就的历史。他们只能在事后才知道历史，而甚至在事后，他们对于了解他们所造就的历史也仍有困难。”基于这种认识，阿隆更多地关注具体的微观事件对历史的影响，未能从总体上把握人类社会发展趋势，否定了历史的主体性，从而无法言说历史的意义和终极价值。而马克思始终坚信，无产阶级肩负着解放全人类的伟大历史使命，这一立场促使马克思主义在遵循历史发展客观规律的基础上追求真理并以此指导改造现实的社会运动。坚定的无产阶级立场使得马克思主义能够充分满足人民大众的根本利益，进而激发历史主体的革命斗志和意志，最终推动社会主义和共产主义目标的实现。

Second, compared with Marx’s historical materialism, Aron’s historical theory is limited to intellectual enlightenment rather than active action; it is more about “observing” and “analyzing” than substantive “engagement.” In contrast, Marx “was both a prophet and a man of action and a scholar.” [15]15 Raymond Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought*, vol. 1, trans. Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 145. On the one hand, Marx’s “prophecy” was based on a scientific analysis of the capitalist mode of production to reveal its development trends, rather than providing immutable ready-made solutions, as Marx himself pointed out: “The advantage of the new trend is precisely that we do not want to anticipate the future dogmatically, but only want to discover the new world through the critique of the old one.” [16]16 Karl Marx, “Letter to Ruge (September 1843),” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3, p. 142. On the other hand, and more importantly, Marx was a revolutionary and an active actor; he combined historical science with social critique and human liberation, committed to establishing an association in which everyone can develop freely and fully. This is both the value stance of historical materialism and the meaning of human history.

其二，与马克思的唯物史观相比，阿隆的历史理论局限于思想启蒙，而非积极行动，更多地是“旁观”“分析”，而非实质性的“介入”。相反，马克思“既是一个预言家，又是一个行为家和学者”。一方面，马克思的“预言”是基于对资本主义生产方式的科学分析揭示其发展趋势，而非给予一成不变的现成方案，正如马克思所指出的：“新思潮的优点又恰恰在于我们不想教条地预期未来，而只是想通过批判旧世界发现新世界。”另一方面，更为重要的是，马克思是革命家，是积极的行动者，他将历史科学与社会批判、人类解放相结合，致力于建立一个每个人都能自由而全面发展的联合体。这既是唯物史观的价值立场，也是人类历史的意义所在。

(Author’s brief introduction: Jia Xiangyun: School of Marxism, Fujian Normal University)

（作者简介：贾向云：福建师范大学马克思主义学院）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心