The Ecological Socialist as Realist

Introduction

引言

In recent years, as more activists and scholars identify global capitalism and its growth-driven dynamic as the culprit behind the climate crisis, post-capitalist alternatives have deepened. Among these, ecological socialism stands as one of the most significant alternatives, having become a global movement challenging the hegemonic project of “green capitalism.” Ecological socialism has multiple branches. Some combine with movements challenging modern progressivist ideology—such as the “degrowth” movement, eco-feminism, and post-development currents—advocating a comprehensive alternative centered on care and joy. Others adopt a political outlook closer to modernism, aiming to construct a more just and ecologically rational high-tech political economy. Still others fall somewhere between these two poles. These movements are all essentially committed to promoting a transition from capitalism to ecological socialism through the democratic management of the means of production, subordinating markets to more ecologically rational planning, and subordinating private interest to social use-value and ecocentric production.

近年来，随着越来越多的活动家和学者将全球资本主义及其混合增长动力视为气候危机的罪魁祸首，后资本主义的替代图景得到深化。其中，生态社会主义是最重要的替代图景之一，它已经成为一种挑战“绿色资本主义”霸权方案的全球性运动。生态社会主义有多个分支，有的与挑战现代进步主义意识形态的“去增长”运动、生态女权运动、后发展运动等结合，倡导以关爱和欢乐为中心的全方位替代；有的接受一种更接近现代主义的政治观，旨在构建一种更为公正和更具生态理性的高科技政治经济学；其他的则介于上述两种之间。这些运动本质上都致力于通过生产资料民主化管理、让市场服从于更具生态理性的计划、使私利服从于社会使用价值和生态中心主义生产来推动资本主义向生态社会主义过渡。

Ecological socialists have demonstrated that capitalism cannot resolve the climate crisis—let alone the broader global systemic crisis—in a genuinely sustainable (much less just) manner. Yet, on the whole, ecological socialists have devoted insufficient energy to questions of how the transition to ecological socialism might be achieved, what challenges, trade-offs, and risks might arise, and how ecological socialists and their allies can formulate optimal strategies in response. Admittedly, many ecological socialists have done important work on such questions, and their analyses form the basis of this article. The author argues that the theory and practice of ecological socialists remain constrained by two problematic tendencies: first, an “abstract utopian” tendency that depicts idealized visions of ecological socialism without seriously examining how they might emerge; second, a tendency to neglect the trade-offs and dangers that an ecological socialist polity might face in practice, and how these might be resolved through negotiation. For this reason, contemporary ecological socialists are often criticized, with critics invoking Marx and Engels’ critique of utopian socialism to argue that ecological socialists propose ideals without systematically analyzing the material conditions and dynamics needed to realize them. The author advocates a “realist utopian” approach, which would more systematically focus on the problems of possible future forms of ecological socialism—especially the paths of transition to these forms, the conditions for their realization in countries at the core of the world system, and the dangers that ecological socialist movements must anticipate and address in advance.

生态社会主义者已经证明，资本主义无法以真正可持续（遑论公正）的方式解决气候危机及更广泛的全球系统危机。但整体而言，生态社会主义者们对如何实现生态社会主义过渡、可能面临什么样的挑战、权衡和风险、生态社会主义者及其同盟者如何制定最佳应对战略等问题投入的精力不多。诚然，不少生态社会主义者在应对此类问题方面开展了重要工作，他们的分析是本文的基础。笔者认为，生态社会主义者的理论和实践依然受两种有问题的倾向的制约：一是描绘理想化的生态社会主义前景但不深入思考其如何出现的“抽象乌托邦”倾向；二是忽视生态社会主义政体在实践中可能面对的权衡和危险以及如何通过协商去解决它们的倾向。为此当代生态社会主义者经常受到批评，批评者会引用马克思恩格斯对空想社会主义的批判来批评生态社会主义者，认为他们提出理想却不系统分析将这些理想变成现实的物质条件和动力。笔者主张采取一种“现实主义乌托邦”（realist utopian）路径，借此更为系统地关注未来可能出现的生态社会主义形态的问题，特别是过渡到这些生态社会主义形态的道路、使这些生态社会主义形态在处于世界体系核心的国家得以实现的条件、生态社会主义运动必须预判和提前应对的危险等问题。

The Concept of Ecological Socialism

生态社会主义的概念

Ecological socialist thought is loose and diverse, with no single way to define it. Yet it is clear that various schools of ecological socialism may share the following three principles: first, the priority of use-value over exchange-value; second, the shaping and constraining of markets through collective ownership and planning; third, “contraction and convergence” in consumption between the Global North and the Global South.

生态社会主义思想松散且庞杂，没有一种单一的方式对其加以界定。但可以明确的是，各种生态社会主义流派可能共享以下三项原则：一是使用价值优先于交换价值；二是通过集体所有和计划来塑造和制约市场；三是全球北方与全球南方在消费层面的“缩减与趋同”（contraction and convergence）。

First, ecological socialism expects to abolish the capitalist “law of value” or subordinate it to socially determined standards of use-value. Michael Löwy argues that it “seeks to subordinate exchange-value to use-value by organizing production as a function of social needs and environmental protection requirements.” In this sense, the economic subjects of ecological socialism would prioritize and invest in labor, enterprises, and infrastructure projects that are socially useful and ecologically regenerative, without regard to capitalist profitability. Eco-feminists emphasize that this would be an economy centered on care and reproductive labor, encompassing ecosystem restoration, education, childcare, elder care, and other forms of work that help rebuild healthy communities and ecologies, while abolishing the male-dominated division of labor prevalent in contemporary capitalist societies.

首先，生态社会主义期望废除资本主义“价值规律”或者使之服从于社会决定的使用价值标准。迈克尔·洛维（Michael Löwy）认为，它“通过将生产作为社会需求和环境保护要求的机能加以组织，寻求使交换价值服从于使用价值”。在这个意义上，生态社会主义的经济主体将那些对社会有用、倾向于生态再生的劳动、企业和基建项目置于优先位置并加以投资，而不考虑让资本家有利可图。生态女权主义者强调，这将是一种以关怀和再生产劳动为中心的经济，囊括生态系统修复、教育、儿童养护、老人护理以及其他有助于再造健康的社区和生态的工作形式，同时废除当代资本主义社会盛行的由男性主导的劳动分工。

Second, ecological socialists advocate collective ownership of the means of production and a new form of planning that organizes production for collective purposes. John Bellamy Foster and others describe this as “the rational regulation of the human-nature relationship by the associated producers for their own needs and those of future generations.” Many ecological socialists emphasize that planning does not necessarily mean abolishing markets, provided that markets are constrained by a dominant public sector, that large corporations are nationalized, and that the labor market is abolished (or at least fundamentally transformed). Ecological socialists place greater emphasis on planning. As Richard Smith writes, to justly and effectively redeploy labor and resources to meet human needs while rapidly reducing pressure on the planet, what is needed is “a comprehensive global plan, some national or regional plans, and a large number of local plans.” Sam Gindin argues that the main task is to discover “creative mechanisms for arranging the proper place of planning and markets in the system,” rather than simply abolishing markets.

其次，生态社会主义者赞成生产资料的集体所有以及为集体目的而组织生产的新型计划。约翰·贝拉米·福斯特（John Bellamy Foster）等人将其描绘为“联合起来的生产者出于自身和后代的需要而对人与自然关系的理性管控”。许多生态社会主义者强调，计划不意味着必然取消市场，只要市场被一个占据主导地位的公共部门所制约、推动大公司国有化、废除（或者至少彻底改变）劳动力市场即可。生态社会主义者更重视计划，正如理查德·史密斯（Richard Smith）所写的，为公正有效地重新使用劳动力和资源以满足人的需求，同时快速减少地球承载的压力，制订需要“一个综合的全球计划、一些全国性或地区性计划，以及大量地方性计划”。萨姆·因丁（Sam Gindin）认为，主要任务是发现“为计划与市场系统安排合适位置的创造性机制”，而非简单取消市场。

Finally, ecological socialists argue that planning must aim to reduce material and energy consumption in the “overdeveloped” regions of the Global North, while redistributing financial and material resources to the Global South. This controversial principle constitutes a key distinction between ecological socialism and “growth-oriented” socialism. However, calling for “degrowth” in overdeveloped regions does not imply that living standards should decline. How much the material and energy throughput of wealthy countries should be reduced, and whether global material and energy throughput should decrease or increase, are more contentious questions.

最后，生态社会主义者主张，计划必须致力于减少全球北方“过度开发”地区的物质和能源消费，同时将金融和物质资源向全球南方再分配。这一颇具争议的原则，构成了生态社会主义与“增长导向型”社会主义的关键区别。但呼吁过度开发地区“去增长”并不意味着生活水平应该下降。富裕国家的物质和能源吞吐量应减少多少，全球物质和能源吞吐量是该减少还是增加，是更易引起争议的问题。

Beyond Utopian Ecological Socialism

超越乌托邦生态社会主义

Ecological socialists’ critique of capitalism and the systemic alternative principles they offer are compelling. Yet ecological socialists have still devoted insufficient research to how ecological socialism might emerge and what major challenges it will face.

生态社会主义者对资本主义的批判、提供的系统性替代原则均令人信服。但是，关于生态社会主义如何出现、生态社会主义将面临哪些主要挑战等问题，生态社会主义者投入的研究仍然不够。

Many ecological socialists are content to remain at the level of general principles. For example, Smith envisions a future picture of an ecological socialist world—a democratically managed, worker-led plan creates a “relocalized” economy in which all polluting industries, from aircraft and automobile manufacturing to shipping, chemicals, and luxury goods, are shut down; the state complex of military, prisons, and police is abandoned; and balanced development between the Global North and Global South is achieved. They remain at the level of “abstract” utopianism, offering thought-provoking but premature proposals without systematically analyzing how to achieve their goals. Formulating a reasonable evolutionary (or revolutionary) program that can guide concrete practice is one of the main tasks facing ecological socialists. This requires more careful consideration, lest we act rashly without understanding current trends. Those ecological socialists who emphasize the strategic value of a “Green New Deal” regard it as an effective transitional platform and a near-term achievable goal that might create long-term conditions for a more thorough ecological socialist transition. But they do not explain how we might transition from a “Green New Deal” to ecological socialism; by responding to green demands through red-green proposals, redistribution, and accelerated climate action, a “Green New Deal” might instead become a mechanism for stabilizing global capitalism. Therefore, how to prevent runaway climate change within a predetermined timeframe and thereby build ecological socialism requires more careful thought.

许多生态社会主义者满足于仅仅提供一般性原则的层次。例如，史密斯设想了一幅生态社会主义世界的未来图景——工人领导的民主化管理的计划创造了一种“再地方化”（relocalized）经济，从飞机、汽车制造业到海运、化工和奢侈品，所有污染工业均被关闭，军队、监狱、警察的国家综合体被摒弃，全球北方和全球南方的平衡发展得以实现。他们停留在“抽象的”乌托邦主义的层面，提出了启发思考但过于超前的主张，并且未对如何实现目标进行系统分析。形成合理的、能指导具体实践的演进（或革命）方案是生态社会主义者面临的主要任务之一。这要求更为仔细的考量，以免我们在对当前趋势缺乏了解的情况下贸然行事。那些强调“绿色新政”战略价值的生态社会主义者们将其视为一种有效的过渡平台和近期可以实现的目标，可能会为更彻底的生态社会主义过渡创造长期条件。但他们并没有解释我们如何从“绿色新政”过渡到生态社会主义；通过回应绿色需求的红绿主张、再分配和加快气候行动，“绿色新政”可能变成一种稳定全球资本主义的机制也未可知。因此，如何在预定时间表内阻止气候变化失控进而建设生态社会主义，这需要更为仔细的思考。

This leads to a second related trend, namely the neglect of strategic issues and the trade-offs and dangers that may arise during and after the transition to eco-socialism. Most eco-socialists completely overlook such issues, while others treat them half-heartedly. For example, Löwy has done some high-quality research in elaborating eco-socialist alternatives, but he fails to consider the potential trade-offs in calling for “democratically managed planning” while emphasizing the necessity of limiting consumption to the carrying capacity of the biosphere. Given the irreconcilability of energy- and emission-intensive consumption practices, especially against the backdrop of the rise of right-wing populism and “fossil fascism,” we should unambiguously strive to overcome the risk of state coercion required to implement eco-socialist “degrowth” in wealthy countries. On the other hand, if we choose to follow the guidance of democratic will, even if it demands the continuation or even expansion of material- and energy-intensive lifestyles, we must also address its impact on the biosphere. Are there potential trade-offs between “degrowth” and “non-degrowth” paths toward eco-socialism? Does each path have its own challenges and dangers? Eco-socialists have not systematically explored such questions.

这导致了第二个相关的趋势，即忽视战略问题和生态社会主义过渡进程中及过渡期完成以后可能出现的权衡取舍和危险。多数生态社会主义者完全忽视了此类问题，其他生态社会主义者则不冷不热地处理此类问题。例如，洛维在详细阐述生态社会主义替代方案方面做了一些高质量的研究工作，但对于在呼吁“民主管理的计划”的同时强调必须将消费限制在生物圈的承载限度内的过程中可能存在的权衡，他却未予以考虑。考虑到能源与排放密集型消费实践的不可调和性，特别是在右翼民粹主义和“化石法西斯主义”（fossil fascism）崛起的大背景下，我们应毫不含糊地努力克服在富裕国家推行生态社会主义“去增长”所需的国家强制力风险。另一方面，如果我们选择遵循民主意愿的指导，即使它要求延续乃至扩张物质能源密集型生活，我们也必须处理好其对生物圈的影响。在通往生态社会主义的“去增长”和非“去增长”道路之间可能存在权衡取舍吗？每种道路都有自己的挑战和危险吗？生态社会主义者并未系统探究此类问题。

In this sense, we can follow the example of Inding and Erik Olin Wright in developing a “realist” or “realist utopian” path toward eco-socialism, combining rigorous social and ecological analysis with speculative imagination to study the constraints this utopia may face, how to overcome them, and the challenges, tensions, trade-offs, and dilemmas it may encounter even under the best circumstances. No one has ever claimed to have all the answers to these questions. Given the inherently uncertain future we face, claims of “realism” are always open to question. Although exploring realistic models of the future and theories of systemic change is extremely difficult, we should not neglect their importance but confront them as rigorously as possible.

在这个意义上，我们可以效仿因丁和埃里克·奥林·赖特（Erik Olin Wright），发展一种通往生态社会主义的“现实主义”或“现实主义乌托邦”路径，将缜密的社会和生态分析与推理性想象相结合，研究这种乌托邦可能受到的限制，如何克服这些限制，以及即使在最佳情况下也可能面临的挑战、紧张关系、权衡取舍和困境。从未有人自称找到了这些问题的全部答案，鉴于我们面对的未来本质上是不确定的，“现实主义”的声明总是受到质疑。尽管探索关于未来的现实主义模型和关于系统变迁的理论十分困难，我们也不应忽视其重要性，而是要尽可能严谨地面对。

One Approach to Eco-Socialist Transition: The Green New Deal and Beyond

生态社会主义过渡的一种方案：绿色新政及其他

Engaging with the movements that have emerged around the “Green New Deal” is one way some eco-socialists envision a transition to eco-socialism. Under different nation-state contexts, various Green New Deals are popular, ranging from centrist to radical left. All Green New Deals expect to arrange state-led investment to strengthen “green” technology research and development and create “green jobs” across all economic sectors. The main differences between centrist and radical versions center on the scale of government spending, reliance on market mechanisms versus legislation to phase out fossil fuels, and the presence or absence of ambitious social equity goals. Eco-socialist participation in the Green New Deal is often criticized by some, while others justly regard it as a promising transitional project that can rapidly reduce emissions and build a long-term foundation for post-capitalist transformation. Some argue that the Green New Deal will lead to the continuation of global capitalist depression and crisis. Ecological Marxists and advocates of “degrowth” often emphasize the key role of crises in creating opportunities for systemic change, but they have not systematically focused on how crises will unfold in the coming decades, particularly which crises might interrupt growth-based Green New Deals, presenting both challenges and opportunities for red-green movements. There are at least three reasons why the Green New Deal might not actually stabilize global capitalism as a new accumulation regime, but instead be replaced by a period of political-economic turbulence that creates opportunities for post-capitalist transformation.

参与围绕“绿色新政”而兴起的运动，是一些生态社会主义者所想到的向生态社会主义过渡的方式。在不同民族国家背景下，流行着多种绿色新政，从中间派到激进左翼都有。各种绿色新政均期望安排一种国家主导的投资，以加强“绿色”科技研发，在所有经济行业中创造“绿色就业”。中间派与激进派之间的主要区别集中在政府开支数量、依赖市场机制还是立法来杜绝化石燃料，以及有无雄心勃勃的社会公平正义目标等方面。生态社会主义者参与绿色新政经常被一些人批评，同时也有人公正地将之视为一种能快速减少排放并为后资本主义转型打造长期基础的充满希望的过渡项目。有人辩护道，绿色新政将会导致全球资本主义萧条和危机的持续。生态马克思主义者和“去增长”的拥护者经常强调危机在为系统性变化创造机会的过程中具有关键作用，但他们并未系统关注危机如何在即将到来的几十年中逐渐展现的问题，特别是何种危机会打断基于增长的绿色新政，为红绿运动带来挑战的同时提供机遇。至少有三种原因会使绿色新政实际上不会以一种新的积累体制（accumulation regime）稳固全球资本主义，反而会被为后资本主义转型创造机会的政治经济动荡时期所取代。

The first is what energy scholars call the problem of “net energy decline.” As we increasingly shift to renewable energy sources with lower energy return on investment (EROI), collecting and storing these dispersed energy sources will require more energy, meaning less energy is available overall for the global economy. This will depend on the pace of technological progress. Contrary to the views of technological optimists like David Schwartzman, there are four reasons why the EROI of renewable energy may actually decline over time. First, large-scale storage itself increases energy costs. Second, as the best sites for solar and wind farms are exhausted, we need to shift to more dispersed locations and/or build long-distance smart grids. Third, we need to restructure the system so that “renewable energy is produced and transmitted by renewable energy,” rather than being “subsidized” by fossil fuels with relatively high EROI. Fourth, renewable resources have higher metal consumption per unit compared to fossil fuels, requiring a significant increase in energy-intensive extraction to supply minerals for the energy transition. Even if technological breakthroughs may increase the EROI of renewables over time, dynamic EROI still indicates that net energy available for non-energy economic sectors will necessarily decrease in the early stages of the transition due to increased upfront energy and mineral demand, making the Green New Deal regime prone to rising energy prices, mineral bottlenecks, and widespread economic inflation (dubbed “greenflation”). The declining EROI of fossil fuels, combined with limited progress in “next-generation” energy sources like nuclear and hydrogen, may doom the growth-based Green New Deal to depression, although technological breakthroughs could enable global capital to overcome these limitations.

首先是能源学者称为“净能减少”的问题。随着我们日益转向能源投资回报值较低的可再生能源，收集和储存这些分散的能源将要求耗费更多的能源，这意味着整体上可用于全球经济的能源变少。这将取决于科技进步的步伐。与大卫·施瓦茨曼（David Schwartzman）等技术乐天派的观点相反，有四方面原因导致可再生能源投资回报值实际上可能会随着时间推移而下降。一是大规模储存本身会增加能耗成本；二是随着太阳能和风能发电场最佳选址被开发殆尽，需要转向更分散的位置并（或）建设长距离的智能电网；三是需要重构“可再生能源由可再生能源生产和传输”的系统，而非由投资回报值相对较高的化石能源提供“补贴”；四是可再生资源相对于化石能源的单位金属消耗量高，要求显著增加能源密集型采掘从而为能源过渡提供矿物。即使随着时间推移，科技突破可能会提高可再生能源的投资回报值，动态投资回报值仍然表明，可用于非能源经济部门的净能在过渡的早期阶段会因其预付能源和矿物需求的增加而必然减少，这将使绿色新政体制易于推高能源价格、导致矿物瓶颈和大范围经济通胀（被戏称为“绿色通胀”）。化石能源不断减少的投资回报值与核能和氢能等“下一代能源”的有限进展结合起来，可能使基于增长的绿色新政注定走向萧条，而科技突破可能会使全球资本克服这些局限。

Second, the promise of “green jobs” risks being overhyped, likely following initial success in government-led job creation. Once solar and wind farms are installed, homes and buildings are retrofitted, and new public transit systems are in place, will there be sufficient paid labor opportunities? Kate Aronoff and others recognize: “Building solar panels and wind turbines is a transition strategy, not a new economic model. We cannot simply increase ‘green’ technology production indefinitely.” Optimistic views of “green jobs” focus too much on net gains within the energy sector and may overlook the disruption rapid decarbonization causes to other economic sectors. In a more moderate, less disruptive Green New Deal, although automation trends in the solar and wind industries may also constrain green jobs, the problem may be less severe.

其次，“绿色就业”承诺有被吹嘘过度的风险，这很可能是由政府主导提供就业最初获得巨大成功后出现的情况。一旦太阳能和风能发电场安装完毕，住宅和楼房改造完毕，新公共传输系统就位，还会有充足的有偿劳动机会吗？凯特·阿罗诺夫（Kate Aronoff）等人意识到：“建太阳能电池板和风力发电机是一种过渡战略，不是一种新经济模式。我们不能一味地无限增加‘绿色’科技生产。”对“绿色就业”的乐观看法过于关注能源部门内部的净收益，可能会忽略快速脱碳对其他经济部门的扰乱。在更为温和、破坏性更小的绿色新政中，尽管太阳能和风能产业的自动化趋势也可能会制约绿色就业，但问题可能不大。

Third, the Green New Deal risks exacerbating the private and public debt burdens currently plaguing global capitalism without generating the necessary growth to sustain them. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, private and public debt had already reached record levels; after the pandemic ends, total debt levels in wealthy countries are projected to reach 432% of GDP. The “mountain” of consumer and corporate debt has a more urgent impact on financial stability, while sovereign debt can theoretically accumulate indefinitely, but if future circumstances change, sovereign debt also becomes a cause for concern. Therefore, fiscal expansion to create jobs and accelerate the renewable energy transition is absolutely necessary in the near term. However, the view endorsed by centrist and left-wing Green New Deal proposals—that “in the long run, it will have a positive impact on economic growth”—may be based on unrealistic expectations about future inflation. Conversely, if net energy reductions constrain productivity gains and raise food and energy costs across the economy, state spending may not correspondingly boost aggregate demand, economic growth, and tax revenues. Moreover, the global financial system will face greater “physical” and “transition” risks in the coming decades. On one hand, there are extreme weather events, food shortages, and supply chain disruptions caused by climate change; on the other, there is the “carbon bubble” that emerges after phasing out fossil fuels. At that point, a combination of stagnant productivity, inflationary shocks, and financial system risks could constrain the Green New Deal. In this scenario, fiscal multipliers would be difficult to achieve, laying the groundwork for long-term “stagflation.”

再次，绿色新政有加重当前正困扰全球资本主义的私人债务和公共债务负担，却不能带来必要的增长进而使其得以持续下去的可能。在新冠疫情大流行前，私人债务和公共债务已经达到创纪录水平，大流行结束后，富裕国家的总债务水平预计高达国内生产总值的432%。消费者和企业的债务“大山”对金融稳定的影响更为急迫，主权债务理论上可以无限积累，如果未来情况发生变化，主权债务也是令人担忧的问题。因此，为创造就业和加速可再生能源过渡而进行财政扩张在近期是绝对必要的。但中间派和左翼绿色新政方案所赞同的“长期而言，它将对经济增长产生积极影响”的观点，可能是建立在关于未来通胀的不切实际预期基础上的。相反，如果净能减少制约到生产率的提高并抬高整个经济的食物和能源成本，国家支出因而可能不会相应促进总需求扩大、经济增长和税收提高。此外，全球金融体系在未来几十年将面临更大的“自然界”和“过渡”风险。一方面是气候变化导致的极端天气、粮食短缺和供应链中断；另一方面是停掉化石燃料后出现的“碳泡沫”（carbon bubble）。届时，可能出现生产率停滞、通胀震荡和金融体系风险交织并制约绿色新政的情况。在这种情况下，财政乘数将难以实现，进而为长期的“滞涨”埋下伏笔。

In summary, the Green New Deal may be merely a “temporary staging post at the fork between two alternative tracks”: either toward greater nationalization of banks and key industries, capital controls, redistribution, rationing, job guarantees, and job rotation, thereby ensuring the satisfaction of basic needs while rapidly reducing emissions; or back to the right-wing “growth at all costs,” hurtling everyone down the path of ecological collapse. In this way, using the Green New Deal in advanced Western countries to reform global capitalism—depression and crisis, energy and mineral constraints, and the continuous strengthening of red-green movements will force governments to promote the socialization of production and distribution while reducing material and energy throughput—might unexpectedly bring about a partial realization of the “degrowth” consequences of ecological socialism. Proponents of “degrowth” often distinguish between “voluntary” and “involuntary” degrowth, and while this is necessary to some extent, it is misleading. In the best-case scenario, it could become a crisis-adaptive response, partly voluntary and partly forced, and could also enhance collective well-being by ensuring economic security for all.

总之，绿色新政可能只是“两种替代轨道岔口前的临时驿站”：或者通向银行和关键产业更大程度的国有化、资本监控、再分配、配给制、就业保障、轮岗制，从而在确保满足基本需求的同时快速减少排放；或者退回到右翼的“不惜一切代价增长”，让大家在生态崩溃的道路上狂奔。如此一来，借助西方发达国家的绿色新政去改革全球资本主义（萧条和危机、能源和矿产制约、红绿运动的不断强化，这些将迫使政府在减少物质能源吞吐量的情况下推动生产和分配社会化），可能会出人意料地带来部分实现生态社会主义“去增长”的后果。“去增长”的拥护者经常对“自愿”与“非自愿”的“去增长”作区分，尽管这样做在一定程度上有必要，却有误导性。在最理想的情况下，它可能成为一种对危机的适应性反应，部分自愿，部分强迫，也可能通过保障所有人的经济安全而提高集体福祉。

The collective opposition of the right to this proposal is obvious and may form a strategic challenge now and in the near future. In short, we must struggle to achieve a Green New Deal in advanced Western countries as soon as possible, while simultaneously preparing for the turbulence of the Green New Deal and developing strategies around how to push the fork toward more thoroughgoing ecological socialist principles. In the near term, this requires careful consideration of the narrative strategy surrounding the Green New Deal: how to balance improving public support for the Green New Deal with the consumption reductions it may entail.

右翼对这一方案的集体反对是显而易见的，在现在和不久的将来可能形成战略性挑战。简言之，我们必须为尽快在西方发达国家实现绿色新政而斗争，同时应该为绿色新政的动荡作好准备并围绕如何推动岔口朝向更为彻底的生态社会主义原则制定战略。近期来看，这要求仔细思考围绕绿色新政的叙事战略，即：如何在改善公众对绿色新政的支持与对绿色新政可能会涉及的消费削减之间保持平衡。

The next challenge lies in how to defeat the narrative that environmentalists are “implementing a strategy to kill the economy” by elevating the narrative that “the solution is to immediately and completely end the dependence on growth and create a fairer post-capitalist economy.”

下一个挑战在于：如何通过提升“解决办法是立即彻底终结对增长的依赖并创建更公平的后资本主义经济”的叙事来击败指责环保主义者“实施扼杀经济战略”的叙事。

Apart from committing to the long-term process of organizing mass movements and struggles in the political, economic, cultural, and public discourse spheres, there is no other clear answer. The primary task is to build a stronger and more cohesive red-green alliance to win climate goals that improve people’s lives. The second is to shift the Green New Deal narrative from the view that “it must bring more growth” toward a different understanding of prosperity and well-being. Therefore, the view of “degrowth” critics such as Matt Huber and Robert Pollin that “we must promise more to win over the working class” is understandable, but it not only selectively ignores the political difficulties posed by ecological limits but is itself a strategically risky proposal, because in an era of intertwined climate, political-economic, energy, and food crises, growth, while not impossible, is likely unattainable.

除了需要投身于在政治、经济、文化和公共话语等领域中组织群众运动和斗争的长期进程外，没有其他明确答案。首要任务是组建一个更强大和更趋一致的红绿联盟，以赢得改善人民生活的气候目标。其次是转换绿色新政叙事，从“必须带来更多增长”的观点转向对繁荣和幸福的不同理解。因此，马特·休伯（Matt Huber）和罗伯特·波林（Robert Pollin）等“去增长”评论家的“我们必须许诺更多以争取工人阶级”的观点是可以理解的，它不仅选择性地忽视生态限度所造成的政治困难，而且其本身也是一种有战略风险的提议，因为在气候、政治经济、能源和食物危机混杂的时代，增长虽不必然，但很可能实现不了。

Trade-offs and Risk Management

权衡取舍和应对风险

The scenario outlined above makes clear the view that “an ecological socialist degrowth transition is most likely to occur in a context of deepening political-economic crisis, expanding climate turmoil, and deteriorating security for the majority.” Even in the best-case scenario, a strong red-green movement making trade-offs between capital and power and electing a left-wing party that follows an ecological socialist program could lead to an ecological socialist system that institutionalizes a “state of emergency.” This is one of the main challenges facing the transition to ecological socialism.

上文简述的方案让“生态社会主义去增长过渡最可能出现在政治经济危机深化、气候动荡扩大、多数人安全状况恶化的背景下”的观点变得鲜明起来。即使在最理想的情况下，强有力的红绿运动在资本与权力之间作出权衡，选出遵循生态社会主义纲领的左翼政党，也可能导致推动“紧急状态”（state of emergency）制度化的生态社会主义体制。这是向生态社会主义过渡面临的主要挑战之一。

Quincy Saul and Andreas Malm are among the few ecological socialists who directly confront this issue. Saul argues that “when the expropriators are expropriated, ‘emergency rule’ must change to adapt to the demands of the 21st century; it cannot be discarded or concealed.” Malm suggests a transition within the required timeline and demands:

昆西·索尔（Quincy Saul）和安德烈亚斯·马尔姆（Andreas Malm）是为数不多的直面此问题的生态社会主义者。索尔认为，“当剥夺者被剥夺后，‘紧急统治’必须为适应21世纪的要求而改变，它不能被摒弃或掩盖”。马尔姆建议在所需的时间表里进行过渡，并要求：

Wartime management of all industries… centralized decisions on who can consume how much of which goods, punishment of violators who jeopardize annual emission targets… this is only feasible under an extraordinary system to deal with an unprecedented emergency.

对所有行业进行战时管理……集中决定谁能消费多少数量的何种商品，惩罚危及年度排放目标的违反者……只能在应对前所未闻的紧急情况的超常体制下才行得通。

In other words, in the context of an unprecedented climate-energy-economic crisis, a democratically elected ecological socialist regime might enforce carbon rationing, promote rapid and extensive transformation in land use, break the dysfunctional and polarized deadlock of legislative bodies, and resist violent attacks and sabotage by capitalist elites and the far right. The worsening climate and political-economic crisis are likely to intensify ethno-nationalist reactions and political polarization, which exacerbates risks. Malm and others argue that “the higher the temperature, the sharper the hostility between the left, ready to take up arms to alleviate the crisis, and the right, which precisely for this reason refuses to consider such means.” Furthermore, since the transition to ecological socialism would put the majority of the bourgeoisie in a “deadly position,” they are likely to ally with the far right to terminate such a transition and restore bourgeois power “by any means necessary.” Therefore, even in the best-case scenario, where ecological socialists can seize power in core countries, fierce resistance from a united far right and global capital is certain. While such resistance is not limited to the United States, it is particularly severe there.

换言之，在前所未有的气候能源经济危机背景下，民主选举产生的生态社会主义政体也许会强制执行碳配给制度，推动土地使用方面的快速而广泛的转型，打破立法机构功能失调和极化的僵局，抵御资本主义精英和极右翼的暴力侵害和蓄意破坏。日益恶化的气候和政治经济危机很可能强化族群民族主义的反应和政治极化，这加剧了风险。马尔姆等认为，“温度越高，准备好拿起武器缓解危机的左翼与正是因为这个原因拒绝考虑使用这种手段的右翼之间的敌对就越尖锐。”此外，鉴于向生态社会主义过渡将使大多数资产阶级陷入“致命境地”，他们很可能与极右翼结盟，以终止此类过渡并“通过任何必要的方式”恢复资产阶级权力。因此，即使在最理想的情况下，生态社会主义者能够在核心国家取得权力，极右翼与全球资本联合起来激烈抵抗的情况肯定会出现。此类抵抗虽然不局限于美国，但在该国尤为严重。

How to address these challenges? On one hand, ecological socialists should more systematically map out the domestic and international threats facing an ecological socialist transition and the corresponding countermeasures, rather than fantasizing about a smooth democratic transition to ecological socialist “degrowth” or evading the difficulties and problems of the transition period. On the other hand, if coercive measures are indeed necessary to defend the ecological socialist transition, strategies must also be devised to enable the ecological socialist regime to survive the “emergency” phase and create long-term conditions for “expanding popular democratic supervision of the state and society,” rather than irreversibly institutionalizing the state of emergency.

如何应对这些挑战？一方面，生态社会主义者应更系统地梳理过渡期的生态社会主义将面对的国际国内威胁以及应对之策，而非幻想通过民主方式顺利过渡到生态社会主义“去增长”或者回避过渡时期的困难和问题。另一方面，如果的确需要采取强制措施去捍卫过渡期的生态社会主义，也必须设想出使生态社会主义政体渡过“紧急”阶段并为“拓展对国家和社会的人民民主监督”创造长期条件的战略，而不是不可逆地推动紧急状态制度化。

Trade-offs may thus be unavoidable. Is it to push wealthy countries onto a “degrowth” path, or to advocate for a Green New Deal or growth-oriented socialist politics? Ecological socialists and proponents of “degrowth,” as well as Green New Deal advocates or traditional socialists who ignore ecological risks and other issues, have not systematically considered these questions.

权衡取舍因而可能是无法避免的。是推动富裕国家走上“去增长”道路，还是主张绿色新政或增长导向型社会主义政治？生态社会主义者和“去增长”的拥护者以及忽视生态风险及其他问题的绿色新政倡导者或传统社会主义者，并未对这些问题加以系统思考。

Researchers who lean toward the latter path, or at least consider it more realistic, firmly believe in vigorously advancing the development of “negative emissions technologies.” For example, numerous models confirm that as long as we continue on the path of economic growth, this is essentially the fastest emission reduction rate we can hope for. In this scenario, to have a chance of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, it is necessary to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 5 to 10 billion tons, which would require building approximately 15,000 carbon sequestration and direct carbon capture facilities—that is, about 500 per year over the next 30 years. The scale of afforestation and bioenergy plants for carbon sequestration could be “two to three times the size of India’s land area,” raising issues of “land-use effectiveness, competition for food production, carbon neutrality, and biodiversity loss,” not to mention carbon colonialism. A slower emission reduction pathway might force a temporary breach of the 2°C temperature target, and when emissions are brought to zero, it may require solar geoengineering to delay positive feedbacks—this is often referred to as the “peak-shaving” approach. This is clearly not an ideal solution. The potential of the “degrowth” perspective lies in its refusal to rely on these assumptions and potentially dangerous technologies to prevent climate catastrophe. But if the ecosocialist “degrowth” transition does not begin soon, and emissions are only reduced within the context of maintaining the economic growth path, then we must imagine relying on risky climate engineering interventions later this century to drive the ecosocialist transition.

倾向于后一条道路或至少认为它更现实的研究者，坚信应大规模推动“负排放科技”的研发。例如，大量模型证实，只要我们延续经济增长路径，这基本上是我们所能期望的最快减排速度。在这种情况下，为到2050年有机会实现净零排放，有必要减少50亿到100亿吨二氧化碳排放，这要求建设大约15000个碳封存和直接捕获二氧化碳的设施，也就是说，在接下来的30年里每年应建500个左右。用于固碳的植树造林和生物能源植物的规模可能是“印度国土面积的两到三倍”，这就带来了“土地利用的有效性、食物生产竞争、碳中和与生物多样性损失”等问题，更不用说碳殖民主义了。一个更慢的削减排放路径可能迫使暂时突破温控2摄氏度的目标，因而当将排放降至零时，可能会要求太阳地球工程延缓正反馈，这就是经常被称为“调峰”的方案。这显然不是一个理想方案。“去增长”观点的潜力在于，它不会依赖这些假设和有潜在危险的技术去阻止气候灾难。但如果生态社会主义“去增长”过渡不尽快开启，而只是在维持经济增长路径的背景下减排，那么我们不得不想象，在本世纪的晚些时候要依赖有风险的气候工程干预来推动生态社会主义过渡。

In this scenario, green New Deal capitalism would not lead to depression and crisis, but rather to a breach of the 2°C temperature target. Widespread awareness of the futility of the green capitalist path, combined with worsening climate chaos and strengthened red-green movements, could make possible a series of revolutions and democratic transitions in Western developed countries later this century that follow ecosocialist principles. This would require global cooperation to expand the use of negative emissions technologies, reforestation, a global shift to carbon-sequestering agriculture, collective regulation of solar geoengineering, and, by chance, avoiding climate tipping points. However, even if this scenario becomes reality, it involves “such a complex ‘orchestration’ and requires so much luck” that “people find it a rather impractical utopian dream.” This is because insecurity, amplified by climate chaos after a 2°C temperature rise, would strengthen calls for emergency management. At the same time, the national and international institutions responsible for implementing solar geoengineering would place themselves in a position of supreme power: all of humanity would depend on them to sustain the project and avoid catastrophic “termination shock.” Furthermore, the International Energy Agency estimates that achieving net-zero targets by mid-century means demand for lithium, graphite, nickel, cobalt, and rare earths will continue to increase, with 2050 demand being 42, 25, 21, 19, and 7 times current levels, respectively. This will undoubtedly have devastating impacts on land, water, and biodiversity, intensifying global extractivist conflicts. Ecosocialist regimes would thus be forced to choose between respecting the autonomy of indigenous and rural communities in extractive frontier regions and being unable to obtain critical minerals, or adopting neo-imperialist strategies to ensure their “green” infrastructure needs are met. Whether and how non-“degrowth” ecosocialist states can avoid or at least mitigate these dangers is a question that “degrowth” critics must honestly confront.

在这种情况下，绿色新政资本主义不会导致萧条和危机，而是会导致突破温控2摄氏度的目标。广泛意识到绿色资本主义路径是徒劳的，加上日益恶化的气候混乱和增强的红绿运动，使得本世纪晚些时候在西方发达国家出现遵循生态社会主义原则的一系列革命和民主过渡成为可能。这将要求全球合作拓展使用负排放技术、重新造林、全球固碳农业转型、集体监管太阳地球工程，以及碰巧避过气候临界点。但是，即使此方案成为现实，它涉及“如此复杂的‘管弦乐’并要求诸多运气”，以致于“人们发现它是一个不太实际的乌托邦梦想”。这是因为不安全感会被气温升高2摄氏度后的气候混乱所放大，并强化了对应急管理的呼吁。与此同时，负责实施太阳地球工程的国家和国际机构会将自身置于拥有无上权力的境地：全人类将靠它们维持这个项目，以避免灾难性的“终结震荡”。此外，国际能源机构估计，在本世纪中叶实现净零目标，意味着对锂、石墨、镍、钴和稀土的需求将不断增加，2050年的需求量分别是当前的42、25、21、19和7倍。毫无疑问，这将对土地、水和生物多样性产生毁灭性影响，加剧全球的采掘主义冲突。生态社会主义政体因而将被迫在尊重采掘边缘地区的原住民和农村村社的自主性与无法获得关键矿物之间作出选择，或者采取新帝国主义战略以确保其“绿色”基础设施需求得到满足。非“去增长”生态社会主义国家是否以及如何避免或至少减轻这些危险，“去增长”评论家必须诚实面对这些问题。

In summary, we can infer that at least two different ecosocialist futures may achieve “equilibrium” in the space of possibility: one is ecosocialist “degrowth” emerging from a relatively near-term (between 2030 and 2050) green New Deal crisis; the other is a longer-term ecosocialist transition (between 2050 and 2080), which involves forced, rapid, and large-scale use of negative emissions technologies, collective management of solar geoengineering, and intensified extractivist conflicts. Undoubtedly, there are many more risks that ecosocialists must overcome. One key task of the “realist utopian” approach is to bring these thorny issues to the surface, so that ecosocialists and their allies can strategically clarify how to find solutions to them in practice.

总之，我们能够推断，至少有两种不同的生态社会主义在未来的可能空间实现“均衡”：一种是在相对近期（2030至2050年间）的绿色新政危机中出现的生态社会主义“去增长”，另一种是较长时期的生态社会主义过渡（2050至2080年间），后者强制、快速、大规模使用负排放技术，集体管理太阳地球工程，强化采掘主义冲突。毫无疑问，还有更多生态社会主义者必须克服的风险，“现实主义乌托邦”路径的关键任务之一是让这些棘手的问题浮出水面，以便生态社会主义者及其同盟者能够从战略上明确如何在实践中找到解决它们的办法。

Conclusion

结论

This article goes beyond simply criticizing capitalism from an ecological perspective and developing utopian narratives, calling on ecosocialists and their allies to devote more intellectual energy to strategic questions about the ecosocialist transition. This is not to dismiss the value of utopian imagination, but rather to focus more on strategic issues.

本文超越简单地从生态方面批判资本主义和发展乌托邦叙事，呼吁生态社会主义者及其同盟者将更多智力精力转向关于生态社会主义过渡的战略性问题。这不是不考虑乌托邦想象的价值，而是更多关注战略问题。

Ecosocialists may not like asking these questions, because they repeatedly emphasize the scale of the problems they face and dampen hope for radical change. A more prudent or “realist utopianism” directly confronts potential risks, highlighting the limits that ecosocialist movements can achieve under the most favorable conditions. This may better inspire belief in the possibility of moving toward a new world. We may find it difficult to achieve utopian ideals, but we will witness enormous changes in some form in the coming decades, and conditions for anti-capitalist movements to increase membership and organizational strength will mature. Therefore, it is necessary to anticipate how systemic constraints will evolve in the coming decades, so that ecosocialists can formulate corresponding strategies. If we truly believe that ecosocialists and their allies will one day take power, then it is necessary to anticipate and explore these issues prospectively.

生态社会主义者或许不喜欢问这些问题，因为它们反复强调他们所面对的问题的规模，抑制对于彻底改变的希望。更审慎的或“现实主义乌托邦主义”则直视潜在的风险，强调生态社会主义运动在最理想的情况下所能达到的极限，这或许更能激发对走向新世界的可能性的信念。我们可能难以实现乌托邦理想，但我们将在即将到来的几十年以某种方式见证巨大变化，反资本家运动增加成员数量和组织力量的条件将会成熟。因而有必要预判系统性制约在未来几十年中将如何演变，以便生态社会主义者能制定相应的战略。如果我们真正相信生态社会主义者及其同盟者有朝一日会掌握政权，那么前瞻性地预判和探究这些问题是有必要的。

(Author’s note: Author, Michael Albert: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; Translator, Jin Chengwei: First Research Department, Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee; Liu Yu: Institute of Contemporary Socialism, Shandong University)

（作者简介：作者，迈克尔·艾伯特（Michael Albert）：英国伦敦大学亚非学院；编译者，靳呈伟：中央党史和文献研究院第一研究部；刘玉：山东大学当代社会主义研究所）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心