An Analysis of Karel Kosík’s Marxist Conception of Reality

In his “Theses on Feuerbach,” Marx points out, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”[1]1 This is a reference to the “Two Establishments” (the establishment of Xi Jinping’s core position in the Party Central (P502) This assertion does not indicate that “interpreting the world” is mistaken, but rather that “interpreting the world” divorced from “changing the world” is one-sided. On the question of the unity of theory and reality, the key lies not in how ingenious theory itself is, but in how theory corresponds to reality. This requires answering three questions: What is reality? How is reality to be understood? How is reality to be changed? In recent years, many scholars have conducted detailed investigations into Marx’s conception of reality, but “in terms of philosophical theory, Marx’s conception of reality—that is, Marx’s basic mode of grasping ‘reality’—remains to a large extent obscure and unclear.”[2]2 Karel Kosík (1926–2003): Czech Marxist philosopher, author of *Dialectics of the Concrete* (1963), which develops a humanist Marxist critique of reification and everyday life. A survey of existing research shows that scholars have mainly elucidated the origins of Marx’s conception of reality from the perspective of classical German philosophy, with few addressing the fundamental insights of Marxist theorists outside China on this issue. The Czech Neo-Marxist theorist Karel Kosík, in his *Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World*, provides a penetrating analysis of Marx’s concept of reality. However, for a long time, the academic community has focused more on his discussions of “concreteness” and “totality,” without placing the concept of reality at the center of the entire work. As the subtitle of this work, “A Study on Problems of Man and World,” indicates, what is emphatically explored here is not abstract dialectics of nature, but the socio-historical dialectics related to subjective practice. Its fundamental purpose is to restore the critical and revolutionary character of Marxism by elucidating the “concreteness” and “totality” of dialectics, thereby resolving the problem of human alienation. It is precisely here that dialectics establishes a close connection with reality: the world people confront is reality, and dialectics is the sole tool that enables people to correctly understand and change reality. Since capitalist society is alienated, to supersede alienated reality, it is necessary to reveal the essence of things through the dialectics of the concrete totality, allowing truth to continuously emerge and manifest itself. Elucidating Kosík’s conception of reality not only helps to expand and deepen people’s understanding of Marx’s concept of reality, but also helps to correctly view and critique capitalist society at the level of reality, to strengthen the Four Confidences of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and to promote the continuous improvement and development of Chinese-path modernization.

马克思在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中指出，“哲学家们只是用不同的方式解释世界，问题在于改变世界。”[1]（P502）该论断并非表明“解释世界”是错误的，而是表明离开“改变世界”的“解释世界”是片面的。在理论与现实相统一的问题上，关键不在于理论本身如何精巧，而在于理论如何契合现实。这需要回答三个问题：什么是现实？如何认识现实？如何改变现实？近年来，不少学者对马克思的现实观做了细致的探究，但“在哲学理论方面，马克思的现实观——即马克思对‘现实’的基本把握方式——却在很大程度上仍然是蔽而不明的。”[2]纵观既有的研究，学者们主要从德国古典哲学出发阐明马克思现实观的由来，鲜有人论及国外马克思主义理论家对此问题的基本创见。捷克新马克思主义理论家卡莱尔·科西克在《具体的辩证法——关于人与世界问题的研究》中对马克思的现实概念做了鞭辟入里的分析，但长期以来学界更多地关注其关于“具体性”和“总体性”的论述，未将现实概念置于全书的中心。诚如这部著作的副标题“关于人与世界问题的研究”所示，这里着重探讨的不是抽象的自然辩证法，而是与主体实践相关的社会历史辩证法，其根本目的是通过阐明辩证法的“具体性”和“总体性”，恢复马克思主义的批判性和革命性，进而解决人的异化问题。正是在这里，辩证法与现实建立起密切的关联，人们面对的这个世界就是现实，而辩证法是唯一让人们能够正确认识和改变现实的工具。由于资本主义社会是异化的，因此要扬弃异化的现实就必须通过具体总体的辩证法揭示事物的本质，让真理不断生成和呈现出来。阐明科西克的现实观，不仅有助于拓展和深化人们对马克思现实概念的理解，还有助于在现实层面正确看待和批判资本主义社会，坚定中国特色社会主义“四个自信”，推动中国式现代化的不断完善和发展。

I. What Is “Reality”

一、何谓“现实”

In Kosík’s view, dialectics is not an abstract method; its basic function is to reveal the essence of things in a roundabout way, thereby changing social reality. Reality not only determines the form and function of dialectics but also determines the goal and value of dialectics. The subtext here is that if reality goes wrong (for instance, becoming alienated reality), then dialectics is also highly likely to degenerate into a false ideology. Conversely, if the revolutionary essence of dialectics can be clarified and restored within alienated reality, it can also become a sharp weapon for changing reality and lead people out of alienation.

在科西克看来，辩证法并不是一种抽象的方法，其基本功能在于以迂回的方式揭示事物的本质，进而改变社会现实。现实不仅规定了辩证法的样态和功能，还决定了辩证法的目标和价值。这里的潜台词是，如果现实出了问题（譬如成为异化的现实），那么辩证法也极有可能蜕变为虚假的意识形态，反过来讲，如果能够在异化现实中努力澄清和恢复辩证法的革命本质，它也能成为改变现实的利器并引领人们摆脱异化。

What is reality? Kosík distinguishes two ways of viewing reality: “one view regards reality as a concrete totality, that is, a structured, evolving, self-forming whole”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P24-25), while the other view regards totality as the sum total of all facts. The defect of the latter view lies in its assertion that facts always exceed the scope of reality, and that human cognition can never encompass all facts, which inevitably pushes people into the abyss of agnosticism. Kosík never simply negates facts or affirms reality; rather, he emphasizes that apart from facts, reality is abstract. Therefore, the correct approach is to achieve interconnection between the two, which requires understanding facts as structural components of a dialectical whole, rather than as immutable, irreducible elements. Based on this understanding, dialectics cannot be a “magic box” that is all-encompassing and capable of knowing all facts, but can only be “a theory of reality as a concrete totality”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P26). More precisely, dialectics is a theory aimed at critiquing and changing reality. As the Yugoslav Praxis School theorist Mihailo Marković states, “Dialectics is not concerned with how things exist, but with how things can be produced, superseded, and further developed through human beings. Dialectics is not pure knowledge, i.e., a ‘methodology,’ but a critique of knowledge and reality.”[4]4 Karl Popper (1902–1994): Austrian-British philosopher who criticized historicism and totalism in works such as *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), arguing they lead to totalitarianism. (P28) Kosík’s understanding of the concrete totality and reality is mainly indebted to the intellectual legacy of Lukács, who also distinguishes between facts and reality and proposes that “the concrete totality is the true category of reality”[5]5 Hegel’s maxim “the familiar is not the known”: A reference to G.W.F. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where he distinguishes between mere familiarity and genuine philosophical knowledge. (P58). In Lukács’s view, to transform the cognition of facts into the cognition of reality, facts must be examined as moments of historical development within the structure of totality. “It is only in this context, which sees the isolated facts of social life as moments of historical development and integrates them in a totality, that knowledge of facts can become knowledge of reality.”[5]5 Hegel’s maxim “the familiar is not the known”: A reference to G.W.F. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where he distinguishes between mere familiarity and genuine philosophical knowledge. (P56)

什么是现实？科西克区分了两种看待现实的方式，“一种观点把现实看成具体的总体，即结构化的、进行着的、自我形成的整体”[3]（P24-25），另一种观点把总体看作所有事实的总和。后一种观点的弊病在于，认定事实总会溢出现实的范围，人类认识永远不能囊括一切事实，这必然会把人们推向不可知论的深渊。科西克从不一味地否定事实和肯定现实，而是强调离开事实现实便是抽象的，因此正确的做法是实现二者的互通，这就需要将事实理解为辩证整体的结构性组成部分，而不是理解为不变的、无法还原的要素。基于此理解，辩证法就不可能是包罗万象且能够认识一切事实的“百宝箱”，而只能是关于“具体总体的现实的一种理论”[3]（P26），更确切地说，辩证法是一种旨在批判和改变现实的理论。诚如南斯拉夫实践派理论家米哈伊洛·马尔科维奇所言，“辩证法所关注的不是事物如何存在，而是事物如何可能通过人被产生、扬弃并进一步得到发展。辩证法不是纯粹的知识即一种‘方法论’，而是对知识和现实的一种批判。”[4]（P28）科西克对具体总体以及现实的理解主要受惠于卢卡奇的思想遗产，卢卡奇也主张区分事实和现实，并提出“具体的总体是真正的现实范畴”[5]（P58）。在卢卡奇看来，要让对事实的认识成为对现实的认识，就必须把事实作为历史发展的环节置于总体性的结构中进行审视，“只有在这种把社会生活中的孤立事实作为历史发展的环节并把它们归结为一个总体的情况下，对事实的认识才能成为对现实的认识。”[5]（P56）

As Hegel points out in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, “Whatever is actual is necessary in itself. Necessity consists in the whole being divided into different concepts, and in this divided whole having a permanent and fixed determination, which, however, is not rigid, but constantly produces itself in its process of dissolution.”[6]6 “System of implements” (装具系统) is Kosík’s term for the network of tools, objects, and social arrangements that mediate human activity in the pseudo-concrete world, drawing on Heidegger’s concept of the “equipmental totality” (Zeugganzes). (P280) Hegel’s concept of reality has two core constitutive elements: first, necessity, emphasizing that reality concerns essence and law; second, processuality, emphasizing that reality is in constant development and change. But as Lukács correctly points out, it is precisely on the conception of reality that Marx parts company with Hegel; the latter fails to overcome the opposition between thought and being, theory and practice, subject and object, and even fails to surpass Kant at crucial points.[5]5 Hegel’s maxim “the familiar is not the known”: A reference to G.W.F. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where he distinguishes between mere familiarity and genuine philosophical knowledge. (P65) Kosík also emphasizes that “reality is a structured, evolving, self-forming whole”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P30). Starting from this, he directs his critique at Karl Popper’s “piecemeal engineering.” Popper opposes all forms of holism, arguing that “we cannot observe or describe the whole of the world or of nature”[7]7 “Thrownness” (Geworfenheit) is a central concept in Heidegger’s Being and Time, referring to the fact that human existence is always already situated in a specific historical and social context not of its own choosing. (P66), because when studying something, people can only select certain aspects of it. Kosík considers Popper’s “limited selection theory” to be groundless; its fundamental problem lies in equating totality with the sum of facts. Once this is done, people will conclude that “the viewpoint of the concrete totality is mysticism.” Starting from the fact that “human cognition can never encompass all facts,” Popper attempts to convince people that holism is a form of mysticism, and that to avoid agnosticism, one must adopt “piecemeal engineering.” From the standpoint of the concrete totality, Kosík argues that Popper confuses facts with reality, which not only hinders the cognition of reality but also falls into uncritical fetishism and mysticism. Kosík’s critique of Popper represents the intellectual orientation of the entire Eastern European Neo-Marxism. Like Western Marxism, Eastern European Neo-Marxism also tends toward a humanist Marxism and advocates a critique of all positivism that one-sidedly pursues “factuality.”

正如黑格尔在《法哲学原理》中指出的，“凡是现实的东西，在其自身中是必然的。必然性就在于整体被分为各种不同的概念，在于这个被划分的整体具有持久的和巩固的规定性，然而这种规定性又不是僵死的，它在自己的分解过程中不断地产生自己。”[6]（P280）黑格尔的现实概念有两个核心构成要件：其一是必然性，即强调现实关涉本质与规律；其二是过程性，即强调现实是不断发展变化的。但正如卢卡奇正确指出的，马克思恰恰在现实观上同黑格尔分道扬镳，后者没有克服思维和存在、理论和实践、主体和客体的对立，甚至在关键的地方未能超过康德。[5]（P65）科西克也强调“现实是结构化的、进化着的、处于自我形成中的整体”[3]（P30），由此出发，他将批判的矛头指向卡尔·波普尔的“零碎工程学”。波普尔反对一切总体论，认为“我们不可能观察或描述整个世界或自然的全貌”[7]（P66），因为人们在研究某事物时只能选择它的某些方面。科西克认为波普尔的“有限选择论”毫无道理，其根本问题在于将总体等同于事实的总和，而一旦这样做，人们就会得出“具体总体的观点是神秘主义”的结论。波普尔从“人类认识永远不能囊括所有事实”出发试图让人们相信总体论是一种神秘主义，并认为要避免不可知论就必须采用“零碎工程学”。从具体的总体出发，科西克认为波普尔将事实与现实混为一谈，这不仅有碍于认识现实，而且还会陷入无批判的拜物教和神秘主义。科西克对波普尔的批判代表了整个东欧新马克思主义的思想定位，与西方马克思主义一样，东欧新马克思主义也倾向于一种人道主义的马克思主义，并主张对一切片面追求“事实性”的实证主义展开批判。

Overall, Kosík tends to view the relationship between facts and reality dialectically, emphasizing their mutual dependence and mutual support. On the surface, it seems that reality is superior to facts, because facts can only be understood within the overall structure of reality. Yet Kosík also stresses that “to hypostatize the whole and to prefer the whole over the parts (facts) is a path leading to a false totality rather than a concrete totality.”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P36) That is to say, once the totality is allowed to override facts, or the totality and facts are treated in isolation, emphasizing the totality while ignoring facts, one falls into subjectivism. In fact, one important reason why Popper and others criticize totalism and historical determinism is that they believe the latter leads to totalitarianism in politics and ideas. Kosík disagrees with Popper and others; on the one hand, he emphasizes that totality is closely linked to revolution, and on the other hand, he is soberly aware that a false totality may lead to totalitarianism. In short, Kosík believes that historical trends must be based on facts; once they are allowed to overstep their bounds and become an independent force, they regress to a reality lower in rank than empirical facts. Here, Kosík implicitly refers to Hegel’s philosophy of history as bearing totalitarian traits, and on the other hand, he implies that capitalist society is a lower-level reality.

总体上看，科西克倾向于辩证看待事实与现实的关系，强调二者相互依赖、相互支撑。表面上看，似乎现实高于事实，因为只有在总体性的现实结构中才能理解事实，但科西克又强调，“把整体实体化，在整体与部分（事实）之间更偏爱整体，是一条通向虚假总体而非具体总体的道路。”[3]（P36）也就是说，一旦让总体凌驾于事实之上，或者将总体和事实割裂看待，强调总体而无视事实，就会陷入主观主义。事实上，波普尔等人之所以批判总体论和历史决定论，一个重要的原因就是他们认定后者在政治和观念上将导致极权主义。科西克不同意波普尔等人的观点，一方面强调总体性与革命性紧密相连，另一方面清醒地意识到虚假的总体有可能导向极权主义。总之，科西克认为历史趋势必须基于事实，一旦任由其僭越界限成为独立存在的力量，就会退到比经验事实等级更低的现实。在这里，科西克一方面暗指黑格尔的历史哲学带有极权主义的特质，另一方面暗指资本主义社会是一个更低层级的现实。

Distinguishing facts from reality and regarding reality as a concrete totality does not mean that reality can be grasped, because people may still fall into a mode of thinking characterized by the dichotomy of subject and object. The crux of the issue lies in whether reality is understood from the perspective of human practice, because “as long as man is fundamentally or merely intuited as an object within the framework of the totality, as long as the importance of man as the subject of objective-historical practice is not recognized, social reality is not treated as a concrete totality.”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P33) Thus, the question “what is reality” is transformed into the question “how is reality formed,” and the formation of reality contains “a revolutionary conception of society and man.”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P33) However, Kosík encounters a new historical dilemma: the proletariat has not, as Lukács envisioned, broken through reified consciousness to become the revolutionary subject. This means that people can neither know reality nor have the power to change it. Kosík attributes the crux of the problem to individuals being captured by an “evil totality,” falling into a “pseudo-concrete world” and “utilitarian practice,” and he hopes to use the dialectics of the concrete totality to dispel the fog and reshape true reality.

区分事实和现实，将现实视为具体的总体，并不意味着可以把握现实，因为人们仍可能陷入一种主客二分的对立思维模式。问题的关键在于是否从人的实践出发理解现实，因为“只要从根本上或仅仅把人直觉为总体框架中的一个客体，只要作为客观—历史实践的主体的人的重要性没有得到承认，就没有把社会现实当作具体的总体。”[3]（P33）这样一来，“现实是什么”的问题就转化为“现实如何形成”的问题，而现实的生成包含了“一个关于社会和人的革命性概念”[3]（P33）。然而，科西克遭遇到一个新的历史困境，那就是无产阶级并没有按照卢卡奇的设想冲破物化意识，成为革命主体，这就意味着人们既无法认识现实，更无力改变现实。科西克将问题的症结归为个体被“恶的总体”所俘虏，陷入了“伪具体的世界”和“功利主义实践”，并期待用具体总体的辩证法拨开迷雾，重塑真正的现实。

In summary, Kosík’s view of reality can be summarized in three points: First, it distinguishes reality from facts, holds that dialectics is the method for grasping reality, and emphasizes that facts can only be grasped within the concrete totality of reality. Second, it emphasizes that reality without man is false; without man and his cognition, both reality and the cognition of reality are incomplete. That is to say, reality can only be human reality; it is man who creates human reality, and only man can know and change reality. Third, it understands reality from the perspective of human practice, arguing that utilitarian practice obscures the essence of reality, leaving people immersed in the level of facticity and phenomena, unable to extricate themselves. This understanding not only directs the critique of reality toward a revolutionary direction but also reveals an extremely important truth: reality can be known and changed by dialectics because reality is constructed by human practical activity. In short, Kosík believes that reality is higher than the existent; it is not environment and conditions, but the unity of event and subject. It means both the continuous generation of events and the continuous transcendence of environment by the subject. Only the dialectics of the concrete totality can correctly understand and grasp reality, leading humanity toward liberation and freedom.

综上，科西克的现实观可归纳为三个要点：一是区分现实与事实，认为辩证法是把握现实的方法，强调事实只有在具体总体的现实中才能被把握。二是强调没有人的现实是虚假的，离开人及其认识，现实以及对现实的认识都是不完整的。也就是说，现实只能是人的现实，正是人创造出人类现实，也只有人才能认识和改变现实。三是从人的实践出发理解现实，认为功利主义的实践遮蔽了现实的本质，让人们沉浸在事实性和现象的层面不能自拔。这一理解不仅将对现实的批判引向革命的方向，还揭示出一个极其重要的道理：现实之所以能够被辩证法认识和改变，是因为现实是由人的实践活动建构的。总之，科西克认为现实高于现存，它不是环境和条件，而是事件与主体的统一，既意味着事件不断生成，也意味着主体不断超越环境，只有具体总体的辩证法才能正确理解和把握现实，将人类引向解放和自由。

II. Negative Factors Hindering Humanity’s Grasp of “Reality”

二、阻碍人类把握“现实”的消极因素

The reason Kosík emphasizes that reality must be grasped circuitously stems not only from his unique understanding of reality but also from his recognition of the alienated reality of capitalist society. In his view, capitalist society contains multiple factors and forces that hinder people from knowing and grasping reality. If their influence cannot be fundamentally eliminated, reality cannot be known or changed.

科西克之所以强调现实必须迂回地被把握，除了源于对现实的独特理解外，还与对资本主义社会异化现实的体认有关。在他看来，资本主义社会存在多种阻碍人们认识和把握现实的因素和力量，若不能在根本上清除其影响，现实就无法被认识和改变。

First, the pseudo-concrete world of false autonomy. Although Kosík repeatedly claims that the core function of dialectics is to know and change reality, he discusses this view more on the level of what ought to be. Facing the alienated reality of capitalist society, Kosík finds that the subject has been replaced by an autonomous coercive structure, so that what were originally objects and targets of human practical activity have now been reversed into subjects that tower over man. The world of false autonomy is precisely the world of the pseudo-concrete, a world of everyday life that people know well. But as Hegel’s maxim “the familiar is not the known” shows, people often know nothing of the essence of this world. Kosík distinguishes two types of practice: one is fetishized utilitarian practice, which allows man to exist in the world yet conceals the essence of things, causing man to forget the meaning of life. The spiritual atmosphere it creates is one of “immediacy,” “self-evidence,” and “naturalness,” with the consequence that people believe they face a natural and unchangeable world. The other is active, historically self-generating authentic practice, “namely, it is a unity of man and world, matter and spirit, subject and object, product and production, in a process of constant renewal and constant establishment.”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P170) Dialectics, as a method for grasping reality, is essentially critical and revolutionary, which means opposing the pseudo-concreteness and false autonomy of the everyday life world. Although Kosík regards the everyday life world as a world of phenomena and advocates that philosophy aims to reveal the essence and laws of things, he opposes pursuing essence directly by bypassing phenomena, because if people treat phenomena and essence as two different levels of things, they fall into a Platonic dualism. In this sense, reality is neither pure phenomena nor an abstract essence isolated from phenomena; rather, it is the unity of the two. What is “false autonomy”? As the name implies, false autonomy is not genuine independence or autonomy, but a superficial autonomy that originates from the subject’s misrecognition of alienated reality. That is to say, it is not that reality possesses autonomy, but that human individuals engaged in utilitarian practice mistakenly believe that reality possesses autonomy. Kosík points out that when people face the phenomena of everyday life, they always think they have insight into the essence of things and believe that the world and its essence possess a naturalness and autonomy independent of human will. This fundamental misrecognition actually confuses objectivity with autonomy. Dialectics never denies that the existence of the material world and its phenomena is objective, but it emphasizes that this objectivity is confirmed through the mediation of human practical activity. Therefore, the seemingly independent and autonomous world is precisely derivative, and the claim of autonomy is also false. The key is to understand reality from the perspective of practice, thereby breaking the false autonomy of the everyday life world. In this way, “the various reified forms of the objective world and the world of ideas disappear, losing their fixed and natural character, as well as their false originality, and appear as derivative and mediated phenomena, as sediments and artifacts of human social practice.”[3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P8-9) Unlike fetishized utilitarian practice, authentic practice is revolutionary and critical; it does not pursue absolute truth but allows truth to constantly generate. Once people shift from utilitarian practice to authentic practice, the pseudo-concrete world collapses.

第一，虚假自主性的伪具体世界。科西克虽然反复声称辩证法的核心功能是认识和改变现实，但却更多地是在应然层面上论及此观点的。面对资本主义社会的异化现实，科西克发现主体已经被一种自主性的强制结构所取代，这使得本来是人类实践活动对象和客体的东西，现在却反转成为凌驾于人之上的主体。虚假自主性的世界也就是伪具体的世界，这是一个人们熟知的日常生活世界，但正如黑格尔“熟知非真知”的箴言所示，对于这个世界的本质人们常常一无所知。科西克区分了两类实践：一类是拜物教化的功利主义实践，它让人存活于世，却又掩盖事物的本质，让人遗忘生活的意义，其营造的精神氛围是“直接性”“自明性”“自然性”，后果是让人们相信他们面对的是一个自然而然、无法改变的世界。另一类是能动的、在历史中自我生成的真正实践，“即它是一个处于不断更新、不断建立过程中的人与世界、物质与精神、主体与客体、产品与生产的统一。”[3]（P170）辩证法作为把握现实的方法，本质上是批判的、革命的，这就意味着反对日常生活世界的伪具体性和虚假自主性。科西克虽然认为日常生活世界是现象世界，主张哲学旨在揭示事物的本质和规律，但却反对抛开现象直接追求本质，因为如果人们将现象和本质视为两种不同等级的事物，就会陷入柏拉图式的二元论。在这个意义上，现实既不是纯粹的现象，也不是隔绝现象的抽象本质，毋宁说乃是二者的统一。什么是“虚假自主性”呢？顾名思义，虚假的自主性并不是真正意义上的独立或自主，而是一种表面上的自主性，它源于主体对异化现实的误认。也就是说，并不是现实具有自主性，而是从事功利主义实践的人类个体误认为现实具有自主性。科西克指出，当人们面对日常生活的现象时，总以为他们洞察到了事物的本质，并认为世界及其本质具有一种不以人的意志为转移的自然性和自主性，这种根本性的误认其实是将客观性和自主性混为一谈。辩证法从不否认物质世界及其现象的实存是客观的，但它强调这种客观性是通过人的实践活动的中介性得以确证的，因此，貌似独立自主的世界恰恰是派生性的，自主性宣称也是虚假的。关键是要从实践出发理解现实，以此破除日常生活世界的虚假自主性。如此一来，“客观世界和观念世界的各种物化形式消失了，丧失了其确定的和自然的特性，也丧失了其虚假的原初性，呈现为派生的与中介的现象，以及人类社会实践的沉淀物和人造物。”[3]（P8-9）与拜物教化的功利主义实践不同，真正的实践是革命的、批判的，它不追求绝对真理，而是让真理不断生成。一旦人们从功利主义实践转向真正的实践，伪具体的世界便会土崩瓦解。

Second, determinism and reductionism in epistemology. As discussed above, Kosík holds that false autonomy does not originate from the nature of objective things, but from the misrecognition of the reified world by the alienated subject. He finds that the alienated subject always tends toward elementarism and reductionism in its mode of thinking; therefore, eliminating the influence of these two erroneous theoretical tendencies in epistemology becomes the key to understanding and changing reality. According to the traditional view, materialism and idealism represent two entirely distinct epistemological lines: materialism insists on moving from things to sensations and thoughts, while idealism insists on moving from thoughts and sensations to things. But in Kosík’s view, “every epistemology, whether explicitly or implicitly, is based on some theory of reality and presupposes some concept of reality” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P17). That is to say, even if one adheres to the materialist epistemological line, if one practices a kind of reductionism, the theory remains abstract and reality remains unknowable. In everyday thinking, reductionism and elementarism are always entangled with each other: reductionism tends to reduce complex things to some simple element, and once complex things are regarded as a collection of elements, one inevitably moves toward reductionism. In Kosík’s view, “reductionism presupposes a rigid entity and some immutable and further irreducible elements, to which all kinds of phenomena can ultimately be reduced” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P17). The fundamental flaw of reductionism lies in severing individuality from universality, so that on one side there is abstract universality and on the other abstract individuality. Individuality and universality appear to be opposed on the surface, but are in fact unified. As Hegel states: “The individual, through its own action, places itself into the universal element of existing reality, or rather, it makes itself into the universal element of existing reality; its action, even according to the meaning it itself gives it, should have the value of a universal order” [8]8 The “general problematic” (总问题) is a term derived from Louis Althusser, referring to the underlying theoretical framework or problematic that structures a body of thought. (P246). People often think that as long as one insists on dynamism and flux, dialectics can become a revolutionary method. But in Kosík’s view, the problem is not about making the entity move, but about whether the theory is still, at its core, a reductionist thinking of the “nothing but” type. “Dialectics is not a method of reduction, but a method of spiritually and intellectually reproducing society, a method of unfolding and interpreting social phenomena based on the objective activity of historical human beings” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (PP22-23). Kosík’s understanding of dialectics and the concept of reality carries a certain phenomenological flavor. He realizes that “idealism as spiritual substance and materialism as material substance are in principle the same thing, both products of speculation” [9]9 “Ideological determinism” (思想决定论) and “revolution of consciousness” (意识革命论) are critical labels used by Yan Yan to characterize Kosík’s emphasis on subjective and ideological transformation as the primary means of changing reality, rather than material or structural change. (P6). Therefore, reality must never be understood as an abstract entity or substance; reality can only be grasped by people when it exists as an objective being, on the one hand captured by human consciousness and on the other hand mediated by human practice. It should be said that Kosík deeply appreciated the “post-metaphysical” implications of Marx’s philosophy and consciously transformed the phenomenology of spirit and phenomenology of consciousness in Western philosophy into a social phenomenology and historical phenomenology.

第二，认识论中的决定论与还原论。如前所述，科西克认为虚假自主性并非源于客观事物的本性，而是来自异化主体对物化世界的误认，他发现异化主体在思维方式上总是倾向于要素论和还原论，因此在认识论上消除这两种错误理论倾向的影响就成为认识和改变现实的关键。按照传统的观点，唯物主义和唯心主义分别代表两种截然不同的认识路线，唯物主义坚持从物到感觉和思想，唯心主义坚持从思想和感觉到物。但在科西克看来，“每一种认识论都或明或暗地以某种关于现实的理论为基础，都预设了某种现实概念”[3]（P17）。也就是说，即便人们坚持唯物主义的认识路线，但若奉行一种还原论，那么理论就仍然是抽象的，现实就仍然不可知。在日常思维中，还原论和要素论总是相互纠缠在一起，还原论倾向于将复杂的事物归为某个简单的要素，而一旦将复杂的事物视为各要素的集合，就势必会走向还原论。在科西克看来，“还原论预设了一个僵化的实体和一些不变的且不能进一步还原的要素，各种各样的现象归根到底都能被还原到这一实体和这些要素上。”[3]（P17）还原论的根本要害在于将个性和普遍性割裂开来，使得一端是抽象的普遍性，另一端是抽象的个性。个性和普遍性表面上看是对立的，但其实是统一的，正如黑格尔所言：“个体通过它自己的行为把自己放进存在着的现实的普遍原素里去，或者更可以说，它把自己当作了存在着的现实的普遍要素；它的行为，即使按照它自己所赋予的意义来说，也应该具有一种普遍的秩序的价值。”[8]（P246）人们常以为，只要坚持动态性和流变性，辩证法就可以成为革命性的方法，但在科西克看来，问题不在于让实体运动起来，而在于理论是否在底色上仍是一种“只不过是”的还原论思维。“辩证法不是一种还原方法，而是精神地、理智地再生产社会的一种方法，是对以历史的人的客观活动为基础的社会现象进行展开和阐释的一种方法。”[3]（P22-23）科西克对辩证法和现实概念的理解带有某种现象学意味，他意识到“唯心主义作为本体的精神和唯物主义作为本体的物质原则上是同一个东西，是思辨的产物”[9]（P6）。因此，决不能将现实理解为抽象的实体或本体，现实只有作为对象性的存在，一方面被人的意识所捕获，另一方面被人的实践所中介，才能真正为人们所把握。应该说，科西克深刻体会到了马克思哲学的“后形而上学”意蕴，并自觉地将西方哲学中的精神现象学和意识现象学转变为社会现象学和历史现象学。

Third, the world of acquisition and manipulation. The pseudo-concrete world not only makes people abandon the pursuit of the meaning of life, but also causes their practice to degenerate into acquisitive activity, thereby forming a system of manipulation over the subject. In essence, acquisition is the product of abstract labor, reflecting a kind of fetishized practice. On the surface, it seems that the subject can understand and change reality through acquisitive activity, but in fact, the subject is instead captured by the system of implements [6]6 “System of implements” (装具系统) is Kosík’s term for the network of tools, objects, and social arrangements that mediate human activity in the pseudo-concrete world, drawing on Heidegger’s concept of the “equipmental totality” (Zeugganzes). in this process; the object is for him merely a ready-made, incomprehensible, irrational thing. “Acquisition is the practical behavior of human beings in a ready-made, given world, which is equivalent to maintaining and manipulating implements in a certain world, but it is by no means a process of forming the human world” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P49). Through acquisitive activity, people cannot truly grasp reality, because reality presents itself as a ready-made, incomprehensible world of abstract utility; everything is meaningless, or rather, things have meaning only when they become objects of manipulation. As for the human individual, at this point he too becomes an object of manipulation, able to prove his own meaning and value only through abstract labor. Therefore, acquisition means that manipulation and abstract universality occupy a dominant position. If Heidegger holds that the subject inevitably falls into thrownness [7]7 “Thrownness” (Geworfenheit) is a central concept in Heidegger’s Being and Time, referring to the fact that human existence is always already situated in a specific historical and social context not of its own choosing. and is perpetually burdened with care, Kosík regards care as the entanglement of the individual in social relations and believes that as long as existing social relations are changed, the alienated mode of existence can be cast off. It is not difficult to see that Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy tends to solidify the existing state of affairs and is therefore conservative, while Kosík’s critical theory emphasizes the realization of human freedom and liberation through concrete dialectics and is therefore radical and revolutionary.

第三，获取与操控的世界。伪具体世界不仅让人们放弃对生活意义的追求，还会让人们的实践蜕变为获取活动，进而形成系统对主体的操控。从本质上看，获取是抽象劳动的产物，反映的是一种拜物教化的实践。表面上看，主体似乎能够通过获取活动认识和改变现实，但事实上，主体在这个过程中反被装具系统捕获，客体对他而言只是现成的、无法理解的非理性之物。“获取是人在一个现成的、给定的世界里的实践行为，这相当于在某个世界里维护和操控器具，但它绝不是一个形成人类世界的过程。”[3]（P49）通过获取活动人们无法真正把握现实，因为现实呈现为一个现成的、不可理解的抽象效用世界，一切都没有意义，或者说事物只有成为被操控的对象才有意义。而就人类个体而言，这时也变成了被操控的对象，只能通过抽象劳动证明自身的意义和价值，因此获取意味着操控和抽象普遍性占据统治地位。如果说海德格尔认为主体必然陷入沉沦并终身烦忧，科西克则将烦忧视为个人在社会关系中的纠缠，并相信只要改变现存的社会关系，就可以摆脱异化的生存方式。不难看出，海德格尔的存在主义哲学倾向于固化现存，因而是保守主义的，科西克的批判理论强调通过具体的辩证法实现人的自由和解放，因而是激进的、革命的。

Fourth, the familiar world of everyday life. In Kosík’s view, the pseudo-concrete world is precisely the world of everyday life; the everyday is each day, and it usually manifests as a familiar world in which all of people’s activities are subconscious, instinctive, and unreflective. Kosík never believes that people can easily break free from the everyday, but the problem lies in the inertia and interchangeability of the everyday: not only can each day of the everyday be replaced by another day, but even the subject of everyday life can be replaced by another subject. Therefore, the everyday world is left with only numbers and symbols. Kosík holds that the most conservative aspect of the everyday is its concealment of the essence of things, which distances people from history and drains life of meaning. In popular terms, everyday life always tends toward alienation. Like Ágnes Heller, Kosík sees the connection between the everyday and history, believing that without history the everyday becomes empty, and without the everyday history becomes absurd. With regard to understanding and grasping reality, although the everyday, as the phenomenal level of reality, conceals essence, the essence of reality can only be revealed through the everyday’s description of the phenomenal world. Kosík reminds people that the everyday world does not automatically manifest essence; therefore, it is necessary to destroy the pseudo-concrete through revolutionary transformation, to reveal its connection with fetishism, and to fully expose the cruel side of alienated reality. Unlike Heller, who advocates overcoming the alienation of everyday life through existentialist choice, Kosík believes that existentialist choice only changes the individual’s attitude toward the world, without truly changing the world, and is therefore not the most appropriate way to sublate alienation. In the essay “Socialism and the Crisis of Modern Man,” Kosík offers another path: “In today’s Czechoslovakia, there exists a humanistic socialism that is unceasingly struggling to be created; it is a revolutionary, humanistic, and liberating alternative to a system of universal manipulation” [10]10 The reference [10] in the original text corresponds to a source cited by the author, likely a work by Kosík or a related scholar. The specific bibliographic details are not provided in the source material. (P67). So how is humanistic socialism to be realized? Kosík’s view on this issue is relatively comprehensive. On the one hand, he emphasizes the importance of proletarian revolution and the transformation of social systems; on the other hand, he holds that philosophy, especially dialectics, plays an important role, stressing that “dialectics, revolutionary character, critique, and humanism precisely become components of socialism” [10]10 The reference [10] in the original text corresponds to a source cited by the author, likely a work by Kosík or a related scholar. The specific bibliographic details are not provided in the source material. (P72).

第四，熟识的日常生活世界。在科西克那里，伪具体的世界就是日常生活世界，日常就是每一天，它通常表现为熟识的世界，人们在这个世界里的一切活动都是下意识的、本能的和未经反思的。科西克从不认为人们可以轻而易举地摆脱日常，但问题在于日常具有惰性和互换性，不仅日常的每一天可以被另一天来代替，就连日常生活的主体也可以被另一个主体代替。因此，日常世界只剩下数字和符号。科西克认为日常最为保守之处在于掩盖事物的本质，这便令人们远离历史，让生活丧失意义。通俗地说，日常生活总是倾向于异化。与阿格妮丝·赫勒一样，科西克看到了日常与历史的关联，认为离开历史日常将变得空洞，而离开日常历史也将变得荒诞。就理解和把握现实而言，日常作为现实的现象层面虽然会掩盖本质，但现实的本质却又只能通过日常对现象世界的描述才能被揭示出来。科西克提醒人们，日常世界并不会自动地将本质显现出来，因此必须通过革命性的变革摧毁伪具体，揭示其同拜物教的关联，充分暴露异化现实的残忍面。与赫勒主张通过存在主义的选择摆脱日常生活的异化不同，科西克认为存在主义的选择仅仅改变了个体面对世界的态度，并没有真正改变世界，因此并不是最恰当的扬弃异化的方式。在《社会主义与现代人的危机》一文中，科西克给出了另一条出路：“在今天的捷克斯洛伐克，存在着一种为创建它而不懈斗争的人道主义的社会主义，它是一种对于一个普遍操控的系统的革命的、人本主义的和解放性的替代性选择。”[10]（P67）那么，人道主义的社会主义如何实现？科西克在这个问题上观点比较全面，他一方面强调无产阶级革命和社会制度变革的重要性，另一方面认为哲学尤其是辩证法发挥着重要的作用，强调“辩证法、革命本色、批判和人道主义恰恰成为社会主义的组成部分”[10]（P72）。

(5) The Economic System and the Hypothesis of “Economic Man”. Kosík discovers that in modern society the positions of subject and object have been inverted: “the subject is abstracted from its subjectivity and becomes an object and an element of the system. Man becomes a unit determined by its function within a law-governed system.” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P63) It is precisely this that directly leads to the failure of plans to cognize and change reality. Why does the subject turn into an object? Is this an active choice by the subject or a passive acceptance? How can the alienated subject regain its identity as subject? Like Lukács, Kosík regards the inversion of subject and object as a phenomenon of alienation, deeply rooted in the capitalist system, “reflecting the real deformation of man caused by capitalism” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P63). Kosík holds that the deformed person under capitalism is the so-called “economic man”, an important invention of bourgeois economics. The economic system and “economic man” are inseparable: “economic man” is an indispensable element maintaining the system’s operation, while the system creates a special economic atmosphere that transforms the subject into “economic man”. Unlike idealists, Kosík does not trace the root of alienation to ideas or categories, but emphasizes that alienation comes from the social reality of capitalism – the economic system. “Once man enters the economic realm, he is transformed. As soon as he enters economic relations, he is dragged, independently of his will and consciousness, into an environment and into law-governed relations” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P66). Thus, the inversion of subject and object is not something the subject willingly accepts, but the result of the operation of objective material forces. Paradoxically, however, in this process of transformation the subject offers no resistance, because it believes that the objective world and its social relations are natural and unchangeable. In other words, in capitalist society the concealment of essence by appearance is deep-seated and not easily detected: “This concealment is possible because in capitalist society man’s environment, especially the economic categories, confront him directly and necessarily in an objectified form, and this objectified form conceals the fact that they are categories of relations between men.” [5]5 Hegel’s maxim “the familiar is not the known”: A reference to G.W.F. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where he distinguishes between mere familiarity and genuine philosophical knowledge. (P63)

（五）经济系统与“经济人”假设。科西克发现，现代社会的主体与客体地位已经颠倒，“主体从他的主体性中抽象出来变成了一个客体和系统的一个要素。人变成了规律般的系统中由其功能决定的一个单元。”[3]（P63）正是这一点直接导致认识和改变现实计划的落空。主体为什么会转变为客体？对于主体来说是主动的选择还是被动的接受？异化的主体如何重新获得主体的身份？与卢卡奇一样，科西克认为主客体的颠倒是一种异化现象，它深深地根植于资本主义制度，“反映了资本主义所造成的人的真正变形”[3]（P63）。科西克认为资本主义制度下变形的人也就是所谓的“经济人”，这是资产阶级经济学的一项重要发明。经济系统和“经济人”是不可分离的关系，“经济人”是维系系统运转不可或缺的要素，而系统则营造出一种特殊的经济氛围，让主体蜕变为“经济人”。与唯心主义者不同，科西克并没有将异化的根源归于观念或范畴，而是强调异化来自资本主义社会现实——经济系统。“一旦进入经济王国，人就会被改造。他一进入经济关系，就不以他的意志和意识为转移地被拖入环境和规律般的关系中”[3]（P66）。可见，主客体的颠倒并不是主体心甘情愿的，而是客观物质力量发生作用的结果。但悖谬在于，在这个转变过程中，主体却没有丝毫的反抗，因为他们相信，客体世界及其社会关系是自然而然的、不可改变的。换言之，在资本主义社会里，现象对本质的掩盖是深层次的、不易察觉的，“这种掩盖之所以可能，是因为在资本主义社会中人的环境，尤其是经济范畴，以对象性形式直接地和必然地呈现在他的面前，对象性形式掩盖了它们是人和人之间的关系的范畴这一事实。”[5]（P63）

Going further, Kosík reveals the secret of classical economics’ hypothesis of “economic man”. In essence, “economic man” serves the capitalist economic system; it is the system that produces “economic man”: “the economy is a life atmosphere that has a tendency to turn man into economic man, to drag him into an objective mechanism that subjugates and transforms man” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P66). Although classical economics exposes from an objective level the manipulation of man by the economic system, it uses “economic man” to conceal this manipulation, failing to correctly reveal the real roots of alienation, and thereby falls into the ideology of the objective world [Kosík distinguishes between objective reality and objectified reality, holding that capitalist society essentially transforms objective reality into objectified reality; classical economics knows only objectified reality, which is not the true human world but a reified, inverted world.]. Like Marx, Kosík believes that the romantics also failed to truly pierce the secret of classical economics. Although they opposed “economic man” and the system, and tried to restore the integrity of man, this integrity was false, patriarchal, and not yet fully developed; in Marx’s words, it was a primitive richness, with human capacities confined to narrow localities. Thus, although Kosík opposes the manipulation of man by the economic system, he simultaneously acknowledges that this manipulation is a great advantage of modernity; therefore the correct approach should be to change reality and overthrow the system, rather than simply declaring the system illegitimate and advocating a return to pre-modern society. “The romantics despised the system and despised abstraction, but they forgot that the problem of man, the problem of his freedom and his concreteness, is always his relationship with the system.” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P71) In short, as part of reality, man must both exist within the system and transcend it.

更进一步，科西克为我们揭示了古典经济学“经济人”假设的秘密，从本质上看，“经济人”是服务于资本主义经济系统的，正是系统造就了“经济人”，“经济就是一种有把人变成经济人，把人拖入征服人、改造人的客观机制之中的趋势的生活氛围”[3](P66)。古典经济学虽然从客观层面揭露了经济系统对人的操纵，但却以“经济人”掩盖了系统的操纵，未能正确揭示异化的现实根源，进而跌入了客体性世界[ 科西克区分了客观性现实和客体性现实，认为资本主义社会本质上是将客观性现实转变为客体性现实，古典经济学唯一知道的是客体性现实，但这并不是真正的人类世界，而是一个物化颠倒的世界。]的意识形态。与马克思一样，科西克认为浪漫主义者也没有真正戳穿古典经济学的秘密，他们虽然反对“经济人”和系统，试图恢复人的完整性，但这种完整性是虚假的、宗法式的、尚未充分发展的，用马克思的话说，这是一种原始的丰富性，人的能力被局限在狭小的地域内。可见，科西克虽然反对经济系统对人的操控，却同时承认这种操控是现代性的一个巨大优势，因此正确的做法应该是改变现实和推翻系统，而不是简单宣布系统是非法的，并主张退回到前现代社会。“浪漫主义轻视系统、轻视抽象，而他们忘了，人的问题、他的自由的问题以及他的具体性的问题始终是他与系统的一种关系。”[3]（P71）质言之，人作为现实的一部分，必须既在系统中生存，又要超越系统。

(6) The Fallacy of Economic Factor Determinism. Factor theory, reductionism, and the economic system intertwine to produce the emergence of economic factor determinism. Lukács once understood the core of Marxism as the method of totality rather than the primacy of the economy; although this move ensured to a certain extent the revolutionary character of Marxism, it came at the cost of a regression toward idealism. For a long time, people have fallen into a contradictory position on this issue. Kosík’s brilliance lies in combining the method of totality with the principle of the primacy of the economy. His basic view is: Marxism is not economic factor determinism, but economic structure determinism; the latter is not only not contradictory to the method of totality, but takes the method of totality as its fundamental premise. In Kosík’s view, it is capitalist society that produces economic factor determinism; the fundamental problem of this theory is that it ahistorically treats a certain factor as a decisive independent variable, which is entirely a metaphysical approach. Marxism is undoubtedly a determinism, and it also strongly emphasizes the role of the economy; but it must be pointed out that Marxism is by no means linear determinism or narrow economic determinism. On the one hand, it regards society as a whole determined by the economic structure; on the other hand, it holds that man can influence and change the economic structure through practical activity. Fundamentally, historical materialism not only concerns itself with “social beings”, but also penetrates behind “things” to explore the roots of social reality, which involves the subject and its consciousness. “The economy has primacy not because some of man’s creations are more real than others, but because practice and labor occupy a central position in the constitution of reality.” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P89) Since practice and labor in capitalist society are alienated, reality degenerates into a world of objects beyond human control; in this process, the subject is inverted into an object and left at the mercy of the economic system. Thus, in capitalist society, reality becomes the economy, the economy becomes economic factors, and man becomes “economic man”. Kosík holds that “materialist philosophy raises a revolutionary question: how is social reality constituted?” [3]3 Georg Lukács (1885–1971): Hungarian Marxist philosopher whose work *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) introduced the concept of reification and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. (P99) The correct answer to this question is: social reality must never be reduced to fixed, unchanging objects; social reality can only be the result of human practical activity, and therefore man is the core of social reality.

（六）经济因素决定论的迷误。因素论、还原论和经济系统交织在一起促成了经济因素决定论的出现。卢卡奇曾将马克思主义的核心理解为总体性方法而不是经济的首要性原则，这一举动虽然在一定程度上确保了马克思主义的革命性，但却是以向唯心主义的倒退为代价的。长期以来，人们在这个问题上陷入了矛盾的境地，科西克的高明之处就在于将总体性方法与经济首要性原则结合在一起，其基本观点是：马克思主义不是经济因素决定论，而是经济结构决定论，后者非但与总体性方法不矛盾，而且是以总体性方法为根本前提的。在科西克看来，正是资本主义社会造就了经济因素决定论，该理论的根本问题在于非历史地将某一因素视为决定性的独立变量，这完全是一种形而上学的做法。马克思主义无疑是一种决定论，它也非常强调经济的作用，但必须指出，马克思主义绝不是线性决定论和狭隘的经济决定论，它一方面将社会看成是由经济结构决定的整体，另一方面认为人可以通过实践活动影响和改变经济结构。从根本上看，历史唯物主义不仅关注“社会存在物”，更是深入到“物”的背后去探究社会现实的根源，这就涉及主体及其意识的问题，“经济之所以具有首要性，不是因为人类的某些创造物比其他创造物更真实，而是因为实践和劳作在构造现实的过程中具有核心地位。”[3]（P89）由于资本主义社会的实践和劳作是异化的，因此现实就蜕变为人们无法掌控的客体的世界，在这个过程中，主体颠倒成为客体，并任由经济系统摆布。于是，在资本主义社会，现实变成了经济，经济又变成了经济因素，人成了“经济人”。科西克认为，“唯物主义哲学提出了一个革命性的问题：社会现实是怎么形成的？”[3]（P99）这个问题的正确解答是：决不能将社会现实还原为固定不变的客体，社会现实只能是人的实践活动的结果，因此人是社会现实的核心。

III. The Limitations of Kosík’s Dialectics and Conception of Reality

三、科西克辩证法及现实概念的局限

Kosík’s understanding of dialectics and the conception of reality reflects the “general problematic” of the entire Eastern European neo-Marxism. Its core view is that philosophy (dialectics) must be able to cognize and change reality; this is consistent with Marx’s understanding of dialectics, but the theory still has three defects.

科西克对辩证法以及现实概念的理解反映出整个东欧新马克思主义的“总问题”，其核心观点是哲学（辩证法）必须能够认识和改变现实，这一点契合了马克思对辩证法的理解，但该理论仍存在三点缺陷。

First, Kosík’s understanding of dialectics and the conception of reality does not go beyond the horizon of Western Marxists such as Lukács; its core remains a kind of “ideological determinism” and “revolution of consciousness”. The strength of this view is that it incorporates the subject and practice into the understanding of dialectics, thereby restoring the critical and revolutionary character of dialectics. But the weakness is equally obvious: the analysis of capitalist contradictions unconsciously takes on a strong subjectivist coloring, because “exaggerating the concept of practice can lead to its opposite: falling back into idealist intuition” [5]5 Hegel’s maxim “the familiar is not the known”: A reference to G.W.F. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where he distinguishes between mere familiarity and genuine philosophical knowledge. (P12). This defect is fully exposed when Kosík firmly believes that the dialectics of the concrete totality can break through the pseudo-concrete world.

首先，科西克对辩证法和现实概念的理解并未超出卢卡奇等西方马克思主义者的视界，其内核仍是一种“思想决定论”和“意识革命论”。这一观点的优点是将主体和实践纳入对辩证法的理解中，进而恢复辩证法的批判性和革命性，但缺点同样显而易见，那就是关于资本主义矛盾的分析不自觉地带上了浓厚的主观主义色彩，因为“过度夸张实践概念可以走向其反面：重新陷入唯心主义的直观之中”[5]（P12）。当科西克坚信具体总体的辩证法能够破除伪具体世界时，该缺陷便暴露无遗。

Second, the understanding of socialist society held by Kosík and other Eastern European neo-Marxists is seriously skewed; they tend to examine the differences between the two sides from a dichotomous perspective, failing to see the continuity and commonality between them. Specifically, Eastern European neo-Marxists tend to set capitalist society and Soviet socialist society in opposition, believing that neither has eliminated alienation, and they oppose both capitalism and Soviet socialism. However, in the author’s view, the humanistic socialism that Kosík and others yearn for is merely a simple negation of capitalism and Soviet socialism; it cannot be realized in reality as long as the logic of capital has not fully withdrawn and as long as the capitalist mode of production can still accommodate new productive forces. The greatest defect of this understanding is that it ignores the diversity of paths of socialist development and fails to grasp the true meaning of Marx’s dictum that “alienation and the supersession of alienation follow the same path.” The great practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics shows that Chinese-path modernization can effectively regulate and guide capital, make full use of market factors, and thereby avoid “the system’s manipulation of people.” Kosík only saw that socialism should move in the direction of humanization and democratization, but he overlooked the fact that this transformation is not an external transcendence of capitalist modernity; rather, it should inherit all the civilizational achievements of capitalist society and achieve a genuine transcendence from within. In this regard, Kosík’s view has a utopian character.

其次，科西克等东欧新马克思主义者对社会主义社会的理解存在严重偏差，他们倾向于从二分对立的角度审视双方的差异，而未能看到二者之间的连续性和共通性。具体而言，东欧新马克思主义者倾向于将资本主义社会和苏联社会主义社会对立看待，认为二者均未能消除异化，他们既反对资本主义，也反对苏联社会主义。然而，在笔者看来，科西克等人心向往之的人道主义的社会主义不过是对资本主义和苏联社会主义的简单否定，在资本逻辑完全退场之前，在资本主义生产方式仍能够容纳新的生产力的情况下，根本不可能在现实中实现。这种理解最大的弊病就是忽略了社会主义发展道路的多样性，未能理解马克思“异化与异化的扬弃是同一条道路”一语之真谛。中国特色社会主义的伟大实践表明，中国式现代化能够有效规范和引导资本，充分利用市场要素，进而避免“系统对人的操控”。科西克只看到了社会主义应该朝着人道化和民主化的方向迈进，但却忽略了这一转变并不是对资本主义现代性的外在超越，而是应继承资本主义社会的一切文明成果，从内部实现真正的超越。就此而论，科西克的观点带有乌托邦主义的色彩。

Finally, Kosík’s critique of capitalist society does not strike at the heart of the matter. Although he directs his critical spear at the economic system, he does not further reveal that the logic of capital is the hidden hand manipulating the system. “The logic of capital is a logic of being-for-itself, self-multiplying, and self-centered; individuals and even the whole society appear as means and instruments for the valorization of capital, while the self-valorization of capital appears as the highest purpose of individual and social life.” [11]11 The reference [11] in the original text corresponds to a source cited by the author, likely a work discussing the logic of capital. The specific bibliographic details are not provided in the source material. (P150) In fact, the “false autonomy,” “inversion of subject and object,” “economic determinism and reductionism,” and “the system’s manipulation of people” that Kosík criticizes are all results of the logic of capital spreading and proliferating in modern society. Precisely because he fails to grasp this key link, Kosík’s understanding of reality remains insufficiently precise. This not only directly leads him into subjectivism in theory but also forces him toward pessimism, entrusting human liberation to a radical break with the present society—that is, “depending on a completely different foundation and requiring an absolutely different conceptualization of humanity, nature, truth, and history” [10]10 The reference [10] in the original text corresponds to a source cited by the author, likely a work by Kosík or a related scholar. The specific bibliographic details are not provided in the source material. (P72). Kosík’s pessimism is particularly evident in his commentary on the Czech writer Jaroslav Hašek’s *The Good Soldier Švejk*. Hašek attempts to use Švejk’s grotesque behavior to prove the absurdity of the system, but Kosík aims to show that although Švejk’s resistance to the system is admirable, he does not truly overcome the system; he merely offers a glimmer of hope to those in despair.

最后，科西克对资本主义社会的批判并未切中要害，他虽然将批判的矛头指向了经济系统，但并未进一步揭示出资本逻辑才是操纵系统的幕后黑手。“资本逻辑是一种自为存在、自行倍增、自我中心的逻辑，个人甚至整个社会都表现为资本增殖的手段和工具，而资本的自我增殖则表现为个人和社会生活的最高目的。”[11]（P150）事实上，科西克所批判的“虚假自主性”“主客体颠倒”“经济因素决定论和还原论”“系统对人的操控”等，都是资本逻辑在现代社会滋生蔓延的结果。正是由于未能把握住这一关键环节，科西克对现实的理解仍然不够精准，这不仅直接导致其在理论上陷入主观主义，而且也使他不得不走向悲观主义，将人类解放托付于同当下社会的决然断裂，即“依赖于一个完全不同的基础，并需要一种绝对不同的人、自然、真理和历史的概念化”[10]（P72）。科西克的悲观主义在评论捷克文学家雅洛斯拉夫·哈谢克的《好兵帅克》中表现地尤为突出，哈谢克试图用帅克怪诞的行为证明系统的荒诞性，但科西克则要表明，尽管帅克抵制系统的举动令人佩服，但他并没有真正战胜系统，只是给予绝望中的人们一丝希望。

In summary, Kosík’s Marxist conception of reality accurately distinguishes between fact and reality, phenomenon and essence. His critique of capitalist society can be said to hit the nail on the head and strike at the vital point, and his understanding of dialectics also differs from Soviet dogmatic Marxism, providing new ideas for reflecting on the subject and practice. However, it should also be noted that Eastern European neo-Marxism, like Western Marxism, has tendencies toward subjectivism, utopianism, and pessimism in its understanding of some core issues. This stems both from a narrow understanding of capitalist society and from ingrained prejudices against socialist society. The theoretical gains and losses of this school still merit reflection today.

综上所述，科西克的马克思主义现实观准确区分了事实和现实、现象和本质，其对资本主义社会的批判可谓一针见血、直击要害，而他对辩证法的理解也有别苏联教条化马克思主义，为人们反思主体和实践问题提供了新的思路。但也应看到，东欧新马克思主义与西方马克思主义一样，在一些核心问题的理解上有主观主义、乌托邦主义和悲观主义的倾向，这既源于对资本主义社会的狭隘理解，也源于对社会主义社会的固有成见，其理论得失至今仍值得人们反思。

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑