"The Economics of Shortage" and the Systemic Crisis of Global Capitalism

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, a persistent phenomenon of shortage has emerged in global capitalist countries, particularly in the advanced Western nations, with global energy and food prices rising sharply, attracting widespread attention and discussion. Many believe that this phenomenon is primarily caused by exogenous shocks such as the pandemic and will gradually disappear as the pandemic recedes. However, the shortages over these three years may have a more complex background and more far-reaching implications. According to the latest report by the International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook*, global economic growth is projected to decline further in 2023, and although inflation has peaked, it will not fall back to pre-pandemic levels even by 2024.[1]1 International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook*, October 2022. An editorial in the American *Atlantic Monthly* at the end of 2022 elevated the issue of shortage to the level of a fundamental problem, pointing out that the basic contradiction of the U.S. economy has shifted from "Americans cannot afford to buy things" to "there are not enough goods to purchase," and that this shift is directly related to the stage of "secular stagnation" — characterized by low investment, low labor productivity growth, and low interest rates — that former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers argued the world economy had entered.[2]2 *The Atlantic Monthly*, "The New American Shortage," December 2022.

2020年新冠肺炎疫情暴发以来，全球资本主义国家特别是西方发达国家出现了持续性短缺现象，全球能源和食品价格大幅攀升，引起了广泛的关注和讨论。许多人认为，这种现象主要是由新冠肺炎疫情这样的外生冲击带来的，并且会随着疫情的结束而逐渐消失。但是，这三年间的短缺可能有着更为复杂的背景和更为深远的影响。根据国际货币基金组织最近发表的报告《世界经济展望》,2023年全球经济增长率预计会进一步下降，尽管通货膨胀率已经见顶，但即使到2024年，通胀率也不会下降到疫情之前的水平。1美国《大西洋月刊》2022年底的一篇社论将短缺问题上升到根本问题的高度，指出美国经济的基本矛盾已经从“美国人买不起东西”转变为“没有足够的商品可以购买”,而这一转向与美国前财政部长劳伦斯·萨默斯曾提出的世界经济进入低投资、低劳动生产率增长、低利率的“长期停滞”阶段直接相关。2

In people's stereotypical view, "shortage" has always been a label attached to traditional socialist countries, as if capitalism is plagued only by "surplus." This is linked to two representative academic works: János Kornai's *The Economics of Shortage*, which regards shortage as an inherent feature of the traditional socialist system, and John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society*, which portrays the post-World War II United States as a society of extreme material abundance. But if we broaden our perspective slightly, we find that capitalist countries on the periphery of the world system have never escaped the state of shortage; even developed capitalist countries like the United States experienced widespread shortages in the 1970s. At that time, the oil crisis intensified the contradictions of the post-war capitalist accumulation regime, ultimately evolving into a stagflation crisis. The widespread shortages in the global capitalist economy from 2020 to 2022 appear to be triggered by a series of exogenous factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme climate events, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, considering the intensifying contradictions of the neoliberal capital accumulation regime since 1980, especially the prolonged stagnation of capitalism for over a decade after the 2008 international financial crisis, it is necessary to explore the nature of global capitalist shortages and their future trajectory from the perspective of the deepening systemic crisis of capitalism.

在人们的刻板印象里，“短缺”一直是贴在传统社会主义国家身上的标签，似乎困扰资本主义的只有“过剩”。这与两部具有代表性的学术著作有关，一是亚诺什·科尔内的《短缺经济学》,其将短缺视为传统社会主义制度的内在特征；二是约翰·肯尼思·加尔布雷斯的《丰裕社会》,其将二战后的美国视为物质产品极为丰裕的社会。但如果我们的视野稍微开阔一点，便会发现处于世界体系外围的资本主义国家从未摆脱短缺状态；即便是美国等发达资本主义国家在20世纪70年代也曾发生大面积短缺。当时，石油危机激化了战后资本主义积累体制的矛盾，并最终演变为滞胀危机。2020—2022年全球资本主义经济的普遍短缺看似是由新冠肺炎疫情、极端气候、俄乌冲突等一系列外生因素所引发，但考虑到1980年以来新自由主义资本积累体制矛盾的不断加剧，尤其是2008年国际金融危机后资本主义持续十几年长期停滞的状况，有必要从资本主义系统性危机不断深化的角度来探讨全球资本主义短缺的性质以及未来的可能走向。

I. The Widespread Phenomenon of Shortage in Global Capitalism, 2020–2022

一、2020—2022年全球资本主义的普遍短缺现象

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, global capitalism experienced all-around chaos and shortages. Supply chain crises, energy crises, food shortages, labor shortages, and other forms of shortage coexisted and intertwined, with far-reaching impacts. Although various exogenous shocks were the direct causes of the shortages, the shortage phenomenon of this period profoundly reflects the technical characteristics and institutional attributes of contemporary capitalist production.

新冠肺炎疫情暴发后，全球资本主义出现了全方位的混乱与短缺，供应链危机、能源危机、粮食短缺、劳动力短缺等各个领域的短缺同时存在且相互交织，影响深远。尽管各种外生冲击是造成短缺的直接原因，但这个时期的短缺现象深刻地体现了当前资本主义生产的技术特征与制度属性。

(1) Shortages in the Transport Sector and the Supply Chain Crisis

(一)运输业短缺与供应链危机

After the pandemic, the first shortages to emerge were in the transport sector, which then evolved into a full-blown supply chain crisis and shortages of industrial goods. In the early stages of the pandemic's spread, due to reduced economic activity and lower household incomes, no obvious contradictions appeared in the transport sector. But entering 2021, as developed countries took the lead in reopening, coupled with the recovery of import demand in the United States under the government's "unlimited easing" stimulus policies, shortages in the transport sector quickly appeared and spread. According to research by the International Monetary Fund, the average global shipping time began to rise significantly from the end of 2020. By December 2021, the average global shipping delay exceeded 1.5 days, and sailing time increased by 25%. Among these, the average delay time at U.S. ports increased by 8 days compared to 2019, and at the Port of Los Angeles it increased by as much as 17 days, most of which was due to port congestion.[3]3 International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook*, October 2022, Chapter 1. By 2022, port congestion had still not significantly improved. According to data from the British broker Clarksons, in July 2022, 37.8% of the global container fleet capacity was stuck in ports, exceeding the peak recorded in October 2021 and far above the pre-pandemic average of 31.5% for 2016–2019.[4]4 Clarksons Research, "Container Port Congestion Tracker," July 2022.

疫情之后，首先显现出来的是运输业的短缺，进而演变为全面的供应链危机与工业品短缺。在疫情蔓延之初，由于经济活动减少、居民收入降低，运输业没有显现出明显的矛盾。但进入2021年后，随着发达国家率先放开，加之美国在政府“无限宽松”刺激政策下进口需求复苏，运输行业的短缺现象很快出现并蔓延开来。根据国际货币基金组织的研究，全球航运平均用时从2020年底开始明显加速上升，截至2021年12月，全球航运平均延误超过1.5天，航行时间增加25%。其中美国港口的平均延误时间相比于2019年增加了8天，洛杉矶港口更是增加了17天之久，其中大部分是由于港内拥堵造成的。3到了2022年，港口的堵塞状况仍未明显好转。根据英国经纪商克拉克森的数据，2022年7月，全球37.8%的集装箱船队运力滞留港口，超过2021年10月记录的峰值，远高于疫情前2016—2019年间的平均水平31.5%。4

The shortages in the transport sector stemmed partly from pandemic-induced labor shortages and from long-term underinvestment in port infrastructure in the context of deindustrialization in developed countries.[5]5 See, for example, the discussion in *The Economist*, "The Supply Chain Crisis," October 2021. In addition, the characteristics of shipping are also an important factor. Before the pandemic, the flow of containers around the world was relatively balanced, and shipowners usually did not need to return empty after completing transport. But after the pandemic, due to differences in the pace of economic recovery and containment policies across countries and regions, especially as exports from East Asian countries to the United States even exceeded pre-pandemic levels while demand in other directions did not increase correspondingly, this led to a shortage of empty containers on the export side, port congestion on the import side, and an overall rise in transport costs.[6]6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport 2022*, Chapter 3.

运输行业的短缺部分源于疫情带来的劳动力短缺，以及发达国家去工业化背景下港口基础设施长期投资不足。5此外，船舶运输的特性也是重要因素。疫情之前，集装箱在世界各地的流动是相对平衡的，船主通常不需要在运输完成后空船返回。但在疫情后，由于各个国家和地区的经济恢复状况与封控政策的差异，尤其是东亚国家向美国的出口甚至超过疫情前，而其他方向的需求并未相应增加，从而导致出口方空箱短缺，而进口方港口堵塞，总体运输成本上升。6

According to the *Review of Maritime Transport 2022* published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, shipping accounts for over 80% of global trade volume, and the rise in shipping costs and the decline in maritime connectivity have led to consequences such as rising global inflation, food shortages, and supply chain disruptions.[7]7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport 2022*, Executive Summary. In fact, shortages in the transport sector were merely the trigger for the supply chain crisis. The fragility of supply chains stems more from two important changes in global production since the 1980s: first, the formation of global production networks has split the production process of individual products into different links and modules, completed by different countries and regions through division of labor; therefore, an interruption in a single link is more likely than before to be transmitted to the entire network. Second, the widespread adoption of the "just-in-time" production method, which has even evolved into a "zero inventory" management model, has lowered enterprise costs but is highly dependent on a good match between raw material inputs and finished product outputs.

根据联合国贸易和发展会议发布的《2022年世界海运评述》,船舶运输量占全球贸易总量的80%以上，而航运成本的上升和海运连通性的降低导致了全球通货膨胀率上升、食品短缺、供应链中断等后果。7事实上，运输业短缺仅仅是供应链危机的导火索，供应链的脆弱性更多源于20世纪80年代以来全球生产的两个重要变化：一是全球生产网络的形成使得单个产品的生产过程被拆分为不同环节和模块，由不同国家和地区分工完成，因此，单个环节的中断相比于之前更有可能会传导到整个网络；二是“准时制”生产方式的普及，甚至发展为“零库存”管理模式，这种生产方式压低了企业成本，但高度依赖原料输入与成品输出之间的良好匹配。

In the global supply chain crisis of 2020–2022, the chip shortage is a typical manifestation of the fragility of current global production networks. On the supply side, global chip manufacturing is mainly concentrated in East Asia and the United States. In 2021, chip supply was simultaneously affected by the Sino-U.S. trade friction and extreme climate events in the Taiwan region of China and the U.S. state of Texas. Entering 2022, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict exacerbated difficulties in chip supply, because the two countries produce 70% of the world's neon, an indispensable raw material for chip production. On the demand side, against the backdrop of ongoing digitalization in various production and consumption sectors, the impact of the chip shortage has been all-encompassing. According to Goldman Sachs analysis, at least 169 industries worldwide have been affected by the chip crisis, including not only the consumer electronics and automotive industries, which are clearly dependent on chips, but also traditional manufacturing sectors such as steelmaking and food and beverage production.[8]8 Goldman Sachs, "The Chip Shortage: How It's Affecting 169 Industries," April 2021. Similar transmission mechanisms are also widespread in other sectors.

在2020—2022年全球供应链危机中，芯片短缺是当前全球生产网络脆弱性的典型体现。在供给方面，全球芯片制造主要分布在东亚和美国。2021年，芯片供应同时受到中美贸易摩擦以及中国台湾地区与美国得克萨斯州极端气候的影响。进入2022年，俄乌冲突的爆发加剧了芯片供应的困难，因为俄乌两国生产了全球70%的氖，而氖是芯片生产不可或缺的原材料。需求方面，在各生产和消费领域不断数字化的背景下，芯片短缺带来的影响是全方位的。据高盛公司分析，全球至少有169个行业受到芯片危机的影响，其中不仅包括明显依赖芯片的消费电子产业和汽车产业，也包括钢铁制造、食品饮料生产等传统制造业。8类似的传导机制在其他部门也普遍存在。

(2) Energy and Food Shortages

(二)能源与粮食短缺

Since the beginning of 2021, energy and food shortages have plagued many countries, and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022 further exacerbated global energy and food security issues. If shortages in the transport sector and the supply chain crisis reflect the complexity and fragility of global production networks, then energy and food shortages directly threaten the important material foundations of economic operation and social reproduction.

自2021年初，能源与粮食的短缺开始困扰许多国家，2022年2月爆发的俄乌冲突更加剧了全球能源与粮食安全问题。如果说运输业短缺和供应链危机体现了全球生产网络的复杂性与脆弱性，那么，能源和粮食的短缺则直接威胁经济运行与社会再生产的重要物质基础。

The International Energy Agency believes that the severity of the current energy crisis is comparable to the oil crisis of the 1970s, and the close interconnection of national economies has amplified its impact. Among these, natural-gas-intensive manufacturing enterprises in the global production network are mainly concentrated in Europe, while Europe’s natural gas supply relies primarily on Russia. Therefore, after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, many European manufacturing enterprises saw a sharp increase in energy costs, were forced to reduce production or even shut down, and the high inflation linked to energy shortages has also driven many households into poverty.[9]9 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” October 2022. The food shortage is equally severe. According to *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022* published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other agencies, compared with before the pandemic, the number of people facing hunger globally and those in a state of moderate or severe food insecurity increased by 150 million and 350 million respectively in 2021.[10]10 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO, *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022* (Rome: FAO, 2022). In terms of distribution, the increase in hunger and malnutrition mainly comes from developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but the problem is also prominent in developed countries. According to World Bank data, under the general situation of high global inflation, from October 2022 to January 2023, the inflation rate of food prices in European countries was more than 5% higher than the CPI for the same period. As a result, household sectors had to allocate a larger share of their income to purchasing food and reduced the quantity of food consumed.[11]11 World Bank, “Food Security Update,” April 13, 2023.

国际能源署认为，当前能源危机的严重程度堪比20世纪70年代的石油危机，各国经济的紧密联系更是放大了其影响。其中，全球生产网络中的天然气密集型制造企业主要分布在欧洲，而欧洲的天然气供应又主要依赖俄罗斯，因此，在俄乌冲突爆发后许多欧洲制造业企业的能源成本剧增，被迫减产甚至停工，与能源短缺相关的高通胀也使许多家庭陷入贫困。9粮食短缺问题同样严重。根据联合国粮食及农业组织等机构发布的《世界粮食安全和营养状况2022》,相较于疫情暴发前，2021年全球面临饥饿的人数和处于中度或重度粮食不安全状态的人口分别增加了1.5亿和3.5亿。10从分布上看，饥饿与营养不良人数的增加主要来自亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲的发展中国家，但发达国家的问题也很突出。根据世界银行的数据，在全球通货膨胀率普遍高企的情况下，2022年10月至2023年1月欧洲国家食品价格的通胀率比同时期的CPI要高出5%以上，为此家庭部门不得不将收入中更大的份额用于购买食物，并减少食物的消费数量。11

In recent years, the global energy and food shortages have been caused by multiple factors, some of which are difficult to eliminate in the short term. First, the frequent extreme weather events worldwide in recent years are a common cause of both crop reduction and energy shortages. Although extreme weather does not necessarily affect the production of traditional fossil energy enterprises, it impacts the production of new energy, thereby increasing demand for traditional energy. Second, because modern agriculture relies heavily on chemical fertilizers, and fossil energy is the main raw material for fertilizers, the energy shortage itself exacerbates the food shortage. Finally, both energy and food shortages are closely related to the international situation. For example, the wheat exports of Russia and Ukraine once accounted for one-third of global exports, while Russia is the world’s largest exporter of fossil energy and a major exporter of fertilizers. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has intensified the severity of global energy and food shortages.[12]12 FAO, “The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the Current Conflict,” March 2022.

近年来，全球能源与粮食短缺是由多种因素共同造成的，其中一些因素很难在短期内被消除。首先，近年来全球范围内频发的极端气候是粮食减产和能源短缺的共同原因。极端气候虽然不一定影响传统化石能源企业的生产，但会冲击新能源的生产，从而增加对传统能源的需求。其次，由于现代农业严重依赖化肥，而化石能源是化肥的主要原料，因此，能源短缺本身又会加剧粮食短缺。最后，能源短缺与粮食短缺都与国际局势密切相关，如俄乌两国的小麦出口量曾占全球出口的1/3,而俄罗斯则是全球最大化石能源出口国以及化肥主要出口国，俄乌冲突加剧了全球能源和粮食短缺的严重程度。12

However, even before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, surpluses and shortages of energy and food had been in continuous and violent fluctuation.[13]13 For example, the global food price index of the FAO fluctuated violently between 2019 and 2021. See FAO, “FAO Food Price Index,” various issues. This fluctuation is not controlled by any single country but is severely influenced by international geopolitics (for example, the long-standing game between OPEC and European and American countries), and is amplified by financial capital’s speculative activities in commodities.

然而，即便在俄乌冲突爆发前，能源与粮食的过剩与短缺便处于持续的剧烈波动中。13这种波动不受单个国家的控制，而是严重受到国际地缘政治的影响(例如欧佩克与欧美国家长期以来的博弈),并且由于金融资本对大宗商品的投机活动而放大。

(3) Labor Shortage

(三)劳动力短缺

In traditional perceptions, labor shortage seems to be the only shortage faced by developed capitalist countries, usually linked to high labor costs and low fertility rates in developed countries. However, the labor shortage in recent years has exhibited a different nature.

在传统认知中，劳动力短缺似乎是发达资本主义国家面临的唯一短缺，这种短缺通常与发达国家的高劳动力成本和低生育率联系在一起，但近两年的劳动力短缺却呈现出不同的性质。

First, under the impact of the pandemic, many workers were unable to work due to illness. Because of repeated infections with the novel coronavirus and the effects of long COVID, some of the labor force may be unable to enter the labor market normally for a considerable period, which undoubtedly exacerbates the already tight labor supply in developed capitalist countries. According to an analysis report by the Brookings Institution in August 2022, approximately 16 million working-age Americans were infected with “long COVID,” of whom 2 to 4 million lost their jobs as a result.[14]14 Katie Bach, “New Data Shows Long COVID Is Keeping as Many as 4 Million People Out of Work,” Brookings Institution, August 24, 2022. According to data from the U.S. Department of Labor, as of December 2022, there were 11 million job vacancies in the United States, accounting for 6.7% of total positions, an increase of more than 4 million compared with January 2020.[15]15 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey,” December 2022. The labor shortage is comprehensive, with vacancies in warehousing, logistics, and sales-related positions exceeding 1.7 million, comparable to the 1.9 million vacancies for medical staff. This is also one of the important reasons for the shortage in the transportation industry mentioned earlier.

首先，疫情影响下，许多工人因疾病而无法工作。由于反复感染新冠病毒及受到新冠后遗症的影响，部分劳动力可能在相当长的一段时间内都无法正常进入劳动力市场，这无疑使发达资本主义国家本就紧张的劳动力供给雪上加霜。根据布鲁金斯学会2022年8月的一份分析报告，约有1600万处于工作年龄的美国人感染了“长新冠”,其中200—400万人因此失业。14而根据美国劳工部的数据，截至2022年12月，美国有1100万个岗位空缺，占总岗位数的6.7%,比2020年1月增加了400多万。15劳动力短缺是全方位的，其中与仓储、物流和销售相关的岗位空缺达到170多万，与医护人员190多万的空缺相当，这也正是前文提到的造成运输业短缺的重要原因之一。

Second, the social contradictions accumulated during the neoliberal period erupted intensively against the backdrop of the pandemic, exacerbating the labor shortage. Since the 1980s, major capitalist countries in the world have generally implemented neoliberal policies, adopting measures such as suppressing trade union power and dismantling social protections, leading to a comprehensive decline in the organizational strength, relative income, and risk-resistance capacity of the working class. During the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, some workers withdrew from the labor market due to illness, and their income and quality of life plummeted. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie attempted to recover losses caused by the pandemic by requiring on-the-job workers to engage in higher-intensity work without providing pandemic protection, while also trying to reduce wage costs. Coupled with severe inflation caused by the global supply chain crisis, the situation of the working class became increasingly difficult. Against this backdrop, labor-capital conflicts in capitalist countries intensified. According to data from the U.S. Department of Labor, from 2020 to 2022, the number of work stoppages involving more than 1,000 workers annually in the United States increased from 8 to 22, and the resulting workdays lost rose from 966,000 to 2.213 million.[16]16 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Work Stoppages Involving 1,000 or More Workers,” 2020–2022. The situation in other countries was similar. According to Bloomberg News, from U.S. railways and ports to Australian natural gas fields and truck transport in Peru, labor-capital conflicts at key nodes of the global supply chain were escalating.[17]17 Bloomberg, “Global Supply Chain Labor Unrest Spreads from U.S. to Australia,” October 2022. In these struggles, the main demands of the working class included higher wages and workplace pandemic protection, all closely related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the comprehensive material shortages.[18]18 For example, in 2022, railway workers in the United States threatened a nationwide strike demanding paid sick leave and higher wages. See *The Guardian*, “US Rail Workers Threaten Strike over Sick Leave and Pay,” September 2022.

其次，新自由主义时期积累的社会矛盾在疫情的背景下集中爆发，加剧了劳动力的短缺。20世纪80年代以来，世界主要资本主义国家普遍实行新自由主义政策，采取了打压工会力量、取消社会保护等措施，导致工人阶级的组织力量、相对收入和抗风险能力全面下降。在新冠肺炎疫情蔓延期间，部分工人因疾病退出劳动力市场，收入和生活质量也急剧下降；而资产阶级试图挽回疫情带来的损失，因此，在不提供防疫保护的情况下，要求在岗工人从事强度更高的工作，同时还试图降低工资成本。加之全球供应链危机导致的严重通胀，工人阶级的处境愈发困难。在这样的背景下，资本主义国家的劳资冲突愈演愈烈。根据美国劳工部的数据，从2020年到2022年，美国每年超过1000人以上的停工次数从8起增加到22起，造成的工作天数损失也从96.6万天增加到221.3万天。16其他国家情况也很相似。据彭博社报道，从美国的铁路与港口到澳大利亚的天然气田，再到秘鲁的卡车运输，全球供应链关键节点上的劳资冲突都在升级。17在这些斗争中，工人阶级的主要诉求包括提高工资待遇、提供工作场所的疫情防护等，这些都与新冠肺炎疫情和物资全面短缺带来的影响密切相关。18

The labor shortage is both a result of the comprehensive shortage in the capitalist economy during the COVID-19 pandemic and may become a cause that further exacerbates the shortage. Material shortages lead to a rise in the reproduction cost of labor power, while a shortage of labor in key positions also exacerbates difficulties in material production. This bears some resemblance to the shortage situation of the 1970s: in both cases, capitalist production encountered resource constraints, there was severe inflation, and labor-capital struggles revolved around inflation. Although the organizational capacity of the working class today is far inferior to that of the 1970s, the global production network is also more fragile, and a continuously strengthening vicious cycle between material shortages and labor shortages remains possible.

劳动力短缺既是新冠肺炎疫情期间资本主义经济陷入全面短缺的结果，也可能会成为进一步加剧短缺的原因。物资短缺带来劳动力再生产价格的上升，而关键岗位劳动力不足同样会加剧物质生产的困难。这与20世纪70年代的短缺状况有一定相似之处：同样是资本主义生产遇到资源约束，同样是严重的通货膨胀，也同样是围绕通货膨胀展开的劳资斗争。尽管当前工人阶级的组织性远不如20世纪70年代，但全球生产网络也更加脆弱，物资短缺与劳动力短缺之间仍有可能形成不断增强的恶性循环。

II. The Relationship between “Shortage” and Capitalism

二、“短缺”与资本主义的关系

The comprehensive and far-reaching impact of the shortage in global capitalism from 2020 to 2022 raises the theoretical demand for further exploring the relationship between capitalism and shortage. Although shortage is not uncommon in capitalist economies, people tend to associate shortage with traditional socialism. In theoretical circles, one of the most important drivers of this stereotype is the theory of the economics of shortage by the Hungarian economist Kornai. This theory holds that shortage is an inevitable result of the traditional socialist system. This section will re-examine Kornai’s theory, pointing out that although Kornai’s theory of shortage mainly targets the traditional socialist system, the shortage mechanisms he describes have a certain applicability to different social systems. At the same time, limited by its micro-level perspective, the “economics of shortage” only explains the potential possibility of shortage, and the way this possibility is ultimately realized depends on the preconditions for normal production order.

2020—2022年全球资本主义的短缺具有全面且深远的影响，这提出了进一步探讨资本主义与短缺之间关系的理论要求。尽管短缺在资本主义经济中并非罕见，但人们往往倾向于将短缺与传统社会主义联系起来。在理论界，造成这种刻板印象最重要的推手之一便是匈牙利经济学家科尔内关于短缺经济的学说。这一学说认为，短缺是传统社会主义制度所带来的不可避免的结果。本部分将重新考察科尔内的学说，指出尽管科尔内关于短缺的学说主要针对的是传统社会主义制度，但其描述的短缺机制对于不同的社会制度均有一定的适用性。同时，受其微观视角的局限， “短缺经济学”只是解释了短缺的潜在可能性，而这种可能性最终实现的方式取决于正常生产秩序所依赖的前提条件。

(1) The Definitional Issue of “Shortage”

(一)“短缺”的定义问题

Frank N. Magill’s *International Encyclopedia of Economics* defines shortage as a situation in which the price of a commodity is below the market-clearing equilibrium price, so that the quantity people wish to purchase exceeds the supply.[19]19 Frank N. Magill, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Economics*, Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 986. Most economics literature follows this definition when using the concept of “shortage.” In this discursive system, a fully market-dominated economy would never experience persistent shortage, because once demand for a commodity exceeds supply, its price rises until a new supply-demand equilibrium is reached. By this logic, all factors causing shortage can only come from outside the market, and these factors prevent market prices from tending toward an equilibrium state. In theoretical models of shortage, improper government intervention is often regarded as the “chief culprit” causing shortage, such as the government setting “official prices”[20]20 “Official prices” refers to prices set by government decree rather than by market forces, a common feature in planned economies. or imposing quotas on specific commodities.[21]21 Quotas here refer to government-imposed limits on the quantity of a good that can be produced, consumed, or traded. This market-equilibrium-based definition has influenced the judgment of mainstream Western scholars on the future trajectory of capitalist shortages since the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the World Economic Forum predicted that there would be no large-scale shortages in 2023, on the grounds that as household living costs rise and inflation prevails, effective demand will decrease and the market will re-establish equilibrium.[22]22 World Economic Forum, “Global Shortages: What They Are and Why They Might Not End in 2023,” January 2023.

弗兰克·N.马吉尔的《经济学百科全书》将短缺定义为商品价格低于市场出清的均衡价格，从而人们希望购买产品的数量超过供给的情况。19大多数经济学文献在使用“短缺”这一概念时遵循了这种定义。在这种话语体系中，完全由市场主导的经济根本不会出现持续性短缺，因为一旦对某种商品的需求超过供给，其价格便会上升，直至达到新的供求均衡为止。按照这个逻辑，一切造成短缺的因素只能来自市场之外，这些因素会阻碍市场价格趋向均衡状态。而在关于短缺的理论模型中，政府不当的干预行为往往被认为是造成短缺的“罪魁祸首”,比如政府设置“官方价格”20,或者政府对特定商品设置配额21,等等。这种基于市场均衡的定义影响了西方主流学者对新冠肺炎疫情以来资本主义短缺的未来走向的判断，例如，世界经济论坛便预测2023年不会出现大规模短缺，理由是随着家庭生活成本的上升、通胀盛行，有效需求会降低，市场会重新达到均衡。22

The above definition focuses on how to allocate a given resource supply in a partial market, which gives rise to two important issues. First, from the perspective of commodity demanders, “shortage” usually manifests as a shock to some “normal state.” Because producers or consumers cannot obtain from the market the quantity of products they originally expected, their economic activity plans are disrupted, and this disruption cannot be simply repaired by a rise in the equilibrium price. Moreover, understanding shortage from the perspective of a partial market may overlook the complexity arising from the interdependence of various sectors in a modern economy. For example, a rise in energy prices might create a new equilibrium in the energy market, but as energy is an important industrial input, its price increase may in turn produce new shocks to the supply-demand conditions of many other products, thereby causing shortages in micro-markets to spread throughout the entire economy.

上述定义的重点在于如何在局部市场上对于给定的资源供给进行配置，由此带来两个重要问题。首先，站在商品需求者的角度，“短缺”通常表现为对某种“正常状态”的冲击。由于无法从市场中获得原先预期数量的产品，生产者或消费者的经济活动计划被打断，而这种打断不能简单地通过均衡价格的上涨修复。此外，从局部市场的角度理解短缺可能会忽视现代经济各部门相互依赖所产生的复杂性，例如，能源价格上涨或许会使能源市场形成新的均衡，但能源作为重要的工业投入品，其价格上涨又可能对许多其他产品的供求状况产生新的冲击，从而导致微观市场的短缺扩散到整个经济。

Kornai’s *Economics of Shortage*, starting from the actual production experience of traditional socialism, provides a measure of shortage different from that of mainstream Western economics: shortage means the inability to obtain the inputs needed to realize some “serious intention.” And what is called a “serious intention” is the daily shop-floor work plan.[23]23 János Kornai, *Economics of Shortage* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980), p. 25. As for the demand side corresponding to the supply side, the reason Kornai chose to express it as the seemingly vague “serious intention” rather than the more intuitive “effective demand backed by purchasing power” is mainly that under the traditional socialist system, the price mechanism played a limited role in most economic activities, and production adjustments were based primarily on product quantities rather than prices.[24]24 In traditional socialist economies, prices were largely administrative tools; production targets were set in physical units (tons, meters, etc.) rather than responding to price signals. This allows Kornai’s perspective to transcend market price phenomena and discuss, within the concrete production process, how the quantity demand for a certain input is formed. If the formation of “serious intention” under different social systems can be generalized, a more universal definition of “shortage” can be obtained.

科尔内的《短缺经济学》从传统社会主义的实际生产经验出发，给出了一个与西方主流经济学不同的短缺衡量标准：短缺意味着不能得到实现某种严肃意图所需要的投入。而所谓“严肃意图”,就是车间日作业计划。23对于与供给端相对应的需求端，科尔内之所以选择将其表述为看似模糊的“严肃意图”而非更为直观的“有购买力的有效需求”,主要是因为在传统社会主义制度下，价格机制在绝大部分经济活动中作用有限，生产调节的依据主要是产品数量而非价格。24这使得科尔内的视角能够超越市场价格现象，在具体的生产过程中讨论对某种投入品的数量需求是如何形成的。如果能将不同社会制度下“严肃意图”的形成进行一般化概括，便能得到对“短缺”更为普适的定义。

In any stably operating social system, producers and consumers form reasonable expectations about the products they can obtain, based on past experience and the conditions of other economies at a similar stage of development. This is the basis for the formation of “serious intention.” The meaning of “serious” lies in the fact that it is formed within specific production modes and institutional constraints, distinct from “needs” that are governed by individual desires and ignore material conditions. Although individual demand for commodities fluctuates from time to time, the total demand of all economic participants in the entire society for each commodity is relatively stable; this is the prerequisite for enterprises to organize production. In a capitalist economy, “serious intention” depends on the investment and consumption decisions made by economic agents based on past experience, and whether it can be realized depends on budget constraints such as monetary income, monetary savings, and financing channels. Under the traditional socialist system, the realization of an enterprise’s “serious intention” might depend less on budget constraints measured in monetary units, but the mechanism for forming “serious intention” is similar to that in a capitalist economy.

在任何一个稳定运行的社会制度中，生产者和消费者根据过去的经验以及处于类似阶段的其他经济体的状况，形成对于可获得产品的合理预期，这就是“严肃意图”形成的基础。“严肃”的含义在于，它是在特定的生产方式与制度约束中形成的，有别于受到个别欲望所支配的、无视物质条件限制的“需要”。尽管个体对于商品的需求时有波动，但整个社会所有经济参与者对每种商品的总需求是相对稳定的，这是企业组织生产的前提。在资本主义经济中，“严肃意图”取决于经济当事人根据过去的经验所形成的投资与消费决策，而它能否实现则取决于货币收入、货币储蓄、融资渠道等预算约束限制。在传统社会主义制度下，企业“严肃意图”的实现或许较少取决于以货币为单位的预算约束，但“严肃意图”的形成机制与资本主义经济是相似的。

(2) The Formation of “Serious Intention” and the Persistence of Shortage

(二) “严肃意图”的形成与短缺的持续性

In a general sense, “serious intention” may exceed product supply in two situations. The first situation is when factors outside the economy, such as the political system and ideology, affect people’s expectations of obtaining products, thereby causing “serious intention” to be persistently higher than actual supply, leading to continuous shortage—that is, economic production is long unable to meet people’s demands for obtaining social products. This is precisely the situation faced by the traditional socialist system. From this perspective, the socialist catch-up goal, which Kornai considered a non-essential cause, may in fact be an important factor explaining shortage. The tendency of enterprises under the traditional socialist system to overspend their budgets was, to a large extent, the result of the catch-up pressure faced by the 20th-century socialist camp being transmitted to the enterprise level. This pressure prompted enterprise managers to formulate taut production plans in order to better meet the assessments imposed by their superiors. On the other hand, under the Cold War structure, the notion that “socialism has greater superiority than capitalism” led people in Eastern European countries to benchmark their welfare levels against those of neighboring developed capitalist countries, despite the non-negligible gap in industrialization levels and economic development between the two camps before World War II.[25]25 The reference is to the post-WWII Cold War competition between the US-led capitalist bloc and the Soviet-led socialist bloc, where each side claimed systemic superiority. This caused people’s “serious intention” for consumer goods under the traditional socialist system to be persistently pushed upward, exceeding the resource constraints faced by their countries, thereby resulting in shortage. As Kalecki acutely pointed out, the relationship between short-term consumption and long-term investment under the socialist system is the foremost political issue.[26]26 Michał Kalecki, *Selected Essays on the Economic Growth of the Socialist and the Mixed Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 162.

就一般意义而言，“严肃意图”可能在两种情况下超过产品供给。第一种情况是政治制度、意识形态等经济之外的因素影响人们获得产品的预期，从而使得“严肃意图”长期高于实际供给，并由此带来持续短缺，即经济生产长期无法满足人们获得社会产品的要求。这种情况正是传统社会主义制度所面临的状况。从这个角度来看，被科尔内认为是非本质原因的社会主义赶超目标可能恰恰是解释短缺的重要因素。传统社会主义制度下企业超预算支出的倾向在很大程度上是20世纪社会主义阵营面临的赶超压力传导至企业层面的结果，这种压力促使企业管理者制定紧张的生产计划，以更好地完成上级对其的考核。另一方面，在冷战格局下，“社会主义比资本主义具有更强的优越性”的观念促使东欧国家的人们将福利水平与邻近的发达资本主义国家对标，尽管两大阵营在二战前的工业化水平与经济发展水平上存在着不可忽视的差距。25这使得传统社会主义制度下，人们对消费品的 “严肃意图”长期被推高，超出了所在国家面临的资源约束，进而造成短缺的结果。正如卡莱斯基敏锐指出的，社会主义制度下短期消费与长期投资之间的关系是排在第一位的政治问题。26

The second situation arises when the normal order of economic production is disrupted, breaking people’s experience and expectations of obtaining specific quantities of products. This situation is more universal and is precisely the situation faced by current capitalist shortages. The traditional socialist economy frequently experienced this type of shortage, because some industries might face technological or organizational bottlenecks that prevented them from keeping pace with the growth of target expectations.[27]27 “Bottlenecks” refer to sectors or stages of production whose limited capacity constrains the growth of the entire economy, a concept widely discussed in development economics and socialist planning theory. Similarly, when a capitalist crisis occurs, people’s expectations of a normal economic order are disrupted, and shortage and surplus coexist in different senses. Theoretically, a shortage caused by a disruption of economic order should not last very long, because people may revise their past experience and re-plan their economic activities to adapt to price increases and insufficient commodity supply. Households may reduce consumption of specific commodities, enterprises may change their input mix, and ultimately a new economic normal will form. However, in reality, capitalist economic crises can last for a considerable period, because the factors causing the production disruption may be systemic rather than partial. In a systemic crisis, the material and institutional prerequisites on which the previous normal economic production order depended are destroyed, and the formation of a new order may take longer than market adjustment and expectation adaptation.

第二种情况是由于正常的经济生产秩序中断，人们获得特定数量产品的经验与预期被打破。这种情况更加具有普遍意义，也是当前资本主义短缺所面临的情况。传统社会主义经济经常会出现这类短缺，因为部分产业可能面临技术或者组织的瓶颈，从而无法跟上预期目标的增长。27同理，当资本主义危机发生时，人们对于正常经济秩序的预期被打破，短缺与过剩在不同的意义上同时存在。理论上讲，由经济秩序中断带来的短缺不会持续很长时间，因为人们可能会修正自己过去的经验，重新规划经济活动，以适应价格的上涨和商品供给的不足。家庭可能减少特定商品的消费，企业可能改变投入品组合，最终形成新的经济常态。然而在现实中，资本主义的经济危机可能持续相当长的时间，因为导致生产中断的因素可能是系统性的而非局部的。在系统性危机中，原先正常的经济生产秩序所依赖的物质前提和制度前提会被破坏，而新的秩序的形成可能需要花费比市场调节与预期适应更长的时间。

(3) The Applicability of “The Economics of Shortage” to Capitalism

(三) “短缺经济学”对资本主义的适用性

In *The Economics of Shortage*, Kornai proposed a mechanism of shortage under the socialist system that differs from traditional explanations. In his view, the main cause of shortage is neither policy errors, nor the relatively low material starting point of socialist countries or their goal of catching up with developed capitalist countries, but rather the socialist economic-social relations and institutional conditions, whose core mechanism can be summarized as “soft budget constraint.” Under this mechanism, enterprises can always receive state assistance and will not go bankrupt due to sustained losses. Therefore, enterprises’ demand for inputs is almost unrestricted by solvency, and investment carries no risk. At the same time, out of motives such as professional responsibility, power, social prestige, and material remuneration, enterprise managers will strive to obtain more resources from higher-level planning departments to expand investment, thereby forming “serious intentions” that exceed actual supply quantities.[28]28 János Kornai, *The Economics of Shortage* (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1986), p. 191. [Original Chinese citation retained; the English edition is Kornai, *Economics of Shortage* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980).] The ultimate result is that the more frantically enterprises produce, the more their demand for inputs exceeds supply, and the more severe the general shortage becomes.

在《短缺经济学》中，科尔内提出了一套不同于传统解释的社会主义制度下的短缺机制。在他看来，造成短缺的主要原因既非政策失误，也非社会主义国家相对较低的物质起点或者赶超发达资本主义国家的目标，而是社会主义的经济社会关系与制度条件，其核心机制可用“软预算约束”进行概括。在这种机制下，企业总能得到国家帮助而不会因持续亏损破产。因此，企业对投入品的需求几乎不受偿付能力的限制，投资也没有任何风险。与此同时，企业管理人员出于职业责任、权力、社会名望、物质报酬等动机，会尽可能向上级计划部门争取更多资源以扩大投资，从而形成超出实际供给数量的 “严肃意图”。28最终结果是，企业越拼命生产，其对投入品的需求就越是超过供给，普遍短缺的状况也愈发严重。

From a micro and sub-micro perspective, Kornai described the typical pattern of enterprise production decisions in the Eastern European countries where he lived. From this typical pattern, we can summarize two micro-level preconditions that cause shortage: first, economic participants, especially enterprises, have soft budget constraints; second, these enterprises generally have motives to spend beyond their budgets. These two conditions existed not only under the traditional socialist system but also exist widely in modern capitalism.

科尔内基于微观和亚微观的视角，对其所处的东欧国家中企业生产决策的典型模式进行了描述。我们从这种典型模式中可以概括出两个造成短缺的微观前提：一是经济参与者尤其是企业拥有软预算约束，二是这些企业普遍具有超出预算进行支出的动机。这两个条件不仅在传统社会主义制度下存在，同样也广泛存在于现代资本主义制度中。

Regarding the first condition, Kornai judged whether an enterprise’s budget constraint is soft or hard from five aspects: whether the enterprise has pricing power over its products, whether the tax system is rigid, whether there is state gratuitous allocation, whether there is credit, and whether there is external monetary investment funds.[29]29 János Kornai, *The Economics of Shortage* (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1986), pp. 323–324. Kornai observed that under the capitalist system, enterprises’ budget constraints are “nearly hard,” but there is a trend toward softening. First, with the formation of giant enterprises and the concentration of production, capitalist enterprises have gained monopoly pricing power based on their cost-plus markup. Second, out of consideration for solving unemployment problems, rescuing enterprises whose survival is threatened through tax exemptions, subsidies, government-guaranteed loans, and other forms has become a routine practice in capitalist countries, and this has been strengthened as the limits of government budget deficits expand.[30]30 János Kornai, *The Economics of Shortage* (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1986), pp. 327–328. Although Kornai believed that no universal proposition can be made about the hardness of capitalist enterprises’ budget constraints, we can clearly see from the trajectory of capitalism’s historical development stages that the trend of softening enterprise budget constraints is consistent with the trend of expanding bourgeois economic and political power, and thus with the trend from free-competition capitalism to monopoly capitalism and then to state monopoly capitalism.

对于第一个条件，科尔内从五个方面来判断企业预算是软约束还是硬约束：企业对其产品是否有定价权、税收制度是否具有刚性、是否存在国家无偿拨款、是否存在信贷、是否存在外部的货币投资资金。29科尔内观察到，资本主义制度下企业的预算约束是“近乎硬”的，但有软化的趋势。首先，随着巨型企业的形成和生产的集中，资本主义企业拥有了按照其成本加成的垄断定价权力。其次，出于解决失业问题的考虑，通过免税、补贴、政府担保贷款等形式解救生存受到威胁的企业已成为资本主义国家的惯例，而这一点随着政府预算赤字限度的扩大而加强。30尽管科尔内认为无法对资本主义企业预算约束的硬度提出普遍性命题，但我们能从资本主义历史发展阶段的脉络中清晰地看到，企业预算约束软化的趋势与资产阶级经济和政治权力扩大的趋势是一致的，进而与自由竞争资本主义走向垄断资本主义、再走向国家垄断资本主义的趋势是一致的。

Regarding the second condition, even in the classical capitalist period, when enterprises’ budget constraints were closest to the hardest state as defined by Kornai, over-budget spending based on credit creation by the banking system could still occur, which also created conditions for the periodic overheating of classical capitalism. As Marx said, “In periods of overproduction and speculation, the productive forces are stretched to the utmost, until they exceed the capitalist limits of the production process.”[31]31 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 25 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974), p. 547. [Standard Chinese edition; the English equivalent is Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3 (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 357.] In a typical capitalist economic cycle, the boom phase of rapid credit expansion is precisely when material production gradually approaches the limits of its resource constraints, unemployment falls, and the profit rate begins to decline,[32]32 See Anwar Shaikh, *Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 14. which is the precursor to the outbreak of panic and crisis in the form of relative overproduction.

对于第二个条件，即便是在古典资本主义时期，企业的预算约束接近于科尔内定义的最硬状态，基于银行系统信用创造的超预算支出仍然可能发生，这也为古典资本主义周期性出现过热创造了条件。正如马克思所说：“在生产过剩和投机盛行的时期，生产力伸张到极点，直至越过生产过程的资本主义限制。”31在典型的资本主义经济周期中，信用急剧扩张的繁荣阶段，也正是物质生产逐渐逼近其资源约束的极限、失业率降低、利润率开始下降的阶段32,是狂热转变为恐慌、危机以生产相对过剩形式爆发的前兆。

Since the 1980s, with the rise of global liquidity surplus and financial monopoly capital, soft budget constraints and over-budget spending in capitalist economies have taken on new forms. In the United States, enterprises shifted to a “shareholder value maximization” business model, which ultimately evolved into large enterprises’ shareholder dividends and stock buybacks exceeding profits, with the resulting funding gap filled by loose bank credit.[33]33 See William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, “Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance,” *Economy and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 13–35. Shareholder returns distributed in the form of dividends and buybacks are either used for shareholders’ personal consumption or reinvested in financial markets, and partly used to support the over-consumption of working-class households against the backdrop of long-term wage stagnation. The excess spending under enterprises’ soft budget constraints ultimately transforms into excess consumption by the household sector, and the resulting demand exceeding domestic production capacity is filled through long-term trade deficits. For developing countries, especially emerging economies, soft budget constraints and over-budget spending take another form: enterprises obtain additional funds through the free flow of international financial capital to carry out investment. For these enterprises, whether the state of “over-budget spending” can be maintained depends, of course, on whether their business operations are profitable, but more on the international financial market conditions and the international capital flows brought about by domestic financial speculative opportunities.

20世纪80年代以来，伴随着全球流动性过剩与金融垄断资本的崛起，资本主义经济中的软预算约束与超预算支出呈现出新的形式。在美国，企业转向“股东价值最大化”的经营模式，这种模式最终演变为大企业的股东分红与股票回购超过盈利，由此产生的资金缺口则由宽松的银行信贷填补。33以分红和回购形式发放的股东报酬要么用于股东个人消费，要么重新投入金融市场，并部分用于支持工资长期停滞背景下工人家庭的透支消费。企业软预算约束下的超额支出最终转化为居民部门的超额消费，而由此产生的超出国内生产能力的需求则通过长期的贸易逆差填补。对于发展中国家尤其是新兴经济体而言，软预算约束和超预算支出则表现为另一种形式，即企业通过国际金融资本的自由流动获得额外资金以开展投资。对于这些企业而言，“超预算支出”的状态能否维持固然与其经营活动能否盈利有关，但更多地取决于国际金融市场状况与国内金融投机机会带来的国际资金流动。

In a highly developed modern industrial society, appropriate and repayable over-budget spending is a powerful way to buffer risks. However, the over-budget spending in the above cases is all unsustainable to a certain extent, thus meeting the conditions for forming shortage as summarized by Kornai. At the end of a typical capitalist cycle, the profit rate has already declined, and borrowing based on expectations of future prosperity becomes unsustainable; therefore, shortage becomes a reality during the boom phase. In the case of modern capitalism, economies with over-budget spending can obtain resources from outside to meet their domestic “serious intentions,” which in effect transforms the domestic potential shortage problem into a problem of international trade balance. In this situation, whether shortage occurs depends on whether the order of this international trade balance can be maintained.

在分工高度发达的现代工业社会，适当的、可偿还的超预算支出是缓冲风险的一种有力方式，然而上述案例中的超预算支出都具有一定的不可持续性，从而满足科尔内所概括的形成短缺的条件。在典型资本主义周期的末尾，利润率已经下降，基于未来繁荣预期的借贷变得不可持续，因此，在繁荣阶段短缺成为现实。而在现代资本主义的案例中，出现超预算支出的经济体都能从外部获取满足其国内“严肃意图”的资源，这实际上是将国内潜在的短缺问题转化为国际贸易差额的问题。在这种情况下，短缺是否会出现取决于是否能够维持这种国际贸易差额的秩序。

III. The Systemic Crisis of Global Capitalism Behind Shortage

三、短缺背后的全球资本主义系统性危机

According to the preceding analysis, there is currently a possibility of shortage in capitalism. To understand how this possibility will become reality and what the ultimate destructiveness will be, it is necessary to further examine the preconditions of the mode of operation of global capitalism over the past few decades. Specifically, at the level of material production, what weak links exist in current global capitalist production that could interrupt normal economic operations? At the level of power relations, among the various components of global capitalism, how are the “serious intentions” that exceed resource constraints realized and sustained, and can this relationship be maintained? These two levels are interconnected, forming the deep background of the global capitalist shortage from 2020 to 2022.

根据前文的分析，当前资本主义存在短缺的可能性，而要弄清楚这种可能性会怎样转化为现实，最终的破坏性如何，则需要进一步考察过去几十年来全球资本主义运行方式的前提条件。具体而言，在物质生产层面，当前全球资本主义生产中存在哪些薄弱环节可能会导致正常的经济运行被中断?在权力关系层面，在全球资本主义的各个组成部分中，超出资源约束的“严肃意图”是如何实现并持续下去的，这种关系能否维持?这两个层面相互关联，形成了2020—2022年全球资本主义短缺的深层背景。

(1) The Material Basis of Shortage: The Declining Profit Rate and the Neoliberal Response

(一)短缺的物质基础：利润率下降以及新自由主义应对

The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall revealed by Marx, and the response of developed capitalist countries, constitute the material basis of the current shortage phenomenon. According to the general principles of political economy, capitalist production is for profit; therefore, enterprises will only produce when production activities are profitable. The long-term downward trend of the profit rate not only signifies a decline in the growth potential of the capitalist economy but also a decline in the bourgeoisie’s motivation to engage in production activities, creating conditions for shortage. The last large-scale shortage in developed capitalist countries occurred in the 1970s, triggered by the oil crisis, but the deep-seated cause was the sustained decline in the profit rate since the post-World War II period, especially the 1960s. Since the declining trend of the profit rate was caused by the technological conditions and class power relations in developed countries, the then-popular Keynesian policies not only failed to resolve the crisis but instead brought about excessive demand and triggered a wage-price spiral, ultimately resulting in the coexistence of inflation and economic stagnation.[34]34 See Robert Brenner, *The Economics of Global Turbulence* (London: Verso, 2006).

马克思揭示的利润率趋向下降规律以及发达资本主义国家的应对是当前短缺现象的物质基础。按照政治经济学的一般原理，资本主义生产是为了利润，因而只有当生产活动有利可图时，企业才会进行生产。利润率长期下降的趋势，不仅意味着资本主义经济增长潜力的下降，也意味着资产阶级进行生产活动的动力下降，这为短缺创造了条件。上一次发达资本主义国家的大规模短缺出现在20世纪70年代，它由石油危机引发，但深层原因在于二战后尤其是20世纪60年代以来的利润率持续下降。由于利润率下降趋势是由发达国家的生产技术状况与阶级力量对比造成的，因此，当时流行的凯恩斯主义政策非但未能解决危机，反而带来了过多的超额需求，并引发了工资—价格的螺旋上升，最终造成通货膨胀与经济停滞并存的局面。34

Thereafter, capitalist countries adopted a series of measures to raise the rate of profit and thereby rescue capitalism from the stagflation crisis. In the technological sphere, the bourgeoisie utilized new transport and communications technologies to alter the form of production organization, implementing “just-in-time production” within enterprises, reducing costs and raising production efficiency by cutting inventories and accelerating turnover, while simultaneously deploying direct investment, outsourcing, and other means to lay out global production networks, further splitting up the production process of commodities and retaining only the high-value-added production links within the developed countries. In the sphere of class relations, capitalist countries universally implemented neoliberal reforms, adopting measures such as suppressing trade unions, relaxing market regulation, cutting taxes for the rich and for corporations, and reducing social protection expenditure, thereby raising the profit share of enterprises at the expense of the working class.

此后，资本主义国家采取了一系列措施以提高利润率水平，进而将资本主义从滞胀危机中挽救出来。在技术方面，资产阶级利用新的交通运输与通信技术改变了生产组织形式，在企业内部实行“准时制生产”,通过减少库存、加速周转来降低成本、提高生产效率，同时通过直接投资、外包等方式布局全球生产网络，将商品的生产过程进一步拆分，并只将高附加值的生产环节留在发达国家内部。在阶级格局方面，资本主义国家普遍实行新自由主义改革，采取压制工会、放松市场管制、为富人和企业减税、降低社会保护性支出等措施，以牺牲工人阶级为代价，提高企业利润份额。

The above measures either cut back part of the necessary expenditure for the reproduction of capitalist society, or reduced the redundant space of capitalist production through a reconfiguration of the production layout; their essence was to shift additional costs and risks onto society to bear, ultimately exacerbating the fragility of the capitalist economy. The neoliberal policies pursued at the expense of workers’ interests affected the reproduction of the working class, both lowering the quality of the labor force and weakening the risk-resistance capacity of workers’ families, which manifested during the pandemic in the fact that large numbers of workers’ families faced survival pressure due to income interruption caused by work stoppages or illness. Just-in-time production reduced enterprises’ warehousing costs, at the price of a weakened capacity to cope with external shocks to supply chains. Global production networks raised production efficiency through a more detailed international division of labor, but also made each country more dependent on global trade. At the same time, because the tendency for the rate of profit to fall brought about by the rising organic composition of capital has not changed,[35]35 This refers to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, a key concept in Marx’s *Capital*, driven by the rising organic composition of capital (the increasing ratio of constant capital, i.e., machinery and materials, to variable capital, i.e., labor power). the willingness of private capital in developed countries to invest, especially in infrastructure, has declined; coupled with the reduction in government expenditure under the guidance of neoliberal thinking, the maintenance and renewal of infrastructure in developed capitalist countries has been insufficient, and there has even been a decline in the total stock of fixed capital,[36]36 Fixed capital refers to means of production (machinery, buildings, infrastructure) used in production over multiple cycles. which has brought greater instability to the normal operation of production activities. The frequent extreme weather events in recent years that have severely impacted agriculture and transport can also be seen, to a certain extent, as the result of capitalism’s failure to pay the necessary environmental costs for long-term production.[37]37 The authors argue that capitalism externalizes environmental costs, failing to pay for the long-term ecological maintenance necessary for sustainable production. In short, since the 1980s, capitalist countries have traded long-term sustainability of economic operation for economic prosperity, and the consequences have gradually been exposed in recent years, manifesting in the frequent occurrence of various accidents, the interruption of the continuity of capitalist production, and the difficulty the capitalist production system faces in coping with these “external” shocks.

上述措施要么削减了资本主义社会再生产的部分必要开支，要么通过重新安排生产布局降低了资本主义生产的冗余空间，其本质都是将额外的成本和风险交由社会来承担，最终加剧了资本主义经济的脆弱性。以损害工人利益为代价的新自由主义政策影响了工人阶级的再生产，既降低了劳动力质量，也使得工人家庭的抗风险能力变弱，这在疫情中表现为大量工人家庭因停工停产或者疾病导致收入中断而面临生存压力。准时制生产降低了企业的仓储成本，代价则是应对供应链外来冲击的能力减弱。全球生产网络通过更细致的国际分工提高了生产效率，但也使得各国对于全球贸易的依赖程度更高。与此同时，由于资本有机构成提高带来利润率下降的趋势并没有改变35,发达国家私人资本的投资意愿尤其是投资于基础设施的意愿降低，加之在新自由主义思想的指导下，政府支出被削减，发达资本主义国家的基础设施维护和更新不够，甚至出现固定资本总额的下降36,这为生产活动的正常运行带来了更大的不稳定性。近几年来频频出现的极端气候给农业和交通运输业带来的严重影响也能在一定程度上被视为资本主义没有为长期生产支付必要的环保开支的结果。37总而言之，20世纪80年代以来，资本主义国家以牺牲经济运行的长期可持续性为代价换取经济繁荣，其后果在近几年逐渐暴露出来，表现为各种意外事故的频繁发生、资本主义生产的连续性被打断，以及资本主义生产体系在面临这些“外部”冲击时难以应对。

On February 3, 2023, a train derailment in Ohio, USA, caused a leak of hazardous chemical substances, resulting in extremely serious economic losses and ecological consequences. This accident is a typical case of the superposition of multiple problems brought about by changes in the US production sphere since the 1980s. Due to reasons such as aging infrastructure, the rate of train derailments in the United States is quite high; between 2013 and 2022, an average of 3.3 train derailments occurred every day.[38]38 Source: data from the US Federal Railroad Administration, as cited by the authors. In this situation, railway companies have paid far more attention to efficiency than to safety. Since 2017, major US railway companies have carried out a reform called “Precision Scheduled Railroading,” pursuing an extreme “operating ratio,” reducing costs by cutting crew sizes, arbitrarily lengthening trains, and reducing inspections and maintenance at critical positions; its central idea is consistent with “just-in-time production.”[39]39 “Precision Scheduled Railroading” (PSR) is a management model that prioritizes minimizing the operating ratio (operating expenses as a percentage of revenue) through reduced crew sizes, longer trains, and less frequent maintenance. By lobbying the Trump administration, railway companies also abolished the requirement that railcars carrying flammable hazardous materials be equipped with electronic braking systems; the consequence was that when emergency braking was needed, the cars could not stop simultaneously, increasing the risk of collision.[40]40 The Trump administration (2017–2021) rolled back a 2015 Obama-era rule requiring electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes on trains carrying certain hazardous materials. The train involved in the Ohio accident was 2.8 kilometers long, containing 150 cars, with 40% of the weight concentrated in the rear third of the train; this meant that when the accident occurred, the heavier cars struck the lighter cars from behind, causing the cars to tumble—precisely a result of so-called “Precision Scheduled Railroading.”[41]41 The accident occurred in East Palestine, Ohio, on February 3, 2023, involving a Norfolk Southern train carrying vinyl chloride and other chemicals. Another consequence of “Precision Scheduled Railroading” was that large numbers of workers were laid off while those still on the job faced higher work intensity. Before this accident occurred, the COVID-19 pandemic and the transport industry shortage had already pushed workers’ work intensity to the limit, and the US Congress even rejected workers’ demand for seven days of paid sick leave in early December 2022, forcing many workers to work while ill, which increased the risk of accidents caused by operational errors. Admittedly, this accident had a certain element of contingency, but it reflects the current situation in developed countries where infrastructure has become “scarce” over time and the production system has become fragile; this may lead to a higher frequency of similar incidents, thereby raising the overall social cost of production and strengthening supply constraints.

2023年2月3日，美国俄亥俄州发生由火车脱轨引起的危险化学物质泄漏事故，造成了极其严重的经济损失和生态环境后果。这次事故正是20世纪80年代以来美国生产领域变革带来多个问题叠加的典型案例。由于基础设施老化等原因，美国列车脱轨事故发生率相当高，2013年至2022年间，平均每天都会发生3.3起列车脱轨事件。38在这种情况下，铁路公司对效率的关注却远大于安全。自2017年起，美国各大铁路公司开展名为“精准调度铁路”的改革，追求极致的“运营比率”,通过减少车组、任意加长列车、减少关键位置检查与维护等方式降低成本，其中心思想与 “准时制生产”相一致。39通过游说特朗普政府，铁路公司还废除了要求运载危险易燃材料的轨道车配备电子制动系统的规定，其后果是需要紧急制动时各节车厢无法同时停止，增加了冲撞的风险。40 此次俄亥俄州事故中的列车长达2.8公里，包含150节车厢，其中40%的重量集中在列车后1/3处，这使得事故发生时较重的车厢向前撞击较轻的车厢，导致车厢翻滚，而这正是所谓“精准调度铁路”的结果。41 “精准调度铁路”的另一个后果是大量工人被裁员的同时在岗工人面临更高的工作强度。在本次事故发生前，新冠肺炎疫情与运输业短缺已经将工人的工作强度推至极限，而美国国会甚至还在2022年12月初拒绝了工人7日带薪病假的诉求，使得大量工人不得不带病工作，这提高了因工作失误导致意外的风险。诚然，本次事故具有一定的偶然性，但它却反映了发达国家基础设施随着时间的推移出现“短缺”、生产系统变得脆弱的现状，这可能会造成类似事件更高频率发生，从而带来社会总体生产成本的提高和供给约束的增强。

(2) The Impact of the Accumulation Regime Dominated by Finance Capital on Shortage

(二)金融资本主导的积累体制对短缺的影响

The pursuit of valorization is the nature of capital. When the rate of profit falls and the real economy grows sluggishly, capital seeks other modes of valorization; the result is that finance-monopoly capital has broken through the various restrictions imposed on it by governments since World War II,[42]42 Post-World War II financial regulations, such as the US Glass-Steagall Act (1933–1999), separated commercial and investment banking and restricted capital flows. penetrating into all commercial relations to an unprecedented degree,[43]43 This phrasing echoes Marx’s description in *Capital* of capital’s drive to penetrate all social relations. forming a global accumulation regime centered on creditor’s rights and ownership, with rent-seeking and speculation as its main features.[44]44 “Rent-seeking” refers to the extraction of income through ownership of assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, real estate) rather than through productive activity; “speculation” refers to profit from price fluctuations. This accumulation regime, acting together with the various changes in the production sphere under neoliberalism, has caused serious damage to the conditions of capitalist production and reproduction, increasing the possibility of shortage and exacerbating its consequences. At the same time, because finance capital dominates global capitalist production, these consequences are mainly borne by the proletariat and developing countries.

追求增殖是资本的本性，当利润率下降、实体经济增长乏力时，资本便会寻找另外的增殖方式，其结果便是金融垄断资本突破二战以来政府对其的种种限制42,以空前的程度渗透到一切商业关系中43,形成了一套以债权和所有权为载体、以食利和投机为主要特征的全球积累体制44。这种积累体制同新自由主义在生产领域的各项变革共同作用，对资本主义的生产与再生产条件造成了严重的破坏，增加了短缺的可能性并加剧了其后果。同时，由于金融资本对全球资本主义生产的主导，这些后果主要由无产阶级与发展中国家承担。

The intervention of finance capital in enterprise business activities is an important feature of the financialized accumulation regime; this intervention has a distinct speculative and “short-termist” character. Due to the relaxation of financial regulation, finance capital can conveniently take controlling stakes in listed companies, then push them to adopt various means to increase revenue and raise stock prices in order to achieve the required rate of return, and finally transfer ownership of the enterprise by selling shares and other means. Under this model, finance capital hardly considers the long-term development of the enterprise. Taking freight railways as an example, between 2011 and 2021, the seven largest US freight railway companies (including Norfolk Southern, the company involved in the derailment accident mentioned above) spent $191 billion on dividend payouts and stock buybacks; during the same period, these companies invested only $138 billion in capital expenditure. Adopting the “Precision Scheduled Railroading” reform and lobbying Congress to repeal safety agreements were precisely means to increase revenue to satisfy shareholder interests.[45]45 Stock buybacks and dividends are methods of returning cash to shareholders, often at the expense of reinvestment in productive capacity or safety. Before the dangers brought about by these means are fully exposed, finance capital has ample time to exit, while the consequences are borne by society as a whole; this may lead to a huge waste of resources precisely when the economy is already facing shortage.

金融资本对企业经营活动的介入是金融化积累体制的重要特征，这种介入具有鲜明的投机性与“短期主义”的性质。由于金融管制的放松，金融资本可以便利地对上市企业进行控股，然后促使其采取各种方式增加营收、抬升股价，以达到自己所要求的收益率，最后再通过出售股票等方式将企业所有权转移出去。在这种模式下，金融资本几乎不会考虑企业的长远发展。以货运铁路为例，2011—2021年间美国最大的7家货运铁路公司(其中就包括前文提到的脱轨事故当事公司诺福克南方铁路)花费了1910亿美元进行股息分红与股票回购，在同一时期这些公司用于投资的资金只有1380亿美元，而采取“精准调度铁路”改革、游说国会废除安全协议等措施正是增加营收以满足股东利益的手段。45在这些手段带来的危险充分暴露之前，金融资本有充足的时间抽身，而后果则由整个社会来承担，这可能在经济本就面临短缺的情况下带来巨大的资源浪费。

Furthermore, financial liberalization is often linked with globalization, and the speculative nature of financial capital brings additional instability to global production networks. The layout of global production networks is based on the cross-border free flow of financial capital. Therefore, transnational financial capital in the form of international investment banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and the like has replaced trade and industrial capital to become the dominant stratum within the bourgeoisie and to dominate international trade and global production networks.[46]46 This refers to the dominance of financial capital over industrial and commercial capital within the capitalist class, a key feature of the monopoly finance capital stage theorized by economists such as Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff. By virtue of their own scale and the policies of financial liberalization, international monopoly financial capital can rapidly channel funds into or out of a country, artificially create prosperity or depression, and obtain speculative gains from exchange rate fluctuations and even payment crises. This is one of the important reasons why financial crises have occurred frequently in various countries since globalization and financial liberalization.[47]47 The text references the frequency of financial crises in developing and emerging economies since the 1980s, such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2001 Argentine crisis, often linked to volatile capital flows. Enterprises in developing countries embedded in global production networks often find it difficult to cope with fluctuations in exchange rates, grain prices, energy prices, and the like brought about by the speculative activities of financial capital, and their production is severely affected. Artificially creating and exploiting shortages and crises is precisely the way international monopoly financial capital makes profits.

此外，金融自由化往往与全球化联系在一起，金融资本的投机属性为全球生产网络带来了额外的不稳定性。全球生产网络的布局建立在金融资本跨国自由流动的基础上，因此，国际投资银行、对冲基金、私募股权基金等形式的跨国金融资本取代贸易和产业资本，成为在资产阶级中占主导地位的阶层，并主导了跨国贸易与国际生产网络。46凭借自身体量与金融自由化的政策，国际垄断金融资本能使资金快速涌入或流出一个国家，人为制造繁荣或萧条，并从汇率波动甚至兑付危机中获得投机收益，这正是全球化与金融自由化以来金融危机在各国频频发生的重要原因之一。47处于全球生产网络中的发展中国家企业往往难以应对金融资本投机行为带来的汇率、粮食、能源等价格的波动，生产受到严重影响，而人为制造并利用短缺与危机正是国际垄断金融资本获利的方式。

Finally, the monopoly financial bourgeoisie dominates the formulation of financial rules and promotes them globally, yet the implementation of these rules exhibits a clear “double standard.” As creditors, financial capital demands strict financial discipline from debtors; when financial capital itself faces the risk of default and bankruptcy, however, it demands government bailouts on the grounds of being “too big to fail.” When the 2008 financial crisis broke out, because of the sharp drop in housing prices, a large number of residents who had been able to repay their loans normally had their homes repossessed and became homeless due to their inability to provide sufficient collateral. The financial bourgeoisie, as the initiators of the crisis, often suffered no substantial damage; on the contrary, large-scale government bailouts intensified the concentration and expansion of the financial sector. During the pandemic, the Federal Reserve did not hesitate to implement unlimited quantitative easing policies to maintain financial market stability and prevent a stock market crash. Far from dealing a blow to the financial bourgeoisie, the crisis actually made its power more entrenched. The same applies in the international financial sphere. In response to the sovereign debt difficulties faced by various countries against the backdrop of the 2008 economic crisis, international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund proposed austerity solutions. This approach benefited creditors in recovering loans but worsened the economic plight of debtor countries. On the other hand, as the center of world capitalism and the stronghold of monopoly financial capital, the United States faces almost no restrictions on its external liabilities. In this “double standard,” the rules of financial capital reveal obvious hypocrisy. And precisely because of the dominant position of monopoly financial capital, when global production deviates from its normal state and shortages prevail, the financial bourgeoisie and countries with greater financial hegemony can obtain financial resources first to cushion the impact of shortages. The ultimate result is that developing countries pay a higher price than developed countries, and the proletariat pays a higher price than the bourgeoisie.

最后，金融垄断资产阶级主导了金融规则的制定，并将其在全球范围内推广，而这些规则的执行却呈现出明显的“双重标准”。作为债权人，金融资本要求对债务人实行严格的金融纪律；而当金融资本自身面临违约与破产风险时，却以“大而不能倒”为由，要求政府进行救助。在2008年金融危机爆发之时，由于房价暴跌，大量原本能正常还贷的居民因无法提供足够的担保品而被收回住房、无家可归，金融资产阶级作为危机的始作俑者却往往没有受到实质性损害，大规模的政府救市反而加剧了金融部门的集中与扩张。在疫情期间，美联储更是不惜推行无限量化宽松政策以维持金融市场稳定、防止股市崩盘，危机非但没有对金融资产阶级造成打击，反而使其权力更加稳固。在国际金融领域同样如此。针对2008年经济危机背景下各国面临的主权债务困境，世界银行、国际货币基金组织等国际机构提出了紧缩的解决方案。这种方案有利于债权人收回贷款，但加重了债务国的经济困境。另一方面，作为世界资本主义的中心、金融垄断资本的集中地，美国对外负债却几乎不受限制。在这种“双重标准”中，金融资本的规则呈现出明显的虚伪性。而正是由于金融垄断资本的主导地位，当全球生产偏离正常状态、短缺盛行时，金融资产阶级与拥有更多金融霸权的国家可以优先获得金融资源以缓冲短缺带来的冲击，最终结果是发展中国家比发达国家付出了更多代价，无产阶级比资产阶级付出了更多代价。

(3) The Disorder of the World Capitalist System Brings Conflict and Crisis

(三)世界资本主义体系的失序带来冲突与危机

According to the perspective of world-systems theory, the global economies as a whole engage in capital accumulation. The normal operation of any single capitalist country presupposes the normal order of world capitalism, and this order constitutes the global capital accumulation model of a specific period. The globalization since the 1980s has precisely been an accumulation model centered on the United States and dominated by monopoly financial capital.[48]48 This refers to the period of neoliberal globalization, characterized by the deregulation of financial markets, the rise of transnational corporations, and the dominance of U.S.-led financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. This model is an extension of the post-World War II global capitalist order, and factors of imbalance are constantly accumulating within it. These factors mean that the world capitalist order of the past few decades faces the danger of disorder and even collapse.

按照世界体系理论的观点，全球各经济体作为一个整体进行资本积累，任何单个资本主义国家的正常运转都以世界资本主义的正常秩序为前提，而这种秩序构成了特定时期的全球资本积累模式。20世纪80年代以来的全球化正是以美国为中心、由金融垄断资本主导的积累模式。48该模式是二战后全球资本主义秩序的延伸，其内部正在不断积累失衡的因素，这些因素使得过去几十年来的世界资本主义秩序面临失序甚至崩塌的危险。

With the end of World War II and the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, the capitalist world-system order dominated by the United States took shape. This order continued the center-periphery structure of previous world capitalist systems. Although the peripheral countries were no longer directly colonized and achieved political independence, they formed economically a new type of dependency relationship that the Brazilian scholar Dos Santos called “industrial-technological” dependency. Because these countries had weak industrial foundations and their production was highly dependent on foreign exchange earnings and on obtaining machinery and raw materials from the international market, the traditional export sectors from the colonial period, along with their backward relations of production or control by foreign capital, were preserved, and the previous division of labor pattern of raw materials versus manufactured goods with the center countries was continued.[49]49 Theotonio Dos Santos (1936-2018), a Brazilian economist and key figure in dependency theory, argued that peripheral economies remain dependent on center countries for technology and capital, perpetuating underdevelopment. The center countries, especially the United States, profited through unequal exchange and profit repatriation, thus forming the so-called “golden age” of the developed capitalist countries for more than two decades after the war.

随着二战的结束与布雷顿森林体系的建立，由美国主导的资本主义世界体系秩序得以形成。这套秩序延续了以往世界资本主义体系的中心—外围结构，其中外围国家尽管不再被直接殖民，取得了政治独立，但却在经济上形成了被巴西学者多斯桑托斯称作“工业—技术”的新型依附关系。由于这些国家工业基础薄弱，生产高度依赖外汇收入以及从国际市场上取得机器和原材料，因此殖民时期的传统出口部门，连同其落后的生产关系或外国资本的控制被保留下来，并延续了此前其与中心国家的原材料—制造品分工模式。49中心国家尤其是美国则通过不平等交换与利润回流从中获利，从而形成了战后20余年发达资本主义国家所谓的“黄金年代”。

After the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, with the implementation of a new round of globalization and the decline of the United States’ position as the world’s production center, the United States changed its mode of exercising hegemony, and the peripheral countries also experienced a certain degree of differentiation. The economies in the current global division of labor can be roughly divided into four categories:[50]50 This four-fold classification is a schematic representation of the contemporary global division of labor, drawing on world-systems analysis and dependency theory. First is the United States, at the center of the world system, which uses its monopoly on core technologies, its control over core resources such as grain and oil, and its monopoly on the dollar as the world currency to maintain its hegemonic position, obtain cheap energy and consumer goods from around the world, and maintain a long-term external deficit. The second category consists of developed capitalist countries represented by European countries, Australia, Canada, and the like. They master core technologies and high-value-added production links and possess high-end manufacturing, but they are relatively dependent on foreign sources for grain and energy and do not possess financial hegemony comparable to that of the United States. The third category consists of manufactured goods exporting countries represented by East Asian countries and regions. They have taken over industrial transfers from developed countries and mainly export low-value-added manufactured goods to developed countries through labor-intensive industries. To gain an advantage in international competition and maintain the purchasing power of their foreign exchange reserves, these countries and regions tend to keep their exchange rates relatively undervalued against the dollar, thus having to cooperate with U.S. monetary and financial policies and indirectly or directly finance the huge external debt of the United States. It is precisely their relative overproduction that fills the additional demand for goods from the center countries. The fourth category consists of raw material exporting countries represented by Latin American and Middle Eastern countries and regions. They largely continue the industrial-technological dependency relationship of the post-war period, have the most monolithic industries, and are the most dependent on the international market. The severe inequality inherent in this global division of labor is reflected not only in the distribution of benefits between global production and trade but also in the varying degrees of dependence of different countries on the world system. Obviously, the fourth category of countries is the most dependent on the world system. The sovereign debt crises of Sri Lanka and Ghana in 2022 are the best illustration of this dependency. The economic operations of both countries are highly dependent on imported energy and thus on the foreign exchange provided by the export sector. Therefore, against the backdrop of slow recovery of demand in Western countries after the pandemic and the depreciation of their currencies due to U.S. interest rate hikes, these two countries had almost no buffer space and inevitably fell into the predicament of debt crisis and shortage. On the other hand, even the United States, which holds a hegemonic position and has a relatively high degree of self-sufficiency in grain and energy, cannot avoid dependence on the world system, because obtaining cheap consumer goods from around the world through a long-term trade deficit has become an important material basis for maintaining social reproduction in the United States.

20世纪70年代滞胀危机后，随着新一轮全球化的推行和美国作为世界生产中心地位的下降，美国改变了霸权的行使方式，而外围国家也出现了一定分化。当前全球分工秩序中的经济体大致可以分为四类50:首先是处于世界体系中心的美国，它利用对核心技术的垄断、对粮食与石油等核心资源的掌控以及对美元作为世界货币的垄断来维持自身霸权地位，从全球获得廉价的能源与消费品，并长期保持对外赤字的状态。第二类是以欧洲国家、澳大利亚、加拿大等为代表的发达资本主义国家，它们掌握着核心技术与高附加值生产环节，拥有高端制造业，但粮食和能源的对外依赖性较强，也不具备与美国相当的金融霸权。第三类是以东亚国家和地区为代表的制造品出口国，它们承接了来自发达国家的产业转移，主要通过劳动密集型的产业向发达国家出口低附加值制造品。为了在国际竞争中获得优势并维持其外汇储备的购买力，这些国家和地区倾向于本币汇率相对美元被低估，从而不得不配合美国的货币金融政策，间接或直接为美国的巨额对外债务融资，而正是他们的生产相对过剩填补了中心国家对商品的额外需求。第四类则是以拉美和中东国家与地区为代表的原材料出口国，它们大体延续了战后时期的工业—技术依附关系，产业最为单一，对国际市场的依赖程度也最高。这种全球分工体系存在的严重的不平等，不仅体现在全球生产与贸易之间的利益分配中，也体现在各国对世界体系不同程度的依赖上。显然，第四类国家对世界体系的依赖性最强，2022年斯里兰卡和加纳的主权债务危机是这种依赖性最好的说明，这两个国家的经济运行都高度依赖进口能源，从而依赖出口部门提供的外汇，因此，在疫情后西方国家的需求恢复缓慢、美元加息导致本币汇率贬值的背景下，两国几乎没有缓冲空间，不可避免地陷入债务危机与短缺的困境。另一方面，即便是处于霸权地位、粮食和能源自给程度较高的美国也无法避免对于世界体系的依赖，因为通过长期贸易赤字从全球获得廉价消费品，已经成为美国的社会再生产得以维持的重要物质基础。

At the same time, although all countries rely to varying degrees on the above-mentioned global production order, as contradictions within the world system develop, this order becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. According to the view of world-systems theorist Arrighi, the transformation in the mode of US hegemony after the 1980s signalled that the strengthening of US power was no longer considered to serve the overall interests of the world system, but merely its own interests; this was the turning point at which the accumulation cycle of the world system moved from its ascending phase to its declining phase.[51]51 Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994). With the shift of the global production centre from the United States to East Asia, the US position in the global capitalist economy has declined substantially compared with the post-war period. Even if the dollar remains the world currency, a long-term trade deficit will damage dollar hegemony, and this process is largely irreversible. To reverse this situation and simultaneously address the problems of domestic industrial hollowing-out and unemployment, the United States began implementing a reindustrialisation strategy from 2010.[52]52 The reindustrialisation strategy refers to US policy initiatives from the Obama administration onward aimed at reviving domestic manufacturing, including the “National Export Initiative” and tax incentives for reshoring. However, because it is difficult to change the underlying causes and mechanisms that led to deindustrialisation, the US can only resort to suppressing other countries to achieve its goals. Measures such as launching a trade war against China and using the Russia-Ukraine conflict to promote the transfer of European industries are manifestations of this approach. On this issue, the United States is caught in a dilemma: if it does not suppress other countries, its position in global production will further decline; if it does suppress them, it threatens the conditions of its own social reproduction, which relies on cheap goods from other countries. In this context, the United States, as the hegemonic power, is not only increasingly unable to maintain the order of the existing world system but is gradually turning into a destroyer of that order, destabilising the global production system. This will not only disrupt the normal production conditions of countries dependent on the world capitalist system, thereby creating and exacerbating shortages, but also carries the potential to escalate into more intense conflicts and crises.

与此同时，尽管各国都在不同程度上依赖于上述全球生产秩序，但随着世界体系内部矛盾的发展，这一秩序越来越难以维持。按照世界体系理论家阿瑞吉的观点，20世纪80年代后美国霸权行使方式的转变，标志着美国力量的增强不再被认为符合世界体系的整体利益，而仅仅是为其自身利益服务，这是世界体系积累周期从上升期走向衰落期的转折点。51随着全球生产中心从美国向东亚地区的转移，美国在全球资本主义经济中的地位已经较战后有了大幅下降。即便美元仍是世界货币，长期贸易赤字也会对美元霸权造成损害，并且这一过程在很大程度上是不可逆的。为扭转这一局面，同时解决国内产业空心化与失业的问题，美国从2010年开始推行再工业化战略52,但由于其难以改变那些导致去工业化的基础性原因和机制，美国只能采用打压其他国家的手段来实现自己的目的，对中国发动贸易战、借俄乌冲突局势推动欧洲产业转移等措施便是这一手段的体现。而在这一问题上，美国陷入了两难困境：不打压其他国家，则美国在全球生产中的地位将进一步衰落；打压其他国家，则会威胁到美国依赖他国廉价商品进行社会再生产的条件。在这样的背景下，美国作为霸权国家不仅愈发难以维持现行世界体系的秩序，反而日渐转变为秩序的破坏者，冲击全球生产系统的稳定。这不仅会打破依赖于世界资本主义体系的各个国家的正常生产条件，进而带来和加剧短缺，并且还有演变为更剧烈的冲突和危机的可能性。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 语

In the face of the widespread shortages and chaotic conditions in the capitalist economy in recent years, many scholars and institutions have likened them to a “perfect storm.” This metaphor originates from a 2000 film of the same name, used to refer to a combination of a series of rare events producing extremely severe consequences. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, extreme weather, and so on can all be seen as exogenous rare events, and the direct causes of the shortages in capitalism in recent years can indeed be attributed to these events. Therefore, some scholars believe that the shortages are merely a temporary phenomenon; once these events pass, the global economy will gradually return to normal levels.

面对近年来资本主义经济普遍的短缺与混乱情形，许多学者与机构将其比喻为“完美风暴”。该比喻出自2000年的一部同名电影，用以指代一系列罕见事件的组合造成极其严重的后果。的确，新冠肺炎疫情、俄乌冲突、极端气候等似乎都可以被看作外生的罕见事件，而近年来资本主义发生短缺的直接原因的确可以归因于这些事件。因此，部分学者认为，短缺只是暂时现象，只要这些事件过去，全球经济就会逐渐恢复到正常水平。

However, as discussed above, the shortages in capitalism during the COVID-19 pandemic are related to the systemic contradictions accumulated in global capitalism over the past few decades. These contradictions had already manifested before the pandemic, appearing as sluggish economic growth in capitalist countries, intensified social conflicts, and the frequent occurrence of various “black swan” events in the political sphere.[53]53 “Black swan” events refer to unpredictable occurrences with severe consequences, a concept popularised by Nassim Nicholas Taleb. The widespread global shortages since the pandemic represent another eruption of the systemic contradictions of capitalism, and this eruption may not yet have reached its peak.

然而，如上所述，新冠肺炎疫情期间资本主义的短缺与过去几十年来全球资本主义所积累的系统性矛盾有关，这些矛盾早在疫情之前就已经显现出来，表现为资本主义国家经济增长乏力、社会冲突加剧、各种政治领域的“黑天鹅”事件频繁发生。53疫情以来出现的全球普遍短缺是资本主义系统性矛盾的又一次爆发，而这次爆发可能尚未达到其顶点。

First, the material production basis of the current capitalist shortages and systemic crisis lies in the series of neoliberal reforms implemented by capitalist states in response to the falling rate of profit, aimed at reducing enterprise costs and increasing profits. To this end, some expenditures necessary for maintaining social reproduction have been eliminated, increasing the fragility of production, while repairing this system would require additional costs. For example, many institutions have begun calling for enterprises to shift from “just-in-time production” to maintaining some buffer inventory, but under the economic conditions of falling profit rates and pessimistic economic expectations, it remains unknown how many enterprises can make such adjustments. This means that the fragility of the capitalist production system in responding to shocks will persist for a considerable period.

首先，当前资本主义短缺与系统性危机的物质生产基础，在于资本主义国家为应对利润率下降所实施的一系列新自由主义改革，其目的是减少企业成本、增加利润。为此，部分维持社会再生产所必需的开支被取消，生产的脆弱性增加，而要修复这个体系则意味着需要增加额外的成本。例如，许多机构已经开始呼吁企业从“准时制生产”转向保有一定冗余库存，但在利润率下降、经济预期悲观的经济形势下，有多少企业能够进行这种调整仍是未知数。这也就意味着，资本主义生产体系在应对冲击方面的脆弱性仍会在相当一段时间内存在。

Second, in developed capitalist countries, although financial capital still occupies a dominant position and attempts through various means to shield itself from the consequences of the crisis, it is precisely for this reason that the neoliberal order dominated by the financial monopoly bourgeoisie is increasingly losing its legitimacy, and class contradictions within developed capitalist countries are intensifying accordingly. In this situation, a mutually reinforcing effect may emerge between shortages of material goods and labour shortages. This effect will persist for some time even after the exogenous events related to both types of shortages have ended, and may lead to a stagflation crisis similar to that of the 1970s.

其次，在发达资本主义国家，尽管金融资本仍然占据主导地位，并且试图通过种种方式免受危机所带来的后果，但也正因如此，金融垄断资产阶级主导的新自由主义秩序正在越来越失去其合法性，发达资本主义国家内部的阶级矛盾也随之愈演愈烈。在这种情况下，物质资料的短缺与劳动力短缺之间可能会产生相互加强的效应，这种效应在与两种短缺相关的外生事件结束后仍会持续一段时间，并且可能会带来类似于20世纪70年代的滞胀危机。

Finally, the risks facing the global capitalist system are likely to intensify further. From a production perspective, the global production network is an integrated whole. Under the impact of various “black swan” events, different economies suffer varying degrees of damage and recover at different speeds, disrupting the overall structure and rhythm of the global production network, making it nearly impossible to return to pre-pandemic normal levels. In this situation, the more a country depends on foreign exchange, the more vulnerable it is to shortages and the risk of bankruptcy. After 2023, more countries may fall into sovereign debt crises similar to those in Sri Lanka and Ghana. From the perspective of power shifts in the world system, it is not yet known how long the Russia-Ukraine conflict will last. However, due to the inevitable decline of US hegemony and the need for developed countries to divert their increasingly severe domestic class and social contradictions, economic, political, and even military frictions triggered by the US to defend its hegemony may continue to emerge in the future. At that point, the global production network may even face the danger of disintegration.

最后，全球资本主义体系面临的风险很可能会进一步加剧。从生产的角度看，全球生产网络是一个整体，而在各种“黑天鹅”事件的冲击下，不同经济体的受损程度和恢复速度不同，导致全球生产网络的整体结构和步调被破坏，几乎不可能恢复到疫情前的正常水平。在这种情况下，越是依赖外汇的国家，越容易遭受短缺与破产的风险。2023年后，可能会有更多的国家陷入与斯里兰卡和加纳类似的主权债务危机中。而从世界体系权力变迁的角度看，俄乌冲突还会持续多长时间尚未可知，但由于美国霸权不可避免的衰落趋势，同时出于发达国家转移国内愈发严重的阶级矛盾与社会矛盾的需要，由美国为捍卫其霸权而引发的经济、政治乃至军事摩擦可能会在未来不断出现，届时全球生产网络甚至可能面临分崩离析的危险。

As a major socialist country deeply involved in the global production network, China is a highly exceptional presence within the capitalist world system. When it first entered the global production network, China took over a large amount of industrial transfer from developed countries, undertaking the manufacture of labour-intensive goods within the world system and exporting low-value-added products to developed countries. However, China resisted neoliberalism to a considerable extent, adhered to the socialist system, and insisted on independent innovation. Therefore, over the past few decades, China’s position in the global production network has continuously risen, making it the only country in the world with all industrial categories. Today, with the decline of US hegemony appearing inevitable, China is regarded by the United States as its greatest challenger, and frictions and conflicts between China and the US are highly likely to escalate further. Judging from the history of world capitalism, the decline of a hegemonic power and the reshaping of the global order have never been peaceful processes. China must not only prepare for further deterioration in global material supply and the production order but also be prepared for the possibility that the United States may provoke malignant incidents.

作为深度参与全球生产网络的社会主义大国，中国对于资本主义世界体系而言是极为特殊的存在。在进入全球生产网络之初，中国承接了大量来自发达国家的产业转移，在世界体系中承担劳动密集型商品制造，并向发达国家出口低附加值产品。然而，中国在相当程度上抵制了新自由主义，坚持社会主义制度，坚持自主创新。因此，在过去几十年间，中国在全球生产网络中的地位不断攀升，成为全世界唯一拥有全部工业门类的国家。在美国霸权的衰落趋势不可避免的今天，中国被美国看作最大的挑战者，中美之间的摩擦与冲突极有可能会进一步升级。从世界资本主义的历史看，霸权国家的衰落与全球秩序的重塑从来都不是和平的过程。中国不仅需要做好全球物资供应与生产秩序进一步恶化的准备，更要做好美国可能挑起恶性事件的准备。

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑