How Neo-Fascism Rises from Neoliberal Capitalism

I. Introduction

一、引言

There is an inherent political, economic, and social contradiction between the necessary conditions for capitalist accumulation and the political legitimacy of the capitalist state. In the development of neoliberal capitalism over the past 40 years, the rise of corporate power has eroded public representation, agencies, and accountability mechanisms within the state. The definition of neoliberal capitalism often evades the issue of corporate power, conflating “neoliberalism” with weakening the role of the state and supporting “free markets.” On the contrary, improving the representation of corporate power within the capitalist state, rather than “weakening the role of the state” or promoting “free markets,” is the core of understanding the developmental dynamics of neoliberal capitalism. Under neoliberal capitalism, the shift in the public functions of the capitalist liberal democratic state—namely, further subsidizing, strengthening, and concentrating private power within the state and the market—has expanded the political and market power of corporations. As the public functions of the capitalist state have been continuously weakened over the 40 years of neoliberal capitalism’s rise, public support for capitalist liberal democratic institutions has correspondingly declined. This has created opportunities for politicians who support authoritarian capitalism to promote neo-fascism, and this has become a global phenomenon.

资本主义积累的必要条件与资本主义国家的政治合法性之间存在着固有的政治、经济和社会矛盾。在过去40年新自由资本主义的发展中，企业权力的崛起削弱了国家内部的公众代表、代理机构和问责机制。新自由资本主义的定义常常回避企业权力的问题，即将“新自由主义”与削弱国家作用并支持“自由市场”混为一谈。与此相反，改善资本主义国家中企业权力的代表性，而不是“削弱国家作用”或促进“自由市场”，才是理解新自由资本主义发展动态的核心。在新自由资本主义下，资本主义自由民主国家公共职能的转向（即进一步补贴、增强和集中国家与市场内部的私人权力）扩大了企业的政治和市场权力。随着资本主义国家的公共职能在新自由资本主义崛起的40年里不断被削弱，公众对资本主义自由民主制度的支持率也随之下降，这为支持威权资本主义的政客推行新法西斯主义创造了机会，并且这已经成为一种全球性现象。

To better understand the relationship between neoliberal capitalism and neo-fascism, we must first trace back to the historical context of the emergence of fascism in the 1930s. When the ruling institutions of capitalist society are unable to operate within the original laws, norms, and standards, capitalist crises give rise to authoritarian “solutions.” Over the long term, these crises have been driven by the inherent tensions of capitalism as an accumulative economic system. When capitalists are unable to maintain a rate of profit that allows for the expansion of capital investment, they seek solutions (including rebuilding those institutions that hinder profitability).

为了更好地理解新自由资本主义和新法西斯主义之间的关系，我们首先要追溯至20世纪30年代法西斯主义出现的历史背景。当资本主义社会的统治机构无法在原有的法律、规范和准则内运作时，资本主义危机就催生了威权主义的“解决方案”。长期以来，这些危机都是由资本主义作为一种积累型经济体系所固有的紧张关系驱动。当资本家无法维系一个允许资本投资进行扩张的利润率时，他们就会寻求解决办法（包括重建那些阻碍盈利的制度）。

When such a crisis erupts, reconstruction may lead to fundamental changes in the political system of the capitalist state, or at least to the emergence of social movements and hegemonic projects that protect capitalism through authoritarian rule. The history of capitalist development tells us that there are multiple types of authoritarian regimes, differing in their degree of reliance on military force, mass mobilization, and/or the retention of republican forms (such as referendums or controlled electoral processes).

当这种危机爆发时，重建可能会导致资本主义国家政体的根本改变，或者至少会出现通过威权统治保护资本主义的社会运动和霸权计划。资本主义的发展历史告诉我们，因其军事力量、群众动员和（或）共和制形式保留（如公民投票或受控的选举过程）的程度不尽相同，威权主义政体存在多种类型。

In the 1930s, when “national capitalists” faced intensifying political, economic, and social crises due to the Great Depression, leaders who embraced fascism emerged from a divided class and social environment. They promoted white supremacy, reactionary nationalism, militarism, chauvinism, and viewed ethnic minorities, social democrats, and the labor movement as obstacles to achieving their ideal state, seeking to expel, oppress, and eliminate them.

在20世纪30年代，当“民族资本家”面临因全球大萧条而日益加剧的政治、经济和社会危机时，那些信奉法西斯主义的领导者便从分裂的阶级和社会环境中粉墨登场。他们推行白人至上主义、反动民族主义、军国主义、沙文主义，并把少数族裔、社会民主党、工人运动等视为实现其理想国家的阻碍，试图驱逐、压迫和消灭他们。

The capitalist ruling class either supported this reactionary turn, seeing it as an opportunity to stabilize and increase capitalist profits, or ultimately cooperated with the fascist movement out of shared interests, suppressing working-class political parties and trade unions that were seen as obstacles to profitability. The fascism that emerged in the 1930s was a malignant outcome of the capitalist crisis, manifested in the collapse of the legitimacy of the capitalist system and the deepening of class and social struggles, which were primarily focused on what kind of society needed to be constructed to resolve the crisis. Therefore, the type of fascism was closely related to the economic, political, and social conditions of capitalism during this period. It turned out that if fascists could rebuild the capitalist state in a way that expanded state power, restored its profitability, and suppressed working-class political parties, trade unions, and political movements, they served the interests of the ruling class. During a period when state capitalism actively competed for market access, raw materials, and geopolitical advantages, the fascism that arose in the 1930s began to build large-scale authoritarian states, which relied on powerful armies and mass mobilization through large fascist parties.

资本主义统治阶级要么支持这种反动转向，并将其视为稳定和提高资本主义利润的机会，要么最终因共同利益与法西斯主义运动合作，镇压那些被视为盈利障碍的工人阶级政党和工会。20世纪30年代出现的法西斯主义是资本主义危机的恶果，表现为资本主义制度合法性的崩溃，以及阶级和社会斗争的不断深化，这些斗争主要集中在当时需要构建何种社会才能解决危机。因此，法西斯主义的类型与这一时期资本主义的经济、政治和社会条件密切相关。事实证明，如果法西斯分子能够以扩大国家力量的方式重建资本主义国家，恢复其盈利能力，镇压工人阶级政党、工会和政治运动，他们就符合统治阶级的利益。在国家资本主义积极争夺市场准入、原材料和地缘政治优势的时期，20世纪30年代兴起的法西斯主义开始建设大规模的威权主义国家，这类国家有赖于强大的军队和大规模的法西斯主义政党进行群众动员。

II. Fascism and Neo-Fascism

二、法西斯主义与新法西斯主义

In contrast, the current neo-fascism has emerged from the crisis of neoliberal capitalism. In this crisis, except in the areas of militarization and regulation, the functions of the capitalist state have long been redirected from large-scale state capacity back to urgent capitalist accumulation. Over 40 years, neoliberal capitalism has restructured the capitalist state to serve more directly the profit accumulation of the most powerful capitalist sectors. This means that the capitalist state has undergone a 40-year “deconstruction,” whereby state activities have been variably dedicated to enhancing the political and economic power of the corporate sector. In this process, the state has become more heavily reliant on regressive tax policies, which reduce taxes on corporations and the wealthy while increasing the burden on the middle and working classes, leading to more public-private “partnerships.” In these relationships, the state directly provides more subsidies to corporate investors to lower investment costs; reduces public subsidies and welfare assistance to the working class, encouraging the provision of more cheap labor to capitalists; and incentivizes the establishment of global supply chains through trade and investment agreements, institutionalizing a globalized system of corporate power.

相比之下，当前的新法西斯主义是在新自由资本主义危机中出现的。在危机中，除了在军事化与监管方面，资本主义国家的职能长期以来已经从大规模的国家能力重新转向迫切的资本主义积累。在40年间，新自由资本主义对资本主义国家进行了重建，以便使其更直接地为最强大的资本主义部门的利润积累服务。这意味着资本主义国家已经经历了长达40年的“解构”，由此，国家活动不同程度地致力于增强企业部门的政治和经济实力。在此过程中，国家更严重地依赖累退税政策，这降低了企业和富人的纳税，增加了中产阶级和工人阶级的负担，导致了更多的公私“伙伴关系”。在这种关系中，国家直接向企业投资者提供更多补贴，以降低投资成本；减少对工人阶级的公共补贴和福利援助，鼓励向资本家提供更多廉价劳动力；通过贸易和投资协议激励全球供应链的建立，推动企业权力全球化体系的制度化。

Compared to the 1930s, today’s neo-fascist movements aim to accelerate the institutionalization of neoliberal capitalism by promoting the further “deconstruction” of the capitalist state. Unlike the fascism of the 1930s, which built a powerful state apparatus serving capitalists by mobilizing large support networks and utilizing political parties, neo-fascism operates within a globalized capitalist system. Its goal is to increase the accumulation of its social assets by accelerating the stripping away of public and regulatory functions from already weakened public capacities, promoting the “freedom” of powerful capital interests. The fascist rhetoric of the contemporary far right, including white supremacy, chauvinism, xenophobia, and attacks on a corrupt “political class,” echoes many of the fascist precursors of the 1930s. Neo-fascism is a product of the intensifying crisis of capital accumulation. Neo-fascists attack the institutionalized power of what they call the “political class,” and this capacity for attack is a direct manifestation of the declining political legitimacy of liberal capitalist democracy. Over 40 years, the public functions of the capitalist state have been hollowed out, turned to directly serve the accumulation needs of the bourgeoisie.

与20世纪30年代相比，当今的新法西斯主义运动旨在通过推动资本主义国家的进一步“解构”，加速新自由资本主义的制度化进程；不同于20世纪30年代的法西斯主义通过动员大规模的支持网络并利用政党来构建一个为资本家服务的强大国家机构，新法西斯主义在一个全球化的资本主义体系中运作，其目的是从已经被削弱的公共能力中加速剥离公共和监管职能来增加其社会资产的积累，促进强大资本利益的“自由”。当代极右翼的法西斯主义言论，包括白人至上主义、沙文主义、排外心理以及攻击腐败的“政治阶层”等，与20世纪30年代的许多法西斯主义前身遥相呼应。新法西斯主义是资本积累危机加剧的产物。新法西斯主义者攻击他们所谓的“政治阶层”的制度化权力，这种攻击能力是自由资本主义民主政治合法性下降的直接表现。40年来，资本主义国家的公共职能被掏空，转而直接服务于资产阶级的积累需求。

Our interpretation of contemporary neo-fascism includes the following structural and functional factors, which explain the relationship between neo-fascism, the capitalist state, and power blocs in different sectors of capitalism:

我们对当代新法西斯主义的释义包括以下结构性的和有用的因素，这些因素诠释了新法西斯主义、资本主义国家和资本主义不同部门的权力集团之间的关系：

1. Over the 40 years of neoliberal capitalist development, the capitalist state has undergone a long-term structural crisis, characterized by the hollowing out of public functions and the dominance of corporate interests within the state. This has reduced the public legitimacy of the state, leading to declining support for major political parties and government institutions, creating opportunities for far-right, neo-fascist movements and their leaders.

1. 在新自由资本主义发展的40年里，资本主义国家经历了一场长期的结构性危机，其特征是公共职能的空心化和企业利益在国家内部占据支配地位，这降低了国家的公共合法性，导致了主要政党和政府机构的支持率下降，为极右翼、新法西斯主义运动及其领导者创造了机会。

2. Capitalist crises, especially the global capitalist crisis that erupted in 2008, directly led to the rise of far-right movements. These movements often include neo-fascist political currents, whose rhetoric and goals oppose the institutions, procedures, and processes of liberal democracy, supporting authoritarian “strongmen” who demand the replacement of procedural democracy. In this process, attacks on the “political class,” people of color, ethnic minorities, and immigrants become political weapons for neo-fascist leaders. These movements attempt to express that “white civilization” is under attack and define the “nation” as an embodiment of white supremacist values.

2. 资本主义危机，特别是2008年爆发的全球资本主义危机，直接导致了极右翼运动的兴起。这些运动通常包括新法西斯主义政治潮流，其言论和目标是反对自由民主的制度、程序和过程，支持那些要求取代程序民主的威权主义“强人”。在这个过程中，攻击“政治阶层”、有色人种、少数族裔和移民成为新法西斯主义领导者的政治武器。这些运动试图表达“白人文明”正在受到攻击，并将“国家”定义为白人至上主义价值观的体现。

3. Capitalist sectors are divided on how to respond to far-right and neo-fascist coalitions.

3. 资本主义部门在如何应对极右翼和新法西斯主义联盟的问题上存在分歧。

Financial speculators, extractive capitalist sectors such as oil, mining, and agribusiness, along with small business groups and coalitions, have facilitated and funded the formation and development of far-right and neo-fascist political networks, whose purpose is to increase corporate power by strengthening neoliberal capitalist policies. Some (though not all) powerful neoliberal think tanks, typically funded by capitalists, have adopted much of the far-right’s xenophobic and racist rhetoric as part of a capitalist political plan that seeks to further delegitimize the state and deconstruct it in order to grant capitalists in the private sector more power. For a long time, corporations have used far-right and neo-fascist political movements to undermine the legitimacy of government public functions, supporting privatization, subsidizing enterprises, and expanding corporate power within the state.

金融投机者，石油、采矿和农业综合企业等采掘性资本主义部门，以及小型商业团体和联盟，为极右翼和新法西斯主义政治网络的形成发展提供了便利和资金，其目的是通过加强新自由资本主义政策扶持来增加企业权力。一些（虽然不是全部）通常由资本家资助的强大新自由主义智库，已经接受了许多极右翼的排外主义和种族主义言论，将其作为资本家政治计划的一部分，这一计划试图进一步剥夺国家的合法性和解构国家，以赋予私营部门的资本家更多权力。长期以来，企业一直利用极右翼和新法西斯主义的政治运动来消解政府公共职能的合法性，支持私有化、补贴企业和扩大国家内部的企业权力。

4. The far right, which encompasses neo-fascist forces, also includes groups outside the capitalist power structure, such as members of the middle class, the upper strata of the white working class, police and security personnel, and religious groups. They define themselves using the racialized language and political programs associated with neo-fascism: championing white supremacy, viewing ethnic minorities, people of color, and immigrants as “threats,” and peddling a “law and order” rhetoric that treats prisons, border security, and punitive security measures as necessary conditions for returning to white supremacy.

4. 囊括了新法西斯主义势力的极右翼也包括资本主义权力结构之外的群体，如中产阶级成员、白人工人阶级的上层部分、警察和安保人员，以及宗教团体，他们用与新法西斯主义相关的种族化语言和政治纲领来界定自己：拥护白人至上主义，将少数族裔、有色人种和移民视为“威胁”，兜售把监狱、边境安全和惩罚性安全措施视作重回白人至上主义必要条件的“法律和秩序”言论。

5. We recognize that neo-fascist movements will produce different variants with the above four characteristics based on their specific historical and social contexts.

5. 我们认识到，新法西斯主义运动将根据其特定的历史和社会背景产生具有以上四个特征的不同变体。

To better illustrate the classification of neo-fascism, this article conducts relevant research on the United States and Brazil, which not only fully exemplify our definition of neo-fascism but will also have a profound impact on promoting global neo-fascist movements.

为了更好地说明对新法西斯主义的分类，本文对美国和巴西进行了相关研究，它们不仅充分诠释了本文对新法西斯主义的界定，而且将对推动全球新法西斯主义运动产生深远影响。

Contrary to our view, many left-wing and liberal commentators describe the rise of neo-fascism as “right-wing populism,” arguing that it fills the vacuum created by the hollowing out of public functions in liberal-democratic regimes. For instance, the Amsterdam School describes “national populism” as a response to financial globalization, viewing it as countering neoliberalism. In contrast to this understanding of the rise of right-wing authoritarianism, our analysis points to the consistent persistence and defense of neoliberalism; Trump’s “renaming” of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) is in fact a reshaping. That is, neo-fascism rhetorically stirs up public resentment against the effects of neoliberalism, but as a power bloc, it embodies a transformation of global hegemony, not its overthrow.

与我们的观点相反，许多左翼和自由主义评论家将新法西斯主义的崛起描述为“右翼民粹主义”，认为它填补了自由—民主政体中公共职能空心化所造成的空白。如阿姆斯特丹学派（Amster‐dam School）将“民族民粹主义”描述为对金融全球化的一种应对，认为它与新自由主义相抗衡。与这种对右翼威权主义崛起的理解相反，我们的分析指出了新自由主义的一贯坚持和捍卫；特朗普将《北美自由贸易协定》（NAFTA）“重新命名”为《美国—墨西哥—加拿大协定》（USMCA），这实际上是一种重塑，即新法西斯主义在言论上激起了公众对新自由主义影响的怨恨，但作为一个权力集团，它体现了对全球霸权的改造，而不是推翻。

Regarding Donald Trump, in contrast to classical fascism, Dylan Riley argues that “Trump has no bureaucratic organization to lead.” But since the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot, this view has clearly become untenable. At least for left-wing analyses of developments in the United States, one should not lightly dismiss this Trumpism with neo-fascist characteristics. That is to say, in fact, the far right in the United States lacks both ideological unity and the organizational capacity of classical fascism. Nevertheless, Riley’s view may still be correct, given the long-standing ideological fragmentation of the American right. Looking back at the heyday of Keynesian liberalism in the United States, we can see a common pattern described by liberal historian Richard Hofstadter: “The American right wing is organized into an extremely large number of fanatical groups of varying size. These groups are far from united. They have points of cooperation and convergence… and also common idols.” The unique combination of issues Hofstadter listed includes “solving the money problem, breaking up land monopolies, exposing the invisible world government, taking the lead in getting rid of bureaucracy, distributing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, impeaching Eisenhower, abolishing the income tax, eliminating the Freemasons, persecuting Catholics… disbanding the mental health movement, stopping the fluoridation of water…” The continuities and differences between neo-fascism and the far right of the 1950s are thought-provoking; racism and xenophobia need to be further escalated to encompass Islamophobia and more overt hostility toward immigrants, especially since contemporary neo-fascism has largely abandoned the “socialist” alternative goals of its classical precursors; there is no longer any interest in breaking up any form of monopoly, nor any interest in challenging any form of property rights. But its hostility toward medical research seems to have lasting momentum.

关于唐纳德·特朗普，与经典法西斯主义形成对比的是，迪伦·莱利（Dylan Riley）认为“特朗普没有可以领导的官僚组织”。但自2021年1月6日发生的美国“国会暴乱”事件以来，上述观点显然站不住脚。至少就左翼对美国事态发展的分析而言，不应该轻易蔑视这种具有新法西斯主义特征的特朗普主义。也就是说，事实上美国的极右翼既缺乏意识形态的统一性，也缺乏经典法西斯主义的组织能力。尽管如此，莱利的观点仍然可能是正确的，毕竟美国右翼的意识形态分裂由来已久。回顾凯恩斯—自由主义在美国的鼎盛时期，我们可以看到自由主义历史学家理查德·霍夫施塔特（Richard Hofstadter）所描述的一种常见的模式：“美国的右翼被组织成数量极其庞大、规模不定的狂热团体。这些团体远没有团结起来。他们有合作和趋同之处……也有共同的偶像。”霍夫施塔特列出的各种问题的独特组合，包括“解决资金问题，打破土地垄断，揭露隐形的世界政府，带头摆脱官僚主义，分发《犹太人贤士议定书》，弹劾艾森豪威尔，废除所得税，消灭共济会，迫害天主教徒……解散心理健康运动，停止供应氟化水……”新法西斯主义与20世纪50年代的极右翼之间的连续性和差异发人深省；种族主义和排外心理需要进一步升级，以囊括伊斯兰恐惧症和对移民更为明显的敌意，尤其是当代新法西斯主义在很大程度上放弃了其经典先驱的“社会主义”替代目标；不再有兴趣打破任何形式的垄断，也不再有兴趣挑战任何形式的产权。但其对医疗研究的敌意似乎后劲十足。

Perry Anderson insists that the term “fascism” can only be used in the sense and context of the socioeconomic crises and mass-based social movements of the interwar period, that fascism is “a response to the crisis of social revolution during economic chaos or depression.” In contrast, in our view, this insistence that fascism can only be a product of a specific situation (requiring an extreme authoritarian state to restrain a both radical and powerful working class, although unfortunately the working class was not strong enough to successfully achieve socialism) has no historical basis. As we see in the rise of neo-fascism, resorting to authoritarian politics can also be preemptive. In Anderson’s focused analysis of Brazilian politics, he raises a point fundamental to our analysis: that the Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) is “the only new mass party built from the labor movement since World War II, surpassing other organizations in Latin America in terms of scale, influence, and relative cohesion.” In the post-Cold War historical context, even the revival of the mildest social democracy in Brazil, along with Bernie Sanders’s campaign, was enough to cause panic, or serve as a pretext for the anti-socialist ideology of figures like Bolsonaro and Trump. Anderson also notes: “There has always been an asymmetry between the moderate and conciliatory policies of the Workers’ Party and the hostility of the angry middle class and media toward it… This expression of one-sided hatred has become increasingly violent… while the demonstrators sang their signature song ‘Capitalism Will Continue.’” William I. Robinson offers a rather apt summary of the rise of neo-fascism, saying: “It appears to be a preemptive strike to prevent the spread of working-class and mass resistance.”

佩里·安德森（Perry Anderson）坚持认为，“法西斯主义”这一术语只能在两次世界大战期间的社会经济危机和以群众为基础的社会运动的意义和语境中使用，法西斯主义“是在经济混乱或萧条时期对社会革命危机的一种回应”。相反，在我们看来，这种坚持认为法西斯主义只能是某种情况下（需要一个极端的威权主义国家来限制既激进又强大的工人阶级，尽管不幸的是，工人阶级的力量还不足以成功实现社会主义）的产物的观点并没有历史依据。正如我们在新法西斯主义的崛起中所看到的，诉诸威权主义政治也可以先发制人。在安德森对巴西政治的重点分析中，他提出了一个对我们的分析具有根本性意义的观点，即巴西劳工党是“二战以来唯一从劳工运动中建立起来的新型群众政党，它从规模、影响力和相对凝聚力方面都超过了拉丁美洲的其他组织”。在冷战后的历史背景下，即便是最温和的社会民主主义在巴西的复兴，以及伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）的竞选活动，也足以引发恐慌，或者成为博索纳罗和特朗普等政治人物反社会主义意识形态的借口。安德森还指出：“劳工党的温和和宽容政策与愤怒的中产阶级和媒体对其的敌对态度之间一直存在着不对称性……这种单方面憎恶的表达变得越来越暴力……而示威者则高唱他们的标志性歌曲《资本主义将继续存在》。”威廉·I.罗宾逊（William I.Robinson）对新法西斯主义的崛起进行了相当巧妙的总结，他说：“这似乎是一场防止工人阶级和群众抵抗蔓延的先发打击。”

In the post-Cold War era, the emergence of mild social democratic politics in the United States and Brazil was enough to trigger neo-fascism. In this context, the petty bourgeoisie is easily misled, and a considerable portion of the capitalist elite is accustomed to instrumentalizing the state. This also helps us understand the crisis of traditional conservatism, which tends to conceptualize the state as social integration. All forms of fascism tend to imitate the left (as it conceives it) and view politics as a struggle that can play a significant role; given its chauvinistic ideology, fascism uses pejorative terms (such as “scoundrels” and the like) to describe more traditional forms of conservative politics. Bannon’s use of “deconstructionism” in this regard is a rhetorical device of “classical fascism,” especially since he has treated “cultural Marxism” as an adversary.

在后冷战时代，美国和巴西出现的温和社会民主政治就足以引发新法西斯主义。在这种情况下，小资产阶级很容易被误导，相当一部分资本主义精英习惯于将国家工具化。这也有助于我们理解传统保守主义的危机，传统保守主义倾向于将国家概念化为社会一体化。所有形式的法西斯主义都倾向于模仿左翼（正如其所设想的那样），并将政治视为能够起到重要作用的斗争，鉴于其沙文主义的意识形态，法西斯主义会用贬义术语（如“卑鄙小人”等）描述更传统的保守政治形式。班农（Bannon）在这方面使用“解构主义”就是一种“经典法西斯主义”的修辞手法，尤其是他曾将“文化马克思主义”视为对手。

Wherever neo-fascist leaders or neo-fascist movements have come to power, the public legitimacy of capitalist liberal-democratic states is declining. Over a period of forty years, the public functions of capitalist states have been twisted to serve private capital accumulation more directly (especially during prolonged political, social, and economic crises), which has further eroded the public legitimacy of capitalist states. The outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis can precisely be seen as the ultimate expression of massive public subsidies by the state to capitalist enterprises, whose survival has since depended on trillions of dollars in government spending. The huge public subsidies transferred from taxpayers to the wealthiest financial companies starkly reveal the inseparable close relationship that has been established between the capitalist state and its most powerful corporate donors. By accelerating the growth of economic inequality and intensifying distrust and suspicion of capitalist governing institutions, the government’s generosity toward the powerful global financial sector has deepened the contemporary crisis of capitalism. At the same time, the intensification of the crisis has led to the emergence of neo-fascist politicians, parties, and social movements, whose interpretation of the crisis reflects the advantage of political alliances that believe the entire “political class” is beyond redemption and requires a “complete change.” The far right and neo-fascist forces also used the COVID-19 pandemic as a political opportunity to justify avoiding disruptions to capitalist production and global value chains at the cost of human lives.

凡是新法西斯主义领导者或新法西斯主义运动获得权力的地方，资本主义自由民主国家的公共合法性都在下降。在长达40年里，资本主义国家的公共职能扭转为更直接地服务于私人资本积累（特别是在长期的政治、社会和经济危机期间），这进一步侵蚀了资本主义国家的公共合法性。2008年全球金融危机爆发恰好可以被视为国家对资本主义企业大规模公共补贴的终极表现，自此这些企业的生存开始依赖于数万亿美元的政府支出。从纳税人运转到最富有金融公司的巨额公共补贴，明显地暴露出资本主义国家与其最强大的企业捐助者之间已经建立起来的不可分割的密切关系。通过加速经济不平等的增长，以及加剧对资本主义管理机构的不信任和怀疑，政府对实力雄厚的全球性金融部门的慷慨解囊，加深了当代资本主义危机。与此同时，危机的加剧导致了新法西斯主义政治家、政党和社会运动的出现，他们对危机的解读反映了政治联盟的优势，这些政治联盟认为整个“政治阶层”已无药可救，需要“彻底改变”。极右翼和新法西斯主义势力还利用新冠病毒疫情作为政治机会，为以牺牲人的生命为代价来避免资本主义生产和全球价值链的中断进行辩护。

Powerful capitalist sectors have long relied on such incendiary rhetoric to drive the neoliberal restructuring that has drained the state’s public functions and regulatory capacity. Currently, the capitalist crisis under the COVID-19 pandemic is replaying the 2008 global financial crisis more violently, with the same actors benefiting from the largest corporate subsidies in contemporary capitalist history, subsidies supported by mainstream parties whose long-standing commitments to their corporate support networks, donors, and lobbyists have stripped them of the ability to represent the public electorate. As the public increasingly vents its anger over where tax money goes and who pockets taxpayer expenditures, and as the terms of public bailouts are imposed with almost no conditions, these various disorders prepare the ground for larger-scale class conflict and the rise of left-wing social movements, parties, and organizations that can direct anger toward the close relationship between the political class and the corporate class. However, this path has been blocked by four decades of ruling-class attacks on trade unions and the rightward shift of social democratic and labor parties toward supporting more business-friendly legislative policies, which have led to the fragmentation and destruction of effective working-class political and economic representation.

强大的资本主义部门长期以来一直依赖这种煽动性言论来推动新自由主义的重建，这耗尽了国家的公共职能和监管能力。当前，新冠病毒疫情下的资本主义危机正在更加剧烈地重演2008年全球金融危机，同样的行为体正从当代资本主义历史上最大规模的企业补贴中受益，这些补贴得到了主流政党的支持，长期以来，这些政党对其企业支持网络、捐赠者和游说者的承诺使他们丧失了代表公众选民的能力。随着公众不断迁怒于税款去向以及谁将纳税人的支出中饱私囊，公共捐赠条款也几乎没有任何条件限制，种种乱象为更大规模的阶级冲突和左翼社会运动的兴起作好了准备，这些运动、政党和组织可以将愤怒引向政治阶层和企业阶层之间的密切关系。然而，因40年来统治阶级对工会的打击，以及社会民主党和工党右转倾向于支持对企业更友好的立法政策，导致了有效的工人阶级政治和经济代表权的分裂和破坏，这条道路被阻断了。

The vacuum in working-class representation has ultimately been filled by far-right political alliances, which easily evolve into variants of neo-fascism as they attempt to distinguish themselves from the “political class” as “outsiders” who can purge state corruption and represent the interests of traditional fascist discourse, such as white supremacy, racism, xenophobia, and myths of “national greatness.” Neo-fascism, like its predecessor, defines the capitalist crisis in racial terms and argues that the interests of the privileged race are harmed because the “political class” has stripped them of the “special interests” that rightfully belong to them. This rhetoric is a “gift” to the bourgeoisie, which has a vested interest in further stripping the public functions of the capitalist state of their legitimacy. As neo-fascist rhetoric demonizes ethnic minorities and immigrants and calls for accelerating social control and militarization, the culprits of the capitalist crisis gradually shift from powerful capitalists to the institutions of the liberal-democratic state itself. In this way, neo-fascism, like its predecessor, provides the political and ideological impetus toward further restricting, reducing, or even possibly eliminating capitalist liberal democracy, and tends toward adopting authoritarian measures to elect a trusted leader who can represent the grievances of a small segment of the public.

工人阶级代表权的真空最终被极右翼政治联盟所填补，他们很容易演变成新法西斯主义的变体，因为他们试图将自己与“政治阶层”区分开来，成为一种可以肃清国家腐败并代表传统法西斯主义话语利益（如白人至上主义、种族主义、排外心理以及“国家伟大”神话）的“局外人”。新法西斯主义和其前身一样，用种族来界定资本主义危机，并认为特权种族的利益受到损害的原因在于“政治阶层”从他们手中剥夺了本应属于他们的“特殊利益”。这种言论是送给那些在进一步剥夺资本主义国家公共职能合法性方面获得既得利益的资产阶级的“礼物”。随着新法西斯主义言论妖魔化少数族裔和移民，并呼吁加快社会管制和军事化进程，资本主义危机的罪魁祸首逐渐从实力雄厚的资本家身上转移到自由民主国家机构本身。这样一来，新法西斯主义就像它的前身一样，提供了政治和意识形态上的动力，朝着进一步限制、减少甚至可能消除资本主义自由民主的方向发展，并倾向于采取威权措施，选出一个被信任的，而且可以代表一小部分公众不满情绪的领导者。

As with previous fascism, the segment of the public most supportive of neo-fascist leaders belongs to the petty bourgeoisie, which is much wealthier than the majority of the working class but less secure than the dominant sectors of capital, whose interests are most directly protected and guaranteed by neoliberal capitalism. Implementing a more regressive tax system has a greater impact on middle-tier capital than on the top 1%. The level of support from this middle-tier capital group for neo-fascist leaders and neo-fascist movements should not be underestimated, despite an unfortunate tendency to lump this group’s decline into the category of the “white working class,” which obscures their socioeconomic status and hierarchy, as the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie are classified into the same income and class categories as workers who have little capital and savings beyond wages. Any analysis of the social base of neo-fascism needs to consider the divisions that exist between workers and middle-tier capitalists and/or managers. The use of false statistical classifications that equate the working class with people without a college degree—a practice common in U.S. articles depicting “white working-class support” for Trump—needs to be questioned through a more specific examination of Trump’s neo-fascist support network.

与以往的法西斯主义一样，公众中最支持新法西斯主义领导者的那部分人属于小资产阶级，他们比大多数工人阶级富裕得多，但不如资本的主导部门那么稳固，后者的利益受到新自由资本主义最直接的保护和保障。实行更具累退性的税收制度对中层资本造成的影响比对上层1%的影响更大。中层资本这个群体对新法西斯主义领导者和新法西斯主义运动的支持程度不应被低估，尽管有一种不幸的趋势，即这一群体衰落为“白人工人阶级”的一部分，这削弱了他们的社会经济地位和等级，小资产阶级中的较低阶层与除了工资之外没有多少资本和储蓄的工人被划为同一个收入和阶级类别。对新法西斯主义社会基础的任何分析都需要考虑工人与中层资本家和（或）管理人员之间存在的分歧。使用虚假的统计分类将工人阶级与没有大学学历的人群等同起来，这种做法在美国那些描绘“白人工人阶级支持”特朗普的文章中司空见惯，我们需要通过对特朗普的新法西斯主义支持网络进行更具体的审视来质疑这种做法。

In the following analysis, we will first discuss the structural economic and political conditions for the rise of neo-fascism in contemporary global capitalism. Second, we will analyze the composition of the political alliance that tends to support neo-fascist political leaders or movements, including the capitalist sector of global speculative finance; extractive sectors such as oil, gas, mining, and agribusiness; members of the petty bourgeoisie (including both high- and low-income groups in small businesses); white workers who feel abandoned by deindustrialization and financial chaos; and religious movements, especially those linked to far-right evangelical or other Christian denominations. The marriage between some of the most profitable sectors of global capital and middle-class social support, built on racism, xenophobia, and patriarchal power structures intensified by corporate and religious ideology, creates the conditions for a neo-fascist support network at the national and even global levels.

在接下来的分析中，我们将首先讨论新法西斯主义在当代全球资本主义中崛起的结构性经济和政治条件。其次，我们将解析倾向于支持新法西斯主义政治领导者或运动的政治联盟的构成，其中包括全球投机金融的资本主义部门，石油、天然气、采矿和农业综合企业等采掘部门，小资产阶级成员（包括小企业中的高收入与低收入群体），因去工业化和金融失控而感到被抛弃的白人工人群体，以及宗教运动，尤其是与极右翼福音派或其他基督教派别联系在一起的宗教运动。全球资本中一些最盈利的部门与中产阶级社会支持之间的联姻，建立在种族主义、排外心理和因企业和宗教意识形态而加剧的父权制权力结构基础之上，这种联姻为国家乃至全球的新法西斯主义支持网络创造了便利。

Finally, we will briefly outline two case studies, including two politically successful neo-fascist political alliances: Trump in the United States and Bolsonaro in Brazil. Through these case studies, we illustrate the historical and comparative factors that give rise to neo-fascist movements in different contexts, and then we examine the impact of the rise of neo-fascism on the left. Here, we argue that the left needs to take a clear oppositional stance toward neo-fascism, because neo-fascism poses an existential threat to workers and humanity. However, the necessity of this political opposition must be built on the general elevation of the working-class position, which has been extremely suppressed during the forty years of neoliberal development. Only by promoting a working-class movement with the common mission of defeating fascism and reversing neoliberal capitalism (and challenging capitalism itself) can we both overcome neo-fascism and weaken the direct relationship between neo-fascism and capitalism. Capitalism has an inherent tendency toward authoritarianism, and neoliberal capitalism has produced neo-fascism because the relentless drive for accumulation has stripped liberal-democratic institutions of their public accountability mechanisms, which historically only incorporated working-class participation under pressure from the workers’ movement. Facing the political and economic crisis of neo-fascism, the left needs to learn these lessons.

最后，我们将简要概述两个案例研究，其中包括两个在政治上取得成功的新法西斯主义政治联盟：美国的特朗普和巴西的博索纳罗。我们通过这些案例研究来说明在不同背景下引起新法西斯主义运动的历史和比较因素，随后我们又考察了新法西斯主义的兴起对左翼的影响。在这里，我们认为左翼需要对新法西斯主义采取明确的反对立场，因为新法西斯主义对工人和人类构成了生存威胁。然而，这种政治反对的必然性需要建立在工人阶级地位普遍提升的基础上，因为工人阶级在新自由主义发展的40年中一直受到极端打压。只有通过推动以战胜法西斯主义和扭转新自由资本主义（以及挑战资本主义本身）为共同使命的工人阶级运动，才能既战胜新法西斯主义，又削弱新法西斯主义和资本主义之间的直接关系。资本主义有着威权主义的固有倾向，新自由资本主义产生了新法西斯主义，因为无情的积累动力剥夺了自由民主制度的公众问责机制，公众问责机制在历史上仅有的吸纳工人阶级参与，正是源自工人运动的压力。面对新法西斯主义的政治和经济危机，左翼需要吸取这些教训。

III. The Legitimacy Crisis of the Capitalist State

三、资本主义国家的合法性危机

Powerful capitalist alliances have accelerated the “rightward turn” of domestic and international policy through political lobbying, structural economic forces, and class struggle against workers and the poor. In our analysis, these alliances represent “the fusion of transnational capital with reactionary and repressive political power,” leading to a “transnational capitalist dictatorship” in the form of contemporary neo-fascism. One of the contradictions of the neoliberal regime is that it deregulates corporations while strictly regulating the poor. As neoliberalism transforms itself into neo-fascism, its authoritarian aspect naturally becomes more prominent and increasingly dominant. In this sense, as marginalization and authoritarian control over the surplus population intensify, the war on drugs and the militarization of the police become indispensable parts of maintaining its rule.

强大的资本主义联盟通过政治游说、结构性经济力量和反对工人与穷人的阶级斗争，加速了国内和国际政策的“右转”。在我们的分析中，这些联盟代表“跨国资本与反动和压制性政治权力的融合”，导致了当代新法西斯主义形式下的“跨国资本独裁”。新自由主义政权的矛盾之一便是它放松了对企业的监管，却又严格管制着穷人。由于新自由主义摇身一变成为新法西斯主义，其威权主义的一面便当然更加凸显，并日益占据主导。从这个意义上说，随着边缘化和对过剩人口的威权式控制的加剧，禁毒战争和警察军事化成为维系其统治不可或缺的一部分。

Particular attention must be paid to fossil fuel fascism, which plays an important role in the neo-fascist agenda of maintaining deregulation by force when necessary. Green politics, especially the re-emergence of left-wing green politics, just like the social democracy of Lula and Sanders, largely threatens the power and profits of the fossil fuel sector. Notably, we have identified a material basis for ideological appeal to the working class employed in this sector. Our analysis agrees with the traditional view of the petty bourgeoisie as the mass base of fascism, but also acknowledges that a relatively privileged segment of the white working class does provide a certain base for neo-fascism in the United States, due to its ties to the fossil fuel industry, the military-industrial complex, or the national security police apparatus. In this sense, on the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic provided a backdrop for accelerating the radicalization of Trump-Bolsonaro neo-fascism, and also created conditions for its crisis and possible decline; on the other hand, we anticipate increasing irrationalism on issues such as climate science, medicine, electoral operations, and any other realities that are not easily verifiable—this is again a typical fascist characteristic and a manifestation of what we call the potential structural decline of neoliberal capitalism.

需要特别注意的是化石燃料法西斯主义，其在新法西斯主义议程中对于必要时通过武力保持解除管制起到重要作用。绿色政治，尤其是左翼绿色政治的再次出现，正如卢拉和桑德斯的社会民主主义一样，在很大程度上威胁了化石燃料部门的权力和利润。值得注意的是，我们发现了对在这一部门工作的工人阶级有意识形态上吸引力的物质基础。我们的分析认同小资产阶级作为法西斯主义群众基础的传统观念，但也要承认，相对有特权的那部分白人工人阶级确实为美国的新法西斯主义提供了一定的基础，因为他们与化石燃料工业、军工复合体或国家安全警察机构存在联系。从这个意义上说，一方面，新冠病毒疫情为加速特朗普—博索纳罗新法西斯主义的极端化提供了背景，也为其危机和可能的衰落创造了条件；另一方面，我们预计在气候科学、医学、选举运作和任何其他不易验证的现实问题上，非理性主义会越来越多，这又是典型的法西斯主义特征，也是我们所说的新自由资本主义潜在结构性衰退的表现。

From 1980 to the present, through relentless attacks on social welfare and regulatory functions, capitalist states have promoted, to varying degrees, a structural adjustment of capitalist production and accumulation. One way to measure these trends is to examine the share of income going to capitalist profits versus workers’ wages. In many capitalist countries, issues such as the wealth gap and class inequality have become increasingly prominent, with labor income declining relative to capital income. This trend manifests in different ways depending on the specific socioeconomic and political histories of each country. Multinational corporations in the United States and Western Europe have used their political and market power to promote the restructuring of global value chains in production, leading to the subcontracting of production activities to regions with lower wages, thereby reducing the wages of workers in developed countries. At the same time, transnational capital has fully leveraged its structural power in the global political economy within preferential trade agreements, which help establish an increasingly globalized production system, thereby putting downward pressure on wages in the “Global South,” whose governments have promoted a global division of production under conditions quite favorable to capital’s extraction of surplus value.

1980年至今，通过对社会福利和监管职能的无情抨击，资本主义国家在不同程度上促进了资本主义生产和积累的结构性调整。衡量这些趋势的一种方法是考察资本家利润和工人阶级工资在收入中的占比。在众多资本主义国家中，贫富差距、阶级不平等等问题日益凸显，劳动收入相对于资本收入占比下降。因各国具体社会经济和政治历史的差异，这一趋势以不同的方式呈现。美国和西欧的跨国公司利用其政治和市场力量促进全球价值链的生产重组，这导致生产活动被分包给工资较低的地区，从而降低了发达国家工人的工资。与此同时，跨国资本在特惠贸易协定中充分利用其在全球政治经济上的结构性力量，这些协定有助于建立日益全球化的生产体系，从而给“全球南方”的工资带来下行压力，其政府在相当有利于资本榨取剩余价值的条件下，促进了全球生产的分工。

Following each capitalist crisis—including the 2001 global economic crisis, especially the 2008 global financial crisis, and the 2019 COVID-19 pandemic—transnational capitalists have actively sought large-scale subsidies from capitalist states, with the scope of these subsidies growing ever larger. The increasingly large-scale systemic crises of global capitalism have accelerated the erosion of the legitimacy of capitalist states, a legitimacy that had already been weakened by decades of state policies that led to increased public sector debt financing, increased household debt (and precarity) for wage-earning families facing wage stagnation, and increased corporate debt driven by low profit rates and the increasing financialization of corporate profits (encouraged by cheap funding sources provided by capitalist states).

历次资本主义危机（包括2001年全球经济危机，特别是2008年全球金融危机和2019年新冠病毒疫情）之后，跨国资本家都会积极地向资本主义国家寻求大规模补贴，补贴的范围越来越大。规模日益庞大的全球资本主义系统性危机加速了对资本主义国家合法性的侵蚀，这种合法性同时也被几十年来的国家政策所削弱，这些政策导致了公共部门债务融资增加，面临工资停滞的工薪阶层家庭负债（和不稳定性）增加，以及由利润回报率低迷和企业利润日益金融化（受资本主义国家提供的廉价资金来源的激励）推动的企业债务增加。

As a response to the hollowing out of the state’s public functions, capitalist states have experienced a long-term crisis of legitimacy. This is evident in many capitalist countries, including the United States, most of Western Europe, and countries at various income levels in the “Global South.” In the United States and most of Western Europe, public support for national legislatures and elected officials has declined, and voter turnout—especially among the working class—has also fallen. At the same time, support for parties historically linked to working-class voters, particularly socialist and social democratic parties, has also declined. Parties with different ideologies have increasingly favored neoliberal policies after taking office, a trend reflecting the “corporatization” and “professionalization” of parties, as party elites rely more on public relations firms, corporate consultants, opinion polling data, and the anticipated impact of their policies on capitalist markets, regardless of ideology.

作为对国家公共职能空心化的回应，资本主义国家经历了长期的合法性危机。这在许多资本主义国家都很明显，包括美国、西欧大部分国家以及“全球南方”不同收入水平的国家。在美国和西欧大部分国家，公众对国家立法机构和民选官员的支持率有所下降，参选率（尤其是工人阶级的参选率）同样在下降。与此同时，历史上与工人阶级选民有联系的政党，特别是社会主义政党和社会民主党，其支持率也在下降。有着不同意识形态的政党在执政后越来越青睐新自由主义政策，这一趋势反映了政党的企业化和“专业化”，因为政党精英更多地依赖于公关公司、企业顾问、民意调查数据以及他们的政策对资本主义市场的预期影响，而不管意识形态如何。

IV. The Agents of Neo-Fascism

四、新法西斯主义的代理人

Academia has attempted to explain the rise of far-right parties, movements, and alliances by focusing on both supply-side and demand-side factors. On the supply side, they examine the extent to which the decline in the legitimacy of mainstream capitalist parties can drive the far right to absorb their supporters—those who often feel betrayed or abandoned by mainstream parties. Many scholars link the decline in support and legitimacy for social democratic and labor parties to a political vacuum that is filled by far-right parties. At the same time, conservative parties have also experienced a crisis of legitimacy with declining public support, leading to splits within conservative party coalitions, and the emergence of far-right movements and parties has accelerated the spread of rhetoric such as white supremacy, anti-immigration, and extreme nationalism.

学界试图通过关注供给和需求两方面的因素来解释极右翼政党、运动和联盟的崛起。在供给方面，他们考察了主流资本主义政党合法性的下降可以在何种程度上推动极右翼势力吸纳其支持者（那些人往往感觉自己被主流政党背叛或抛弃）。很多学者将社会民主党、工党的支持率和合法性的下降与被极右翼政党填补的政治真空联系在一起。与此同时，保守派政党也经历了一场公众支持率下降的合法性危机，这导致了保守派政党联盟内部的分裂，极右翼运动和政党的出现加速了白人至上主义、反移民和极端民族主义等言论的散播。

Scholars focusing on demand-side factors argue that there is a close relationship between financial crises and the rise of far-right political movements. However, most of these scholars have failed to directly link increasing inequality or poverty to the rise of the far right; instead, the best predictor of rising social support for far-right movements is relative deprivation, especially among groups within the middle class whose stability of class position is uncertain, often related to perceived threats such as ethnic minorities, immigrants, foreign cultures or religious traditions, and the weakening of what is considered the best social order capable of protecting existing hierarchies. It has been found that financial crises fuel support for far-right movements and parties among some people whose debt is increasing, potentially dislodging them from their position in the social hierarchy. As part of this process, new leaders who promise to “challenge” the establishment and its entire institutional edifice gain support from those who believe that fundamental reforms seem necessary to restore conditions of greater security.

关注需求的学者则认为金融危机与极右翼政治运动的兴起之间具有密切关系。然而，其中的大多数学者都未能把日益加剧的不平等或贫困与极右翼的崛起直接联系起来；相反，极右翼运动的社会支持率不断上升的最佳预测因素是相对剥夺，尤其是中产阶级内部的群体，他们的阶级地位稳定性存在不确定因素，这往往与其感知到的威胁有关，如少数族裔、移民、外国文化或宗教传统，以及被认为是更有能力保护现有等级制度的最佳社会秩序的弱化。人们发现，金融危机助长了一些人对极右翼运动和政党的支持，那些人的债务不断增加，这有可能使他们脱离在社会阶层中的地位。作为这一进程的一部分，承诺“挑战”建制派及其整个体制大厦的新领导者会得到一些人的支持，这些人认为似乎有必要进行根本性改革，以恢复关乎更高安全性的条件。

To date, scholars have often downplayed the connection between the far right and fascism, not only because far-right parties are willing to participate in elections, but also because they (sometimes) adjust their messaging and political promises, which may include promises to strengthen the welfare state (especially for native-born white voters) and to form coalitions that may include explicitly fascist parties (only a small part of them). We argue that this view, which sees the far right as operating within the establishment rather than actively seeking to destroy liberal democracy, overlooks the attempts by leaders of far-right movements to actively seek to expand capitalist profits and to try to remove any liberal democratic obstacles to capitalist accumulation. By examining far-right political movements in recent decades, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, we identify three trends that constitute the characteristics of what we call neo-fascist political movements.

截至目前，学者们往往淡化了极右翼与法西斯主义的联系，不仅因为极右翼政党有参加选举的意愿，而且（有时）他们也会调整信息传递方式和政治承诺，其中可能包括承诺强化福利国家（特别是对土生土长的白人选民而言），并组建可能包括明确的法西斯主义政党（仅是其中的一小部分）的联盟。我们认为，这种将极右翼视为在建制内活动，而不是积极寻求摧毁自由民主的看法，忽视了极右翼运动领导者积极寻求扩大资本主义利润，并试图清除影响资本主义积累的任何自由民主障碍的企图。通过考察近几十年来特别是2008年全球金融危机之后的极右翼政治运动，我们发现了三种趋势，这构成了我们所说的新法西斯主义政治运动的特征。

First, there is a close connection between certain neoliberal think tanks, foundations, and political actors and neo-fascist political signals. Many global neoliberal organizations began as early as the 1990s to propagate conservative nationalist positions, providing favorable ideological support for neo-fascist political movements, including the superiority of “Western culture,” opposition to multiculturalism, Islamophobia, reaffirmation of “national greatness,” xenophobia and anti-immigration, and defense of state-supported capitalist accumulation. The founders of neoliberalism were broadly committed to erecting barriers between the capitalist market and liberal democratic states, whose functions would be restricted to ensure universal protection of capitalists’ property rights and to provide conditions for free capitalist accumulation. Neoliberals have long opposed liberal democracy because it exceeds what they consider the permissible limits for protecting and expanding capitalists’ private property and capital accumulation, and the founders of the neoliberal tradition sought to protect these rights from democratic accountability.

第一，一些新自由主义智库、基金会和政治行为体与新法西斯主义政治信号之间有着密切联系。不少全球性的新自由主义组织早在20世纪90年代就开始宣扬保守的民族主义立场，为新法西斯主义政治运动提供了有利的意识形态支持，包括“西方文化”的优越性、反对多元文化主义、伊斯兰恐惧症、重申“国家伟大”、排外和反移民，以及为国家支持资本主义积累而辩护。新自由主义的创始人广泛致力于在资本主义市场和自由民主国家之间设立障碍，自由民主国家的职能将受到限制，以确保对资本家财产权的普遍保护，并为自由的资本主义积累提供条件。长期以来，新自由主义者一直反对自由民主，因为自由民主超出了他们所认为的保护和扩大资本家私有财产和资本积累的允许限度，而新自由主义传统的创立者试图保护这些权利不受民主问责。

Neoliberal thinkers from the 1990s to the present have continued this trend, viewing the rise of multiculturalism, immigration, institutional and systemic racist struggles by oppressed groups for recognition, and foreign religions, especially Islam, as threats to the “Western order.” This order is essentially a commitment to individual property rights, and Eurocentric values treat group demands on the state, especially those from cultures, religions, or ideologies deemed foreign, as opposed to the Western concept of “freedom.” Neoliberal think tanks, including the Institute for International Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute, the Hayek Institute, the Austrian Economics Center, the Mises Institute, the Hoover Institute, and the Heritage Foundation, have produced some of the leading intellectual vanguards supporting neo-fascist political movements, including support for Brexit and the far-right political coalition that led the Brexit referendum. There are also important connections between members of these neoliberal think tanks and neo-fascist movements in the United States (Trump) and Brazil (Bolsonaro), as well as a range of other neo-fascist movements emerging in Western and Eastern Europe. Neoliberal policy advocates have provided ideological and material support to far-right parties and movements, whose coalition members include typical fascist groups intent on replacing liberal democratic states with authoritarian rule.

20世纪90年代至今的新自由主义思想家们延续了这一趋势，他们将多元文化主义的兴起，移民、被压迫群体为争取承认的制度性和系统性的种族主义斗争，以及外国宗教特别是伊斯兰教，视为对“西方秩序”的威胁。这种秩序本质上是对个人财产权的承诺，欧洲中心主义价值观将群体对国家的要求，特别是来自被认为是外来文化、宗教或意识形态的要求，视为与西方“自由”观念的对立。新自由主义智库，包括国际事务研究所（the Institute for International Affairs）、亚当·斯密研究所（the Adam Smith Institute）、哈耶克研究所（the Hayek Institute）、奥地利经济中心（the Austrian Economics Center）、米塞斯研究所（the Mises Institute）、胡佛研究所（the Hoover Institute）和美国传统基金会（the Heritage Foundation），都产生了一些支持新法西斯主义政治运动的主要思想先锋，包括支持英国脱欧、领导英国脱欧公投的极右翼政治联盟。这些新自由主义智库的成员与美国（特朗普）和巴西（博索纳罗）的新法西斯主义运动以及西欧、东欧出现的一系列其他的新法西斯主义运动之间也存在重要联系。新自由主义政策倡导者为极右翼政党和运动提供了意识形态和物质上的支持，其联盟成员包括那些意图用威权统治取代自由民主国家的典型法西斯主义团体。

Second, the political coalitions that constitute neo-fascist movements include capitalist interest groups that often seek to weaken and undermine the law enforcement and regulatory capacity of liberal democratic states. Financial speculative capital supports far-right movements, including neo-fascism, such as the Brexit movement in the UK, which was funded by the most speculative financial sectors of the City of London. Extractive sectors such as oil, mining, and agribusiness, which rely on natural resources for profit accumulation, have provided consistent support for neo-fascist movements, which are rife with fallacies and lies related to climate change denial and ecosystems. Neo-fascism is built on a systematic attack on truth and the peddling of myth-based narratives, often seen as necessary to defend Western civilization and white identity against the “natural order” and “threats.” Based on traditional notions of white supremacist ideology from the fascist past, and the history of racial oppression by capitalism to promote capitalist profit, the capitalist extractive sector has been a major driver of neo-fascist attacks on liberal democratic states. Enterprises in this sector have established ties with far-right movements and parties, with activities aimed at further delegitimizing the ideas, actions, and purposes of liberal democratic states.

第二，组成新法西斯主义运动的政治联盟包括资本主义利益集团，这些集团往往要求削弱、破坏自由民主国家的执法和监管能力。金融投机资本则支持包括新法西斯主义在内的极右翼运动，例如英国的脱欧运动，该运动的资金来自伦敦金融城（City of London）最具投机性的金融部门。石油、采矿和农业综合企业等采掘部门依赖自然资源获取利润积累，它们为新法西斯主义运动提供了一贯的支持保障，这些运动充斥着大量否认气候变化和生态系统相关的谬误和谎言。新法西斯主义建立在对真相的系统性攻击和兜售与神话有关的叙事基础上，这些叙事往往被认为是维护西方文明和白人身份、抵御“自然秩序”和“威胁”的必要手段。基于法西斯主义过去的白人至上主义意识形态的传统观念，以及资本主义为促进资本家获利而进行的种族压迫历史，资本主义采掘业一直是新法西斯主义攻击自由民主国家的重要推手。该部门的企业与极右翼运动和政党建立了联系，其活动旨在进一步剥夺自由民主国家观念、行动和宗旨的合法性。

Third, the base of neo-fascist movements comes mainly from relatively small-scale regional and local enterprises, rather than from globalized capitalist sectors. These capital owners have direct political influence locally and are connected through business supply chains to networks of larger capital owners. However, their status is not equivalent to that of global upper-tier capital, as the latter often possesses and controls power, privilege, or monetary funds. For them, the greatest threats are state regulations, rules, and tax demands, and they are affected by a shrinking tax base that reduces the tax burden on multinational corporations, while transnational ownership structures enhance their flexibility and ability to evade domestic taxes. Small and medium-sized enterprises, especially those with a high proportion of labor costs in their capital composition, are most vulnerable to capitalist crises and most likely to support far-right candidates associated with neo-fascist movements.

第三，新法西斯主义运动的基础主要来自规模相对较小的区域和本地企业，而不是全球化的资本主义部门。这些资本所有者在当地具有直接的政治影响，并通过商业供应链与更大规模的资本所有者网络建立联系。然而，他们的地位并不等同于全球上层资本，因为后者往往拥有和控制着权力、特权或货币资金。对他们而言，最大的威胁是国家的条例、法规和税收要求，而且受到日益缩小的税基的影响，税基缩小减轻了跨国公司的纳税负担，而跨国所有权结构强化了其逃避国内税收的灵活性和能力。中小企业，尤其是那些资本构成中劳动力成本占很大比例的企业，最容易受到资本主义危机的影响，也最有可能支持与新法西斯主义运动有关联的极右翼候选人。

Religious extremist movements often play an important role in the ideology and objectives of neo-fascist movements. Scholarship links the rise of the far-right evangelical movement in the United States with the authoritarian, neo-fascist goal of abolishing the separation of church and state as a pathway to establishing an authoritarian theocracy. This far-right evangelical neo-fascist current paved the way for Donald Trump’s election as US president, but it has been an important political and social base of the Republican Party for decades. This neo-fascist evangelical extremist movement is not confined to the United States; it has become a global movement, including neo-fascist currents in Latin America such as Brazil. Religious extremism appears in different sectarian forms elsewhere, such as the rise of nativist and neo-fascist Hindu nationalist movements, which enabled Narendra Modi to become Prime Minister of India and implement his neo-fascist policies.

宗教极端主义运动通常在新法西斯主义运动的意识形态和宗旨中发挥着重要作用。学界将美国极右翼福音派运动的崛起与威权主义、新法西斯主义的目标，即废除政教分离联系在一起，并以此作为建立专制神权政体的途径。这种极右翼福音派新法西斯主义思潮为特朗普当选美国总统铺平了道路，但几十年来，它一直是共和党重要的政治和社会基础。这场新法西斯主义福音派的极端主义运动并不局限于美国，它已经成为一场全球性运动，如包括巴西在内的拉丁美洲新法西斯主义思潮。宗教极端主义在其他地方以不同的教派形式出现，如本土主义和新法西斯印度教民族主义运动的兴起，这些运动使纳伦德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）得以成为印度总理，并推行其新法西斯主义政策。

Below, we introduce two brief case study summaries of neo-fascist movements, namely Trump and Bolsonaro. We focus on how these movements emerged, the characteristics of their support base, and the types of policies they support.

下文将介绍两个简短的关于新法西斯主义运动案例的研究总结，即特朗普和博索纳罗。笔者将重点介绍关于这些运动如何产生、其支持基础的特点以及他们所支持的政策类型等。

V. Case Studies

五、案例研究

Fascism is a fundamental structural feature of capitalism, and its emergence often accompanies different capitalist crises. Therefore, it is incorrect to simply view 21st-century fascism as a repetition of early 20th-century fascism. Although they both originate from capitalism and capitalist crises, these crises are formed within specific historical materialist contexts, and their differences are crucial for understanding the basic characteristics of neo-fascism. Here, we briefly introduce two presidents—Trump and Bolsonaro—who came to power amid contemporary capitalist crises, and who epitomize neo-fascist characteristics. Our work aims to strengthen the effectiveness of political responses to neo-fascist movements, thereby promoting the establishment of an alternative more likely to overcome neo-fascism, rather than simply rebuilding the conditions for its continued recurrence.

法西斯主义是资本主义的一个基本结构特征，它的出现往往伴随着不同的资本主义危机。因此，把21世纪法西斯主义简单地视为20世纪早期法西斯主义的重演是不正确的。它们虽然源自资本主义和资本主义危机，但这些危机都是在特定的历史唯物主义背景中形成的，它们的差异对于理解新法西斯主义的基本特征至关重要。在这里，我们简要地介绍在当代资本主义危机中上台的两位总统——特朗普和博索纳罗，他们是新法西斯主义特征的缩影。我们所做的工作旨在加强针对新法西斯主义运动的政治回应的有效性，进而推动建立一种更有可能战胜新法西斯主义的替代方案，而不是简单地重建新法西斯主义持续再现的条件。

Capitalism and capitalist political alliances paved the way for the emergence of neo-fascist figures such as Trump and Bolsonaro. Just before Trump and Bolsonaro won their elections, well-organized, deeply entrenched corporate lobbying groups had thoroughly plundered their respective capitalist states. In the United States, the most direct manifestation occurred after the 2008 global financial crisis, as crisis-management provisions intensified the continuous concentration of social wealth at the top of the US income pyramid and further delegitimized the capitalist political system. The corporate-funded Tea Party movement, anticipating Trump’s attacks on the “political class,” governance institutions, and the social security system, directly paved his path to election. At the federal and state levels, organizations representing broad capitalist interests actively pushed to cut funding for public services, privatize government functions, vilify supporters of activist government, and exploit racism and xenophobia to fuel the ongoing militarized expansion of US police and security forces—a long-standing trend that became especially pronounced after the September 11 attacks.[1]1 The September 11 attacks refer to the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, which led to a significant expansion of US security and surveillance apparatus.

资本主义和资本主义政治联盟为特朗普和博索纳罗等新法西斯分子的出现铺平了道路。就在特朗普和博索纳罗赢得选举之前，组织严密、根深蒂固的企业游说团体对各自的资本主义国家进行了深度掠夺。在美国，最直接的表现发生在2008年全球金融危机之后，如危机管理条款加剧了社会财富持续向美国收入金字塔顶端集中，并进一步使资本主义政治制度丧失合法性。企业资助的茶党运动预料到特朗普会攻击“政治阶层”、治理机构和社会保障体系，因此直接为其铺平了竞选之路。在联邦和州一级，代表广泛资本主义利益的组织积极推动削减公共服务资金，私有化政府职能，丑化激进政府的支持者，并利用种族主义和排外心理来助推美国警察和安全部队的持续军事化扩张——这一趋势由来已久，但自9·11事件以来尤为突出。

Trump’s largest financial backers came from capital sectors seeking to further advance neoliberal policies such as deregulation and tax cuts, as well as those lobbying for tariff protection, expanded military budgets, and enhanced border “security.” Additionally, capitalist hedge fund managers, oil and gas companies, steel and aluminum firms, and manufacturing industries seeking protection from foreign competition were attracted to Trump. During Trump’s tenure, a broader range of corporate interests actively participated in drafting the details of the corporate tax cut plan, which was projected to reduce taxes by $1.9 trillion. Other capitalists kept their distance from Trump, directing their wealth and political capital toward the Democratic Party. Trump’s political machine operated within a larger context in which, even after his removal from office, capitalist political alliances could continue to extract ongoing benefits from the state. Over the past few decades, the function of the capitalist state has often been to directly subsidize capitalist profits and cut funding for public services. Capitalist political alliances sought to salvage a large portion of this political system, even as they disagreed on how to handle Trump. However, the vacuum that enabled Trump’s success was filled neither by a cohesive capitalist political bloc nor by a vibrant workers’ movement. Over the past 40 years, as the Democratic Party further capitulated to corporate interests, the workers’ movement continued to suffer defeats. Biden’s presidency failed to deliver substantial long-term benefits for the US working class, helping ensure that Trump’s neo-fascist Republican Party remains highly likely to regain the presidency and congressional seats.

特朗普最大的资金后援来自那些希望进一步推行放松管制、降低税收等新自由主义政策的资本部门，以及那些游说关税保护、扩大军事预算、加强边境“安全”的资本部门。此外，寻求保护以免受外国竞争的资本主义对冲基金经理、石油和天然气公司、钢铁和铝业公司以及制造业等都被特朗普所吸引。在特朗普任职期间，更大范围的企业利益集团积极参与企业减税方案细则的起草，该方案预计减税1.9万亿美元。其他资本家则与特朗普保持距离，把自己的财富和政治资本投向民主党。特朗普的政治机器在更大的背景下运行，即使其本人下台，资本主义政治联盟也可以在这种背景下巧妙地从国家那里获取源源不断的好处。过去几十年，资本主义国家的职能往往是直接补贴资本家的利润，削减公共服务资金。资本主义政治联盟希望挽救这一政治体系的一大部分，即使他们在如何对待特朗普这一问题上存在分歧。然而，使特朗普得以成功的这种真空，既没有被一个富有凝聚力的资本主义政治集团所填补，也没有被一场充满活力的工人运动所填补。在过去40年间，随着民主党进一步向企业利益屈服，工人运动仍在遭受失败。拜登担任总统期间未能为美国工人阶级带来可观的长期利好，这有助于确保特朗普领导的新法西斯主义共和党仍然极有可能重获总统职位和国会席位。

Bolsonaro’s rise to power was also linked to capitalist accumulation and a crisis of state legitimacy. Initially, Bolsonaro’s electoral social base—his most radical supporters—consisted of agribusiness, the arms industry, and religious conservative movements, themselves products of social crisis and widespread opposition to the dysfunction of the “political class.” In the later stages of the October 2018 presidential campaign, finance and large-scale domestic industrial capital flocked to Bolsonaro after their preferred candidate, Geraldo Alckmin of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, was on the verge of defeat. Bolsonaro’s victory unleashed a wave of fascism: racist and xenophobic attacks on political opponents, workers, and the poor; escalating state-sanctioned mob violence by illegal paramilitary organizations, which continued to use terror to “monitor” and expand their property; open permission for agribusiness to further plunder the Amazon rainforest, accelerating the existential threat of climate change; and intimidation of small farmers, villagers, and indigenous guardians of the Amazon who posed obstacles to further profit accumulation by agribusiness. Just as the fossil fuel sector has long supported fascist currents in global politics and neo-fascist leaders like Trump, agribusiness depended not only on Bolsonaro’s favoritism but also on previous Workers’ Party governments, whose allocation of funds for social welfare programs was directly linked to rising commodity export prices and thus to agribusiness’s economic fortunes.

博索纳罗的上台也与资本主义积累和国家合法性危机有关。最初，博索纳罗竞选的社会基础（即最激进的支持者）是由农业综合企业、军火工业和宗教保守运动组成的，他们也是社会危机和广泛反对“政治阶层”功能失调的产物。在2018年10月总统竞选后期，金融业和国内大型工业资本纷纷投向博索纳罗，因为他们首选的巴西社会民主党的杰拉尔多·阿尔克明（Geraldo Alckmin）即将落败。博索纳罗的胜利掀起了一波法西斯主义浪潮，种族主义和排外主义抨击政治反对派、工人和穷人，非法军事组织发动的国家许可的群众暴乱不断升级，它们继续使用恐怖手段“监视”和扩大其财产，公开许可农业综合企业进一步掠夺亚马孙雨林，加速气候变化的生存威胁，恐吓对农业综合企业进一步利润积累构成威胁的亚马孙小农、村民和原住民守护者。正如化石燃料部门长期以来支持全球政治中的法西斯主义潮流，以及同特朗普等新法西斯主义领导者一样，农业综合企业不仅依赖于博索纳罗的偏袒，还依赖于前劳工党（PT）政府，后者在社会福利项目上的资金分配直接关系到商品出口价格的上涨，进而关乎农业企业的经济财富。

However, as during Trump’s presidency, Bolsonaro failed to secure broad support for his government. In fact, he gradually lost the backing of capital sectors and the vast majority of Brazilians. Bolsonaro embodies a key contradiction in fascist political expression: the intensification of deep-seated fissures—racism, xenophobia, and unrestrained capitalist accumulation—allowing sectors threatened by previous governance measures to freely pursue capitalist accumulation and hoping to use fascist political movements to further enrich themselves. If opportunities for increased profits arise, capitalist political alliances may seek the shelter of fascism. Yet the instability associated with fascist rule can also destabilize capital sectors to the point where they attempt to restore the “normality” of the previous system. However, capitalist political actors lack the economic incentives to support reversing the socioeconomic conditions that initially fueled fascism.

但是，与特朗普担任总统期间一样，博索纳罗未能为他的政府争取到广泛的支持。事实上，他已经逐渐失去了资本部门以及绝大多数巴西人的支持。博索纳罗是法西斯主义政治表达其矛盾的关键：种族主义、排外心理和不受约束的资本主义积累等根深蒂固的裂痕加剧，受到前任治理措施威胁的部门自由地进行资本主义积累，并希望利用法西斯政治运动进一步致富。如果出现增加利润的机会，资本主义政治联盟可以寻求法西斯主义的庇护。但与法西斯统治相关的不稳定因素也会破坏资本部门的稳定性，以至于它们试图恢复以往制度的“常态”。然而，资本主义政治行为体缺乏经济激励以支持扭转最初助推法西斯主义的社会经济状况。

VI. Conclusion

六、结 语

In summary, what are the political implications of our analysis? First, the rise of the far right is not merely an exercise within the framework of the current governance system. The spread of neo-fascism, neo-fascist political movements, and neo-fascist leaders—their ever-more-prominent political momentum—has increasingly normalized attacks on liberal capitalist democracy, thereby justifying the use of authoritarian methods to maintain, expand, and strengthen capitalist power. This means that the far right and neo-fascist movements pose an existential threat to humanity, and left-wing activists and social movements must recognize this threat. Second, given the dominance of corporations in liberal capitalist states and the willingness of powerful corporate sectors to weaponize far-right and neo-fascist alliances and provide them with support, the left must confront neo-fascist political movements head-on, as they represent a potential extension of capitalist political rule through authoritarian means. This means the left must systematically determine whether the goals of the far right and neo-fascist right align with those of the most powerful capitalist interests and organizations. To combat these far-right and neo-fascist movements, the left must build large-scale civil society organizations, demand the expansion of political democracy and public accountability within the state, and transform corporate welfare into social welfare. If the left wishes to defeat neo-fascist movements backed by major capital sectors and capital-funded think tanks, and supported by relatively privileged middle classes, the only method is to mobilize a broader working class to fight for higher social wages and democratic representation within the system. Failure to take these measures will only leave the arena of political and economic competition in the hands of corporate economic and political elites, who have too much at stake to change the system—including combating neo-fascism under capitalism. (Notes omitted.)

综上，我们的分析有什么政治意义？首先，极右翼势力的崛起不仅仅是当前治理体系框架内的演习。新法西斯主义的传播、新法西斯主义政治运动以及新法西斯主义领导者，它们不断凸显的政治势头，已经将攻击自由资本主义民主政治日益常态化，以此为使用威权主义方法维护、拓展和增强资本主义力量作辩护。这意味着极右翼和新法西斯主义运动对人类构成了生存威胁，左翼活动家和社会运动应意识到这种威胁。其次，考虑到企业在自由资本主义国家中占据主导力量，以及那些强大的企业部门将极右翼和新法西斯主义联盟作为武器并愿意为它们提供帮助，左翼必须直面新法西斯主义政治运动，因为它们代表着资本主义政治统治通过威权手段的潜在延伸。这意味着，左翼必须系统地确定极右翼和新法西斯主义右翼的目标是否与最强大的资本主义利益集团和组织保持一致。为了与这些极右翼和新法西斯主义运动进行斗争，左翼必须建立大规模的公民社会组织，要求扩大国家的政治民主与公共责任，并将企业福利转化为社会福利。如果想要挫败那些得到主要资本部门和资本智库支持、并获得享受相对特权的中产阶级支援的新法西斯主义运动，唯一的方法便是动员更多的工人阶级，以争取更高的社会工资，并在体制内获得民主代表权。若不采取这些措施，只会让政治和经济竞争的领域掌握在企业经济和政治精英手中，他们牵扯太多的利害关系而无法改变体制，包括打击资本主义制度下的新法西斯主义。（注释略）

[Author bios: Ronald W. Cox, Professor, Department of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University, USA; Daniel Skidmore-Hess, Professor of Political Science, Armstrong Campus, Georgia Southern University, USA; Zhou Changmin, Doctoral Candidate, School of Marxism, Nankai University, and Lecturer, School of Marxism, Shandong Management University, China.]

[作者简介：罗纳德·W.考克斯（Ronald W.Cox），美国佛罗里达国际大学国际与公共事务学院教授;丹尼尔·斯基德莫尔·赫斯（Dan-iel Skidmore-Hess），美国佐治亚南方大学阿姆斯特朗校区政治科学教授;周长民，南开大学马克思主义学院博士研究生、山东管理学院马克思主义学院讲师]

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑