An Inquiry into the Living Standards of the Soviet People in the 1970s and 1980s

Regarding the causes of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a view exists in academic circles that the Soviet Union never broke through the highly centralized planned economic system established during the Stalin period in its economic development model, long overemphasizing heavy industry while neglecting the development of agriculture and light industry, and during the Cold War poured vast resources into the bottomless pit of the arms race, so that the people's living standards were not improved for a long time, and living standards far inferior to those of the developed Western countries became one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the various academic works holding the above view have not provided a detailed demonstration of the assertion that "the living standards of the Soviet people were low before the dissolution of the Soviet Union." Even those scholars who did provide a demonstration used only two very simple methods: one was to generalize the phenomenon of high accumulation and insufficient consumption from the Stalin period to the entire history of the Soviet Union; the other was to make a simple comparison between some macro or abstract economic indicators of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, such as per capita national income or nominal wages, the Engel coefficient, etc., and those of Western countries. The long-term imbalance in the proportions of heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture in the development of the Soviet national economy, and the stagnation of economic growth in the 1980s, go without saying. However, can it be concluded from this that the living standards of the Soviet people did not improve in the 1970s and 1980s, and that a gap emerged that was difficult to close with the Western developed capitalist countries? This article attempts to analyze this view and explore the correlation between the factor of living standards and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

关于苏联解体的原因，学界存在这样一种观点：苏联在经济发展模式上始终没有突破斯大林时期建立起的高度集中的计划经济体制，长期偏重重工业而忽视农业和轻工业发展，并且在冷战时期把大量资源投入军备竞赛的无底洞中，人民生活水平长期得不到改善，而生活水平远不及西方发达国家成为苏联解体的原因之一。然而，持上述观点的各种学术成果并未对“苏联解体前人民生活水平低下”这一论断进行详细的论证，即使进行了论证的学者，也只是使用了两种十分简单的方法：一种是将斯大林时期的高积累和消费不足现象泛化到整个苏联历史中；另一种是把苏联20世纪80年代的一些宏观或抽象的经济指标，例如人均国民收入或名义工资、恩格尔系数等与西方国家作简单对比。苏联国民经济发展中重工业、轻工业和农业比例的长期失衡以及经济增长速度在20世纪80年代陷入停滞自不待言，然而是否能就此认为七八十年代苏联人民的生活水平没有得到提高，且与西方发达资本主义国家产生了难以追赶的差距？本文尝试对这一观点进行辨析并对生活水平因素与苏联解体的关联性进行探讨。

I. A Comparison of Living Standards between the Soviet Union and Major Developed Capitalist Countries in the 1970s and 1980s

一、20世纪七八十年代苏联与主要发达资本主义国家的生活水平对比

In a general sense, per capita household disposable income can be regarded as one of the important indicators for measuring living standards, even the most important and most intuitive indicator. By comparing the household income and average wages of the Soviet Union and Western developed capitalist countries, it is easy to find that the Soviet Union was far inferior to Western countries in this respect. For example, in 1970, the average monthly wage of workers in the Soviet industrial sector was 133.3 rubles, while the weekly wage of American manufacturing workers was 133.33 US dollars. Calculated at the official exchange rate at the time, the annual income of the latter was 3.9 times that of the former. In the same year, households with an annual income of less than 1,500 rubles in the Soviet Union accounted for 94% of the total number of households, while households with an annual income of more than 3,000 US dollars in the United States accounted for 84.2% of the total number of households. This means that, by American standards, almost all Soviet households belonged to the poverty-stricken category. Another example: in 1984, the average monthly wage of workers in the Soviet industrial sector was 205 rubles, while the average wages of manufacturing workers in some capitalist countries in the same year were: the United States — 9.18 US dollars/hour, Japan — 292,255 yen/month, France — 35.67 francs/hour, Canada — 465.64 Canadian dollars/week. Converted into US dollars at the exchange rate at the end of that year and the average weekly working hours of each country, the average annual incomes of workers in the above countries can be calculated: the Soviet Union — 2,894 US dollars, the United States — 19,429 US dollars, Japan — 13,967 US dollars, France — 7,485 US dollars, Canada — 18,343 US dollars. That is, the income of workers in developed capitalist countries was 5 to 7 times that of Soviet workers. From this perspective, in terms of workers' monetary income, the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1980s seems to have been even larger than in the 1970s.

一般意义上，家庭人均可支配收入可被视为衡量生活水平的重要指标之一，甚至是最重要、最直观的指标。通过对比苏联和西方发达资本主义国家的家庭收入和平均工资很容易发现，苏联在这一方面是远不如西方国家的。例如，1970年苏联工业部门职工的平均月工资是133.3卢布，美国制造业工人的周薪是133.33美元，按当时官方汇率计算，后者的年收入是前者的3.9倍。同年苏联职工家庭年收入在1500卢布以下的占总户数的94%，而美国年收入在3000美元以上的家庭占总户数的84.2%。这意味着，按美国标准，几乎所有的苏联家庭都属于贫困户。又如，1984年苏联工业部门职工平均月工资为205卢布，同年部分资本主义国家制造业工人平均工资分别为：美国9.18美元/小时、日本292255日元/月、法国35.67法郎/小时、加拿大465.64加元/周。按当年年末汇率和各国每周平均工时换算成美元可计算出上述国家工人的平均年收入：苏联——2894美元、美国——19429美元、日本——13967美元、法国——7485美元、加拿大——18343美元，即发达资本主义国家工人的收入为苏联工人的5倍—7倍。这样看来，在工人的货币收入上，20世纪80年代苏美间的差距似乎比70年代还大。

The gap in monetary income naturally projected onto residents' consumption. Theoretically, under the premise that nominal wages were so far behind those of the West, the Soviet people might have been "starving." But surprisingly, in reality, the gap between the Soviet Union and Western countries in terms of food, clothing, and durable consumer goods was far smaller than the gap in nominal wages. By the end of the 1970s, the per capita daily calorie intake of the Soviet Union had caught up with the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, surpassing Japan; protein intake was basically on par with the United States; animal fat intake was close to that of Italy. Overall, from the perspective of nutritional intake, the level of food consumption in the Soviet Union had already approached the average level of developed countries by the end of the 1970s.

货币收入的差距自然而然会投射到居民消费上。理论上，在名义工资与西方相比差距如此之大的前提下，苏联人民也许要“食不果腹”了。但令人吃惊的是，实际上，在食品、衣着和耐用消费品方面苏联与西方国家的差距远比名义工资小。20世纪70年代末苏联人均每天卡路里摄入量已追平英国、法国和联邦德国，超过日本；蛋白质摄入量基本与美国持平；动物性脂肪摄入量接近意大利。总的来说，从营养摄入角度看，苏联的食品消费水平在70年代末就已接近发达国家平均水平。

A longitudinal comparison between 1970 and 1985 shows that the per capita annual consumption of bread in the Soviet Union decreased from 143 kg to 133 kg, potato consumption decreased from 124 kg to 104 kg, while meat and meat product consumption increased from 48 kg to 62 kg, fish consumption increased from 15.4 kg to 18 kg, egg consumption increased from 159 to 260, milk and dairy product consumption increased from 307 kg to 325 kg, vegetable consumption increased from 82 kg to 102 kg, and fruit consumption increased from 35 kg to 48 kg. Overall, excluding individual special years, the per capita consumption of high-protein foods in the Soviet Union showed a year-on-year increase, while the proportion of starchy foods in total consumption continuously declined. It is particularly noteworthy that the Soviet Union experienced four consecutive years of poor grain harvests from 1979 to 1982, and during the same period, due to the US grain embargo, there was a significant shortfall in livestock feed, yet its consumption of animal-based foods remained stable. In contrast, the level of food consumption in developed capitalist countries showed little change. For example, from 1975 to 1983, the per capita annual meat consumption of Americans decreased by 0.4 kg, and egg consumption decreased from 16 kg to 15 kg; during the same period, the per capita annual meat consumption of Japanese increased from 23.4 kg to 25.9 kg, an increase of only 2.5 kg, while fish and egg consumption decreased slightly. Therefore, although the meat consumption of the Soviet Union was always lower than that of the United States, the gap was narrowing — from 40% of the US level in 1960 to 55% in 1983. Even the Soviet experts of the US Central Intelligence Agency, in a classified report on Soviet economic development, had to admit: "Perhaps the most striking aspect of the comparison of living standards is in the area of food. In 1981, the Soviet Union's daily calorie intake level almost caught up with the United States. Soviets eat more starchy foods than Americans, but the gap is narrowing. At the same time, poultry products have become more common... The Soviet per capita protein intake level is almost comparable to that of the United States... The Soviet daily per capita calorie level is higher than the recommended adult value for the United States."

而纵向对比1970年与1985年，苏联人均年面包消费量从143千克减少为133千克，土豆消费量从124千克减少为104千克，而肉类及肉制品消费量从48千克增加到62千克，鱼类消费量从15.4千克增加到18千克，蛋类消费量从159枚增加到260枚，奶和奶制品消费量从307千克增加到325千克，蔬菜消费量从82千克增加到102千克，水果消费量从35千克增加到48千克。总的来说，排除个别特殊年份，苏联的高蛋白食品人均消费量都呈逐年增加态势，淀粉类食物在总消费中的比例则不断下降。尤其需要指出的是，苏联在1979年—1982年连续四年粮食歉收，而且同期因美国谷物禁运导致牲畜饲料出现大幅缺口，但其动物类食品消费量依然保持稳定。而与之形成对比的是，发达资本主义国家的食品消费水平鲜有变化。例如，1975年—1983年，美国人年均肉类消费量减少0.4千克，蛋类消费量从16千克减少到15千克；同期日本人年均肉类消费量从23.4千克增加到25.9千克，仅增加了2.5千克，鱼类和蛋类消费量还略微下降了。因此，虽然苏联肉类消费量始终低于美国，但差距在不断缩小——从1960年相当于美国的40%增加到1983年的55%，连当年美国中央情报局的苏联问题专家在有关苏联经济发展的秘密级报告中也不得不承认：“在生活水准比较上最亮眼的或许是食品领域。1981年苏联的日常卡路里摄入水平几乎追平美国。苏联人比美国人吃的淀粉类食物更多，但差距在缩小。同时，禽类产品也更加普遍……苏联人均蛋白质摄入水平几乎已能和美国媲美……苏联的日常人均卡路里水平高于美国的成年人建议值。”

In May 1982, in his report "On the Soviet Food Program up to 1990 and the Ways to Implement It" delivered at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Brezhnev [1]1 Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 until his death, a period often referred to as the "Era of Stagnation." proposed the task of achieving, by 1990, a per capita annual food consumption of 70 kg of meat, 19 kg of fish, 330–340 kg of milk, 260–266 eggs, 45.5 kg of sugar, 126–135 kg of melons and vegetables, and 66–70 kg of fruit. Although, due to various complex reasons, this plan was ultimately not fully realized as planned, according to comparative calculations by Western scholars, by 1990, the per capita annual meat consumption of residents of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic had caught up with that of Switzerland, while the latter's per capita GDP was nearly three times that of the former; the per capita annual meat consumption of residents of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was roughly equivalent to that of the United Kingdom, Finland, and Iceland, but its per capita GNP was only about 40% of the latter's, while Brazil and Venezuela, with per capita GDP slightly exceeding that of Ukraine, had meat consumption only about 60% of Ukraine's. Such an achievement was undoubtedly quite remarkable.

1982年5月，苏共中央总书记勃列日涅夫在苏共中央全会上所作的报告《关于至1990年苏联食品纲要及其实现办法》中曾提出了这样的任务，即到1990年苏联人年均食品消费量应达到70千克的肉、19千克的鱼、330千克—340千克的奶、260枚—266枚的鸡蛋、45.5千克的糖、126千克—135千克的瓜菜、66千克—70千克的水果。尽管由于各种复杂的原因这一计划最终未能完全按计划实现，但根据西方学者的比较推算，到1990年，俄罗斯苏维埃联邦社会主义共和国居民年均肉类消费量已赶上瑞士，而后者的人均国内生产总值是前者的近3倍；乌克兰苏维埃社会主义共和国居民年均肉类消费量大约与英国、芬兰和冰岛相当，但其人均国民生产总值只有后者的40%，而人均国内生产总值略超过乌克兰的巴西和委内瑞拉的肉类消费量仅有其60%左右。这样的成就毫无疑问是相当惊人的。

Given the widening gap in monetary income levels between the Soviet Union and Western countries, how did the Soviet Union manage to bring its per capita food consumption increasingly close to Western levels? This question can be approached from the perspective of prices and purchasing power. During the Cold War, the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [2]2 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was an economic organization of socialist states, founded in 1949 under Soviet leadership, which coordinated economic planning and trade among its members. had their own independent economic system, based on the transferable ruble as its monetary foundation and relatively independent of the Western world. Abundant natural resources and the internal circulation of the socialist camp enabled the Soviet Union to achieve self-sufficiency in basic consumer goods, with domestic prices insulated from fluctuations in the world market. For example, from 1971 to 1982, the average annual increase in Soviet consumer prices was only 0.4%, compared to 7.9% in the United States, 13.1% in the United Kingdom, and nearly 15% in Italy. Thus, apart from rice, for which both Soviet production and consumption demand were relatively low, the prices of all other foodstuffs in the Soviet Union were lower than those in the United States, Japan, and West Germany, with meat prices showing an even greater differential. In other words, when purchasing power is taken into account, the gap in real wages between the Soviet Union and the West was far narrower than the nominal gap. In 1970, the average monthly wage of Soviet workers and employees was 122 rubles; by 1980, it had increased to 169 rubles, a rise of about 30%, while consumer prices remained virtually unchanged throughout the 1970s. Hence, the increase in nominal wages also represented the increase in real wages. In Western countries, not only was the rate of increase in the price index far higher than in the Soviet Union, but wage and price increases were essentially synchronized. This is one reason why the Soviet Union rapidly caught up with Western countries in per capita consumption of meat, eggs, and milk.

苏联和西方国家在居民的货币收入水平差距不断加大的情况下，如何使食品人均消费量不断接近西方水平？可以尝试从物价和购买力角度来阐释这一问题。冷战时期经互会国家自有一套以记账卢布为货币基础、较低程度依赖西方世界的独立经济体系。丰富的自然资源和社会主义大家庭的内循环，使苏联的基本消费品能够实现自给自足，国内物价不随世界市场波动。例如，1971年—1982年，苏联消费物价的年均上涨幅度只有0.4%，而美国为7.9%，英国达13.1%，意大利更是接近15%。可见，苏联除了自身产量和消费需求均相对较低的大米外，其他食品价格都低于美、日、德，肉类更甚。也就是说，考虑到购买力因素，苏联与西方的实际工资水平差距远比名义上的小。1970年苏联职工月均工资为122卢布，1980年增加到169卢布，涨幅约30%，而消费物价在整个70年代几乎没有变化，所以名义工资的涨幅也代表了实际工资的涨幅。而西方国家不仅物价指数的涨幅远高于苏联，且其工资和物价增速基本是同步的，这是苏联在肉蛋奶消费量上快速赶上西方国家的原因之一。

The comparison of per capita income, food consumption, and prices also raises another question: although the amount of money spent on purchasing the same quantity of food in the Soviet Union was lower than in the United States, the advantage of the ruble in terms of food purchasing power was insufficient to offset the gap in absolute average wages between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet Soviet per capita food consumption levels continued to approach those of the United States. Does this mean that the Soviet Engel coefficient [3]3 The Engel coefficient is the proportion of household income spent on food; a higher coefficient is generally associated with lower living standards. was far higher than that of the United States, i.e., that consumption of goods other than food was far lower?

人均收入和食品消费、价格的对比还引出了另一个问题：尽管在苏联购买相同数量的食品所花费的货币金额比在美国低，但卢布在食品购买力方面对美元的优势不足以弥补苏联平均工资绝对值与美国的差距，而苏联的人均食品消费水平又不断接近美国，那么，这是否意味着苏联的恩格尔系数会远高于美国，即除食品外的其他种类商品的消费远少于美国？

In the 1970s and 1980s, the proportion of total household expenditure spent on food was indeed somewhat lower for American families than for Soviet worker families. However, if we exclude essential expenditures on food, housing, transportation, healthcare, social security, and taxes, other material consumption (purchasing high-end durable goods, etc.), cultural consumption (going to movies and theater, etc.), and savings (often used for overseas travel) accounted for only 16.5% of total household expenditure in the United States in 1981, whereas in the Soviet Union the figure was as high as 43.2%, and this share was rising year by year, while in the United States it was declining. In other words, the proportion of expenditure on living services and social security in the Soviet Union was far lower than in the United States, allowing the Soviet people to use a larger share of household income to purchase durable consumer goods, and thereby to catch up with Western countries in the consumption of durable goods.

20世纪七八十年代美国家庭食品消费占家庭总支出的比例的确要比苏联工人家庭低一些。但是，如果排除吃、住、行、医疗、社会保障和纳税等必要支出，其他物质消费（购买高档耐用商品等）、文化消费（看电影和戏剧等）和储蓄（往往被用于出国旅游）在1981年美国家庭总支出只占16.5%，而同期苏联则高达43.2%，且呈逐年上升趋势，而美国却相反。换言之，苏联在生活服务和社会保障上的支出比例远低于美国，苏联人民可以用更大比例的家庭收入来购买耐用消费品，并由此在耐用商品消费上追上西方国家。

In terms of clothing, if we ignore fashion and consider only fabric consumption, the Soviet Union had already caught up with or even surpassed the developed capitalist countries by the early 1970s. In 1973, per capita consumption of cotton textiles in the Soviet Union was 22.4 square meters, compared to 27 square meters in the United States, 14.3 square meters in the United Kingdom, and 13.6 square meters in West Germany. For woolen textiles, the figures were: Soviet Union 2.9 square meters, United States 0.8 square meters, United Kingdom 3.1 square meters, and West Germany 2.9 square meters. In addition, per capita consumption of leather shoes in the Soviet Union during the same period was close to that of the United Kingdom and the United States.

在衣着方面，如果忽略流行样式仅计算织物消费量的话，20世纪70年代初苏联就已赶上甚至超过了发达资本主义国家——1973年苏联按人口平均计算的棉织品消费量为22.4平方米，美国为27平方米，英国为14.3平方米，联邦德国为13.6平方米；毛织品的消费量则分别如下：苏联2.9平方米，美国0.8平方米，英国3.1平方米，联邦德国2.9平方米。此外，同期苏联居民年均皮鞋消费量也接近英美。

In terms of durable goods, the Soviet Union initially lagged considerably behind Western countries, but after the 1970s, their penetration rate grew rapidly. Even according to the statistical methods used by Americans at the time, the average annual growth rate of per capita consumption expenditure on durable goods in the Soviet Union was as high as 10% from 1970 to 1975, and although it declined markedly from 1975 to 1980, it still stood at 5.3%. Therefore, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union was steadily closing the gap with developed Western countries in per capita ownership of durable goods. For example, the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union in television sets per thousand people narrowed from 2.9 times in 1970 to 2.1 times in 1981. From 1970 to 1979, per 100 households in the Soviet Union, private car ownership increased from 2 to 8, television sets from 51 to 83, refrigerators from 32 to 82, washing machines from 52 to 70, and vacuum cleaners from 12 to 26. By 1990, these indicators had further increased to 19 cars, 107 television sets, 92 refrigerators, 75 washing machines, and 48 vacuum cleaners per 100 households, with the penetration rate of many household appliances catching up with Japan and the United Kingdom.

在耐用商品方面，苏联一度较西方国家有相当大的差距，但20世纪70年代以后，其普及率快速增长。即便是按照当时美国人的统计方法，1970年—1975年苏联耐用商品人年均消费额涨幅高达10%，1975年—1980年出现明显下降，但依然有5.3%。因此，20世纪七八十年代苏联在耐用商品人均拥有量上是在不断接近西方发达国家的。例如，在电视每千人拥有量上美国与苏联的差距从1970年的2.9倍缩小到1981年的2.1倍。1970年—1979年，苏联每百户家庭私人汽车拥有量从2辆增加到8辆，电视机由51部增加到83部，冰箱由32台增加到82台，洗衣机由52台增加到70台，吸尘器由12台增加到26台。而到1990年，这些指标进一步增加到了每百户家庭拥有汽车19辆、电视机107部、冰箱92台、洗衣机75台、吸尘器48台，多种家用电器的普及率追平日本和英国。

It cannot be denied that, despite considerable progress, by the late 1980s the Soviet Union still lagged far behind developed countries in the penetration rate of automobiles and certain avant-garde high-end durable goods (such as video recorders). Apart from insufficient domestic production capacity, a more important reason is that, like all other socialist countries, the fundamental goal of the Soviet Union in developing a socialist economy was to ensure the all-round development of all the people and to minimize the gap between rich and poor. In the Soviet Union, the prices of basic living services such as food, housing, transportation, healthcare, and education, as well as cultural services such as reading books, newspapers, watching movies, and attending theater performances, were set far below cost, while high-end consumer goods such as video recorders and automobiles were, to a certain extent, regarded as non-essential "luxury items" and sold by the state at high prices, with the profits used to subsidize basic consumer goods. For example, in the 1960s, the GAZ-21 Volga car cost 1,900 rubles to produce but was sold for 5,500 rubles; in the early 1970s, the VAZ-2101 Zhiguli car cost less than 1,000 rubles to produce but was sold for 5,500 rubles. Soviet officials were also quite open about this: the funds for subsidizing food, medicine, fuel, rent, public service fees, and urban transportation came not only from the profits of state-owned enterprises but also "from the profits of tobacco, alcohol, diamonds, and other high-end handicrafts, because the prices of these goods were set on the high side."

不可否认，在取得了相当进步的前提下，20世纪80年代末苏联小汽车和某些前卫的高档耐用商品（例如录像机）的普及率距发达国家仍存在较大差距。除了自身产能不足外，更重要的原因在于，和其他所有社会主义国家一样，苏联发展社会主义经济的根本目标在于保证全体人民的全面发展、尽量缩小贫富差距。在苏联，食品、住房、交通、医疗、教育等基本生活服务和读书、看报、观影、听剧等文化服务的价格远低于成本，而录像机、小汽车等高档消费品在一定程度上被视为非必需的“奢侈品”，由国家以高价销售，所得利润用来补贴基本消费品。例如，60年代的ГАЗ-21伏尔加牌汽车成本为1900卢布，售价为5500卢布；70年代初ВА3-2101日古利牌汽车的成本不到1000卢布，售价5500卢布。苏联官方对此也毫不讳言：对食物、药物、燃料、房租、公共服务费和城市交通费等的补贴资金，除了来源于国营企业的利润，“另一个来源是烟、酒、钻石和其他高档工艺品的赢利，因为这些商品的价格是定得偏高的”。

A similar contrast is evident in the field of cultural services. For capitalist countries, cultural services are a private industry, driven by capital's pursuit of profit, whereas for the Soviet Union, cultural services were a public undertaking, aimed at meeting the people's spiritual needs and the requirements of individual development. For example, according to the records of the famous writer Wang Meng [4]4 Wang Meng (born 1934) is a prominent Chinese writer and former Minister of Culture of the People's Republic of China., who visited both the Soviet Union and the United States during the same period, the ticket price for an opera at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow in 1984 was 3 rubles, while a comparable performance on Broadway in New York cost 50 dollars. Similarly, although the penetration rate of television sets, as a medium of cultural dissemination, was lower in the Soviet Union than in the United States, the Soviet Union's per capita annual cinema attendance and the number of cinema seats per thousand people far exceeded all developed capitalist countries. In 1981, these two indicators for the Soviet Union were, respectively, 3.5 times and 4.4 times those of the United States, 10.6 times and 11.9 times those of the United Kingdom, and 4.5 times and 5.6 times those of France. In other words, the Soviet Union shifted cultural services from the private to the public sphere. Like low wages, high welfare, subsidies for basic consumer goods, and heavy taxation on high-end consumer goods, this reflects a socialist state governance philosophy and value pursuit fundamentally different from capitalism, aimed at benefiting all working people.

类似的反差体现在文化服务领域。对资本主义国家来说，文化服务属于私有产业，具有资本逐利性，而对苏联来说，文化服务是公共事业，旨在满足人民精神生活和个性发展的需要。例如，根据同期先后访问了苏美的著名作家王蒙所记，1984年在莫斯科大剧院看一场歌剧的票价是3卢布，而当时在纽约百老汇观看同等规格的演出要50美元。又如，尽管作为文化媒介载体的电视机在苏联普及度不如美国，但苏联的人年均观影次数和每千人拥有电影院座位数却远超所有发达资本主义国家，在1981年苏联的这两个指标分别是美国的3.5倍和4.4倍、英国的10.6倍和11.9倍、法国的4.5倍和5.6倍。换句话说，苏联是将文化服务从私人转向公共，这与低工资、高福利，补贴基本消费品、重课高档消费品一样，反映的是迥异于资本主义的、旨在造福全体劳动人民的社会主义国家治理理念和价值追求。

Capitalist countries, because they pursue the maximization of economic interests for the ruling bourgeoisie, are unconcerned about the widening gap between rich and poor. In the 1970s, the distribution of income classes in the United States was highly dispersed, with no so-called numerically dominant middle class, whereas income levels in Soviet society were relatively equal. In terms of income equity, another notable achievement of the Soviet Union was the virtual elimination of the urban-rural gap by the 1980s. In 1980, the per capita monetary income of collective farm [5]5 Collective farms (kolkhozy) were agricultural production cooperatives in the Soviet Union, where land and major means of production were collectively owned and members shared income according to labor contributed. households had already reached 75% of that of worker and employee households, and by 1985 it had further increased to 81%. Considering that the former could also obtain free agricultural products through collective distribution and private plots, their actual income may have been even higher.

资本主义国家由于追求的是占统治地位的资产阶级的经济利益最大化，并不在乎贫富差距的扩大。20世纪70年代美国各类收入阶层的比例是非常分散的，根本没有所谓的数量上占优势的中产阶级，而苏联社会的收入水平则是相对平等的。在收入公平性方面，苏联另一个瞩目的成就是在20世纪80年代已经基本消除了城乡差别——1980年集体农庄庄员家庭人均货币收入已相当于职工家庭的75%，1985年进一步达到了81%，考虑到前者可通过集体分配和自留地获得免费农产品，其实际收入可能更高。

The huge gap in income between classes in capitalist countries results, in terms of the possession of consumer goods, in high-end commodities being concentrated in the hands of a small number of wealthy people (who often possess far more than they actually need), while a considerable number of people at the bottom are destitute. However, expressed in absolute numbers, the average possession per thousand residents or per hundred households often exceeds that of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1974, 64.2% of white households in the United States owned color televisions, while the ownership rate among black households, which generally had lower incomes, was only 37.8%. Yet, due to the demographic advantage of whites, the national color TV penetration rate was as high as 61.3%. In the same year, 48.8% of US households owned one car, and 32.7% owned two or more cars. Thus, the data expressed as possession per hundred households (or per thousand residents) appeared impressive: at least 115 cars per hundred households, meaning on average every household had a car. But in reality, nearly 20% of households nationwide still had no private car. Another example: in 1988, 45% of British households owned one car, 17.5% owned two cars, and 3.6% owned three or more cars. On average, car ownership per hundred households was about 91 cars. Yet, in reality, 34% of British households at that time did not own a single car. In contrast to capitalist countries, because there was no severe polarization between rich and poor, the average possession of high-end commodities in the Soviet Union was more balanced. From this perspective, the gap between the Soviet Union and developed capitalist countries in the penetration rate of durable goods was smaller than it appeared on paper.

资本主义国家阶层收入的巨大差距反映到消费品占有上的结果就是，高档商品集中在少数富有者手里（且他们往往掌握着远超出自己实际所需的数量），相当多的底层人民一贫如洗，但表现在绝对数量上的每千名居民或每百户家庭的平均拥有量却大都超过了苏联。例如，1974年美国白人拥有彩电的家庭共占总数的64.2%，收入水平普遍较低的黑人家庭彩电拥有率只有37.8%，但由于白人的人口优势，彩电普及率在全国却高达61.3%；同年美国拥有1辆小汽车的家庭有48.8%，拥有2辆以上小汽车的家庭有32.7%，那么体现为每百户家庭拥有量（或者每千名居民拥有量）的数据就很可观，每百户至少有115辆，即平均家家有车，但实际上全国却还是有近20%的家庭是没有私家车的。再如，1988年英国45%的家庭拥有1辆小汽车，17.5%的家庭拥有2辆小汽车，3.6%的家庭拥有3辆及3辆以上小汽车，平均下来，每百户小汽车拥有量约为91辆，然而实际上当时34%的英国家庭是1辆小汽车都没有的。与资本主义国家相反，由于没有严重的两极分化，苏联的高档商品平均拥有量更为均衡。从这个角度来说，苏联与发达资本主义国家在耐用商品普及率上的差距要比纸面上小。

In terms of social welfare such as healthcare, housing, and education, the superiority of Soviet socialism was even more evident. Taking healthcare as an example, as early as 1969, the Soviet Union, through legislation by the highest state authority, established the "universality, free-of-charge nature, and high level" of medical services provided to Soviet citizens. The average number of people served per doctor in the Soviet Union was already far lower than in contemporary Western developed countries in the 1970s. In 1985, the Soviet Union had an average of 42 doctors per 10,000 people, almost double that of the United States (23.3). The number of hospital beds per 10,000 people in the Soviet Union was also the highest in the world, double that of the United States (56.5 beds). It can be considered that the medical resources enjoyed by the Soviet people were not only completely free but also more abundant than in capitalist countries.

在医疗、住房、教育等社会福利方面苏联的社会主义优越性体现得更加明显。以医疗为例，1969年苏联就以国家最高权力机关立法的形式确定了提供给苏联公民医疗服务的“普及性、免费性和高水平性”。苏联平均每1名医生的服务人口数在20世纪70年代就远少于同期西方发达国家。1985年苏联每万人平均拥有医生的数量为42名，几乎是美国（23.3名）的两倍；苏联每万人拥有的病床数同样居世界之首，为美国（56.5张）的两倍。可以认为，苏联人民享受的医疗资源不仅完全免费，而且比资本主义国家丰沛许多。

In terms of housing, the Soviet Union implemented a system of free allocation for all citizens. The rent standard, set in 1928, remained unchanged thereafter. Due to the continuous growth of nominal wages, by the 1970s and 1980s, rent had become entirely symbolic. By the beginning of 1987, the per capita living space in the Soviet Union reached 14.9 square meters. Although this was only equivalent to the level of the United States and Europe in the 1960s, it basically met the standard of one room per person. Moreover, this figure did not include the area of suburban dachas. In the 1980s, 8.3 million urban families in the Soviet Union owned summer dachas with yards on the outskirts of cities, and the land they occupied was also entirely provided free of charge by the state.

在住房方面，苏联实行的是面向全体公民的无偿分配制度，房租标准自1928年确定后一直未变。由于名义工资的不断增长，到20世纪七八十年代，房租已完全变成了象征性收费。到1987年年初苏联人均居住面积达到14.9平方米，虽然只相当于美欧国家60年代水平，但基本已达到人均一居室的标准。而且，这一数值还未包括郊外别墅的面积，苏联在20世纪80年代有830万城市家庭在城郊拥有带院子的夏日别墅，它们所占用的土地同样完全是由国家免费提供的。

The proportion of expenditure on necessities of life in total household expenditure for the Soviet people was far lower than in the United States. The primary reason can be attributed to social welfare factors. In the Soviet Union, expenses for rent, water, heating, and public transport were almost negligible in daily spending. Apart from preschool education and summer camp activities, compulsory education and higher education were completely free. For example, in the early 1980s, the average monthly cost per square meter of housing in the Soviet Union was 0.14 rubles, the price per cubic meter of natural gas was 0.02 rubles, and the fare for the metro and buses was 0.05 rubles. In contrast, the corresponding prices in the United States were $4.5, $0.12, and $0.6, respectively. University tuition fees were $5,000–$9,000 per year, and hospital stay costs were $175 per day.

苏联人民维持生活必需的支出占家庭总支出比例远低于美国，首要原因可归结于社会福利因素。在苏联，房租、水暖和公共交通费用在日常开支中几乎可以忽略不计，除学前教育和夏令营活动，义务教育和高等教育完全免费。例如，20世纪80年代初苏联每平方米住房月均费用为0.14卢布，每立方米天然气价格为0.02卢布，地铁和公交车票价0.05卢布。而美国相对应的价格分别为4.5、0.12、0.6美元，高等学校学费每年5000美元—9000美元，住院费每天175美元。

It is worth noting that the "implicit income" from social welfare was not reflected in the paper wages of workers. According to official Soviet statistics, in 1975, the average monthly monetary wage of Soviet workers was 146 rubles. However, if various benefits paid from the social consumption fund were included, such as free education, free healthcare, scholarships and grants, sanatorium subsidies, and kindergarten care fees, the average wage could reach 199 rubles. In 1985, these two indicators were 190 and 268 rubles, respectively. Needless to say, the Soviet Union calculated the above data only based on the cost price of various social security services. However, in capitalist countries, if housing, healthcare, childcare, and education could be provided free of charge, the implicit income they bring would even greatly exceed the nominal wage. Let us make the following assumption: In 1985, a four-person family of two Moscow workers, both earning the average wage, received a free three-room apartment of 60 square meters after queuing for 7.5 years (the average waiting time for Soviet families applying for new housing in the latter half of the 1980s was 7–8 years). At that time, an apartment of the same area in New York City was worth $160,000 (New York housing prices in the 1980s were $250 per square foot). This was equivalent to the state "giving away" $160,000 to this Moscow couple. Spreading this amount over 7.5 years means they received an "implicit income" of $1,800 per month from free housing alone. Similarly, if the cost of higher education were converted according to US standards, the fact that their two children did not have to pay university tuition would save this Soviet couple at least $200 per month until the children reached adulthood. That is to say, calculated at market prices, the "implicit income" brought to working people by the Soviet Union's provision of free housing and free education alone far exceeded their nominal wages. Ignoring this "implicit income" naturally makes the Soviet Engel coefficient appear high.

值得注意的是，社会福利方面的“隐性收入”并不体现在纸面上的职工工资中。根据苏联官方统计，1975年苏联职工的月平均货币工资为146卢布，而如果算上由社会消费基金支出的各种优惠，包括免费教育、免费医疗、奖助学金、疗养优惠、幼儿园保育费等，则平均工资可达199卢布，1985年这两个指标分别为190和268卢布。不言而喻，苏联是仅按照各种社会保障服务的成本价计算而得出上述数据的。但是，换作在资本主义国家，如果住宅、医疗、托儿、教育能够免费提供，则其带来的隐性收入甚至将大大超过名义工资。不妨作如下假设：1985年一户夫妻都拿平均工资的莫斯科市双职工四口之家在排队7.5年后免费获得一套三居室60平方米的公寓（80年代后半期苏联家庭申请获得新住宅的平均排队时间为7年—8年）。而当时同样面积的一套公寓在纽约市价值16万美元（80年代纽约房价为每平方英尺250美元）。这相当于国家“白送”给了这对莫斯科夫妻16万美元。把这笔钱分摊到7.5年里，则意味着他们每月仅在免费住房上就获得了1800美元的“隐性收入”。同样地，假如按照美国标准来换算高等教育的费用，则仅两个孩子免缴大学学费就使这对苏联夫妻在将其抚养成人前每月省下至少200美元。也就是说，按市场价计算，苏联仅提供免费住房和免费教育这两项给劳动人民带来的“隐性收入”就远超其名义工资。忽略掉这种“隐性收入”的话，苏联的恩格尔系数当然高。

In the final analysis, comparing nominal wages and Engel coefficients without considering the specific social system and living environment is meaningless. In the early 1980s, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Nikolai Tikhonov pointed out succinctly, "Comparing the living standards of the Soviet Union and capitalist countries based on the cash income of residents is fundamentally wrong (comparing wages is even more incorrect!)... As the saying goes, you cannot use the same yardstick to measure the living standards of two societies with diametrically opposed systems." "In short, mechanically comparing the cash income and expenditure structures of Soviet and Western families distorts the truth."

归根结底，脱离具体的社会制度和生活环境，名义工资和恩格尔系数的比较没有任何意义。20世纪80年代初苏联部长会议主席吉洪诺夫（Николай Тихонов）一针见血地指出，“依据居民的现金收入来对比苏联与资本主义国家的生活水平，这种方法从根本上就是错误的（对比工资就更不对！）……俗话说，不能用一把尺子衡量制度截然相反的两种社会的生活水平”，“总而言之，将苏联和西方家庭的现金收支结构进行机械的对比，就会歪曲事实真相”。

II. The Impact of Living Standard Factors on Soviet Political and Economic Development

二、生活水平因素对苏联政治经济发展的影响

The CPSU regarded accelerating the improvement of people's welfare and more fully satisfying the material and cultural needs of all Soviet people as its most important task, the highest goal of economic policy, and a consistently followed line. This was clearly written into the reports and documents of successive Party Congresses after the 1960s. The CPSU believed that only by continuously raising the material and cultural living standards of the people could the best conditions be created for the comprehensive development of the individual personality and for building communism. Brezhnev explicitly stated in his report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, "The Communist Party will lead the people and, together with them, do everything to make the lives of Soviet people better, richer, and more civilized year by year. We consider this our highest duty, and for this we are building communism." "'Everything for man, everything for the welfare of man' – this is the Party's programmatic principle."

苏共把加速提高人民福利、更充分地满足全体苏联人民的物质和文化需要作为自己最重要的任务、经济政策的最高目标和始终遵循的路线，并将其明白无误地写入了20世纪60年代之后的历次党代会的报告和文件中。苏共认为，只有通过不断提高人民的物质和文化生活水平，才能够为人的个性的全面发展创造最好的条件，并为实现共产主义而创造条件。勃列日涅夫曾在苏共二十三大报告中旗帜鲜明地指出，“共产党将领导人民并同他们一起尽一切努力使苏联人的生活一年比一年更好、更富裕、更文明。我们认为这是自己的最高职责，为此我们正在建设共产主义”；“‘一切为了人，一切为了人的福利’，这就是党的纲领性原则”。

Furthermore, several large-scale political movements in Eastern European socialist countries after World War II (the East Berlin Uprising of 1953, the Poznań Uprising of 1956, and the Third Polish Crisis of 1980) were initially directly triggered by livelihood issues such as wage declines or consumer price increases. The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 was also partly caused by declines in wages and consumption levels. Taking these as a warning, the Soviet-led Comecon countries tried their best to avoid actions that might negatively impact people's living standards, such as raising prices.

此外，第二次世界大战后东欧社会主义国家发生的几次大规模政治运动（1953年的东柏林事件、1956年的波兹南事件、1980年第三次波兰危机），最初都是由工资水平下降或消费品价格上涨等民生问题直接引发的，1956年匈牙利事件爆发的部分原因也是工资和消费水平的下降。以此为戒，以苏联为首的经互会各国尽力避免提高物价等可能对人民生活水平产生负面影响的行为。

In order to maintain a relatively high standard of living for the people, the Soviet government had to ensure an adequate supply of consumer goods, stable prices, and continuously rising wages. However, from the mid-1970s onward, as the growth rate of Soviet labour productivity slowed, these policies gave rise to several problems that could not be ignored.

为了维持人民较高的生活水平，苏联政府必须确保充足的消费品供应、稳定的物价和不断增长的工资。而这些政策从20世纪70年代中期开始随着苏联劳动生产率增长速度的放缓产生了几个不容忽视的问题。

First, on the grain question: because there was always a considerable shortfall in the feed grain consumed in meat production (most of the Soviet Union’s territory lies in high-latitude regions with a cold climate, so the feed grain required to produce the same weight of meat was one to two times greater than in Central European countries), and because coordination within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [Comecon] still could not meet demand, the only option was to import from Western countries. If a poor harvest occurred and grain output fell sharply, imports had to be increased further. For example, in the early 1970s the Soviet Union imported about 15 million tonnes of grain annually; in 1979, owing to several consecutive years of poor harvests, imports rose to about 30 million tonnes, and in 1984 they exceeded 50 million tonnes. Even in normal years, because of the people’s growing demand for meat, the scale of such imports had a tendency to expand: for instance, in 1986 grain imports were 27.56 million tonnes, in 1987 31.35 million tonnes, and in 1988 35.84 million tonnes. Correspondingly, Soviet expenditure on agricultural imports rose steadily: in 1986 agricultural imports cost US$15.5 billion, in 1987 US$16.5 billion, and in 1988 US$17.9 billion. When exports of goods to Western countries were insufficient to offset grain imports, the Soviet Union sometimes had to spend precious foreign exchange and gold reserves. Besides primary agricultural products, the Soviet Union also directly imported large quantities of finished food products to compensate for insufficient domestic supply, and the amount increased year by year: in 1970, food imports accounted for 29.9% of total consumer goods imports, and imported food accounted for 3.9% of food retail turnover; by 1980 these two proportions had risen to 38.2% and 10.1% respectively.

第一，在粮食问题上，由于生产肉类所消耗的饲料粮始终存在较大缺口（苏联大部分领土处于高纬度地区，气候寒冷，生产相同重量肉所耗费的饲料粮要比中欧国家多1倍—2倍），在经互会内部的相互协调仍不能满足需求的情况下，只能从西方国家进口。如果赶上灾年，粮食产量大幅减少，则不得不进一步增加进口。例如，苏联在20世纪70年代初每年进口粮食约1500万吨，1979年因粮食连年歉收，进口量增至约3000万吨，1984年更是超过5000万吨。即便是正常年景，因人民对肉类需求的增长，这种进口规模也有不断扩大的趋势，如1986年进口谷物2756万吨，1987年3135万吨，1988年3584万吨。相应地，苏联进口农产品的支出不断上涨：1986年农产品进口额为155亿美元，1987年为165亿美元，1988年达到179亿美元。在对西方国家的商品出口不够抵偿粮食进口的情况下，有时不得不花费宝贵的外汇和黄金储备。除了初级农产品，苏联还直接进口大量食品成品来弥补国内供应的不足，且数量逐年增加：1970年食品进口额占消费品进口总额的29.9%，进口食品占食品零售额的39%，而到1980年这两项比例分别增加到38.2%和10.1%。

Second, on price stability: because the state continuously raised procurement prices for major agricultural products while keeping retail prices unchanged at levels already below cost, and because international market prices for raw materials kept rising and the nominal incomes of workers and employees kept increasing, subsidies for consumer prices became a heavy and ever-growing burden on the Soviet budget. For example, during the Eighth Five-Year Plan [1966–1970], subsidies for meat, milk, potatoes and similar products amounted to 38.55 billion rubles, accounting for 6% of state budget expenditure; during the Ninth Five-Year Plan [1971–1975], subsidies reached 86.8 billion rubles, an increase of 1.25 times over the Eighth Five-Year Plan period, accounting for more than 9% of state budget expenditure; during the Tenth Five-Year Plan [1976–1980], subsidies for meat and milk alone reached 100 billion rubles, averaging 20 billion rubles per year, exceeding the officially published defence budget, and in 1976, the first year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, total Soviet fiscal expenditure was only 226.7 billion rubles. After 1985, as international oil prices fell, the problem of price subsidies became even more acute. A report from a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] in April 1987 pointed out: “Since 1982, the growth of real national income has stopped… In the shops, oil sells for 3 rubles 40 kopecks, while its cost price is 8 rubles 20 kopecks; beef sells for 1 ruble 50 kopecks, while its production cost is 5 rubles. If everything continues as before, price subsidies just for food will rise to 100 billion rubles (per year).” In addition to this heavy item of agricultural subsidies (which accounted for about 12% of annual state budget expenditure), other Soviet consumer subsidies and fiscal subsidies for social security were also staggering: for example, in the 1970s annual rent subsidies were 5 billion rubles, and public transport subsidies exceeded 2 billion rubles; by the mid-1980s, various annual fiscal subsidies in the Soviet Union already accounted for 15%–18% of state budget expenditure.

第二，在稳定物价方面，由于国家不断提高主要农产品的收购价格，又维持本就低于成本价的销售价格保持不变，加上国际市场原材料价格不断上涨以及职工名义收入不断增加，对消费价格的补贴便成了苏联财政的沉重包袱且不断加重。例如，苏联“八五”计划期间，用于肉类、奶类、马铃薯等产品的补贴为385.5亿卢布，占国家预算支出的6%；“九五”计划期间的补贴为868亿卢布，比“八五”计划期间增长1.25倍，占国家预算支出的9%以上；“十五”计划期间仅肉、奶类补贴就达1000亿卢布，年均200亿卢布，比官方公布的国防预算开支还要多，而“十五”计划第一年的1976年，苏联全部财政支出也不过2267亿卢布。1985年后，随着国际油价下跌，价格补贴问题更加凸显。1987年4月苏共中央政治局的一次会议报告指出，“自1982年以来实际国民收入的增长停止了……商店里的油卖3卢布40戈比，而其成本价是8卢布20戈比；牛肉卖1卢布50戈比，而生产成本是5卢布。如果一切照旧的话，（每年）光在食品上的价格补贴就要涨到1000亿卢布”。除了农产品补贴这一重项（每年约占国家财政支出的12%），苏联其他消费性补贴和社会保障方面的财政补贴也是惊人的，如20世纪70年代每年的房租补贴为50亿卢布、公共交通补贴超过20亿卢布，到80年代中期，苏联每年各项财政补贴已占到国家预算支出的15%—18%。

Third, after the growth rate of Soviet national income gradually slowed in the latter half of the 1970s, the nominal wages and consumption of the population still maintained a fairly high rate of growth, and there even emerged a phenomenon in which the growth rate of wages exceeded that of labour productivity and national income. For example, throughout the 1970s the wage fund grew at an average annual rate of 5.1%, while social labour productivity grew at an average annual rate of 3.6%; in 1982, when the growth rate of labour productivity had already fallen to 2.6%, wage growth still reached 3.5%. After Gorbachev came to power, this trend intensified: in 1986, the average wage of Soviet workers and employees grew by 3.2%, while national income grew by only 2.3%; in 1987, the average wage grew by 3.6%, while national income grew by only 1.6%. Moreover, from the 1970s onward, there also emerged the problem of wage growth exceeding the growth of consumer goods production and commodity retail turnover. In 1987, Gorbachev publicly acknowledged at a plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee that from 1971 to 1985 the Soviet money supply had grown by 2.1 times, while consumer goods production had increased by only 1 time. In the long run, the above problems would obviously lead to the following direct consequences: an increase in accumulated foreign debt, a decrease in foreign exchange reserves, a decline in the accumulation rate, a continuous increase in interest payments on household savings, an imbalance between supply and demand, and intensified inflation.

第三，苏联国民收入增速在20世纪70年代后半期逐渐放缓后，居民名义工资和消费仍保持了相当速度的增长，甚至出现了工资增长速度快于劳动生产率和国民收入增长速度的现象。例如，整个70年代工资基金年均增长5.1%，而社会劳动生产率年均增长3.6%；1982年在劳动生产率增速已降到2.6%的前提下，工资增长仍达到3.5%。戈尔巴乔夫执政后，这种趋势还在加剧：1986年，苏联职工平均工资增长3.2%，国民收入只增长2.3%；1987年平均工资增长3.6%，国民收入却只增长1.6%。此外，自70年代起还出现了工资增长超过消费品生产和商品零售额增长的问题。1987年戈尔巴乔夫在苏共中央全会上曾公开承认，1971年—1985年苏联的货币流通量增长了2.1倍，而消费品生产只增加了1倍。长远来看，以上几个问题显然会带来如下的直接后果：积欠外债增多、外汇储备减少、积累率下降、居民储蓄利息支付持续增加、供需比例失调、通货膨胀加剧。

In order to maintain a standard of living that was ahead of the level of development of the productive forces, the Soviet Union could only continuously expand the share of household consumption in the use of national income, which caused its accumulation rate in the 1980s to generally decline compared with the 1970s. A reduction in the accumulation fund used for expanded reproduction would obviously affect the sustained development of the national economy, and this in turn would hinder the improvement of living standards—because, in the absence of any possibility of sharply increasing the growth rate of the national economy in a short period, the only way to alleviate the contradiction was to compress household consumption and reduce social welfare, but this ran counter to the essence and practical requirements of a socialist state to raise the people’s standard of living. Moreover, because people had long been accustomed to regarding the “freezing” of food prices as an important guarantee of social stability and to regarding any increase in food prices as an “anti-people” measure, it was also unrealistic, and even dangerous, to resolve the contradiction between the people’s standard of living and the level of national economic development by compressing household consumption and reducing social welfare.

为了维持超前于生产力发展水平的生活水平，苏联只能不断扩大居民消费在国民收入使用中的比例，这使得其20世纪80年代积累率普遍较70年代有所下降。用于扩大再生产的积累基金的减少，显然会影响国民经济的持续发展，而这又会反过来阻碍生活水平的提高——因为在短时间内无法大幅提高国民经济增长速度的情况下，只有通过压缩居民消费、缩减社会福利来缓解矛盾，但这又不符合社会主义国家提高人民生活水平的本质和现实要求。而且，由于人们长期习惯于把食品价格的“冻结”看作社会安定的重要保证，把提高食品价格看作“反人民”的措施，通过压缩居民消费、缩减社会福利来解决人民生活水平与国民经济发展水平脱节的矛盾也是不现实的，甚至是危险的。

As is well known, the third Polish crisis of 1980–1981 was precisely triggered in this way: the state had for years spared no expense to guarantee household consumption, falling into a predicament of chronic fiscal deficits and mounting foreign debt. As a result, Poland had to reduce subsidies on basic consumer goods, and this measure provoked discontent among a population accustomed to long-term low prices. The vicious cycle of long-term low prices → state fiscal difficulties → price increases → workers’ strikes → production decline → even greater state fiscal difficulties → decline in living standards → further workers’ strikes ultimately led to sustained social turmoil in Poland. In fact, many Comecon countries experienced, to varying degrees, economic development problems related to living standards; it was only that Poland manifested them in the form of an explosive eruption of contradictions.

众所周知，1980年—1981年的第三次波兰危机恰恰就是这样被引起的：国家常年不惜一切代价保证居民消费，陷入了财政连年赤字、对外债台高筑的困境。为此，波兰不得不减少基本消费品价格补贴，这一措施引发了习惯于长期低物价的人民的不满。长期低物价—国家财政困难—提价—工人罢工—生产下降—国家财政更困难—生活水平下降—工人再罢工的恶性循环最终导致波兰持续性的社会动荡。事实上，许多经互会国家都在不同程度上存在与生活水平相关的经济发展问题，只是波兰以一种矛盾总爆发的方式呈现了出来。

So, since the Soviet economy in the 1980s also exhibited the contradiction of high consumption, high welfare, and low growth, did these contradictions lead to a decline in the people’s living standards, and consequently provoke popular discontent, escalating even into political turmoil? To answer this question, we must first trace and clarify when the Soviet people’s living standards began to decline. The following two representative indicators may provide the answer: the life expectancy at birth of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic peaked in the latter half of the 20th century in 1987 and 1988 (both at 69.6 years), and only began to decline continuously from 1989 onward; per capita consumption of various food products, including eggs, fish, sugar, vegetables, and fruit, also began to decrease only from 1989; meat consumption growth stagnated from 1989. In 1989, due to an overall shortage in market supply, the Soviet authorities for the first time implemented commodity rationing. In June 1989, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [12]12 The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) was the central body of the official Soviet trade union system, which functioned as a transmission belt for Party and state policies rather than as an independent labor organization. for the first time determined and published a poverty income line; by the then-standard of 78 rubles per month, approximately 14% of the national population was defined as poor, but by September 1990, according to an updated poverty income line, this proportion had actually reached nearly 40%. According to analysis and observation by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, by early 1991, the Soviet Union’s long-maintained social welfare system, including free medical care, employment guarantees, low rents, and stable and low prices, had begun to collapse.

那么，既然20世纪80年代苏联经济同样出现了高消费、高福利与低增长的矛盾，这些矛盾是否导致了人民生活水平倒退，继而引发人民的不满，直至升级为政治动乱？回答这一问题，首先需要追溯和澄清苏联人民生活水平是何时开始下降的。以下两个代表性指标或许能给出答案：俄罗斯苏维埃联邦社会主义共和国的人口预期寿命在整个20世纪后半叶的峰值位于1987年和1988年（均为69.6岁），自1989年起才开始连续下降；多种食品人均消费量，包括禽蛋、鱼、糖、蔬菜、水果，也是自1989年才开始减少；肉类消费增长从1989年开始停滞。1989年由于出现市场供应全面短缺，苏联官方首次实行商品限购。1989年6月全苏工会首次确定和公布了贫困收入线，按当时的标准——每月78卢布，全国约14%的人口被定义为贫困人口，而到1990年9月，根据更新了的贫困收入线，这一比例竟达到了近40%。据美国中央情报局分析观察，1991年年初，苏联长期维持的社会福利体系，包括免费医疗、就业保障、低房租、稳定和较低的物价等，已经开始崩坏。

How should the above phenomena be explained? Statistical data show that the growth of domestic production of food and consumer goods in the Soviet Union continued until 1990, and the volume of food and consumer goods imports did not fluctuate significantly between 1985 and 1990. That is to say, the root of the commodity shortage lay in the circulation and distribution links, not in the production link. The problems in circulation and distribution can be traced back to Gorbachev’s reforms. In June 1988, at the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU [13]13 The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU (June 1988) was a major political event that marked the shift of Gorbachev’s perestroika from economic to political reform, introducing proposals for a new legislature and a strong executive presidency., Gorbachev announced a “radical reform” of the political system and the construction of a “humane, democratic socialism,” and from then on, Soviet reform penetrated into the political sphere. Fueled by radical political reform, Soviet national separatism intensified: in May 1989, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania amended its constitution, stipulating that its own legislation took precedence over the Soviet constitution; in December 1989, the Communist Party of Lithuania announced its secession from the leadership of the CPSU; in March 1990, Lithuania declared independence. Beginning with the secession of the three Baltic states led by Lithuania, the Soviet Union as a unified multinational state gradually disintegrated. For the Soviet Union, which had implemented a high degree of production specialization among its constituent republics, the disintegration of the “socialist commonwealth” [14]14 “Socialist commonwealth” (sotsialisticheskoye sodruzhestvo) was a Soviet term for the community of socialist states allied with the USSR, primarily the members of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). meant the loss of a considerable number of raw material sources and sales markets, while the permeability crisis brought about by the strengthening of national centrifugal forces weakened economic ties within the Union, affecting production coordination and material allocation across regions. According to data published in a government report by the Soviet State Planning Committee at the time, direct economic losses from national conflicts and strikes in 1989 and 1990 amounted to 2 billion rubles. Therefore, the first occurrence of negative economic growth and the regression in actual living standards in the Soviet Union in 1989–1990 were primarily caused by the political crisis. It was precisely the laxity of Party organizations and government functional departments at all levels amid political turmoil and national disintegration that led to difficulties in commodity circulation and distribution. There is no doubt that it was the failure of Gorbachev’s reforms first, followed by the decline in the Soviet people’s living standards.

该如何解释上述现象？统计数据表明，苏联本国食品和消费品的生产增长持续到1990年，食品和消费品进口量在1985年至1990年间未出现较大波动。也就是说，商品短缺的根源是在流通和分配环节，而非生产环节。而流通和分配出现问题还要追溯到戈尔巴乔夫的改革。1988年6月，戈尔巴乔夫在苏共第十九次代表会议上宣布要对政治体制进行“根本改革”和建设“人道的、民主的社会主义”，苏联改革自此深入政治领域。在激进的政治改革推波助澜下，苏联的民族分离主义愈演愈烈：1989年5月立陶宛最高苏维埃修改宪法，确定本国立法高于苏联宪法；1989年12月立陶宛共产党宣布脱离苏联共产党领导；1990年3月立陶宛宣布独立。从以立陶宛为首的波罗的海三国开始脱离苏联，苏联作为统一的多民族国家逐步瓦解。对于在苏联各加盟共和国之间实行生产高度分工化的苏联来说，“社会主义大家庭”的瓦解使其失去了相当多的原料产地和销售市场，民族离心力的加强带来的渗透性危机则削弱了联盟内部的经济联系、影响到各地区的生产协调和物资调配。根据当时苏联国家计划委员会在政府报告中公布的数据，1989年和1990年苏联由于民族冲突和罢工的直接经济损失高达20亿卢布。因此，1989年—1990年苏联首次出现的经济负增长和实际生活水平的倒退首先是由政治危机造成的。正是政治动荡和民族分裂中各级党组织和政府职能部门的涣散导致商品流通和分配的困难。毋庸置疑，是先有戈尔巴乔夫改革的失败，后有苏联人民生活水平的下降。

III. The Relationship between the Living Standards Factor and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

三、生活水平因素与苏联解体的关系

Regardless of when the Soviet Union’s macroeconomic development slowed down, when it fell into stagnation, or how severe the stagnation was in the 1970s and 1980s, the following fact is undeniable: the living standards of the Soviet people had been continuously improving until the late 1980s, there had been no large-scale commodity shortages in society, and there had been no large-scale unrest protesting against Soviet power due to dissatisfaction with living conditions. Moreover, whether in a vertical comparison with the Stalin period and the early post-war years, or in a horizontal comparison with the developed capitalist countries of the same period, the improvement in the Soviet people’s living standards was very significant. In the mid-1980s, the average Soviet person consumed half a jin [15]15 A jin is a Chinese unit of weight equal to 0.5 kilograms (about 1.1 pounds). The author uses it here as a translation of the Soviet unit of measurement. of meat, eggs, and fish per day and nearly one liter of milk; every household had a radio, television, refrigerator, and washing machine. Although at this time their per capita monetary income on paper was still far lower than that of the Western developed countries, the Soviet Union maximized the guarantee of high standards in the basic needs of the broad masses of the people, such as clothing, food, housing, and transportation, and some indicators measuring living standards even caught up with Western European countries and the United States, while in various social welfare aspects, it reached a height completely incomparable to Western countries.

无论20世纪七八十年代苏联的宏观经济发展何时放缓、何时陷入停滞、停滞到了怎样的地步，以下事实都不可否认，即苏联人民的生活水平在80年代末以前一直在不间断地提高，社会上并未出现过大范围的商品短缺，也未曾发生因对生活状况不满而抗议苏维埃政权的大规模动乱。而且，无论是与斯大林时期及战后初期的纵向比较，抑或是与同时期发达资本主义国家的横向比较，苏联人民生活水平的提高都是非常显著的。20世纪80年代中期，苏联人均每天吃肉蛋鱼半斤、饮奶近一升，家家有收音机、电视机、电冰箱、洗衣机。尽管这时其纸面上的居民人均货币收入仍远低于西方发达国家，但苏联在衣食住行等广大人民生活基本需要上最大限度地保证了高标准，衡量生活水平的部分指标甚至赶上了西欧国家及美国，在各种社会福利方面则达到了西方国家完全无法与之比拟的高度。

Of course, the highly developed and continuously improving living standards of the Soviet people at that time exceeded the level of its national economic development. It can be considered that by the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union, on the basis of a per capita GDP slightly lower than that of Mexico, had achieved a living standard comparable to that of Italy. Against the backdrop of continuously declining growth rates in gross industrial and agricultural output and labor productivity, the state paid a huge price to maintain and further improve the people’s high living standards, having to expand imports of consumer goods and provide substantial financial subsidies for various consumer goods and social security, which naturally had a negative impact on economic development. However, the contradiction between low-speed economic development and high-speed consumption growth, due to its relatively short duration, did not intensify before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The substantive decline in the Soviet people’s living standards began in the process of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The decline in living standards was a result of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, not a cause. The view that low living standards caused popular discontent, thereby leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is untenable.

当然，当时苏联高度发达和不断提高的居民生活水平是超越了其国民经济发展水平的，可以认为，到20世纪80年代中期苏联在略低于墨西哥的人均国内生产总值基础上达到了与意大利不相上下的生活水平。在工农业总产值和劳动生产率增长不断降速的背景下，国家为了维持并进一步提高人民的高水平生活付出了巨大代价，不得不扩大消费品进口，对各种消费品及社会保障予以大量财政补贴，这对经济发展自然产生了消极影响。但是，经济低速发展和消费高速增长的矛盾因持续时间较短，并未在苏联解体前激化。苏联人民生活水平的实质性下降，是在苏联解体的进程中开始的。生活水平下降是苏联解体的结果，而非原因。那种认为生活水平低下引起人民不满，从而导致苏联解体的看法是不成立的。

Although the Soviet socialist construction process had various drawbacks and problems, we cannot deny the fact that in the 1970s and 1980s, the CPSU and the Soviet government, under the conditions of the time, did their utmost to guarantee and improve the people’s living standards and brought them to a fairly high level. Still less can we obliterate the tremendous efforts and great achievements made by the Soviet Union in eliminating polarization and the urban-rural gap, and in establishing a social security system that was unparalleled in the world in terms of inclusiveness and fairness. This achievement is not only an achievement of the Soviet Union as a single country or of the Soviet nationalities, but also a monument in the history of socialist development.

尽管苏联社会主义建设进程存在各种各样的弊端和问题，但我们无法否认２０世纪七八十年代苏共和苏联政府在当时条件下尽最大可能保障和改善了人民生活并使其达到相当高水平的这一事实，更不能抹煞苏联在消除两极分化、城乡差距和建立发展普惠性与公平性世界首屈一指的社会保障体系方面付出的巨大努力及取得的伟大成就。这一成就不仅是苏联一国或者苏联各民族的成就，更是社会主义发展史上的一座丰碑。

As is well known, the national economies and living standards of the people in the former Soviet republics such as Russia and Ukraine suffered a catastrophic cliff-like decline after independence. Taking life expectancy as an example, as mentioned above, the life expectancy of the Soviet Union reached its historical peak in 1987–1988, while after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this indicator in the former constituent republics plummeted sharply. Russia and Ukraine did not recover or exceed their 1988 levels until 2011; Belarus’s life expectancy did not surpass the Soviet-era peak until 2012; even Estonia, which had a relatively better economic foundation and actively integrated with the West after independence, did not see its life expectancy break through the Soviet-era historical peak until 2002. In 2007, Russia had already weathered the pains of large-scale privatization, with its economy achieving rapid growth for ten consecutive years, and its relations with Western countries were almost at their best in history. Yet in the same year, former Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kvitsinsky [16]16 Yuli Kvitsinsky (1936–2010) was a Soviet and Russian diplomat who served as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR from 1986 to 1990 and later as Russian ambassador to Norway and the United Kingdom., in an interview, made the following remarks, which are quite thought-provoking: “When our social welfare had reached a fairly high level—this was in the mid-1980s—a certain weariness set in… At that time, we thought that the Western model would make everything the Soviet Union had already achieved even better, adding brilliance to its splendor, but reality was not like that. Now, when the stores are full of goods, we find that the problem is not what is on the shelves, but that we have no money to buy these goods. We once thought that free medical services were a matter of course, that they would exist forever, but now we know that is not the case at all. We once thought that everyone could reasonably afford the medicines necessary to maintain health, and now we also understand that this is not the case at all—either you spend all your money on medicine in your old age, or you can only quietly wait for death.”

众所周知，俄罗斯、乌克兰等原苏联加盟共和国在独立后国民经济和人民生活水平遭遇灾难性的断崖式下跌。以人口预期寿命为例，上文提到苏联的人口预期寿命在1987年—1988年达到历史峰值，而苏联解体后原加盟共和国的这一指标急剧下降。俄罗斯和乌克兰直到2011年才恢复或超过其1988年的水平，白俄罗斯的人口预期寿命到2012年才超过苏联时期的峰值，即便是原经济基础较好、独立后积极融入西方的爱沙尼亚，人口预期寿命也到2002年才突破苏联时期的历史峰值。2007年，俄罗斯已度过大规模私有化带来的阵痛，经济连续10年实现快速增长，与西方国家的关系几乎处于历史最佳时期。但同年原苏联外交部第一副部长克维钦斯基在接受采访时说出的如下一段话却十分耐人寻味：“当我们的社会福利达到了相当高的水平时——这是在80年代中期——出现了某种倦怠……当时我们以为，西方模式会让苏联已经获得的一切好上加好、锦上添花，但现实并非如此。现在，当商店里商品琳琅满目时我们却发现，问题不在于货架上摆的是什么，而在于没钱去买这些商品。我们曾以为，免费医疗服务是天经地义的事情，它会永远存在下去，但现在知道了，完全不是这样。我们曾以为，人人理所应当都能买得起保障健康所必需的药品，现在也明白了，完全不是这样——你要么在晚年把所有的钱都花去买药，要么就只能安静地等待死亡。”

(Author’s bio: Li Yinan, visiting scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies, Shanghai International Studies University, and doctoral candidate at the Higher School of Economics, Russia)

（作者简介：李义男，上海外国语大学上海全球治理与区域国别研究院访问学者，俄罗斯高等经济大学博士候选人）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心