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Western Populist Thought and the Dynamics of World Political Restructuring

林红:西方民粹主义思潮与世界政治重构的动力

· · Marxism Abroad · "Foreign Theoretical Trends" 2024, no. 2 · 31 min read

World politics in the twenty-first century opened with three epochal crises. The September 11, 2001 attacks, the 2008 global financial crisis, and the 2015 European refugee crisis successively battered the political order of the Western world, which had been built on the value foundation of neoliberalism. Within Western countries, domestic politics first underwent a turn to varying degrees of right-wing and conservative orientation; an unprecedented wave of populist protest and increasingly severe Islamophobia fragmented their domestic social structures and eroded their domestic political consensus, while the governance capacity of Western countries came under constant criticism. Subsequently, the political turbulence within Western countries produced a ripple effect, triggering "remarkable and large-scale protest activities that span the globe" on an unprecedented scale. The extreme conservative thought led by populism provided the conceptual impetus for global protest activities. This current of thought generated a latent force sufficient to reverse domestic and international politics, bringing about tensions such as political polarization within Western countries and negative interactions between states.

21世纪的世界政治以三场时代危机为开篇。2001年“9·11”事件、2008年全球金融危机和2015年欧洲难民危机接连冲击了以新自由主义为价值基础的西方世界的政治秩序。西方国家的国内政治首先出现了不同程度的右翼化、保守化转向,规模空前的民粹主义抗议浪潮和日渐加重的伊斯兰恐惧症分化了其国内社会结构,削弱了其国内政治共识,西方国家的治理能力不断被诟病。紧接着,西方国家内部的政治动荡产生了辐射效应,引发了前所未有的“跨越全球的显著而且大规模的抗议活动”。由民粹主义引领的极端保守主义思潮为全球性抗议活动提供了观念动力。这股思潮生成了足以逆转国内政治和国际政治的潜在力量,带来了西方国家国内政治极化、国家间负面互动等紧张状态。

Domestic politics and international politics are always connected in some way, and there are many dimensions for observing and discussing this connection. The wave of Western populism in the twenty-first century reveals the necessity and feasibility of discussion from the perspective of political thought. Populism is a political thought capable of inspiring extreme action, possessing a powerful conceptual force that may alter power structures and institutional arrangements. At present, it is necessary to reinterpret world politics as the wave of Western populism surges forward, and in the study of world politics, equal attention must be paid to the influence of domestic politics and ideational variables within Western countries. This article aims to conduct a preliminary discussion of how populist thought affects changes in world politics, specifically examining how populist thought connects the domestic political processes of Western countries with international political processes, thereby initiating the process of world political restructuring.

国内政治与国际政治总是以某种方式连接在一起,对这种连接的观察和讨论有很多维度。21世纪的西方民粹主义浪潮揭示了从政治思潮视角进行讨论的必要性和可行性。民粹主义是一种足以激发极端行动的政治思潮,具有强大的、可能改变权力结构和制度安排的观念力量。当前,有必要在西方民粹主义浪潮汹涌而来之时对世界政治进行重新解释,在世界政治研究中,同时要重视西方国家国内政治和观念变量的影响。本文旨在对民粹主义思潮如何影响世界政治变迁进行初步讨论,具体考察民粹主义思潮是如何连接西方国家国内政治过程与国际政治过程,进而开启世界政治的重构进程。

I. Value Turn: Collective Insecurity and the Right-Wing Shift of Populism

一、价值观转向:集体不安全感与民粹主义的右翼化

Like other political thoughts, populism is essentially a product of domestic political and economic changes. Dani Rodrik believes that populism is a political backlash generated when the forces of globalization enter a country's domestic social sphere, causing social fragmentation. The contemporary Western populist rebellion that people are witnessing is essentially an anti-liberal democratic rebellion. In the words of Harold Lasswell, the era of populism is an era of "the revolt of the masses," placing the emotions of the common people in the most prominent position within political events. For the ruling elites of various countries, avoiding or quelling "the revolt of the masses" is a political mission of life-and-death importance. It requires that any state governance aimed at eliminating adverse conditions must gain the support of ordinary people, and that any social values aimed at re-strengthening national cohesion must gain the recognition of ordinary people.

与其他政治思潮一样,民粹主义本质上是国内政治经济变迁的产物。丹尼·罗德里克(Dani Rodrik)认为,民粹主义就是全球化力量进入一国国内社会层面造成社会分化而产生的一种政治反弹。这场当代人正在见证的西方民粹主义反叛运动,本质上是一种反自由主义的民主反叛。用哈罗德·拉斯韦尔(Harold Lasswell)的话来说,民粹主义时代是“民众的叛乱”的时代,它将人民群众的情感置于政治事件中最显著的位置。对于各国执政精英来说,避免或平息“民众的叛乱”是一项攸关生死的政治使命,它要求任何旨在消除不良状况的国家治理必须得到普通民众的支持,要求任何旨在重新强化国家凝聚力的社会价值观念必须得到普通民众的认同。

In Western countries, historical populist thought was strongly influenced by domestic economic factors, primarily responding to the public's demands for economic equality and distributive justice. Populism in the era of globalization is likewise stimulated by the gap between rich and poor and issues of inequality. For example, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the fiscal austerity policies of European countries gave rise to left-wing populism pursuing equal distribution, while Sanders also launched a social-democratic left-wing populist movement in the United States. However, due to the influence of neoliberal policies, markets and capital, multinational corporations, and supranational organizations have been able to penetrate domestic political processes, making relations between the people and the state, and between states, increasingly tense. More and more ordinary people believe that economic inequality is related to the decline in the state's willingness and ability to care for its people, and that it is globalization that has interfered with the state's willingness, weakened its capacity, and brought about more severe cultural and value shocks. Arjun Appadurai believes that globalization has been weakening the nation-state, ultimately reducing it to a fantasy of the national community, becoming the last cultural resource for the state to achieve comprehensive rule. This concern about state capacity has bred a profound collective insecurity in Western societies, greatly fueling state conservatism centered on anti-immigration and the identity of a single nation-state, thereby nurturing a right-wing, conservative populist thought.

在西方国家,历史上的民粹主义思潮受到国内经济因素的强烈影响,主要回应民众对经济平等和分配正义的诉求。全球化时代的民粹主义同样受到贫富分化和不平等问题的刺激。例如,2008年全球金融危机之后,欧洲国家的财政紧缩政策催生了追求平等分配的左翼民粹主义,同时桑德斯在美国也掀起了一场社会民主主义性质的左翼民粹主义运动。然而,由于新自由主义政策的影响,市场和资本、跨国公司和超国家组织得以渗透进国内政治过程,使得民众与国家、国家与国家之间的关系变得紧张起来。越来越多的普通民众相信,经济不平等问题与国家照看民众的意愿和能力下降有关,而正是全球化干扰了国家的意愿、削弱了国家的能力,并且带来了更为严重的文化与价值冲击。阿尔琼·阿帕杜莱(Arjun Appadurai)认为,全球化一直在削弱民族国家,使其最终沦为民族共同体的幻想,成为国家实现全面统治的最后的文化资源。这种对国家能力的担忧在西方社会滋生了一种深刻的集体不安全感,极大地助长了以反移民为核心的国家保守主义和单一民族国家认同,进而孕育了右翼化、保守化的民粹主义思潮。

The collective insecurity of the era of globalization is embedded in the profound identity politics or culture wars of Western societies. Ken Jowitt sees, in the post-Cold War world order, the redrawing of boundaries and the reshaping of identities, as well as the proliferation of conflict and a substantial increase in uncertainty. From the real-world connections between the September 11 attacks and terrorism, the financial crisis and sharp welfare cuts, and the refugee crisis and disappearing borders, the public has perceived a crisis of the state

全球化时代的集体不安全感存在于西方社会深刻的身份政治或文化战争中。肯·乔威特(Ken Jowitt)从后冷战的世界秩序中看到了边界的重新划分和身份认同的重新塑造,以及冲突的泛滥和不确定性的大幅增加。民众从“9·11”事件与恐怖主义、金融危机与福利锐减、难民危机与消失的国界等现实关联中感受到了国家的危机、身份的危机和生存的危机。财富、尊重和安全是社会成员的普遍目标,但是接连的危机冲击严重动摇了人们追求这些目标的信心。马克斯·韦伯(Max Weber)认为,人类是文化动物,有着对世界采取某种特定态度和赋予世界以意义的能力和意愿,焦虑感和不安全感是一种对世界的悲观态度,更包含有改变现状、改变秩序的强烈意愿。拉斯韦尔分析过世界政治与个体不安全感之间的复杂关系,认为在工业革命的影响下,剧烈的社会变迁导致人们丧失了对传统权威或价值的认同。他认为,由于个体被剥夺了人身安全感,没有归属感,因而造成了普遍的焦虑,相信观念、心理对政治过程具有决定性意义。如果当前的政治经济体系无法充分缓解大众的焦虑感,大众就会去寻找少数群体作为替罪羊,宣泄其憎恨,同时也会听信别有用心的在野精英的蛊惑,为其反建制的政治方案背书,结果导致“‘怨恨政治’成为国内政治甚至国际政治中攫取权力的有用工具”。在西欧和北欧,这种由集体不安全感驱动的“怨恨政治”表现为本土主义、排外主义和极端种族主义的日益上扬。关于外来移民挤占公共服务资源、削弱本土文化价值观,难民涌入威胁本土公共安全等种种假定或判断刺激了欧洲民众的排外情绪。从社会层面上看,美国历史上多项限制移民进入的政策行动也是源于普遍的不安全感,“这种普遍的不安全感的产生是由美国在世界的新角色和自身内在的改革所引起的”。在当今时代,美国人普遍的不安全感来自移民涌入带来的文化与身份危机,本质上是对外部世界的不信任,从而产生了一种强烈的寻求归属和自我保护的大众心理需求。从这种意义上看,民粹主义思潮是本土集体活动与外部社会文化相互冲突的结果,它建构了完全不同于自由主义、社会主义的价值观念,为民族、宗教和部落等身份政治的卷土重来打开了大门。

Twenty-first-century Western populism has awakened values and concepts in political culture that are more conservative, more nativist, and therefore more isolationist and xenophobic. While emphasizing class politics of vertical confrontation between elites and masses, it increasingly focuses on ethnic politics of horizontal confrontation between insiders and outsiders, moving from a radical left toward an extremist right. At root, the reason the revived populist current takes on a more distinctly right-wing and conservative coloration is closely tied to the ideological resources it draws from nationalism. Anthony Giddens argues: “Populism exists almost everywhere, but it is the extremists within it who tend to provoke crises. In a sense, most of them are nationalists and Eurosceptics.” The confluence of populism and nationalism has produced an extreme form known as national populism or right-wing populism, which has established three core demands for the ultra-conservative domestic ideology of Western countries in the twenty-first century.

21世纪的西方民粹主义唤醒了政治文化中更保守化、更本土化,因而更加孤立和排外的价值和观念,它在强调上下对抗的阶级政治的同时更加关注内外对抗的族群政治,从激进主义的左翼日益走向极端主义的右翼。从根源来看,复兴的民粹主义思潮之所以具有更鲜明的右翼化和保守化色彩,与它从民族主义那里获得的意识形态资源密切相关。安东尼·吉登斯(Anthony Giddens)认为:“民粹主义几乎哪里都存在,但其中的极端分子往往会引起危机。在某种意义上,他们大多是民族主义者和欧洲怀疑论者。”民粹主义与民族主义的合流造就了一种被称为民族民粹主义或右翼民粹主义的极端形态,为21世纪西方国家极端保守的国内意识形态确立了三个核心诉求。

First, it emphasizes the severity of external threats. Both populism and nationalism possess the ideological capacity to trigger confrontational politics: the former treats establishment elites as enemies, while the latter treats “those not of our kind” as enemies. Lasswell pointed out: “To sustain an offensive, an enemy must exist; sometimes this enemy can be found at home—monopolists, capitalists, or Wall Street speculators—but more often the unconscious mind takes some foreign threat as the target of attack.” [1]1 Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 8. Due to large-scale immigration and the refugee crisis, native ethnic groups experience an unprecedented sense of identity crisis and cultural crisis, adopting a hostile attitude toward the liberal elites who promote lenient immigration policies and toward the foreign immigrants who compete for jobs and welfare. From Trump’s presidency in the United States, Brexit in Britain, the “Yellow Vests” movement in France, to the collective rise of right-wing populist parties in European countries, one can find the social soil conducive to the confluence of populism and nationalism. In the West, a series of events expressing populist and nationalist demands have become symbols of anger directed at anything external. From anti-Semitism to hatred of people of color, Muslim groups, and other ethnic minorities, the expression of social grievances is outward-directed and emotional. Although Western social movements led by white groups also have a left-wing character of wage-earners and底层 [n] opposing social injustice, this vertical resistance is increasingly giving way to horizontal resistance driven by nativist and xenophobic values.

首先,强调外部威胁的严重性。民粹主义和民族主义都具有触发对抗性政治的意识形态力量,前者将建制派精英视为敌人,后者将“非我族类”视为敌人。拉斯韦尔指出:“要能持续进行进攻,就必须有敌人的存在,有时在国内能找到这种敌人,即垄断者、资本家或华尔街的投机商,更常有的是无意识的心灵把某种国外威胁作为攻击的靶子。”由于移民的大量流入和难民问题的出现,本国族群感受到前所未有的身份危机、文化危机,对出台宽松移民政策的自由派精英以及抢夺饭碗和福利的外国移民持敌视态度。从美国的特朗普执政、英国的脱欧成功、法国的“黄背心”运动,再到欧洲国家右翼民粹主义政党的集体崛起,都可以发现适宜民粹主义与民族主义合流的社会土壤。在西方,一系列表达民粹主义和民族主义诉求的事件成为对任何外部事物表达愤怒的象征。从反犹到仇视有色人种、穆斯林群体和其他少数族裔,社会积怨的表达都是对外的、情绪性的。尽管由白人群体主导的西方社会运动也有着工薪阶层和底层民众反对社会不公的左翼色彩,但是这种纵向反抗越来越让位于由本土主义和排外主义价值观推动的横向反抗。

Second, it emphasizes state-centered holistic interests. Western practice shows that populism venerates authoritarianism and statism; nationalism has participated in the construction of modern states. Both have unwavering loyalty to the nation and firmly believe that the state occupies a decisive position in ideology. Their confluence is a response to the weakening of state power and national interests by globalization and to external threats; together they forge a “native-first,” even exclusive, preference for the nation’s own interests into a new national interest, and together they revise the open, pluralistic liberal foreign strategy. Populism’s original goal was to pursue equal rights and distributive justice, placing hope for achieving equality and fairness in a strong state. Similarly, “nationalist waves sometimes rise in the name of the demand for equality and expand into an imperialist demand for hegemony over culturally heterogeneous people.” [2]2 This is a paraphrase of a passage from E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 207. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” and other populist leaders’ “country first” slogans all promote xenophobic, isolationist anti-globalization ideas under the banner of national interests. Éric Zemmour, the far-right French presidential candidate known as “the French Trump,” used “mass immigration is the nation’s misfortune” as his campaign slogan, claiming that deepening “Islamization” has put “our country in danger.” Unlike traditional nationalism or populism, national populism no longer explains the crisis facing the nation through narrow ethnic or class concepts; instead, it combines the nation with the people to provide a moral justification for its view of the state.

其次,强调以国家为中心的整体性利益。西方实践表明,民粹主义崇尚威权主义和国家主义;民族主义参与了现代国家的建构过程。二者对国家都有着坚定不移的忠诚,坚信国家在意识形态中居于决定性地位。二者的合流是对国家权力、国家利益受到全球化削弱和外部威胁的回应,它们合力将本土优先的甚至是排他的本民族利益偏好打造成新的国家利益,合力修正开放多元的自由主义对外战略。民粹主义最初的目标是追求平等权利和分配正义,将实现平等公正寄望于强大的国家。与此相似的是,“民族主义浪潮有时以对平等的需求为名而兴起,并扩大成为对异质文化者拥有霸权的帝国主义需求”。特朗普的“让美国再次伟大”和其他民粹主义领导人的“本国优先”主张都是打着国家利益的旗号来推行排外主义、孤立主义的反全球化理念。有“法国特朗普”之称的法国极右翼总统候选人埃里克·泽穆尔(Éric Zemmour)以“大规模移民是国家的厄运”为竞选口号,宣称日益加深的“伊斯兰化”使“我们的国家处于危险之中”。与传统的民族主义或民粹主义不同,民族民粹主义不再用狭隘的民族观念或阶级观念来解释国家面临的危机,而是将民族与人民结合起来,为其国家观进行道德辩护。

Third, it emphasizes the dynamic power of values and ideas. For a long time, the influence of ideational factors in domestic and international affairs has been generally underestimated. Although since the rise of neorealism and new institutionalism in the 1980s, ideational factors have been considered within the framework of neo-utilitarianism, people still only emphasize their instrumentality—that is, the significance of ideas for individual units pursuing material interests—while downplaying the dynamic role of values and ideas for political actors. In fact, ideas, identity, and values help actors aggregate preferences and demands, thereby influencing collective action and political institutions. Helen Milner argues that the value preferences of political actors are more fundamental than institutional structures, because institutions are important only when combined with preference structures. [3]3 Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 16. In historical practice, there are countless instances where ideas have acted on human action beyond interests or institutions. Friedrich Schiller once described the European religious wars of the seventeenth century: “Few people would willingly fight for the interests of the state and its princes, but for religion, merchants, artists, and peasants alike would gladly take up arms… For religion, people willingly gave up wealth and blood, even abandoning all earthly hopes.” [4]4 Friedrich Schiller, *History of the Thirty Years’ War*, trans. A. J. W. Morrison (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1861), p. 3. In the twenty-first century, identity politics, recognition politics, or faith politics have amassed enormous energy driving political change. Extremely xenophobic national populism relies heavily on values and ideological construction, emphasizing cultural differences in race, religion, and even language, and stoking various cultural conflicts between groups with differential identities.

再次,重视价值观念的能动性力量。长久以来,观念因素在国内事务和国际事务中的影响被普遍低估。尽管自1980年代新现实主义和新制度主义兴起以来,观念因素在新功利主义的框架下得到了考虑,但人们仍然只强调其工具性,即观念对于追求物质利益的个体单位的意义,而轻视了价值观念对于政治行为体的能动作用。事实上,观念、认同和价值能够帮助行为体聚合偏好和诉求,进而影响集体行动和政治制度。海伦·米尔纳(Helen Milner)认为,政治行为体的价值偏好相比于制度结构更具根本性,因为制度只有同偏好结构结合在一起时才是重要的。在历史实践中,观念超越利益或制度而作用于人类行动的事实比比皆是。弗里德里希·席勒(Friedrich Schiller)曾这样描述17世纪的欧洲宗教战争:“很少有人会自愿为国家和诸侯的利益而战,而为宗教则商人、艺术家和农民均会乐于拿起武器。……为了宗教,人们甘愿献出财富和鲜血乃至放弃尘世间的所有希望。”在21世纪,身份政治、认同政治或信仰政治集结了推动政治变迁的巨大能量。极端排外的民族民粹主义对价值观、意识形态建构有着强烈依赖,强调种族、宗教甚至语言等方面的文化差异,在具有差异性认同的群体之间挑动各种文化冲突。

II. Reshaping the Political Process: The Impact of Populism

二、政治过程重塑:民粹主义的影响

The trend of change in human life patterns is closely related to two structures: first, the structure of social interests; second, the structure of state institutions. The interaction of these two structures influences human activities at multiple levels—local, national, and global. In Western international relations scholarship, when distinguishing between domestic and international factors in foreign policy, there has been debate over the question “are social interests more important, or are domestic institutions more important?” Each side argues that both need to be taken into account in some consistent manner. [5]5 See, for example, the debate between Andrew Moravcsik and Robert O. Keohane in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Institution-oriented researchers believe that values and interest preferences cannot provide a sufficient explanation for political change; they hold that social facts require the support and maintenance of institutions established by people. However, under the impact of globalization, whether in the industrialized West or the underdeveloped Third World, “the inability of existing institutions to regulate and ease tensions and conflicts will encourage people to try new institutional arrangements.” [6]6 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), p. 249. Globalization’s greatest impact on the domestic politics of Western countries has been to change their social interest structures and value consensus, especially bringing about wealth polarization and identity crisis. In response, populism forms new values and policy demands from the discontent and anxiety of mainstream ethnic groups, demands changes to the neoliberal globalized political and economic order, and influences public policy by participating in the domestic political processes of Western countries.

人类生活模式的变迁趋势与两个结构密切相关:一是社会利益结构;二是国家制度结构。这两种结构的相互作用影响着地方、国家和世界等诸层次的人类活动。西方国际关系学界在辨析外交政策中的国内和国际因素时,对“是社会利益重要,还是国内制度更为重要”的问题进行过争论,各方均认为二者需要以某种一致的方式纳入考虑。制度取向的研究者认为,价值与利益偏好无法为政治变迁提供充分的解释,他们相信社会事实的存在需要人们所建立的制度加以支撑和维系。然而,在全球化的冲击下,无论是在工业化的西方,还是欠发达的第三世界,“现有制度在制约和调节紧张与冲突方面的无能为力将鼓励人们尝试新的制度安排”。全球化对西方国家国内政治的最大影响是改变了其社会利益结构和价值共识,尤其是带来了贫富分化和身份危机。作为回应,民粹主义从主流族群的不满和焦虑中形成新的价值观念和政策诉求,要求变革新自由主义的全球化政治经济秩序,并通过参与西方国家国内政治过程去影响公共政策。

Populist thought injects new interest demands and value preferences into the domestic political processes of Western countries, exerting a significant impact on the “state-society” relationship, the pattern of party politics, and the formulation of public policy. First, populism strengthens the social dominance of domestic political structures in Western countries. The so-called domestic political structure generally refers to a country’s political system, social structure, and the policy networks that integrate the political system with the social structure. In terms of composition, although decision-making organizations occupy the center of the political structure, the state-society relationship, or the social forces relative to the state, has a decisive influence on the political structure. “A country’s domestic order structurally encompasses the institutions and conventions, rules and procedures of political and social operation, as well as the values and concepts embedded in political culture.” Peter Gourevitch distinguishes between a state-dominated structure of “strong state–weak society” and a society-dominated structure of “weak state–strong society.” The historical practice of populism shows that it is more likely to emerge in a society-dominated structure, because anti-establishment politics is difficult to generate in a “strong state–weak society” structure, where a powerful state has sufficient means to control social forces that might fragment the nation. In political structures where institutional power is weak and social power is strong, social movements are frequent, radical thought runs high, and populism is typically a common phenomenon. Against the backdrop of globalization, with the rise of domestic democratic demands in Western countries and the escalation of external economic and social pressures, especially the constant stimulation of real problems such as economic inequality and identity crisis, populist thought has greater opportunity to incite social forces to attack establishment elites, use social discontent to form public opinion pressure, and strengthen civil society’s intervention and dominance over the domestic political structure. If traditional populism intensified the antagonistic relationship between domestic elites and the general public, then under the impact of globalization, populism nourished by nationalism further highlights the antagonistic relationship between one’s own country and others, and between one’s own country and the international system, influencing the country’s foreign policy choices and the exercise of international power by shaping exclusionary policy preferences.

民粹主义思潮将新的利益诉求与价值偏好输入西方国家国内政治过程,对“国家—社会”关系、政党政治格局和公共政策的制定均产生了重大影响。其一,民粹主义强化了西方国家国内政治结构的社会主导性。所谓国内政治结构,一般指国家的政治制度、社会结构以及结合政治制度与社会结构的政策网络。从构成上看,虽然决策组织处于政治结构的中心地位,但是国家与社会关系,或者说与国家相对的社会力量,对政治结构具有决定性影响。“一国的国内秩序在结构上涵盖了政治社会运行中的机构与惯例、规则与程序,以及深嵌于政治文化中的价值与观念。”彼得·古雷维奇(Peter Gourevitch)辨析了“强国家—弱社会”的国家主导型结构、“弱国家—强社会”的社会主导型结构。民粹主义的历史实践表明,它更容易在社会主导型结构中出现,因为反建制政治在一个“强国家—弱社会”的结构中很难生成,强大的国家有足够的手段来控制可能分化国家的社会力量。在制度力量疲弱而社会力量强大的政治结构中,社会运动频发,激进思潮高涨,民粹主义通常是易发现象。在全球化背景下,随着西方国家国内民主诉求的高涨和外部经济社会压力的升级,尤其是经济不平等和身份危机等现实问题的不断刺激,民粹主义思潮更有机会煽动社会力量对建制派精英发起冲击,利用社会不满形成民意压力,强化民间社会对国内政治结构的干预和主导。如果说传统的民粹主义强化了国内精英与社会民众之间的对立关系,那么在全球化的冲击下,得到民族主义滋养的民粹主义还进一步突显了本国与他国、本国与国际体系之间的对立关系,通过塑造排他性的政策偏好来影响本国的对外政策选择和国际权力发挥。

Second, populism enters the political process by participating in party competition, leading to a loosening of the traditional party landscape. Cass Mudde argues: “The populist wave is an illiberal democratic response to decades of undemocratic liberal policies.” Globalization has brought problems such as unfair distribution, identity crisis, and democratic deficit to the domestic politics of Western countries, intensifying public resentment toward establishment elites and disappointment with mainstream parties. This resentment and disappointment have contributed to the electoral success of populist parties. Since 2010, support for populist parties in Western countries has reached its highest level since 1960. In 2017, populist support in EU countries reached 19% and has maintained a continuous upward trend. Rodrik uses a “supply-demand” paradigm to explain the collapse of mainstream parties and the rise of extreme populist parties in Europe and America. He argues that mainstream parties in Europe and America choose to play a political role from the supply side, that is, to act before social movements by providing explanatory narratives, guiding social attention toward specific programmatic directions, but they rarely have clear solutions or effective policy measures to address public discontent and concerns. In contrast, populist parties on the margins, based on considerations of political mobilization, actively respond to real issues of common concern to the public, striving to resonate with the demand side. The loss of voters by mainstream parties in Europe and America is actually the result of their declining responsiveness, as well as the loss of appeal of the discursive mobilization of the center-right and center-left. This change provides enormous space for the mobilization of identity politics and populist discourse, with policy issues such as anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and anti-EU becoming discursive tools for marginal and extreme right-wing populist parties to expand their political influence. To cater to the public, some European right-wing populist parties have even proposed mixed left-right policy platforms, that is, adhering to an anti-immigration right-wing stance on social culture while leaning toward a left-wing stance on political economy, demanding improved citizen welfare benefits and expanded political rights for democratic participation. John Judis observes the flexible strategies of European right-wing populist parties in recent years, finding that these parties are changing their anti-tax, anti-government intervention stance, partially adopting social democratic left-wing positions, and beginning to oppose neoliberalism and support the welfare state. For example, in France, “Le Pen’s National Front has become the defender of the welfare state.” In Western countries, the flexible adjustment of political strategies has increased the social support for populist parties, making their impact on the traditional party landscape more sustained and powerful. For now, although populist parties in European countries have not developed to the point of replacing mainstream parties, their vote shares and positions in parliament have fundamentally changed, posing major challenges to the traditional political order and public policy choices. In the United States, although the institutional penetration of populism lacks the party political pathway available under European multi-party systems, the social rifts and political polarization caused by this penetration have, to a large extent, altered the two-party political landscape, making it increasingly difficult for the two parties to reach consensus on domestic issues.

其二,民粹主义通过参与政党竞争进入政治过程,导致传统政党格局发生松动。卡斯·穆德(Cass Mudde)认为:“民粹主义浪潮是对数十年非民主的自由主义政策的一种非自由民主的回应。”全球化给西方国家的国内政治带来了分配不公、身份危机、民主赤字等问题,加剧了民众对建制派精英的怨恨和对主流政党的失望。这种怨恨和失望促成了民粹主义政党在选举中的成功。自2010年开始,西方各国对民粹主义政党的支持率已经达到了1960年以来的历史最高水平。2017年,欧盟国家的民粹主义支持度达到19%,并保持着持续上升的趋势。罗德里克以一种“供给—需求”范式来解释欧美主流政党的溃败和极端民粹主义政党的崛起。他认为,欧美的主流政党选择从供给侧发挥政治作用,即先于社会行动进行解释性叙述,引导社会关注特定的纲领性方向,但是很少有明确的解决方案或有效的政策措施来应对民众的不满和担忧;不同的是,处于边缘地位的民粹主义政党基于政治动员的考虑,积极回应社会民众共同关注的现实议题,力争与需求方产生共鸣。欧美主流政党的选民流失实际上是其回应能力衰退的结果,也是中右、中左的话语动员失去吸引力的结果。这种变化为身份政治和民粹主义话语提供了巨大的动员空间,反全球化、反移民、反欧盟等政策议题成为边缘和极端的右翼民粹主义政党扩大政治影响的话语工具。为了迎合民众,一些欧洲右翼民粹主义政党甚至提出了左右混合的政策纲领,即在社会文化上坚持反移民的右翼立场,而在政治经济上偏向左翼的立场,要求加强公民福利待遇和扩大民主参与的政治权利。约翰·朱迪斯(John Judis)观察到近年来欧洲右翼民粹主义政党的灵活策略,发现这些政党正在改变反税收、反政府干预的立场,部分采纳了社会民主主义的左翼主张,也开始反对新自由主义、支持福利国家,比如在法国,“勒庞的国民阵线成为了福利国家的捍卫者”。在西方国家,政治策略的灵活调整提高了民粹主义政党的社会支持度,使其对传统政党格局的冲击更为持久有力。就当前而言,尽管欧洲国家的民粹主义政党并没有发展到足以取代主流政党的程度,但是它们的得票率、在议会中的地位都有了根本性的改变,为传统政治秩序和公共政策选择带来了重大挑战。在美国,虽然民粹主义的制度化渗透缺乏欧洲多党制之下的政党政治路径,但是这种渗透所造成的社会裂痕和政治极化在很大程度上改变了两党政治格局,使两党在其国内议题上越来越难以达成共识。

Third, populism fully participates in party, electoral, and parliamentary activities in Western countries, inputting policy preferences into the political process. Political science research typically focuses on the policy preferences of multiple actors and their competition or cooperation in domestic politics, arguing that national politics is rarely a complete hierarchy with a single policymaker, especially in Western countries that claim to be democracies, where legislative and executive institutions jointly influence policymaking, and the ruling party, ruling coalition, and opposition parties are often in a competitive state during the policymaking process, forming a kind of “veto-player system.” However, existing theories of international relations understand domestic politics differently; they tend to treat the state as a unitary actor, “domestic politics is often seen as organized according to hierarchical principles, with a single actor at the top of domestic politics exercising final decision-making.” Milner questions this, arguing that within a country there is polyarchy, composed of actors with different preferences. On this premise, she proposes a parsimonious model explaining how domestic forces influence international politics, emphasizing the important impact of differences in preferences and political institutions within a country on international politics. The anti-establishment politics of Western populism reflects the fact of differing value preferences within a country, and even more so the complexity of political struggles among multiple actors. In the policymaking process, domestic actors possess four key powers: the ability to initiate and set the agenda, the ability to amend policy proposals, the ability to approve or veto policies, and the ability to put issues to a referendum. Populist parties and their supporters in different countries possess these four powers to varying degrees, especially in initiating agendas, vetoing policies, and promoting referendums. George Tsebelis focuses on domestic actors as “veto players,” arguing that as the number of these actors increases, their preferences diverge, and their internal consistency decreases, the difficulty of decision-making will also increase. In Western countries, populism plays the role of a widely influential veto player in the decision-making process of domestic and foreign affairs. Its opposition to neoliberalism and globalization not only stirs up biased political mobilization domestically but also forms political alliances on specific issues such as anti-immigration and anti-establishment, directly influencing the preferences and choices of foreign policy.

其三,民粹主义全面参与西方国家的政党、选举和议会等活动,向政治过程输入政策偏好。政治学研究通常关注国内政治中多元行为体及其竞争或合作的政策偏好,认为国家政治很少是只有单一政策制定者的完全等级制,尤其是在以民主政体自居的西方国家,立法机构与行政机构共同影响政策制定,执政党、执政党联盟和反对党在政策制定过程中常常处于竞争状态,形成某种“否决型体制”。但是,国际关系的现有理论对国内政治的理解有所不同,它倾向于将国家视为单一行为体,“国内政治常常被视为按照等级制度原则来组织的,在国内政治的顶端有一个单一的行为者来行使最终的决策”。米尔纳对此提出了质疑,认为一国内部是多头政治,由具有不同偏好的行为体组成。以此为前提,她提出了一个解释国内力量如何对国际政治产生影响的简约模型,强调国家内部偏好和政治制度的差异对国际政治的重要影响。西方民粹主义的反建制政治反映了国家内部价值偏好存在差异的事实,更反映了多元行为体之间政治角力的复杂性。在政策制定过程中,国内行为体拥有四种关键力量:发起和设定议程的能力、修正政策提议的能力、批准或否决政策的能力、付诸公决的能力。不同国家的民粹主义政党及其支持者程度不同地拥有这四种力量,尤其是在发起议程、否决政策和推动公决方面。乔治·塞布里斯(George Tsebelis)关注作为“否决角色”的国内行为体,认为随着这些行为体数量的增加、偏好的分化和内部一致性的降低,决策的困难程度也将随之提高。在西方国家,民粹主义在内政外交的决策过程中扮演着影响广泛的否决者角色,它对新自由主义和全球化的反对不仅在国内掀起了有偏向性的政治动员,而且在反移民、反建制等特定议题上结成政治联盟,直接影响了对外政策的偏好与选择。

Foreign policy serves national interests, but the perceptions of what constitutes national interests are often inconsistent among various groups within Western countries. In Western political practice, governments and ruling parties define the national interests they pursue based on domestic political objectives and formulate corresponding foreign policies. For example, they may adopt aggressive or invasive foreign policy actions to divert domestic public attention from economic difficulties or distributional injustice, thereby improving the government’s governing public opinion environment or influencing election outcomes. The influence of populist parties on domestic public policy is concentrated in social fields such as welfare, taxation, income, and employment, as they vigorously promote public policies aimed at expanding state intervention, increasing welfare, and raising employment rates. In foreign policy, they advocate decoupling and non-cooperation, opposing immigration, free trade, and international norms. The domestic political mobilization of European and American populist parties is filled with various anti-globalization demands. After entering the domestic political process through social movements, party politics, and parliamentary activities, they then steer foreign policy in a conservative direction that opposes global mobility and transnational cooperation.

对外政策服务于国家利益,但是西方国家内部各集团之间关于何为国家利益的认知常常是不一致的。在西方的政治实践中,政府和执政党基于国内政治目的来定义它们要追求的国家利益,制定相应的对外政策,例如,采取冒进或侵略性的对外政策行动来转移国内民众对经济困境或分配不公的注意,改善政府执政的舆论环境或影响选举结果。民粹主义政党对国内公共政策的影响集中于福利、税收、收入和就业等社会领域,极力推行以扩大国家干预、增加福利、提高就业率为目标的公共政策;在对外政策方面则主张脱钩和不合作,反对移民、反对自由贸易、反对国际规范。欧美民粹主义政党的国内政治动员充满着各种反全球化的诉求,它们通过社会运动、政党政治和议会活动进入国内政治过程后,继而将对外政策导向反对全球流动、反对跨国合作的保守主义方向。

III. The Formation of a World Political Trend: The Spillover of Populism

三、世界性政治思潮的形成:民粹主义的外溢

Populism is a domestic political trend stimulated by the externalities of globalization. Within the domestic political systems of Western countries, it has shaped values and policy preferences that are anti-globalization and anti-liberalism, serving as an important driver of social differentiation and political polarization in Western countries. At the same time, populism responds to the behavior of other countries and the international system through increasingly conservative foreign policies, forcing these countries to adopt nativist and xenophobic foreign policies and externalizing conservative domestic issues to the international level. As a result, populist thought spills over into the world political system through institutionalized channels. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the United States and Western European countries, which have benefited the most from globalization, have shifted their domestic populist pressures outward, implementing exclusionary and non-cooperative populist foreign policies and global strategies, which have had a major impact on the power structure and interest configuration of world politics. “Scientific and technological progress and the human quest for recognition are the fundamental driving forces of world political change.” Populism is the most radical part of the human quest for recognition. In the process of right-wing radicalization and extremism, it has triggered identity politics, religious wars, or cultural conflicts, echoing the collective sense of insecurity among mainstream domestic populations, and has also become an ideological tool for states to enhance national autonomy and expand national interests in world politics.

民粹主义是一种受全球化外部刺激而形成的国内政治思潮,它在西方国家国内政治体系中塑造了反全球化、反自由主义的价值观念和政策偏好,是西方国家社会分化、政治极化的重要推手。同时,民粹主义通过日益保守化的对外政策对他国行为和国际体系作出响应,迫使这些国家出台本土主义、排外主义的对外政策,将保守化的内部议题外化到国际层次,作为结果,民粹主义思潮通过制度化的途径外溢到世界政治体系。2008年全球金融危机以来,从全球化中获利最多的美国和西欧国家,纷纷将其国内民粹主义压力向外转移,推行排他性和不合作的民粹主义对外政策和全球战略,对世界政治的力量格局和利益格局造成重大影响。“科学技术的进步和追求承认的人性诉求是世界政治变迁的根本动力。”民粹主义是追求承认的人性诉求中最为激进的部分,它在右翼化极端化的过程中触发了身份政治、宗教战争或文化冲突,呼应了国内主流民众的集体不安全感,也成为国家在世界政治中提升国家自主性、扩大国家利益的意识形态工具。

The current Western populist trend has not yet reached the point of subverting the liberal international order led by the United States, and it even retreats from time to time under the siege and counterattack of liberals in various countries. However, through the interaction of the following three mechanisms, this deconstructive domestic political trend has inevitably crossed national borders and developed into a world political trend with profound implications for the world political landscape.

当今的西方民粹主义思潮并未达到颠覆美国主导的自由主义国际秩序的程度,甚至在各国自由派的围攻反击下还时有后退。但是,在以下三方面机制的相互作用下,这种解构性的国内政治思潮已不可避免地越出国界,发展成为对世界政治格局有着深远影响的世界性政治思潮。

First, the outward transfer of domestic political and economic contradictions in Western countries. Liberals claim that free governments advocating free trade can create a good world order. Populists, on the other hand, argue that globalization has brought about a “runaway world” that not only fails to create a good world order but instead leads to more severe economic inequality and identity crises. Noam Chomsky believes that neoliberalism “is merely the modern term for the struggle of a small number of the wealthy to limit the political power and rights of the people.” Therefore, in the eyes of populists, globalization is the chief culprit for domestic wealth disparity. In post-World War II Europe, when many countries fell into severe economic downturns, foreign tourists, businessmen, and others were perceived by local residents as a threat. The middle class and workers could not see any direct benefits from foreigners and easily inferred that they had suffered losses. To appease domestic voters, political elites choose to shift domestic economic contradictions and relieve public opinion pressure, actively shaping external enemies and implementing tougher foreign policies. In the United States, Trump’s rise to power was the result of the decline of traditional American manufacturing and the intensification of the white identity crisis, both of which are domestic dilemmas brought about by globalization for the United States. After lower- and middle-class white voters pushed Trump into the presidency, Trump promptly transferred these economic and social contradictions outward through a tough decoupling foreign policy.

首先,西方国家国内政治经济矛盾向外转移。自由主义者声称主张自由贸易的自由政府能够创造出一个良好的世界秩序。而民粹主义者则认为,全球化带来的是一个“失控的世界”,不仅没有创造良好的世界秩序,反而导致更加严重的经济不平等和身份危机。诺姆·乔姆斯基(Noam Chomsky)认为,新自由主义“只不过是少数富人为限制民众的政治权力和权利而进行斗争的现代称谓而已”,因此,在民粹主义者看来,全球化是造成国内贫富分化的罪魁祸首。在二战后的欧洲,当许多国家陷入严重的经济低谷时,外国游客、商人等会被本土居民视为一种威胁。中产阶级和工人们看不到自己能从外国人那里得到什么直接的好处,很容易推断出自己遭受了损失。而政治精英为了取悦国内选民,会选择转嫁国内经济矛盾和纾解舆论压力,于是积极塑造外部敌人,推行更加强硬的对外政策。在美国,特朗普的上台是美国传统制造业衰退和白人身份危机加剧的结果,两者都是全球化给美国带来的国内困境,在中下层白人选民将特朗普推上总统宝座之后,特朗普随即将这些经济与社会矛盾通过强硬脱钩的外交政策向外转移。

Second, the demonstration effect of anti-globalization movements in the central countries of the world system. Stimulated by globalization, populist thought exists to varying degrees in most Western countries, but its impact is greatest on the United States and Europe, which are at the center of the world political system. Yang Guangbin points out: “Political trends or discourse systems spawned by political development in central countries are promoted by central countries as factual national interests abroad, and international mechanisms are even organized to disseminate their ideas, thereby turning a local knowledge or thought into a global trend.” The United States is the dominant country in globalization, but since the 9/11 attacks, its hegemonic position has become unsustainable. Domestic public opinion in the United States generally believes that the diffusion of technological innovation and the flow of capital are increasingly favorable to competitors, coupled with the enormous cost of maintaining global order, more and more people believe that the United States’ advantageous position as the dominant country has been severely eroded. This national sense of loss has pushed the United States to the forefront of the international wave of right-wing populism. Influenced by the “America First” concept, the three pillars of the “liberal hegemonic order” led by the United States—namely, the United States’ superpower strength, the international institutions dominated by the United States, and the liberal values promoted by the United States—have all been impacted to varying degrees. The conservative turn in American politics has also influenced the values and policy orientations of many countries. In particular, Trump’s policy measures such as shirking international responsibilities and prioritizing domestic interests have triggered major international effects. Imitators such as “Brazil’s Trump,” “Britain’s Trump,” and “France’s Trump” have emerged one after another, and many countries have increasingly moved toward an anti-globalization conservative direction through adjustments in their domestic and foreign policies.

其次,世界体系中的中心国家反全球化运动的示范效应。在全球化的刺激下,民粹主义思潮在西方多数国家都不同程度地存在,但其对处于世界政治体系中心位置的美欧影响最为巨大。杨光斌指出:“中心国家政治发展所催生的政治思潮或话语体系,被中心国家作为事实性国家利益对外推广,甚至组织国际机制去传播其思想,从而使一种地方性知识或思想成为全球性思潮。”美国是全球化的主导国家,但“9·11”事件以来,其霸权地位难以为继,美国国内舆论普遍认为技术创新的扩散和资本的流向日益有利于竞争对手,加上维持全球秩序的巨大成本,越来越多的民众相信美国作为主导国家的优势地位遭到了严重侵蚀。这种国家性失落使得美国在右翼民粹主义国际化浪潮中冲在前面。受到“美国优先”理念的影响,由美国主导的“自由主义霸权秩序”的三大支柱,即美国超强国家实力、美国主导的国际制度、美国推崇的自由主义价值,都在不同程度上受到了冲击。美国政治的保守化也对许多国家的价值观念和政策取向产生了影响,尤其是特朗普推脱国际责任、强调国内利益优先等政策举措引发了重大的国际效应。“巴西的特朗普”“英国的特朗普”“法国的特朗普”等效仿者纷纷出现,许多国家通过内外政策的调整日益走向反全球化的保守主义方向。

Third, the weakening of national autonomy by globalization. The external behavior of a state essentially depends on the pattern of power allocation within the state system, which links international and domestic power politics. “In polyarchy, reaching internal compromises is crucial, and international and foreign policies become part of domestic power struggles and the process of reaching internal compromises.” The two-level game theory also holds that both domestic politics and international politics are power-centered game processes, with domestic politics being the ratification game process and international politics being the negotiation game process, overall forming a coherent and unified power politics. Gourevitch has explored issues such as how the international system constrains domestic politics, how domestic structures affect state behavior, and the importance of domestic society. “Global integration and universal cosmopolitanism reduce the previous sense of independence, identity, and autonomy, prompting many countries to cede part of their sovereignty in order to gain benefits through cooperative participation in a competitive global market.” Therefore, economic globalization, which prioritizes capital and markets, to some extent limits the state’s ability to respond appropriately to the external environment. A concomitant result is the restriction of national autonomy, with international or supranational mechanisms gaining more opportunities to influence domestic power distribution. In Europe, the constraints of EU mechanisms on the actual choices of sovereign states are an important reason for the emergence of Eurosceptic thought and anti-EU social movements. If the exercise of state power is further constrained, “the most likely consequence is the emergence, within and between national societies, of a network of contracts, associations, and interactions that escape the effective control of central government institutions.” Populism is generated within decentralized domestic social networks, but in essence, it is the domestic political consequence of the global economy.

再次,全球化对国家自主性的削弱。国家的对外行为本质上取决于国家体系内部权力配置的模式,这使得国际与国内的权力政治联系在一起。“在多头政治中,达成内部妥协至关重要,国际和对外政策就成为国内权力斗争和达成内部妥协的一部分。”双层博弈理论也认为,国内政治和国际政治都是以权力为中心的博弈过程,国内是批准博弈过程,国际则是谈判博弈过程,总体上是连贯一体的权力政治。古雷维奇探讨过国际体系如何制约国内政治,国内结构如何影响国家行为以及国内社会的重要性等问题。“全球的一体化和普遍的世界主义减少了过去那种对独立、身份和自主的感觉,推动许多国家让渡它们的部分主权,以便在一个竞争的全球市场中通过合作参与获得利益。”因此,以资本、市场为优先原则的经济全球化在某种程度上限制了国家对外部环境做出适当反应的能力,其连带的结果是国家自主权受限,国际或超国家机制获得更多影响国内权力分配的机会。在欧洲,欧盟机制对主权国家实际选择的约束是疑欧主义思潮和反欧盟社会运动出现的重要原因。如果国家的权力行使受到进一步约束,“最可能出现的后果是在国家社会内和国家社会之间,出现一个由契约、联合及互动构成的、摆脱政府机构中心政策有效控制的网络”。民粹主义生成于去中心化的国内社会网络中,但实质上是全球经济的国内政治后果。

Therefore, populist thought has emerged in an era of globalization marked by intensifying governance crises and identity crises, creating in the West an image of countries slipping out of control and globalization collapsing. This anti-globalization worldwide political trend has brought about three important transformations. In terms of interstate relations, populist thought has strengthened identification with national identity, and the policy preference for putting national interests first has altered the interaction patterns between states. “Managing globalization means opening up new political fields, which will also be interwoven with the restructuring of governance and political power.” Due to the lack of effective domestic and global strategies to address the internal and external crises brought by globalization, sovereignty crises, governance crises, and identity crises have intensified and become increasingly intertwined. Driven by domestic extremist forces, exclusionary concepts and policy choices “place national foreign policy within a framework of conflict and beggar-thy-neighbor thinking, doubly internalizing the identity difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ at both the domestic and international levels.” The decline of globalization and the rise of national populism occur simultaneously, and together they weaken mutual trust and interdependence between states, leading to frequent trade frictions, economic decoupling, and political conflicts. The purpose of state action may revert to “maintaining power, increasing power, and displaying power.” In this context, so-called active participation in international politics may even mean preparing for or becoming involved in some form of war between states.

因此,民粹主义思潮出现在治理危机、身份危机不断加剧的全球化时代,在西方造成了一种各个国家都在脱离控制、全球化正在崩解的意象。这种反全球化的世界性政治思潮带来了三种重要变革。在国家间关系方面,民粹主义思潮强化了对国家身份的认同,国家利益至上的政策偏好改变了国家之间的互动模式。“管理全球化意味着新政治领域的开辟,也会夹杂着治理与政治权力的重组。”由于缺乏有效的国内战略和全球战略来应对全球化带来的内外危机,主权危机、治理危机与身份危机不断加剧并日益交织。在国内极端势力的推动下,排他性的观念塑造和政策选择“将国家对外政策置于冲突和以邻为壑的思维之中,在国内和国际层次上双重内化‘我们’与‘他们’的身份差异”。全球化的衰退与民族民粹主义兴盛同时发生,二者共同削弱了国家间的相互依赖、相互信任,各种贸易摩擦、经济脱钩和政治冲突频繁发生,国家的行动目的或将回归“保持权力、增加权力和显示权力”。在此背景下,所谓积极参与国际政治甚至可能意味着在准备或卷入国家间某种形式的战争。

In terms of international mechanisms, populist thought has weakened trust in international institutions and norms. National populism generally adopts an unfriendly attitude toward the external world, especially harboring suspicion or hostility toward issues such as trade, immigration, or integration. This attitude not only affects trust and interdependence between states but also undermines trust in the international mechanisms that handle these issues. Trump’s rejection of international organizations and international conventions, and the dominance of the “America First” concept in U.S. foreign policy, all bear distinct right-wing populist overtones, severely weakening domestic American belief in international cooperation and multilateralism. As the willingness of countries to participate globally continues to decline, the functions of international mechanisms become difficult to fulfill, leading to intensified and even uncontrollable power struggles and interest competition between states amid mutual suspicion and fear. John H. Herz pointed out that the insecurity bred by mutual suspicion and mutual fear forces states to compete for power in search of greater security. Since complete security can never be ultimately achieved, such competition can only lead to self-defeat. The weakening of international mechanisms not only leads to a stronger collective sense of insecurity within states but also plunges states back into an insoluble “security dilemma” within the world system, thereby intensifying arms races and sharply increasing the risk of war.

在国际机制方面,民粹主义思潮削弱了对国际制度与规范的信任。民族民粹主义在总体上对外部世界持不友好的态度,尤其是对贸易、移民或一体化议题持怀疑或敌对的态度,这种态度不仅影响了国家间的信任与依存关系,也影响了对处理这些议题的国际机制的信任。特朗普对国际组织和国际公约的排斥、“美国优先”观念对美国对外政策的主导等都具有明显的右翼民粹主义色彩,严重削弱了美国国内对国际合作和多边主义的信念。在各国的全球参与意愿不断下降的情况下,国际机制的功能很难发挥出来,结果将导致国家间权力博弈和利益竞争在相互怀疑和恐惧中加剧甚至失控。约翰·赫兹(John H. Herz)指出,从相互怀疑和相互恐惧中滋生的不安全感迫使国家为寻找更多的安全而进行权力竞争,由于完全的安全始终无法最终求得,这样的竞争只能导致自我失败。国际机制被削弱,不仅会导致国家内部更加强烈的集体不安全感,还会使国家在世界体系中重新陷入无解的“安全困境”,进而军备竞赛加剧、战争风险激增。

In terms of global value consensus, ideologies that once supported globalization, such as neoliberalism, multiculturalism, globalism, and cosmopolitanism, have come under joint attack from populism and nationalism. The antagonistic relationship between populism and globalization indicates that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between domestic democratic politics and global capital markets. Rodrik argues that to resolve this contradiction, states have three choices: first, to restrict domestic democracy in order to win international market competitiveness; second, to restrict globalization in order to establish the legitimacy of domestic democratic politics; third, to pursue democratic globalization at the cost of national sovereignty. The first choice is what neoliberalism requires, the second is a typical populist option, and the third is inconsistent with mainstream views on sovereignty and democracy—this option, which disregards national interests, is not realistic. However, no matter which choice is made, a state cannot simultaneously have globalization, democracy, and national self-determination. Populism pursues democracy and equality internally, while demanding sovereignty and self-determination externally. It regards global civilization as a threat to its own national culture and opposes cultural communication and civilizational dialogue based on mutual understanding and mutual tolerance, thus earning a reputation for being narrow, extreme, and selfish. Yet, under the influence of populist local-first values, local and ethnic identity politics constantly demand an expansion of their action space. Ideologies such as regional separatism and extreme nationalism infiltrate domestic and international political processes, and the ethics of statism and localism are surpassing the ethics of globalism and cosmopolitanism.

在全球价值共识方面,诸如新自由主义、多元文化主义、全球主义和世界主义等支撑全球化的意识形态受到了民粹主义和民族主义的联手攻击。民粹主义与全球化的对立关系说明,国内民主政治与全球资本市场之间存在难以调和的矛盾。罗德里克认为,为解决这一矛盾,国家有三种选择:一是限制国内民主而赢得国际市场竞争力;二是限制全球化以建立国内民主政治的合法性;三是以国家主权为代价追求民主全球化。第一个选择是新自由主义所需要的,第二个选择是典型的民粹主义选项,第三个选择与主流的主权观与民主观不符,这种无视国家利益的选择不具有现实性。但是,不管如何选择,国家都不可能同时拥有全球化、民主和民族自决。民粹主义对内追求民主与平等,对外要求主权与自决,将全球文明视为对本民族文化的威胁,反对相互理解、相互包容的文化沟通和文明对话,因此落得一个狭隘、极端和自私的名声。然而,在民粹主义的本土至上价值观影响下,地方性、族群性的认同政治不断要求扩大行动空间。地区分离主义、极端民族主义等意识形态侵入国内和国际政治过程,国家主义、地方主义伦理正在超越全球主义和世界主义伦理。

IV. The Restructuring of the World Political System: The Driving Force of Populism

四、世界政治体系重构:民粹主义的推动力

Since the beginning of the 21st century, advances in science and technology have driven a structural shift in the driving forces of development. With the decline of traditional manufacturing and the rapid development of artificial intelligence, along with the intensification of uneven development and unfair distribution, the world economic and political landscape has undergone unprecedented changes. As in any historical period, the driving forces of worldwide change first originate from within states. The political changes of the 21st century stem largely from domestic anti-globalization forces led by populism. Populist thought is a powerful driver of domestic economic and social change. Especially after merging with nationalism, it exhibits stronger defensiveness and exclusivity, and its political influence has reached its highest point since the 1930s. British left-wing political scientist Chantal Mouffe, in her new book *For a Left Populism*, proclaims the arrival of the “populist moment,” referring to the moment of crisis in the contemporary Western neoliberal hegemonic order. In fact, a series of “populist moments”—including the financial crisis, the European debt crisis, the Tea Party movement, Trump’s election, Brexit, and the European refugee crisis—have created an unprecedented populist era for the Western world. Within this great tide of the times, the restructuring of the world political landscape is inevitable. The following major changes mark the beginning of this restructuring process.

进入21世纪以来,科学技术的进步带动了发展驱动力的结构性转移。随着传统制造业的衰微和人工智能的迅速发展,以及发展不平衡、分配不公平的日益加剧,世界经济与政治格局发生了前所未有的变化。与历史上的任何时期一样,世界性变迁的推动力都首先来自国家内部,21世纪的世界政治变迁在很大程度上源自民粹主义引领的国内反全球化力量。民粹主义思潮是造成国内经济与社会变迁的强劲推手,尤其是与民族主义合流之后表现出更强烈的防御性、排他性,其政治影响达到1930年代以来的最高点。英国左翼政治学家尚塔尔·墨菲(Chantal Mouffe)在其新著《为了左翼民粹主义》(For a Left Populism)中宣告“民粹主义时刻”的到来,意指当代西方新自由主义霸权秩序的危机时刻。事实上,金融危机、欧债危机、茶党运动、特朗普当选、英国脱欧和欧洲难民危机等一连串“民粹主义时刻”为西方世界打造了一个前所未有的民粹主义时代。在这个时代大潮当中,世界政治格局的重构已不可避免,以下重大变革宣告了这一重构进程的开启。

First, the influence of domestic politics on world politics is rapidly rising. The field of international relations does not deny that the domestic political order has an important impact on a state’s external behavior, but traditional research has not given it sufficient attention. Milner argues that major paradigms of international relations research, such as realism and new institutionalism, have overlooked the important role of domestic politics as a key part of international relations. The view that domestic factors, rather than international events, are the root of a state’s external behavior is not new. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides already observed that events within Greek city-states shaped their external behavior more than interactions between city-states. Modern international relations theory, when explaining the so-called “security dilemma,” also holds that “states are often the main source of international insecurity,” because a state may adopt foreign policies that provoke other countries to meet its domestic political needs. Kalevi J. Holsti argues that it cannot be assumed that the problem of war is merely a problem of interstate relations, because the security of states increasingly depends on security within those states. “The problems of contemporary and future politics are essentially problems of domestic politics.” Robert O. Keohane criticized the debates in international relations after 9/11, arguing that analyzing the consequences of the attack on the United States requires not only grasping the factor of power structure but also capturing changes in subjective beliefs and their impact on strategy. It is necessary to consider the factors of world politics emphasized by different schools of thought, that is, to explore the connection between domestic politics and international politics. Therefore, to understand the contemporary changes in world politics, the crucial role of domestic political processes should be given high priority.

首先,国内政治在世界政治中的影响力迅速上升。国际关系学界并不否认国内政治秩序对国家对外行为有着重要影响,但是传统研究没有对其给予足够的重视。米尔纳认为,国际关系研究的重要范式如现实主义和新制度主义都忽视了国内政治作为国际关系的关键部分的重要作用。国内因素而非国际事件是国家对外行为的根源的观点并不新鲜,古希腊历史学家修昔底德早已观察到,发生在希腊城邦中的事情要比城邦之间的互动更多地塑造它们的外部行为。现代国际关系理论在解释所谓“安全困境”时也认为“国家往往是国际不安全的主要根源”,因为国家为了国内政治的需要可能会采取激怒他国的对外政策。卡列维·霍尔斯蒂(Kalevi J. Holsti)认为,不能假设战争问题只是国家间关系的问题,因为国家间的安全越来越取决于这些国家内部的安全,“当代政治与未来政治的问题本质上是个国内政治问题。”罗伯特·基欧汉(Robert O. Keohane)曾对“9·11”之后的国际关系学争论提出了批评,认为分析美国遭受攻击的后果,不仅需要抓住权力结构因素,还需要抓住主观信念的变化及其对战略的影响,必须考虑不同思想流派强调的世界政治因素,即探究国内政治与国际政治之间的联系。因此,要理解世界政治的当代变迁,应高度重视国内政治过程的关键性作用。

Populist thought is an important topic in the analysis of domestic politics in twenty-first-century Western countries, highlighting the intensifying antagonism, diversity and uncertainty of these countries’ domestic political processes. Interpreting the phenomenon of populism requires breaking through the traditional understanding that takes the state as a single unit of analysis. It is necessary not only to focus on the different roles of administrative agencies, legislative bodies, bureaucratic institutions, political parties and interest groups in the domestic political process, and their differing impacts on a country’s foreign policy, but also to pay attention to the foreign-policy propositions and influence of populist parties, as an anti-establishment force, and their broad base of supporters. In domestic politics, populism emphasizes the values of distributive justice and identity security, forming conservative and exclusionary foreign-policy preferences. This both weakens the country’s willingness to participate in international affairs and its degree of investment in international institutional construction, and hinders normal relations between the country and the external world, impairing the functioning of regional or global norms. Therefore, the various challenges that populist thought poses to the current liberal world order indicate that the study of world politics should start from the domestic sphere and fully consider the complex changes in the domestic political process.

民粹主义思潮是21世纪西方国家国内政治分析的重要议题,突显了这些国家不断加剧的国内政治过程的对抗性、多元性和不确定性。对民粹主义现象的解读,要求突破将国家作为单一分析单位的传统认识,不仅要关注行政机构、立法部门、官僚机构、政党及利益集团在国内政治过程中的不同作用,及其对本国对外政策的不同影响,更要关注作为反建制力量的民粹主义政党及其广大支持者对国家对外政策的主张和影响。民粹主义在国内政治中强调分配正义和身份安全的价值理念,形成保守性、排他性的对外政策偏好,这既削弱了本国在国际事务的参与愿意和对国际制度建设的投入程度,也妨碍了本国与外部世界的正常关系,削弱了地区性或全球性规范的功能发挥。因此,民粹主义思潮对当前自由主义世界秩序发起的种种挑战表明,世界政治研究应该从国内出发,充分考虑国内政治过程的复杂变迁。

Secondly, values have become an important driver of change in world politics. Realist power-politics theory, proceeding from strict rationalism, regards the state as the most important actor in world affairs, emphasizes the distinction between domestic and international politics, and neglects or even refuses to acknowledge that ideas and institutions that play an important role in domestic politics may also influence world politics. However, realist theory finds it difficult to adequately explain how populism simultaneously acts on domestic and international politics, or how identity politics has transcended class politics to become the main force of the anti-establishment. Goldstein and Keohane examined the causal pathways through which ideas influence foreign policy, arguing that ideas can help people determine preferences, serving as a “road map”; that ideas can play a “focal point” role in bringing individual actors together; and that ideas can influence policy choices through institutionalized pathways. Yang Guangbin explored the internal mechanisms through which political thought influences changes in world politics, arguing that domestic needs give rise to political thought, which induces changes in the domestic political and economic order; that central states become the main drivers of the external dissemination of political thought; and that political thought, while changing the world order, shapes new international relations. Domestic political thought centered on specific value preferences and political ideas enters the political process through institutionalized pathways, influencing foreign policy and international strategy. At the same time, changes in the world political economy input new preferences and ideas into the domestic political process. Therefore, from the domestic to the world is a coherent and cyclical political process, in which ideas and values play a role in triggering and driving change.

其次,价值观念成为推动世界政治变迁的重要动力。现实主义权力政治理论从严格的理性主义出发,将国家视为世界事务中最重要的行为体,强调国内政治与国际政治的区别,忽视甚至拒绝承认在国内政治中起重要作用的观念与制度也可能对世界政治产生影响。然而,现实主义理论很难充分解释民粹主义如何同时作用于国内政治和国际政治,身份政治又如何超越阶级政治成为反建制的主力。戈尔茨坦和基欧汉考察了观念影响对外政策的因果路径,认为观念可以帮助人们确定偏好,起到“路线图”的作用;观念可以起到将个体行为者集中到一起的“聚焦”作用;观念可以通过制度化路径影响政策选择。杨光斌探讨了政治思潮影响世界政治变迁的内在机制,认为是国内需要催生了政治思想,诱发国内政治经济秩序的变迁,中心国家成为政治思想对外传播的主要推手,政治思想在改变世界秩序的同时,塑造了新的国际关系。围绕特定价值偏好、政治理念而形成的国内政治思潮,通过制度化路径进入政治过程,影响对外政策和国际战略;与此同时,世界政治经济的变迁又为国内政治过程输入新的偏好与理念。因此,从国内到世界是连贯和循环的政治过程,观念与价值在其中起到了触发和驱动变迁的作用。

Populism replacing liberalism and socialism as the driving force of change is a new trend in the changes in domestic and international politics in twenty-first-century Western countries. This trend confronts the study of international politics with the challenge of a paradigm shift, i.e., it is necessary to fully consider not only the role of the domestic political process, but also the role of values, ideas and ideology. In this sense, the concept of world politics is more capable than international politics of accommodating the functioning of these two roles. “What truly connects the world and forms ‘world politics’ is a certain kind of political thought centered on ideology—a trend-like political phenomenon driven by ideological (including religious) theory.” Populism, like liberalism and socialism, emphasizes that ideas are generated from social change, holding that social structure shapes the identity and preferences of actors, as well as shaping their ideas and behavior. Although populism is merely a value concept with an empty core and a loose system, it pursues a non-liberal world political order. By merging with nationalism, it has established a set of value symbols and action norms used to reshape state authority and patch up loopholes in the existing order. Whether the current challenge of right-wing populism to the liberal world order will succeed is as yet unknown, but the powerful force of ideas has already become apparent. Populism’s conservative values, which demand a return to the nation-state and the pursuit of national interests first, are revising the direction of world political evolution.

民粹主义取代自由主义、社会主义成为变革的动力,这是21世纪西方国家国内政治与国际政治变迁的新趋势。这一趋势使得国际政治研究面临范式更替的挑战,即既要充分考虑国内政治过程的作用,更要考虑价值、观念和意识形态的作用。从这个意义上说,世界政治在概念上要比国际政治更能容纳这两种作用的发挥。“真正把世界联系起来并形成‘世界政治’的,是以意识形态为核心的某种政治思潮——由意识形态(包括宗教)理论驱动而形成的一种趋势性的政治现象。”民粹主义与自由主义、社会主义等一样,都强调观念从社会变迁中生成,认为社会结构塑造行为体的身份与偏好,也塑造其观念与行为。尽管民粹主义只是一种内核空洞、体系松散的价值观念,但是它追求一种非自由主义的世界政治秩序,通过与民族主义的合流,建立了一套用于重塑国家权威和修补既有秩序漏洞的价值符号和行动规范。当前右翼民粹主义对自由主义世界秩序的挑战能否成功,结果尚未可知,但是,观念的强大力量已经显现。民粹主义要求返回民族国家、追求本国利益优先的保守主义价值观念正在修改世界政治的演进方向。

Finally, anti-systemic movements will have a lasting impact on the world political system. World politics is a systemic movement that is sometimes turbulent and sometimes stable, influenced by domestic politics and inter-state politics in specific periods, and is the combined result of political, economic and cultural factors. Since the 1980s, economic globalization has not brought about a truly stable world political system, nor has neoliberalism integrated the world into some unified system in terms of ideas and institutions. Instead, it has led to severe internal wealth polarization and identity crises within countries, and even “between countries there also exists an image of relative deprivation among states.” [23]23 Wang Zhengyi, “反体系运动” [Anti-systemic movements], in Wang Zhengyi, Yuan Zhengqing and Zhu Feng, eds., 国际政治经济学通论 [General Theory of International Political Economy] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010), p. 131. Wang Zhengyi points out that the capitalist world system can only benefit a minority, and the majority harbors resistance to it; although the resistance of the majority changes the balance of power and leads to new political accommodations, each accommodation incorporates the anti-systemic movement into the framework of political stability of the capitalist world system. Anti-systemic movements are transformative factors of the world system. The resentment and protest behavior against the world political system shake the stable structure of the existing system, creating a trend toward fragmentation with states or even localities as units of action.

最后,反体系运动将对世界政治体系产生持久的冲击。世界政治是一种时而动荡、时而稳定的体系性运动,受到特定时期的国内政治与国家间政治的影响,是政治、经济和文化因素共同的结果。1980年代以来,经济全球化并没有带来一个真正稳定的世界政治体系,新自由主义也没有在观念和制度上将世界整合到某种统一体系内,反而导致了国家内部严重的贫富分化和身份危机,甚至“在国家之间也存在相对剥夺的国家意象”王正毅指出,资本主义世界体系只能惠及少数人,多数人对此抱有抵制情绪;尽管多数人的抵制改变了力量对比并导致新的政治调和,但是每一次调和都将反体系运动融入资本主义世界体系的政治稳定的框架内。反体系运动是世界体系的变革性因素,对世界政治体系的抵触情绪和抗议行为动摇了现体系的稳定结构,造成以国家甚至地方为行动单元的碎片化趋势。

The ultra-conservative thought formed by the merger of populism and nationalism is an ideology targeting non-material interests such as identity, religion and culture, which has triggered powerful anti-globalization resistance actions. Domestic policy and foreign policy are the result of the mutual game-playing of multiple domestic actors. Therefore, “a country’s actions do not arise from consensus formed by the calculation of strategic interests, but from struggles among individuals with different understandings and interests.” [24]24 Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 11. The emphasis of national populism on ideational and value-based national differences or cultural divisions makes it difficult to establish cross-national and cross-ethnic value consensus, and ethnic contradictions and identity conflicts are hardly susceptible to compromise. The world political order, subjected to the dispersive effects of populism and nationalism, will become more fragmented and scattered, more self-willed and self-directed. At root, the reason populism causes political polarization and identity conflict in the domestic societies of Western countries, and fosters inter-state conflict and weakens international norms in world politics, lies in its confrontational thinking and conservative values. Therefore, populist-oriented foreign policies typically adopt a clearly defensive, contractionary and exclusionary stance, demanding that states refuse to assume additional international responsibilities and reject international cooperation that may require compromise of interests and transfer of power. Populist policies will undoubtedly exacerbate skepticism in world politics, encouraging division, confrontation and reckless extreme behavior. If populism, especially right-wing national populism, runs rampant, then world politics will find it difficult to form value consensus and unified action, but will instead slide toward a more fragmented future.

民粹主义与民族主义合流形成的极端保守主义思潮是一种以身份认同、宗教文化等非物质利益为目标的意识形态,激发了力量强劲的反全球化抵制行动。国内政策和外交政策是国内多元行为者相互博弈的结果,因此“一国的行动不是产生于对战略利益估算形成的一致,而是来自具有不同认识与利害关系的个体之间的争斗”。民族民粹主义对观念性、价值性的民族差异或文化分歧的强调,使得跨国家、跨民族的价值共识很难建立,族群矛盾和身份冲突也几无可能妥协。世界政治秩序受到民粹主义、民族主义的离散作用,将变得更加破碎散漫、更加自在自为。从根源上来说,民粹主义之所以在西方国家的国内社会造成政治极化和身份冲突,在世界政治中助长国家间冲突和弱化国际规范,均源于其反抗性思维与保守主义价值观。因此,民粹主义取向的外交政策通常持明确的防御性、收缩性和排他性立场,要求国家拒绝承担额外的国际责任、排斥可能需要利益妥协和权力让渡的国际合作。民粹主义政策无疑会加剧世界政治中的怀疑主义情绪,鼓励分化、对立和冒进的极端行为。如果民粹主义尤其是右翼民族民粹主义肆意滥觞,那么世界政治将很难形成价值共识和统一行动,而是滑向更加碎片化的未来。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

The world political system is like a loosely connected political jigsaw puzzle. Behind each fragment lie the different understandings of the world held by multiple entities, and behind these different understandings lie different values. Among these are liberalism and multiculturalism, which lead globalization; populism and nationalism, which resolutely oppose globalization; and post-materialist concepts such as the debated “cultural globalization” and “clash of civilizations.” The aspects of the world that these ideological concepts seek to understand, when combined, constitute the panoramic picture of world politics.

世界政治体系如同一幅联系松散的政治拼图,每一个碎片背后都是多元实体对世界的不同理解,而不同理解的背后则是不同的价值观念,其中既有引领全球化的自由主义、多元文化主义,有坚决反全球化的民粹主义、民族主义,也有争论不休的“文化的全球化”与“文明的冲突”等后物质主义观念。这些意识形态观念所要理解的世界侧面组合到一起,构成了世界政治的全景图。

From a historical perspective, populism is a radical current of thought that takes shape within a nation-state, giving rise to social movements of resistance on an unprecedented scale and carrying a series of transformations in power, institutions and ideas from the domestic political arena onto the stage of world politics. From the moment it first entered the political stage, populism has already served as an ideological link connecting domestic politics with world politics. The world today has been profoundly changed by globalization and new technologies; to understand the construction of world political order and its transformations, a broader perspective is essential. It has become inevitable to move beyond the international politics shaped by the Peace of Westphalia in order to understand world politics. People need to examine the interweaving of domestic and international politics from a global perspective, and to focus on the interaction of factors such as power, institutions and ideas in different political processes. Practice since the 21st century has repeatedly shown that populism not only participates in but also profoundly influences the political changes of today’s world, and is becoming a force that cannot be ignored in the political landscape of Western countries and even the entire globe. The future evolution of world politics will be filled with uncertainty because of the enduring nature of populism.

从历史的视角来看,民粹主义是一种形成于国家内部的激进思潮,它引发了规模空前的抗争性社会运动,将权力、制度和观念上的一系列变革从国内政治舞台带到了世界政治舞台。从其初登政治舞台起,民粹主义就已经成为连结国内政治与世界政治的思想纽带。当今世界已被全球化和新技术深刻改变,要理解世界政治的秩序建构及其变迁,必须具有更广阔的视野。超越威斯特伐利亚和约所形塑的国际政治去理解世界政治已势所必然,人们需要在一个世界性的视角下审视国内政治与国际政治的相互交织,需要关注权力、制度与观念诸因素在不同政治过程中的相互作用。21世纪以来的实践一再表明,民粹主义不仅参与、而且深刻影响着当今世界的政治变迁,正在成为西方各国以至全球政治图景中的不可忽视的力量。世界政治的未来演进将因为民粹主义的经久不息而充满不确定性。

(About the author: Lin Hong: School of International Studies, Renmin University of China)

(作者简介:林红:中国人民大学国际关系学院)

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑:同心

Notes

  1. Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 8. ↩
  2. This is a paraphrase of a passage from E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 207. ↩
  3. Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 16. ↩
  4. Friedrich Schiller, *History of the Thirty Years’ War*, trans. A. J. W. Morrison (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1861), p. 3. ↩
  5. See, for example, the debate between Andrew Moravcsik and Robert O. Keohane in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). ↩
  6. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), p. 249. ↩
  7. Peter Gourevitch (1943–), American political scientist known for his work on international relations and comparative politics, particularly the concept of “second image reversed” analyzing how international systems affect domestic politics.
  8. Cass Mudde (1967–), Dutch political scientist specializing in populism and extremism.
  9. Dani Rodrik (1957–), Turkish-born economist at Harvard Kennedy School, known for his work on globalization and political economy.
  10. John Judis (1941–), American journalist and political analyst, author of *The Populist Explosion*.
  11. Marine Le Pen (1968–), French far-right politician, leader of the National Rally (formerly National Front) party.
  12. Helen Milner (1958–), American political scientist specializing in international political economy and domestic politics.
  13. George Tsebelis (1952–), Greek-born political scientist, known for his “veto players” theory analyzing how institutional constraints affect policy outcomes.
  14. The “9/11 attacks” refers to the terrorist attacks carried out by al-Qaeda against the United States on September 11, 2001, which killed nearly 3,000 people and prompted a major shift in U.S. foreign and security policy.
  15. “America First” is the nationalist foreign policy doctrine of the Trump administration (2017–2021), prioritizing U.S. domestic interests over international commitments and multilateral cooperation.
  16. “Two-level game theory” is a concept developed by political scientist Robert Putnam, analyzing international negotiations as simultaneous games at the domestic and international levels, where leaders must satisfy both domestic constituencies and foreign counterparts.
  17. Peter Gourevitch is an American political scientist known for his work on the interaction between international and domestic politics, particularly in “The Second Image Reversed” (1978).
  18. The “security dilemma” is a concept in international relations theory, particularly associated with John H. Herz and the realist school, referring to a situation where actions taken by a state to increase its own security (e.g., building up military forces) cause other states to feel less secure, prompting them to respond in kind, leading to an arms race and heightened tensions even when no state has aggressive intentions.
  19. Chantal Mouffe is a Belgian-born British political theorist associated with post-Marxism and radical democracy. Her book *For a Left Populism* (2018) argues that left-wing forces should adopt a populist strategy to challenge the neoliberal hegemony.
  20. The Tea Party movement was a conservative, populist political movement in the United States that emerged in 2009, characterized by opposition to government spending, taxation, and the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), and it played a significant role in the rise of the Republican Party’s right wing.
  21. Helen Milner is an American political scientist known for her work on international relations and comparative politics, particularly on the domestic sources of international cooperation and trade policy.
  22. Thucydides was an ancient Greek historian and author of *History of the Peloponnesian War*, which is considered a foundational text in the realist tradition of international relations, emphasizing power politics and the security dilemma.
  23. Wang Zhengyi, “反体系运动” [Anti-systemic movements], in Wang Zhengyi, Yuan Zhengqing and Zhu Feng, eds., 国际政治经济学通论 [General Theory of International Political Economy] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010), p. 131. ↩
  24. Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 11. ↩
  25. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is traditionally regarded as the foundation of the modern state system, establishing the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.