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Is Populism a Thin Ideology?

何涛:民粹主义是一种薄意识形态吗?

· · Marxism Abroad · "Foreign Theoretical Trends" 2024, no. 2 · 24 min read

Populism is undoubtedly one of the most highly attended research topics in the social sciences in recent years. Scholars have engaged in exceptionally intense debates around important issues such as the concept of populism, the reasons for its rise, the impacts it produces, and the response strategies that need to be adopted. Among these, the conceptual definition of populism is a matter of much contention. Political scientist Cass Mudde has proposed that populism should be defined as a so-called “thin-centered ideology,” abbreviated as “thin ideology.” In using the concept of thin ideology, Mudde on the one hand clarifies that the essence of populism is an ideology, i.e., a unique set of ideas and concepts; on the other hand, it highlights the ambiguity in the content of populism. He argues that, compared with mainstream ideologies such as socialism and liberalism, populism does not possess an equivalent level of ideological completeness and consistency; its ideological core is relatively limited. Although populism can summarize the main social cleavages and offer general suggestions on the best way to conduct politics, it rarely puts forward specific views on political institutions or socio-economic issues, so it can at best be considered a thin ideology.

民粹主义无疑是社会科学界近年来关注度最高的研究议题之一。学者们围绕民粹主义的概念、兴起的原因、造成的影响以及需要采取的应对策略等重要问题,展开了异常激烈的争论。其中关于民粹主义的概念界定,可谓是聚讼纷纭。政治学家卡斯·穆德(Cass Mudde)提出,民粹主义应该被界定为一种所谓的“薄中心意识形态”(thin-centered ideology),简称“薄意识形态”。穆德使用薄意识形态这个概念,一方面明确了民粹主义的本质是意识形态,即一套独特的思想观念;另一方面突出了民粹主义在内涵上的模糊性。他认为,与社会主义、自由主义等主流意识形态相比,民粹主义并不具备同等水平的思想完善性与一致性,其思想内核较为有限。民粹主义虽然能够概括社会的主要分歧,并就政治运行的最佳方式提出一般性建议,但是它很少对政治制度或社会经济问题提出具体观点,因此充其量只能算一种薄意识形态。

This view of defining populism as a thin ideology is known as the “Mudde thesis.” This thesis has been highly recognized by many researchers, especially those in comparative political studies, and has even been regarded by some as an unquestionable definition. In Chinese academic circles, the Mudde thesis has also received widespread attention and discussion, with more than 50 articles citing this concept in the past three years alone. However, since its proposal, the Mudde thesis has also faced some criticism, and recently some scholars have called it a “dangerous myth.” Compared with foreign academic circles, domestic academic circles have paid less attention to the possible defects of the Mudde thesis. On the basis of affirming the value of the Mudde thesis, this article attempts to delve into the historical background and ideological roots of its proposal, and then to critically reflect on its possible defects from the two levels of methodology and core elements.

这种将民粹主义界定为薄意识形态的观点被称为“穆德命题”。该命题得到了许多研究者尤其是比较政治学研究者的高度认可,甚至被一些人奉为毋庸置疑的定义。在中国学界,穆德命题也得到了广泛关注与讨论,近三年来即有50多篇文章引用了这一概念。然而,穆德命题自提出以来也受到了一些批评,最近还有学者称其为一种“危险的神话”。相比于国外学界,国内学界对穆德命题可能存在的缺陷关注较少。本文在肯定穆德命题价值的基础上,试图深入回顾其提出的历史背景与思想根源,进而从方法论与核心要素两个层面对其可能存在的缺陷进行批判性反思。

I. The Origin of the Concept of Thin Ideology: Freeden

一、弗里登与薄意识形态概念的起源

The concept of thin ideology was not created by Mudde; the first to propose and use this concept was the British contemporary ideology research expert Michael Freeden. In his 1996 monograph, he defined ideology as “a distinctive configuration of political concepts, creating specific conceptual patterns from an indeterminate and unlimited pool of combinations.” Since ideologies are all regarded as clusters of concepts combined in specific patterns, in Freeden’s view, the best method for studying ideology is the morphological approach. This approach focuses on examining the internal structure of ideological concept clusters, which contains three layers from the inside out: key concepts, adjacent concepts, and peripheral concepts. Key concepts are the minimum content of an ideology; without them, the ideology cannot exist. Adjacent concepts enrich the content of the ideology, eliminate possible misunderstandings of the key concepts, and extend them in a more specific direction. Peripheral concepts are more variable and fluid, broadening the scope of the ideology’s reference, especially enabling it to connect with specific policy proposals. It should be noted that the above three layers are not fixed; they are influenced by changes in the objective environment and people’s political practice, and thus continuously undergo a two-way movement from the core to the periphery and from the periphery to the core. This two-way movement both enhances the inclusiveness of the ideology and strengthens its adaptability to various new issues.

薄意识形态这个概念并非穆德所创,最早提出和使用这个概念的人是英国当代意识形态研究专家迈克尔·弗里登(Michael Freeden)。在其1996年出版的专著中,他将意识形态界定为“对政治概念的独特配置,从一堆不确定和无限的组合中创造出特定的概念模式”。既然认为意识形态都是以特定模式组合起来的概念集群,那么在弗里登看来,研究意识形态的最佳方法应该是语词形态学(morphological approach)。这种方法重点考察意识形态概念集群的内部结构,它包含由内到外的三个层次:核心概念(key concepts)、近邻概念(adjacent concepts)和外围概念(peripheral concepts)。核心概念是一种意识形态的最低限度内容,缺少了它们,意识形态就无法存在;近邻概念充实了意识形态的内涵,消除了人们对核心概念的可能误解,并将其延伸到一个更加明确的方向;外围概念则更具多变性和流动性,它让意识形态涉及的对象更加广泛,尤其是能够与一些具体的政策主张联系起来。需要注意的是,上述三个层次并非固定不变,而是会受到客观环境变化与人们政治实践的影响,进而不断进行着从核心到外围以及从外围到核心的双向运动。这种双向运动既提高了意识形态的包容性,也增强了其对各种新问题的适应性。

If we take liberalism, the mainstream ideology in modern Western countries, as an example, it can be considered that its key concepts are mainly liberty, individuality, reason, and progress; its adjacent concepts include democracy, equality, and legitimacy; its peripheral concepts include women’s equal rights, opposition to censorship, and so on. Other ideologies such as conservatism also have a similar structure, and they all attempt to provide comprehensive diagnoses of all important political issues facing human society, and then propose corresponding political action blueprints and programs. Therefore, Freeden believes they can be called macro-ideologies or thick ideologies, i.e., a kind of “all-encompassing network of thought that, intentionally or unintentionally, offers solutions to all the major political issues confronting a society.”

如果以现代西方国家的主流意识形态——自由主义为例,可以认为,其核心概念主要是自由、个性、理性与进步等;其近邻概念包括民主、平等与合法性等;其外围概念包括妇女的平等权利、反对审查制度等。其他诸如保守主义等意识形态也具有类似的结构,而且它们都试图为人类社会面临的所有重要政治问题作出综合性诊断,进而提出相应的政治行动蓝图与纲领。因此,弗里登认为它们可以被称为宏大的意识形态(macro-ideologies)或者厚意识形态,即某种“包罗万象的思想网络,它们有意或无意地为一个社会面临的所有重要政治问题提出解决方案”。

However, in addition to these common thick ideologies, Freeden also keenly observed that since the 1970s, some new currents of thought such as feminism and ecologism have emerged in Western societies. From the perspective of the morphological approach to ideology, compared with thick ideologies like liberalism and conservatism, the key concepts of these emerging currents are relatively limited, and the number of adjacent and peripheral concepts attached around their key concepts is very small; their relationship with the key concepts is also relatively loose, and the two-way interaction between core and periphery is rarely seen. Sometimes, these currents even seem to “isolate themselves from the broader conceptual background by deliberately deleting or replacing many of the concepts we expect an ideology to contain.” Functionally, they are usually unable or unwilling to propose comprehensive solutions to socio-political issues like thick ideologies do; their ambition and scope are relatively limited.

然而,除了这些常见的厚意识形态之外,弗里登也敏锐地发现,西方社会自1970年代以来兴起了一些像女权主义、绿色主义之类的新思潮。从意识形态的语词形态学来看,相比于自由主义、保守主义等厚意识形态,这些新兴思潮的核心概念比较局限,而且其核心概念周围附着的邻近概念和外围概念数量很少,它们与核心概念的关系也比较松散,很少能看到核心与外围之间的双向互动关系。甚至有的时候,这些思潮似乎“通过故意删除或替换我们期望意识形态包含的许多概念,将自己与更广泛的概念背景隔离开来”。从功能上来看,它们通常无法或者无意像厚意识形态那样对社会政治问题提出全面的解决方案,其雄心和范围都比较有限。

Therefore, Freeden suggested tentatively naming them thin ideologies. As for the specific scope of thin ideologies, in addition to feminism and ecologism, Freeden later added nationalism. He further inferred that these thin ideologies usually have two evolutionary directions in reality: first, to maintain relatively limited characteristics, advocating for a single issue, such as women’s rights or environmental protection; second, to merge with other, thicker ideologies, breaking through their own limitations, and thereby forming new ideological variants, such as liberal feminism or green socialism. At this point, the thick ideologies they attach to are also called host ideologies.

因此,弗里登建议将它们暂且命名为薄意识形态。至于薄意识形态的具体范围,除女权主义和绿色主义之外,弗里登后来又增加了民族主义。他进一步推断说,这些薄意识形态在现实中通常会有两种演进方向:其一,继续保持相对有限的特征,主张某项单一议题,如女性权利或者环境保护等;其二,与其他更厚的意识形态发生融合,突破自身的局限,进而形成一些新的意识形态变体,如自由女权主义或绿色社会主义等。此时,它们所依附的那些厚意识形态,也被称为宿主意识形态(host-ideology)。

It should be noted here that Freeden himself did not link populism with thin ideology in his research. However, this concept inspired many researchers; it was Mudde who, in exploring the minimal definition of populism, connected the two. The label of thin ideology is indeed conducive to highlighting the relatively simple nature of populism’s ideological core. In 2008, the journal *Political Ideology*, edited by Freeden, published an important article by Ben Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism.” This should be the first academic paper in English-language scholarship to directly place thin ideology in its title, and it can be said to have played a crucial role in promoting the Mudde thesis. Many of the arguments in that article were later cited by Mudde. For example, Stanley argues that populism not only lacks the capacity to provide broad and coherent solutions to key political problems, but also that there is no such thing as a “Populist International” in reality; furthermore, there are no important populist ideological texts or significant anniversaries; all this evidence indicates that populism is merely a loose combination of ideas. Although Freeden did not regard populism as a thin ideology, for a long time he did not oppose other researchers linking the two. Moreover, when Freeden edited the *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, he specifically invited Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser to co-author the chapter on “Populism.” It was in this chapter that Mudde reaffirmed the definition of thin ideology and its advantages over other approaches.

这里需要注意,弗里登本人在研究中并没有将民粹主义与薄意识形态联系在一起。但是这个概念给很多研究者带来了灵感,穆德就是在探寻民粹主义的最小定义时,将二者联系到了一起。薄意识形态这个标签,确实有利于突出民粹主义思想内核较为简单的特质。2008年,由弗里登担任主编的《政治意识形态》杂志刊登了本·斯坦利(Ben Stanley)的重要文章《民粹主义薄意识形态》。这应该是英语学界中第一篇直接将薄意识形态置于标题中的学术论文,它对穆德命题的推广可以说起到了至关重要的作用。该文中的许多论点后来也被穆德所引用。例如,斯坦利认为民粹主义不但缺乏为解决关键的政治问题提供广泛和连贯的方案的能力,而且现实中也不存在“民粹主义国际”之类的东西;此外,也没有重要的民粹主义思想文本或者重要的纪念日,这些证据都说明民粹主义只是一种松散的观念组合。虽然弗里登没有将民粹主义视为薄意识形态,但他在很长时间内也不反对其他研究者将二者联系起来。而且,弗里登在主编《牛津政治意识形态手册》时,还专门邀请穆德和克里斯托巴尔·罗维拉·考特瓦瑟(Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser)合作撰写了“民粹主义”一章。正是在这一章中,穆德重申了薄意识形态的定义及其相比于其他方法的优势。

II. The Intention and Advantages of Mudde’s Proposition

二、穆德命题的意图与优势

In fact, in his early years Mudde was not an expert on populism; his initial focus was on far-right political parties in Europe, and this problem awareness has consistently run through his research on populism. From the end of the 20th century to the early 21st century, many far-right political parties in Europe successively adjusted their platforms and propositions. For example, they no longer openly used racist discourse, nor did they directly negate liberal democratic systems; instead, they touted themselves as true defenders of the democratic system and defenders of the interests and values of ordinary people, claiming to speak for those people ignored and disregarded by the elites in power. Consequently, a growing number of researchers and commentators began to use the label “populism” to refer to these parties. It was against this backdrop that Mudde turned to the study of populism.

其实穆德早年并非研究民粹主义的专家,他最初关注的对象是欧洲的极右翼政党,而这种问题意识也一直贯穿在他的民粹主义研究当中。在20世纪末到21世纪初期,欧洲许多极右翼政党纷纷调整了自己的纲领与主张,比如,它们不再公开使用种族主义的话语,也不再直接否定自由民主制度,而是将自己标榜为民主制度的真正捍卫者、普通民众的利益及价值观的捍卫者,宣称要为那些被掌握权力的精英们忽略和无视的民众发声。于是,越来越多的研究者和评论家开始用民粹主义这个标签来称呼这些政党。而穆德正是在这个背景下转向了民粹主义研究。

However, Mudde soon discovered that there was enormous controversy and confusion within academia regarding the definition of populism itself. At that time, three main types of conceptual approaches to populism were prevalent in Western academia: political discourse, political strategy, and political style. After in-depth comparison, Mudde acknowledged that each of these different conceptual approaches had its own advantages, but he also pointed out that they had many shortcomings.

不过,穆德很快发现学界关于民粹主义的定义本身存在着巨大的争议与混乱。当时西方学界主要流行三种不同类型的民粹主义概念取向:政治话语(political discourse)、政治策略(political strategy)和政治风格(political style)。在深入比较之后,穆德既承认这些不同的概念取向各有优势,但同时也指出它们存在着很多不足。

Specifically, Ernesto Laclau and the Essex School influenced by him understood populism as a special kind of political discourse. Laclau believed that the core of populism is to construct an antagonism between “the people” and the elite through “the people” as an “empty signifier” that can be filled with any content, thereby gaining the support of the broadest masses. The Laclauian definition was widely praised in the field of political theory research. However, in Mudde’s view, Laclau’s understanding of populism was too abstract, and he later equated populism with politics itself — “either populism is omnipresent, or anything non-populist cannot be regarded as politics” — which caused the concept itself to lose its significance in empirical research. Compared with the political discourse approach, understanding populism as a political strategy was particularly popular in political communication and media studies, with Kurt Weyland as its representative figure. Weyland believed that populism is essentially “a means and method of winning and exercising power,” based on the direct, unmediated, and non-institutionalized support provided by a large number of unorganized followers. This definition was very popular in the study of Latin American politics. However, in Mudde’s view, this definition overemphasized the importance of political leadership and omitted some classic objects when delineating populism. For example, it could not cover populist movements like the American Tea Party, which lacked a clear leader. Furthermore, the concept of political strategy also tended to neglect the study of the psychology and motivations of ordinary supporters — the demand side of populism. Benjamin Moffit and others argued that populism is a unique political style, mainly manifested in politicians speaking and acting in ways favored by the people, frequently discussing topics such as crisis, collapse, and threats, and deliberately engaging in behaviors such as impoliteness in manner. Obviously, this definition, which emphasizes the dimension of political performance, easily conflates populism with various types of demagogic behavior, potentially labeling almost all political actors as populist, and thus cannot serve as a discerning analytical concept for comparative research.

具体来说,恩斯特·拉克劳(Ernesto Laclau)及受其影响而产生的埃塞克斯学派,将民粹主义理解为一种特殊的政治话语。拉克劳认为,民粹主义的核心是通过“人民”这个可以被任何内容填充的“空的能指”,构建一种人民与精英之间的对立,从而获得最大多数民众的支持。拉克劳式定义在政治理论研究界广受好评。然而在穆德看来,拉克劳对民粹主义的理解过于抽象,而且他后来还将民粹主义等同于政治本身——“要么民粹主义是无所不在的,要么任何非民粹主义的东西都不能被视为政治”,这就使概念本身丧失了在实证研究中的意义。相比于政治话语取向,将民粹主义理解为一种政治策略的做法在政治传播和媒体研究中特别流行,其代表人物是库尔特·韦兰(Kurt Weyland)。韦兰认为,民粹主义本质上是“赢得和行使权力的方法与手段”,其基础是大量无组织追随者所提供的直接、无中介、非制度化的支持。这种定义在拉美政治研究中非常流行。然而在穆德看来,该定义过分夸大了政治领导的重要性,而且在梳理民粹主义时遗漏了一些经典对象。比如,它无法涵盖像美国茶党这类没有明显领导者的民粹主义运动。此外,政治策略的概念也容易忽略对民粹主义的需求端——普通支持者——的心理与动机的研究。本杰明·墨菲特(Benjamin Moffit)等人主张民粹主义是一种独特的政治风格,主要表现为政治家以民众喜爱的方式说话和行事,经常谈论危机、崩溃、威胁等议题,并且故意做出在举止上不礼貌等行为。显然,这种强调政治表演维度的定义容易将民粹主义与各种类型的煽动行为混为一谈,使得几乎所有政治行动者都可能被贴上民粹主义的标签,无法作为一个可以进行比较研究的有辨别力的分析性概念。

Therefore, dissatisfied with the above three mainstream definitions of populism, Mudde attempted to construct a minimal definition through a new path. He hoped that this minimal definition could meet the requirements of an ideal concept in comparative political science research proposed by Giovanni Sartori, accurately capturing the core of all major manifestations of populism, past and present, while precisely excluding other non-populist phenomena, thereby laying a basic consensus and solid foundation for cross-national and cross-regional comparative research.

于是,在对以上三种民粹主义的主流定义表示不满的基础上,穆德试图通过一条新的路径来构建一个最小定义。他期望这种最小定义能够符合乔万尼·萨托利(Giovanni Sartori)提出的比较政治学研究中的理想概念的要求,既能准确捕捉民粹主义过去和现在所有主要表现形式的核心,又能精确排除其他非民粹主义现象,为跨国和跨地区的比较研究奠定基本的共识和牢固的基础。

Mudde believed that although populism can manifest as a political movement, political discourse, and political strategy, its essence belongs to a unique set of ideas. It is this set of ideas that shapes certain groups’ understanding of politics, thereby driving them to adopt unique political movements, advocate certain political discourses, and formulate corresponding political strategies. The core of populist ideas is undoubtedly “the people,” while “the elite” is defined as the opposite of the people. Beyond the people and the elite, Mudde added “the general will,” and together these constitute the simplest and core three elements of populism. At the same time, because the ideational system of populism is relatively weak and easily combines with other, more complex ideologies, Mudde associated it with Freeden’s concept of thin ideology, thereby conceptualizing populism as a thin ideology. That is to say, seeking a minimal definition of populism was the original intention behind the Muddean proposition.

穆德认为,民粹主义虽然可以表现为一种政治运动、政治话语和政治策略,但其本质属于一套独特的思想观念,正是这种思想观念塑造了一些群体关于政治的理解,进而驱使他们采取独特的政治运动、宣扬某种政治话语以及制定相应的政治策略。民粹主义思想观念的核心无疑是人民,而精英则是作为人民的对立面而被定义的。在人民和精英之外,穆德又添加上了公意,它们共同构成了民粹主义最简单也是核心的三个要素。与此同时,由于民粹主义思想观念的体系性较弱,很容易与其他更复杂的意识形态相结合,穆德就联想到了弗里登的薄意识形态概念,进而将民粹主义概念化为一种薄意识形态。也就是说,探求民粹主义的最小定义才是穆德命题提出的最初意图。

In Mudde’s view, understanding populism as a thin ideology with the people, the elite, and the general will as its core elements has four distinct advantages over other definitional methods: distinguishability, categorizability, travelability, and versatility.

在穆德看来,将民粹主义理解为一种以人民、精英和公意为核心要素的薄意识形态,相比于其他定义方法具有四个明显优势:可区别性(distinguishability)、可分类性(categorizability)、可通约性(travelability)和多功能性(versatility)。

Distinguishability means that this definition sets clear boundaries that can be used to distinguish populism from non-populism. As long as a set of ideas interprets the main social cleavage as an antagonism between the people and the elite, and proposes the general suggestion that “the best way to run politics should conform to the general will of the people,” then it can be identified as populism, without needing to consider whether it also puts forward specific views on political institutions or socio-economic issues. For example, in qualitative research, Mudde used this definition to examine several parties in Belgium that were frequently labeled as populist, and found that only the Flemish Interest possessed all three elements simultaneously and could be classified as a populist party.

可区别性是指这种定义设定了明确的边界,可以用来区分民粹主义与非民粹主义。只要一种观念是将社会的主要分歧解释为人民与精英之间的对立,并且就政治运行的最佳方式提出“应该符合人民的公意”这个一般性的建议,那么它就可以被认定为民粹主义,而无需考虑它是否还就政治制度或者社会经济问题提出了具体的观点。比如在定性研究中,穆德就用这个定义来考察比利时的几个经常被贴上民粹主义标签的政党,结果发现只有“弗拉芒利益党”(Flemish Interest)同时具备这三个要素,可以被归类为民粹主义政党。

Categorizability means that this definition lays the foundation for the classification of populism. Mudde believed that, according to Sartori’s classic taxonomy, for a concept to be classifiable, two prerequisites must be met: first, the concept itself must have a clear definition; second, each subtype must include all the characteristics of the concept itself. The thin ideology definition fully meets this requirement because it clarifies the minimal core elements of populism. Researchers can delineate subtypes based on its peripheral elements or the other ideologies it attaches to. For instance, based on differences in economic policy, populism can be divided into left-wing populism and right-wing populism; based on different definitions of the scope of “the people,” populism can be divided into inclusive populism and exclusive populism, and so on.

可分类性是指这种定义为民粹主义的分类奠定了基础。穆德认为,根据萨托利的经典分类法,一个概念能够被分类,需要满足两个前提条件:一是概念本身具有明确的定义,二是每种子类型都应该包括概念本身的全部特征。而薄意识形态的定义完全符合这种要求,因为它明确了民粹主义最低限度的核心要素。研究者可以根据它的外围要素或者它所依附的其他意识形态来划分子类型。比如,根据经济政策上的差异,民粹主义可以被划分为左翼民粹主义和右翼民粹主义;根据人民的范围的不同界定,民粹主义又可以被划分为包容性民粹主义和排他性民粹主义等。

Travelability means that this definition is applicable to cross-national and cross-regional multi-case comparative studies. Previous definitions of populism were mostly limited to specific cases, such as the People’s Party in American history and Peronism in Latin America. In contrast, the thin ideology definition can be used for the study of populism across the globe and in different historical periods. Among these, the book *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?*, co-edited by Mudde and Kaltwasser, is a model of this type of research, containing a large-scale comparative study by ten scholars of eight different country cases in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, and South America.

可通约性是指这种定义适用于跨国、跨地区的多案例比较研究。以往的民粹主义定义大多局限于某个具体的案例,如美国历史上的人民党和拉美的贝隆主义等。相比之下,薄意识形态的定义可以用于全球范围以及不同历史时期的民粹主义研究。其中,穆德与考特瓦瑟共同编辑出版的《欧洲和美洲的民粹主义:民主的危险还是纠正?》一书是此类研究的范例,书中包含了10位学者关于东欧、西欧、北美和南美的八个不同国家案例的大型比较研究。

Multifunctionality refers to the fact that this definition can be used to study both the supply side and the demand side of populism simultaneously. The supply side primarily focuses on populist politicians; for example, some scholars have already used this definition to study the speeches of certain leaders, political party program documents, and so on. The demand side primarily focuses on the political attitudes of ordinary people, that is, populist attitudes at the individual level. This definition can also be used to explore questions such as whether voters holding populist attitudes necessarily support populist parties, and whether the countries that have most successfully implemented populist policies also possess the largest number of populist voters.

多功能性是指这种定义可以用来同时研究民粹主义的供给侧和需求侧。供给侧主要关注的是民粹主义政治家,比如有学者已经用这种定义来研究一些领导人演讲、政党纲领文献等。需求侧主要关注的是普通民众的政治态度,也就是个体层面上的民粹主义态度。该定义还可以用来探究持民粹主义态度的选民是否必然支持民粹主义政党,以及实施民粹主义政策最成功的国家是否拥有数量最多的民粹主义选民等问题。

In summary, Mudde defines populism as a thin ideology mainly to overcome relevant academic debates and to provide a minimal definition that can be widely accepted. He hopes to advance comparative research on populism across regions and time periods on this basis, deepening people’s understanding of populism.

综上所述,穆德将民粹主义界定为一种薄意识形态,主要是为了克服学界的相关争论,并提供一个能被广泛接受的最小定义。他期望在此基础上推进民粹主义跨地域、跨时段的比较研究,深化人们对民粹主义的认识。

III. Methodological Controversies over the Mudde Proposition

三、穆德命题在方法论上的争议

Although scholars have expressed affirmation and recognition of the Mudde proposition, criticism has also been incessant. This section mainly discusses the controversies over the Mudde proposition at the methodological level, focusing on examining whether Mudde’s pursuit of a minimal definition of populism is appropriate, and the problems arising from defining populism as a thin ideology.

学者们对穆德命题尽管表示了肯定与认可,但批评声也不绝于耳。本部分主要讨论穆德命题在方法论层面上的争议,重点考察穆德追求民粹主义最小定义的做法是否恰当,以及用薄意识形态来界定民粹主义时产生的问题。

First, for a complex, multi-dimensional political phenomenon like populism, the minimal definition method pursued by the Mudde proposition may itself be inapplicable. Mudde believes he follows the minimal definition method pioneered by Sartori, that is, expanding the extension by reducing the intension of the concept. However, although a minimal definition helps eliminate disagreements among researchers, researchers should not artificially obscure the complexity of populism in reality for the sake of pursuing an idealized so-called minimalism. Treating populism as an ideology is merely one of many viewpoints in the history of populism research, not an academic consensus. As Carlos de la Torre and Oscar Mazzoleni and others have criticized: why focus only on the ideological dimension of populism, rather than its political strategy or mode of communication? Mudde has not provided an adequate answer to this.

首先,对于民粹主义这样一种复杂的、多维度的政治现象来说,穆德命题追求的最小定义法本身可能是不适用的。穆德认为自己遵循了萨托利开创的最小定义法,即通过减少概念的内涵来扩大外延。不过,最小定义虽然有利于消除研究者之间的分歧,但研究者也不能为了追求一种理想中的所谓极简主义而人为遮蔽现实中民粹主义的复杂性。将民粹主义视为意识形态,只是民粹主义研究历史上诸多观点中的一种,而非学界共识。正如卡洛斯·德拉托尔(Carlos de la Torre)和奥斯卡·马佐莱尼(Oscar Mazzoleni)等人批评的那样:为什么只关注民粹主义的意识形态层面,而不是其政治策略或者沟通方式?穆德对此并未作出充分解答。

Sartori once warned researchers to be very cautious when constructing the defining attributes and accompanying attributes of a concept, with one important point being to avoid incorporating too much personal preference. However, Mudde’s treatment of populism as an ideology is, to a large extent, constrained by his early research on European far-right parties. Although these European parties often have clear ideological programs, many populists in other parts of the world are not like this. For example, some famous populists in Latin American history, such as Perón in Argentina and Chávez in Venezuela, adjusted their political stances during their terms in office and even proposed diametrically opposed policy positions, making it difficult to believe they possess a consistent ideology, even a thin one. These populists place greater emphasis on establishing direct connections with voters to win and maintain their support; therefore, the policies they introduce depend on their own strategic considerations, sudden ideas, or even whims. Thus, Barrios Suvelza reminds people: “It is one thing to examine populism from an ideological perspective; it is another thing to define populism as an ideology.” That is to say, ideology is only one dimension of populism; we can study it, but we should not directly equate it with an ideology. If one wants to treat ideology as the defining attribute of the concept of populism, then one must not only prove that all populism contains an ideology, but also prove that this attribute is more important than other attributes of populism. However, Mudde has not only failed to prove the first point, but when he declares that populism is essentially a thin ideology, i.e., its ideological core is very weak, is this not tantamount to admitting that the reason populism can continuously develop and exert influence in reality may be precisely because the political discourse and political style of populism play a more important role?

萨托利曾经告诫研究者们,在构建一个概念的决定性属性与伴随性属性时要非常谨慎,其中很重要的一点是尽量避免代入过多的个人偏好。然而穆德将民粹主义视为一种意识形态,在很大程度上却是受困于自己早年对欧洲极右翼政党的研究。虽然这些欧洲政党往往具有明确的意识形态纲领,但是世界其他地区的很多民粹主义者并非如此。比如,拉美历史上一些著名的民粹主义者,例如阿根廷的贝隆、委内瑞拉的查韦斯,他们在执政期间曾经调整自己的政治立场,甚至提出截然相反的政策主张,因此很难相信他们具有一以贯之的意识形态,哪怕只是一种薄意识形态。这些民粹主义者更看重的是与选民建立直接的联系,从而赢得和维持选民的支持,因此他们推出的政策取决于自身的策略考虑、突然的想法,甚至是一时兴起。所以,巴里奥斯·苏维尔扎(Barrios Suvelza)提醒人们:“从意识形态角度来审视民粹主义是一回事,将民粹主义界定为意识形态则是另一回事。”也就是说,意识形态只是民粹主义的一个维度,我们可以对其进行研究,但不应该将其直接等同于一种意识形态。如果想要将意识形态作为民粹主义概念的决定属性,那就不但需要证明所有民粹主义都包含了一种意识形态,还要证明这一属性比民粹主义的其他属性更加重要。然而,穆德不但没有证明第一点,而且当他宣称民粹主义本质上是一种薄意识形态,即思想内核非常薄弱时,不就是等于承认民粹主义之所以能够在现实中不断发展和产生影响,或许是因为民粹主义的政治话语、政治风格可能发挥着更加重要的作用吗?

It is worth noting that in several important recent works on populism published in Western academia, such as *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* and *The Routledge Handbook of Populism*, most researchers believe that populism itself may precisely be a complex political phenomenon, and that a single-theme definition method cannot describe all the important dimensions of populism. Therefore, they insist on adopting a methodological pluralism, while emphasizing that political strategy, political discourse, etc., remain important dimensions for studying populism. Furthermore, Giuseppe Ballacci and Rob Goodman, in a highly influential article, also argue that the study of populism should adopt a holistic method, taking into account both content and substance; only in this way can the coherent logic of the populist political phenomenon from ideas to action be fully presented.

值得注意的是,在西方学界近期出版的几部重要的民粹主义著作,如《牛津民粹主义手册》《劳特里奇民粹主义手册》中,大多数研究者们相信民粹主义本身可能恰恰就是一种复杂的政治现象,单一主题的定义法无法描述民粹主义的所有重要维度。因此他们坚持在方法论上采取一种多元主义,同时强调政治策略、政治话语等仍然是研究民粹主义的重要维度。而朱塞佩·巴拉西(Giuseppe Ballacci)和罗伯·古德曼(Rob Goodman)在一篇颇有影响力的文章中也论证说,对民粹主义的研究应该采取整体主义方法,兼顾内容与实质,只有这样,民粹主义政治现象从观念到行动的连贯逻辑才能得以完整呈现。

Second, the Mudde proposition also severely underestimates the defects of the concept of thin ideology itself. Judging from Mudde’s relevant discussions, he is actually not particularly clear about Freeden’s theory of ideology, but merely casually borrowed the label of thin ideology. In reality, Freeden’s concept of thin ideology is highly controversial. Freeden has never clearly defined the intension and extension of the concept of thin ideology from beginning to end. “Thin” and “thick” are, for him, a very vague matter of degree. As for the so-called “the core concepts of thin ideology are relatively limited, and the policy content is relatively narrow,” these statements also lack clear, quantifiable standards. As Paris Aslanidis has criticized, thin ideology may well be a false concept, because the ambiguity of its standards inevitably leads to an excessive expansion of its extension, “to the point that almost any political idea whose core concepts are relatively simple and which cannot propose a package of policy recommendations can be regarded as a thin ideology.” Moreover, regarding whether the same ideology is thin or thick, different researchers are likely to arrive at completely different views. For example, Mudde declares that populism belongs to a thin ideology, one reason being that populism usually does not propose specific plans for how to allocate scarce resources. However, recent political reality shows that both left-wing and right-wing populism in Western countries have developed their own distribution plans: right-wing populism requires giving priority in distribution to citizens belonging to a certain racial or cultural group; while left-wing populism requires limiting the income of economic elites and foreign workers who have benefited more from globalization, allocating more resources to the domestic working class.

其次,穆德命题还严重低估了薄意识形态概念本身的缺陷。从穆德的相关论述来看,他其实并不特别清楚弗里登的意识形态理论,只是随意地借用了薄意识形态这个标签。实际上,弗里登的薄意识形态概念存在很大争议。弗里登自始至终都没有清晰界定薄意识形态这个概念的内涵与外延。“薄”与“厚”在他那里是一个非常模糊的程度问题。至于所谓“薄意识形态的核心概念比较局限,政策内容比较狭窄”,这些说法也都缺乏明确的、可量化的标准。正如帕里斯·阿斯拉尼迪斯(Paris Aslanidis)所批评的那样,薄意识形态很可能是一个虚假的概念,因为其标准的模糊性必然导致外延的过分扩张,“以至于几乎一切核心概念比较简单并且无法提出一揽子政策建议的政治观念,都可以被视为薄意识形态”。此外,对于同一种意识形态是薄的还是厚的,不同的研究者们很可能得出完全不同的看法。比如,穆德宣称民粹主义属于薄意识形态,其中一个理由是民粹主义通常不会提出关于如何分配稀缺性资源的具体方案。然而近年来的政治现实表明,西方国家中左右两翼的民粹主义都发展出了各自的分配方案:右翼民粹主义要求在分配时优先考虑属于某个种族或文化群体的公民;而左翼民粹主义则要求限制那些从全球化中受益较多的经济精英和外国工人的收入,将资源更多分配给本国劳工阶层。

More troublesome is that Freeden himself has also publicly opposed treating populism as a thin ideology in recent years, placing Mudde in a very awkward position. In Freeden’s view, a thin ideology should also include adjacent concepts and peripheral concepts beyond its core concepts, although their number may be small. For instance, thin ideologies like feminism and nationalism, “although their cores are relatively limited, are still well-articulated and are the product of long-term, deliberate political reflection.” In contrast, populism seems to have only core concepts, and these core concepts also lack the potential and interest to expand outward. Therefore, populism not only has the problem of a thin center, but is also emaciatedly thin as a whole. It is at best an “amorphous, sporadic, fragmentary, scattered, combative, and contemptuous of traditional ideological opponents” conceptual hybrid. Thus, Freeden humbly but firmly states: “Although we are all engaged in the art of interpretation, rather than issuing academic commands, we should harbor considerable doubt about the applicability of ‘thin-centrism’ to populism.”

更麻烦的是,弗里登本人近年来也公开反对将民粹主义视为薄意识形态,这让穆德处在了一种非常尴尬的位置。在弗里登看来,一种薄意识形态在核心概念之外,也应该包括近邻概念和外围概念,尽管它们的数量可能不多。比如,女权主义和民族主义这些薄意识形态,“虽然内核比较有限,但仍然得到了很好的阐释,是经过长期深思熟虑的政治思考的产物”。相比之下,民粹主义则似乎只有核心概念,而且这些核心概念也缺乏向外扩展的潜力和兴趣。因此,民粹主义不只有中心薄弱的问题,而且是整体上萎缩的(emaciatedly thin)。它充其量是一种“无定型的、零星的、片断的、散乱的、好战的、蔑视传统意识形态对手”的观念混合体。所以,弗里登谦逊但又坚定地表示:“虽然我们都从事于解释的艺术,而非下达学术命令,但是我们应该就‘薄中心主义’对民粹主义的适用性抱有相当大的怀疑。”

In some works published in recent years, Mudde has also begun to intentionally downplay terms such as “thin ideology” and “ideology,” sometimes even declaring: “Whether this set of populist ideas constitutes a political discourse, ideology, or style … in many cases, this distinction is secondary to the issue at hand.” This adjustment by Mudde not only blurs the distinction between his own definition and the research orientation of populist discourse, but also once again proves that his use of the concept of ideology is highly arbitrary.

在近年出版的一些作品中,穆德也开始有意淡化薄意识形态以及意识形态这类说法,有时甚至宣称:“民粹主义这一套思想是否构成了一种政治话语、意识形态或风格……在许多情况下,这种区别对于手头的问题来说是次要的”。穆德的这种调整,不但模糊了自己的定义与民粹主义话语研究取向的区别,而且再次证明他对意识形态概念的使用具有很大的随意性。

IV. Deficiencies in the Three Core Elements of Mudde’s Thesis

四、穆德命题核心三要素的缺陷

In addition to defining populism as a thin ideology, Mudde’s thesis also summarizes its main content as follows: populism believes that society is fundamentally divided into two internally homogeneous opposing camps, the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”; and that politics should reflect the general will of the people. Thus, the people, the elite, and the general will constitute the three core elements of Mudde’s thesis. This section will specifically analyze the deficiencies inherent in each of the three core elements of Mudde’s thesis.

穆德命题除了将民粹主义界定为一种薄意识形态之外,还将其主要内容概括为:民粹主义相信社会从根本上分裂为“纯洁的人民”与“腐败的精英”这两个内部同质化的对立阵营;而政治应当反映人民的公共意志。由此,人民、精英和公意构成了穆德命题的三个核心要素。本部分将具体分析穆德命题核心三要素各自存在的缺陷。

First, Mudde’s understanding of the people is too general and fails to grasp the uniqueness of populism. The people are undoubtedly the most important core element of populism, because the other two elements—the elite (the opposite of the people) and the general will (the political proposition of the people)—also derive their meaning based on the people. Mudde acknowledges that the referent of “the people” is quite vague, often used interchangeably by researchers in three dimensions: the sovereign, the common people, and the nation. However, in order to distinguish himself from Laclau’s political discourse research, Mudde is unwilling to accept the concept of the “empty signifier.” He repeatedly emphasizes that in his ideological approach, the people are not completely empty but are determined by the cultural background of each society. For example, “American populists would not describe the people as atheists, and Western European populists would not define the people as Muslims. In other words, the populist perception of the people is usually related to the self-perception or self-loyalty of the target people.”

第一,穆德关于人民的理解过于笼统,未能抓住民粹主义的独特性。人民,无疑是民粹主义最重要的核心要素,因为另外两个要素——精英(人民的对立面)和公意(人民的政治主张)也都是基于人民才获得了各自的意义。穆德承认人民指涉的对象是相当模糊的,通常在主权者、平民和民族三个维度上被研究者混用。但是为了区别于拉克劳的政治话语研究,穆德不愿接受“空的能指”的概念。他反复强调在自己的意识形态方法中,人民并不是完全空洞的,而是被每个社会的文化背景所决定的,例如,“美国的民粹主义者不会把人民描述为无神论者,西欧的民粹主义者也不会把人民定义为穆斯林。换句话说,民粹主义者对人民的感知通常与目标人民的自我感知或自我忠诚有关”。

However, the above examples are too general, while populism in reality proposes more diverse and more detailed definitions of the people: for instance, linking the people to a particular class, to a particular race, or to a particular way of life. In response, Mudde easily explains that populism is actually influenced by the host ideology it attaches to, which retreats him back to Laclau’s “empty signifier” that he previously rejected.

然而,上述例子过于笼统,而现实中的民粹主义提出了更加多样、更加细化的人民定义:比如将人民与特殊的阶级联系在一起,与特殊的种族联系在一起,与特殊的生活方式联系在一起。对此,穆德又轻易地解释说民粹主义实际上受到了其所依附的宿主意识形态的影响,这就让自己退回到了之前拒绝的拉克劳的“空的能指”。

Mudde seems to realize that the scope of the people may be determined by some cultural background, but this line of thought fails to deepen. On this point, the sociocultural research orientation of Pierre Ostiguy and others is more enlightening. Simply put, Ostiguy constructs a cultural “high-low” dimension that intersects with the common economic “left-right” dimension. The so-called low culture is not economic poverty, but the taste and aesthetics emphasized by French thinker Pierre Bourdieu as social markers. Every society has cultures recognized as high or low by different groups, which have no direct connection with politics. However, when people begin to use low culture as a marker of identity, gathering a sizable group that expresses certain political demands, the populist people and populist politics truly emerge. In other words, from a cultural perspective, the characteristic of the populist people lies in the public flaunting of the low. This also explains why those populist politicians generally strive to appear “down-to-earth” in their attire, language, behavior, and so on.

穆德似乎意识到,人民的范围可能是由某种文化背景决定的,但这一思路未能深入下去。关于这一点,皮埃尔·奥斯提古(Pierre Ostiguy)等人的社会文化研究取向更有启发性。简单来说, 奥斯提古构建了一个与常见的经济上的“左—右”相交的文化上的“高—低”维度。所谓的低维文化,不是经济上的贫穷,而是法国思想家皮埃尔·布迪厄(Pierre Bourdieu)强调的作为社会标记的品味和美学。每个社会都会有被不同群体认同的或高或低的文化,它与政治并没有直接的联系。但是当有人开始以低维文化作为身份认同的标志,聚集起一个数量可观的并且表达某种政治诉求的群体时,民粹主义的人民和民粹主义的政治就真正出现了。换句话说,从文化层面来看,民粹主义人民的特点在于公开炫耀低维的文化(flaunting of the low)。这也就解释了那些民粹主义政治家为什么大都要在穿着、语言、行为等方面表现得“接地气”。

Second, Mudde overemphasizes the moral nature of the opposition between the elite and the people, which narrows the understanding of populism. Another researcher, Kirk A. Hawkins, even elevates this opposition to a theological level, viewing it as a Manichaean cosmology of light versus darkness. However, the intense moral opposition between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” as posited by Mudde and Hawkins is neither unique to populism nor a core element of populism; at most, it is one type of opposition between the people and the elite. For example, some researchers point out that in Chavez’s countless speeches, the word “pure” almost never appears. According to another researcher, Giorgos Katsambekis, in the public discourse of Greece’s most famous populist party, Syriza, the party’s view of the people and their enemies is more based on purely political reasons than moral reasons. Mudde’s excessive emphasis on the moral opposition between the people and the elite precisely reveals that his understanding of populism is mainly based on Western European right-wing populism, and thus his definition is difficult to cover left-wing populism in Latin America and Southern Europe.

第二,穆德过分强调精英与人民对立关系的道德性质,这就窄化了对民粹主义的理解。另一位研究者柯克·A. 霍金斯(Kirk A. Hawkins)甚至把这种对立上升到神学层次,认为它是一种摩尼教式的光明对抗黑暗的宇宙论。然而,穆德和霍金斯所谓“纯洁的人民”与“腐化的精英”之间强烈的道德对立,既不是民粹主义所特有的,也并非民粹主义的核心要素,而最多只是人民与精英对立的一种类型。例如一些研究者指出,在查韦斯的无数次演讲中,几乎从来没有出现过“纯洁”这个词。而根据另一位研究者乔治·卡察姆贝基斯(Giorgos Katsambekis)的说法,在希腊最著名的民粹主义政党激进左翼联盟(Syriza)的公开论述中,该党对人民及其敌人的看法更多是出于纯粹的政治理由而非道德理由。穆德过于强调人民与精英之间的道德对立,恰好暴露了他对民粹主义的理解主要还是基于西欧的右翼民粹主义,因而他的定义也就难以涵盖拉美和南欧的左翼民粹主义。

More notably, some famous populist politicians like Trump, Berlusconi, and Fujimori are themselves wealthy economic elites and are even considered morally flawed due to some inappropriate remarks or actions, but this does not affect their being regarded by many supporters as representatives of the people, even the only true representatives. That is to say, the populace does not dwell on the moral issues of these political figures; they seek an outsider who shares their common values. What populism opposes is not morally corrupt elites, nor elites in a general sense, but the political elites currently in power. The people’s indignation stems mainly from feeling harmed and neglected, not from their own “purity.” As Nadia Urbinati summarizes: “Populist voters do not expect Berlusconi, Fujimori, or Trump to be as pure as saints, because they themselves are not pure. The immorality of the subject is not the problem; the problem lies in the exercise of power.”

更值得注意的是,一些著名的民粹主义政治家像特朗普、贝卢斯科尼以及藤森等,他们不但本身就属于富有的经济精英,而且还因为一些不当言论或行为被认为有道德瑕疵,但这些并不影响他们被众多支持者视为人民的代表,甚至是唯一真实的代表。也就是说,民众并没有纠结于这些政治人物的道德问题,他们寻求的是一个与自己拥有共同价值观的体制外人士。民粹主义反对的并不是道德腐败的精英,也不是一般笼统意义的精英,而是正在掌握权力的政治精英。人民愤慨的原因主要是认为自己受到了伤害和忽视,而不是他们的“纯洁”。正如纳迪娅·乌尔比纳蒂(Nadia Urbinati)总结的那样:“民粹主义选民并不希望贝卢斯科尼、藤森或者特朗普真能像圣人一样纯洁,因为他们自己也不是纯洁的。主体的不道德并非问题,问题在于权力的行使。”

Third, Mudde’s understanding of the general will is biased. Although the general will is ranked after the people and the elite, it determines populism’s specific propositions on political issues and is also used to explain populism’s dissatisfaction with representative government and its preference for direct democratic forms such as referendums. However, Mudde’s understanding of the general will does not conform to the exposition of Rousseau, the originator of this concept. In Rousseau, the general will has a strong idealistic character, requiring every citizen to vote from the perspective of the whole, always thinking of others, not themselves. Therefore, Rousseau’s concept of the general will emphasizes reflexivity, “the reflective individual thus participates in the effort to identify commonality amidst diverse differences.” The Brexit camp and major European populists did not exhibit the reflexivity in Rousseau’s sense. On the contrary, they described themselves as the authentic, sole people. Furthermore, referendums are originally a form of modern democratic system, and many countries in reality frequently hold referendums on various issues; it is impossible to classify them all as populism. In other words, criticism of representative government does not equate to having only direct democracy as the sole alternative.

第三,穆德对公意的理解存在偏差。公意虽然在顺序上排在人民和精英之后,但它却决定着民粹主义关于政治问题的具体主张,也被用来解释民粹主义对代议制的不满,以及对全民公投等直接民主形式的偏好。然而,穆德对公意的理解也并不符合这个概念的原创者卢梭的论述。在卢梭那里,公意具有强烈的理想主义色彩,它要求每个公民在投票时都必须从全体出发,心里总是想着别人,而不是自己。因此,卢梭的公意概念强调一种反思性,“反思的个人因此参与了在多元差异中识别共性的努力”。而英国脱欧派和欧洲主要民粹主义者们并没有表现出卢梭意义上的反思性。相反,他们将自己描述为真实的、唯一的人民。此外,全民公投原本就是现代民主制度的一种形式,现实中许多国家也经常进行各种议题的公投,不可能把它们都归入民粹主义。换句话说,对代议制的批评并不等于只有直接民主这一种选择。

It is worth noting that Hawkins, who shares a similar research orientation with Mudde, has already explicitly abandoned the concept of the general will in his definition of populism, and Mudde has also adjusted his stance in recent years, beginning to acknowledge that populism’s understanding of the general will is “vulgar” and does not conform to Rousseau’s original intent. However, Mudde has not noticed that his main problem actually lies not in the general will itself, but in the fact that his understanding of the relationship between populism and democracy is confined to the perspective of direct democracy. In contrast, Jan-Werner Müller and Urbinati and others point out that populism does not pursue the so-called general will, but is rather a phenomenology of substituting the part for the whole. To become a populist, one must claim that a part of the people is the true people, and all others must be excluded. That is to say, populism’s challenge to democracy stems mainly not from direct democracy’s critique of indirect democracy, nor from a desire to completely eliminate the representative role of elites, but from an attempt to establish a new kind of representative relationship between a part of the people and the elites—the politician becomes the embodiment of the people.

值得注意的是,与穆德研究取向相近的霍金斯,在对民粹主义的定义中已经明确放弃了公意概念,而穆德近年来也调整了自己的立场,开始承认民粹主义对公意的理解是“庸俗的”(vulgar)并不符合卢梭的原意。但是穆德没有注意到,他的主要问题其实不在于公意本身,而是对民粹主义与民主之间关系的理解局限在了直接民主的视角之中。相比之下,扬-维尔纳·米勒(Jan-Werner Müller)和乌尔比纳蒂等人则指出,民粹主义并不追求所谓的公意,而是一种用部分代替整体的现象学。要成为民粹主义者,必须宣称人民的一部分才是真正的人民,其他人都要被排除在外。也就是说,民粹主义对民主的挑战,主要不是出于直接民主对间接民主的批评,也不是要完全排除精英的代表作用,而是要在部分人民与精英之间建立一种全新的代表关系——政治家成为人民的化身。

In short, Mudde’s thesis on the people, elites, and the general will all have obvious flaws and cannot comprehensively and accurately summarize the phenomenon of populism. This also severely weakens the advantages Mudde previously claimed, such as distinguishability, classifiability, commensurability, and multifunctionality. As mentioned earlier, Mudde himself and supporters of his thesis have recently argued that researchers should not overly dwell on Freeden’s exposition, but merely understand the term “thin ideology” in a general, broad sense, for example, as a simple set of ideas. This seems intended to remedy the flaws in Mudde’s thesis. Yet this defense is clearly untenable, because besides its methodology, the core elements of Mudde’s thesis are also problematic. Thus, when Mudde criticizes the inadequacies of other definitions, others can equally mount a powerful counterattack against him.

简而言之,穆德命题关于人民、精英及公意的论述都存在明显缺陷,无法全面准确地概括民粹主义现象。这也严重削弱了穆德之前宣称的可区别性、可分类性、可通约性和多功能性等优势。前文提到,穆德本人及其命题的支持者最近辩解道,研究者不应过分纠结于弗里登的论述,只需从一般的、笼统的意义上来看待薄意识形态这个词,比如把它理解为一套简单的思想观念就可以了。似乎这样就可以弥补穆德命题的缺陷。然而这种辩解显然是站不住脚的,因为穆德命题除了方法论之外,其核心要素也问题重重。所以,当穆德批评其他定义的不足时,别人也可以对他提出同样有力的反击。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

In summary, whether by reference to Freeden’s own exposition of thin ideology or to the concrete manifestations of populism in reality, it is not difficult to see that populism is not suitable for definition as a thin ideology. Mudde’s attempt to eliminate conceptual confusion by pursuing a minimal definition is itself commendable. However, Mudde’s thesis has problems in both methodology and core elements, which may instead bring greater drawbacks.

综上所述,无论是参照弗里登本人对薄意识形态的论述,还是现实中民粹主义的具体表现,都不难看出,民粹主义并不适合被界定为一种薄意识形态。穆德试图通过追求最小定义来消除概念的混乱,这一努力本身值得肯定。但是穆德命题在方法论和核心要素上都存在问题,反而可能会带来更大弊端。

Populism is a complex political phenomenon, encompassing multiple dimensions such as ideology, political strategy, political discourse, and social movements. In specific research, one may focus on one of these dimensions, but one should also avoid being seduced by minimalism and thus taking the part for the whole. When researchers attempt to examine populism from an ideological perspective, they should first take seriously the complex脉络 and rich connotations of ideological theory, rather than simply applying a seemingly fashionable label. Furthermore, it is necessary to penetrate some surface features and excavate what is unique about populism’s understanding of politics itself. For example, the religious coloring or faith dimension lurking within populist thinking tends to view political activity as a thorough renewal and redemption of the real world, rather than a purely rational process of interest redistribution; populism advocates granting political leaders greater discretionary power, weakening the role of rule-of-law procedures and checks and balances; populism’s conception of political representation differs from mainstream representative democracy, expecting to establish some form of direct representation between leaders and voters, fundamentally questioning the necessity of accountability and deliberative debate, and so on. Only by exploring such issues as comprehensively as possible can one truly grasp the complex relationship between populism and modern democracy, thereby making up for the lack of theoretical analytical depth in Mudde’s thesis. In other words, it is not that populist ideology itself is too “thin,” but that Mudde’s thesis only touches the “thin” outer layer of populism.

民粹主义是一种复杂的政治现象,兼具意识形态、政治策略、政治话语、社会运动等多重维度。在具体研究中可以侧重关注其中的一个维度,但也要避免受到极简主义的诱惑而以偏概全。当研究者试图从意识形态角度考察民粹主义时,应该首先严肃对待意识形态理论的复杂脉络与丰富内涵,而不是简单地套用一个看起来时髦的标签。此外,还需要努力穿透一些表面特征,挖掘民粹主义对政治本身的理解有哪些独到之处。比如,民粹主义思维中潜藏着的宗教色彩或信仰维度,倾向于将政治活动视为对现实世界的一种彻底的更新与救赎,而非纯粹理性的利益再分配过程;民粹主义主张赋予政治领导人更多的自由裁量权,削弱法治程序和制衡机制的作用;民粹主义对政治代表关系的构想区别于主流的代议制民主,期望在领导人与选民之间建立某种直接代表形式,从根本上质疑问责制和协商辩论的必要性,等等。尽可能全面地探究这类问题,才能有助于真正把握民粹主义与现代民主之间的复杂关系,从而弥补穆德命题中缺乏的那种理论分析深度。换句话说,并非民粹主义意识形态本身太“薄”,而是穆德命题只触及了民粹主义“薄”的外层。

(Author’s bio: He Tao, School of Political Science and Public Administration, China University of Political Science and Law)

(作者简介:何涛,中国政法大学政治与公共管理学院)

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑:同心

Notes

  1. Cas Mudde is a Dutch political scientist known for his influential definition of populism as a “thin-centered ideology.” His 2004 article “The Populist Zeitgeist” is a foundational text in the field.
  2. Giovanni Sartori (1924–2017) was an Italian political scientist who developed the “minimal definition” method for concept formation, aiming to reduce intension (the set of defining attributes) to maximize extension (the range of cases covered).
  3. Michael Freeden is a British political theorist who developed the concept of “thin ideologies” (or “thin-centered ideologies”) to describe political ideologies with a limited core of concepts, such as feminism or nationalism, as distinct from “thick” or “full” ideologies like liberalism or socialism.
  4. Mudde: Cas Mudde, a Dutch political scientist known for his influential definition of populism as a “thin-centered ideology.”
  5. Laclau: Ernesto Laclau, an Argentine political theorist who analyzed populism through discourse theory and the concept of the “empty signifier.”
  6. Manichaean: A reference to the dualistic religion founded by Mani, often used metaphorically to describe a worldview of absolute good versus absolute evil.
  7. Syriza: The Coalition of the Radical Left, a left-wing political party in Greece that came to power in 2015.
  8. Rousseau: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the 18th-century Genevan philosopher whose concept of the “general will” (volonté générale) is central to his political theory in *The Social Contract*.
  9. Michael Freeden is a scholar of ideology theory who conceptualized “thin ideologies” as partial, truncated ideological systems that lack the comprehensive scope of “thick” or “full” ideologies.