The Technological Drivers of the Rise of Western Populism in the Digital Age

Since the mid-1990s, Western societies have experienced a wave of rapid digitalization, and populism has risen quietly during this period. The connection between digital technology and populism has gradually attracted more attention. Especially in recent years, digital technology has played an important role in typical events regarded as markers of the proliferation of Western populism. For example: algorithmic recommendation technology directly influenced voting outcomes in “black swan” events such as the Brexit referendum and Trump’s election victory; the populist party the Five Star Movement in Italy successfully formed a government relying entirely on online operations; during the COVID-19 pandemic, fake news and anti-science rhetoric flooding new media swayed public opinion and government decision-making; after Trump’s electoral defeat, he directly incited his supporters to storm the Capitol via Twitter; mass protest movements such as “Black Lives Matter” in the United States and the “Yellow Vests” in France were organized almost entirely through social media. A systematic review of the relationship between digital technology and populism can provide a technological dimension of explanation for the rise of contemporary Western populism, and can also build a framework for further observation of the impact and reshaping of digital technology on Western democracy, as well as for studying the future trends of Western political change in the digital age.

自1990年代中期以来，西方社会经历了快速数字化的浪潮，民粹主义也在此期间悄然崛起，数字技术与民粹主义之间的关联逐渐受到了更多关注。尤其是近年来，在被视为标志西方民粹主义泛滥的典型事件中，数字技术都扮演了重要角色，例如：算法推送技术在英国脱欧公投和特朗普胜选等“黑天鹅”事件中直接影响了投票结果；民粹主义政党意大利五星运动完全依赖线上运营成功上台组阁；新冠疫情期间新媒体上充斥的假新闻和反科学言论左右了民意和政府决策；特朗普败选后直接通过推特煽动支持者攻占了国会山；美国的“黑命贵”和法国的“黄马甲”等大众抗议运动更是几乎完全借助社交媒体组织发起。系统梳理数字技术与民粹主义之间的关系，可以为当代西方民粹主义的崛起提供一种技术维度的解释，也能为进一步观察数字技术对西方民主的影响和重塑、研判数字时代西方政治变革的未来趋势搭建一个思考框架。

I. The Question of Equality in the Digital Age

一、数字时代的平等问题

As an ideology, populism is “thin and hollow”; it is chaotic and changeable, lacking the precise internal consistency of other ideologies. Even so, it is clear that populism pursues equality on the basis of constructing a binary opposition between “the people” and “the elite.” Whether from the “economic-class” perspective of left-wing populism or the “identity-nation” perspective of right-wing populism, the pursuit of equality is a core demand. Thomas Piketty points out: “The intensification of inequality in the West and the lack of democracy have led to populism.” John Judis also argues: “Movements like Occupy Wall Street had a broad popular base, bringing the core challenge facing neoliberalism—political and economic inequality—to the table.” Therefore, tracing back to the discussion of the question of equality is an inevitable approach when reflecting on the phenomenon of Western populism.

作为一种意识形态，民粹主义是“稀薄的、空心的”，它混乱而多变，不像其他意识形态那样有着精密的内在一致性。即便如此，在构建“人民”与“精英”二元对立的基础上追求平等这一点上，民粹主义是明确的。无论是左翼民粹主义的“经济—阶级”视角，抑或是右翼民粹主义的“身份—民族”视角，都将追求平等作为核心诉求。托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）指出：“西方不平等现象加剧和民主的缺乏导致了民粹主义。”约翰·朱迪斯(John Judis)也认为：“占领华尔街等运动拥有广泛的群众基础，它将新自由主义所面临挑战的核心——政治与经济不平等问题——搬上了台面。”所以，追溯到对平等问题的讨论，是思考西方民粹主义现象时必然采用的思路。

While driving changes in the mode of production and life in capitalist society, the new round of technological revolution has also readjusted the relations of equality in politics and economics within human society. This reshaping of equality relations has played a role in underpinning the wave of Western populism from the bottom up. The impact of the technological revolution on the evolution of the entire set of human social relations of production and superstructure is comprehensive, multi-dimensional, and fundamental. Major technological revolutions always greatly enhance the level of productive forces. This not only changes the production function, producing a “creative destruction” innovation effect, but also exerts a profound and fundamental influence on social structure, geopolitics, and the balance of national power. Unlike previous technological revolutions that replaced manual labor, the digital revolution replaces repetitive mental labor while also replacing manual labor, and intervenes more deeply in people’s spiritual world and cultural life. It not only reshapes production but also manifests as a kind of “fluid technology,” providing new ways for people to work, live, consume, socialize, and entertain, raising new demands for political development and national governance, and issuing new challenges to the global political and economic order. In this context, the complex impact of digital technology on the question of equality urgently needs reassessment.

新一轮科技革命在带动资本主义社会生产和生活方式变迁的同时，也对人类社会在政治和经济方面的平等关系进行了一次重新调整，这种平等关系的重塑对西方民粹主义浪潮起到了底层助推的作用。科技革命对整个人类社会生产关系和上层建筑演变的影响是全面、立体和根本性的。重大的科技革命总是使生产力水平得到极大程度的提升，这不但改变着生产函数，产生“毁灭”的创新效应，而且对社会结构、地缘政治、国家力量对比产生深远而根本性的影响。与以往的科技革命对体力劳动的替代不同，数字革命在替代体力劳动的同时也在替代重复性的脑力劳动，并且更加深刻地介入到人的精神世界和文化生活之中。它不仅再造了生产，还呈现为一种“流动的技术”，为人们的工作生活、消费购物、社交娱乐提供了新的方式，对政治发展和国家治理提出了新的要求，向全球政治经济秩序也发出了新的挑战。在此背景下，数字技术对平等问题的复杂影响亟待重估。

(1) The Information Revolution Created the Beautiful Expectation of a “Digital Democratic Utopia”

（一）信息革命制造了“数字民主乌托邦”的美好期待

At the global level, the internet constructed a vision of a harmonious and peaceful “global village.” From its inception, the internet broke down barriers of time and space, creating a digital space covering the entire world, greatly enhancing economic and cultural exchanges between different countries and regions, promoting the emergence of global popular culture and homogenized mass commodities, and placing ordinary people at any time within an international information horizon and a global concern for shared destiny.

从全球层面来看，互联网构建了和谐和平的“地球村”愿景。互联网自诞生伊始便打破时空隔阂，开创出覆盖全世界的数字空间，极大地增进了不同国家和地区间的经济文化交流，助推着世界性流行文化和同质化大众商品的出现，使普通人随时随地处于国际性的信息视野和全球性的命运关切之中。

At the national level, digital technology brought about a new industrial revolution and a revolution in public governance. The rise of the digital economy promoted the upgrading of traditional industries, accelerated the renewal of the industrial structure, and drove overall economic development. The internet, due to its characteristics of autonomy, openness, and sharing, is considered the most democratic invention, representing “the voice of the people” and “the victory of the grassroots.” New technologies provided new tools for the disclosure of government information and public participation in governance. Social media platforms built an instantaneous, equal, and open public sphere, allowing more people to engage in broader public discussion and political participation at lower cost.

从国家层面来看，数字技术带来了新的产业革命和公共治理革命。数字经济的崛起促进了传统行业升级，加速了产业结构换代，推动了经济的总体发展。互联网因自主、开放、共享等特点被认为是最民主的发明，代表了“人民的声音”和“草根的胜利”。新技术为政务信息公开、民众参与公共治理提供了新的工具。社交平台搭建了一个即时、平等、开放的公共舆论场域，它允许更多的人以更低的成本进行更大范围的公共讨论和政治参与。

At the organizational level, the essence of the media revolution was to change the way people connect and organize. “Technology is a social construction; it can serve the existing system of social power, or it can facilitate changes in the organization and distribution of power.” Digital social life broke down the barriers to expression and action within past organizations; factors such as hierarchy, seniority, procedure, and professional competence were weakened. The internet enabled “weak ties” based on shared interests and emotional resonance to begin replacing the “strong ties” between people in traditional society, thereby shaking the monopoly position of traditional groups and institutions, and allowing isolated yet homogeneous individuals scattered in an atomized society to organize themselves freely and spontaneously through the network. These new types of organizations lack traditional organizational frameworks yet possess stronger capacities for sharing, mutual cooperation, and collective action.

从组织层面来看，传媒革命的实质是改变了人与人之间的链接和组织方式。“技术是一种社会建构，它可以服务于现行社会权力体系，也可以促成权力组织与分配的改变。”数字社交生活打破了过去组织中的表达和行动障碍，等级、资历、程序、专业能力等因素被弱化，互联网使得基于志趣情感共鸣的“弱连接”开始替代传统社会人与人之间的“强连接”，从而动摇了传统群体和机构的垄断地位，使散布在原子化社会中的那些孤立而又同质的个体借由网络自由自发地组织起来。这些新式组织没有传统的组织框架却又具备更强的分享能力、相互合作能力和集体行动能力。

At the individual level, the internet brought about greater equality of opportunity between people. The internet greatly narrowed the information gap between individuals, enabling people to access knowledge and information that were previously difficult to obtain, in a cheap and convenient way, thereby creating more opportunities for fairness in economic and educational terms. “Everyone is a self-media” allowed ordinary individuals to break the past monopoly of information by traditional media and professionals, becoming content creators and disseminators. The digital economy, transcending barriers of time and space, provided individuals with highly personalized ways of working, consuming, and entertaining. Even when individuals go online with virtual identities, they can easily ignore real-world differences between people and develop a natural sense of equality.

从个体层面来看，互联网带来了人与人之间更多的机会平等。互联网极大地缩小了人与人之间的信息差距，使得人们能够以廉价便捷的方式获取原本难以触及的知识和信息，进而制造了更多经济和教育层面的公平机会。“人人都是自媒体”使普通个体打破了过去传统媒体和专业人士对信息的垄断，成为内容原创者和传播者。数字经济更是跨越时空隔阂为个体提供了极具个性化的工作、消费和娱乐方式，甚至当个人以虚拟身份上网时也很容易忽略人与人之间在现实中的差别而生出一种天然的平等感。

(2) Cyberspace Exhibits the Real Trend of a “Technocratic Leviathan”

（二）网络空间存在着“技术专制利维坦”的现实趋势

There is factual inequality in individual rights within cyberspace. Huge differences in digital rights exist between people due to factors such as place of residence, wealth, and level of education, thus forming a digital divide. “Compared with other modes of organization and communication, networks are not more equal, democratic, open, free, intimate, unconditional, or likely to reduce people’s social ties.”

网络空间中的个体权利存在事实上的不平等。人与人之间会因为居住地、财富、受教育程度等因素而存在着在数字权利上的巨大差别，从而形成数字鸿沟。“与其他组织和交流模式相比，网络并没有更加平等、民主、开放、自由、亲切、不需要条件或减少人们的社会联系。”

Digital power within cyberspace spontaneously tends toward concentration and monopoly. The internet has an underlying logic of self-agglomeration; the “winner-takes-all” model repeats at every level of the network. Digital platform giants and information management departments have gradually monopolized the acquisition, storage, analysis, and use of big data. Digital power has in fact penetrated all fields, from macro-level international relations and national governance to micro-level individual production and consumption, ultimately forming surveillance capitalism.

网络空间内的数字权力自发走向集聚和垄断。互联网存在着自我集聚的底层逻辑，“赢家通吃”的模式在网络的每一层级都重复着。数字平台巨头和信息管理部门逐渐垄断了大数据的获取、存储、分析和使用，数字权力事实上已经渗透进了从宏观的国际关系、国家治理到微观个体生产和消费的各领域，最终形成了监视资本主义。

The boom of the digital industry has been accompanied by the decline of many other industries. Dan Schiller argues that while digital technology has flourished, it has also intensified political and economic contradictions, leading to a “digital recession” in the vast majority of industries. Technological renewal and progress cause the redistribution of wealth and power between different countries and different classes. Technological upgrading forces the re-socialization or elimination of labor. While eliminating old inequalities, it creates new ones.

数字产业的勃兴伴随着其他诸多产业的衰退。丹·席勒（Dan Schiller）认为，数字技术蓬勃发展的同时也激化了政治经济矛盾，导致绝大多数产业出现了“数字化衰退”。技术更新、技术进步使得财富和权力在不同国家和不同阶层之间重新分配，技术升级逼迫着劳动力再社会化或者被淘汰，它在消除旧的不平等的同时，又制造出新的不平等。

Over the past decade or more, the digital domain has clearly undergone a process from freedom and equality to monopoly and control. The development of the digital industry has increasingly moved toward platformization, agglomeration, and monopolization. Digital rights among individuals have become markedly differentiated. The digital economy has caused the decline of some industries and the polarization between rich and poor. Nearly all individuals' private data is controlled by digital monopoly platforms, and big data technology has become the most important tool of public management. In this process, the problem of inequality in the digital age has also become increasingly apparent. Taken together, the digital space simultaneously contains the two-way effects of "equalization" and "inequalization," "populization" and "elitization," and "liberation" and "oppression." This dialectical contradictory movement is the logical starting point for thinking about how digital technology reshapes Western society and fuels the rise of populism.

在过去的10余年间，数字领域明显经历了一个从自由平等走向垄断和控制的过程。数字产业的发展加速走向平台化、集聚化、垄断化，个体之间的数字权利出现明显分化，数字经济造成部分产业衰退和贫富分化，几乎所有个体的隐私数据都被数字垄断平台所把持，大数据技术成为了最重要的公共管理工具。在这个过程中，数字时代的不平等问题也日渐显现出来。综合来看，数字空间同时包含着“平等化”与“不平等化”、“民粹化”与“精英化”、“解放”与“压迫”的双向作用，这种辩证的矛盾运动是思考数字技术重塑西方社会并助推民粹主义崛起的逻辑起点。

II. External Support of Digital Technology for the Rise of Populism

二、数字技术对民粹主义崛起的外部支持

The digital revolution has had a profound impact on world development. New technologies have played a complex role at multiple levels—economic, cultural, and political—cultivating a suitable external environment for the rise of populism in the West. Research has shown: "The result of third-generation mobile networks going from zero coverage to full coverage is to increase support for left-wing populism by 5% and support for right-wing populism by 6%." [6]6 Source: reference in original text, not further identified.

数字革命对世界发展产生了深远的影响，新技术在经济、文化和政治等多个层面发挥了复杂的作用，为民粹主义在西方的崛起孕育了适宜的外部环境。有研究表明：“第三代移动网络从零覆盖到全覆盖的结果是将左翼民粹主义的支持率提高了5%、右翼民粹主义的支持率提高了6%。”

(I) The Application of Digital Technology Has Intensified Economic Inequality Globally

（一）数字技术的应用在全球范围内加剧了经济不平等

While creating enormous wealth, the development of the digital economy is also redistributing wealth and resources globally and among different classes. The losers in this process include both traditional industry elites who have fallen behind in the new round of globalization and the technological revolution, and the middle class and blue-collar workers impacted by production automation, industrial restructuring, and the intensification of the gap between rich and poor. Together, these losers constitute the typical image of populists in Western countries.

数字经济的发展在创造巨大财富的同时，也在全球范围内和不同阶层之间进行着财富和资源的重新分配。这个过程中的利益受损者，既包括在新一轮全球化和科技革命中掉队的传统行业精英，也包括因生产自动化、产业结构调整和贫富分化加剧而受到冲击的中产阶级和蓝领工人，这些利益受损者共同构成了西方国家民粹主义者的典型形象。

From a macro perspective, the uneven development of digital technology among countries has become a key factor reshaping the new world political and economic order. Digital technology advantages are the core arena of current great-power competition, and the digital economy and cybersecurity have become the most important aspects of national wealth and security. The development of digital technology is uneven. The United States holds a dominant position in chips, operating systems, search engines, e-commerce, social platforms, etc., and possesses clear technological advantages in information control, intelligence gathering, and network surveillance. With the boost of the mobile internet and artificial intelligence revolution, although the digital economy boomed after 2010, under the successive shocks of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the GDP of major Western economies such as the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy in 2023 was basically flat or even regressed compared to before the 2008 global financial crisis. Apart from the United States, other Western countries have experienced a "lost 15 years" economically. [7]7 "Lost 15 years": a reference to the prolonged economic stagnation experienced by many advanced economies outside the US following the 2008 global financial crisis, analogous to Japan's "lost decade." Precisely because of this, the EU's attitude towards issues such as digital sovereignty and economic globalization has become increasingly tough in recent years, and these have also become important topics for Western European populist parties.

从宏观上看，数字技术在国家间的不均衡发展，成为重塑世界政治经济新秩序的关键因素。数字技术优势是当前大国竞争的核心领域，数字经济和网络安全成为国家财富和安全的最主要方面。数字技术的发展是不均衡的，美国在芯片、操作系统、搜索引擎、电子商务、社交平台等方面占据着主导地位，在信息控制、情报收集、网络监视等方面拥有明显的技术优势。在移动互联网和人工智能革命的加持下，尽管2010年以后数字经济蓬勃发展，但在全球金融危机和新冠疫情的连续冲击下，英、法、德、日、意等西方主要经济体2023年的国内生产总值相较2008年全球金融危机之前基本持平甚至出现了倒退，除美国以外的其他西方国家在经济上经历了“失去的15年”。正因为如此，欧盟近年来对数字主权、经济全球化等问题的态度日渐强硬，这些也成为西欧民粹主义政党的重要议题。

From a micro perspective, only a few people profit from the monopolistic development of the digital industry. Although the digital economy led by new technologies often touts sharing, in fact, every technological revolution and change in the means of production in human history has led to the intensification of the gap between rich and poor. As Marx said: "All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and stultifying human life into a material force." [8]8 Karl Marx, "Speech at the Anniversary of the People's Paper," 1856. The original English reads: "all our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and stultifying human life into a material force." Going further than Marx's era, the digital revolution integrates various fields more deeply and to a higher degree. A large amount of data has formed a new form of capital—digital capital. The boundaries between work and leisure, production and consumption become increasingly blurred, and the gap between labor income and capital income further widens. The internet has become a tool for capital elites and technology elites to extract wealth, while ordinary people caught up in digital capitalism find it difficult to escape the fate of being enslaved by capital. The technological revolution and globalization have jointly promoted the transfer and adjustment of industrial structures, worsening the situation of blue-collar workers in Western countries. Schiller pointed out that the wave of digital automation would turn work into a "luxury good." [9]9 Reference to Herbert Schiller or similar critical theorist of digital capitalism; specific source not given. The artificial intelligence revolution has brought a large amount of "technological unemployment," and the "proletariat" seems to be increasingly degenerating into a "useless class."

从微观上看，从数字产业的垄断发展中获利的只是少数人。尽管新技术主导的数字经济常常标榜共享性，但事实上，人类历史上每一次科技革命和生产工具变革都导致了贫富分化的加剧。正如马克思所言：“机器具有减少人类劳动和使劳动更有成效的神奇力量，然而却引起了饥饿和过度的疲劳。财富的新源泉，由于某种奇怪的、不可思议的魔力而变成贫困的源泉。”比马克思所处的时代更进一步的是，数字革命对各个领域的整合更加精深、一体化程度也更高，大量数据形成了新的资本样态——数字资本，工作与休闲、生产与消费之间的界限愈加模糊，劳动收入与资本收入的差距进一步拉大。互联网成为资本精英和技术精英汲取财富的工具，而被数字资本主义裹挟下的普通人难逃被资本奴役的命运。科技革命和全球化共同推动了产业结构的转移和调整，导致西方国家蓝领工人的处境更加恶化。席勒指出，数字自动化浪潮会将工作变为“奢侈品”。人工智能革命带来了大量的“技术性失业”，“无产阶级”似乎正日益沦落为“无用阶级”。

A large amount of income data also proves that inequality in Western developed capitalist countries is intensifying. From 1973 to 2016, U.S. labor productivity increased by 73.7%, while hourly wages only increased by 12.3%. [10]10 Source: reference in original text, not further identified. An International Labour Organization report points out: "Income distribution in high-income countries from 2004 to 2017 showed a 'hockey stick' trend: the income of the middle class and lower-middle class fell sharply, while the income of the high-income group increased significantly. The richest people gained more wealth, while the vast majority of the rest suffered losses. This trend is very obvious in Germany, the UK, and the United States." [11]11 Source: reference in original text, not further identified. Some scholars have pointed out: "From the fact that a high proportion of populist supporters belong to the low-income class or low-education class, it can be known that populist parties represent these 'losers' whose lives and work are threatened, confronting the globalization and European integration promoted by elites, and successfully gaining support." [12]12 Source: reference in original text, not further identified.

大量收入数据也都证明西方发达资本主义国家的不平等现象正在加剧。1973—2016年美国劳动生产率增加了73.7%，而小时工资仅增长了12.3%。国际劳工组织报告指出：“高收入国家2004—2017年期间的收入分配呈现出‘曲棍球棒’的趋势：中产阶级和中下阶层的收入大幅下跌，而高收入群体的收入大幅增加。最富有的人获得更多的财富，其余绝大多数人蒙受损失。这种趋势在德国、英国、美国十分明显。”有学者指出：“从民粹主义的支持者中，有很高比例属于低所得阶级或低学历阶级即可知道，民粹主义政党代表这些生活与工作受到威胁的‘失败者’，对抗精英推动的全球化与欧洲整合，并成功获得支持。”

The revolutionary progress of technology affects the living standards of laborers and the trend of labor mobility; this is a historical law. "The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex." [13]13 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848. The original English reads: "The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex." The new data regime limits the opportunities of the poor and the working class, dissolves their political organizations, restricts their actions, and exploits their human rights. It is against this backdrop that large numbers of white working-class voters in the American "Rust Belt" abandoned the Democratic Party in the 2016 election and became supporters of populism. Marine Le Pen insists that the French National Rally is the "party of the working class" and entered the second round of voting again in the 2022 French presidential election. As the backbone of Western democratic politics, the living conditions of the traditional middle class have actually worsened in the digital age, which has become an important social cause of the proliferation of populism and the intensification of political polarization.

技术的革命性进步会影响劳动者的生活水平和劳动力流动趋向，这是一种历史规律。“机器使劳动的差别越来越小，使工资几乎到处都降到同样低的水平，因而无产阶级内部的利益、生活状况也越来越趋于一致。”新数据体制限制了贫困人口和工人阶层的机会，解散了他们的政治组织，限制了他们的行动，剥削了他们的人权。正是在这样的背景下，大批美国“铁锈地带”的白人工薪阶层在2016年大选中抛弃了民主党转而成为民粹主义的支持者；玛丽娜·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）坚称法国国民联盟是“工薪阶层的党”并在2022年法国总统大选中再次进入第二轮投票。作为西方民主政治的中坚力量，传统的中产阶级在数字时代的生活状况反而恶化了，这成为民粹主义泛滥和政治极化加剧的重要社会原因。

(II) The New Media Revolution Has Fueled Populism in Social Culture

（二）新媒体革命助长了社会文化中的民粹主义

The promotion of populism by digital technology in mass culture and psychology is more complex and hidden. The new media revolution has overturned the dominance of mass media and media professionals over the public opinion space. The emergence of new media allows everyone to become a broadcaster, which is itself a "cultural populist movement." [14]14 "Cultural populist movement": a term used by some scholars to describe the democratizing but also anti-elitist effect of new media on cultural production and consumption. However, an online public opinion space that is overly free, lacks rationality, and makes truth difficult to discern provides convenient conditions for the emergence and spread of populist thought.

数字技术在大众文化和心理方面对民粹主义的推动更为复杂和隐秘。新媒体革命颠覆了大众媒体和媒体人对公共舆论空间的主导，新媒体的出现让每个人都可能成为广播的主体，这本身就是一场“文化民粹主义运动”。但是，过度自由、缺乏理性、真相难辨的网络舆论空间为民粹主义思潮的产生和传播提供了便利的条件。

First, new media have weakened the public’s capacity for judgment. According to Marshall McLuhan’s theory, cool media with low definition convey less information, thus requiring people to mobilize more thought to understand and interpret. However, compared with the era of books, newspapers, and radio, today’s online new-media environment is filled with large amounts of high-definition information that engages multiple senses, information that does not require the audience to possess high levels of comprehension or critical thinking. From the perspective of communication logic, content creators, under the pressure of competition for online traffic, are more likely to publish material that can quickly attract attention and generate clicks, regardless of factual basis or social impact. From the perspective of commercial logic, what determines the content of digital communication is powerful capital; manufacturing irrational impulses is key to influencing mass consumer psychology and behavior. Over time, short, fast-paced audiovisual content has further replaced text as the main carrier of information, and even textual information tends to attract eyeballs through explosive headlines, while serious, in-depth commentary articles are replaced by fragmented, fast-food-style content. Information overload reduces the public’s attention span, the amplification effect of online communication fuels the contagion of social emotions, extreme or false information manufactured to compete for attention disrupts the public’s rational judgment, and homogenized, entertainment-oriented video content exacerbates the superficiality and fragmentation of mass thinking… These problems may lead people into what Hannah Arendt described as the “thoughtless era.”

首先，新媒体削弱了公众的判断力。按照马歇尔·麦克卢汉（Marshall McLuhan）的理论，低清晰度的冷媒介透露出的信息更少，所以需要人们调动更多的思维去思考和理解。然而，相较于书籍、报纸、收音机的时代，今天的网络新媒体时代充满了大量清晰的、能调动多种感官的信息，这些信息无需受众具备较高的理解力和思考力。从传播逻辑来看，内容创作者在网络流量竞争之下更有可能发布能够快速吸引注意力、制造点击量的内容而罔顾事实根据和社会影响。从商业逻辑来看，决定数字传播内容的是强大的资本，制造非理性冲动是影响大众消费心理和行为的关键。长此以往，短平快的视听内容进一步取代了文字而成为信息的主要载体，即便是文字信息也倾向于通过爆炸性标题来博眼球，深刻严肃的评论文章被碎片化的快餐式内容取代。信息过载降低了公众的专注力，网络传播的放大效应助长了社会情绪的传染，为争夺注意力而被制造出来的偏激或虚假信息干扰了民众的理性判断，同质化、娱乐化的视频内容加剧了大众思考的表面化和碎片化……这些问题有可能导致人们进入汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt）所描述的“无思想时代”。

Second, popular culture has replaced elite culture as the dominant force. The new-media revolution has flattened the pyramid structure of culture. Under the logic of “traffic is king,” high culture no longer occupies a dominant position, while entertainment culture, consumer culture, and popular culture have begun rapid “viral spread.” The role of traditional media professionals as gatekeepers of public opinion and filters of culture has also disappeared, making cultural disorder and value alienation in society inevitable. “The root of political failure is the excessive fusion of the market with consumer psychology; our entire consumer culture elevates instant gratification to the primary goal of life. This culture encourages people to use the most direct and effective methods to maximize short-term satisfaction while ignoring future costs.” [15]15 Yang Chunlin, “The Root of Political Failure is the Excessive Fusion of the Market with Consumer Psychology,” *People’s Forum*, no. 12 (2019), p. 56. When the logic of capital becomes the primary driver, the proliferation of anti-intellectual, superficial, and vulgar populist culture in capitalist societies becomes difficult to contain. As Aldous Huxley once predicted: “Our culture is becoming a culture of sensory stimulation, desire, and ruleless games.”

其次，流行文化取代精英文化占据了主导。新媒体革命推平了文化的金字塔结构，在“流量为王”逻辑的支配下，高雅文化不再占据统治地位，娱乐文化、消费文化、通俗文化开始了快速的“病毒式传播”。传统媒体人作为公共舆论守门人和文化过滤器的作用也不复存在，社会文化的失序和价值异化变得不可避免。“政治失灵的根源是市场与消费者心理的过度融合，我们的整个消费文化把即时满足上升为人生的最主要目标，这种文化鼓励人们用最直接、最有效的方法来最大限度地追求短期的满足而忽略了未来的成本。”当资本逻辑成为第一推手，反智性、浅表化、低俗化的民粹文化在资本主义社会的泛滥也就难以遏制了。正如阿道司·赫胥黎（Aldous Huxley）曾预言的那样：“我们的文化正成为充满感官刺激、欲望和无规则游戏的文化。”

Finally, algorithmic recommendation has fueled political polarization and biased divisions. Platform algorithms tailor personalized information for each individual, thereby achieving “one click, click after click.” People trapped in “information cocoons” find it difficult to access different viewpoints, and the focus of attention among individuals becomes increasingly fragmented. The seemingly free and diverse internet actually reinforces personal biases, and the public sphere available for reaching consensus further tears apart and collapses. When users lack specific knowledge reserves, information discrimination skills, and independent judgment, they become more easily misled and manipulated by algorithmic information. Herbert I. Schiller once warned: “The reality is that a very small portion of the population is highly discerning, knows what they want, and can therefore utilize the massive information flow, while the majority of Americans are basically unwittingly trapped in an information predicament that amounts to having no choice.” [16]16 Herbert I. Schiller, *Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America* (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2000), p. 42. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, social platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, in addition to displaying a small amount of authoritative professional content, pushed more information lacking professionalism and scientific validity, some of which deviated from the truth and was filled with bias and discrimination, even containing specific political purposes. For a time, trends such as anti-intellectualism, populism, and racism ran rampant in the West, increasing the difficulty of scientific public decision-making and policy implementation. Dialogue based on facts, consensus based on diversity, and decisions based on science have become luxuries in Western society in the digital age.

最后，算法推送助长了政治极化和偏见分歧。平台算法为每个人量身定制了个性化信息，借此实现“一次点击，次次点击”。身处“信息茧房”的人们难以接收到不同的观点，人与人之间的关注点也越来越分散。看似自由多元的互联网实际上强化了个人偏见，可用于达成共识的舆论空间进一步撕裂和坍缩。当用户缺乏特定的知识储备、信息辨别力和独立判断能力时，就会更加容易被算法信息误导和操纵。赫伯特·I. 席勒（Herbert I. Schiller）曾警告道：“实际情况是，人口中有极小一部分人非常挑剔，他们清楚自己要什么并因此能够利用大规模的信息流，而大多数美国人基本上不知不觉地陷入了相当于别无选择的信息困境。”例如，在新冠疫情蔓延期间，优兔、推特、脸书等社交平台除了展示少数权威专业内容外，推送更多的是缺乏专业性和科学性的信息，有的偏离真相且充满偏见歧视，甚至包含特定的政治目的。一时间，反智主义、民粹主义、种族主义等思潮在西方甚嚣尘上，为科学的公共决策和政策执行增加了难度。事实基础上的对话、多元基础上的共识、科学基础上的决策，在数字时代的西方社会已经成为奢侈品。

(3) The anti-establishment tendency of digital space has impacted the system of representative democracy

（三）数字空间的反建制倾向冲击了代议民主制度

Bryan Caplan once pointed out: “The core argument for why democracy fails is that voters are worse than ignorant; in short, they are irrational, and they are irrational when they vote.” [17]17 Bryan Caplan, *The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies* (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2010), p. 2. New technology has not only failed to solve the problems of “ignorance” and “irrationality” in electoral politics but has instead increased public apathy and distrust toward politics, with anti-establishment and anti-authority populist sentiments continuously accumulating. Social platforms allow citizens to directly participate in political protests and express dissatisfaction, while also providing conditions for people to break free from dependence on traditional political parties and mainstream media.

布莱恩·卡普兰（Bryan Caplan）曾指出：“民主失灵的原因，核心观点在于，选民的状况比无知更糟糕，简言之，他们是非理性的，而且在投票时也是如此。”而新技术不仅未能解决选举政治中的“无知”和“非理性”问题，反而增加了民众对政治的不关心和不信任感，反建制、反权威的民粹情绪不断累积。社交平台让民众直接参与政治抗议、表达不满情绪的同时，也为人们摆脱对传统政党和主流媒体的依赖提供了条件。

First, digital life has fostered a rebellious mood among the masses. Digitalization is a process in which self-media replaces public media; this itself includes the masses’ resistance to elites, the disenchantment of commoners with authority, and the attack of the periphery of power on the center. Joseph S. Nye predicted as early as 2002 that both public media and the public sector would undergo a crisis of authority deconstruction triggered by the information revolution. [18]18 Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2002), p. 89. Western representative democracy was designed to prevent the “tyranny of the majority” and serves to filter and contain populism. Today, critical emotions that are difficult to express through formal institutions and channels have instead found an outlet in anonymous virtual spaces. On the one hand, the majority of netizens distance themselves from formal political life and public concerns; on the other hand, they enjoy anonymously participating in radical online criticism. In the post-truth public opinion environment, ordinary citizens find it difficult to see the full picture of events, are easily misled by false information and extreme speech, and are also easily attracted to anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, thereby triggering widespread social discontent.

首先，数字生活滋生了大众的反叛情绪。数字化是自媒体替代公共媒体的过程，这本身就包含了大众对精英的反抗、平民对权威的祛魅、权力边缘对中心的进攻。约瑟夫·奈（Joseph S. Nye）早在2002年便预见性地指出，无论是公共媒体，还是公共部门，都将经历一场由信息革命引发的权威解构危机。西方代议制民主是为防范“多数人暴政”而设计的，对民粹主义起着过滤和遏制的作用。而在今天，那些通过正式制度和渠道难以表达的批判性情绪转而将匿名的虚拟空间当成了宣泄口。多数网民一方面疏离正式的政治生活和公共关怀，另一方面却又喜欢匿名参与激进的在线批判。在后真相的舆论环境下，普通民众难以窥见事件的全貌，既容易被虚假信息和极端言论误导，也容易被反建制、反精英的言论吸引，从而引发普遍的社会不满情绪。

Second, social media has fueled collective protest actions. Even before the digital age, both *The Passing of Traditional Society* in the radio era and *Amusing Ourselves to Death* in the television era emphasized that communication technology drives social restructuring. [19]19 Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958); Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Viking, 1985). The dispersed and isolated individuals shaped by neoliberal society are aggregated and restructured by social media into political communities, because social media has the ability to gather “like-minded” people and, in an instant, achieve social mobilization through inflammatory content. All of this makes leaderless, centerless, and organizationless mass protest actions easier and more common, leading to a sharp increase in the political risks faced by representative democratic systems. From the 2011 Egyptian protests to the 2020 storming of the U.S. Capitol by Trump supporters, to the 2022 “Yellow Vest” movement and the 2023 French general strike, Twitter and Facebook have become the main organizational tools for numerous populist movements.

其次，社交媒体助长了集体抗议行动。即便在数字时代之前，无论是收音机时代的《传统社会的消逝》还是电视时代的《娱乐至死》，都强调传播技术推动了社会的重构。新自由主义社会塑造的分散而孤独的个体被社交媒体聚合重构为政治共同体，因为社交媒体有能力聚集起“志同道合”的人群，并有能力在瞬间通过煽动性内容实现社会动员。这些都使得无领导、无中心、无组织的大众抗议行动变得更加容易和普遍，导致代议制民主政体面临的政治风险陡增。从2011年埃及抗议到2020年特朗普支持者攻占国会山，再到2022年的“黄马甲”运动和2023年的法国大罢工，推特和脸书已经成为众多民粹主义运动的主要组织工具。

Finally, the digital revolution has impacted the existing democratic framework. First, for a long time, the convergence of left and right, political correctness, and the rotation of mainstream parties in power have made Western politics dull, lacking in policy competition and representativeness, causing large numbers of people to become the “silent majority” because they cannot find a sense of existence within the formal institutional framework. Today, however, people can use the internet to express radical demands and organize large-scale street protests, which are gradually exceeding the carrying capacity of modern Western democratic institutions. It can be said that in the digital age, the West is simultaneously facing the dilemma of “insufficient democratic supply” and “excessive democratic participation.” Second, the rise of digital power has broken the balance of power on which democracy depends for its survival. Newly risen tech elites and information oligarchs have gained powerful digital power, and “power–capital–technology” together determine the outcome of the democratic game. The rise of digital power provides populists with potential allies outside the formal system to draw upon. In this regard, Schiller points out: “As digital capitalism turns authoritarian, fragile democratic systems are being torn apart.” Francis Fukuyama and others also warn: “The political threat posed by digital monopoly platforms is far more alarming than their economic impact; its real danger is not distorting markets but threatening democracy.” Third, some of the roles and functions of traditional political parties have been weakened. Political parties occupy a central position in Western democratic politics, bearing political functions such as elite selection, aggregation of public opinion, and interest expression. In recent years, however, people have become more inclined toward direct expression and immediate action; the elite selection function of party organizations has been impacted by the spontaneous “god-making” movements on the internet; the intermediary function of parties has declined due to direct online connections between politicians and the people; and the functions of opinion aggregation and interest expression have been weakened by vigorous online political expression and participation. In contrast, the demand of populist parties for unmediated direct democracy has, to some extent, catered to this trend of party transformation. Alongside the decline of traditional parties, the party systems of Western multi-party states have shown a trend toward polarization and fragmentation, providing an opportunity for populist parties to confuse the public and manipulate public opinion.

最后，数字革命冲击了既有的民主框架。第一，长期以来，左右翼趋同、政治正确、主流政党轮流坐庄使得西方政治变得乏味、缺乏政策竞争、代表性不足，大批民众因在正式制度框架内找不到存在感而沦为“沉默的大多数”。而今天，民众可以利用网络表达激进诉求，组织大规模街头抗议，这些正逐渐超出现代西方民主制度的承载能力。可以说，在数字时代，西方正同时面临“民主供给不足”和“民主参与过度”的困境。第二，数字权力的崛起打破了民主赖以维系的权力制衡格局。新崛起的技术精英和信息寡头掌握了强大的数字权力，“权力—资本—技术”共同决定了民主游戏的结局。数字权力的崛起让民粹主义者在正式制度之外有了可供助力的潜在盟友。对此，席勒指出：“随着数字资本主义转向威权主义，纤弱的民主体系正在被撕裂。”弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）等也警告说：“数字垄断平台造成的政治威胁远比其经济影响更令人震惊，它真正的危险不是扭曲市场，而是威胁民主。”第三，传统政党的部分作用和功能遭到削弱。政党在西方民主政治中居于中心位置，它承担着精英遴选、民意聚合、利益表达等政治功能。但近年来，民众变得更加期望于直接的表达和即时的行动，政党组织的精英遴选功能受到了互联网上自发的造神运动的冲击；政党的中介功能因政治家和民众之间直接的网络联系而下降；政党的民意聚合和利益表达功能因旺盛的在线政治表达和参与而弱化。相比之下，民粹主义政党要求的无中介直接民主却在某种程度上迎合了这一政党变革趋势。伴随着传统政党的衰落，西方多党制国家的政党格局呈现出极化和碎片化的趋势，这为民粹主义政党混淆视听、驾驭民意提供了契机。

III. The Intrinsic Empowerment of Digital Technology for the Rise of Populism

三、数字技术对民粹主义崛起的内驱赋能

Digital technology not only creates a favorable environment for the breeding of populism from the outside; in terms of the development of populist forces themselves—from leader propaganda to party operations, from the dissemination of ideas to election campaigns—digital technology has been widely and actively applied, driving the rise of populism from within.

数字技术不仅从外部为民粹主义的滋生创造了有利环境，就民粹主义力量自身的发展来说，从领袖宣传到政党运作，从理念传播到竞选活动，数字技术都得到了广泛和积极的应用，从内部驱动了民粹主义的崛起。

(I) Relying on Social Media Platforms to Boost Populist Leaders

（一）依托社交平台捧红民粹主义领袖

The role of political leaders has been re-emphasized in the digital age. “In all liberal democracies, there is a trend toward the increasing personalization of politics… leaders play an increasingly important role.” The leader is the soul of the group, the primary factor in aggregating and unifying public opinion, organizing the group, and inspiring faith; operating around a charismatic leader is an important feature of populist parties. Examples include Jörg Haider of the Austrian Freedom Party, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the French National Front, Beppe Grillo of the Italian Five Star Movement, Matteo Salvini of the League Party, Le Pen of the French National Rally, Nigel Farage of the UK Brexit Party, and Geert Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom. Populist leaders oppose representation and prefer to make the people accept that they are “one of us”; they do not claim to “represent the people” but emphasize “I am the people.” “The relationship between the leader and his followers gives populist politics its own unique mode of identity.” Thus, populism endows charismatic leaders with an “authoritarian personality,” making the leader the embodiment of the “people” as a whole, achieving a concentration of power while touting democracy.

政治领袖的作用在数字时代被重新凸显出来。“所有自由民主国家都存在一种趋势，即政治越来越趋向人格化……领导人起到越来越重要的作用。”领袖是群体的灵魂，是聚合和统一民意、群体组织化、激发信仰的首要因素，围绕魅力型领袖运作是民粹主义政党的重要特征。例如，奥地利自由党的约尔格·海德尔（Jörg Haider）、法国国民阵线的让-马里·勒庞（Jean-Marie Le Pen）、意大利五星运动的贝佩·格里洛（Beppe Grillo）、联盟党的马泰奥·萨尔维尼（Matteo Salvini）、法国国民联盟的勒庞、英国脱欧党的奈杰尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）、荷兰自由党的基尔特·维尔德斯（Geert Wilders）等。民粹主义领袖反对代表制，更倾向于让民众接受其是“我们中的一员”，他们并不宣称自己“代表人民”，而是强调“我就是人民”。“领导者与其追随者之间的关系，使得民粹主义政治有了自身独特的认同模式。”由此可见，民粹主义赋予了魅力型领袖以“权威人格”，将领袖作为“人民”整体的化身，在标榜民主的同时也实现了权力的集中。

Populist leaders particularly value direct, effective, and concise dialogue with those people who previously rarely participated in politics and were not taken seriously. The vast majority of supporters often lack fixed institutionalized ties with populist leaders; “the strength of the internet seems to lie in bringing together large, loose, and geographically dispersed groups to pursue common goals.” The internet allows politicians to bypass existing intermediaries and organizations, directly using the online megaphone to stir up emotional resonance among the people. Facts have proven that the combination of “internet celebrity leader + populist discourse + social media” is extremely powerful; in this regard, it is not an exaggeration to say that “what populists are best at is taking power.” Before the UK Brexit referendum, then-Mayor of London Boris Johnson toured the UK in a bus emblazoned with “the UK sends £350 million a week to the EU” to campaign for Brexit, yet this statement itself was a lie. It is precisely the existence of a free and chaotic cyberspace and a large number of internet users lacking judgment that provides populists with an excellent political opportunity to fish in troubled waters and manipulate public opinion.

民粹主义领袖尤其重视与那些之前很少参与政治、不受重视的民众开展直接的、有效的、简明的对话。绝大多数支持者同民粹主义领袖之间往往并不存在固定的制度化纽带，“互联网的强项似乎在于将大量的、松散的和地理上分散的群体汇集起来去追求共同目标”，互联网允许政治家绕过既有的中介和组织机构，直接借助网络扩音器煽动起民众的情感共鸣。事实证明，“网红领袖+民粹主义话语+社交媒体”的组合极富威力，从这个方面来说，“民粹主义者最善长的是上台掌权”确不为过。在英国脱欧公投前，时任伦敦市长的鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）乘坐一辆写有“英国每周向欧盟提供3.5亿英镑”的大巴环游英国宣传脱欧，然而这句话本身就是谎言。正是自由而混乱的网络空间和大批缺乏判断力的网民的存在，为民粹主义者浑水摸鱼、操纵民意提供了绝佳的政治机会。

Although many populist politicians are “political novices” or “political outsiders,” they are well-versed in the laws of media communication and communication skills. Trump pioneered the precedent of a president using social media to bypass the White House Press Office and public media to express political views anytime, anywhere and directly dialogue with the people; “Trump marks the beginning of the era of microblog politics.” Grillo, the founder of the Italian Five Star Movement and a comedian, is adept at using humorous talk shows to satirize politics; these clips are widely circulated on social media platforms, and audiences unconsciously accept the temptation of populism while being entertained, thereby deepening their disdain for real politics. In similar examples, “serious important elections have turned into TV reality shows”; there is a close connection between the trend toward the entertainment of politics and the rise of populist leaders.

许多民粹主义政治家虽然是“政治素人”或者“政治门外汉”，但他们深谙媒体的传播规律和沟通技巧。特朗普开创了总统借助社交媒体越过白宫新闻办公室和公共媒体随时随地发表政见、直接与民众对话的先例，“特朗普标志微博政治时代的开始”。意大利五星运动创始人、喜剧演员格里洛善于运用幽默风趣的脱口秀讽刺政治，这些桥段在社交平台上流传甚广，观众在娱乐中不知不觉地接受着民粹主义的诱惑，从而加深了对现实政治的不屑。在类似的例子中，“严肃重要的竞选变成了电视真人秀”，政治的娱乐化倾向与民粹主义领导人的崛起之间存在着密切的关联。

(II) Using the Internet to Develop Populist Parties

（二）借助互联网发展民粹主义政党

For a long time, in the Western political landscape where center-left and center-right parties alternate in power, populist parties have occupied a marginal and non-mainstream position. Compared with traditional mainstream parties, the development of populist parties originally faced many difficulties—non-politically correct ideas, sensationalist rhetoric, and attacks on mainstream politics. These difficulties mean that they are not only often filtered out by the “gatekeeping” function of mass media but also bear enormous social criticism pressure. In terms of operation, these parties face problems such as loose and weak organization, low institutionalization, scattered and fragmented members and supporters, and a lack of stable financial support. The popularization of the internet has made flattening and decentralization a new trend in the development of party organizations, allowing populist parties to operate and propagandize at low cost without complex organizational structures and strict institutional rules, providing an opportunity for populist parties to overtake on the curve. Furthermore, the internet also provides a practical platform for populist parties to fulfill their promise of so-called “direct democracy” within the party.

长期以来，在中左和中右轮流上台的西方政治格局中，民粹主义政党居于边缘和非主流的地位。与传统主流政党相比，民粹主义政党的发展原本面临着诸多困难——非政治正确的理念、哗众取宠的言论、对主流政治的攻击，这些困难导致它们不仅常常被大众媒体的“守门”功能过滤掉，还要因此承受巨大的社会批评压力。在运作上，这些政党面临着组织松散弱小、制度化程度不高、党员和支持者零星而分散、缺乏稳定的资金支持等问题。而互联网的普及使得扁平化和去中心化成为政党组织发展的新趋势，它允许民粹主义政党抛开复杂的组织架构和严密的制度规则，以较低的成本进行运作和宣传，这为民粹主义政党弯道超车提供了契机。此外，互联网还为民粹主义政党在党内兑现其所谓“直接民主”的承诺提供了实践平台。

Against this backdrop, populist political parties that primarily operate through the internet have emerged in the West. The Italian Five Star Movement was founded in 2009; it lacks a fixed office, hierarchical organization, and financial support, relying entirely on online operations. The party refuses to be defined as a “political party,” claiming to draw a clear line with traditional politics. In 2018, it became the largest party in parliamentary elections and formed a populist government in coalition with another populist party, the League. The party advocates for unmediated internet-based direct democracy, using a platform called “Rousseau,” where members directly vote on the party’s platform, issue positions, party affairs decisions, and election candidates. In addition to the web platform, the Five Star Movement released a mobile app called “Rousseau X” on Christmas 2019, allowing members to participate in party activities anytime, anywhere. Despite its claim to democracy, the platform has many undemocratic aspects, mainly including the following: first, speech control—the platform blocks critical comments and covers them with the statement, “The Rousseau platform only accepts comments that align with our philosophy, and does not accept criticism.” Second, a lack of transparency—the platform’s operational rights and source code are controlled by its founder. The winner of the 2017 internal party leadership election was Di Maio, but the platform did not disclose specific voting data. Third, formal democracy outweighs substantive democracy—although the party claims that leadership appointments, candidate nominations, and policy platform formulation are all decided by member votes, actual member turnout is not high; even the participation rate for the party leadership election was only about 30%. Furthermore, the platform’s backend pre-designs policy options for the party’s election platform, allowing members to make online multiple-choice selections, which limits the actual policy choices. Even so, the party has gained strong social mobilization and appeal through its active online platform.

在这样的背景下，西方出现了主要依靠互联网运作的民粹主义政党。意大利五星运动于2009年创建，它缺乏固定办公地点、层级组织、经费支持，完全依靠线上运作。该党拒绝被定义为“政党”，标榜自己与传统政治划清界限。2018年，该党在议会选举中一举成为第一大党并与另一个民粹主义政党“联盟党”共同组阁成立了民粹主义政府。该党标榜无中介的互联网直接民主，借助一个名为“卢梭”的平台，由成员直接投票决定党的纲领、议题主张、党务决策和竞选候选人。除了网页平台，五星运动还在2019年圣诞节发布了名为“卢梭X”的手机端应用程序，方便成员随时随地参与党内活动。尽管标榜民主，但该平台也有诸多不民主之处，主要包括以下几个方面：一是言论控制，平台会屏蔽批评性留言并用一句“卢梭平台只接受认同我们理念的评论，不接受批评”覆盖。二是缺乏透明，平台的运营权和源代码程序掌握在其创始人手中。2017年党内领导人选举的获胜者是迪·马约（Di Maio），但平台并不公布具体投票数据。三是形式民主大于实质民主，该党虽标榜领导人任免、候选人提名、政策纲领制定全部由成员投票决定，但成员实际的投票率并不高，就连党领导人选举的参与率也只有30%左右。此外，平台后台会提前设计好政党竞选纲领的政策选项，让成员在线做选择题，这使实际政策选择空间有限。即便如此，该党仍凭借活跃的网络平台获得了极强的社会动员力和吸引力。

(3) Spreading Populist Political Discourse Through New Media

（三）通过新媒体散布民粹主义政治话语

Populists are well aware of the power of political discourse that is illogical but capable of attracting attention and inciting political emotions in the era of information fragmentation. They are adept at using “ultimate words” with blurred boundaries but easy to occupy moral high ground to construct political discourse, such as “we the people,” “democracy,” “patriotism,” “our ancestors,” and “our culture.” The characteristics of populist discourse on social media are: “ideology is fragmented, but it emphasizes popular sovereignty, attacks elites, excludes others, and uses heartland terms.” In short, rather than convincing through reason, they are better at moving through emotion; rather than engaging in complex policy debates, they specialize in inciting discontent; rather than proposing constructive solutions, they tend to merely criticize. The discourse style of populism is highly communicative, critical, infectious, and mobilizing. Its characteristics and functions can be briefly summarized as: using binary oppositions to divide friend from foe, using simplification and commonality to appeal to the majority, using provocative topics to attract public opinion, using direct democracy to bypass procedures, using political passion to dissolve rationality, using entertainment and satire to deconstruct authority, and finally using grievance and hatred to mobilize the masses.

民粹主义者十分清楚不讲逻辑但能够吸引注意力、煽动政治情绪的政治话语在信息碎片化时代的威力，他们善于运用内涵边界模糊却容易占据道德高位的“终极词汇”来编制政治话语，诸如“我们人民”“民主”“爱国”“我们的祖先”“我们的文化”等。社交媒体上的民粹主义话语特征是：“意识形态呈现碎片化，但强调人民主权、攻击精英、排斥他人、使用心脏地带的词语。”总之，相比以理服人，他们更擅长以情动人；相比参与复杂的政策辩论，他们更专于煽动不满；相比提出建设性方案，他们更倾向于只是批判。民粹主义的话语风格极富传播力、批判力、感染力、动员力，其特点及功能可以简单概括为：用二元对立划分了敌我，用简化通俗贴近了多数，用出位话题吸引了舆论，用直接民主越过了程序，用政治激情消解了理性，用娱乐讽刺解构了权威，最后又用悲情仇恨动员了大众。

In the past few years, under the influence of a series of crises such as the global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and regional conflicts, a restless anxiety and sense of crisis have swept through the spiritual world of ordinary Western people. Populists understand that negative pressures or negative information—such as a sense of deprivation in reality, uncertainty about the future, fear of unfamiliar ethnic groups and cultures, jealousy of the powerful, and a bias toward conspiracy theories and rumors—can more effectively arouse public concern. On the one hand, populists spread “manipulative false content that is unverified but more easily widely disseminated” on social media, using “negative, emotional, and popular” discourse to create a sense of insecurity; on the other hand, while constructing fear, they blame domestic or external “scapegoats,” mobilizing the masses to liberate themselves, attack “enemies,” and thereby legitimize their own policy proposals. Oxford professor Ralph Schroeder points out that populists are well aware that their propaganda in the social media space is enough to offset defamation from traditional media.

过去的几年里，在全球金融危机、新冠疫情、地区冲突等一系列危机的影响下，浮躁的焦虑感和危机感已经席卷了西方普通民众的精神世界。民粹主义者明白，现实中的被剥夺感、对未来的不确定感、对陌生民族和文化的恐惧感、对得势者的嫉妒心、对阴谋论和小道消息的偏信等负面压力或者消极信息更能激发民众的关切。民粹主义者一方面通过在社交媒体上散布“未经证实但又更容易广泛传播的操纵性虚假内容”，利用“消极性、情感性和大众性”的话语营造不安全感，另一方面又在构建恐惧的同时归咎于国内或者外部的“替罪羊”，动员民众自我解放、打击“敌人”并顺势将自己的政策提案合法化。牛津大学教授拉尔夫·施罗德（Ralph Schroeder）指出，民粹主义者深知他们在社交媒体空间的宣传足以抵消来自传统媒体的诋毁。

Populists often have higher online activity levels. Although polls before the Brexit referendum showed that the “Remain” camp had only a slight numerical advantage, statistics indicate that on Twitter, the number of active “Leave” supporters was seven times that of “Remain” supporters. The official “Vote Leave” campaign spent over £2.7 million on political advertising on Facebook, with these ads receiving over 169 million views. The Leave camp used intuitive information on social media to convey high-arousal emotions such as anger and resentment, promoting the viral spread of the Leave position among young people and grassroots groups.

民粹主义者往往具有更高的网络活跃度。尽管脱欧公投前民调显示“留欧派”人数仅略占优势，但统计数据显示，在推特上，脱欧派活跃人数是留欧派的七倍。“投票脱欧”（Vote Leave）官方在脸书上投入了超过270万英镑投放政治广告，这些广告的浏览量超过1.69亿次。脱欧阵营在社交媒体上通过直观的信息传导着愤怒、怨恨等高唤醒度的情绪，促进了脱欧主张在年轻人和草根阶层中的病毒式传播。

(4) Using Algorithmic Technology to Interfere with Voting and Elections

（四）利用算法技术干扰投票选举

Elections and voting are hallmark procedures of Western democratic operations, and also the stage for populist leaders and parties to showcase their image, expand political influence, peddle policy proposals, and seize political power. The limitations of populist parties in elections are very obvious: they are often small, underfunded, and suppressed by mainstream media; moreover, many potential supporters of populism are either dissatisfied with mainstream politics, politically apathetic, lacking political knowledge or interest, or hold extreme political attitudes, often residing in marginal areas beyond the reach of campaign propaganda. However, the spread of the internet and the emergence of algorithmic technology have provided opportunities for populist parties to overcome their own limitations, find these scattered individuals, and carry out precise campaign propaganda and mobilization. Populist parties have largely abandoned the strategy of using expensive mainstream media for campaign propaganda, instead choosing to allocate limited funds to efficiently push targeted political ads on social media, search engines, and portal web pages.

选举和投票是西方民主程序运作的标志性环节，也是民粹主义领袖和政党展现自身形象、扩大政治影响、兜售政策主张、攫取政治权力的舞台。民粹主义政党在选举中的局限性十分明显，它们往往规模小、资金不足，被主流媒体打压；而民粹主义的许多潜在支持者或对主流政治不满、对政治冷漠，或对政治缺乏常识和兴趣，或者持有极端的政治态度，他们往往居于竞选宣传活动难以触及的边缘地带。但是，互联网的普及和算法技术的出现为民粹主义政党突破自身局限、找到这些分散个体、开展精准的竞选宣传动员提供了机遇。民粹主义政党基本放弃了通过价格不菲的主流媒体开展竞选宣传的策略，转而选择将有限的资金用于在社交媒体、搜索引擎、门户网站网页上高效推送定向政治广告。

Ted Brader points out: “Elections are the most passionate endeavor in modern Western political life; the art of campaigning lies in personalized contact, touching stories, compelling rhetoric, and clever political ads.” Currently, these techniques he mentions have been integrated by populists through algorithmic push. Algorithmic political advertising is the most powerful and cost-effective campaign tool in Western elections today. It collects private information about voters—such as occupation, interests, social relationships, and political leanings—to classify voters with labels. For example, it can easily identify those lacking political knowledge, the politically apathetic, those with unstable political leanings, environmentalists, feminists, etc. The system then delivers tailored political ads online to different types of voters, aiming to influence their political psychology and voting behavior. For a long time, in many Western elections, the vote share gap between the two sides has been narrow, and voter turnout has been low, which means populists only need to influence or mobilize a small number of people to sway the final election outcome.

泰德·布拉德尔（Ted Brader）指出：“选举是西方现代政治生活中最富有激情的事业，竞选的艺术在于个性化的接触、触动人心的故事、动人的言辞和高明的政治广告。”当前，他提到的这些技巧被民粹主义者借助算法推送整合了起来。算法政治广告是当今西方选举中最富威力和性价比的竞选宣传工具，它通过收集选民的职业、兴趣、社交关系、政治倾向等私人信息，对选民进行标签化分类。例如，它可以轻易识别政治常识缺乏者、政治冷漠者、政治倾向不稳定者、环境保护主义者、女权主义者等，之后系统会向不同类型的选民在线投放为其量身定做的政治广告，以期影响其政治心理和投票行为。长期以来，在西方许多选举中，选举双方的得票率差距不大，且民众投票率不高，这使得民粹主义者只需要干预或者动员一小部分人，就能左右最终投票结果。

In two “black swan” events in 2016, data companies such as Cambridge Analytica and AggregateIQ helped the Leave campaign place more than one billion highly inflammatory algorithmic advertisements before the UK Brexit referendum, and also helped Donald Trump in the United States focus algorithmic advertising on swing states. These actions were exposed and sparked heated debate with the Facebook “data breach” incident. Before the 2017 German federal election, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), cooperating with Harris Media, which had previously successfully intervened in the Kenyan election, used Facebook user data to divide target voters into seven groups, among which identities such as business owners, unionized workers, and mothers were identified as key intervention targets. The party’s interaction frequency with users on social media was more than ten times that of other parties, and it became the third-largest party and the largest opposition party in the 2017 federal election. Because algorithmic technology posed a major threat to electoral fairness and political security, European and American countries successively enacted legislation to restrict targeted political advertising. Before the 2020 US presidential election, Google and Twitter successively announced a ban on competitive targeted political advertising, and Facebook announced it would stop placing targeted ads one week before the election. Even so, Trump’s campaign app still required users to authorize location access during installation to facilitate targeted outreach in specific constituencies.

在2016年的两场“黑天鹅”事件中，剑桥分析、聚合智囊等数据公司在英国脱欧公投前曾帮助脱欧派投放了超过10亿条极具煽动性的算法广告，还帮助美国特朗普在摇摆州着重进行算法广告投放，这些行为随着脸书“数据门”事件曝光并引发热议。在2017年德国议会选举前，德国选择党（AfD）与曾成功干预肯尼亚大选的哈里斯传媒合作，通过脸书的用户数据将目标选民分为七个群体，其中，企业主、参加工会的工人、母亲等身份被识别出来作为重点干预对象。该党在社交媒体上与用户的互动频率超过其他政党10倍以上，在2017年议会选举中成为德国第三大党和最大反对党。由于算法技术对选举公正和政治安全构成了重大威胁，欧美国家纷纷立法对定向政治广告加以限制。在2020年美国大选投票前，谷歌和推特先后宣布禁止竞争性的定向政治广告，脸书宣布选举投票前一周停止投放定向广告。即便如此，特朗普的竞选应用程序在安装时仍要求用户允许授权使用位置以方便开展特定选区的定向宣传。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

Populism is often seen as a signal that Western societies are facing systemic crises and pressures for change, but what is more worth exploring than the phenomenon of populism itself is the generative mechanism behind it. The digital revolution has brought new modes of value creation and logics of interest distribution, from the impact of digital modes of life and production on the material and spiritual conditions of micro-level individuals, to the digital reshaping of the economic, cultural, and political spheres, to the challenges faced by the value foundations and institutional frameworks of Western democracy. Capitalist society is undergoing a great transformation driven by the technological revolution. In the process of capitalism’s continuous enhancement of productive forces, the contradictory movements of exploitation and resistance to exploitation, inequality and the pursuit of equality, elitism and democratization increasingly manifest as the eternal driving force of changes in human society. The rise of Western populism is a concentrated reflection of the inherent contradictions of capitalist society.

民粹主义常常被视为西方社会正面临系统性危机和变革压力的信号，而比民粹主义现象本身更值得探究的是其背后的生成机理。数字革命带来了新的价值创造方式和利益分配逻辑，从数字生活生产方式对微观个体的物质和精神状况的影响，到经济、文化、政治等领域的数字化重塑，再到西方民主的价值基石与制度框架面临的挑战，资本主义社会在科技革命的助推下正经历一场巨变。在资本主义不断提高生产力的过程中，压榨与反对压榨、不平等与追求平等、精英化与民主化的矛盾运动愈加表现为人类社会变迁的永恒动力，西方民粹主义的崛起是对资本主义社会固有矛盾的集中反映。

The rise of populism indicates that the old system of Western democracy has fallen into a predicament of rupture and continuity under new technological conditions. First, the traditional public sphere of opinion has already collapsed, with severe group value differentiation and party political polarization, and a new communicative field for rational public discussion and consensus-building has not yet formed. Second, traditional political elites and authority are facing challenges, while new digital power has risen and seeks collusion with political power and capital, posing risks of uncontrolled politics. Third, public management empowered by surveillance capitalism lacks value appeal and moral persuasion for the Western public. “The technocratic administrative management of industrial society renders any democratic formation of will an objectless thing.” [29]29 Jürgen Habermas, “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’,” in *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 106. The function of democracy is not only to pursue efficiency but also to satisfy individuals’ sense of participation and dignity in the political process. The rise of populism is precisely a response to Western democracy and mainstream political parties’ long-term avoidance of issues, neglect of public opinion, and lack of representation. Finally, the rise of populism is also a reaction of Western people to the decline of “human value” in the digital age. It forces people to rethink the philosophy concerning “the human” in a new environment where technological development advances rapidly day by day, which will inevitably rekindle the core concerns of humanism. Western democracy is facing the danger of being torn apart by new technology, which makes Jürgen Habermas’s question from more than half a century ago even more meaningful: “The question we pose is the relationship between technology and democracy, namely, how can the technical power that people have mastered be used in reverse for the consensus of citizens engaged in production and conversation?” [30]30 Jürgen Habermas, “The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion,” in *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 57. Technology itself is neutral; technology can benefit the majority, but the prerequisite is to embed the value of “the human” throughout the entire process of technological development. The absence of “the human” is precisely the root of the rise of populism from the perspective of the philosophy of technology. Today’s Western society urgently needs a new humanist movement in the digital age.

民粹主义的崛起表明，西方民主这套旧制度在新技术条件下陷入了断裂与接续的困境之中。首先，传统的公共舆论空间已然坍缩，群体价值分化和政党政治极化严重，可供理性公共讨论并达成共识的新传播场域还未形成。其次，传统的政治精英和权威正遭遇挑战，新的数字权力崛起并寻求与政治权力和资本的合谋，存在失控的政治风险。再次，监控资本主义赋能下的公共管理对西方公众来说缺乏价值感召力和道德说服力，“工业社会的技术统治论的行政管理，使任何民主的意志形成变为没有对象的东西”，民主的功能不只是追求效率，还包括满足个体在政治过程中的参与感和尊严感，而民粹主义的崛起正是对西方民主和主流政党长期回避问题、忽视民意、代表性不足的回应。最后，民粹主义的崛起也是西方民众对数字时代“人的价值”面临衰退的一种反应，它迫使人们在科技发展一日千里的新环境下重新思考关涉“人”的哲学，这必将再度激发人文主义的核心关切。西方民主正面临被新技术撕裂的危险，这让于尔根·哈贝马斯（Jürgen Habermas）半个多世纪前的提问变得更有意义：“我们提出的问题是技术和民主的关系问题，即如何把人们所掌握的技术力量，反过来使用于从事生产的和进行交谈的公民的共识？”技术本身是中性的，技术可以为多数人谋福利，但前提是要将“人”的价值植入技术发展的全过程。“人”的缺位恰是技术哲学视野下民粹主义崛起的根源，今天的西方社会亟需一场数字时代的新人文主义运动。

(Author’s bio: Yang Chunlin, Institute of Contemporary Socialism, Shandong University)

（作者简介：杨春林，山东大学当代社会主义研究所）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心