The Political Pathology of the “Economic Resource Curse”: Research Evolution and Knowledge Genealogy

I. Introduction

一、引言

For most resource-rich countries, the slowdown or even stagnation of economic growth is the main symptom accompanying their resource development and export. This pathological phenomenon, labeled the “economic resource curse,” and its generative mechanisms constitute a highly controversial research topic and an extremely important research agenda within political science. For a long time, research in this field has primarily revolved around discussions of the reality of the “economic resource curse” [1] phenomenon, its generative mechanisms, and the conditions under which it arises. Among these, a consensus has gradually formed regarding the reality of the phenomenon; debates on the conditions for its emergence are burgeoning; while research on its generative mechanisms—that is, the pathological study of the “economic resource curse”—remains in a phase of intense debate, with traditional explanations becoming increasingly refined, new explanations emerging constantly, and alternative explanations clashing fiercely.

就大多数资源丰裕国而言，经济增长的趋缓甚至停滞是与其资源开发和出口伴随而来的主要表征。这种被冠以“经济资源诅咒”的病理现象及其生成机制是政治学中颇具争议的研究议题与极其重要的研究议程。长期以来，该领域内的研究主要围绕“经济资源诅咒”

At present, a comprehensive review of the existing stock of research on the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse,” rather than blindly expanding its increment, is an urgent task for this field. This is mainly because: on the one hand, although a large number of empirical studies have offered many viewpoints on the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse,” their mutually falsifying argumentative orientation has not only failed to substantially advance the discussion of this issue at the theoretical level but has also caused complexity and fragmentation in the argumentation at the empirical level. In response, this article does not seek to engage in direct dialogue with the aforementioned studies through empirical analysis but instead attempts to step outside their falsification framework and, within the scope of political science, re-examine the pathological mechanisms by which the “economic resource curse” is generated by sorting through the main findings and progress of relevant research. On the other hand, after decades of development, political science research on the “economic resource curse” has formed a vast knowledge network, meaning that sorting out the research genealogy and reflecting on the research process is itself an important part of this field. However, earlier literature reviews are far from sufficient to depict the recent progress in this field; and recent literature reviews are not only few in number but are mostly confined to the subfields of their respective authors, unable to comprehensively present the basic landscape of the field’s development. In response, this article attempts to systematically sort out the macro context and major progress of the political pathology of the “economic resource curse.”

现象的真实性、生成机制以及生成的条件展开讨论。其中，关于其现象真实性的讨论已逐渐形成共识；关于其生成条件的思辨方兴未艾；而关于其生成机制的研究，即“经济资源诅咒”的病理学研究仍处于激烈大辩论阶段，传统的解释愈加精细，新兴的解释层出不穷，替代性解释激烈交锋。

Based on this, the remainder of this article analyzes from five aspects: the second part traces the evolutionary history of the pathology of the “economic resource curse” along the temporal dimension. The third part depicts the current disciplinary distribution of research in this field along the horizontal dimension of disciplines. The fourth part, within the disciplinary scope of political science, presents the main intellectual contributions that reveal the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse.” The fifth part discusses the main dilemmas currently facing this field and future research agendas. The sixth part is the conclusion.

当前，全面检视“经济资源诅咒”生成机制研究的存量，而非盲目拓展其增量是该领域研究的当务之急。这主要是因为：一方面，尽管有大量的实证研究针对“经济资源诅咒”的生产机制提供了诸多观点，但其相互证伪的论证取向不仅在学理层面并未实质性地推动该问题的讨论，反而还在经验层面造成了论证的复杂化和碎片化。对此，本文并未寻求通过实证分析与上述研究直接进行对话，而是试图跳出其证伪藩篱，在政治学范畴内通过梳理相关研究的主要发现和进展来重新检视“经济资源诅咒”得以生成的病理机制。另一方面，关于“经济资源诅咒”的政治学研究历经数十年的发展已经形成了庞大的知识脉络，这意味着对研究谱系的梳理与研究进程的反思本身就是该领域研究的重要一环。然而早年的文献梳理已经远不足以刻画该领域研究的新晋进展；而近年的文献梳理不但在数量上寥寥无几，并且多以作者所在的分支领域画地为牢，无法全面呈现该领域发展的基本面貌。对此，本文试图系统梳理“经济资源诅咒”的政治病理学的宏观脉络与主要进展。

II. The Evolutionary History of the Pathology of the “Economic Resource Curse”

基于此，本文其余部分从五个方面进行分析：第二部分按照时间的纵向维度追溯了“经济资源诅咒”病理学的演进历程。第三部分按照学科的横向维度刻画了当前该领域研究的学科分布。第四部分在政治学的学科范畴内呈现了揭示“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的主要智识。第五部分探讨了当前该领域研究的主要困境和未来的研究议程。第六部分是结论。

Looking back to the 18th and 19th centuries, classical economists at that time had already recognized the positive role of resources in economic growth, but they clearly paid insufficient attention to their potential constraining effects. Scholars such as William Petty each expounded that resources in a broad sense, represented by land, contributed to the creation of private wealth and national economic growth. However, in their view, compared to resources, labor and capital played a much more important role in economic growth. This insufficient awareness of resource constraints was criticized by Richard Auty as “the careless arrogance of economists... in the 19th century,” and under the influence of research inertia, it led subsequent economists to fail for a long time to effectively focus on and seriously discuss the constraining role of resources on economic growth.

二、“经济资源诅咒”病理学的演进历程

It was not until the 1950s–1970s that some structuralist economists noticed the phenomenon of developing countries exporting resources and the associated unequal exchange; the corresponding discussions can be regarded as the first phase of research on the pathology of the “economic resource curse.” At that time, economists represented by Arthur Lewis and Jacob Viner firmly believed that resource-rich developing countries would achieve faster economic growth than resource-poor developing countries, because resources could provide the necessary capital for industrialization and export diversification. This view was criticized and challenged by structuralist economists, and the debate over the relationship between resources and economic growth became one of the focal points of the debate between structuralist and non-structuralist economics throughout the 1950s–1970s. At that time, development economists such as Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer observed the “anomalous phenomenon” in some developing countries in Latin America and Africa that, despite exporting large quantities of resources, failed to achieve economic growth. To this end, they provided explanations from three aspects: first, the conditions for developing countries to participate in international trade and their own endowments differed significantly from those of developed countries, making it difficult for the former’s resource endowments to naturally transform into drivers of economic growth as they did for the latter. Second, the sharp fluctuations in resource prices in the international market would be transmitted to the domestic economies of resource-exporting countries, affecting their government fiscal and foreign exchange revenues. Third, resource development and export dominated by Western resource companies resulted in unequal exchange between developing and developed countries; resource exports did not actually create additional profits for resource-exporting countries that could drive the development of other industries. It can be said that structuralist economists provided the earliest explanations for the causes of the “economic resource curse.”

回溯至18到19世纪，当时古典经济学家已经认识到了资源对于经济增长的积极作用，但对其可能起到的约束作用则显然关注不足。诸如威廉·配第（William Petty）等学者各自阐述了以土地为代表的广义上的资源有助于私人财富的创造和国家经济的增长。然而在他们看来，相较于资源，劳动力和资本显然对经济增长的作用要重要得多。这种对资源约束性的认知不足被理查德·奥蒂（Richard Auty）批评为“经济学家……在19世纪的粗心自大”，并且在研究惯性的影响下，导致后续的经济学者长期未能有效地关注和严肃地探讨资源对经济增长的制约作用。

From the 1970s to the early 1990s, the second phase benefited from innovations in observational perspectives and core concepts, and the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” gradually gained attention from mainstream economics. If the first phase of research was driven by the critique of structuralist economics, then the second phase was clearly driven by innovations in core concepts. This phase can be further divided into three waves based on differences in core concepts: the first wave originated in 1970 with Hussein Mahdavy’s discussion of the rent-seeking effects in Middle Eastern resource-exporting countries; his pioneering concept of the “rentier state” was also the earliest abstract description of the “resource curse.” The second wave began in 1982 with Max Corden and Peter Neary’s discussion of the deindustrialization phenomenon in the Netherlands following the development of the Groningen gas field; their pioneering concept of the “Dutch disease” is regarded as an important concept for depicting the pathological mechanism of the “economic resource curse.” The third wave began in 1988 with Alan Gelb’s discussion of oil “windfalls,” and more symbolically, in 1993 Auty first used the concept of the “resource curse” and systematically proposed the hypothesis that resources drag down economic growth. These literary concepts not only successfully attracted high attention from academia, policy circles, and even the public, but the innovations in observational perspectives behind them also propelled research on the causes of the “economic resource curse” to rapidly mature.

直至1950—1970年代，部分结构主义经济学家注意到发展中国家出口资源以及与之伴随的不等价交换现象，相应的讨论可被视为“经济资源诅咒”病理学的第一阶段研究。当时以阿瑟·刘易斯（Arthur Lewis）和雅各布·维纳（Jacob Viner）为代表的经济学家坚信，资源丰富的发展中国家要比资源贫乏的发展中国家实现更快的经济增长，其原因在于资源能够提供必要的资本以实现工业化和出口多元化。这一观点受到了结构主义经济学家的批评和挑战，而围绕资源与经济增长关系的争论也成为了贯穿1950—1970年代结构主义与非结构主义经济学的辩论焦点之一。当时劳尔·普雷维什（Raul Prebisch）和汉斯·辛格（Hans Singer）等发展经济学者观察到拉丁美洲与非洲的部分发展中国家大量出口资源却未能实现经济增长的“反常现象”。为此，他们从三个方面提供了解释：其一，发展中国家参与国际贸易的条件和自身禀赋与发达国家差异明显，这使得前者的资源禀赋很难像后者那样自然而然地转化成为经济增长动力。其二，国际市场上资源价格的剧烈波动会传导至资源出口国的国内经济，影响其政府财政和外汇收入。其三，由西方资源公司主导的资源开发和出口造成了发展中国家与发达国家的不等价交换，资源出口实际上并未给资源出口国创造出能够推动其他产业发展的额外利润。可以说，结构主义经济学家为“经济资源诅咒”的成因提供了最早的解释。

From the second phase, spanning the 1970s to the early 1990s, thanks to innovations in observational perspectives and core concepts, the generative mechanisms of the "economic resource curse" gradually attracted the attention of mainstream economics. If the first phase of research was driven by critiques from structuralist economics, then the second phase was clearly driven by innovations in core concepts. This phase can be further divided into three waves based on differences in core concepts: the first wave originated in 1970 with Hussein Mahdavy's discussion of the rent-seeking effects in Middle Eastern resource-exporting countries; his pioneering concept of the "rentier state" also constitutes the earliest abstract description of the "resource curse." The second wave began in 1982 with Max Corden and Peter Neary's examination of the deindustrialization phenomenon in the Netherlands following the development of the Groningen gas field; their pioneering concept of "Dutch disease" is regarded as an important concept for depicting the pathological mechanisms of the "economic resource curse." The third wave started in 1988 with Alan Gelb's discussion of oil "windfalls," and more symbolically, in 1993, Auty first used the concept of the "resource curse" and systematically put forward the hypothesis that resources drag down economic growth. These concepts, with their literary flair, not only successfully attracted high attention from academia, policy circles, and even the general public, but the innovations in observational perspectives behind them also propelled the study of the causes of the "economic resource curse" toward rapid maturity.

自1970—1990年代初的第二阶段得益于观察视角及核心概念的创新，“经济资源诅咒”的生成机制逐渐得到了主流经济学的关注。如果说第一阶段的研究是由结构主义经济学的批判所驱动的话，那么第二阶段的研究显然是由核心概念的创新驱动的。这一阶段又可以根据核心概念的差异被进一步分为三个波次：其中第一波滥觞于1970年侯赛因·马哈达维（Hussein Mahdavy）对中东资源出口国寻租效应的讨论，其首创的“食利者国家”概念也是对“资源诅咒”最早的抽象描述。第二波肇始于1982年马克斯·科登（Max Corden）和彼得·内里（Peter Neary）关于在格罗宁根天然气开发之后荷兰去工业化现象的探讨，其首创的“荷兰病”概念被视为刻画“经济资源诅咒”病理机制的重要概念。第三波则始于1988年艾伦·盖尔布对石油“意外之财”的讨论，而更具标志性的是1993年奥蒂首次使用了“资源诅咒”的概念并且系统提出了资源拖累经济增长的猜想。上述带有文学色彩的概念不仅成功吸引到了学界、政策界甚至大众的高度关注，其背后的观察视角创新更是推动“经济资源诅咒”的成因研究迅速走向成熟。

From the mid-1990s to the present, in the third phase, driven by both mechanism exploration and empirical testing, the pathology of the “economic resource curse” has become more scholarly and refined. Since the groundbreaking empirical study by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner in 1995, research on the causes of the “resource curse” has fully entered a new stage of uncovering pathological mechanisms and subjecting them to empirical testing. Based on differences in explanatory variables and mechanisms chosen, this phase can be roughly divided into two waves: the first wave originated with the aforementioned study by Sachs and Warner. Inspired by this research, economists, on the one hand, conducted detailed tests of traditional explanatory mechanisms such as “Dutch disease,” price volatility, and terms of trade; on the other hand, they also revealed new mechanisms affecting economic growth, such as resource type and debt. The precursor to the second wave lies in Terry Lynn Karl’s exploration of the “paradox of plenty” in oil states, but its substantive starting point should be traced back to Michael Ross’s 1999 exposition of the “political economy of the resource curse.” At this point, the pathology of the “economic resource curse” formally entered the research agenda of political science. Subsequently, political scientists have attempted, through empirical research, to explore the roots of the “economic resource curse” from perspectives such as rent-seeking, civil war, and state capacity. Unlike the three successive waves of the second phase, the two waves of the third phase, after emerging separately, have developed in parallel and continue to do so to the present day.

自1990年代中期至今的第三阶段，在机制发掘和实证检验的双重驱动下，“经济资源诅咒”的病理学更为学理化和精细化。自杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffrey Sachs）与安德鲁·华纳（Andrew Warner）1995年的开创性实证研究起，“资源诅咒”的成因研究全面迈入了发掘病理机制并加以实证检验的全新阶段。根据解释变量和机制的选择差异，这一阶段又可以被粗略地划分为两个波次：其中第一波滥觞于萨克斯与华纳的上述研究。在这项研究的启发下，经济学家一方面对“荷兰病”、价格波动、贸易条件等传统的解释机制进行细致的检验；另一方面也揭示了诸如资源类型、债务等影响经济增长的新机制。第二波的先声在于泰瑞·林·卡尔（Terry Lynn Karl）对石油国家“丰裕的悖论”的探讨，但其实质性的起点则应回溯至迈克尔·罗斯（Michael Ross）于1999年对“资源诅咒政治经济学”的阐述。至此，“经济资源诅咒”的病理学正式进入政治学的研究议程，此后政治学家纷纷尝试通过实证研究从寻租、内战、国家能力等角度出发探讨“经济资源诅咒”的生成根源。与第二阶段前后承袭的三个波次不同，第三阶段的两个波次各自兴起后呈现出并行发展的态势并持续至今。

III. Disciplinary Distribution of Research on the Pathology of the “Economic Resource Curse”

三、“经济资源诅咒”病理学研究的学科分布

Current pathological research on the “economic resource curse” has already exhibited distinct multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary characteristics. Although using disciplinary categories as the thread for literature review is somewhat self-limiting, the disciplinary attributes of variable selection and analytical perspectives in exploring the causes of the “economic resource curse” remain clearly demarcated. Overall, research across different disciplines shows a micro-macro level divergence. Some disciplines focus on using micro-level variables to examine the “economic resource curse” and its governance within specific administrative regions of a country, while other disciplines tend more toward cross-national comparisons and exploration of structural causes of the “economic resource curse” at the macro level.

当前“经济资源诅咒”的病理学研究已经呈现出明显的多学科和跨学科特质。尽管以学科门类作为文献梳理的脉络难免有些画地为牢，但探索“经济资源诅咒”成因的研究在变量选择和分析视角上的学科属性仍泾渭分明。总的来看，不同学科内的研究呈现出了微观与宏观的层次分野。其中一部分学科侧重于借助微观变量探讨国家内部特定行政区的“经济资源诅咒”及其治理，而另一部分学科则更倾向于从宏观层面进行“经济资源诅咒”的跨国比较与结构性成因的探讨。

At the micro level, research on the “economic resource curse” is mainly concentrated in disciplines such as regional economics, administrative management, human geography, and environmental sociology. As the largest branch at the micro level, research within the scope of regional economics primarily analyzes variables such as technological innovation, social capital, and human resources to examine the reasons why specific regions within a country fall into or avoid the “economic resource curse.” Research within the scope of administrative management mostly focuses on aspects closely related to government or state governance, such as corruption, political culture, macro-policy, bureaucratic administrative capacity, fiscal revenue and expenditure, or government functions, to explore the causes and governance of the “economic resource curse.” Research within the scope of human geography mainly studies the causes of the “resource curse” by analyzing geography-related variables such as resource spatial structure and geographical location. As another major branch at the micro level, research within the scope of environmental sociology discusses the causes of the “economic resource curse” more broadly. However, because environmental sociology itself is highly focused on resource issues, its variable and perspective choices are more generalized and complex. Besides the above four disciplines, disciplines such as anthropology, which were previously considered relatively distant from or not directly related to the pathology of the “economic resource curse,” have also begun to explore the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” at the micro level.

在微观层次上，“经济资源诅咒”的研究主要集中在区域经济学、行政管理学、人文地理学、环境社会学等学科。作为微观层次最庞大的分支，区域经济学范畴内的研究主要通过分析技术创新、社会资本、人力资源等变量来检视一国内部特定地区陷入或避免“经济资源诅咒”的原因。行政管理学范畴内的研究多聚焦于从腐败、政治文化、宏观政策、官僚行政能力、财政收支或政府职能等与政府或国家治理密切相关的方面探讨“经济资源诅咒”的成因和治理。人文地理学范畴内的研究主要通过分析资源空间结构、地理区位等与地理相关的变量来研究“资源诅咒”的成因。作为微观层次的另一大分支，环境社会学范畴内的研究更为宽泛地讨论了“经济资源诅咒”的成因。然而，由于环境社会学本身高度聚焦于资源议题，其变量及视角选择更为泛化庞杂。除了以上四个学科外，人类学等早前被视为与“经济资源诅咒”病理学较为疏离或不直接相关的学科也开始在微观层次探讨“经济资源诅咒”的生成机制。

Overall, the above research discussing the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” at the micro level exhibits the following four characteristics: First, it focuses more on analyzing the empirical phenomenon of the “economic resource curse” at the level of subnational administrative regions, with the identification and narrative style of this empirical phenomenon clearly differing from cross-national comparisons. Second, focusing on phenomena within a single country allows for effective control of many variables, resulting in relatively small heterogeneity between different samples. Therefore, these studies often treat macro-level variables such as political institutions, degree of democracy, and international resource prices as micro-level constants. Third, they primarily explore micro-level variables such as negotiation processes, contract disclosure, transparency, agreement signing, auction design, regional technological innovation, and local administrative capacity, along with the micro-level mechanisms leading to the “economic resource curse,” and use micro-level socioeconomic data for analysis. Fourth, they mostly propose policy recommendations for mitigating or avoiding the “economic resource curse” following scholarly discussion.

总的来看，上述在微观层次讨论“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的研究呈现出以下四个特点：第一，更聚焦于对一国国内地区行政区层面“经济资源诅咒”的经验现象进行剖析，对这种经验现象的识别和叙事方式明显有别于跨国比较。第二，聚焦于一国内部的现象使得诸多变量都得到了有效的控制，不同样本之间的异质性相对较小。因此，这些研究多将政治制度、民主程度、国际资源价格等宏观层面的变量作为微观层面的常量。第三，主要探讨诸如谈判过程、合同披露、透明度、协议签订、拍卖设计、区域技术创新、地方行政能力等微观变量及其导致“经济资源诅咒”的微观机制，并且使用微观社会经济数据进行分析。第四，多在学理性讨论之后提出了缓解或避免“经济资源诅咒”的政策性建议。

At the macro level, pathological research on the “economic resource curse” is mainly concentrated in disciplines such as development economics, international economics, comparative political economy, and international political economy. As the largest branch at the macro level, research within the scope of development economics broadly explores the causes of the “economic resource curse” from perspectives such as factor prices, crowding-out effects, debt levels, and inequality. Research within the scope of international economics primarily analyzes the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” based on perspectives such as terms of trade and resource price volatility. Particularly under open economy conditions, the impact of international trade terms and commodity prices on national economic growth is extremely significant, and research within the scope of international economics has fully explored this. Research within the scope of comparative political economy mostly examines variables such as rent-seeking, corruption, civil war, and domestic institutional quality to study the causes of the “economic resource curse.” Overall, research within the scope of comparative political economy not only emphasizes the aforementioned political variables but also focuses on discussing political processes. Research within the scope of international political economy integrates variables from international economics and comparative political economy; thus, compared to the former, it focuses more on studying political processes, while compared to the latter, it places greater emphasis on analyzing the impact of, for example, international trade, international migration, globalization processes, international reputation, and other global activities on resource politics.

在宏观层次上，“经济资源诅咒”的病理学研究主要集中在发展经济学、国际经济学、比较政治经济学、国际政治经济学等学科。作为宏观层次最庞大的分支，发展经济学范畴内的研究从要素价格、挤出效应、债务水平、不平等程度等视角出发对“经济资源诅咒”的成因进行了宽泛的探讨。国际经济学范畴内的研究主要基于贸易条件、资源价格波动等视角分析了“经济资源诅咒”的生成机制。特别是在开放经济条件下，国际贸易条件及大宗商品价格对国家经济增长的影响极其显著，国际经济学范畴内的研究对此进行了充分的探讨。比较政治经济学范畴内的研究大多着眼于寻租、腐败、内战、国内制度质量等变量来研究“经济资源诅咒”的成因。总体而言，比较政治经济学范畴内的研究不仅重视上述政治变量，而且侧重于讨论政治进程。国际政治经济学范畴内的研究对国际经济学和比较政治经济学的变量进行了整合，因而相较于前者更侧重研究政治过程，而相较于后者则更注重分析譬如国际贸易、国际移民、全球化进程、国际声誉及其他全球性活动对资源政治的影响。

Overall, the above research discussing the causes of the “economic resource curse” at the macro level exhibits the following three characteristics: First, it focuses more on observing the empirical phenomenon of the “economic resource curse” at the sovereign state level and emphasizes providing cross-national empirical analysis. Second, because the differences between countries are much larger than those between regions within the same country, variables such as political institutions, degree of democracy, and international resource prices are all treated as variables rather than constants. Third, it primarily explores macro-level variables such as public debt scale, inequality, international trade terms, international resource price levels and stability, rent-seeking and corruption levels, civil war, domestic institutional quality, international migration, and cross-border direct investment, along with the macro-level mechanisms leading to the “economic resource curse.”

总的来看，上述在宏观层次讨论“经济资源诅咒”成因的研究呈现出以下三个特点：第一，更聚焦于在主权国家层面对“经济资源诅咒”的经验现象进行观察，并且侧重提供跨国的实证分析。第二，由于不同国家之间的差异性要比同一国家内部不同地区的差异性大得多，因而政治制度、民主程度、国际资源价格等都被视作变量而非常量。第三，主要探讨诸如公共债务规模、不平等程度、国际贸易条件、国际资源价格水平及稳定性、寻租及腐败程度、内战、国内制度质量、国际移民、跨国直接投资等宏观变量及其导致“经济资源诅咒”的宏观机制。

IV. Political Science Explanations of the Generative Mechanisms of the “Economic Resource Curse”

四、“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的政治学解释

At the macro level, discussions of the “economic resource curse” in comparative political economy and international political economy constitute the main thread of research into the pathology of the “economic resource curse.” Within the scope of political science, the possible explanations for the emergence of the “economic resource curse” are as follows: First, resource development easily gives rise to rent-seeking behavior. Government regulation of the market and the existence of a quota economy inevitably breed rent-seeking behavior, and rent-seeking and competition for rents are essentially a waste of resources, thus hindering sustained national economic growth. Compared with other industries, rent-seeking behavior within resource industries is more widespread and rampant. The reasons are: first, resources are often among the industries with the most concentrated government intervention and regulation; measures involved in their development and export, such as license processing, special approval, and quota issuance, are all closely related to the government, making large-scale rent-seeking behavior objectively possible. Second, resource economies are inherently monopolistic or oligopolistic in nature; resource companies seeking to obtain or consolidate their monopoly or oligopoly position have ample incentive to seek rents from the government. Third, the revenue from resource development and export is enormous, leading resource companies to invest more costs in rent-seeking competition to obtain rents. Therefore, although rent-seeking behavior inevitably exists in all industries in almost all countries, it is particularly severe in resource industries and countries dependent on resource industries. Large-scale rent-seeking behavior within resource industries not only wastes the resources invested by various resource enterprises in rent-seeking competition but also lowers the economy’s revenue curve by distorting resource allocation. In fact, resource abundance increases the number of actors engaged in rent-seeking behavior while decreasing the number of actors engaged in productive activities. Considering the externalities of economic activities, it can be found that the economic growth effect brought by resource development is less than the economic drag effect produced by resource rent-seeking. The Theory of Rent Cycling proposed by Auty focuses on the differentiated incentives that different levels of rent provide to policymakers. According to this theory, high rents brought by resource abundance will encourage policymakers to implement erroneous policies that harm market efficiency in order to enrich themselves, which in the long run will inevitably lead to economic collapse. In short, resource-exporting countries find it difficult to achieve economic growth due to the widespread prevalence of severe rent-seeking behavior.

在宏观层面，比较政治经济学和国际政治经济学对“经济资源诅咒”的讨论组成了“经济资源诅咒”病理学研究的主要脉络。在政治学范畴内,“经济资源诅咒”之所以生成，其可能的解释是：第一，资源开发容易引起寻租行为。政府对市场的管制和配额经济的存在必然催生寻租行为，而寻租及寻租竞争本质上是一种资源浪费，因而有碍于国家经济的持续增长。相较于其他产业，资源产业内的寻租行为更为普遍和猖獗。其原因为：其一，资源往往是政府干预和管制最集中的产业之一，其开发和出口所涉及的执照办理、特许审批、配额发放等措施均与政府密切相关，这使得大规模的寻租行为在客观上成为了可能。其二，资源经济天生具有垄断或寡头性质，为了获得或巩固其垄断或寡头地位的资源公司有充足的动力向政府寻租。其三，资源开发和出口的收益巨大，这使得资源公司为获取租金而在寻租竞争中投入更多的成本。因此，虽然寻租行为不可避免地存在于几乎所有国家的所有产业当中，但是其在资源产业和依赖资源产业的国家中格外严重。资源产业内大规模的寻租行为不仅浪费了寻租竞争中各资源企业投入的资源，还因扭曲了资源配置而降低了经济的收益曲线。实际上，资源丰裕增加了从事寻租行为的行为体数量，同时减少了从事生产性活动的行为体数量。在考虑经济活动外部性的基础上可以发现，资源开发所带来的经济增长效应不及资源寻租产生的经济拖累效应。奥蒂所提出的租金循环理论（Theory of Rent Cycling）聚焦于不同水平的租金对政策制定者的差异化激励。根据该理论，资源丰裕所带来的高租金将鼓励政策制定者为实现自身致富而推行有损市场效率的错误政策，长此以往必将导致经济的崩溃。总之，资源出口国因普遍存在严重的寻租行为而难以实现经济增长。

Second, resource development easily breeds corrupt behavior. Although in reality rent-seeking and corruption are often intertwined, it is still necessary to distinguish between them theoretically. While from a distributional perspective, both rent-seeking and corruption are detrimental to economic growth, from a legal perspective, not all rent-seeking is illegal, but corruption is always illegal. Resource development breeds a large amount of corruption. For example, empirical research by Jing Vivian Zhan and others shows that as resource dependence increases, the propensity for corruption among state public officials also rises significantly. Dong Baomin and others, in their study of the relationship between coal development and county-level corruption, found a positive correlation between the two. Fernanda Brollo and others, at the municipal level, similarly found that resource development triggers political corruption, thereby lowering the quality of mayoral candidates. In short, resource development induces corrupt behavior, and the more a country or region depends on resource development, the more severe its corruption phenomenon. The channels through which resource development causes corruption and thereby affects economic growth vary: First, severe corruption significantly increases a country’s political risk, allowing state public officials to embezzle resource revenues, often resulting in losses of billions of dollars. Second, resource corruption erodes resource development itself. Corruption caused by resource development leads resource companies and the government to jointly choose a suboptimal rather than optimal resource production model; therefore, resource production volume is lower than in a scenario without corruption, ultimately affecting the development revenue of resource-producing countries. Third, resource corruption has an overall negative impact on national governance. For example, it undermines resource management policies, reduces tax revenue, damages the ecological environment, erodes public trust in the government, exacerbates socio-economic inequality, undermines judicial impartiality, and reduces the government’s public service capacity. These negative effects further impact economic growth.

第二，资源开发容易滋生腐败行为。尽管在现实中寻租与腐败往往互为表里，但在学理上仍需要对两者区别看待。虽然从分配层面来看，寻租和腐败都不利于经济增长；但从法律层面来看，寻租并非都是违法行为，但腐败一定是违法行为。资源开发滋生了大量腐败，如詹晶（Jing Vivian Zhan）等的实证研究表明，伴随着资源依赖的增加，国家公务人员的腐败倾向也明显上升。董保民等在对煤炭开发与县级腐败关系的研究中发现了两者之间的正相关关系，费尔南达·布罗洛（Fernanda Brollo）等在市级层面同样发现资源开发引发了政治腐败进而降低了市长候选人的质量。总之，资源开发诱发腐败行为，而且越依赖资源开发的国家和地区其腐败现象也就越严重。资源开发引起腐败进而影响经济增长的渠道不尽相同：其一，严重腐败明显增加了国家的政治风险，使得国家公务人员能够窃据资源收益，造成数十亿美元的损失也屡见不鲜。其二，资源腐败反蚀资源开发。资源开发所导致的腐败使得资源公司和政府共同选择了次优而非最优的资源生产模式，因此资源生产量要低于没有腐败的情形，最终这会影响资源生产国的开发收入。其三，资源腐败对国家治理造成了全局性的负面影响。譬如破坏了资源管理政策，减少了税收收入，破坏了生态环境，侵蚀了民众对政府的信任，加剧了社会经济不平等，破坏了司法的公正性，降低了政府的公共服务能力等。而这些负面效应又进一步影响了经济增长。

Third, resource development easily triggers armed conflict. As an important form of contemporary violent conflict, civil war has become a major factor affecting state-building, shaping social forms, and determining economic growth. Research by Paul Collier and others found that four factors, including resource abundance, determine the probability of civil war onset and its duration, and the more abundant the resources, the more likely they are to lead to civil war. Building on this, subsequent research has extensively explored the mechanisms through which resource abundance triggers civil war: First, the “resource curse” brought by resource abundance lowers the economic growth rate and people’s income levels, thereby reducing the opportunity cost of civil war. Second, the “resource curse” brought by resource abundance undermines state institutions and erodes political systems, and the weakening of state capacity and the decay of political systems make civil war more likely. Third, potential resource revenues greatly stimulate the greed of local populations, separatist forces, ethnic minorities, etc., incentivizing them to launch armed struggles aimed at controlling resources. Fourth, either by looting funds from resource companies or by selling resources independently to obtain revenue, these two methods provide ample funding for the aforementioned groups, thereby enabling them to resist the central government’s rule through force. Fifth, the geographical distribution of resources is also very important. When resources are mainly distributed in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, areas in conflict for other reasons, or densely populated areas, resource development is more likely to lead to civil war or prolong its duration. Sixth, problems caused by resource development, such as environmental degradation, land acquisition, and the gap between rich and poor, intensify social contradictions or amplify historical grievances, leading to violent resistance. In addition, resource abundance makes civil war more likely to erupt through multiple channels, such as affecting the interaction between the government and rebel armed forces, inducing armed intervention by other countries, and providing “booty futures” for rebel armed forces to sell. Besides civil war, resource abundance can easily lead to other forms of conflict. Regarding interstate war, Jeff Colgan found that oil-exporting countries are more likely to become involved in interstate wars than non-oil-exporting countries. The reason is that oil abundance provides revolutionary governments with the autonomy for reckless actions, leading more national resources to be used for war preparations and warfare. Regarding terrorist attacks, resources provide terrorists with high-value targets, stimulate the “greed mentality” or “grievance mentality” of a few individuals and prompt them to join terrorist organizations, and oil revenues can easily be used to fund terrorist activities; thus, resource abundance makes terrorist attacks more likely. In short, although the specific mechanisms by which resource abundance leads to civil war or other forms of conflict are complex and varied, it is certain that these conflicts all suppress productive activities, blur property rights boundaries, reduce the labor force, and thereby drag down economic growth.

第三，资源开发容易引发武装冲突。作为当代暴力冲突的重要形式，内战已经成为影响国家建构、塑造社会形态、决定经济增长的主要因素。保罗·科利尔（Paul Collier）等的研究发现，包括资源丰裕在内的四个因素决定了内战的发生概率和持续时间，且资源越丰裕就越容易导致内战。以此为基础，后继的研究对资源丰裕诱发内战的机制进行了大量探讨：其一，资源丰裕带来的“资源诅咒”降低了经济的增长率和民众的收入水平，由此导致内战的机会成本降低。其二，资源丰裕带来的“资源诅咒”破坏了国家机构并侵蚀了政治制度，而国家能力的削弱和政治制度的衰朽更容易导致内战。其三，潜在的资源收益极大地激起了地方民众、分裂势力、少数族裔等的贪欲，激励其发动旨在控制资源的武装斗争。其四，对资源公司进行资金劫掠或者自行出售资源以获取收益，这两种方式均为上述群体提供了充足的资金来源，进而使得其有能力通过武力反抗中央政府的统治。其五，资源的地理分布也非常重要。当资源主要分布在少数族裔聚居区、因其他原因导致冲突的地区、人口稠密的地区时，资源开发更容易导致内战或延长内战的时间。其六，资源开发所导致的环境退化、土地征用、贫富分化等问题激化了社会矛盾或放大了历史积怨，进而导致暴力抗争。此外，资源丰裕还通过影响政府与反叛武装的互动、诱使其他国家进行武装干预、提供反叛武装用以出售的“战利品期货”（Booty Futures）等多个渠道使得内战更容易爆发。除了内战外，资源丰裕也很容易造成其他形式的冲突。就国家间战争而言，杰夫·科尔根（Jeff Colgan）发现，石油出口国要比非石油出口国更容易卷入国家间战争，其原因在于石油丰裕为革命性政府的冒进举动提供了自主性，这导致更多国家资源被用于战备和战争当中。就恐怖袭击而言，资源为恐怖分子提供了高价值的袭击目标，激发了少数个体的“贪婪心态”或“怨恨心态”并促使其加入恐怖组织，同时石油收益也很容易用于资助恐怖活动，因而资源丰裕更容易带来恐怖袭击。总之，尽管资源丰裕导致内战或其他形式冲突的具体机制纷繁复杂，但可以肯定的是，这些冲突都会抑制生产活动、模糊产权边界、减少劳动力，进而拖累经济增长。

Fourth, resource development weakens domestic institutions. The view that “institutions matter” is indisputable, with benign institutions being an important cornerstone of economic growth, while malignant institutions severely constrain economic growth. Some negative effects of resource abundance undermine institutions or reduce institutional quality, thereby affecting economic growth. The possible logics behind this are, respectively: resource abundance tempts politicians to undermine institutions in order to obtain rents more easily; resource abundance leads to policy closure and inequitable distribution, hindering institutional improvement; resource abundance induces more frequent and violent conflict, thereby undermining the country’s property rights system; and non-tax resource windfalls exacerbate political agency problems and affect the operation of political institutions by lowering the quality of political candidates. In short, the “economic resource curse” diminishes institutional quality, and the reduction in institutional quality undermines the momentum of economic growth in multiple ways. It is worth noting that, unlike the above discussion of institutions in a general sense, some studies focus more specifically on the property rights system of resource-exporting countries and its impact on economic growth. These studies can be categorized in two aspects: the strength of property rights protection and the type of property rights system. Regarding the former, research by Ramón López et al. and Frederick van der Ploeg respectively shows that the clearer the definition of property rights and the more thorough their protection, the less likely the “economic resource curse” is to appear; conversely, negative externalities from unclear property rights cause resource price increases and a “greed mentality” to lead to premature and accelerated resource extraction, thereby causing a series of negative effects. Regarding the latter, the pioneering research by Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal focuses on the ownership structure of resources and analyzes one by one the impact of four different ownership structures on the economic growth of five former Soviet republics dependent on resource exports. Their research shows that the choice of ownership structure determines whether resource-exporting countries can escape the “economic resource curse.”

第四，资源开发弱化国内制度。“制度至关重要”这一观点无可争议,其中良性的制度是经济增长的重要基石，而恶性的制度则会严重制约经济增长。资源丰裕的一些负面效应破坏了制度或降低了制度质量，进而影响了经济增长。其背后的可能逻辑分别在于：资源丰裕诱使政治家破坏制度以便更容易地获得租金；资源丰裕导致政策封闭和分配不公等阻碍了制度改善；资源丰裕引致了更频繁和更暴力的冲突进而破坏了国家的产权制度；非税收的资源意外之财加剧了政治代理问题，并且通过降低政治候选人素质而影响了政治制度的运作。总之，“经济资源诅咒”减损了制度质量，而制度质量的降低则在多个方面破坏了经济增长的动能。值得注意的是，有别于上述对一般意义上的制度的探讨，部分研究更为聚焦于资源出口国的产权制度及其对经济增长的影响。这些研究可以从产权保护强弱及产权制度类型等两个方面来分类。就前者而言，拉蒙·洛佩斯（Ramón López）等和弗雷德里克·范德普勒格（Frederck van der Ploeg）的研究分别表明，产权界定越明晰且产权保障越到位，“经济资源诅咒”就越不可能出现；相反，产权不明晰带来的负外部性使得资源价格上涨和“贪婪心态”导致资源被过早地加速开采，进而造成了一系列负面影响。就后者而言，宝琳·隆（Pauline Jones Luong）和艾丽卡·温塔尔（Erika Weinthal）的开创性研究聚焦于资源的所有权结构，并且逐一分析了四种不同的所有权结构对五个依赖资源出口的前苏联加盟共和国经济增长的影响。其研究表明，所有权结构的选择决定了资源出口国究竟能否摆脱“经济资源诅咒”。

Fifth, resource development weakens the state’s resource extraction capacity. If good institutions are one of the two pillars for a state to achieve economic growth, then another, even more important pillar is strong state capacity. The state’s capacity to extract resources from society (also known as extraction capacity, fiscal capacity, etc.) is undoubtedly the most important component of state capacity and is crucial to the state’s economic growth. However, resource development weakens the state’s resource extraction capacity, thereby affecting the state’s economic growth. For example, Lu Lingyu et al. discuss how dependence on oil imports forces importing countries to maximize their tax base, improve bureaucratic efficiency, and increase citizens’ willingness to pay taxes, thereby enabling them to obtain stronger resource extraction capacity. Conversely, it is not difficult to find that large-scale and sustained net resource exports by resource-exporting countries shrink the tax base, reduce bureaucratic efficiency, and decrease citizens’ willingness to pay taxes, thus damaging the resource extraction capacity of resource-exporting countries. It is worth noting that the “rentier effect” is the core mechanism that weakens the state’s resource extraction capacity. Mahdavi and Thad Dunning respectively define rentier states as “states that regularly receive large amounts of external rents” and “states where resource rents account for a large share of government revenue.” The “rentier effect” generated by such states has many pathological manifestations: on the one hand, because the government does not rely on taxation, it does not need to be accountable to the people, and particularly because it does not rely on taxing other industries, it reduces its support for their development. On the other hand, huge oil rents cause policymakers to be short-sighted, complacent, unwilling to improve economic policies, and unwilling to adopt development-oriented policies, and so on. The “rentier effect” causes serious damage to the state’s resource extraction capacity. Karl et al. observe the phenomenon in countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Iran that, although they obtain huge resource rents, their tax capacity has significantly declined. Their research points out that this is because the profits from resource development and export are often very substantial, making the resource rents obtained by the government extremely abundant. Since resource rents basically meet the government’s fiscal revenue needs, it does not need to rely on taxes paid by other industries. This severely weakens the fiscal extraction capacity of resource-exporting countries, and their tax and other administrative agencies are unable to effectively manage economic affairs, ultimately harming the country’s economic growth.

第五，资源开发弱化国家的资源汲取能力。如果说良好的制度是国家实现经济增长的两大支柱之一，那么另一个甚至更为重要的支柱则是强大的国家能力。国家从社会中汲取资源的能力（又被称为汲取能力、财政能力等）无疑是国家能力最重要的组成部分,对国家的经济增长也至关重要。然而资源开发削弱了国家的资源汲取能力，进而影响了国家的经济增长。譬如，卢凌宇等讨论了石油进口依赖迫使进口国尽力扩大其税基规模、提高官僚机构能效、增加公民的纳税意愿，进而使其获得了更强的资源汲取能力。反过来不难发现，资源出口国大规模持续的资源净出口缩减了税基规模、降低了官僚机构能效、减少了公民的纳税意愿,因此损害了资源出口国的资源汲取能力。值得注意的是，“食利者效应”是弱化国家的资源汲取能力的核心机制。马哈达维和萨德·邓宁（Thad Dunning）分别将食利者国家界定为“定期收取大量外部租金的国家”和“资源租金在政府收入中占很大份额的国家”。这类国家所产生的“食利者效应”具有诸多病理表征：一方面，政府因不依赖征税而无需向民众负责，特别是因不依赖从其他产业征税而减少了对其发展的支持。另一方面，巨额的石油租金导致决策者目光短浅、安于现状、无意改善经济政策、无意采取发展型政策，等等。“食利者效应”对国家的资源汲取能力造成了严重的破坏。卡尔等关注到委内瑞拉、尼日利亚、伊朗等国虽然获得巨额的资源租金，但这些国家的税收能力却明显下降的现象。其研究指出，这是因为资源开发与出口的利润往往十分丰厚，使得政府获得的资源租金极其充盈。由于资源租金基本满足了政府的财政收入需求，因而其无需依赖其他产业所缴纳的税收。这严重弱化了资源出口国的财政汲取能力，其税务及其他行政机构无法对经济事务实现有效的管理，最终有损于国家的经济增长。

Sixth, resource exports easily trigger an “intertemporal dilemma.” Due to the long investment cycle, large investment amounts, and high asset specificity of the resource industry, international investors are particularly concerned that the government may adopt different policies before and after investment activities. Therefore, the government’s intertemporal commitment to international investors is particularly important. However, research shows that resource-exporting countries generally face an “intertemporal dilemma.” On the one hand, resource abundance distorts government incentives, making it easier for them to tear up agreements signed with international resource companies, and the resulting reputational damage weakens the investment willingness of other investors. More seriously, governments of resource-abundant countries often illegally expropriate or even nationalize the assets of international resource companies, thereby severely damaging the country’s international reputation. Although joining multilateral international economic institutions and accepting their binding constraints can help a country send positive signals to investors that it abides by rules and values its reputation, resource-abundant countries show a clear lack of interest in joining international economic institutions in the fields of investment and trade. On the other hand, for the above reasons, international resource companies face higher transaction costs when cooperating with resource-exporting country governments. Transaction costs can be divided into ex-ante transaction costs and ex-post transaction costs, where the former refers to the costs incurred in drafting and concluding contracts and ensuring their performance; the latter refers to adaptation costs, bargaining costs, establishment and operation costs, and guarantee costs. It is not difficult to see that, due to the long investment cycle, large investment amounts, and high asset specificity of the resource industry, coupled with the often poor reputation and low transparency of resource-exporting countries, the ex-ante transaction costs of concluding contracts with foreign firms are very high; similarly, because resource-exporting countries are more prone to default, their ex-post transaction costs are also higher than those of ordinary countries. Lu Siheng finds that the higher transaction costs of resource-exporting countries have a significant negative impact on their fiscal expansion and investment incentives. Other studies also respectively show that higher transaction costs create additional barriers for resource-abundant countries to absorb both direct and indirect investment. Combining the above two aspects, resource-exporting countries generally face a more pronounced “intertemporal dilemma.”

第六，资源出口容易引发“跨期困境”。由于资源产业投资周期长、投资额大、资产专用性高，国际投资者尤其担心政府在投资活动前后采取不同的政策，政府对国际投资者的跨期承诺就显得尤为重要。然而研究表明，资源出口国普遍面临着“跨期困境”。一方面，资源丰裕扭曲了政府的激励，导致其更容易撕毁与国际资源公司签订的协议，由此所导致的声誉损失削弱了其他投资者的投资意愿。更为严重的是，资源丰裕国的政府经常对国际资源公司的资产进行非法征用甚至国有化，从而严重破坏了该国的国际声誉。虽然加入多边国际经济制度并接受其硬性约束有助于国家向投资者释放出其遵守规则、重视声誉的积极信号，但是资源丰裕的国家对加入投资和贸易领域的国际经济制度明显缺乏兴趣。另一方面，由于上述原因，国际资源公司在与资源出口国政府开展合作时面临着更高的交易成本。交易成本可以被分为事先的交易成本和事后的交易成本,其中前者是指由草拟和订立合同、确保合同得以履行所付出的成本；后者是指不适应成本、讨价还价成本、建立及转运成本、担保成本。不难发现，由于资源产业投资周期长、投资额大、资产专用性高，加之资源出口国往往声誉较差、透明度较低，其与外国厂商订立合同的事前交易成本往往非常高；同样，由于资源出口国更容易违约，其事后交易成本也比一般国家更高。芦思姮发现，资源出口国较高的交易成本对其财税扩张与投资激励具有明显的负向冲击。另有研究也分别表明，较高的交易成本对资源丰裕的国家吸收直接投资和间接投资都带来了额外的障碍。综合上述两个方面，资源出口国普遍面临着更为明显的“跨期困境”。

V. Major Dilemmas and Research Agenda

五、主要困境与研究议程

The discussion within the scope of political science on the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” is voluminous. These studies provide many different explanations for the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse.” Unfortunately, although the number of studies on the pathology of the “economic resource curse” has continued to surge in recent years, their marginal contribution to knowledge has clearly diminished. Just as the growth rate of knowledge in a discipline inevitably slows down regularly after it enters the “normal science stage,” the innovation process of research on the pathology of the “economic resource curse” objectively slows down due to increased research density. But in reality, a more fundamental reason for this situation is that research in this field is deeply mired in excessive empirical falsification and serious neglect of disciplinary boundaries.

政治学范畴内对“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的讨论可谓卷帙浩繁，这些研究针对“经济资源诅咒”的生成机制提供了诸多不同的解释。然而遗憾的是，尽管近年来“经济资源诅咒”病理学的研究在数量上持续激增，但这些研究在知识上的边际贡献却已明显降低。如同一个学科进入“常规科学阶段”后其知识的增长速度必然会出现规律性的趋缓一样，“经济资源诅咒”病理学研究的创新进程在客观上也会因研究密度的提升而有所减缓。但实际上，出现这种状况的更根本的原因则在于该领域的研究深陷于实证层面的过度证伪和对学理边界的严重忽视。

At the empirical level, in recent years statistical analysis and data mining have become the main channels for discovering new explanatory mechanisms for the “economic resource curse.” However, conclusions drawn from different data are often divergent or even contradictory, causing research in this field to increasingly degenerate into a “statistical game” of mutual falsification based on data. As Alexander James and others have criticized, many studies in this field are frequently plagued by problems such as poor data quality, endogeneity of variables, bias caused by omitted variables, and low fidelity of proxy variables, which may lead to erroneous analysis of the causes and mechanisms of the “economic resource curse.” Although recent “innovative findings” have challenged existing understandings and explanatory mechanisms, empirical research based solely on data and models has turned discussions of the “economic resource curse” into an increasingly elusive statistical game. Even more concerning is the prevalence in this field of a model that refutes and falsifies other studies within the same area through data analysis. Because such studies often strictly follow research design and pass multiple statistical tests, this not only strengthens researchers’ confidence in their own work but also makes it difficult for them to agree with—and instead inclines them to eagerly falsify—other similar studies with differing viewpoints. A large number of meticulous empirical studies have failed to create accumulable knowledge for this field; instead, they have brought wave after wave of mutual falsification. This wave has caused the already relatively mature discussions within the field to exhibit a clear trend of fragmentation. Obsession with falsification, on the one hand, severely squeezes out the review, tracking, and description of empirical phenomena in specific countries; on the other hand, it leaves “economic resource curse” research that might yield breakthroughs from perspectives such as anthropology and social psychology largely neglected.

在实证层面，近年来统计分析和数据发掘已经成为发现“经济资源诅咒”新解释机制的主要渠道，然而基于不同数据而得出的结论经常迥异甚至相对立，由此该领域的研究愈发沦为基于数据相互证伪的“统计游戏”。正如亚历山大·詹姆斯（Alexander James）等批评的那样，该领域内的诸多研究经常性地受困于数据质量较差、变量存有内生性、遗漏变量所导致的偏误、代理变量还原度低等问题，由此可能会导致对“经济资源诅咒”的成因及其作用机制的错误分析。虽然近年来的“创新性发现”挑战了既有的认知和解释机制，但单纯基于数据和模型的实证研究使得关于“经济资源诅咒”的讨论变成了愈发捉摸不透的统计游戏。更为值得警惕的是，该领域研究中基于其数据分析批驳和证伪同领域其他研究的模式大行其道。由于这类研究往往严格遵循研究设计并且通过了多项统计检验，这在强化研究者的研究信心的同时，也使其很难认同并热衷于证伪与之观点相异的其他同类研究。大量精细的实证研究未能为该领域创造可积累的知识，相反带来的只是一轮又一轮相互证伪的浪潮。这种浪潮使得该领域内本已相对成熟的讨论呈现出明显的碎片化趋势，而对证伪的痴迷一方面严重挤压了对特定国家经验性现象的回顾、追踪和描述；另一方面使得在人类学和社会心理学等视域下有可能带来突破的“经济资源诅咒”研究鲜有人问津。

At the theoretical level, most studies exploring the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” suffer from the problem of unlimited expansion of the boundaries of mechanism explanation. This is mainly because the independent variables that this field of research focuses on often have a more comprehensive and fundamental impact on a country’s economic growth, making it easy for researchers to unconsciously exaggerate the explanatory boundaries of these variables and their corresponding mechanisms. For example, institutional weakening is clearly regarded as a universal key to explaining the causes of the “economic resource curse.” Researchers easily attribute all causes of the “economic resource curse” to the poor institutional quality or institutional weakness of resource-exporting countries, which clearly misattributes content that should be explained by other variables to the explanatory scope of institutions. In recent years, discussions on the boundaries or conditions of the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” have still not received due attention. This has also objectively exacerbated the mutual falsification in empirical research among studies explaining different generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse.”

在学理层面，探讨“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的大多数研究存在机制解释边界的无限延展问题。这主要是因为该领域研究所关注的自变量往往对国家的经济增长更具有全局性和根本性的影响，因此研究者很容易不自觉地夸大这些变量及相应机制的解释边界。譬如，制度弱化显然被视为解释“经济资源诅咒”成因的万能钥匙。研究者很容易将“经济资源诅咒”的生成原因统统归结于资源出口国的制度质量较差或者制度羸弱，这显然错误地将应由其他变量解释的内容划归于制度的解释范畴之内。近年来，关于“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的边界或条件的讨论仍然没有得到应有的重视。这也在客观上加剧了阐释“经济资源诅咒”不同生成机制的研究在实证研究上的彼此证伪。

Therefore, regarding the future research agenda for the “economic resource curse”: On the one hand, what this field truly urgently needs is not empirical research aimed at testing and falsification, but empirical analysis that uncovers the unique processes and logics by which individual resource-exporting countries fall into the “economic resource curse.” If pathological research on the “economic resource curse” is to break out of the strange circle of a proliferation of research results but little substantive progress, it must achieve a return of the research agenda. Whether it is the “neoclassical return” in economics, the recent “neoclassical wave” in realism within international relations, or the call for “bringing back old institutionalism” in the research agenda of international institutions, all indicate that the return of traditional paradigms and research agendas can often stimulate a new round of knowledge growth. Similarly, for research on the “economic resource curse,” its future research agenda should by no means be an endless empirical testing of existing variables and mechanisms, but rather a revival of the traditional method of descriptive analysis, a return to country-specific studies focused on individual resource-exporting countries, and a rediscovery of observational horizons and theoretical perspectives that have been repeatedly overlooked. In other words, by stepping out of the Popperian fence of falsification, returning to the description of empirical phenomena and conducting inductive analysis based on it, and uncovering previously neglected variables and mechanisms under the guidance of theory, can we more effectively promote greater progress in research on the “economic resource curse.”

因此，就“经济资源诅咒”的未来研究议程而言：一方面，该领域所真正亟需的并非以检验和证伪为目的的实证研究，而是发掘资源出口国各自陷入“经济资源诅咒”的独特过程和逻辑的经验分析。“经济资源诅咒”的病理学研究要想突破研究成果大量涌现但进展乏善可陈的怪圈，就必须实现研究议程的回归。无论是经济学领域向“新古典回归”，还是国际关系中现实主义近来的“新古典浪潮”，抑或是国际制度的研究议程出现关于“找回旧制度主义”的呼吁，这都表明传统范式和研究议程的回归往往能够激发新一轮的知识增长。同样，对于“经济资源诅咒”的研究而言，其未来的研究议程绝非对既有变量和机制无穷无尽的实证检验，而应是重拾描述性分析的传统方法，找回聚焦于各个资源出口国的国别研究，重新发掘被一再忽视的观察视域和理论视角。换句话说，通过跳出波普尔式的证伪藩篱，回归经验现象描述并据此进行归纳分析，在理论的指导下发掘先前被忽视的变量和机制，如此才能更有力地推动“经济资源诅咒”研究取得更大的进展。

On the other hand, future discussions on the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” need to pay attention to the boundaries and conditions of these mechanisms. The above has already shown that no single mechanism is a “universal acid” for explaining why a country falls into the “economic resource curse.” Therefore, while providing theoretical explanations for specific mechanisms, researchers also need to specify the boundaries of their explanatory power. Additionally, following the classification by Ross and others, explanations of the generative mechanisms of the “economic resource curse” can be divided into conditional and unconditional explanations. Conditional explanations generally hold that resources, together with other specific factors, jointly lead to the resource curse. When other factors are effectively managed, resources themselves do not cause the “economic resource curse.” Unconditional explanations generally hold that the “economic resource curse” originates from resource development and export and the other negative effects derived therefrom. In other words, if a country is resource-abundant and vigorously develops and exports resources, it will inevitably fall into the “economic resource curse.” Currently, the vast majority of research on the pathology of the “economic resource curse” still over-focuses on unconditional explanations, with serious insufficient attention to conditional explanations. In reality, the latter is more likely to yield theoretical breakthroughs. In this regard, future research in this field needs to pay more attention to other concurrent factors related to resources and the mechanisms through which they jointly affect national economic growth.

另一方面，未来对“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的讨论需要重视其机制的边界和条件。上文已经表明任何单一的机制都绝非解释国家陷入“经济资源诅咒”的“万能酸”（Universal Acid），因而在对特定机制进行学理阐释的同时，研究者还需要一并说明其解释力的边界。另外，按照罗斯等的划分，关于“经济资源诅咒”生成机制的解释可以被分为有条件的和无条件的解释。有条件的解释一般认为，资源与其他特定因素共同作用导致了资源诅咒。而当其他因素被有效治理时，资源其本身并不会导致“经济资源诅咒”。无条件的解释一般认为，“经济资源诅咒”滥觞于资源开发和出口以及由此延伸出的其他负面效应。换句话说，如果一国资源丰裕并且大力开发及出口资源，那么将必然陷入“经济资源诅咒”。当前“经济资源诅咒”病理学的绝大多数研究仍过度聚焦于无条件的解释，对于有条件的解释的关注严重不足。实际上，后者更可能孕育出学理层面的突破。对此，该领域未来的研究需要更关注与资源相关的其他并发因素及其共同影响国家经济增长的机制。

VI. Conclusion

六、结论

Within the scope of political science, academic literature focusing on the “economic resource curse” has proliferated over decades, and related research is voluminous, to the extent that reviewing and examining the progress and spectrum of the pathology of the “economic resource curse” has itself become an extremely important research task. Under circumstances where a large amount of research, trapped in the fence of falsification and obsessed with empirical competition, cannot truly provide academic increments, reviewing research progress, clarifying the knowledge spectrum, reflecting on shortcomings and difficulties, and setting a research agenda are important prerequisites for achieving breakthroughs in this field. Therefore, scholars represented by Ross and van der Ploeg, who focus on research on the “economic resource curse,” have long reviewed the academic literature and research progress in this field and have achieved important gains.

在政治学的范畴内，数十年来关注“经济资源诅咒”议题的学术文献大量涌现、相关研究卷帙浩繁，以至于梳理检视“经济资源诅咒”病理学的进展和谱系本身就成为了一项极其重要的研究任务。在大量研究因深陷证伪藩篱和热衷实证竞赛而无法真正提供学术增量的情况下，梳理研究进展、明晰知识谱系、反思不足困境、设置研究议程是实现该领域研究突破的重要前提。因此，以罗斯、范德普勒格为代表的关注“经济资源诅咒”研究的学者长期梳理该领域的学术文献和研究进展，并取得了重要收获。

Based on this, this article strives to provide a detailed review of the main progress and knowledge spectrum of pathological research on the “economic resource curse.” Compared with existing literature reviews, this article shows significant improvement in the number of reviewed works, disciplinary coverage, attention to recent literature, and the level of detail in the review, thereby providing a new shortcut for understanding and grasping the progress and spectrum of research in this field. However, as a review study, this article is far from the end but rather the beginning of exploring the relationship between resources and economic growth. Meta-analyses of existing statistical results and empirical research based on them should be left to subsequent studies to complete.

基于此，本文力求详细地梳理“经济资源诅咒”的病理学研究的主要进展和知识谱系。相比于既有的文献研究，本文在文献梳理的篇目、学科的覆盖度、对新晋文献的关注、梳理的细致程度等方面均有较为明显的提升，进而为认识把握该领域研究的进展和谱系提供了一条新的捷径。然而作为一项综述性研究，本文远非探讨资源与经济增长关系的结束而是开端。对于既有统计结果的元分析和在此之上的实证研究则应分别交由后续的研究接续完成。

(Author’s bio: Song Yiming, School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University)

（作者简介：宋亦明，北京外国语大学国际关系学院）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心