马克思主义研究网Marxism Research Network

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The Gradual Failure of the Traditional “Contractual Order”: The Social Roots of the Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe

张金岭:传统“契约秩序”逐步失效:欧洲右翼民粹政党崛起的社会根源

· · Marxism Abroad · "Contemporary World" 2024, no. 8 · 18 min read

Over the past decade, right-wing populist parties, once burdened with an extremely negative label in public opinion, have risen rapidly in Europe and achieved historic breakthroughs. Their political influence has increased significantly, not only profoundly reshaping the political ecology of individual countries and even the European Union, but also altering the socio-political landscape of European states and the process of European integration. The substantial rise of right-wing populist political forces is the result of a general rightward shift in European public opinion, with deep and complex social roots. The accumulation of multiple factors both reflects the gradual failure of Europe’s traditional “contractual order” and reveals the attempts and efforts of right-wing populist parties to reshape the “social contract.”

过去10年间,曾经在民意认知中拥有极度负面标签的右翼民粹政党在欧洲快速崛起并取得历史性突破,政治影响力显著增强,不仅深刻重塑了各国乃至欧盟的政治生态,而且改变着欧洲各国的社会政治格局与欧洲一体化的进程。右翼民粹政治势力大幅提升是欧洲民意普遍右转带来的结果,有着深刻而复杂的社会根源,诸多因素叠加既折射出欧洲传统“契约秩序”逐步失效,也呈现出右翼民粹政党重塑“社会契约”的尝试和努力。

Right-Wing Populist Parties Profoundly Reshape Europe’s Political Ecology

右翼民粹政党深刻重塑欧洲政治生态

Since 2015, a wave of right-wing populism has swept across Europe. The public approval ratings of many populist parties, as well as the seats they have won in the European Parliament and national parliaments, have risen sharply. Some populist parties have even become ruling parties or joined governing coalitions in their own countries, injecting considerable uncertainty into Europe’s political trajectory.

自2015年以来,右翼民粹主义浪潮席卷欧洲,诸多民粹政党民意支持率及其在欧洲议会与所在国议会中所得议席均大幅上升,部分民粹政党甚至在本国成为执政党或参与政府组阁,给欧洲政治走向带来很多不确定性。

Judging by the results of the 2024 European Parliament elections, the traditional political forces—the center-right European People’s Party group and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats—won 188 and 136 seats respectively, still holding a dominant position. The right-wing populist party groups rose strongly, winning a total of 187 seats, a significant increase from the previous term, occupying three of the eight party groups. Among them, the Patriots for Europe group and the European Conservatives and Reformists group won 84 and 78 seats respectively, ranking third and fourth, while the Europe of Sovereign Nations group won 25 seats, ranking eighth. The centrist Renew Europe group won 77 seats, falling from third to fifth. The Greens/European Free Alliance group and the Left in the European Parliament group won 53 and 46 seats respectively, ranking sixth and seventh. Among the right-wing populist groups, apart from the European Conservatives and Reformists, both the Patriots for Europe and the Europe of Sovereign Nations groups are newly formed, dominated by right-wing populist parties from three major Western European countries—Italy, France, and Germany—creating a situation of both cooperation and mutual restraint within the European Parliament.

从2024年欧洲议会选举结果看,传统政治力量中右翼欧洲人民党党团和中左翼社会党党团分别获得188席和136席,仍居主导地位;右翼民粹党团强势崛起,共获得187席,较上届大幅提升,在八大党团中占据三席,其中欧洲爱国者党团和欧洲保守与改革党团分别获得84席和78席,分列第三和第四,欧洲主权国家党团获得25席,位列第八;中间派复兴欧洲党团获得77席,从原来的第三跌落至第五;绿党党团和左翼党团分别获得53席和46席,分列第六和第七。右翼民粹党团中,除欧洲保守与改革党团外,欧洲爱国者党团和欧洲主权国家党团均是新成立的党团,分别由意大利、法国和德国三个西欧大国的右翼民粹政党主导,在欧洲议会中形成了合作与牵制并存的态势。

The rise of right-wing populist groups in this European Parliament election has had a huge impact on the political ecology of some EU member states, even reshaping the political landscape of certain countries. Specifically, right-wing populist parties in five countries—France, Italy, Hungary, Belgium, and Austria—emerged as the biggest winners in their respective nations.

右翼民粹党团在此次欧洲议会选举中崛起,给部分欧盟成员国的政治生态造成巨大冲击,甚至重塑了一些国家的政治格局。具体而言,法国、意大利、匈牙利、比利时、奥地利等五个国家的右翼民粹政党成为各国最大赢家。

In France, the National Rally alone won 31.37% of the vote, more than double that of the ruling coalition led by President Macron, securing 30 of France’s 81 seats in the European Parliament, while the latter won only 13. Faced with the political pressure from the National Rally, Macron announced the dissolution of the National Assembly on the evening of the European Parliament election results, calling for new legislative elections. In Italy, the ruling Brothers of Italy party won 28.76% of the vote, increasing its European Parliament seats from 10 to 24 (out of Italy’s total of 76), a rise of nearly 1.5 times. In Austria, the Freedom Party also defeated the ruling coalition, winning 25.36% of the vote and securing 6 of 20 seats, double its number from the previous parliament. In Hungary, although the vote share of the Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) and its allies declined compared to the previous election, they still ranked first with 44.82% of the vote, winning 11 of 21 seats. In Belgium, the Flemish Interest party won 3 seats with the highest vote share of 14.5%.

在法国,仅国民联盟一党的得票率就高达31.37%,是马克龙总统领导的执政党联盟的2倍多,赢得法国81个欧洲议员席位中的30个,而后者则仅获13个。鉴于国民联盟带来的政治压力,在欧洲议会选举结束当晚,马克龙就宣布解散国民议会,重新进行立法选举。在意大利,执政的意大利兄弟党获得28.76%的选票,将其欧洲议员席位数量由原来的10个提升至24个(意大利总数76个),增加近1.5倍;在奥地利,自由党同样击败了执政党联盟,赢得25.36%的选票,获得20个席位中的6个,较上届议会数量翻倍;在匈牙利,尽管青年民主主义者联盟(简称“青民盟”)及其盟友的得票率较上届选举有所下降,但依然以44.82%的得票率稳居第一,获得21个席位中的11个;在比利时,弗拉芒利益党以最高得票率14.5%赢得3个席位。

In Germany and the Netherlands, although right-wing populist parties did not win the most seats, they also achieved breakthroughs or occupied important positions. Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union ranked first with 30% of the vote, while the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany ranked second with 15.9% of the vote, winning 15 of 96 seats, more than the Social Democratic Party led by incumbent Chancellor Scholz. The Dutch Party for Freedom ranked second in the Netherlands with 16.97% of the vote, winning 6 seats. Additionally, compared to the 2019 election, right-wing populist parties in several countries achieved breakthroughs from zero seats, such as in Cyprus, Croatia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Romania, where right-wing populist forces won varying numbers of European Parliament seats.

在德国和荷兰,右翼民粹政党虽未赢得最多议席,但同样取得突破性进展或占据重要位置。德国保守派基民盟和基社盟以30%的得票率高居首位,右翼民粹政党选择党则以15.9%的得票率位居第二,赢得96个议席中的15个,多于现任总理朔尔茨领导的社会民主党。荷兰自由党得票率以16.97%在该国位居第二,并获得6个议席。此外,相较于2019年选举,多个国家的右翼民粹政党还实现了零的突破,如在塞浦路斯、克罗地亚、爱尔兰、卢森堡、葡萄牙、罗马尼亚等国,右翼民粹力量赢得数量不等的欧洲议员席位。

In fact, the rapid rise of right-wing populist political forces in EU countries over the past few years has profoundly changed the political landscape of these nations, and they have used their political power to intervene in national economic and social system reforms. Currently, right-wing populist parties in more than a dozen European countries have experience in governing. From 2000 to 2023, right-wing populist parties appeared in almost all EU member states and were widely popular.

实际上,过去几年间右翼民粹政治力量在欧盟国家迅速提升,已深刻改变各国的政治格局,并通过其手中的政治权力介入国家经济与社会制度改革。目前,欧洲已有十多个国家的右翼民粹政党拥有参与执政的经验。2000—2023年,右翼民粹政党几乎出现在所有欧盟成员国中,且大受欢迎。

Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, several European countries had already elected right-wing populist governments: in 2015 and 2019, Poland’s Law and Justice party won consecutive presidential and parliamentary elections; in 2017, Austria’s Freedom Party entered a coalition government; in 2018, Hungarian Fidesz chairman Viktor Orbán was re-elected as prime minister. At the same time, right-wing populist political forces in other European countries or at the EU level also achieved notable results. The UK Independence Party was one of the key driving forces behind the 2016 Brexit referendum. Right-wing populist parties in France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and other countries successively made major breakthroughs in national political elections, particularly strengthening their positions in their respective parliaments. It can be said that the rapid rise of right-wing populist parties within the EU and its member states had already become a common phenomenon before the COVID-19 pandemic.

新冠疫情暴发前,欧洲多国已先后选出右翼民粹主义政府——2015年和2019年波兰法律与公正党连续两次赢得总统与议会选举,2017年奥地利自由党进入政府联合执政,2018年匈牙利青民盟主席欧尔班再次连任总理。与此同时,右翼民粹政治力量在欧洲其他国家或欧盟层面也获得了引人注目的成绩,英国独立党成为2016年英国“脱欧”的重要推动力量之一,法国、德国、葡萄牙、西班牙等国的右翼民粹政党先后在各国政治选举中取得重大突破,尤其是在本国议会中的力量进一步壮大。可以说,在新冠疫情之前右翼民粹政党在欧盟和各成员国内部力量迅速提升就已成为普遍现象。

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the development and activities of right-wing populist parties were somewhat suppressed. However, due to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, they showed a strong resurgence after 2022. The most representative event was the victory of Brothers of Italy leader Giorgia Meloni in the September 2022 parliamentary elections, making her the first female prime minister in Italian history. The Meloni government has also been described as the “most right-wing” in Italy since the end of World War II, marking the beginning of right-wing populist parties taking power in Western European countries. Additionally, in the November 2023 Dutch House of Representatives elections, the right-wing populist Party for Freedom won 37 of 150 seats, becoming the largest party in the House, with a significantly enhanced influence.

新冠疫情暴发后,右翼民粹政党的发展与活动在一定程度上受到抑制,但由于乌克兰危机爆发,其在2022年后又呈现出强势回归的势头。最具代表性的事件是意大利兄弟党领导人梅洛尼在2022年9月举行的议会选举中获胜并成为该国历史上第一位女总理,梅洛尼政府也被称为二战结束以来意大利“最右”的一届,标志着右翼民粹政党开始在西欧国家掌权。此外,在2023年11月举行的荷兰众议院选举中,右翼民粹政党自由党赢得150个席位中的37席,成为众议院第一大党,影响力明显提升。

In summary, right-wing populist parties have profoundly reshaped Europe’s political ecology. The reasons for the significant rightward shift in European public opinion and the rise of right-wing populist forces are diverse and complex, involving multiple factors across political, economic, and social fields in various countries, as well as at European and international levels. These factors have undergone a process of continuous development and change, exerting different stimulating effects over both the long and short term.

总之,右翼民粹政党已深刻重塑欧洲政治生态,而引发欧洲社会民意大幅右倾并推动右翼民粹力量崛起的原因多元且复杂,涉及各国政治、经济、社会等各领域以及欧洲、国际等诸层面的多重因素。这些因素经历了一个持续发展变化的过程,在长期或短期内都发挥着不同的刺激作用。

Economic and Social Development Difficulties Fuel Nationalist Sentiment

经济社会发展困顿助长民族主义情绪

Since 2008, a series of crises—the financial crisis, the European debt crisis, and the refugee crisis—have erupted in succession. Coupled with the failure of neoliberal economic policies, European countries have long been mired in difficulties such as economic stagnation, severe unemployment, welfare contraction, rising inequality, widening wealth gaps, reduced public investment, slowing social mobility, and class solidification. This has become the soil for the rapid growth of right-wing populist forces in Europe. The health, livelihood, energy, and security crises caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis have further provided a strong short-term stimulus for the rightward shift in public opinion. Against this backdrop, European citizens generally feel a growing sense of uncertainty about their countries’ futures and their own personal destinies, increasingly emphasizing national priority and tending toward conservative value demands.

自2008年以来,金融危机、欧债危机、难民危机接连爆发,加之新自由主义经济政策失灵,欧洲各国长期陷入经济低迷、失业严重、福利萎缩、不平等加剧、贫富差距拉大、公共投入减少、社会流动性趋缓且阶层固化等困境,这成为欧洲右翼民粹主义势力快速滋长的土壤。而新冠疫情与乌克兰危机所导致的健康、民生、能源、安全等危机又在短期内对民意右倾产生强烈刺激。在此背景下,欧洲民众普遍感受到国家前途与个人命运的不确定性与日俱增,愈加强调本国优先,在价值诉求上趋向保守。

In May 2024, the French market and opinion research institute BVA Xsight conducted a survey across the 27 EU member states on EU citizens’ concerns and perceptions. The results showed that 57% of respondents believed the economic situation of the entire EU had worsened, while the proportion who thought their own country’s economy had deteriorated was as high as 63%. Among the issues of public concern, the top three were health, war, and purchasing power, reaching 41%, 38%, and 24% respectively, followed by security, taxation, immigration, and terrorism, at 20%, 18%, 17%, and 16% respectively. Clearly, the issues of purchasing power, security, and immigration, on which right-wing populist parties focus, have been widely accepted and set as important political and social issues, becoming considerations that the public cannot ignore in political elections. At the same time, the accelerating aging of the population has sparked conflicts between different groups and generations on issues such as public finance, welfare, employment, and retirement. Some moderate conservatives, and even voters who previously supported the left, have also been successfully attracted by right-wing populist parties.

2024年5月,法国市场与舆论研究机构BVA Xsight在欧盟27国开展了一项有关欧盟公民关切与看法的调查,结果显示57%的受访者认为整个欧盟的经济状况变得更加糟糕,认为本国经济状况恶化的受访者比例高达63%;在民众关切的议题中,排前三位的是健康、战争和购买力,分别达到41%、38%、24%,紧跟其后的议题是安全、税收、移民和恐怖主义,分别达到20%、18%、17%、16%。显然,右翼民粹政党聚焦的购买力、安全与移民等问题,已经被广泛接受并被设置为重要的政治与社会议题,成为民众在政治选举中不容忽视的考量。与此同时,持续加速的人口老龄化在财政、福利、就业、退休等议题上引发不同群体、代际之间的矛盾,一部分温和的保守主义者甚至是支持左翼的选民同样被右翼民粹政党成功吸引。

From a longer-term perspective, the rise of right-wing populist parties reflects the “discomfort” of European citizens with the modernity of European society. At the economic level, in all European economies today, the entire skeleton of industrial capitalism has disappeared, giving way to post-industrial capitalism. In this post-industrial capitalist society, the great development of the service economy, the fragmentation of the labor market (with the lower classes engaged in low-skill, insecure, and marginalized work), and the emergence of a “dual” society have generated strong feelings of abandonment, various anxieties, and nostalgia among large numbers of people.

从更长远的视角来看,右翼民粹政党的崛起折射出欧洲民众对于欧洲社会现代性的“不适”。就经济层面而言,在如今所有欧洲经济体中,工业资本主义的整个骨架已经消失,让位于后工业资本主义。在这个后工业资本主义社会中,服务经济的大发展、劳动力市场的分裂(底层民众从事低技能、无保障和边缘化的工作),以及“二元”社会的出现,使得大量民众产生强烈的被遗弃感和各种焦虑与怀旧情绪。

Faced with the various difficulties of current economic and social development, traditional political parties have failed to offer satisfactory governance remedies, and the many reforms they have led have yielded little effect, triggering continuous demonstrations, marches, and protests. In this situation, right-wing populist parties that emphasize nationalism and prioritize national interests have gained political opportunities, and the alternative solutions they offer are quite anticipated by the public. In fact, the economic and social difficulties faced by European countries are, to a certain extent, a backlash from neoliberalism. Driven by neoliberalism, technological progress and economic globalization have not benefited the European middle class; only a minority group represented by emerging technology industries and the financial sector have become the true beneficiaries. The industrial workers and middle class, who were once the backbone of the social structure, have been increasingly weakened, fundamentally shaking the social foundation of traditional political parties.

面对当前经济社会发展的种种困境,传统政党给不出令人满意的治理良方,其主导的诸多改革收效甚微,引发持续不断的示威游行与抗议活动。在此情势下,强调民族主义、本国利益优先的右翼民粹政党则获得政治机遇,其提供的替代方案颇受民众期待。实际上,欧洲各国所面临的经济社会困境在一定程度上是新自由主义的反噬。在新自由主义的推动下,科技进步与经济全球化并没有惠及欧洲中产阶层,只有以新兴科技产业和金融领域为代表的少数群体成为真正受益者,过去作为社会结构中坚力量的产业工人和中产阶层日渐衰弱,这在根本上动摇了传统政党的社会根基。

Against this backdrop, the transformation of modernity, characterized by the decline of industrial capitalism, has brought various anxieties and nostalgic feelings to European citizens. Right-wing populist parties have seized the opportunity to convert these into slogans for political elections and actions after winning office. The conservative stance of right-wing populist parties often manifests as a condemnation of the current “decline,” a nostalgia for a past “golden age,” and attracts voters from different perspectives. Facing the working class, right-wing populist parties typically advocate building a state that assumes a protective role, emphasizing that welfare state mechanisms should be reserved only for nationals. Facing the independent petty bourgeoisie (artisans, merchants, small business owners, liberal professionals), they emphasize the functions of the state and government, advocating that the state is the bearer of “order and law,” and propose programs that cater to public opinion. It can be said that the “alliance of shops and workshops” is the winning formula for right-wing populist forces in European political elections. [11]11 The “alliance of shops and workshops” (商店与作坊的联盟) refers to the political coalition between the petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers, artisans, small business owners) and the working class, a concept used to describe the electoral base of right-wing populist parties in Europe.

在此背景下,以工业资本主义衰落为典型特征的现代性转型给欧洲民众带来各种焦虑和怀旧情绪,右翼民粹政党乘机将之转化为政治选举的口号和胜选后的行动。右翼民粹政党的保守姿态往往表现为对当下“衰落”的谴责、对过去“黄金时代”的怀旧,并从不同视角吸引选民的目光。面对工人阶级,右翼民粹政党通常主张建设一个承担保护性角色的国家,强调福利国家机制只保留给国民;面对独立的小资产阶级(手工业者、商人、小企业主、自由职业者),他们则强调国家与政府的职能,主张国家是“秩序与法律”的承担者,并提出能够迎合民意的纲领,可以说“商店与作坊的联盟”是欧洲右翼民粹力量在政治选举中的制胜法宝。

Clearly, the rise of right-wing populist parties benefits from their own pragmatic changes and “mainstreaming” transformation, especially by putting forward many propositions on economic and social reform to improve their extreme image, which was overly focused on issues like immigration and identity. In recent years, the political platforms and policy propositions of right-wing populist parties have generally shown a tendency toward de-radicalization and pragmatism. They have adopted a pro-people stance on many economic and social issues, not only keenly capturing various problems in economic and social development but also successfully converting them into political issues favorable to themselves. By proposing some alternative policy propositions, they cater to the expectations of the lower classes and win their trust. For example, in France, many voters do not view the National Rally as far-right, but as a normal force committed to defending French values. [12]12 The National Rally (国民联盟, Rassemblement National) is a French right-wing populist and nationalist political party, formerly known as the National Front (Front National) until 2018. Precisely because of this, the nationalist stance, which is the core demand of the National Rally, is increasingly recognized by the general public, creating conditions for it to win voter support.

显然,右翼民粹政党的崛起得益于其自身的务实变革与“主流化”转型,尤其是通过提出经济社会改革的诸多主张来改善其因过于聚焦移民、身份等问题形成的极端形象。近年来,右翼民粹政党的政治纲领、政策主张总体上呈现出去极端、求务实的变化倾向,他们在诸多经济、社会议题上表现出亲民的姿态,不但能够敏锐地捕捉经济社会发展中的种种问题,而且还成功将之转化为对己有利的政治议题,并通过提出一些替代性的政策主张来迎合底层民众的期待,赢得他们的信任。如在法国,很多选民并不认为国民联盟是极右翼,而是一支致力于捍卫法国价值的正常力量。正因如此,作为国民联盟核心诉求的民族主义立场也日益受到广大民众的认可,为其赢得选民支持创造了条件。

The continuous fermentation of immigration, refugee, and security issues leads to a rightward shift in public opinion

移民难民与安全问题持续发酵导致民意右倾

Over a long period, with the continuous influx of immigrants and refugees, the ethnic composition of European countries’ populations is changing. The size of foreign minority populations is growing, while the growth rate of the native population continues to decline. The stark contrast between the two has caused concern among some citizens. Entering the second decade of the 21st century, illegal immigration and refugee issues, along with terrorist attacks and other incidents related to foreign ethnic groups, have occurred one after another. These are accompanied by many problems such as robbery, rape, abandonment, domestic violence, and public disorder, causing enormous social trauma in European countries and triggering serious concerns about national identity, national security, and social stability. Anxious and uneasy citizens have seen a rise in xenophobic sentiment. It is worth noting that behind this phenomenon, there are also many issues of discrimination, xenophobia, and racism targeting minority ethnic groups (including both foreign immigrants and native-born minorities), deepening ethnic rifts. A 2023 Eurobarometer survey showed that 60% of respondents believed discrimination based on ethnic origin was widespread in their country, and this trend had further increased after 2019. [13]13 Eurobarometer (欧洲晴雨表) is a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission since 1973, covering a wide range of topics related to the European Union. Given the existence of these two phenomena, the tense relationship between the growing minority populations and the native ethnic groups within European societies has fallen into a continuous vicious cycle.

长期以来,随着移民难民持续涌入,欧洲各国的人口族裔结构正在发生变化,外来少数族裔人口规模不断壮大,而本土民族的人口增速持续下降,二者所形成的鲜明对比引发一部分民众担忧。进入21世纪第二个十年后,非法移民与难民问题以及与外来族裔群体有关的恐怖袭击等事件接连不断,还伴随着抢劫、强奸、遗弃、家庭暴力、扰乱治安等诸多问题,给欧洲各国造成巨大的社会创伤,引发了对民族认同、国家安全与社会稳定的严重忧虑,深感不安的民众排外情绪高涨。值得注意的是,在此现象背后还伴随着针对少数族裔(包括外来移民和土生土长的少数族裔)的诸多歧视、排外和种族主义等问题,加深族裔裂痕。欧洲晴雨表于2023年开展的一项调查显示,有60%的受访者表示基于族裔出身因素的歧视现象在其所在国家广泛存在,且在2019年后有进一步上升的趋势。鉴于上述两种现象的存在,在欧洲各国社会内部,人口规模日益壮大的少数族裔与本土民族之间的紧张关系陷入持续的恶性循环。

In fact, the tense relationship between native ethnic groups and minorities in European countries has had high social visibility since the 1980s. It was precisely against this backdrop that right-wing populism in Europe began to achieve political breakthroughs. Starting in the early 1990s, the native populations of Europe experienced sustained negative growth. At that time, the economic and social development of various countries required a large amount of labor, making the absorption of foreign immigrants a national policy for many countries. Although foreign immigrants alleviated the pressure of labor shortages caused by the decline in the native population to some extent, they also brought problems for the native populations of these countries, such as reduced job opportunities, lower welfare benefits, and declining living standards. This sparked dissatisfaction among the native population, with xenophobic sentiment rising, and some citizens gradually turned to support xenophobic right-wing populist movements, thereby providing a political stage for right-wing populist parties. Particularly, the large influx of refugees and immigrants in 2015 brought severe shocks to European society. [14]14 The 2015 refugee crisis refers to the large-scale movement of refugees and migrants, primarily from the Middle East and Africa, into the European Union, peaking in 2015 and causing significant political and social strain. This not only made the ethnic diversity within the population structures of various countries more complex but also further affected the already declining living standards, job opportunities, and welfare benefits of the native populations. The antipathy of native citizens toward foreign ethnic groups, and even native-born minorities, rose sharply, and right-leaning conservative thinking became increasingly serious. Furthermore, the “close relationship” between some minority populations and internal security risks in European society has long served as “rationalizing” evidence for the xenophobic claims of right-wing populism. How to properly resolve this issue is key to reversing the xenophobic mindset of this part of the population.

实际上,欧洲国家本土民族与少数族裔之间的紧张关系自20世纪80年代就已有较高的社会能见度,正是在此背景下,欧洲右翼民粹主义开始在政治上逐步实现突破。20世纪90年代初开始,欧洲本土人口出现持续负增长,而彼时各国经济社会发展又需要大量劳动力,这就使吸纳外来移民成为许多国家的国策。外来移民虽然在一定程度上缓解了因本土人口减少带来的劳动力缺失压力,但也给这些国家本土人口带来工作机会减少、福利待遇降低、生活水平下降等问题,引发本土民族不满,排外情绪不断上升,一部分民众逐步转向支持排外的右翼民粹主义运动,从而给右翼民粹政党提供了政治舞台。特别是2015年大量难民和移民涌入给欧洲社会所带来严重冲击,不但使各国人口结构中的族裔多样性更加复杂,而且进一步影响了各国本土民众本就下降的生活水平、工作机会、福利待遇,本土民众对外来族裔甚至是土生土长的少数族裔的反感情绪大幅上升,右倾保守思想日益严重。此外,部分少数族裔人口与欧洲社会内部安全隐患之间的“密切关系”早已成为右翼民粹主义排外主张的“合理化”证据,如何妥善解决这一问题,是扭转这部分民众排外心结的关键所在。

In a poll conducted by BVA Xsight in May 2024, 56% of respondents said that Europe needs immigrants to fill labour shortages in certain industries, but 53% also believed that immigration brings other problems; 71% of respondents thought their country had taken in too many immigrants and favoured tighter controls on immigration; 85% believed the EU needed to take measures to control illegal immigration, and 20% did not want the EU to adopt a common immigration policy so that each country could control its own borders. According to Eurostat data, as of 1 January 2023, 27.3 million non-European citizens were living in the 27 EU member states, accounting for 6% of the total population, of whom 1.265 million were illegally resident, an increase of 12.9% over 2022.

在2024年5月BVA Xsight开展的民调中,有56%的受访者表示欧洲需要移民以便在某些行业领域内补足劳动力短缺,但也有53%的受访者认为移民带来了其他问题;有71%的受访者认为其所在国家接收了太多移民,赞成对移民加强控制;85%的受访者认为欧盟有必要采取措施控制非法移民,还有20%的受访者不希望欧盟采取共同的移民政策,以便各国能够自主掌控边境。据欧盟统计局数据,截至2023年1月1日,欧盟27成员国境内共居住着2730万名非欧洲公民,占人口总数的6%,其中有126.5万人为非法居住,较2022年增长12.9%。

Clearly, with the intensification of migration flows, increased population mobility and the diversification of social strata, European society is increasingly becoming an “open society”. But this “open society” itself contains a structural contradiction, namely that it is internally split by the difference between the two concepts of accepting “pluralism” and returning to “closure”. Some native-born citizens, feeling unbalanced, anxious and uneasy about the ethnic diversity in the “open society”, tend to prefer a return to the stable and relatively closed society of the past. These sentiments are exploited by right-wing populist parties, which are advocates of the “closed society” and have long held a “closed nationalist” stance. It is precisely by vigorously playing up the various social problems brought by refugees and immigrants, and by promoting political positions such as restricting illegal immigration and cutting immigrant welfare, that right-wing populist parties attract voters who want to return to a “closed society”, gradually consolidate their popular base, gather internal momentum, and thereby win elections. The political manipulation of refugee and immigration issues by right-wing populist parties, along with their identity politics, has attracted a large number of voters, forcing traditional establishment parties to adopt tough stances on refugee and immigration issues in order to win elections and cater to voters. Driven by right-wing populist parties, in order to effectively respond to the challenges posed by ethnic and religious diversity, EU countries have clearly shifted towards more conservative, nationalist and realist positions in their domestic and foreign policies on immigration, borders, ethnicity and religion.

显然,随着移民潮加剧、人口流动增加和社会阶层多元化,欧洲社会日益成为一个“开放社会”,但这个“开放社会”本身就存在结构性矛盾,即内部因接受“多元”和回归“封闭”两种理念的差异而陷入分裂。部分本土民众因“开放社会”中的族裔多样性感到失衡、焦虑和不安,更倾向于回归过去稳定且相对封闭的社会,这些情绪被作为“封闭社会”的倡导者、长期持“封闭的民族主义”立场的右翼民粹政党所利用。右翼民粹政党正是通过大力渲染难民移民带来的种种社会问题以及宣传限制非法移民、削弱移民福利等政治主张来吸引那些希望回归“封闭社会”的选民,逐步巩固民意基础,凝聚内在动力,从而赢得选举胜利。右翼民粹政党对难民移民问题的政治操弄及其身份政治主张吸引了大量选民,使得传统的建制派政党为赢得选举不得不在难民移民问题上转而采取强硬的立场以迎合选民。在右翼民粹政党推动下,为有效应对族群、宗教多元化带来的挑战,欧盟国家在移民、边境、族群、宗教的内外政策上已明显转向更具保守主义、民族主义和现实主义色彩的立场。

The Governance Deficit of Representative Democracy Provides Space for the Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties

代议制民主治理赤字为右翼民粹政党崛起提供空间

Right-wing populism has a marked tendency to oppose traditional elites and the establishment, and in recent years the governance deficit resulting from the practice of representative democracy by traditional parties has created opportunities for the rise of right-wing populist parties.

右翼民粹主义具有显著的反传统精英与反建制倾向,而近年来传统政党在代议制民主实践中导致的治理赤字为右翼民粹政党崛起创造了机遇。

On the one hand, the practice of representative democracy has sharpened the contradiction between ordinary people and traditional political elites, leaving political space for right-wing populism. The many problems in EU countries arising from changes in ethnic structure have made the grassroots facing existential difficulties and the middle class feeling their status threatened acutely aware that there is a huge gap between the representatives of the people’s will and the will being represented—this is one of the inherent ills of representative democracy. In the eyes of many citizens, the elected political elites do not work for the welfare of ordinary voters, but serve the big corporations and big capital behind them; their greed for power and interests often leads to official corruption, abuse of power for personal gain, and similar behaviour. This makes the public extremely disgusted with political elites, which in turn breeds dissatisfaction with the current political system. In this “democratic deficit”, large numbers of citizens have lost trust in traditional political elites and their parties, and have instead turned to right-wing populist parties.

一方面,代议制民主实践使普通民众与传统政治精英之间的矛盾日益尖锐,给右翼民粹主义留下了政治空间。欧盟国家因族裔结构变化导致的诸多问题使面临生存困境的底层民众和深感自身地位受到威胁的中产阶层深刻意识到,民意代表与被代表的民意之间存在着巨大鸿沟——这是代议制民主的内在痼疾之一。在很多民众看来,被选出的政治精英们并没有为普通选民谋福利,而是为其身后的大公司、大资本服务,对权力与利益的贪婪使他们常常出现职务腐败、以权谋私等行为。这使得民众对政治精英们极其厌恶,进而衍生出对现行政治制度的不满,在这样的“民主赤字”中,大批民众对传统政治精英及其所属政党失去信任,转而向右翼民粹政党靠拢。

In the practice of representative democracy, electoral politics has become an important means for European citizens to periodically rescue themselves politically. Faced with various difficulties, European citizens hope to change the status quo through voting, electing representatives and governing teams who can represent them and work for their welfare. In fact, precisely because traditional parties have been slow to deliver solutions to the difficulties, many voters are eager for change. They may not fully agree with the policy positions of right-wing populist parties, but they are willing to give them a chance, even if it is a trial-and-error attempt.

在代议制民主实践中,选举政治成为欧洲民众周期性进行政治自救的重要手段。面对种种困境,欧洲民众希冀借助投票选举来改变现状,选出能够代表他们、为他们谋福利的民意代表与执政团队。实际上,正因为传统政党迟迟交不出解决困境的答卷,导致很多选民迫切求变,他们也许不完全认同右翼民粹政党的政策主张,但愿意给右翼民粹政党一次机会,哪怕是试错性的尝试。

In recent years, more and more supporters of traditional parties have expressed their dissatisfaction and disappointment by refusing to vote. In contrast, supporters of right-wing populist parties maintain a relatively high level of political participation. Although their overall numbers are not very large, in one-person-one-vote political elections, the low turnout of voters from other camps effectively increases the vote share of right-wing populist parties, creating conditions for them to win seats. In addition, right-wing populist parties are very adept at using social media to politically catalyse public opinion, strengthen discourse dissemination and political mobilisation, shape voter behaviour patterns and influence their voting inclinations.

近年来,越来越多的传统政党支持者用拒绝投票来表达自己的不满与失望。与之相反,右翼民粹政党的支持者却保持着较高的政治参与度,尽管他们总体数量并不是很多,但在一人一票的政治选举中,其他阵营选民的低投票率变相地提高了右翼民粹政党的得票率,为其赢得议席创造了条件。此外,右翼民粹政党非常善于利用社交媒体对民意进行政治催化,强化话语传播与政治动员, 塑造选民的行为模式并影响其投票倾向。

On the other hand, as a manifestation of the representative democracy mechanism at the supranational level, the EU’s deprivation of and interference in member state sovereignty in the practice of representative democracy has also stimulated public support for right-wing populist forces. With the continuous advancement of European integration, the supranational nature of the EU has increasingly intensified the contradiction between EU governance and the sovereignty of member states. Marked by the UK’s “Brexit” in 2016, Poland, Hungary and other countries have successively clashed with the EU. Citizens in these countries believe that EU policies do not conform to their own national and personal interests, and that EU governance should not be superior to national sovereignty. As the refugee crisis has continued to ferment, this public opinion rejecting EU policies and EU governance has spread to almost all EU member states, further stimulating nationalist sentiment among citizens of various countries. This is reflected in the practice of representative democracy as voters casting ballots for right-wing populist parties that advocate “our country first”, hoping to regain control over their own nation’s destiny by supporting them. In the May 2024 BVA Xsight poll, 19% of respondents said they did not belong to the EU at all, and another 38% said they identified more with their own national identity than with being an EU citizen; among respondents who supported right-wing populist parties, the proportion for the two categories above was as high as 72%. The questioning of the EU’s role and function has led some citizens to move in the same direction as right-wing populist parties, undoubtedly boosting the momentum of these parties.

另一方面,作为代议制民主机制在超国家层面的一种体现,欧盟在代议制民主实践中对成员国主权的剥夺与干涉也激发了民众对右翼民粹力量的支持。随着欧洲一体化持续推进,欧盟的超国家属性使得欧盟治权和各成员国主权之间的矛盾日益激化。以2016年英国“脱欧”为标志,波兰、匈牙利等国先后与欧盟发生龃龉,这些国家民众认为欧盟政策并不符合本国和自身利益,欧盟治权不应高于本国主权。随着难民危机持续发酵,这种对欧盟政策和欧盟治权不认可的民意几乎传导至欧盟所有成员国,使得各国民众的民族主义情绪进一步被激发,反映在代议制民主实践中即是选民投票给主张本国优先的右翼民粹政党,希冀通过支持他们以夺回对本国命运的掌控。在2024年5月BVA Xsight开展的民调中,有19%的受访者认为自己完全不归属欧盟,另有38%的受访者认为,相较于欧盟公民的身份,自己更认同本国公民的身份;而在支持右翼民粹政党的受访者中,上述两种情形的比例则高达72%。对欧盟角色与作用的质疑,使部分民众与右翼民粹政党相向而行,无疑助长了右翼民粹政党的声势。

Regarding how to “discipline” the EU as a supranational entity, right-wing populist parties are often able to accurately echo the demands of a portion of the population. For example, some proposals put forward by the French National Rally in the 2024 European Parliament elections are quite representative: reaffirming the primacy of the French Constitution, proposing a series of recommendations to “return power to the people”, and calling for the transformation of the European Commission into a “General Secretariat” with “no decision-making power or legislative initiative”; advocating, without a complete rupture with the many EU institutions, a “three-colour strategy” for EU construction, using green, yellow and red to indicate positions on reforming the EU’s existing role and policies—green for support, yellow for limited support, and red for prohibition; stating a position of “showing a red light” to the EU, reducing the authority of EU governance relative to member state sovereignty in certain areas, including that each country’s foreign affairs and defence, immigration management, energy sovereignty, etc., should be decided by the country itself, opposing any reforms aimed at enhancing the powers of the European Commission as well as bonds issued and taxes established by the European Commission, and opposing the abolition of member states’ veto power. Overall, the French National Rally’s thinking on EU construction is to limit the EU’s decision-making power, reduce the transfer of sovereignty from member states to the EU, reduce the EU’s erosion of national sovereignty, and transform it into an executive body that implements the joint decisions of member states. From a nationalist perspective, until European integration reaches a certain depth, the rebuttal and regulation of the EU will remain an important reason for the political survival of right-wing populist forces.

对于如何“规训”作为超国家实体存在的欧盟,右翼民粹政党往往能够准确呼应一部分民众的诉求。比如,法国国民联盟在2024年欧洲议会选举中提出的一些主张就很有代表性:重申法国宪法具有优先地位,提出“还权于民”的系列建议,呼吁将欧盟委员会转变成为一个“没有决策权或立法动议权”的“总秘书处”;主张在不与欧盟诸多制度彻底决裂的情况下,提出关于欧盟建设的“三色战略”,即通过绿、黄、红三种颜色来标识对欧盟现有角色与政策改革的立场,绿色表示支持、黄色表示有限支持,而红色则表示禁止;表明对欧盟“亮红灯”的立场,在部分领域降低欧盟治权相较于成员国主权的权限,包括各国的外交与防务、移民管理、能源主权等应由本国决定,不同意任何有关旨在增强欧盟委员会权力的改革以及由欧盟委员会发行的债券和设立的税收,反对取消成员国否决权等。总体来看,法国国民联盟提出的关于欧盟建设的思路是限制欧盟的决策权,减少成员国向欧盟的主权让渡,减少欧盟对各国主权的侵蚀,并将之转变为一个执行各成员国共同决策的办事机构。从民族主义视角来看,在欧洲一体化深入到一定程度之前,对欧盟的回驳与规制一直会是右翼民粹力量政治存续的重要原因之一。

Conclusion

结语

Although right-wing populist parties cannot yet dominate the European Parliament, as an opposition force they can to a considerable extent hamstring the European Parliament’s decision-making, especially on issues such as immigration and refugees, environmental protection and the green transition. If right-wing populist parties oppose a proposal, the European Parliament will find it very difficult to pass the relevant bill, and this influence will also be transmitted to the member-state level, especially in member states where right-wing populist parties are in power or are relatively strong. However, as the European Parliament elections reflect, the European right-wing populist camp is not a monolithic bloc; they are in a state of both cooperation and mutual restraint. Each right-wing populist party must oppose the establishment on common topics while also checking one another when their respective interests, especially conflicts of interest at the national level, come into play. This is determined by the nationalist stance they hold. At what level these divisions will drive political change in Europe merits continued attention. The rise of right-wing populism reflects the gradual failure of the existing “contractual order” in European society, and many of its political propositions are precisely efforts and attempts to reshape this “social contract.” As a mirror of Western democratic institutions, right-wing populism will repeatedly reappear and impact the existing order, becoming one of the driving forces for the reconstruction of the social order.

尽管右翼民粹政党还不能主导欧洲议会,但是作为反对力量能够在很大程度上掣肘欧洲议会的决策,特别是在移民与难民、环保与绿色转型等议题上。如果右翼民粹政党反对,欧洲议会将很难通过相关议案,这种影响还将传导至各成员国层面,尤其是在右翼民粹政党执政或较为强势的成员国。然而,正如欧洲议会选举反映的,欧洲右翼民粹阵营并不是铁板一块,彼此之间处于合作与牵制的状态,各右翼民粹政党既要在共同话题上反对建制派,又要在涉及彼此利益尤其是所在国利益冲突时相互制约,这是由其持有的民族主义立场所决定的。这种分歧将在何种层面上推动欧洲政局变革,值得持续关注。右翼民粹主义崛起折射出欧洲社会既有“契约秩序”逐步失效,其诸多政治主张恰恰是重塑这种“社会契约”的努力与尝试。作为西方民主制度的一面镜子,右翼民粹主义将会反复再现并冲击既有秩序,成为社会秩序重建的推动力之一。

(This article is a phased result of the National Social Science Fund major project “Research on the History of Exchange and Mutual Learning between the Two Great Civilizations of China and Europe” [project approval number: 23&ZD321].)

(本文是国家社科基金重大项目“中国与欧洲两大文明发展交流互鉴历程研究”(项目批准号:23&ZD321)阶段性成果)

(The author is a researcher at the Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the Research Center for Marxism and European Civilization.)

(作者系中国社会科学院欧洲研究所、马克思主义与欧洲文明研究中心研究员)

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑:同心

Notes

  1. The “contractual order” (契约秩序) refers to the implicit social contract underpinning post-war European welfare states and liberal democratic governance, based on expectations of economic security, social mobility, and institutional trust. The author argues that the erosion of this order drives support for right-wing populist parties that promise to renegotiate or replace it.
  2. The European Parliament party groups mentioned: European People’s Party (center-right), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (center-left), Patriots for Europe (right-wing populist, newly formed in 2024), European Conservatives and Reformists (right-wing populist/soft Eurosceptic), Europe of Sovereign Nations (far-right, newly formed in 2024), Renew Europe (centrist/liberal), Greens/European Free Alliance (green/regionalist), and the Left in the European Parliament (left-wing).
  3. The National Rally (Rassemblement National) is the French right-wing populist party led by Marine Le Pen, formerly the National Front.
  4. Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) is a right-wing populist party led by Giorgia Meloni, with roots in the post-fascist Italian Social Movement.
  5. Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) is the ruling right-wing populist party in Hungary, led by Viktor Orbán.
  6. The Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is a right-wing populist party founded in 2013, initially Eurosceptic and later shifting further right on immigration and identity issues.
  7. The Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) is a Dutch right-wing populist party led by Geert Wilders.
  8. Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) is a Polish right-wing populist party that governed from 2015 to 2023.
  9. The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) is a right-wing populist party founded in 1956, originally with liberal and pan-German nationalist roots.
  10. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) was a right-wing populist and Eurosceptic party that played a central role in campaigning for the 2016 Brexit referendum.
  11. The “alliance of shops and workshops” (商店与作坊的联盟) refers to the political coalition between the petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers, artisans, small business owners) and the working class, a concept used to describe the electoral base of right-wing populist parties in Europe. ↩
  12. The National Rally (国民联盟, Rassemblement National) is a French right-wing populist and nationalist political party, formerly known as the National Front (Front National) until 2018. ↩
  13. Eurobarometer (欧洲晴雨表) is a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission since 1973, covering a wide range of topics related to the European Union. ↩
  14. The 2015 refugee crisis refers to the large-scale movement of refugees and migrants, primarily from the Middle East and Africa, into the European Union, peaking in 2015 and causing significant political and social strain. ↩
  15. The French National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), formerly the National Front, is a major right-wing populist and nationalist political party in France, led by Marine Le Pen.