The 2024 European Parliament Elections and the Development Challenges Facing Left-Wing Parties

The European Parliament elections were a landmark event in the global “big election year” of 2024 and are regarded as a “weathervane” of European politics. In June 2024, the tenth European Parliament elected a total of 720 seats, with voter turnout rising for the second consecutive time to its highest level since 1999, reflecting an increase in public attention to European issues and a shift in perceptions of the EU’s role. Judging from the results of this European Parliament election, compared with the stabilization and recovery of center-right parties and the continued rise of far-right parties, the overall decline of left-wing parties has slowed, with clear differentiation, placing them in a phase of deep adjustment.

欧洲议会选举是2024年全球“选举大年”的一大标志性事件，被视为欧洲政治的“风向标”。2024年6月，第十届欧洲议会共选举产生720个席位，投票率连续两次增长，达到1999年以来最高值，反映了民众对欧洲议题关注度上升，对欧盟作用的认知出现变化。从此次欧洲议会选举结果看，与中右翼政党企稳回升和极右翼政党持续攀升相比，左翼政党整体跌势放缓、分化明显，处于深度调整阶段。

Left-wing party electoral performance continues to diverge

左翼政党选举表现持续分化

The European Parliament is the EU’s supervisory, consultative, and legislative body, whose members are directly elected by voters in the 27 member states for a five-year term. The number of seats for each EU member state is determined through negotiation based on population size. In the tenth European Parliament, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland have 96, 81, 76, 61, and 53 seats respectively, while the less populous Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta have only 6 seats each. According to European Parliament regulations, elected members form transnational parliamentary groups based on party affiliation to carry out daily work. The results of the 2024 European Parliament elections show that, after four consecutive elections of declining seat numbers and seat shares, the European People’s Party group gained 9 seats, maintaining its position as the largest group with 188 seats and a 26.11% seat share. The centrist Renew Europe group saw a significant reduction in seats, plummeting by 21 seats to only 77.

欧洲议会是欧盟监督、咨询和立法机构，由27个成员国选民直接选举产生议员，任期5年。欧盟成员国的议席数基于人口数经由协商确定。在第十届欧洲议会中，德国、法国、意大利、西班牙和波兰各有96、81、76、61和53个议席，人口较少的塞浦路斯、卢森堡和马耳他分别只有6席。根据欧洲议会规定，当选议员按照党派组成跨国党团开展日常工作。2024年欧洲议会选举结果显示，在议席数和议席占比连续四次选举减少之后，欧洲人民党党团新增9席，以188席和26.11%的议席占比保持第一大党团的地位。持中间立场的复兴欧洲党团议席减少幅度较大，骤降21席之后仅剩77席。

Social democratic parties, Green parties, and radical left parties are the main types of European left-wing parties, forming transnational party alliances such as the Party of European Socialists, the European Green Party, and the Party of the European Left, and correspondingly forming the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (abbreviated as the S&D group), the Greens/European Free Alliance (abbreviated as the Greens/EFA group), and the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (abbreviated as The Left group) in the European Parliament. From the perspective of parliamentary groups, the center-left S&D group lost 2 seats, obtaining 136 seats and an 18.89% seat share. Since falling to the second-largest group in the European Parliament in 1999, it has now seen its seat numbers and seat share decline for five consecutive elections. This election was the first European Parliament election after the UK’s formal “Brexit,” and the seat distribution changed accordingly. The strong domestic rebound of the UK Labour Party did not translate into electoral results in the European Parliament. The Greens/EFA group lost 17 seats, leaving only 53, interrupting its upward trend and falling from the fourth-largest group to the sixth-largest. The Left group gained 9 seats, obtaining 46 seats and a 6.39% seat share, still below its 2014 level.

社会民主党、绿党和激进左翼政党是欧洲左翼政党的主要类型，分别组成了欧洲社会党、欧洲绿党、欧洲左翼党等跨国政党联盟，也在欧洲议会相应形成了社会主义者和民主主义者进步联盟（简称社会党党团，S&D）、绿党和欧洲自由联盟（简称绿党党团，Greens/EFA）、欧洲联合左翼和北欧绿色联盟（简称左翼党团，The Left）。从议会党团来看，中间偏左的社会党党团失去2席，获得136席和18.89%的议席占比，自1999年退居欧洲议会第二大党团之后，已连续五次选举遭遇议席数和议席占比下滑。这次选举是英国正式“脱欧”后的首次欧洲议会选举，议席分布发生相应变化，英国工党强势反弹的国内表现未能转化为欧洲议会的选举结果。绿党党团失去17席，仅剩53席，上升势头中断，从第四大党团退居第六大党团。左翼党团新增9席，获46席和6.39%的议席占比，仍低于2014年的水平。

From a regional and national perspective, left-wing parties in Western and Central and Eastern Europe generally performed poorly. The vote shares of the German Social Democratic Party and the Austrian Social Democratic Party fell to historic lows since participating in European Parliament elections. The vote shares of Poland’s New Left, Hungary’s Democratic Coalition, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Slovenia’s Social Democrats, and Latvia’s “Harmony” Social Democratic Party were below 10%, and the Czech Social Democratic Party failed to win any seats. A few countries saw center-left parties show signs of recovery. The electoral alliance led by the French Socialist Party increased from 5 seats and a 6.19% vote share to 13 seats and a 13.83% vote share. Slovakia’s Direction – Social Democracy, expelled from the S&D group, increased from 3 seats and a 17.52% vote share to 5 seats and a 24.76% vote share. Support for Green parties in Germany, France, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, and other countries declined, while newly formed Green parties in Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania are in their infancy, each winning 1 seat. Germany’s The Left party received only 2.7% of the vote, the vote share of the electoral alliance led by France’s La France Insoumise was also below 10%, while Belgium’s Workers’ Party maintained its upward momentum, winning 10.7% of the vote and 2 seats.

从区域国别来看，西欧和中东欧地区左翼政党整体表现低迷。德国社会民主党和奥地利社会民主党的得票率跌至参加欧洲议会选举以来的历史新低，波兰新左翼党、匈牙利民主联盟、保加利亚社会党、斯洛文尼亚社会民主党、拉脱维亚“和谐”社会民主党的得票率不足10%，捷克社会民主党未能赢得议席。少数国家的中左翼政党出现回升势头，法国社会党主导的选举联盟从5个议席和6.19%的得票率增至13个议席和13.83%的得票率。被社会党党团开除的斯洛伐克方向—社会民主党从3个议席和17.52%的得票率增至5个议席和24.76%的得票率。德国、法国、爱尔兰、比利时、奥地利等国家绿党支持率出现回落，而克罗地亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛新成立的绿党处于起步阶段，分别赢得1个议席。德国左翼党仅获得2.7%的选票，法国“不屈的法兰西”所在选举联盟的得票率也不足10%，而比利时劳动党保持上升势头，赢得10.7%的选票和2个议席。

Northern Europe is a region where left-wing parties have traditionally held advantages; Norway and Iceland have not yet joined the EU. Apart from the Danish Social Democrats and the Finnish Green League, most left-wing parties saw their electoral performance improve. The vote share of the Swedish Left Party increased from 6.8% to 11.06%, the Danish Socialist People’s Party jumped to first place with 17.42% of the vote, and the Finnish Left Alliance’s vote share rose from 6.9% to 17.3%.

北欧是左翼政党占据传统优势的地区，挪威和冰岛尚未加入欧盟。除了丹麦社会民主党和芬兰绿色联盟，大部分左翼政党的选举表现有所回升。瑞典左翼党的得票率从6.8%增至11.06%，丹麦社会主义人民党以17.42%的得票率跃居首位，芬兰左翼联盟的得票率从6.9%上升17.3%。

In Southern Europe, social democratic parties generally performed steadily. Support for Greece’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement – Movement for Change increased, but radical left parties that emerged during the sovereign debt crisis, such as Greece’s Coalition of the Radical Left, and populist parties like Italy’s Five Star Movement, continued to decline. Left-wing forces in Spain experienced fragmentation and reorganization; the vote share of the representative left-wing populist party Podemos was only 3.3%, and the left-wing alliance Sumar, participating in its first European Parliament election, received only a 4.67% vote share.

南欧地区社会民主党总体表现稳定，希腊泛希腊社会主义运动—变革运动党支持率出现回升，但主权债务危机时期兴起的希腊激进左翼联盟等激进左翼政党和意大利五星运动党等民粹主义政党持续衰退。西班牙的左翼力量经历分化重组，左翼民粹主义的代表性政党“我们能”的得票率仅为3.3%，首次参加欧洲议会选举的左翼联盟“团结运动”只有4.67%的得票率。

The European Parliament elections not only influence the selection of the EU’s new leadership but are also seen as a test for incumbent governments in member states and a preview of the next general elections, triggering chain reactions in the domestic politics of EU member states. Some ruling parties in member states suffered defeats, while far-right parties gained ground, adding uncertainty to domestic political situations and the future direction of the EU. In France’s snap National Assembly elections, the far-right National Rally had a clear advantage in the first round of voting, prompting a joint boycott by the left-wing alliance and centrists, and mobilizing candidates to strategically withdraw from the second round. Ultimately, the newly formed left-wing alliance, the New Popular Front, won 182 of the 577 seats, and the ruling coalition won 163 seats. The National Rally and its allies won 143 seats, a significant increase from the 89 seats they won in the 2022 National Assembly elections. France’s election produced a “hung parliament”; the mainstreaming of the far right, increased political fragmentation, and a lack of consensus among major political factions will make it more difficult to form a government and pass legislation, constraining Macron’s remaining presidential term.

欧洲议会选举不仅影响欧盟新一届领导人的产生，也被视为对各国执政者的检验和下一次大选的预演，引发欧盟成员国国内政坛的连锁反应。一部分成员国执政党遭遇失利，极右翼政党有所得势，为国内政局和欧盟未来走向增添了不确定性。在法国提前举行的国民议会选举中，极右翼政党国民联盟首轮投票结果优势明显，引发左翼联盟和中间派联合抵制，并动员候选人策略性退出第二轮选举。最终，新组建的左翼联盟“新人民阵线”赢得577个议席中的182个，执政党联盟获得163席。国民联盟及其盟友获得143个议席，相比2022年国民议会选举的89席仍有显著增长。法国选举产生“悬浮议会”，极右翼走向主流、政治碎片化加剧和主要政治派别缺乏共识将会增加政府组阁和提案通过的难度，马克龙余下总统任期面临掣肘。

This European Parliament election broadly conforms to the overall trend of a rightward shift in European politics and the current dynamics of party politics in various countries. Considering elections at both the domestic level of EU member states and the regional level since the 2008 international financial crisis, left-wing parties have not only experienced cyclical phenomena such as the political pendulum effect and organizational fragmentation and reorganization but have also been continuously affected by deep-seated problems in the European development process and structural changes in party politics.

这次欧洲议会选举基本符合欧洲政治右转的总体特征和各国政党政治的现实动向。结合2008年国际金融危机以来欧盟成员国国内层面和地区层面选举，左翼政党不仅经历政治钟摆效应、组织分化重组等周期性现象，而且受到欧洲发展进程深层次问题和政党政治结构性变迁的持续影响。

Left-wing party political ideas constrained by reality

左翼政党政治理念受到现实制约

Entering the third decade of the 21st century, Europe’s multiple crises have not been fundamentally resolved, and a series of new situations and problems have emerged. First, economic growth is weak. Since the 2008 international financial crisis, the EU economy has been persistently sluggish, with slow productivity growth, declining competitiveness, and multiple instances of negative growth. After the 2019 European Parliament elections, Europe suffered successive shocks from the COVID-19 pandemic and regional conflicts, falling into its most severe economic recession since the end of World War II. Although the European economy experienced a phased rebound in 2021, the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 brought energy supply pressures, coupled with a sluggish global economic recovery and weak external market demand, leading to a contraction in European exports and a gradual slowdown in economic growth. In 2023, the GDP growth rate of EU countries was only 0.4%, with Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and other countries experiencing economic recession again. Factors such as high inflation, high interest rates, pressure from economic transformation, and weak external demand pose severe challenges to the stable growth of the European economy.

进入21世纪第三个十年，欧洲多重危机未能得到根本化解并出现一系列新情况新问题。一是经济增长乏力。2008年国际金融危机以来，欧盟经济持续疲软，生产率增长缓慢，竞争力下降，多次陷入负增长。2019年欧洲议会选举之后，欧洲遭受新冠疫情和地区冲突的接连冲击，陷入二战结束以来最严重的经济衰退。尽管2021年欧洲经济出现阶段性反弹，但2022年乌克兰危机爆发带来能源供应压力，加上世界经济复苏乏力，外部市场需求疲软，欧洲出口呈现萎缩趋势，经济增长逐步放缓。2023年，欧盟国家国内生产总值增幅仅有0.4%，德国、奥地利、瑞典、芬兰等国家再次出现经济衰退。高通胀、高利率、经济转型压力、外部需求疲软等因素使欧洲经济稳定增长面临严峻挑战。

Second, the risk of debt crisis. According to the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, member states’ public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP, and the annual fiscal deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. Affected by factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the energy crisis, the relaxation of fiscal discipline, and sustained economic downturn, the fiscal expenditures of EU member states have increased, and the fiscal burden has intensified. The fiscal deficit rate of the 27 EU member states rose from 0.4% in 2019 to 3.5% in 2023, at one point even reaching 6.7%. The public debt rate increased from 77.8% in 2019 to 90% in 2020, then fell back to 81.7% in 2023. The public debt rate of the eurozone once reached 97.3%. The public debt rates of southern European countries such as Italy and France generally exceed 100%, and the problems of excessive new debt and overly high fiscal deficits are relatively prominent.

二是债务危机风险。根据欧盟《稳定与增长公约》规定，成员国的公共债务不得超过国内生产总值的60%，年度财政赤字不得超过国内生产总值的3%。受新冠疫情、能源危机、财政纪律松绑、经济持续低迷等因素影响，欧盟成员国的财政支出加大，财政负担加重。欧盟27国的财政赤字率从2019年的0.4%增至2023年的3.5%，最高时甚至一度达到6.7%。公共债务率从2019年的77.8%上升到2020年的90%，然后回落到2023年的81.7%。欧元区公共债务率一度达到97.3%。意大利等南欧国家和法国的公共债务率普遍高于100%，新增债务过多、财政赤字过高的问题比较突出。

Third, social and livelihood issues. Affected by the global economic recovery and supply chain bottlenecks, the EU inflation rate gradually rose, from 1.4% in 2019 to 2.9% in 2021, breaking the 2% target set by the European Central Bank and reaching its highest level in a decade. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis led to a rise in European energy costs, further driving up consumer goods prices. In 2022, the inflation rate of EU member states soared to 9.2%, reaching its highest level in forty years. In 2023, the inflation rate fell to 6.4%, but it remained significantly higher than pre-pandemic levels. A spring 2024 Eurobarometer survey showed that 38% of respondents still considered “rising prices, inflation, cost of living” the most important issue in their country, 20 percentage points higher than the second-ranked “economic situation.” The combination of a sluggish economic situation, soaring living costs, and declining real incomes has increased the burden on ordinary households and amplified social inequality. EU countries have introduced a series of relief policies to address the pandemic and inflation, such as energy subsidies and food allowances, but the long-accumulated problems of public services and welfare systems remain prominent, and the living conditions of the younger generation and vulnerable groups urgently need improvement.

三是社会民生问题。受全球经济复苏和供应链瓶颈影响，欧盟通货膨胀率逐渐走高，从2019年的1.4%增至2021年的2.9%，突破了欧洲中央银行确立的2%目标，达到了十年来的最高值。乌克兰危机爆发导致欧洲能源成本上升，进一步带动消费品价格上涨。2022年，欧盟成员国的通货膨胀率飙升至9.2%，达到了四十年来的最高水平。2023年，通货膨胀率降至6.4%，但仍明显高于疫情前的水平。2024年春季“欧洲晴雨表”调查显示，仍有38%的受访者把“物价上涨、通货膨胀、生活成本”视为本国最重要的问题，比排第二位的“经济形势”高出20%。经济形势低迷叠加生活成本飙升、实际收入下降，加重了普通民众家庭负担，放大了社会不平等现象。欧盟各国出台能源补贴和食品津贴等一系列应对疫情和通胀的纾困政策，但长期积累的公共服务和福利制度问题依旧突出，青年一代和弱势群体的生活状况亟须改善。

Economic development, full employment, and social stability were once important foundations for European left-wing parties after World War II to promote social reform, uphold social justice, and alleviate social contradictions. Today, the normalization of economic crises, the privatization of public services, the aging of the population structure, and the process of European integration have profoundly changed the economic conditions, social foundations, and external environment for European countries to implement government intervention and maintain welfare systems. To overcome the impact of the pandemic and promote economic recovery, the EU has introduced a total of 750 billion euros in economic stimulus, the largest in history, and approved a long-term budget of 1.07 trillion euros for 2021–2027. Faced with temporary and structural problems such as a low economic trajectory, public fiscal risks, high inflation, and pressure from industrial transformation, left-wing parties have limited space to implement their political ideas and policy proposals, making it difficult to further propose large-scale expansionary fiscal policies to stimulate the economy and improve people’s livelihoods. Compared with center-right parties that advocate liberalism or conservatism, left-wing parties face greater pressure from both inside and outside the party to maintain a dynamic balance among economic development, public finances, and social welfare. The traditional approach of significantly raising taxes to increase fiscal revenue and ensure fiscal expenditure easily increases enterprise costs, reduces investment willingness, and leads competitors to question the sustainability of public finances. Meanwhile, implementing fiscal austerity and cutting social welfare would deviate from their own principles and cause voter attrition, leaving European left-wing parties ultimately trapped in a dilemma.

经济发展、充分就业和社会稳定曾是二战结束后欧洲左翼政党推动社会改革、维护社会公正和缓解社会矛盾的重要基础。如今，经济危机常态化、公共服务私有化、人口结构老龄化和欧洲一体化进程深刻改变了欧洲国家实行政府干预和维持福利制度的经济条件、社会基础和外部环境。为克服疫情影响、推动经济复苏，欧盟已出台总额7500亿欧元、有史以来规模最大的经济刺激方案，通过了1.07万亿欧元的2021—2027年长期预算。面对经济低位徘徊、公共财政风险、通货膨胀高企、产业转型压力等临时性和结构性问题，左翼政党政治理念和政策主张实施空间有限，难以进一步提出大规模的扩张性财政政策来刺激经济和改善民生。与奉行自由主义或者保守主义的中右翼政党相比，左翼政党保持经济发展、公共财政和社会福利之间的动态平衡需要承受更大的党内外压力。通过大幅加税来提高财政收入和保障财政支出的传统做法容易增加企业成本、降低投资意愿，被竞争对手质疑公共财政可持续性，而实行财政紧缩、削减社会福利又会背离自身理念、引发选民流失，欧洲左翼政党最终陷入两难困境。

The voter base of left-wing parties lacks stability

左翼政党选民基础缺乏稳定性

Left-wing parties emphasize social progress and social justice and are important representatives of the lower and middle strata of society. As traditional parties of the European left-wing camp, social democratic parties, facing changes in industrial structure and social structure, transformations in development models and welfare states, and shifts in political culture and political mobilization, have seen their ideological and class-political colors fade, their political ideas and policy proposals become centrist, and their party image and leading members become elitist. After their transformation, the voter base of social democratic parties expanded from the working class to the entire population, and the core voters shifted from industrial workers in the industrial age to the middle class in the globalization era. However, they still find it difficult to escape the dilemma of identity positioning and lack effective means to solve the problem of declining votes. In addition to the differences between the working class and the middle class, social democratic parties must also address the issue of balancing the interests of different groups, such as “gig” workers, those with stable jobs, and the long-term unemployed. In the context of fragmented party systems and intense political competition, social democratic parties often rely on factors such as the law of party alternation, splits in the right-wing camp, and adjustments in electoral strategies to return to power. The German Social Democratic Party, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, and the Danish Social Democratic Party all won general elections with historically low vote shares and needed to form coalition governments with center-right parties with clearly different political stances, or even regional parties with separatist tendencies. Once their governance performance is poor or political scandals are exposed, these parties come under enormous pressure and even suffer “electoral punishment.” For example, in November 2023, Portuguese Prime Minister Costa announced his resignation due to involvement in a corruption investigation, the Socialist Party lost the election, ending its nine consecutive years in power, and its exploration of a “fourth way” to effectively balance economic development, public finances, and social justice had to be suspended.

左翼政党强调社会进步和社会公正，是社会中下阶层的重要代表。社会民主党作为欧洲左翼阵营的传统政党，面对产业结构和社会结构变迁、发展模式和福利国家变革、政治文化和政治动员变化，其意识形态和阶级政治色彩淡化，政治理念和政策主张中间化，政党形象和领导成员精英化。社会民主党转型后的选民基础从工人阶级拓展为全体民众，核心选民从工业时代的产业工人转向全球化时代的中产阶级，但其仍然难以摆脱身份定位困境，解决选票减少问题乏术。除工人阶级和中产阶级之间的差异性问题以外，社会民主党还要应对“零工”劳动者、稳定职业者和长期失业者等不同群体的利益平衡问题。在政党格局碎片化和政治竞争白热化的情况下，社会民主党往往依赖政党轮替规律、右翼阵营分裂、选举策略调整等因素重新上台。德国社会民主党、西班牙工人社会党和丹麦社会民主党均以历史低位水平的得票率赢得大选，并且需要依靠政治立场差异明显的中右翼政党甚至是具有分离主义倾向的地区性政党完成联合政府组建。一旦执政绩效不佳或者政治丑闻曝光，这些政党就会承受巨大压力乃至遭受“选举惩罚”。例如，2023年11月葡萄牙总理科斯塔因牵涉腐败案调查而宣布辞职，社会党败选，丧失连续九年的执政地位，其有效平衡经济发展、公共财政和社会公正的“第四条道路”探索不得不告一段落。

Green parties are a product of post-industrial society and new social movements, and their influence has steadily risen since the beginning of the 21st century. In recent years, the frequent occurrence of extreme weather and its derivative effects have made more European people intuitively feel the harmfulness and urgency of the climate change issue. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, Green parties achieved remarkable electoral performance, benefiting from the widespread attention to environmental issues, their image as a party of active reform, and strong support from young voters. However, the electoral advantages of Green parties have also become a constraining factor for their further development. The EU vigorously promotes the “Green New Deal,” launching the European Green Deal to address climate change and promote green growth. Center-left and center-right parties are also paying more attention to incorporating green transformation into their policy proposals, which has somewhat weakened the issue advantage of Green parties. Urban residents and the middle class are the target voters of both Green parties and social democratic parties, and the fact that the decline of social democratic parties has stabilized means it is more difficult for Green parties to continue to increase their support. The regional distribution and voter composition of Green parties are relatively concentrated, with their strength and influence in Western and Northern Europe significantly higher than in Southern and Central and Eastern Europe. The young voters they rely on are characterized by unstable political participation and loyalty. Green transformation implies profound changes in production methods and lifestyles, and the radical climate policies of Green parties easily impact the real interests of some industries and groups, triggering resistance. This European Parliament election took place amid the energy crisis and inflation, with issues such as poverty, healthcare, employment, and national defense receiving high attention. The public has significant differences over the cost-sharing, timeline, and specific measures of green transformation, leading Green parties to lose the support of some voters.

绿党是后工业社会和新社会运动的产物，进入21世纪以来影响力稳步上升。近年来，极端天气频繁发生及其衍生效应，使越来越多的欧洲民众更加直观感受到气候变化问题的危害性和紧迫性。在2019年欧洲议会选举中，绿党得益于环保议题的广受关注、积极改革的政党形象和年轻选民的大力支持，选举表现令人瞩目。不过，绿党的选举优势也成为其进一步发展的制约因素。欧盟大力推行“绿色新政”，推出《欧洲绿色协议》来应对气候变化和促进绿色增长，中左翼政党和中右翼政党也更加注重把绿色转型纳入政策主张，导致绿党的议题优势有所弱化；城镇居民和中产阶级是绿党与社会民主党的目标选民，而社会民主党跌势趋稳意味着绿党继续提升支持率的难度加大；绿党的地区分布和选民构成比较集中，在西欧和北欧的实力和影响力显著高于南欧和中东欧，其依赖的年轻选民具有政治参与度和忠诚度不稳定的特点；绿色转型意味着生产方式和生活方式的深刻变革，绿党的激进气候政策容易冲击部分行业和群体的现实利益，引发抵触情绪。此次欧洲议会选举正值能源危机和通货膨胀，贫困、医疗、就业和国防等议题受关注度较高，民众对于绿色转型的成本分摊、时间进度和具体措施存在较大分歧，导致绿党失去部分选民的支持。

Radical left-wing parties, as political forces opposing neoliberalism, fiscal austerity, and social inequality, adhere to the political ideas and policy propositions of the traditional left. They once achieved notable progress in European Parliament elections and in domestic elections in Western and Southern Europe. In their limited experience of governing and participating in government, emerging parties represented by the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece were unable to put forward a scientific theory, systematic plan, or feasible path to replace the existing development model. They exposed shortcomings such as insufficient governance experience, excessive political compromise, and limited governing capacity. Their electoral performance declined to varying degrees compared with the period of the sovereign debt crisis, with a considerable portion of voters shifting to social democratic parties and right-wing populist parties. Traditional radical left-wing parties, mainly represented by former communist parties and their successors, have fallen into the predicament of marginalized political positions and an aging voter base. Newly established radical left-wing parties, meanwhile, have insufficient theoretical preparation, an incomplete organizational system, and an excessive reliance on the charisma of leaders or hot-button issues, making it difficult for them to generate lasting and broad political influence. Taking Spain’s Podemos party as an example, it experienced the shock of its founder leaving politics and the collapse of the left-wing alliance. Its electoral performance has seriously declined, and it currently has only five members in the national parliament and two members in the European Parliament.

激进左翼政党作为反新自由主义、反财政紧缩、反社会不平等的政治力量，坚持传统左翼的政治理念和政策主张，一度在欧洲议会选举、西欧和南欧国内选举中取得突出进展。在有限的执政和参政实践中，以希腊激进左翼联盟为代表的新兴政党无法提出替代现有发展模式的科学理论、系统方案和可行路径，暴露出治理经验不足、政治妥协过多、执政能力有限等短板，选举表现相比主权债务危机时期出现不同程度的回落，相当一部分选民流向社会民主党和右翼民粹主义政党。以原共产党及其后继者为主要代表的传统激进左翼政党陷入政治主张边缘化和选民基础老龄化的困境，而新成立的激进左翼政党理论准备不够充分，组织体系不够完善，过于依赖领袖魅力或热点议题，难以产生持久广泛的政治影响。以西班牙“我们能”党为例，该党经历创始人退出政坛和左翼联合破裂的震荡，选举表现严重滑坡，目前只拥有5名国内议会议员和2名欧洲议会议员。

Furthermore, the intensification of geopolitical rivalry, ongoing regional conflicts, and the blurring of boundaries between domestic and foreign policy have exacerbated political and social divisions within EU member states. Some left-wing parties, under domestic and international pressure, have found it difficult to uphold their traditional foreign policy positions and play a role in maintaining peace. They have actively or passively adjusted their policy propositions and discursive expressions to align with the positions of their own governments and the official EU stance. Latvia’s Harmony social democratic party, originally the political representative of the country’s ethnic Russian population, lost a large number of party members and supporters due to a shift in its foreign policy stance, resulting in poor electoral performance. Compared with left-wing pro-Russian parties, radical right-wing pro-Russian parties have generally been more successful electorally. Not only have they not lost their core voters because of their “pro-Russian” stance, but they have even expanded their voter base by successfully exploiting nationalist discourse after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis.

此外，地缘政治博弈加剧、地区冲突持续不断和内政外交边界淡化，加剧了欧盟国家内部政治和社会分化。一部分左翼政党受到国内外压力，难以坚持传统外交立场和发挥维护和平作用，主动或被动调整政策主张和话语表述，同本国政府和欧盟官方立场保持一致。拉脱维亚“和谐”社会民主党原是拉国内俄罗斯族裔的政治代言人，因外交立场转变而失去大批党员和支持者，选举表现不佳。与左翼亲俄政党相比，激进右翼亲俄政党选举表现总体更为成功，其不仅未因“亲俄”而失去基础选民, 甚至还因在乌克兰危机爆发后成功利用民族主义话语扩大了选民基础。

Against the backdrop of a fragile voter base for left-wing parties, the characteristic of competition outweighing cooperation among political forces within the left-wing camp remains prominent. Traditional issues of economic and social policy, along with new problems arising from immigration and refugees, climate change, the Ukraine crisis, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have amplified ideological differences among left-wing parties and weakened the basis for left-wing unity. Italy’s Five Star Movement withdrew from the coalition government due to policy disagreements over responding to the energy crisis and refused to cooperate electorally with the Democratic Party, resulting in a heavy defeat in the general election. Portugal saw, for the first time, the Socialist Party government’s budget proposal rejected by the Unitary Democratic Coalition and the Left Bloc, leading to the dissolution of parliament and early elections. The Danish Social Democratic government faced pressure from a no-confidence motion initiated by the Radical Party of the centre-left coalition due to its pandemic prevention policies, prompting early elections. In France, the Socialist Party and La France Insoumise diverged on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the period of the New Ecological and Social People’s Union, and after the New Popular Front won the parliamentary elections, they became embroiled in a struggle for left-wing leadership.

在左翼政党选民基础脆弱的背景下，左翼阵营政治力量之间竞争性大于合作性的特点依然突出。经济社会政策的传统议题和移民难民、气候变化、乌克兰危机、巴以冲突引发的新问题，放大了左翼政党的理念差异，削弱了左翼政党的联合基础。意大利五星运动党因应对能源危机的政策分歧而退出联合政府，拒绝同民主党展开选举合作，结果遭遇大选惨败。葡萄牙首次出现社会党政府财政预算案被民主团结联盟和左翼集团否决的情况，导致议会解散和大选提前。丹麦社会民主党政府因防疫政策被中左翼联盟的激进党质疑，面临不信任动议的压力而提前大选。法国社会党和“不屈的法兰西”在“生态和社会人民新联盟”时期，在巴以冲突问题上发生分歧，又在“新人民阵线”赢得议会选举之后陷入左翼领导权的争夺。

Left-Wing Parties Face the Sustained Impact of Populism

左翼政党面临民粹主义持续冲击

The voter bases of left-wing parties and populist parties have a high degree of overlap. The practical difficulties of the former become advantageous issues for the latter. The insufficient responsiveness and crisis of representation of left-wing parties have led social groups in deindustrialized regions, which have been continuously impacted by multiple crises, to turn their support to conservative and extremist forces. Meanwhile, the mainstreaming of populist parties will impact the political landscape, reshape the political ecosystem, and continue to erode the issue advantages and voter base of left-wing parties. If left-wing populist parties emerged in Western and Southern Europe alongside the sovereign debt crisis, then right-wing populist parties, due to the ongoing fermentation of the immigration and refugee issue, have a more lasting and widespread influence.

左翼政党和民粹主义政党的选民基础具有较强的重合性，前者的现实难题成为后者的优势议题。左翼政党的回应性不足和代表性危机导致受多重危机持续冲击的产业空心化地区和社会群体转向支持保守和极端势力，而民粹主义政党主流化又会冲击政治格局、重塑政治生态，继续削弱左翼政党的议题优势和选民基础。如果说左翼民粹主义政党伴随主权债务危机而兴起于西欧和南欧地区，那么右翼民粹主义政党就因移民难民问题的持续发酵而具有更持久和广泛的影响力。

The deepening of economic globalization and European integration has promoted international population mobility. Europe faces the dual problems of an aging population and labor demand, and net immigration figures show an upward trend. Due to restrictions on population movement during the pandemic, the number of immigrants to the EU once fell to 3.268 million in 2020, but then quickly rebounded to 6.977 million in 2022, significantly higher than the 2.89 million in 2013. The number of immigrants to Germany and Spain rose from 692,000 and 280,000 in 2013, respectively, to 2.071 million and 1.258 million in 2022.

经济全球化和欧洲一体化的深入发展促进国际人口流动。欧洲面临人口老龄化问题和劳动力需求，净移民人数呈现上升态势。由于疫情防控期间人口流动限制，2020年欧盟移民人数一度降至326.8万，随后迅速回升到2022年的697.7万，大幅高于2013年的289万。德国和西班牙的移民人数更是分别从2013年的69.2万和28万攀升至2022年的207.1万和125.8万。

The deterioration of the geopolitical environment and surrounding instability have led to a refugee crisis in Europe on a scale unprecedented since the end of World War II. The number of asylum applications once exceeded one million in 2015, after which the number of refugees declined somewhat. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the EU activated the “Temporary Protection Directive” mechanism, lowering entry thresholds and simplifying application procedures, allowing Ukrainian refugees to move freely within EU member states and gain access to employment, housing, education, medical care, and other rights. In 2023, the number of refugees in Europe again exceeded one million. Against the backdrop of sluggish economic growth and high inflation, the rapidly growing foreign population has exacerbated a series of problems, including refugee distribution and resettlement, strain on public resources, competition for employment opportunities, deterioration of social order, and cultural and religious differences. This continuously impacts Europe’s tradition of multicultural values, dissolves the atmosphere of openness and tolerance, and nurtures the social foundation of populism.

地缘政治环境恶化和周边动荡不安导致欧洲爆发二战结束以来规模空前的难民危机。难民庇护申请人数一度于2015年超过100万，之后难民人数有所下降。乌克兰危机爆发后，欧盟启动“临时保护令”机制，降低入境门槛、简化申请流程，允许乌克兰难民在欧盟成员国自由流动，获得就业、居住、教育、医疗等权利。2023年，欧洲难民人数再次突破100万。在经济增长乏力、通货膨胀高企的背景下，快速增长的外来人口加剧了难民分配安置、公共资源紧张、就业机会竞争、社会治安恶化、文化宗教差异等一系列问题，持续冲击欧洲多元主义的价值传统，消解开放包容的社会氛围，孕育民粹主义的社会基础。

The de-radicalization strategy of right-wing populist parties, combined with the polarization of European society, has enabled them to continuously break through the “defense line” that mainstream parties have erected against populism, exerting growing influence in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe. The immigration and refugee policies of the Swedish and Danish Social Democratic parties have become more conservative, but this has not stemmed the rise of the Sweden Democrats or the emergence of the Denmark Democrats. In particular, the Sweden Democrats, by signing a governing agreement, providing parliamentary support, and stationing commissioners in government, have for the first time exerted a real influence on government formation and operation. During the Socialist Party’s tenure in Portugal, economic and social development indicators improved, but this did not prevent the Chega party from making continuous electoral gains.

右翼民粹主义政党的去极端化策略与欧洲社会的极化态势相结合，使其不断突破主流政党针对民粹主义的“防线”，在北欧、西欧和南欧地区产生越来越大的影响。瑞典和丹麦社会民主党的移民和难民政策趋向保守，无法遏止瑞典民主党的崛起和丹麦民主党的出现，尤其是瑞典民主党通过签署执政协议、提供议会支持、派驻专员进驻等方式，首次对政府组建和运行发挥实际影响。葡萄牙社会党执政期间经济社会发展指标向好，也没能避免“够了”党不断取得选举进展。

In Central and Eastern Europe, because member states joined the European integration process later, they have different national conditions, distinct demands, and uneven benefits. They hold different views on the EU’s ability to respond to crises, its methods of handling problems, and its mechanisms for distributing benefits, and place greater emphasis on national sovereignty, security, and identity. Parties with populist and nationalist tendencies have a stable base of social support and play an important role in the politics of countries such as Poland and Hungary. “Under the impact of nationalism, populism, and right-wing extremism, anti-establishment parties have risen in Central and Eastern Europe, deeply impacting traditional parties, especially left-wing parties.”

在中东欧地区，由于成员国加入欧洲一体化进程时间较晚，国情各异、诉求有别、获益不均，对欧盟应对危机能力、处理问题方式和利益分配机制存在不同看法，对民族国家主权、安全和认同等方面更为重视。具有民粹主义色彩和民族主义倾向的政党拥有稳定的社会支持基础，在波兰、匈牙利等国政坛扮演重要角色。“在民族主义、民粹主义和右翼极端主义的冲击下，反体制政党在中东欧兴起，使传统政党特别是左翼政党深受冲击。”

In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), led by Italy’s ruling party, Brothers of Italy, won 78 seats, a gain of 9 seats. The newly formed Patriots for Europe group currently has 84 MEPs, making it the third-largest group. Parties such as France’s National Rally, Hungary’s Fidesz, the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, and Portugal’s Chega are participating in it. Constrained by political culture and mainstream parties, right-wing populist parties will continue to seek greater influence through policy adjustments, issue reframing, organizational building, online mobilization, and inter-party cooperation.

在2024年欧洲议会选举中，意大利执政党兄弟党领衔的欧洲保守与改革党团（ECR）获得78席，新增9席。新组建的欧洲爱国者党团现有84名欧洲议员，位居第三大党团，法国国民联盟、匈牙利青年民主主义者联盟、荷兰自由党、比利时弗拉芒利益党、葡萄牙“够了”党等政党参与其中。在受到政治文化和主流政党制约的情况下，右翼民粹主义政党将继续通过政策调整、议题重塑、组织建设、网络动员、政党合作等方式谋求更大影响。

Conclusion

结语

After several electoral cycles in which European countries have attempted alternating left- and right-wing governance, traditional parties and their political elites have still not effectively resolved structural problems or achieved sustainable growth. Their governing philosophies, governing capacities, and governing styles have been widely questioned. The public’s desire for change and innovation, together with the emergence of a younger generation of voters, has accelerated the rise of populist parties, breaking the balance between left- and right-wing camps in European politics. The 2024 European Parliament elections once again confirmed the coexistence of political party polarization, fragmentation, and populist tendencies, presenting a structural shift in which three political forces—a declining center-left, a center-right, and a mainstreaming far right—are contending. Under the pressure of periodic competitive elections and the impact of far-right parties, some social democratic parties have adopted a pragmatic adjustment that moderately reverts to left-wing traditions on the economic and social dimensions while leaning toward right-wing conservatism on the cultural and diplomatic dimensions. Green parties and radical left parties, in their efforts to play a greater practical role, face challenges from the diversification of political issues and voter bases. Their specific policy adjustments and choices of reform paths may further weaken the traditional advantages of left-wing parties, deepen the crisis of these parties, and trap party development in a long-term predicament. In the future, left-wing parties urgently need to adapt to increasingly fierce political competition, explore new paths for party transformation and national governance, achieve strong political leadership and effective organizational mobilization, and promote social inclusiveness, stability, development, and progress through the reshaping of political agendas.

欧洲各国历经数个选举周期尝试左右翼轮替执政，但传统政党及其政治精英仍未有效解决结构性问题和实现可持续增长，其执政理念、执政能力和执政风格备受质疑。民众求新求变的心态和青年一代选民的出现，加快了民粹主义政党的崛起，打破了欧洲政治左右翼阵营的平衡。2024年欧洲议会选举再次印证了政党政治极化、碎片化和民粹化并存的态势，呈现衰退后的中左翼、中右翼和主流化的极右翼三种政治力量角力的结构性变迁。在周期性竞争选举和极右翼政党冲击的压力下，一部分社会民主党采取经济社会维度向左翼传统适度回调、文化和外交维度趋向右翼保守的实用主义调整，绿党和激进左翼政党争取发挥更大实际作用则面临政治议题和选民基础多元化转型的挑战，其具体政策调整和变革路径选择有可能导致左翼政党传统优势进一步弱化，政党危机进一步加深，政党发展陷入长期困境。未来，左翼政党亟须适应日趋激烈的政治竞争，探索政党变革和国家治理的新路径，实现有力的政治引领和有效的组织动员，通过政治议程重塑推动社会的包容稳定和发展进步。

(The author is Vice Dean and Professor of the School of Marxism at China University of Political Science and Law)

（作者系中国政法大学马克思主义学院副院长、教授）

(This article is a phased result of the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Approval No. 24CXTD05) and the Collaborative Innovation Center for the Study of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics at Beijing Universities (China University of Political Science and Law))

（本文是中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（批准号：24CXTD05）和北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心（中国政法大学）的阶段性成果）

Online editor: Tongxin

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