On the “Resurrection” of the Subject — From Lukács, Althusser to Badiou

The “resurrection” of the subject is an “Althusser-Badiou” proposition, or, viewed over a longer span, a “Lukács-Althusser-Badiou” proposition. This is mainly because: Badiou’s “resurrection” of the subject is built upon the foundation of Althusser’s declaration of the “death” of the active subject; the “resurrected” subject remains anti-humanist, still presupposes structural “positions” and contingent events, and bears a relation of inheritance to the subject that Althusser later proposed as the bearer of contingent practice. From another perspective, Badiou does not stop at contingency but strives to extract universality from contingency, ultimately completing a bodily reconstruction from the event-subject to the truth-subject, restoring the activity and creativity of the practical subject. This is in fact also a response, through new theory, to the many early explorations by Lukács and others concerning the reshaping of revolutionary subjectivity.

主体的“复活”是一个“阿尔都塞-巴迪欧”式命题,或者从更长的跨度来看,是一个“卢卡奇-阿尔都塞-巴迪欧”式命题。这主要是因为：巴迪欧对主体的“复活”建立在阿尔都塞宣告能动性主体“死亡”的基础之上,“复活”了的主体仍然是反人道主义的,仍然以结构性“位置”和偶然性事件为前提,并和阿尔都塞后期提出的作为偶然性实践承担者的主体具有承继性关系。从另一方面来看,巴迪欧并没有止步于偶然性,而是力图从偶然性中拖出普遍性,并最终完成了从事件主体到真理主体的身体性重构,恢复了实践主体的能动性和创造性,这实际上也是用新的理论回应了卢卡奇等人早期关于革命主体性重塑的诸多探索。

I. The “Death” of the Subject: Althusser’s Hailing of the Subject’s Emergence and Its Background

一、主体之“死”：阿尔都塞唤询主体的出场及其背景

Among the major schools of Western Marxism, the debate over the question of subjectivity is key to the divergence between humanism and structuralism. The totality-oriented line represented by Lukács is commonly called humanist Marxism, which restores the activity of the subject through the dialectic of subject and object and the reshaping of class consciousness, thereby breaking free from the economic determinist orientation of orthodox theory and providing a revolutionary alternative to reformism. Althusser’s structuralist Marxism is known for its anti-humanism; in his view, the subject can only be a passive bearer of structures, stripped of subjective activity and revolutionary character.

在西方马克思主义的各大流派中,围绕主体性问题的争论是引发人本主义和结构主义分野的关键。以卢卡奇为代表的总体性路线通常被称为人本主义马克思主义,也就是以主客体辩证法和阶级意识的重塑来恢复主体的能动性,从而摆脱正统理论的经济决定论取向,为改良主义提供一种革命性的替代方案。阿尔都塞的结构主义马克思主义则以反人道主义著称,在他那里,主体只能作为结构的消极承担者,失去了主观能动性和革命性。

This article argues that it is necessary to re-examine the theory of the subject from Lukács to Althusser starting from the theory of ideology, so as to derive a more continuous analysis, rather than limiting ourselves to a simple humanism-structuralism dichotomy. Under the lens of ideology theory, the humanist subject also has a dimension of subordination, while the structuralist subject also possesses a humanist face. More crucially, we can see that from Lukács to Althusser, the “death” of the subject actually underwent a long process, not merely a sharply opposed “turn.”

本文认为,有必要从意识形态理论出发重新梳理从卢卡奇到阿尔都塞的主体理论,从中得出一个更具有连续性的分析,而不仅仅局限于一种关于人本主义-结构主义的二分法。在意识形态理论的关照下,人本主义主体也具有服从性的一面,而结构主义主体也具有人道主义面相。更关键的一点就是,我们可以看到,从卢卡奇到阿尔都塞,主体之“死”实际上经历了一个漫长的过程,而不仅仅是一个截然相反的“转向”。

For Lukács, the revolutionary, active subject is not “in-itself”; only individuality is a given fact, while subjectivity must be “recovered” from reified ideology, undergoing a process from in-itself to for-itself. In Lukács’s view, ideology is a false consciousness, a mistaken cognition of reality. For example, the reified consciousness of commodity fetishism is a naturalized displacement of capitalist reality and history: what was originally a relation between people, expressed as value, is now displaced into the nature of use-value; this “reifying” displacement of history by nature is a manifestation of bourgeois ideology. Of course, Lukács does not limit himself to Marx’s sphere of production; what is displaced is not only labor relations and exchange relations but also people’s psychological structures, and even every level of society is covered by such a “veil” of things.

在卢卡奇那里,革命的、能动的主体并不是“自在的”,只有个体性是一个既定事实,而主体性则是需要从物化意识形态中“恢复”的,要经历一个从自在到自为的过程。在卢卡奇看来,意识形态就是一种虚假的意识（false consciousness）,是人对现实的一种错误认知。比如商品拜物教的物化意识,就是对资本现实和历史的自然化置换,本来是体现人与人关系的价值,现在被置换为使用价值的自然,这种自然对历史的“物化”式置换,就是资产阶级意识形态的表现。当然卢卡奇并不局限于马克思所说的生产领域,被置换的不仅是劳动关系和交换关系,还有人的心理结构,甚至是社会的各个层面都被蒙上了这样一层物的“面纱”。

Lukács believes that only the class consciousness of the proletariat can possibly expose this false consciousness, because proletarian class consciousness can transcend an abstract and fragmented state and achieve a totalizing understanding of reality. But Lukács also emphasizes that this represents only a possibility; although the proletariat may be capable of transcending reified consciousness, “able to grasp reified forms as processes between people,” the proletariat in its “in-itself” state or under non-revolutionary conditions is still subject to reified consciousness. Only through constant severance from reified consciousness, through repeated efforts to lift the veil of false consciousness, “can proletarian consciousness grow into the consciousness of the process itself, and the proletariat become the identical subject-object of history,” thereby restoring its historicity and subjectivity, so that it is no longer mediated by the objective laws of the production process, moving from in-itself to for-itself. Therefore, for Lukács, the “recovery” of the practical subject is not a simple matter of a shift in consciousness; it must undergo a difficult, lengthy process, achievable only through continuous ideological critique (repeated “lifting of the veil”) and practice. In other words, “if reification is the necessary, immediate reality, then its overcoming can only take the form of a constant, repeated effort to concretely relate to the contradictions manifested in the whole development, and through recognizing the inherent meaning of these contradictions for the whole development, to practically break the reified structure of existence.”

卢卡奇认为,只有无产阶级的阶级意识才有可能对这种虚假意识进行揭露,因为无产阶级的阶级意识能够超出一种抽象和分割的状态,达成关于现实的总体性认识。但卢卡奇也强调,这仅仅代表一种可能性,尽管无产阶级有可能超越物化意识,“有能力把物化形式把握为人与人之间的过程”,但无产阶级在“自在”状态或非革命条件下,自身仍然要受制于物化意识。只有通过不断和物化意识做切割,不断通过一次次揭开虚假意识面纱的努力,“无产阶级的意识才能成长为过程本身的意识,无产阶级才能成为历史的同一的主体-客体”,才能恢复其历史性和主体性,使自身不再被生产过程的客观规律所中介,从自在走向自为。因此,在卢卡奇这里,实践主体的“恢复”并不是一个简单的意识转换问题,而要经历一个艰巨的、漫长的过程,只有通过不断的意识形态批判（一次次地“揭面纱”）和实践才有可能达成。换言之,如果“物化是必然的直接的现实的话,那么它的克服也只能采用这样的形式：不断地、一再地努力通过与具体表现出的全部发展的矛盾具体联系起来,通过认识到这些矛盾对于全部发展所具有的固有意义,从实践上打破存在的物化结构”。

The Frankfurt School (early period) underwent some changes in its understanding of ideology relative to Lukács. For example, Adorno held that ideology is “false consciousness with objective necessity.” He emphasized the objective necessity of ideology, not merely its falsity; moreover, the aim of ideology critique is not to restore from the naturalness of things to the historicity of people, but to restore from a “identity”-based instrumental rationality to the original richness of nature. For Adorno, ideology is first of all not a matter of human consciousness but of the material structure of commodity exchange. Exchange value, as the secret of ideology, embodies an abstract principle of identity, which allows qualitatively different things to be commensurated, thereby erasing the difference and richness of use-value. This logic of identity, and the instrumental rationality built upon it, is both a false consciousness and a key link in the operation of capital, and therefore possesses objective necessity. It can be seen that for Adorno, breaking false consciousness cannot be achieved through a “lifting of the veil,” nor by replacing reified consciousness with the proletariat’s totalizing consciousness; rather, one must find a “non-identity” principle to dissolve the identity of instrumental rationality and liberate the richness of use-value, in order to restore the subjectivity of nature.

法兰克福学派（早期）对于意识形态的认识相对于卢卡奇而言,就发生了一些变化。比如,阿多诺就认为,意识形态是“具有客观必然性的虚假意识”。他强调了意识形态所具有的客观必然性,而不仅仅是其虚假性；而且意识形态批判的目的也不是从物的自然性恢复到人的历史性,而是要从一种具有“同一性”的工具理性恢复到自然本有的丰富性。在阿多诺这里,意识形态首先不是人的意识问题,而是商品交换的物质结构。交换价值作为意识形态的秘密,体现了一种抽象的同一性法则,它使得不同质之间的事物能够进行通约,从而抹去了使用价值的差异性和丰富性。这种同一性逻辑以及建立在同一性逻辑之上的工具理性既是一种虚假意识,更是资本运作的关键环节,因此具有客观必然性。可见,在阿多诺这里,打破虚假意识并不能通过一种“揭面纱”的方式,也不是以无产阶级的总体性意识来替换物化意识,而是要找到一种“非同一性”法则来消解工具理性的同一性,把使用价值的丰富性解放出来,才能恢复自然的主体性。

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno, through their discussion of the relationship between self-preservation and self-sacrifice, further point out that the subject, enveloped by instrumental rationality, has to a certain extent moved toward a self-sacrificial “death.” Self-sacrifice was originally a means of self-preservation, but in capitalist Enlightenment rationality, self-preservation becomes the means, while sacrifice becomes the end. Once sacrifice becomes the end, self-preservation is replaced by self-abandonment. “Because nature is denied in man, not only the telos of external control of nature but also the telos of human life itself is distorted and becomes obscure. Once people are no longer conscious of themselves as nature, all the ends for which they maintain themselves—social progress, the increase of all material and spiritual powers, in a word, their very self-consciousness—become meaningless; the means becomes the end,” and under late capitalist conditions this inversion reaches its peak: self-preservation as a means ultimately leads to the destruction of the subject. Horkheimer and Adorno point out: under these circumstances, attempting to restore subjectivity by exposing false consciousness is no longer possible. For in false ideology, not only are people deceived, but “people become superfluous”; “if anyone tries to escape the universal, unequal, and unfair exchange, society will surely leave him with nothing—that is social necessity.” In other words, under the universal compulsion of the exchange principle and calculative reason, since self-preservation is no longer the end, people always inevitably move toward self-abandonment, and the subject always inevitably moves toward destruction.

在《启蒙辩证法》中,霍克海默和阿多诺通过对自我持存和自我献祭之间关系的论述,进一步指出,主体由于被工具理性所裹挟,在一定程度上已经走向了自我献祭式“死亡”。自我献祭本来是自我持存的手段,但在资本主义的启蒙理性中,自我持存成为了手段,献祭却成为了目的。而一旦献祭成为目的,自我持存也就被自暴自弃所取代。“由于人的自然被否定了,因此,不仅控制外部自然的目的,而且人类自身生命的目的,也都遭到了歪曲,变得模糊不清。一旦人们不再意识到其本身就是自然,那么,他维持自身生命的所有目的,包括社会的进步、一切物质力量和精神力量的增强,一句话,就是其自我意识本身就变得毫无意义了,手段变成了目的”,而且在晚期资本主义条件下,这种倒置更加登峰造极,自我持存作为手段最终使主体遭到了毁灭。霍克海默和阿多诺指出：在这种情形下,试图通过揭示虚假意识的方式恢复主体性已经不可能了。因为在虚假的意识形态中,不仅人受到了欺骗,而且“人成为了多余”,“如果有人企图逃脱普遍的、不等价的和不公平的交换,那么,社会必定让他一无所有,这就是社会必然性”。换言之,在交换原则和计算理性的普遍性强制下,由于自我持存不再作为目的人总是不可避免地走向自我放弃,主体总是不可避免地走向毁灭。

Althusser continued the Frankfurt School's notion of the objective necessity of ideology, but he completely disagreed with the concept of false consciousness. In Althusser's view, ideology, as "the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence," does not exist at the level of consciousness at all, but rather at the unconscious level. This imaginary relationship at the unconscious level is not supported by a set of systems derived from the subject's consciousness and ideas, but is instead constructed as an ideological state apparatus that bypasses the subject's consciousness. [2]2 Althusser's concept of "Ideological State Apparatuses" (ISAs) refers to institutions (e.g., schools, churches, the family) that function primarily through ideology rather than repression to reproduce the relations of production. This is a material force located in the symbolic order; these material forces directly transform individuals into their subjects through the method of "interpellation," that is, into supporters of the ideological state apparatus. But at the same time, such a subject can only be a "subjected" subject; having lost subjective initiative, the subject is merely a passive bearer of material forces.

阿尔都塞延续了法兰克福学派所说的意识形态的客观必然性,但他完全不同意虚假意识的说法。在阿尔都塞看来,意识形态作为“个体和自身真实生存条件之间的想象性关系”,根本就不存在于意识层面,而是在无意识层面。这种位于无意识层面的想象性关系,其背后并没有一套来自主体意识和观念系统的支撑,而是作为绕过了主体意识的意识形态国家机器的建构。这是一种位于象征界的物质性力量,这些物质性力量直接以“唤询”的方式将个体变为自己的主体,也就是作为意识形态国家机器的支持者。但与此同时,这样的主体只能是“臣服”的主体,由于失去了主观能动性,主体只是作为物质性力量的一个消极承载者。

Althusser in fact dissolved the subject in the name of structure; history no longer unfolds around the subject, history is no longer the product of human activity itself, but proceeds as a subjectless process. This is completely different from the historical dialectics of which Lukács spoke. Although their starting point is both the disappearance of subjectivity brought about by capitalist production, Lukács's theory points towards the restoration of subjectivity at the level of class consciousness. But for Althusser, the material forces behind ideology are indestructibly solid; more importantly, ideology always bypasses consciousness and shapes the subject at the unconscious level. Therefore, the subject is not a self-awareness achieved after escaping some false ideology; the subject is precisely the result shaped by ideology as an unconscious structure. In other words, for Althusser, the subject has no possibility of "restoration" whatsoever. Because whether it is self-sacrifice or self-abandonment, for Althusser, both are necessary to become a subject. In the scene of interpellation, the subject always "actively" makes itself a "submissive" subject through its own language and actions (the response to interpellation) (Althusser repeatedly points out the dual meaning of "subject," namely subject and subjection). The subject no longer signifies the rise of some kind of self-consciousness, nor does it point towards any transformative initiative; the subject can only be a passive bearer of the capitalist structure: "The structure of the relations of production determines the places and functions occupied and performed by the agents of production, who are only the occupants of these places insofar as they are the 'bearers' of these functions. Therefore, the true 'subjects' (i.e., the subjects constituting the process) are not these occupants of places and performers of functions. Contrary to all appearances, the true subjects are not the 'facts' of a naive anthropological 'given existence,' not concrete 'individuals,' the true 'subjects' are these determiners and distributors: the relations of production (and political and ideological social relations). But since these are 'relations,' we cannot conceive of them as categories of the subject." [3]3 This is a direct quotation from Althusser's *Reading Capital* (1965), specifically from the section "On the Object of Capital." This passage clearly shows Althusser's view: structure is the subject, and since relations of production are not a category of the subject, history can ultimately only be "a subjectless process."

阿尔都塞实际上是以结构的名义消解了主体,历史不再围绕主体展开,历史不再是人自身活动的产物,而是作为一个无主体的过程。这和卢卡奇所说的历史辩证法完全不同。尽管他们的出发点都是资本主义生产所带来的主体性的消失,但卢卡奇的理论指向的是主体性在阶级意识层面的恢复。而在阿尔都塞这里,意识形态背后的物质性力量坚固无比,更重要的是,意识形态总能绕过意识,在无意识层面塑造主体。因此,主体不是摆脱某种虚假意识形态之后的自觉,主体恰恰是意识形态作为一种无意识结构所塑形的结果。换言之,在阿尔都塞这里,主体已经没有任何“恢复”的可能性。因为无论是自我献祭还是自我放弃,在阿尔都塞这里都是成为一个主体所必须的。在唤询场景中,主体总是“主动地”通过自己的语言和行为（对唤询的应答）来让自己成为“服从的”主体（阿尔都塞多次指出“subject”的两重含义,即主体和服从）。主体不再意味着某种自我意识的升起,更不指向某种改造世界的能动性,主体只能作为资本主义结构的被动承担者：“生产关系的结构决定生产当事人所占有的地位和所担当的职能,而生产当事人只有在他们是这些职能的‘承担者’的范围内才是这些地位的占有者。因此,真正的‘主体’（即构成过程的主体）并不是这些地位的占有者和职能的执行者。同一切表面现象相反,真正的主体不是天真的人类学的‘既定存在’的‘事实’,不是具体的‘个体’,真正的‘主体’是这些规定者和分配者：生产关系（以及政治的和意识形态的社会关系）。但是,由于这是一些‘关系’,我们不能把它们设想为主体的范畴”。这段话清楚地表明阿尔都塞的观点：结构即主体,且由于生产关系不是主体范畴,历史最终只能是“一个无主体的过程”。

Thus, from Lukács's emphasis on the "restoration" of subjectivity to Althusser's dissolution of the subject's initiative in the name of structure, the discussion within Western Marxism around ideology and the subject underwent a process, in which certain views of the Frankfurt School can serve as a transition between the two. But it was ultimately Althusser who declared the death of the subject, because in his view, the early Western Marxists' attempt to achieve the "restoration" of class consciousness through ideological critique was itself imbued with an idealist tendency. For Althusser, materialism must be an anti-humanism, that is, starting from the over-determination of the capitalist structure to declare the non-determination of the subject. A subject without the capacity for determination and choice represents the death of the active subject. Under Althusser's structuralist Marxism, the thoroughness of the subject's death is also reflected in the fact that even before being born, the individual has already been interpellated across time and space by certain structural forces (ideological mechanisms); in this sense, the subject is always already a subjected subject.

可见,从卢卡奇强调主体性的“恢复”,到阿尔都塞以结构之名消解了主体的能动性,西方马克思主义围绕意识形态和主体问题的讨论经历了一个过程,其中法兰克福学派的某些观点可以作为二者之间的过渡。但最终是由阿尔都塞宣布了主体的死亡,因为在他看来,早期的西方马克思主义者试图通过意识形态批判来达成阶级意识的“恢复”,本身就带有一种唯心主义倾向。在阿尔都塞看来,唯物主义必须是一种反人道主义,也就是从资本主义结构的超决定（over-determination）出发,来宣布主体的非决定性。没有决定和选择能力的主体代表着能动性主体的死亡。在阿尔都塞的结构主义马克思主义之下,主体之死的彻底性还体现在：甚至在还没有出生之前,个体就已经被一些结构性的力量（意识形态机制）穿越时空所唤询了,从这个意义上讲,主体总是已经（always already）是服从性的主体了。

II. The "Subject" of Aleatory Encounter: From Structural Bearer to Practical Bearer

二、偶然相遇的“主体”：从结构承担者到实践承担者

One point worth emphasizing here is: although Althusser's structuralism makes it impossible for the subject to exist as an active subject with self-consciousness and the capacity for choice, Althusser did not abandon the concept of the subject; the subject always occupies a position within the ideological structure. It is precisely this occupation of a position that makes the subject still play a crucial role in Althusser's theory. Although a passive bearer, the subject itself is indispensable. Without the subject's speech acts, ideology itself cannot complete its own interpellation; ideology can only exist as an ideology with material force when it is realized in the subject's actions and discourse (even if unconsciously). That is to say, for Althusser, there is always a relationship of "double reflection" between the subject and ideology: not only does the subject come into being through the interpellation of ideology, but ideology also always revolves around the subject as its center, ensuring its function through a mirror-copy structure. From this perspective, the subject not only exists, but also "works by itself": "the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e., in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e., in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 'all by himself'." [4]4 This is a direct quotation from Althusser's essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (1970).

这里值得强调的一点是：尽管阿尔都塞的结构主义使得主体不可能作为一种能动的、有自我意识和抉择能力的主体存在,但阿尔都塞并没有放弃主体这个概念,主体在意识形态结构中始终占有一个位置。正是这个占位使得主体在阿尔都塞的理论中仍然具有关键性作用。尽管是一个被动承担者,但主体自身不可或缺。如果没有主体的言语式行为,意识形态本身也无法完成自身的唤询,意识形态只有落实在主体的行为和话语中（尽管是无意识的）,才能作为一种具有物质力量的意识形态存在。也就是说,在阿尔都塞那里,主体和意识形态之间总是存在着一种“双重反射”的关系：不仅主体经由意识形态的唤询而来,意识形态也总是围绕着主体这个中心,通过一种镜像复制的结构保证意识形态发挥其功能。从这个视角来看,主体不仅存在着,而且还是“自己起作用”的：“个体被传唤为（自由的）主体,为的是能够自由地服从主体的诫命,也就是说,为的是能够‘全靠自己’作出臣服的表示和行为”。

In other words, if in humanist Marxism, subjectivity has a relationship of mutual waxing and waning with capitalist ideology—for example, reification and identity coercion lead to the atrophy of the subject, while the idea of totality and negative dialectics weaken the control of bourgeois ideology, thereby allowing the totality or richness of the subject to be restored—then for Althusser, the subject and ideology are themselves mutually constitutive, mirroring each other. The effect of the subject is "subjection"; this subjection does not indicate the atrophy of the subject, but precisely the manifestation of the subject's "autonomy," the manifestation of the subject's "freedom," the manifestation of the subject as "the subject and responsible agent of its own actions." Therefore, Althusser argues: "the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects." [5]5 This is a direct quotation from the same essay, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses." That is to say, the effect of structure on the subject is to cancel the subject's initiative, but it does not cancel the subject itself; the "death" of the subject presupposes the retention of the subject's unique position.

换言之,如果说主体性在人本主义马克思主义那里,会有一个和资本主义意识形态之间此消彼长的关系,比如物化和同一性强制会带来主体的萎缩,而总体性思想和否定辩证法则会弱化资产阶级意识形态的控制力,从而使主体的总体性或丰富性得以恢复。但在阿尔都塞这里,主体和意识形态本身就是一种相互构造、互为镜像的关系,主体的效果就是“臣服”,这个臣服并不说明主体的萎缩,恰恰是主体“自主性”的体现,是主体“自由”的体现,是主体作为“自身行为的主体和责任人”的体现。因此,阿尔都塞论道：“主体之所以是所有意识形态的基本范畴,只是因为所有意识形态的功能（这种功能定义了意识形态本身）就在于把具体的个人构成为主体”。也就是说,结构对主体的效应是取消了主体的能动性,但并不会取消主体自身,主体的“死亡”正是以保留主体独一无二的位置为前提的。

In his later work *The Materialism of the Encounter*, Althusser shifts to emphasizing the importance of the subject as a practical bearer. However, for him, the emphasis on practice and class struggle is still built upon a conception of the passive subject. It is not, as Marx argued, that the subject of practical activity can act according to its own will and intentions, transforming the world according to its own subjective purposes. In Althusser's concept of practice, there is no space for purposiveness. Furthermore, due to the influence of an unconscious structure, the subject naturally does not delve into the background from which practice arises; the subject is also not a reflective subject, which excludes the regularity of practice. In other words, for Althusser, practice can only exist as an aleatory practice "independent" of laws, and the subject can only exist as a bearer of such aleatory practice.

阿尔都塞在后期的《偶然相遇的唯物主义》一书中,转而强调主体作为实践承担者的重要性。不过,在他那里,对实践和阶级斗争的强调,仍然建立在一种消极主体观之上。而不是像马克思所说的那样,实践活动的主体能够按照自身的意志和意愿进行活动,按照自己的主观目的来改造世界。在阿尔都塞的实践概念中,并没有合目的性的空间。此外,由于一种无意识结构的影响,主体也天然地不会深究实践所由产生的背景,主体也不是反思的主体,这排除了实践的合规律性。换言之,在阿尔都塞这里,实践只能作为一种“独立”于规律的偶然性实践,主体也只能作为一种偶然性实践的承担者。

Regarding contingent events, one can use the famous metaphor from Althusser’s book to illustrate: the subject of the aleatory encounter is like someone who happens to board a moving train, knowing neither the journey’s end nor its beginning, nor his own fate; everything is unforeseeable, and he himself cares nothing about these things, he is always “on the road.” Yet, from another perspective, he does actually participate in what happens on the train, records and, based on experience, arranges the sequence of contingent events, derives a certain theoretical picture, and will remember to leave room in these theoretical pictures for the particularity of events. It can be seen that the subject here is capable of participating in the practical process, except that this practice excludes any guidance from ready-made theory; everything must submit to contingency. Or, in other words, in the aleatory encounter, this world of givenness, as the point of intervention for the subject, is the precondition of practice. Because it is filled with contingency and randomness, the subject’s practice (such as the workers’ movement) will no longer be constrained by any established framework, thereby being able to shake off the shackles of certain rigid theories, so that contingent practice can always point toward the future. After all, Althusser’s original intention in proposing “aleatory materialism” was to restore political practice, enabling the Eurocommunism of the time to shake off a kind of passivity and overcome reformist tendencies. And political practice cannot do without the subject. Although Althusser denied the purposiveness and lawfulness of practice, the subject, as the result of a future-oriented open practice, can be retrospectively recognized.

关于偶然性事件,可以用阿尔都塞书中的那个著名的比喻来进行说明：偶然相遇的主体,就像是偶然登上某辆行驶中的列车,他不知旅程的终点与起点,也不知自己的命运,一切都不可预见,他自己也不在意这些,他始终“在路上”；但从另一方面来看,他却实实在在地参与了火车里发生的事,记录并依据经验整理偶然事件的发生顺序,得出一定的理论图景,并且会记得让这些理论图景给事件的特殊性留有余地。可见,这里的主体是能够参与到实践进程中的,只不过这里的实践排除了任何现成理论的指导,一切都要服从偶然性。或者说,在偶然相遇中,这个既与性世界作为主体的介入点,就是实践的前提,由于充满了偶然性和随机性,主体的实践（如工人运动）不会再被任何的既定框架所限制,从而能摆脱某些僵化理论的制约,使得偶然性的实践总是能够指向未来。毕竟,阿尔都塞之所以提出“偶然相遇的唯物主义”,其初衷就是为了恢复政治实践,使得当时的欧洲共产主义能摆脱一种消极性,克服改良主义倾向。而政治实践离不开主体.尽管阿尔都塞否定了实践的合目的性和合规律性,但主体作为一种面向未来的开放性实践的结果,可以回溯性地得到承认。

However, Althusser cannot “resurrect” the subject. He points out: “The materialism of the encounter is a materialism that has nothing to do with a subject (whether this subject is God or the proletariat), but with a process, a process without a subject that is imposed on various subjects (individuals and other subjects), a process that dominates the developmental structure of subjects but without an assignable end.” [6]6 Louis Althusser, “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter,” in *Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978–1987*, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), p. 190. There are two kinds of subjects here: one is the Subject in the grand sense, and the other is the subject based on contingency, stripped of essential determination, that is, the subject as an individual. The contingent subject “does not face any definite ‘subjectivity,’ but rather an infinitely open possible situation.” [7]7 Fan Chunyan, *Althusser’s “Aleatory Materialism” and Its Contemporary Significance* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2021), p. 126. That is to say, under contingency, the subject is present in the practice of the encounter and possesses a certain revolutionary potential, but in the practice of the aleatory encounter, the subject can only exist retrospectively as the result of practice; the subject must always be subject to the domination of randomness.

不过,阿尔都塞并不能“复活”主体。他指出：“相遇的唯物主义是这样一种唯物主义,它无关乎主体（不论这主体是上帝还是无产阶级）,而关乎一种过程,而无主体又加之于各类主体（个体等其他主体）的过程,它支配着主体的发展结构,但却没有可分配的目的”。这里有两种主体,一是大写的主体,另一个是基于偶然性、失去了本质规定的主体,也就是作为个体的主体。偶然性主体“所面对的并不是任何一种明确的‘主体性’,而是无限敞开的可能的境遇”。也就是说,在偶然性之下,主体在相遇的实践中在场,也具有一定的革命潜能,但在偶然相遇的实践中,主体只能作为实践结果回溯意义上的存在,主体始终要经受随机性的支配。

III. The “Resurrection” of the Subject: The Evental Subject and the Subject as the “Body” of Truth

三、主体的“复活”：事件主体和作为真理“身体”的主体

Badiou is one of the few philosophers after the decline of Western Marxism to revisit the subject and subjectivity. He continues Althusser’s emphasis on contingency, explicitly stating that the subject is first of all a “place.” But unlike Althusser, Badiou not only gives the subject a “place” but also gives the subject a “body.” In Badiou’s view, the resurrection of the subject must be realized in the “body.” The resurrected subject is an active subject, capable of creating a new world through intervention, nomination, choice, and decision. Furthermore, contingency serves only as the starting point for the subject’s resurrection; only by drawing out a certain universality from contingency can the subject truly come into being.

巴迪欧是西方马克思主义式微之后为数不多重提主体和主体性的哲学家。他延续了阿尔都塞对于偶然性的强调,明确提出主体首先是一个“位置”。但和阿尔都塞不同,巴迪欧不仅给了主体一个“位置”,还给了主体一个“身体”。在巴迪欧看来,主体的复活一定要落实到“身体”。复活了的主体是积极的主体,能够通过介入、命名、选择和决定来创造一个新世界。此外,偶然性只是作为主体复活的起点,只有从偶然性中拖出某种普遍性,主体才能真正得以生成。

What Badiou resurrects is not the “subject” that Althusser sought to kill, that humanist subject. The resurrection of the subject must be based on the subject having been truly killed, and then completed by means of an entirely different body. Badiou once argued: “In any case, I oppose all approaches that treat the subject as a regression to a simple subject-centered path.” [8]8 Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, trans. Bruno Bosteels (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 3. “A materialist theory of the subject has as its primary function ‘exclusion.’” [9]9 Ibid., p. 4. That is to say, only by excluding a certain idealist concept of the subject can a new concept of the subject and a new theory of the subject emerge.

巴迪欧复活的并不是阿尔都塞要杀死的那个“主体”,那个人道主义意义上的主体。主体的复活必须基于主体被真的杀死之后,再借助另一个完全不同的身体才能得以完成。巴迪欧曾这样论道：“在任何情况下,我都反对所有将主体作为退回到简单以主体为中心的道路上”,“一种唯物主义的主体理论,其首要功能就是“排除”。也就是说,只有排除了某种唯心主义的主体概念,新的主体概念和主体理论才能产生。

In his early work *Theory of the Subject*, Badiou explicitly proposes the concept of the subject’s “place.” The term “place” here naturally has a structuralist aspect, that is, as a space of structural configuration, but Badiou does not stop there. In his view, place itself contains the dialectic of “outplace” and “splace.” If the subject’s place as a structural space (i.e., “splace”) is the limit of what Althusser, confined by structuralism, could grant to the status of the subject, then Badiou’s “outplace” points toward the possibility of the subject’s “resurrection.” For “outplace” implies a “force,” a dismantling of fixed structural configurations, pointing toward the possibility of an active subject. In the period of *Theory of the Subject*, Badiou’s definition of the subject is: “as the process of the gathering of forces.” [10]10 Ibid., p. 6. At the same time, “outplace” is also linked to the contingent event; the event serves as the rupture of structure and the guide for the gathering of the subject’s forces, “just as there is only one subject, so here there is only one force, and the existence of this force can only surface through the event.” [11]11 Ibid., p. 7.

在早期的《主体理论》一书中,巴迪欧明确提出关于主体“位置”（place）的概念。这里的“位置”一词当然具有结构主义的一面,也就是作为结构配置的空间,但巴迪欧并没有止于此。在他看来,位置本身就内含“出位”（outplace）和“在位”（splace）的辩证法。如果说主体位置作为一个结构性空间（即“在位”）,是阿尔都塞囿于结构主义所能赋予主体地位的极限,那么巴迪欧提出的“出位”则指向了主体“复活”的可能性。因为“出位”意味着一种“力量”（force）,意味着对固定结构配置的拆解,指向一种积极主体的可能性。在《主体理论》时期,巴迪欧给主体的定义就是：“作为力量的集结过程”。同时,“出位”也和偶然性事件相联系,事件就是作为结构之破局和主体力量得以集结的导引,“正如只有一个主体,这里也只有一个力量,而这个力量的实存只有经由事件才能浮出水面。”

In the mature period of Badiou’s theory, that is, the period of *Being and Event*, Badiou’s subject is the subject faithful to the event. In *Being and Event*, Badiou points out that the characteristic of the event is “undecidability,” and to decide on the undecidable, one must rely on the subject. When an event occurs, nothing guarantees that this is an event; only after the subject intervenes, by naming the event and conducting a positive investigation around the traces left by the event, and finally through “forcing,” can the decision on the “undecidable” event be completed. That is to say, only through the subject’s choice and judgment can the event retrospectively determine itself.

在巴迪欧理论的成熟时期,也就是《存在与事件》时期,巴迪欧的主体就是忠实于事件的主体。在《存在与事件》中,巴迪欧指出,事件的特征就是“不可决定性”,而要想对不可决定性进行决定,就必须依靠主体。当事件发生时,没有任何东西能保证这会是一个事件,只有主体介入之后,通过为事件命名,并围绕着事件过后的一系列痕迹进行正向调查,最终经由“力迫”（force）才能完成对事件这个“不可决定性”的决定。也就是说,只有经过主体的选择和判定,事件才能回溯性地确定了自身。

The event (contingency) is only the starting point for Badiou; unlike Althusser, he does not stop at contingency but insists on deriving universality from contingency, and this requires the deep intervention of an active subject. Badiou calls the subject who intervenes in the event the “faithful subject,” that is, the subject who remains faithful to the traces of the event. “Faithfulness” is borrowed by Badiou from love; in his view, love requires more than just the encounter (the contingent event); the key lies in the subject’s faithfulness to the creation of love. Only then can the contingency of the encounter be overcome by enduring universality (the truth procedure of love). In other words, the faithful subject is the crucial link from the contingent event to universal truth. What Badiou emphasizes is precisely the triple linkage of “event-truth-subject”: the “dice throw” of the event establishes the conversion between contingency and necessity; the subject’s naming of the event and random investigation also elicit the universal truth procedure, ultimately enabling the undecidable event to be decided.

事件（偶然性）在巴迪欧这里只是起点,他并不像阿尔都塞那样停留于偶然性,而是坚持从偶然性之中引出普遍性,而这就需要能动性主体的深度介入。巴迪欧把介入事件的主体称为“忠实主体”,即始终忠实于事件痕迹的主体。“忠实”是巴迪欧从爱情那里借用的,在他看来,爱情仅有相遇（偶然性事件）是不够的,关键在于主体忠实于爱情的创造。只有这样,相遇的偶然性才会被恒久的普遍性（爱情真理程序）所战胜。换言之,忠实主体是从偶然性事件到普遍性真理的关键一环。巴迪欧强调的正是“事件-真理-主体”的三联动：事件的“骰子一掷”,建立了偶然性和必然性之间的转换,主体对事件的命名和随机性调查也引出了普遍性的真理程序,最终使不可判定的事件得以判定。

Furthermore, the subject’s activity is also manifested in the fact that the characteristic of truth is unrecognizable universality (i.e., generic universality); truth has no existence in the “situation”; it is constructed ex nihilo by the subject, forcibly, based on the traces of the event. In Badiou’s mathematical language, truth is a “generic subset” constructed by the faithful subject. After the event occurs, the faithful subject, by investigating the traces of the event, around the “initial statement,” continuously selects some items positively correlated with the event (which are also unrecognizable items in the “situation”), forming an infinite generic set. Of course, the subject, in constructing the generic subset, still submits to contingency; which items are selected and which are not to construct the generic subset is random, and the subject’s investigation is entirely without plan. It can be seen that Badiou’s subject’s practice likewise has no room for purposiveness or lawfulness.

此外,主体的能动性还体现在,真理的特征就是不可辨识的普遍性（即脱殊式普遍性）,真理在“境”（situation）中并没有实存,是主体硬生生地根据事件的痕迹从无到有建构出来的。用巴迪欧的数学语言来说,真理就是忠实主体建构出的一个“脱殊子集”。在事件发生之后,忠实主体通过调查事件的痕迹,围绕“原始陈述”,不断选择一些和事件正相关的项（同时也是“境”中一个不可辨识的项）,构成一个无限脱殊集合。当然,主体在构造脱殊子集的时候仍然是服从偶然性的,选择哪些项和不选择哪些项来构建脱殊子集,都是随机的,主体的调查完全没有计划。可见,巴迪欧的主体之实践同样没有合目的性和合规律性的空间。

The key here is the subject’s “forcing.” Forcing is also a mathematical term, referring to the process of forcing a statement from a certain generic presupposition, a statement that has veridicality in the generic extension. That is, the indiscernible generic subset (i.e., truth) is forced to such a degree that the undecidable statement becomes veridical, thereby rendering the undecidable decided. Through forcing, the subject not only enables the event to be judged but also allows truth to be presented. Hence Badiou arrives at his definition of the subject at this stage: “As the bearer of faithful forcing, the subject links the indiscernible (truth) to the decision on the undecidable (the event). Or, through the decision on the undecidable, the subject elucidates the indiscernible.” In other words, the importance of the subject lies precisely in its constant position at the intersection of knowledge and truth, being and event, and it alone can elucidate truth (the indiscernible) and judge the event (the undecidable).

这里的关键是主体的“力迫”。力迫也是一个数学术语,指的从某个脱殊前提出发力迫出一个陈述,而这个陈述在脱殊延展中具有如实性。也就是说,对不可辨识的脱殊子集（即真理）进行力迫到这么一个程度,使得不可决定的陈述是如实的,从而也就使不可决定得到了决定。主体经由力迫不仅使事件得到了判定,同时也使真理得以呈现。于是巴迪欧得出了他此时关于主体的定义：“作为忠实性力迫的承担者,主体把不可辨识之物（真理）和对不可决定之物（事件）的决定联系起来。或者说,通过对不可决定之物的决定,主体阐明了不可辨识之物”。换言之,主体的重要性就体现在它始终处于知识和真理、存在与事件的交叉点上,且只有它能够阐明真理（即不可辨识之物）和判定事件（即不可决定之物）。

If in the period of *Being and Event* the subject’s agency was mainly manifested in its ability to decide the undecidable through intervention, investigation, and forcing, then in *Logics of Worlds* Badiou explicitly proposes to reconstruct the subject’s body, that is, to treat the subject as the truth’s body-in-the-world, and to posit that the process of subjectivation is a process of constructing a new truth-body. In fact, the body is extremely crucial for the “resurrection” of the subject. For example, a person can only connect with reality, participate in actual actions and struggles, through their own body. Badiou once asked: “If we are materialists, then should we not consider that every subject possesses a body?” However, Badiou’s body is by no means a biological body; Badiou’s definition of “body” is “that which exists in a world.” That is, starting from materialism, the subject must appear in the world as something, “that is, it arrives in the form of some body.” Furthermore, Badiou’s body is not a fixed body of a truth-bearer; the subject’s body can only be a subject-“ized” body. That is, the body is a body that reveals the truth procedure through practice; it represents the transformation from the individual to the subject, embodying the process of subject-“ization.” The body is not a passive bearer of static truth but an active participant in the construction and configuration of the truth procedure; “experiencing the existence of such a body is a practice, not a representation”; the subject is generated through practice. Badiou emphasizes that in this process of “subjectivation,” there are three types of subjects: the faithful subject, the reactive subject, and the obscure subject. These three subjects are all new bodies, because they all “participate” in the body of truth to varying degrees, and can therefore be called “variables of subjectivation.” For example, the faithful subject is linked to the new era revealed by the post-evental truth; the reactive subject negates the consequences of the event, “putting this new body as far as possible into a corner”; while the obscure subject seeks “to provide a completely fictional body to compete with the new body of truth.” Among these three subjects, only the faithful subject represents the body of truth; the other two are reverse operations around the body of truth, differing only in degree, that is, either containing or confronting the body of truth on the basis of examining it.

如果说《存在与事件》时期,主体的能动性主要体现在主体能通过介入、调查和力迫来对不可决定进行决定,那么到了《世界的逻辑》一书中,巴迪欧明确提出要重构主体的身体,也就是把主体作为真理的在世之身,提出主体化的过程就是一个新的真理性身体建构的过程。实际上,身体对于主体的“复活”极为关键。比如人总要通过自己的身体才能与现实发生联系,参与实际的行动和斗争。巴迪欧曾这样追问：“如果我们是唯物主义者的话,那么我们难道就不应该认为每个主体都拥有一个身体吗？”只不过,巴迪欧的身体绝不是一种生物学意义上的身体,巴迪欧对于“身体”的定义是“在一个世界中的实存之物”,也就是说,从唯物主义出发,主体必定是作为某物在世界中出现,“也就是说它以某种身体的形式到来”。此外,巴迪欧的身体也不是一种固定的真理承载者的身体,主体的身体只能是主体“化”的身体。也就是说,身体是用实践揭示出真理程序的身体,它代表了从个体到主体的转变,体现了主体“化”的过程。身体不是一个静态真理之消极承载者,而是真理程序建构和配置的积极参与者,“体验这样一个身体的实存是一次实践,而不是再现”,主体是实践生成的。巴迪欧强调,在此“主体化”的过程中,共有三种主体类型：忠实主体,反动主体和蒙昧主体。这三种主体都是新的身体,因为它们都在不同程度上“参与”了真理的身体,因此可以称为“主体化的变量”。比如,忠实主体和后事件性真理所揭示的新时代相联系；保守主体否定了事件的后果,“尽可能把这个新身体放在一个角落里”；而蒙昧主体则要“提供一个完全虚构的身体来同真理的新身体进行竞争”。在这三种主体中,只有忠实主体代表了真理的身体,其余两种都是围绕真理身体的反向操作,只不过程度不同,即在对真理身体进行考察的基础上或是遏制或是对抗。

In summary, the faithful subject is the truth’s body-in-the-world. Through its incorporation with truth in the process of practice, it fully restores the subject’s agency and vitality. Therefore, it can be said that the faithful subject points to a new, pioneering future: “If we can understand that gradually participating in the creative process of the subjectivated body is to make our lives more powerful, not merely to survive, then we possess what Rimbaud called ‘the truth in the soul and the body,’ and we will be stronger than our time.” (Notes and references omitted)

概言之,忠实主体就是真理的在世之身,它通过在实践过程中和真理的合体（incorporation）完全恢复了主体的能动性和活力,因此可以说,忠实主体指向的是一个新的具有开创性的未来：“如果我们能够理解,逐步参与到主体化身体的创造过程中,就是让我们的生命更加有力量,而不仅仅是存活,那么,我们就拥有了兰波所说的'在灵魂和身体之中的真理',那么,我们将强过我们的时代。”（注释、参考文献略）

(The author is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

（作者系中国社会科学院哲学研究所副研究员）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑