The Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism

I. The “De-segmentation” of the World Economy

一、世界经济的“去分割”

First, let me situate neoliberal capitalism within the entire history of capitalism. Throughout the history of capitalism, labor from the “Global South” has never been permitted to migrate freely to the “Global North,” and this remains the case today. During the “long nineteenth century” (lasting until the First World War), large-scale migration movements occurred within the “Global North.” These migrants came from Europe to the white settler temperate zones of Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand as indentured laborers or coolies. At the same time, large-scale migration movements also occurred within the “Global South,” with some migrants coming from India and China to the West Indies, Fiji, Mauritius, East Africa, and the tropical and subtropical regions across the Pacific. But none of the above migrations were from the “South” to the “North.” According to Arthur Lewis’s estimates, each major wave of migration involved a total of about 50 million people.

首先，让我把新自由主义的资本主义置于资本主义的整个历史之中。在整个资本主义历史中，来自“全球南方”的劳动力从未被允许自由迁移到“全球北方”，现在仍然是这样。在“漫长的19世纪”（一直持续到第一次世界大战），“全球北方”内部发生了大规模移民运动。这些移民作为契约劳工或苦力，从欧洲来到加拿大、美国、澳大利亚和新西兰等白人定居的温带地区。同时，大规模移民运动也出现在“全球南方”，一些移民从印度和中国来到西印度群岛、斐济、毛里求斯、东非和太平洋对岸的热带和亚热带地区。但上述移民都不是从“南方”到“北方”。据阿瑟·刘易斯估算，每一次大规模移民潮的总人数约为5000万。

At the same time, although capital from the “Global North” was legally free to migrate to the “Global South,” historically, apart from mines, plantations, and other activities supporting the colonial pattern of the international division of labor, this capital did not invest in other areas of the “Global South.” It never established manufacturing units in the “Global South” to exploit the latter’s low-wage advantage (which itself was the result of the huge labor reserves created by the “de-industrialization” of the “South” by the exports of the industrialized “Global North”) to meet world demand. For example, by the time of the First World War, the entire Indian subcontinent, as Britain’s largest colonial region, received only about 10% of foreign direct investment, and this investment was concentrated mainly in primary commodity production and activities serving global trade. Capital flows occurred mainly within the “North,” complementing labor flows. Even after the Second World War, when “import-substituting industrialization” spread across the “Global South” behind trade protectionist barriers, foreign direct investment from the “North” was only to meet local markets through “tariff jumping,” not for export to the world market (with partial exceptions later in East Asia).

与此同时，尽管“全球北方”资本在法律上可以自由迁移到“全球南方”，但在历史上，除了矿山、种植园以及其他支持国际分工殖民模式的活动外，这些资本并未在“全球南方”的其他领域进行投资。它们从未在“全球南方”建立起制造业单位，并未利用后者的低工资优势（这本身就是工业化的“全球北方”出口对“南方”的“去工业化”所创造的巨大劳动力储备的结果）来满足世界需求。例如，到第一次世界大战期间，作为英国最大的殖民地区域，整个印度次大陆只有大约10%的外国直接投资，且这些投资主要集中在初级商品生产和为全球贸易服务的活动中。资本流动主要发生在“北方”，与劳动力流动互补。即使是在二战后，当“进口替代工业化”在贸易保护主义壁垒后的“全球南方”蔓延时，从“北方”流入的外国直接投资也只是为了通过“关税跳脱”（tariff jumping）来满足当地市场，而不是为了出口到世界市场（后来在东亚有部分例外）。

The reluctance of “Northern” capital to move to the “South” puzzled development economists and gave rise to various explanations ranging from climate to race. Besides its unwillingness to move to the “South,” “Northern” capital also systematically prevented goods produced by “Southern” capital from being sold in “Northern” markets through protectionist measures and overt and covert discrimination against emerging local capital within the “South” by “Northern” groups distributed across the “Global South.” This essentially meant that, against the backdrop of the aforementioned restrictions on labor migration, the world economy was in fact “segmented.”

“北方”资本不愿意向“南方”转移，这让发展经济学家感到困惑，并引发了从气候到种族的各种解释。除了不愿意向“南方”转移，“北方”资本还通过保护措施和分布于“全球南方”的“北方”团体对“南方”内部新兴的地方资本实施显性和隐性歧视，以系统性地阻止“南方”资本生产的商品销往“北方”市场。这在本质上意味着，在前文提及的限制劳动力迁移的背景下，世界经济实际上是“分割”的。

The characteristic of this “segmentation” was that real wages in the “South” and the “North” could continue to diverge. Due to the persistent existence of a large labor reserve, real wages in the “South” were more or less tied to the subsistence level (the Lewis model captures this in a stylized way), while real wages in the “North” grew with increases in labor productivity. In fact, the binary opposition between the developed and developing countries of the world was a clear manifestation of this “segmentation.”

这种“分割”的特征是，“南方”与“北方”的实际工资可能会继续分化。因持续存在大量的劳动力储备，“南方”的实际工资或多或少地与维持生计的水平挂钩（刘易斯模型以一种程式化的方式捕捉到了这一点），而“北方”的实际工资会随着劳动生产率的提高而增长。实际上，世界上发达国家与发展中国家的二元对立就是这种“分割”的明显表现。

The rise in “Northern” wages not only curbed the degree of local income inequality, becoming an important factor in the stability of capitalist society, but also expanded the domestic market in the “North,” thereby helping to avoid potential troubles arising from the ex ante tendency towards overproduction.

“北方”工资的上涨不仅抑制了当地收入不平等的程度，成为资本主义社会稳定的一个重要因素，而且还扩大了“北方”的国内市场，从而有助于避免因生产过剩的事前趋势（ex ante tendency）而引发的潜在困扰。

Currently, globalization under the dominance of neoliberal capitalism has broken this “segmentation.” Although the flow of labor from the “South” to the “North” remains restricted, capital is now more willing to transfer its production facilities from the “North” to the “South” to exploit the latter’s lower real wages to meet global demand, something that has never happened historically. However, the mobility of capital also includes the mobility of financial capital, which has far-reaching implications.

当前，新自由主义的资本主义主导下的全球化打破了这种“分割”现象。尽管劳工从“南方”向“北方”的流动依然受到限制，但资本现在更愿意将其生产设备从“北方”转移到“南方”，以利用后者较低的实际工资来满足全球需求，这在历史上从未发生过。然而，资本的流动性还包括具有深远影响的金融资本的流动性。

One might think that the current globalization, which has led to relatively unrestricted cross-border flows of goods and services and capital including finance, has brought about a historically unprecedented “de-segmentation” of the world economy and will overcome the binary opposition between developed and developing countries. But, as I will point out below, this is not the case. At present, the binary opposition between developed and developing countries has not ended; rather, the dividing line of this opposition has now shifted to within countries previously regarded as developing countries.

人们可能会认为，目前的全球化导致了商品和服务以及包括金融在内的资本相对不受限制地跨国界流动，从而带来了历史上前所未有的世界经济“去分割”，并将会克服发达国家与发展中国家之间的二元对立。但是，正如笔者在下文所指出的，事实并非如此。当前，发达国家与发展中国家之间的二元对立并没有结束，只是这种对立的分界线现在转移到了此前被视为发展中国家的国家内部。

II. Phenomena Associated with Current Globalization

二、与当前全球化有关的现象

The relatively unrestricted cross-border flows of goods and capital have given rise to several distinct phenomena, of which this article will discuss only four. First, the “de-segmentation” of the world economy brought about by neoliberal capitalism has made the real wages of workers in developed countries subject to the influence of the large labor reserve in the “South.” The “segmentation” of the world economy precisely negated this; its “de-segmentation” does the opposite. The ability of trade unions in the “North” to force wage increases is offset by the threat that, once wages in the “North” rise, capital will move to the “South” where wages are lower. It is therefore not surprising that Joseph Stiglitz found that the average real wage of male workers in the United States in 2011 was slightly lower than in 1968.

商品和资本相对不受限制的跨国界流动引发了几种不同的现象，本文只论及其中的四种。首先，新自由主义的资本主义带来的世界经济“去分割”，使发达国家工人的实际工资受制于“南方”大量劳动力储备的影响。世界经济的“分割”恰恰否定了这一点；它的“去分割”则与之相反。“北方”工会强制提高工资的能力被以下这样一种威胁抵消了，即一旦“北方”工资上涨，资本就会转移到工资较低的“南方”。因此并不令人惊讶的是，约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨发现，2011年美国男性工人的平均实际工资略低于1968年。

Although the threat of moving to the “South,” which has a large labor reserve, depresses wages in the “North,” these labor reserves themselves are not exhausted by such movement (and its secondary effects). On the contrary, the relative size of the labor reserve in the “South” has actually increased.

尽管迁移到拥有大量劳动力储备的“南方”的威胁压低了“北方”的工资，但这些劳动力储备本身并没有因为这种迁移（及其次级效应）而被耗尽。相反，“南方”劳动力储备的相对规模实际上增加了。

The second phenomenon concerns the fact that the relatively easy cross-border flow of goods and services leads to more intense competition between countries. It forces each country to unrestrictedly introduce technological change and structural optimization in its production structure to maintain competitiveness, in order to avoid its markets being captured by imported products. This is in sharp contrast to the earlier period of state intervention, when such changes were strictly controlled.

第二种现象涉及这样一个事实，即货物和服务的跨境流动相对容易，这导致国家之间的竞争更加激烈。它迫使每个国家在其生产结构中不加限制地引入技术变革和结构优化来保持竞争力，以避免其市场被进口产品占领。这与早期干预经济时期形成鲜明对比，当时这种变革受到严格控制。

Structural optimization and technological change in “Global South” countries usually require adopting processes and products already introduced in “Northern” countries. In short, through these changes, the rate of labor productivity growth has accelerated compared to the earlier period of state intervention. This means that, for any given GDP growth rate, the employment growth rate under the influence of neoliberalism (i.e., the difference between the GDP growth rate and the labor productivity growth rate) is lower than in the period of state intervention. Even if the GDP growth rate accelerates compared to the period of state intervention, the labor productivity growth rate may be even faster, so that the employment growth rate declines compared to before.

“全球南方”国家的结构优化和技术变革通常需要采用已经引入的“北方”国家的工艺和产品。简而言之，通过这些变革，劳动生产率的增长速度比早期的干预经济时期加快了。这意味着，对任何给定的GDP增长率，在新自由主义影响下的就业增长率（即GDP增长率与劳动生产率增长率之差）比干预经济时期要低。即使GDP增长率比干预经济时期加快，劳动生产率增长的速度也可能更快，以至于就业增长率比之前有所下降。

In fact, the employment growth rate in capitalist societies under the influence of neoliberalism may not only be lower than in the past, but may even be lower than the growth rate of the labor force. However, in this case, the growth rate of the latter itself is underestimated in official statistics. Due to the lack of jobs, many workers are more reluctant to look for work, a phenomenon known as the “discouraged worker effect.”

事实上，新自由主义影响下资本主义社会的就业增长率可能不仅低于以往，甚至可能低于劳动力的增长率。然而在这种情况下，后者的增长率本身在官方统计数据中被低估了。由于工作岗位的缺乏，许多工人更加不愿意找工作，这种现象被称为“沮丧工人效应”。

This scenario is not only logically possible; in fact, it has already manifested in several countries of the Global South. Taking India as an example, although according to official data India’s GDP growth rate nearly doubled from the period of state intervention to the period of implementing neoliberal policies—from roughly 4% per annum in the earlier period to an average of about 7% per annum from 1991 until the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic—the rate of job creation during the neoliberal policy period was halved from roughly 2% per annum in the earlier period to about 1% per annum. Since, before the COVID-19 pandemic, the growth rate of the population and the working-age population exceeded 1% per annum, even during the heyday of neoliberalism the rate of job creation was lower than the growth rate of the working-age population. This led to a relative increase in the size of the labor reserve. However, at least until 2019–2020, this increase did not manifest as a rise in the unemployment rate. There were two main reasons for this: first, the “discouraged worker effect” led to a decline in the labor force participation rate; second, a given amount of work was distributed among more workers. This indicates that a rise in the proportion of the labor reserve within the working-age population does not necessarily mean an increase in the proportion of unemployed persons, but rather an increase in the average proportion of unemployed time per person. This is not reflected in any standard indicator of unemployment.

这种设想不仅在逻辑上是可能的，实际上，它已经在“全球南方”的几个国家中表现出来。以印度为例，尽管根据官方数据，印度的GDP增长率从干预经济时期到实行新自由主义政策时期几乎翻了一番——从早期的每年4%左右提高到1991年至新冠疫情流行前夕的平均7%左右，但在实行新自由主义政策时期，创造就业机会的速度却从早期的每年2%左右减半到1%左右。由于在新冠疫情之前，人口和劳动年龄人口的增长率每年超过1%，因此，即使在新自由主义的全盛时期，创造就业机会的速度也低于劳动年龄人口的增长率。这使劳动力储备的相对规模有所增加。 然而，至少在2019—2020年之前，这种增长并没有表现为失业率的上升。这主要有两个原因：一是“沮丧工人效应”导致劳动力参与率下降；二是既定数量的工作被分配给了更多的工人。这表明，劳动力储备在劳动年龄人口中所占比例的上升并不一定意味着失业人口的占比增加，而是意味着人均失业时间的平均占比增加。这一点在任何衡量失业率的标准指标中都没有体现出来。

The relative reduction in full-time permanent jobs and the relative increase in the number of temporary and contract workers facilitated this trend of distributing a given amount of work among more people.

全职固定工作的相对减少以及临时用工和合同雇工数量的相对增加，促进了这种将一定数量的工作分配给更多人的趋势。

In this respect, India is by no means an exception. The factors at play in the Indian case exist, to a greater or lesser extent, throughout the Global South. Although India is a “success story” in terms of GDP growth and does not have a population growth rate higher than the Global South average, it has witnessed an increase in the relative size of the labor reserve. The facts show that this relatively increased labor reserve is a characteristic of the Global South under the neoliberal regime; it does not necessarily lead to a rise in open unemployment, but instead manifests as an increase in the average amount of unemployed labor time per worker.

在这方面，印度绝非例外。在印度案例中发挥作用的因素在整个“全球南方”都或多或少地存在。尽管印度在GDP增长方面是一个“成功的范例”，并且没有高于“全球南方”平均水平的人口增长率，但它见证了劳动力储备相对规模的增加。事实表明，这种相对增长的劳动力储备是新自由主义体制下“全球南方”的特征，它不一定导致公开失业率的上升，反而表现为每个工人平均失业劳动时间的增加。

The relative increase in the size of the labor reserve also reduced the bargaining power of a small segment of workers (namely, unionized permanent workers), to the extent that their real wages likewise showed no significant increase. Consequently, the ultimate result of the relative increase in the labor reserve was a decline in the per capita real income of the entire working-age population in the non-self-employed category, which became a hallmark of neoliberal economies. A similar situation occurred among the self-employed, but to understand the reasons for this, we must also note two other phenomena associated with neoliberalism, namely the third and fourth phenomena to be discussed next.

劳动力储备相对规模的增加也降低了一小部分工人（即组成工会的固定工人）的议价能力，以至于他们的实际工资同样没有任何明显的增加。因此，劳动力储备相对规模增加的最终结果是，非自雇类别中整个劳动年龄人口的人均实际收入下降，这成为新自由主义经济的标志。类似的情况也发生在自雇者身上，但如果要理解其中的原因，我们还必须注意到与新自由主义有关的另外两种现象，即接下来要提到的第三种和第四种现象。

The third phenomenon is that, under the influence of neoliberalism, although each country remains a nation-state, it now confronts globalized capital, especially globalized finance capital. This fact weakens the autonomy of the nation-state: if a country adopts policies hostile to globalized finance capital, finance capital will collectively exit that country, likely triggering a crisis there. This is why state policies now tend to appease globalized finance capital, a phenomenon often euphemistically referred to as “maintaining investor confidence.”

第三种现象是，在新自由主义的影响下，虽然每个国家仍然是一个民族国家，但在当前面对的是全球化资本，特别是全球化金融资本。这一事实削弱了民族国家的自主权：如果某一国家执行敌视全球化金融资本的政策，那么金融资本就会集体离开这个国家，从而很可能在那里引发危机。这就是为什么国家政策现在趋向于安抚全球化中的金融资本，这种现象通常被委婉地称为“保持投资者信心”。

This has profound political implications, especially for democracy. Democracy should mean popular sovereignty, but under neoliberal capitalism, popular sovereignty is replaced by the sovereignty of globalized finance, which is fused with the domestic big bourgeoisie. For example, as long as the country remains trapped in the vortex of globalized financial flows, changes of government through the electoral process bring almost no change in economic policy.

这具有深刻的政治含义，尤其对民主而言。民主应该意味着人民的主权，但在新自由主义的资本主义制度下，人民的主权被与国内大资产阶级融合在一起的全球化金融主权所取代。例如，只要这个国家仍然被困在全球化金融流动的漩涡中，那么通过选举过程进行的政府更迭就几乎不会带来任何经济政策的改变。

The fourth phenomenon also arises from this. State policies typically claim to look after the interests of all sections of the people. Some countries of the Global South did indeed do so during the post-colonial, interventionist phase of economic development before the implementation of neoliberal policies. But they are now primarily committed to promoting the interests of global capital and the domestic financial oligarchy fused with it. This policy shift requires the state to withdraw support for domestic small-scale production sectors, especially small peasant agriculture, which gradually undermines their profitability and viability.

第四种现象也由此产生。国家政策通常声称要照顾各阶层民众的利益。一些“全球南方”国家在实行新自由主义政策之前的后殖民时期的干预经济发展阶段也确实是这样做的。但它们现在主要致力于促进全球资本以及与之融合的国内金融寡头的利益。这种政策的转变需要国家取消对国内小生产部门的支持，特别是对小农农业的支持，这将逐渐削弱它们的盈利能力和生存能力。

The above policies manifest in various forms. Due to the need to control fiscal deficits in accordance with the demands of globalized finance, state investment in “land-augmenting” projects (such as investment in irrigation) has decreased. In most of the Global South, only the state can purposefully undertake “land-augmenting” investment; therefore, the decline in such investment has caused the agricultural growth rate to fall even to the point where per capita output of the agricultural population has stagnated.

上述政策以多种形式体现出来。由于需要根据全球化金融的要求控制财政赤字，国家的“土地扩张”投资(例如在灌溉上的投资)有所减少。在“全球南方”的大部分地区，只有国家才能有目的地进行“土地扩张”投资，因此，这种投资的下降导致农业增长率甚至降低到农业人口的人均产出也停止增长的水平。

The reduction in the supply of subsidized agricultural inputs helps reduce fiscal deficits in line with the wishes of globalized finance capital, but it also lowers the profitability of agriculture. This reduction in subsidies also includes cuts in credit lines to subsidized institutions, forcing these institutions to once again borrow from private moneylenders at usurious rates, from whose grip they had largely been freed under the earlier interventionist economic system.

农业补贴投入供应的缩减有助于按照全球化金融资本的意愿减少财政赤字，但也降低了农业的盈利能力。这种补贴的缩减还包括削减受补贴机构的信贷额度，导致这些机构不得不再次从高利贷的私人放债人那里借贷，而在之前的干预经济制度下，他们已经基本上从高利贷的束缚中解放出来。

Market intervention measures are unable to effectively prevent price collapses. By removing quantitative restrictions on trade under World Trade Organization rules and reducing tariff rates on agricultural imports (with actual tariffs even lower than the tariff bindings permitted by the World Trade Organization), domestic markets are also exposed to fluctuations in world market prices.

市场干预措施无法有效地防止价格暴跌。通过取消世界贸易组织规则下的贸易数量限制，并降低农产品进口关税税率(实际关税甚至低于世界贸易组织所允许的关税界限)，国内市场也受到世界市场价格波动的影响。

Currently, under the influence of neoliberal policies, in some countries of the Global South, farmers no longer deal with government agencies but instead interact directly with transnational agribusinesses, purchasing seeds and fertilizers from them and selling their products to them. All these changes deepen the impoverishment of peasants, forcing distressed peasants to flock en masse to cities in search of work.

当前，受新自由主义政策的影响，在部分“全球南方”国家，农民不再与政府机构打交道，而是直接接触跨国农业企业，从它们那里购买种子和肥料，并向其销售产品。所有这些变化都加深了农民的贫困程度，陷入困境的农民被迫大量涌入城市寻找工作。

Another factor works in the same direction: under the influence of neoliberal policies, the state withdraws from providing basic services such as education and health, leading to the increasing privatization of these services and making them more expensive. This raises the cost of living for peasants and small producers, although this is not reflected in official cost-of-living indices. This factor greatly increases the debt burden of peasants. A definite conclusion that can be drawn is that, in terms of the decline in per capita real income of the working-age population in the self-employed category in the Global South, the crisis of small peasant agriculture and of small producers in general is an essential feature of neoliberalism, even during its heyday.

另一个因素也起到了同样的作用，即在新自由主义政策的影响下，国家从提供教育和卫生等基本服务的角色中退出，导致这些服务日益私有化，变得更加昂贵。这提高了农民和小生产者的生活成本，尽管这并没有在官方的生活成本指数中反映出来。这个因素大大增加了农民的负债额。可以得出的一个肯定的结论是，就“全球南方”的自雇类别中劳动年龄人口的人均实际收入下降而言，小农农业和一般小生产者的危机是新自由主义的一个必不可少的特征，即使在其发展鼎盛时期。

Thus, the self-employed and the non-self-employed find themselves in a similar situation: per capita real income for both groups is declining. Therefore, if we take the working population as a whole—workers, peasants, small producers, agricultural laborers, artisans, fisherfolk, and all those who do not live off surplus—then the per capita real income of the working-age population belonging to this group is declining. If we assume that the proportion of the working-age population within this group does not change significantly, then under the neoliberal system, the per capita real income of the working population declines over time.

可见，自雇者与非自雇者处境相似，两类群体的人均实际收入都在下降。因此，如果把劳动人口作为一个整体，即工人、农民、小生产者、农业工人、工匠、渔民以及所有不以剩余为生的人，那么属于这一群体的劳动年龄人口的人均实际收入是下降的。如果假定劳动年龄人口占这一群体总人口的比例变化不大，那么在新自由主义制度下，劳动人口的人均实际收入会随着时间的推移而下降。

III. The Basic Tendencies of Neoliberal Capitalism

三、新自由主义的资本主义的基本趋势

The fundamental characteristic of neoliberal capitalism—the decline in per capita real income of the working population—encompasses two basic tendencies. First, income inequality within each country is intensifying. In the countries of the Global North, although labor productivity has increased, due to the global mobility of productive capital (as distinct from finance capital), the real wages of workers have not only failed to rise correspondingly but have remained almost stagnant. In the countries of the Global South, even if per capita labor productivity of the working population has increased, this is only reflected in the rise of the country’s overall real per capita income; the per capita real income of the working population has not increased.

新自由主义的资本主义导致劳动人口人均实际收入下降的根本特征包含两个基本趋势。首先，每个国家内部的收入不平等都在加剧。在“全球北方”国家，尽管劳动生产率提高了，但由于生产资本(与金融资本不同)的全球流动性，工人的实际工资不仅没有同步增长，反而几乎停滞不前。在“全球南方”国家，即使劳动人口的人均劳动生产率提高了，也只是反映为国家整体的实际人均收入的上升，劳动人口的人均实际收入并没有增加。

The result is that the share of surplus in total output has increased in every country. The rise in this share within each country also means a rise in its share of world output. The intensification of inequality noted by Thomas Piketty and others is a consequence of this factor. Hence the second tendency. On average, the working population consumes more out of a given unit of income than those who appropriate the surplus, so the rising share of surplus in world output, for any given time path of investment, generates overproduction in the world economy. An increase in investment cannot offset this tendency, because investment is driven by the growth of aggregate demand, not an autonomous adjustment to avoid demand deficiency.

结果就是，每个国家的剩余在总产出中所占的比例都有所增加。各国内部这一占比的上升也意味着其占世界产出比重的上升。托马斯·皮凯蒂等人指出的不平等加剧正是这一因素的结果。第二种趋势由此产生。平均而言，劳动人口从单位收入中扣除的消费高于赚取剩余者，因此世界产出中不断增长的剩余占比对任何给定的投资时间曲线，在世界经济中都会产生生产过剩。投资的增加不可能抵消这种趋势，因为投资是由总需求的增长引起的，而不是一种自发调整以避免需求不足的自主现象。

However, according to Keynesian theory, overproduction can be curbed through state action. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argued that such state action occurred in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. But this action faces two obstacles. First, since we have only nation-states and no world state, any such state action must be implemented either through coordination among several major nation-states, as Keynes and a group of German trade unionists suggested in the 1930s; or by the United States, the "leader" of the capitalist world, assuming the role of a proxy world state; or by individual nation-states acting separately within their own economic systems to stimulate demand, output, and employment.

然而，根据凯恩斯的理论，生产过剩可以通过国家行动加以限制。保罗·巴兰和保罗·斯威齐认为，这种国家行动在1950—1960年代的美国就发生过。但是，这种行动存在两个障碍。首先，由于我们只有民族国家而没有世界国家，因此，任何这样的国家行动，或者通过几个主要民族国家之间的协调来实施，正如凯恩斯和一群德国工会主义者在1930年代所建议的那样；或者由美国这个资本主义世界的“领导者”承担起代理世界国家的角色；或者由单个民族国家在自身的经济体系内各自采取行动来刺激需求、产出和就业。

Therefore, the first obstacle to state action to stimulate aggregate demand and avoid overproduction is organizational coordination. Coordinated fiscal stimulus is difficult to organize, which is why little has been said about it until now. In a world where the cross-border flow of goods and services is relatively unrestricted, a US fiscal stimulus would face the risk that its demand-creating effect would "spill over" abroad to some extent. In this way, while creating jobs abroad, the United States would also increase its external debt. This is unacceptable to it.

因此，阻碍国家采取行动刺激总需求以避免生产过剩的第一个障碍是组织协调方面的原因。协调一致的财政刺激很难组织起来，这就是为什么直到现在还没有多少人谈论它。在一个商品和服务跨境流动相对不受限制的世界里，美国的财政刺激将面临这样的风险：其创造需求的效果将在一定程度上“溢出”到国外。这样一来，在为国外创造就业的同时，美国也会增加外债。这是其不能接受的。

The situation is exactly the same for any country providing fiscal stimulus to boost aggregate demand. Moreover, unlike the United States, such a country may not even be able to obtain the necessary foreign credit, an additional difficulty. Therefore, any country taking such stimulus measures alone is always at a disadvantage, unless it appropriately protects its own economy. Consequently, under the influence of unchanged neoliberalism, no single nation-state will undertake fiscal expansion alone.

对于任何一个为提振总需求而提供财政刺激的国家来说，情况都完全一样。况且与美国不同，这样一个国家甚至可能无法获得必要的外国信贷，这是一个额外的困难。因此，任何单独采取这种刺激措施的国家总是处于不利地位，除非它适当地保护自己的经济。因此，在未发生改变的新自由主义的影响下，任何单一的民族国家都不会单独进行财政扩张。

Furthermore, there is a second, more powerful additional deterrent. Even if, through appropriate protective measures, the multiplier effect of expanded state expenditure can be confined to the country itself, state expenditure will have a significant expansionary effect on the economy only if it is financed either by taxing capitalists (or the rich in general) or through fiscal deficits. Since the working population more or less consumes its income, taxing them and spending the proceeds yields almost no net increase in the level of aggregate demand; it merely changes the composition of demand, shifting it from workers' consumption to government expenditure. But if government expenditure is financed not by any additional taxes but by fiscal deficits, then even as government demand increases, individual demand does not decrease. Similarly, if government expenditure is financed by taxing capitalists or the rich in general (who save a portion of their income), then such expenditure leads to a net increase in aggregate demand.

此外，还有第二种更强大的额外威慑。即使通过适当的保护措施，可以将扩大国家支出的乘数效应局限于国家本身，也只有通过向资本家(或一般富人)征税或通过财政赤字提供资金，国家支出才会对经济产生明显的扩张效应。由于劳动人口或多或少地消费了其收入，因此向他们征税并将所得用于支出，几乎不会使总需求水平有净增加，只会改变需求的构成，即从工人消费转向政府支出。但是，如果政府支出的资金不是来自任何额外的税收，而是来自财政赤字，那么即使政府的需求增加，个人的需求也不会减少。同样，如果政府支出是通过向资本家或一般富人（这些人会把一部分收入存起来）征税来筹集资金，那么这种支出就会导致总需求的净增加。

However, both these modes of financing are opposed by globalized finance capital; and, since financial diktats are directed at nation-states, under the influence of neoliberal policies, no single nation-state (possibly excepting the United States, whose currency is considered "very reliable" and therefore need not fear capital flight) can overcome overproduction by stimulating aggregate demand. Finance's opposition to tax increases on the rich is easily understood, since financiers themselves are among the richest; but its opposition to expanding fiscal deficits even when aggregate demand is deficient is less easily understood.

然而，这两种融资方式都遭到了全球化金融资本的反对；而且，由于金融法令是针对民族国家的，在新自由主义政策的影响下，没有一个单独的民族国家(可能美国除外，它的货币被认为“非常可靠”，因此可以不担心资金外流)通过刺激总需求来克服生产过剩。金融业反对向富人增税的行为很容易理解，因为金融家本身就是最富有的人；但是，即使在总需求不足的情况下，它也反对扩大财政赤字就不容易理解了。

As can be seen from legislation enacted in almost all Western countries, apart from the United States, these countries, under fiscal pressure, limit fiscal deficits to around 3% of GDP. Perhaps the reason finance opposes government intervention financed through fiscal deficits is that such stimulus delegitimizes the social role of capitalists, inevitably raising the question: "If the government has to create employment, why do we need capitalists at all?" This delegitimization is particularly severe for those capitalists whom Keynes called "functionless investors" (i.e., financiers).

从几乎所有西方国家颁布的立法中都可以看出，除美国之外，在财政压力下，这些国家都将财政赤字限制在GDP的3%左右。或许，金融业反对政府通过财政赤字筹集资金来进行支出干预的原因在于：这种刺激措施使资本家的社会角色失去了合法性，从而不可避免地提出了这样一个问题：“如果政府必须创造就业，我们为什么还需要资本家的存在？”对于那些被凯恩斯称为“无功能的投资者”的资本家（即金融家）来说，这种非法化尤为严重。

As noted, the United States may be an exception, because it is not constrained by globalized finance; its currency is considered "very reliable" by the world's wealth holders. As things stand, the likelihood of capital flight from the United States seems small. But the United States is constrained by organizational coordination factors, with the result that, under neoliberal capitalism, there is almost no state intervention through direct fiscal stimulus of demand. This has led countries to adopt two other approaches: first, providing subsidies and transfers to capitalists to encourage them to increase expenditure as a means of stimulating the economy; and second, relying on monetary policy as the primary tool to boost the economy.

如前所述，美国可能是一个例外，因为它不受全球化金融的束缚，它的货币被世界上的财富持有者认为“非常可靠”。从目前的情况来看，美国出现资本外逃的可能性似乎不大。但美国会受到组织协调因素的限制，其结果是，在新自由主义的资本主义制度下，通过财政手段直接刺激需求的国家干预几乎没有。这使得各国采取了另外两种做法：一是向资本家提供补贴和转移支付，鼓励他们增加支出，以此作为刺激经济的手段；二是依靠货币政策作为提振经济的主要手段。

In fact, the first measure, far from stimulating the economy, may be counterproductive. This is because, due to fiscal opposition, the government cannot raise funds for transfers to capitalists by increasing fiscal deficits; it must raise funds by reducing other areas of state expenditure or at the expense of the working population. But since the funds transferred to capitalists are not entirely spent—a portion is saved (capitalists' investment increases only on the basis of a prior expansion of the market, not because they have more available resources through such transfers)—financing such transfers in either of the above ways leads to a contraction in the level of aggregate demand. Thus, this approach to stimulating the economy is counterproductive.

事实上，第一项措施非但不会刺激经济，反而可能适得其反。这是因为，由于财政方面的反对，政府无法通过增加财政赤字来筹集向资本家转移的资金，而是必须通过减少其他方面的国家支出，或以牺牲劳动人口为代价来筹集资金。但是，由于向资本家转移的资金并没有被全部用尽，其中一部分被存起来(资本家投资的增加仅仅是基于市场规模的事先扩大，而不是因为资本家通过这种转移获得了更多的可用资源)，因此，上述任何一种方式为这种转移融资都会导致总需求水平的收缩。所以，这种刺激经济的方式适得其反。

As for monetary policy, it is well known to be a blunt instrument for stimulating the economy. Although the US Federal Reserve maintained near-zero interest rates for a considerable period, the stagnation of development in the "Global North" did not change, hence the term "secular stagnation" became popular. In fact, if maintaining near-zero interest rates for a long period leads to a rise in the profit rate managed by monopoly capitalists, it may also produce a counterproductive effect, because the illiquidity risk typically associated with such measures is reduced. Arguably, this is precisely what triggered the current inflation in the "Global North."

至于货币政策，众所周知，它是刺激经济的钝器。尽管美联储在相当长的一段时间内维持着接近于零的低利率，但“全球北方”发展的停滞并未改变，因此“长期停滞”一词开始流行起来。事实上，如果长期维持接近于零的利率导致垄断资本家管理的利润率上升，也可能产生适得其反的效果，因为通常与此类举措相关的非流动性风险有所降低。可以说，这正是引发“全球北方”当前通货膨胀的原因。

One might ask: if "secular stagnation" is the result of overproduction inherent in neoliberal capitalism, why did it not manifest earlier? Why did it only appear about ten years before the COVID-19 pandemic? The answer lies in the fact that, although state intervention to counter this tendency is futile under neoliberal capitalism, what could counter this tendency and actually did so was the formation of asset price "bubbles." Despite their speculative nature, these "bubbles" could also stimulate the real economy. The US internet "bubble" in the 1990s and the real estate "bubble" in the early 2000s both curbed the tendency toward overproduction. But after the real estate "bubble" burst, no similar "bubble" formed, even with near-zero interest rates, nor did it create an asset price "bubble." On the contrary, as noted, it may have stimulated the current inflation through a rise in managed profit rates.

人们可能会问：如果“长期停滞”是新自由主义的资本主义固有的生产过剩的结果，那么为什么它没有更早地表现出来？为什么它只在新冠疫情前10年左右才表现出来？答案在于，尽管在新自由主义的资本主义制度下，对抗这种趋势的国家干预是徒劳的，但能够对抗这种趋势且实际已经做到了的是资产价格“泡沫”的形成。尽管这些“泡沫”具有投机性质，但它们也可以对实体经济起到刺激作用。1990年代美国的互联网“泡沫”以及本世纪初的房地产“泡沫”都抑制了生产过剩的趋势。但房地产“泡沫”破裂后，并没有形成任何类似的“泡沫”，即使维持接近于零的利率，也没有造成资产价格“泡沫”。相反，如前所述，它可能通过管理利润率的上升刺激了当前的通货膨胀。

Unable to generate new "bubbles," and with the bursting of "bubbles" making economic agents more cautious about speculation, after the real estate "bubble" burst, no other "bubble" of comparable scale emerged; instead, it plunged the "Global North" and consequently the world economy into secular stagnation, thereby revealing the inherent tendency toward overproduction under neoliberal capitalism.

由于无法制造新的“泡沫”，况且“泡沫”的破裂会使经济主体对投机行为更加谨慎，因此房地产“泡沫”破裂后，并没有出现另一个规模相当的“泡沫”；相反，它使“全球北方”继而世界经济都陷入了长期停滞，从而表露出新自由主义的资本主义下生产过剩的固有趋势。

When such a long-term stagnation occurs, in addition to the aforementioned reasons causing the labor reserve to continuously grow relative to the working-age population, the stagnation itself will also produce another generation of the unemployed. In other words, during the growth phase of neoliberal capitalism (even when the US asset price “bubble” drove global economic growth), technological and structural unemployment expanded the proportion of the labor reserve within the working-age population, while the end or stagnation of economic growth also triggered additional Keynesian-type unemployment. India’s economic stagnation began shortly after the bursting of the US housing market “bubble”; this phenomenon includes not only the previously existing increase in the relative labor reserve but also a rise in the unemployment rate. Prior to this, India had already been facing a trend of an increasing relative labor reserve and a declining per capita employment rate.

当出现这种长期停滞时，除了上述原因导致劳动力储备相对于劳动年龄人口不断增长之外，还会因为停滞本身产生另一代失业者。换句话说，在新自由主义的资本主义的增长阶段（即使在美国的资产价格“泡沫”推动全球经济增长的情况下），技术性和结构性失业扩大了劳动年龄人口中的劳动力储备比例，而经济增长结束或停滞也会引发凯恩斯主义类型的额外失业。印度的经济停滞始于美国住房市场“泡沫”破裂之后不久，这一现象不仅包括此前一直存在的相对劳动力储备的增加，还包括失业率的上升。在此之前，印度就一直面临着相对劳动力储备增加、人均就业率下降的趋势。

IV. The Emergence of Fascism

四、法西斯主义的出现

It is precisely against the backdrop of this emerging crisis and large-scale unemployment, with no signs of change in sight, that fascist tendencies have begun to appear. Many countries, such as Italy, Poland, Hungary, India, and Turkey, already have fascist tendencies. In other countries, such as France and Germany, the number of such movements has already reached alarming levels.

正是在这种出现危机和大规模失业现象，且看不到任何改变迹象的背景下，法西斯主义倾向开始出现了。许多国家，如意大利、波兰、匈牙利、印度和土耳其，已经有了法西斯主义倾向。而在其他国家，如法国和德国，这类运动的数量也已经达到了惊人的程度。

Fascist or quasi-fascist organizations exist in all capitalist societies, but they are usually on the margins. They come into focus when monopoly capital provides them with financial support and media backing. This typically occurs during periods of crisis when the social dominance of monopoly capital is threatened. In such circumstances, fascist organizations are useful to monopoly capital because they provide a powerful, diversionary discourse that reduces public discussion of the crisis and systemic failures. At the same time, fascist organizations incite the majority to develop hatred toward certain unfortunate ethnic or religious minorities, portraying them as the “other” and holding them responsible for past and present hostile acts against the majority. This discourse not only serves a diversionary function but also divides the working class, making it more difficult for them to unite and challenge the existing system.

法西斯主义或准法西斯主义组织存在于所有资本主义社会中，但通常处于边缘地位。当垄断资本为其提供资金支持和媒体支持时，它们就会成为焦点。这通常发生在垄断资本的社会主导地位受到威胁的危机爆发时期。在这种情况下，法西斯主义组织对垄断资本是有利用价值的，因为它们提供了一种强有力的、能转移话题的言论，从而使民众减少了对危机和制度过失的讨论。同时，法西斯主义组织煽动大多数人对某些不幸的少数族裔或宗教少数派产生仇恨情绪，并将他们描绘为“他者”，认为其要对过去和现在的针对大多数人的敌意行为负责。这种言论除了具有转移话题的作用，还分化了工人阶级，使他们更加难以联合起来挑战现有制度。

The widespread phenomenon of mass unemployment in society also makes it easy for fascist organizations to recruit new members for their movements. By using state apparatus and suppressing through the hooliganism of thugs on the streets, fascist organizations gain political control over society, thereby serving monopoly capital.

社会上普遍存在的大规模失业现象也使法西斯主义组织很容易为其运动招募新成员。通过使用国家机关和利用暴徒的街头流氓行为进行镇压，法西斯主义组织获得了对社会的政治控制，从而为垄断资本服务。

Michał Kalecki argued that the state apparatus under fascist rule in the 1930s was “under the direct control of a partnership between big business and fascist upstarts.” Contemporary fascism (more appropriately termed “neo-fascism”) signifies an alliance between domestic corporate oligarchs, combined with globalized capital, and fascist organizations.

米哈尔·卡莱斯基认为，1930年代法西斯主义统治下的国家机器“处于大企业和法西斯暴发户的伙伴关系的直接控制之下”。当代法西斯主义（更恰当地来说是“新法西斯主义”）意味着与全球化资本相结合的国内企业寡头同法西斯组织之间的联盟。

However, the fascism of the 1930s differs greatly from today’s neo-fascism. The former ruthlessly suppressed all political opposition and workers’ resistance through a combination of state terror and street terror, and promoted the increase of monopoly capital’s interests (although within monopoly capital, fascists particularly favored the emerging strata of monopoly capital); it overcame the Great Depression by substantially increasing military expenditures. These expenditures were primarily raised through government borrowing and were preparations for war. Fascist regimes could achieve this because the government could allay the concerns of the financial world about rising fiscal deficits, since finance itself was primarily national rather than globalized. In today’s globalized finance, no nation-state, even a fascist one, has the ability to persuade financial capital to accept larger fiscal deficits. On the contrary, even a fascist nation-state must accept the dictates of globalized financial capital to avoid expanding fiscal deficits or imposing higher taxes on the rich. Thus, even a fascist state cannot stimulate the economy by increasing spending.

然而，1930年代的法西斯主义与今天的新法西斯主义有很大的不同。前者通过国家恐怖与街头恐怖相结合的方式无情地镇压一切政治反对派和工人的反抗，并促进垄断资本利益的增加(尽管在垄断资本中，法西斯主义分子特别青睐新出现的垄断资本阶层)，它通过大幅增加军费开支克服了大萧条。这些开支主要是通过政府借款筹集的，并且是为战争做准备的。法西斯主义政权之所以能做到这一点，是因为政府可以化解财政赤字增加引起的金融界的忧虑，因为金融本身主要是民族性的，而不是全球化的。在金融全球化的今天，任何一个民族国家，即使是一个法西斯主义民族国家，也没有能力说服金融资本接受更大的财政赤字。相反，即使是法西斯主义民族国家也必须接受全球化金融资本的指令，以避免扩大财政赤字或向富人征收更多的税款。由此可见，即使是法西斯主义国家，也无法通过增加支出来刺激经济。

In other words, even a fascist state faces the same constraints as a liberal bourgeois state: it cannot increase government spending to boost aggregate demand. This sole feasible path has been blocked by the hegemony of globalized finance, which dislikes this approach. In short, contemporary fascism cannot overcome the crisis the way the fascism of the 1930s did. To draw attention to this difference in context, we prefer to use the term “neo-fascism” to denote the contemporary phenomenon. Therefore, monopoly capital’s support for neo-fascism today stems from its repressive and diversionary nature, not from its ability to overcome the current crisis.

换句话说，即使是法西斯主义国家也面临着与自由的资产阶级国家相同的约束，即不能为了提高总需求而增加政府支出。这一唯一的可行途径已被全球化金融的霸权所阻断，因为它不喜欢这种方式。简而言之，当代法西斯主义无法像1930年代的法西斯主义那样克服危机。为了使人们注意到语境中的这种差异，我们更愿意使用“新法西斯主义”一词来表示当代的现象。因此，垄断资本今天对新法西斯主义的支持源于其镇压性和转移性的本质，而不是因为它有能力克服当前的危机。

Neo-fascism serves neoliberalism; it helps maintain the neoliberal order. Since the crisis of neoliberalism cannot be resolved within the neoliberal order, neo-fascism cannot overcome this crisis.

新法西斯主义是为新自由主义服务的，它有助于维护新自由主义秩序。由于新自由主义的危机无法在新自由主义秩序内得到解决，因此新法西斯主义不可能克服这一危机。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 语

To overcome the crisis, it is necessary to go beyond neoliberalism. There is a view that we have already moved beyond the original form of neoliberalism and that the world is no longer dominated by the “Washington Consensus.” But this movement away from original neoliberalism has two main characteristics: first, it concerns the introduction of trade controls, rather than capital controls, especially controls on capital flows; second, while such trade controls have been introduced by the United States and some other “Global North” countries, they have not been introduced in the “Global South.”

要克服危机，必须超越新自由主义。有一种观点认为，我们已经超越了新自由主义的原始形式，世界不再受“华盛顿共识”的支配。但这场远离原始新自由主义的运动有两个主要特征：首先，它关系到引入贸易管制，而不是资本管制，尤其是对资金流动的管制；其次，虽然这样的贸易管制已经被美国以及其他一些“全球北方”国家引入，但在“全球南方”却没有。

In short, no “Global South” country can pursue expansionary fiscal policies for the two reasons mentioned above, because they are constrained by the globalized financial system. Even if they implemented expansionary fiscal policies, their effects might “spill over” abroad. “Northern” protectionism can, to some extent, stimulate a recovery in the “North” (though such a recovery requires the support of expansionary fiscal policies to be sustained), but this offers little comfort to “Global South” countries. Unless they can transcend the neoliberal system, implement controls on financial flows, and adopt supplementary measures such as trade controls, they are doomed to remain trapped in the crisis.

总之，没有哪个“全球南方”国家能够出于上述两个原因而推行扩张性财政政策，因为它们受制于全球化金融体系。即使它们实施了扩张性财政政策，其效果也可能会“外溢”到国外。“北方”的保护主义可以在一定程度上刺激“北方”的复苏(然而这种复苏需要扩张性财政政策的支持才能持续)，但这对“全球南方”国家来说并没有什么安慰作用。除非它们能够超越新自由主义体制,对金融流动实施控制，并采取贸易管制等补充措施，否则它们注定将继续被困在危机之中。

If the “Global North” breaks free from the neoliberal system by introducing protectionism while the “Global South” remains trapped within it, the economic situation of the latter will become even worse. Faced with “Northern” protectionism, the “South” can neither retaliate nor pursue expansionary fiscal policies, which condemns them to become immediate victims of the “North’s” “beggar-thy-neighbor” attacks. In the medium to long term, this asymmetric response to the crisis between the “North” and the “South” will hinder or even reverse the shift of economic activity from the “North” to the “South,” thereby eliminating the main growth stimulus for Southern countries.

如果在“全球北方”通过引入保护主义而摆脱了新自由主义体制的同时，“全球南方”仍然被困在其中，那么其经济状况将变得更加糟糕。面对“北方”的保护主义，“南方”既不能报复，也不能推行扩张性财政政策，这注定了它们将立即成为“北方”“以邻为壑”攻击的受害者。从中长期来看，“北方”和“南方”对危机的这种不对称反应将阻碍甚至逆转经济活动从“北方”向“南方”的转移，从而消除南方国家的主要增长刺激因素。

Neoliberalism has reached a dead end. The sooner the world recognizes this fact, the better, especially for “Global South” countries. But for these countries, breaking free from the neoliberal system by introducing capital controls and corresponding trade controls becomes particularly difficult because the neoliberal crisis has saddled them with unsustainable external debts. The “rescue packages” that “Global South” countries have so far negotiated come with “conditionalities,” making it even harder to escape the crisis. Thus, ironically, just when the crisis forces them to break free from the neoliberal system, the impact of the crisis itself makes this escape more difficult.

新自由主义已经走进了死胡同。世界越早认识到这一事实越好，尤其是“全球南方”国家。但对这些国家来说，通过引入资本管制和相应的贸易管制来摆脱新自由主义体系变得尤为困难，因为新自由主义危机让它们背上了不可持续的外债。“全球南方”国家迄今为止通过谈判得到的“一揽子纾困方案”都有“附加条件”，这使得摆脱危机变得更加困难。因此，具有讽刺意味的是，当危机迫使它们必须摆脱新自由主义体制时，危机本身的影响使这种摆脱变得更加困难。

[Prabhat Patnaik: Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India; Zhou Changmin: School of Marxism, Nankai University, School of Marxism, Shandong Management University; Liu Mingming: School of Marxism, Nankai University]

［普拉巴特·帕特奈克（Prabhat Patnaik）：印度贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁大学经济研究与规划中心；周长民：南开大学马克思主义学院，山东管理学院马克思主义学院；刘明明：南开大学马克思主义学院］

This article was originally published in *The Japanese Political Economy*, Volume 49, Issue 4, 2023. The translation has been abridged.

本文原载《日本政治经济》（The Japanese Political Economy）2023年第49卷第4期，译文有删减。

Translators: Zhou Changmin, Liu Mingming

译者：周长民 刘明明

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑