The Political Lessons of the Argentine Communist Party’s Failure to Transform from a Century-Old Party into a Centenary Major Party

The Argentine Communist Party (hereinafter “the ACP”) is a veritable century-old party on the Argentine political stage and the first communist organization in Latin America to cross the threshold of a century. Since its founding in 1918, the ACP has set the trend in the Latin American region, withstood the severe challenges of volatile political changes at home and abroad, and made important contributions to resisting imperialism, opposing domestic autocratic rule, and fighting for the legitimate rights and interests of the working class. However, from its founding to the early 1980s, the total number of ACP members showed an upward trend, growing from 766 to nearly 200,000; thereafter it continuously declined, and by 2021 it had only 17,000 members, no longer the largest communist party in Latin America, and had degenerated into a marginal minor party domestically. In fact, the ACP not only failed to grow and strengthen in terms of membership numbers, but also never became the ruling party in over a hundred years, never held a significant number of seats in both houses of Congress; on the contrary, it repeatedly lost to the Radical Civic Union and the Justicialist Party in presidential and parliamentary elections, ultimately becoming a “little follower” of the left-wing coalition led by the Justicialist Party. In the presidential election held at the end of 2023, the Justicialist Party candidate lost, and the ACP once again returned from being a party participating in government to being an opposition party. This article attempts to answer: Why did the century-old Argentine Communist Party fail to become a centenary major party? In other words, what political lessons can be drawn from its century-long history?

阿根廷共产党（简称“阿共”）是阿根廷政坛名副其实的百年老党，也是拉美地区第一个跨越百年门槛的共产党组织。自1918年成立至今，阿根廷共产党引领拉美地区风气，顶住了国内外政治风云变幻的严峻挑战，为反抗帝国主义、反对本国专制统治和争取工人阶级正当权益作出了重要贡献。然而，自成立到20世纪80年代初，阿共的党员总体数量呈上升趋势，从766人增长到近20万人；此后不断减少，2021年仅有党员1.7万人，早已不再是拉美地区规模最大的共产党，在国内也沦落为边缘小党。事实上，阿共不仅在党员人数上未能发展壮大，而且在长达一百多年的时间里从未成为执政党，从未在参众两院占据可观的议席，相反在总统和议会选举中屡屡败于激进党和正义党，最终沦为正义党主导的左翼联盟的一个“小跟班”。在2023年底举行的总统大选中，正义党候选人败选，阿共再次从参政党回归在野党。本文试图回答：百年老党阿根廷共产党何以未能成为一个百年大党？换言之，它的百年历史有哪些值得汲取的政治教训？

I. Lack of Innovative Courage, Prevalence of Dogmatism

一、缺乏创新勇气，教条主义盛行

The most important political lesson of the Argentine Communist Party’s failure to become a centenary major party is that it has long lacked innovative courage, and dogmatism has been prevalent within the party. For a considerable period, it was deeply influenced by external forces such as the Comintern and the Soviet Communist Party, severely lacking endogenous momentum for development, and ultimately failed to explore a socialist path suited to Argentina’s national conditions.

阿根廷共产党未能成为百年大党的最重要政治教训是，它长期以来缺乏创新勇气，党内教条主义盛行。在相当长时间里，它深受共产国际和苏共等外部力量影响，自主发展动力严重不足，始终未能探索出一条适合阿根廷国情的社会主义道路。

The Argentine Communist Party and its predecessor, the International Socialist Party, emerged and developed in the course of a line struggle with the Argentine Socialist Party led by Juan Justo. The ACP criticized the Second International reformist line pursued by the Socialist Party for failing to integrate the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with Argentina’s concrete reality, and therefore decided to draw a clear line with the Socialist Party, hoping to independently explore a socialist path suited to Argentina’s national conditions. Regrettably, although the ACP broke away from the reformist Socialist Party, it soon fell under the direct intervention of the Comintern, and then under the powerful influence of the Soviet Communist Party. Soviet-style dogmatism prevailed within the party for a long time, leading to its failure, even a century later, to find a socialist path consistent with Argentina’s national conditions.

阿根廷共产党及其前身国际社会党是在与胡安•胡斯托领导的阿根廷社会党的路线斗争中产生和发展起来的。阿共批判社会党奉行的第二国际改良路线未能将马列主义基本原理与阿根廷具体现实相结合，因此决定与社会党划清界限，希望自行探索出一条适合阿根廷国情的社会主义道路。遗憾的是，阿共虽然脱离了改良主义的社会党，但很快就受制于共产国际的直接干预，继而笼罩在苏共的强大影响下，党内长期盛行的是苏式的教条主义，导致其在百年后的今天也未能找到一条符合阿根廷国情的社会主义道路。

Shortly after its founding, the ACP successively became a branch of the Comintern’s South American Secretariat and the South American Bureau, accepting the direct leadership of the Comintern, actively following the Comintern’s political line, and thus being strongly affected by changes in the Comintern’s line. However, in the nearly ten years from its founding to 1928, dogmatism within the ACP had not yet taken shape, and the leadership had several debates on how to implement the Comintern’s resolutions. The “United Front faction,” the “Chispa faction,” and the Penelón faction within the party, for different reasons, all attempted to maintain a certain degree of independence for the ACP outside the Comintern. However, after early leader José Penelón was expelled from the party in 1928, the ACP completely became, for half a century thereafter, a so-called “outward-oriented party” that blindly followed the Comintern and the Soviet Communist Party step by step, losing its endogenous momentum for development. Because it regarded foreign dogmas as unassailable truths and dared not alter them, the ACP was also called “Criollo communism” by some domestic and foreign critics.

阿共在成立不久先后成为共产国际南美秘书处和南美局的一个支部，接受共产国际的直接领导，在政治路线上积极追随共产国际，也因此受到共产国际路线变化的强烈影响。不过，在其成立到1928年的近十年间，阿共党内的教条主义尚未成气候，领导层就如何贯彻共产国际的决议发生过数次争论，党内的“统一战线派”“星火派”、佩内隆派基于不同理由，都曾试图使阿共在共产国际之外保持一定的独立性。但是，在早期领导人何塞•佩内隆于1928年被驱逐出党后，阿共在之后长达半个世纪的时间里完全成了一个对共产国际和苏共亦步亦趋、失去自主发展动力的所谓“外向型政党”。由于它把外来的教条奉为圭臬、不敢移易，阿共也被一些国内外批评者称作“克里奥尔共产主义”。

The seven years from 1928 to 1935 were a period when the ACP followed the ultra-left theory of the Comintern’s Sixth Congress. In 1928, the Comintern held its Sixth Congress, proposing the ultra-left theory of the “Third Period,” which completely departed from the actual revolutionary conditions of Third World countries at the time. This theory held that the “Third Period” (i.e., after 1928) was a period when capitalism entered total collapse and the proletariat would seize power, thus requiring communist parties in various countries to lead the proletariat in a “life-and-death class struggle” line against the bourgeoisie. The Sixth Congress was also called a congress that “discovered America,” because for the first time it characterized Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina as dependencies of imperialist countries, where there existed both feudal relations similar to those of the Middle Ages and the reality that industries vital to the national economy, such as industry, commerce, finance, and transportation, were controlled by imperialist groups and domestic oligarchs. Therefore, the Comintern required Latin American communist parties, while strengthening Party building and expanding their mass base, to emphasize that their tasks were, on the one hand, to carry out anti-feudal struggles and launch land revolutions; on the other hand, to oppose imperialism and strive for national independence. However, the Comintern proposed a “two-stage revolution theory”: only after a series of preparatory stages, and after the victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution, could Third World countries, including Argentina, transition to the stage of socialist revolution and implement the dictatorship of the proletariat. In November 1928, at its Eighth Congress, the ACP approved the resolutions of the Comintern’s Sixth Congress and declared support for the “Third Period” strategy. The ACP’s Eighth Congress also analyzed the characteristics of Argentina’s economic structure based on the “Third Period” theory of the Comintern’s Sixth Congress, concluding that it was externally dependent on Anglo-American imperialism and internally distorted by the deeply entrenched system of large estates. Under this distorted economic structure, Argentina’s industrial bourgeoisie had not yet matured, the industrial proletariat was far from developed and strengthened, and the material conditions for launching a socialist revolution were not yet present. Therefore, the current revolutionary goal of the Argentine Communist Party was to promote Argentina’s bourgeois democratic revolution, carry out land revolution, and launch an anti-imperialist revolution; after completing the bourgeois democratic revolution, it would then move toward the ultimate revolutionary goal—achieving socialism in Argentina. It can be seen that the decisions of the ACP’s Eighth Congress almost completely copied the resolutions of the Comintern’s Sixth Congress, perfectly matching the “two-stage revolution theory.” In particular, the ACP adopted the “class struggle” line as required by the Comintern, which had a greatly destructive effect on its establishment of a united front with other left-wing forces and also had a negative impact on the ACP’s exploration of the localization of Marxism.

1928年至1935年的七年是阿共追随共产国际“六大”极左理论的时期。1928年，共产国际召开“六大”，提出“第三时期”的极左理论，完全脱离了第三世界国家当时的革命实际。该理论认为，“第三时期”（即1928年以后）是资本主义进入全面崩溃、无产阶级夺权的时期，因而要求各国共产党领导无产阶级对资产阶级采取你死我活的“阶级对抗”路线。“六大”还被称作是一次“发现美洲”的大会，因为它首次将巴西和阿根廷等拉丁美洲各国定性为依附于帝国主义国家的附属国，这些国家既存在类似中世纪那样的封建关系，还有着工商金融交通等事关国家经济命脉的行业掌握在帝国主义集团和国内寡头的现实。因此，共产国际要求拉美各国共产党在加强党的建设和扩大群众基础的同时，强调其任务一方面要进行反封建斗争，发动土地革命；另一方面要反对帝国主义，争取民族独立。但是，共产国际提出了“两阶段革命论”：只有经过一系列准备阶段，在资产阶级民主革命胜利以后，包括阿根廷在内的第三世界国家才能向社会主义革命阶段过渡并实行无产阶级专政。1928年11月，阿共在其“八大”上批准了共产国际“六大”的决议，宣布支持“第三时期”战略。阿共“八大”还根据共产国际“六大”的“第三时期”理论分析了阿根廷经济结构的特点，认为它对外依附于英美帝国主义，对内被根深蒂固的大庄园制所扭曲。在这种扭曲的经济结构之下，阿根廷的工业资产阶级尚未发展成熟，工业无产阶级远未发展壮大，发动社会主义革命的物质条件尚不具备。因此，阿根廷共产党现阶段的革命目标是推动阿根廷实现资产阶级民主革命、进行土地革命和发动反帝革命，在完成资产阶级民主革命之后，再迈向最终的革命目标——在阿根廷实现社会主义。可以看出，阿共“八大”的决定几乎完全照搬了共产国际“六大”的决议，与“两阶段革命论”若合符契。尤其是，阿共按照共产国际要求采取“阶级对抗”路线，对它与其他左翼力量建立统一战线产生了极大的破坏作用，也对阿共探索马克思主义本土化产生了不良影响。

However, due to changes in the international situation, the ultra-left “class struggle” line was abandoned by the Comintern after only eight years, replaced by the right-leaning “Popular Front” line. In 1935, at the Comintern’s Seventh Congress, because fascist forces in Italy and Spain and the Nazi forces in Germany were very rampant, anti-fascism became the top priority for the international communist movement, especially for the Soviet Communist Party. The Comintern instead required communist parties in various countries to form a “Popular Front,” uniting all progressive and democratic forces, including the national bourgeoisie, to jointly confront the European Nazi fascism led by Hitler and Mussolini (and soon Franco). According to the new spirit of the Comintern’s Seventh Congress, the ACP, on the one hand, declared support for establishing a national democratic front composed of national democratic and progressive forces against oligarchy and imperialism; on the other hand, at the trade union level, the ACP decided to dissolve the National Workers’ Trade Union Unity Committee (CUSC), which had been organized and led by the party itself in 1930 according to the requirements of the Comintern’s Sixth Congress, and joined the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), then still controlled by socialists, effectively handing over the leadership of the workers’ movement to others. In 1938, the ACP’s Ninth Congress formally adopted the “Popular Front” line, holding that the urgent task was to promote the realization of the bourgeois democratic revolution, thereby indefinitely postponing the country’s socialist revolution process. The ACP adhered to this dogmatic line, which both abandoned the leadership of the workers’ movement and failed to engage in armed struggle at the appropriate time, for more than half a century, until its Sixteenth Congress in 1986 relatively thoroughly repudiated it.

然而，由于国际形势的变化，“阶级对抗”的极左路线仅执行了八年就被共产国际抛弃，取而代之的是“人民阵线”的右倾路线。1935年，在共产国际“七大”上，由于欧洲意大利、西班牙的法西斯和德国纳粹势力十分猖獗，反法西斯成为国际共产主义力量特别是苏共关注的头等大事，共产国际转而要求各国共产党组建“人民阵线”，联合包括民族资产阶级等所有进步和民主力量，共同对抗希特勒和墨索里尼（不久还包括佛朗哥）领导的欧洲纳粹法西斯主义。根据共产国际“七大”新的精神，阿共一方面宣布支持建立一个由全国民主和进步力量组成的反寡头、反帝国主义的民族民主阵线；另一方面，在工会层面，阿共决定解散1930年根据共产国际“六大”要求成立的由本党组织和领导的全国工人阶级工会团结委员会（CUSC），加入当时尚由社会党人控制的全国总工会（CGT），相当于把工人运动的领导权拱手让人。1938年，阿共“九大”正式通过“人民阵线”路线，认为当务之急是推动实现资产阶级民主革命目标，从而无限期推迟了本国的社会主义革命进程。阿共将这种既放弃工人运动领导权也不适时进行武装斗争的教条主义路线坚持了半个多世纪，直到1986年的“十六大”才将其比较彻底地否定。

Before the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943, the Argentine Communist Party was a branch of the Comintern, obliged to unconditionally implement the line prescribed by the Comintern; even the appointment and removal of the ACP’s leaders were decided by Moscow. After the Comintern’s dissolution, the ACP continued to follow the directives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, who came to power in 1955, adopted a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries such as the United States, explicitly opposing communist parties worldwide from adopting armed struggle as a means, and instead emphasizing economic competition with capitalist countries. The CPSU’s “peaceful coexistence” policy solidified the ACP’s long-standing political line, which had taken the bourgeois-democratic revolution as its goal, ultimately creating a situation of “one voice alone” [5]5 “One voice alone” (一言堂, yī yán táng) is a Chinese idiom meaning a situation where only one person or one viewpoint is allowed to speak, suppressing dissent; it is often used in CCP discourse to criticize authoritarian decision-making within a party or organization. for the “orthodox” Marxist dogma as interpreted by the Soviet authorities. This damaged the autonomy and innovative spirit that the Argentine Communist Party should have possessed, and it almost entirely lost its initiative in exploring the adaptation of Marxism to the local context.

在1943年共产国际解散之前，阿根廷共产党是共产国际的一个支部，必须无条件贯彻执行共产国际规定的路线，甚至就连阿共领导人的任免也由莫斯科说了算。共产国际解散后，阿共继续听从苏共的指示。1955年上台的赫鲁晓夫采取与美国等资本主义国家的“和平共处”政策，明确反对世界各国的共产党采取武装斗争手段，转而强调与资本主义国家的经济竞赛。苏共的“和平共处”政策固化了阿共长期奉行的以资产阶级民主革命为目标的政治路线，最终形成了苏联官方阐释的“正统”马克思主义教条“一言堂”局面，损害了阿根廷共产党原本应有的自主性与创新精神，几乎失去了探索马克思主义本土化的积极性。

The Comintern, far away in Moscow, directed the global communist movement from on high and could not thoroughly understand the national conditions of third-world countries like Argentina. Meanwhile, the CPSU, as the ruling party of a state, had its own national interests, and it often demanded that proletarian parties in third-world countries serve its immediate interests, even at the cost of sacrificing the long-term interests of those third-world countries. In other words, neither the Comintern nor the CPSU could, starting from Argentina’s actual conditions, point out a correct path for the Argentine revolution. Regrettably, the ACP leadership lacked the courage for theoretical innovation, treating the Comintern’s resolutions and the CPSU’s directives as immutable laws that could not be broken, and thus fell into the “quagmire” of dogmatism.

共产国际远在莫斯科，居高临下指导全球共产主义运动，无法透彻了解阿根廷等第三世界国家的国情，而苏共作为一国执政党有自己的国家利益诉求，它常常要求第三世界国家的无产阶级政党服务于本国的现实利益，为此甚至不惜牺牲第三世界国家的长远利益。换言之，无论是共产国际还是苏共，它们都无法从阿根廷的实际情况出发为阿根廷的革命指出一条正确的道路。遗憾的是，阿共领导层缺乏理论创新勇气，将共产国际的决议和苏共的指示当作不能打破也不敢打破的定律，进而陷入教条主义的“泥潭”。

The ACP’s deep entrenchment in dogmatism exacerbated the bureaucratic tendencies within the party leadership, leading to two kinds of “estrangement”: one was the estrangement between the party leadership and ordinary party members, and the other was the estrangement between the ACP, as a proletarian party, and the broad masses at the grassroots. The ACP’s long-standing practice in this regard ultimately cost it the support of the majority of the grassroots masses, who instead turned to support the Justicialist Party led by Perón. With the return of democratic politics in Argentina in the 1980s, and especially after the failure of the Soviet model in the 1990s, the ACP subjected its long-held dogmatism to severe self-criticism. At the time, ACP General Secretary Athos Fava offered the following self-criticism of the party’s dogmatism and the leadership’s bureaucratism in September 1986: “Within the party, there is a high degree of bureaucratization. Leaders are divorced from the masses, divorced from the difficulties of the party members themselves, and are more like managers than revolutionaries.” From then on, the ACP decided to stop imitating others mechanically [6]6 “Imitating others mechanically” (邯郸学步, Hándān xué bù) is a Chinese idiom from the Zhuangzi, referring to a person from Handan who tried to learn the distinctive walk of the people of another state, only to forget his own way of walking and have to crawl home; it is used here to criticize blind imitation. and to go its own way, but it was too late; it had already lost its leadership over the working class and could no longer contend with the now-entrenched Justicialist Party and the trade union forces it led.

阿共深陷教条主义不能自拔，加剧了本党领导层的官僚主义倾向，导致了该党的两种“疏离”：一个是党的领导层与普通党员关系的疏离，另一个是阿共这个无产阶级政党与广大底层群众关系的疏离。阿共实践中长期奉行的这种做法，最终使其失去了多数底层群众的支持，他们转而支持庇隆领导的正义党。随着20世纪80年代阿根廷民主政治的回归，特别是20世纪90年代苏联模式的失败，阿共对过去长期奉行的教条主义进行了严厉的自我批判。时任阿共总书记阿托斯•法瓦在1986年9月对本党的教条主义和领导层的官僚主义作了如下自我批评：“从党内看存在高度的行政化。领导者脱离群众，脱离党员自身的困难，乃至更像管理者而非革命者。”阿共自此开始决定不再邯郸学步而要走自己的路，但为时已晚，它已经失去了工人阶级的领导权，再也无力与已经坐大的正义党及其领导的工会力量相抗衡。

The victories of the Chinese revolution and the Cuban revolution can serve as counterexamples to demonstrate the severe harm of the ACP’s long-term dogmatism. Neither the Chinese revolution nor the Cuban revolution was won under the tutelage of an external force. The key experience of the Chinese Communist Party in winning the Chinese revolution was its timely escape from the remote control of the Comintern through its agents, breaking the shackles of dogmatism. At the Zunyi Conference [7]7 The Zunyi Conference (January 1935) was a pivotal meeting of the Chinese Communist Party during the Long March, at which Mao Zedong gained leadership and the party abandoned the Comintern-backed military line., it repudiated the Comintern’s leftist line represented by Wang Ming [8]8 Wang Ming (1904–1974) was a CCP leader who, with Comintern backing, promoted a dogmatic, Soviet-oriented line in the early 1930s, later criticized as a leftist deviation., decisively abandoned the “city-center theory” based on Soviet experience, and instead, starting from China’s actual conditions, adopted the revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force. The Cuban revolution likewise did not follow the line designed by the Comintern and the CPSU. In the 1960s, the Revolutionary Communist Party of Argentina, which had broken away from the ACP due to the Sino-Soviet split, sharply criticized the ACP’s dogmatism, pointing out incisively: “The Cuban revolution began as a democratic revolution for national liberation and achieved a socialist revolution. Cuba realized Lenin’s theory in Latin America: that there is no Great Wall of China between one stage of revolution and another. It proved that only socialism can thoroughly resolve democratic and anti-imperialist tasks.”

中国革命和古巴革命胜利的例子可以反证阿共长期深陷教条主义的严重危害。无论是中国革命还是古巴革命，没有一个是在外部力量的耳提面命之下取得胜利的。中国共产党取得中国革命胜利的关键经验是及时摆脱了共产国际通过其代理人的遥控指挥，打破教条主义的束缚，在遵义会议上否定了以王明为代表的共产国际左倾路线，果断放弃基于苏联经验的“城市中心论”，转而从中国实际出发，采取农村包围城市、武装夺取政权的革命道路。古巴革命的发生同样没有遵循共产国际和苏共所设计的路线。20世纪60年代，因中苏论战而脱离阿共的阿根廷革命共产党在批判阿共的教条主义时，犀利地指出：古巴革命从“一个民族解放的民主革命开始，实现了一场社会主义的革命。古巴在拉丁美洲实现了列宁主义的理论，即在革命的一个阶段与另一个阶段之间不存在中国的万里长城。它证明了只有社会主义才能彻底解决民主和反帝任务。”

The ACP leadership bears inescapable responsibility for the dogmatism that prevailed in the party for so long. The core leaders during the most severe period of ACP dogmatism were Rodolfo Ghioldi and Victorio Codovilla, and of the two, Codovilla bore the greater responsibility. Codovilla was one of the founding fathers of the ACP, deeply trusted by the Comintern and the CPSU. He traveled to Moscow many times to attend Comintern and CPSU meetings, and during the Spanish Civil War he was stationed in Spain as a Comintern advisor. His position within the ACP was similar to that of Wang Ming in the early Chinese Communist Party, but his influence on the ACP was far greater than Wang Ming’s influence on the CCP. Codovilla led the ACP for more than half a century, faithfully following the “remote guidance” of the Comintern and the CPSU, placing their resolutions and directives above the party itself. Yet in the development of Marxist theory and practice in Argentina, he achieved little of note, leaving behind only some occasional writings and no theoretical innovation whatsoever.

对于阿共长期盛行的教条主义，它的领导层负有不可推卸的责任。阿共教条主义最严重时期的领导核心是鲁道夫•焦尔迪和维克托里奥•柯都维亚二人，而二人之中，柯都维亚的责任更大一些。柯都维亚是阿共的建党元勋之一，深受共产国际和苏共信任，多次赴莫斯科参加共产国际和苏共会议，在西班牙内战前后曾作为共产国际顾问派驻西班牙。他在阿共党内的地位与中国共产党早期的王明类似，但对阿共的影响又远甚于王明对中国共产党的影响。柯都维亚领导阿共长达半个多世纪，忠实遵循共产国际和苏共的“远程指导”，把其决议和指示凌驾于本党之上，但在阿根廷马克思主义理论发展和实践上却乏善可陈，毫无建树，留下的不过是一些应景之作，并无任何理论创新之处。

II. Lack of Unity, Rampant Factionalism

二、缺乏团结精神，宗派主义猖獗

The Argentine Communist Party has long lacked a spirit of unity; factionalism within the party has been rampant, and the party organization has split several times, severely weakening the party’s cohesion and mobilizational capacity. This is the second important political lesson from the ACP’s failure to become a centennial major party.

阿根廷共产党长期缺乏团结精神，党内宗派主义猖獗，党组织几经分裂，严重削弱了党的凝聚力和动员能力。这是阿共未能成为百年大党的第二个重要的政治教训。

Factionalism is a chronic ailment of Argentine party politics. Almost every political party, after its founding, has experienced splits of varying degrees and more than once—this is true of the Radical Civic Union and the Justicialist Party, of the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party is no exception. However, the endless factionalism within the ACP has its particularity: almost every split was related to external factors.

宗派主义是阿根廷政党政治的痼疾，几乎每个政党成立之后都要经历不同程度、不止一次的分裂，激进党和正义党如此，社会党如此，共产党也不例外。但是，阿共内部层出不穷的宗派主义有其特殊性：它的每一次分裂，几乎都与外部因素有关。

The ACP’s first split originated from different interpretations within the party of the Comintern’s positions. The Third Congress of the Comintern in June-July 1921 demanded that communist parties in various countries adopt a “united front” strategy, which sparked intense debate within the ACP. One faction, later called the “united front faction,” believed this meant the Comintern required the recently independent Communist Party of Argentina to merge again with the Socialist Party. The majority, led by then-General Secretary Rodolfo Ghioldi and early leader José Penelón, opposed this interpretation, arguing that the Socialist Party lacked influence in the workers’ movement and opposing the Communist Party’s re-merger into the Socialist Party. After the ACP’s Fourth Congress in January 1922, the “united front faction” was expelled from the party, and some of its members returned to the Socialist Party.

阿共的第一次分裂源自党内对共产国际主张的不同理解。1921年6至7月的共产国际“三大”要求各国共产党采取“统一战线”策略，引发阿共内部的激烈辩论。一部分后来被称作“统一战线派”的党员，认为这意味着共产国际要求不久前刚从阿根廷社会党中独立出的共产党重新与社会党合并，而以时任总书记鲁道夫•焦尔迪、早期领导人何塞•佩内隆为首的多数派反对这种理解，认为社会党在工人运动中缺乏影响力，反对共产党重新并入社会党。1922年1月的阿共“四大”后，“统一战线派”被驱逐出党，其部分党员回归社会党。

Shortly thereafter, a second split followed. In January 1925, Trotsky was defeated in his power struggle with Stalin and expelled from the Revolutionary Military Council of the CPSU. In December 1925, at the ACP’s Sixth Congress, a group of communists known as the “Chispa faction” [9]9 “Chispa” (Spanish for “spark”) was the name of a magazine associated with a faction in the ACP that was later expelled as Trotskyist; the term echoes Lenin’s newspaper *Iskra* (Spark)., named after the magazine *Chispa* (Spark) that served as their platform, were later labeled Trotskyists and expelled from the ACP. It must be particularly noted that this expulsion of the “Chispa faction” was the result of the ACP leaders seeking help from the Comintern, and it was the first direct intervention by the Comintern in the internal affairs of this young party. Relying on a ruling from far-off Moscow for internal political struggles undoubtedly set a bad precedent. The “Chispa faction” incident became an important turning point in the ACP’s loss of organizational and political independence.

此后不久，第二次分裂接踵而至。1925年1月，托洛茨基在与斯大林的权力斗争中落败，被开除出苏共革命军事委员会。1925年12月，阿共“六大”上，以杂志《星火》为阵地而得名“星火派”的部分共产党员，后来被定性为托洛茨基主义者，被阿共驱逐出党。需要特别指出的是，此次驱逐“星火派”是阿共领导人向共产国际求助的结果，也是共产国际对这个年轻政党内部事务的首次直接干预。党内的政治斗争，要依靠远在莫斯科的裁决，这无疑开了一个坏头。“星火派”事件成为阿共失去组织和政治独立性的重要转折点。

The third split of the 1920s occurred in 1928. At that time, the Argentine Communist Party (ACP) leader José Penelón served both as the ACP’s General Secretary and as the head of the South American Secretariat established by the Communist International in 1925. However, Penelón hoped that the ACP would maintain a certain degree of independence from the Comintern in its daily work, thereby preserving some space for the Party’s autonomous development. This stance, which was clearly lacking in internationalism, was sharply criticized by another leader, Rodolfo Ghioldi, who demanded that the ACP fully align with the line formulated by the Comintern. The outcome of the debate between the two sides was a victory for the majority faction represented by Ghioldi. Penelón was expelled from the Party in 1928 and went on to form a new party. A more serious consequence of this split was that, from then on, the ACP became a so-called “outward-oriented party” heavily dependent on external forces, completely losing its ability to question resolutions or directives issued by the Comintern and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that deviated from Argentina’s political and social realities.

20世纪20年代的第三次分裂发生于1928年。阿共当时的领导人何塞•佩内隆既出任阿共总书记，又担任共产国际1925年设立的南美秘书处的负责人，但佩内隆希望阿共在日常工作中对共产国际保持一定的独立性，从而为阿共的自主发展保留一些空间。这一明显缺乏国际主义的立场遭到了另一位领导人鲁道夫•焦尔迪的严厉批评，后者要求阿共与共产国际制定的方针完全保持一致。双方论争的结果，以焦尔迪为代表的多数派获胜，佩内隆于1928年被开除出党，另行组建新党。这次分裂的一个更严重后果是，阿共自此以后就成了一个严重依赖外部力量的所谓“外向型政党”，彻底失去了质疑共产国际和苏共发布的偏离阿根廷政治社会现实的决议或指示的能力。

After Penelón was purged from the Party in 1928, the ACP leadership formed a core leadership of “Codovilla-Ghioldi,” a power combination that lasted until Codovilla’s death in Moscow in 1970, though its influence persisted until the eve of the ACP’s 16th Congress in 1986. During the 1930s and 1940s, the “Bolshevization” policy implemented by the ACP leadership achieved initial results: the Party organization maintained a certain degree of cohesion and experienced no serious splits. This did not last long. In the 1960s, a great debate erupted within the international communist movement, and relations between the Chinese and Soviet parties and states were severed. The ACP leadership chose to side with the CPSU, and this act of taking sides led to the largest and most severe split in its history. In February-March 1963, at the ACP’s 12th Congress, the ACP leadership, headed by Codovilla, expelled a group of young Party members who wanted to discuss the Sino-Soviet debate. This led to over 4,000 Party members leaving the ACP to form new, more radical working-class parties, such as the Communist Vanguard and the Revolutionary Communist Party. These new parties criticized the ACP’s advocacy of “compromise with imperialism” as class conciliation, arguing that the ACP had degenerated into an opportunist and reformist party.

自1928年佩内隆被清除出党以后，阿共领导层形成了“柯都维亚-焦尔迪”的领导核心，二人的权力组合一直保持到1970年柯都维亚在莫斯科去世，但影响力持续到1986年的阿共“十六大”前夕。20世纪30和40年代，阿共领导层推行的“布尔什维克化”初见成效，党组织保持了一定的凝聚力，未出现严重分裂事件。好景不长，20世纪60年代的国际共运发生大论战，中苏两党两国关系中断，阿共领导层选择站在苏共一边，这种选边站队的做法导致其内部发生历史上最大、最严重的一次分裂。1963年2至3月，在阿共“十二大”上，以柯都维亚为首的阿共领导层驱逐了一批想要讨论中苏两党论战的年轻党员，导致40 0 0多名党员脱离阿共，另行组建新的、更激进的工人阶级政党共产主义先锋组织和革命共产党等。这些新党批判阿共的“与帝国主义妥协”的阶级调和主张，认为阿共已经沦为一个机会主义和改良主义的政党。

Entering the 1980s, the Soviet Union began to show signs of decline in its rivalry with the United States, and the CPSU became increasingly unable to exert control over communist parties in various countries. After Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands War, democratic politics returned to the country. Against this historical backdrop, the ACP leadership, undergoing a generational transition, decided to implement a major “turn” in the Party’s line. At the ACP’s 16th Congress in 1986, the ACP conducted a severe self-criticism of the “peaceful coexistence” political line it had pursued for decades, especially its policy of appeasement toward the Videla dictatorship during the military junta period. It decided to abandon the “National Democratic Front,” which aimed at promoting a bourgeois democratic revolution, and instead called for the establishment of a socialist front for national and social liberation led by the proletariat, in order to accumulate strength for the eventual seizure of state power. From today’s perspective, this turn was necessary at the time and represented an important attempt by the ACP to seek political autonomy. However, the new line also triggered serious internal divisions. Leaders such as Rubens Íscaro and Oscar Arévalo, along with some Party members, accused the Party leadership of “taking the Party in a guerrilla and ultra-left direction.” They were soon expelled from the Party or left of their own accord.

进入20世纪80年代后，苏联在美苏争霸中渐露颓势，苏共日益无力施加对各国共产党的控制。马岛海战失败后，阿根廷民主政治回归。在此时代背景下，正在经历新旧代际更替的阿共领导层决定实行党的路线的巨大“转折”。1986年的阿共“十六大”上，阿共对几十年来奉行的“和平共处”政治路线特别是军政府时期对魏地拉独裁统治的绥靖政策进行了严厉的自我批判，决定放弃以促成资产阶级民主革命为目的的“民族民主阵线”，转而要求建立无产阶级领导的民族与社会解放的社会主义阵线，为最终夺取政权积蓄力量。从今天看来，这一转折在当时是必要的，是阿共寻求政治自主性的一次重要尝试。然而，新的路线也引发党内严重分歧，鲁本斯•伊斯卡罗、奥斯卡•阿雷瓦罗等领导人和部分党员指责党的领导层将党“带向游击和极左方向”，他们不久就被开除出党或自行退党。

In the 1990s, severely impacted by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the upheavals in Eastern Europe, the ACP’s past highly centralized leadership model also came under challenge. The Party experienced multiple splits once again and even faced the threat of dissolution. At the end of 1990, the ACP held its 17th Congress. Some Party members, led by Central Political Bureau member Francisco Álvarez, proposed dissolving the ACP in order to establish a center-left political organization that could accommodate various factions, including Peronism and radicalism. Although an intra-Party vote ultimately saved the Party from this existential crisis by a narrow margin, some Party members still announced their departure from the ACP. In 1994, Alejandro Mosquera, a former secretary of the ACP’s Communist Youth League and the Party’s second-ranking figure, led a group of Party members who had lost confidence in the Party’s development to leave. Together with some members of the Justicialist Party, they successively established new center-left parties: the Broad Front and the National and Party Unity Front. In December 1996, due to disagreements over what political strategy the ACP should adopt after the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as internal differences with the ACP leadership, a group of ACP members led by Pablo Pereyra announced their departure from the Party and formed a new party, the Communist Party of Argentina (Extraordinary Congress) (PCCE). Since 2000, although the ACP has not experienced major severe splits, factionalism within the Party has not disappeared.

20世纪90年代，受到苏联解体和东欧剧变的严重冲击，阿共过去高度集权的领导模式也受到挑战，党内再次经历多次分裂，甚至一度面临解散威胁。19 9 0年底，阿共召开“十七大”，以中央政治局委员弗朗西斯科•阿尔瓦雷斯为首的一些党员提出应当解散阿共，以便建立一个可以容纳庇隆主义、激进主义等各类派系的中左翼政治组织。尽管党内投票最终以微弱优势挽救了党的这次灭顶之灾，但依然有部分党员宣布脱离阿共。1994年，曾任阿共共产主义青年联盟书记、党内排名第二的亚历杭德罗•莫斯克拉率领一批对党的发展失去信心的党员退党，他们与部分正义党成员先后成立新的中左翼政党大阵线——党和国家团结阵线。1996年12月，因就苏东剧变后阿共应采取何种政治策略以及与阿共领导层存在内部分歧，以巴勃罗•佩雷拉为首的一些阿共党员宣布脱党并成立新党——阿根廷共产党（特别大会）（PCCE）。20 0 0年以来，阿共虽然未有大的严重分裂，但党内的宗派主义并未销声匿迹。

In short, to a certain extent, we can fully say that the ACP’s century-long history is a history of continuous Party splits and rampant factionalism.

总之，在某种程度上，我们完全可以说，阿共的百年历史就是一部党组织不断分裂、宗派主义猖獗的历史。

III. Lack of Enterprising Spirit, Repeatedly Missing Development Opportunities

三、缺乏进取精神，一再错失发展机遇

The Argentine Communist Party has always lacked an enterprising spirit and has repeatedly missed development opportunities. Specific manifestations are: failing to seize the leadership of the workers’ movement during the era of labor movements, losing to Peronism during the era of nationalism, abandoning armed struggle during the revolutionary era, and degenerating into a marginal left-wing force during the democratic period. This is another important political lesson from the ACP’s failure to become a centennial major party.

阿根廷共产党始终缺乏进取精神，一再错失发展机遇，具体表现是：工运年代未能夺取工人运动领导权，民族主义年代败于庇隆主义，革命年代放弃武装斗争，民主时期沦为边缘左翼。这是阿共未能成为百年大党的又一重要政治教训。

In its history of over one hundred years, the ACP has had multiple periods of opportunity for growth and expansion. Had it been able to discern the general trend of the times, seize the historical initiative, and act with enterprise, it could have grown from small to large and from weak to strong. Even if it could not have come to power and led the country onto the socialist path, it could at least have forged itself into a political force in Argentina that could not be ignored. Regrettably, the ACP repeatedly missed development opportunities and gradually deviated from the path of becoming a centennial major party.

阿共在其一百多年历史中有过多个发展壮大的机遇期。如果能够洞察时代大势，把握历史主动，积极进取，它完全可以从小到大、由弱变强，即使不能上台执政乃至走向社会主义道路，也可以将自身锻造成阿根廷政坛一支不容忽视的政治力量。遗憾的是，阿共一再错失发展机遇，逐渐偏离了百年大党的发展方向。

First, the 1920s and 1930s were the golden age of the Argentine workers’ movement, yet the ACP failed to seize the leadership of the workers’ movement in a timely manner.

首先，20世纪20、30年代是阿根廷工人运动的黄金年代，阿共未能适时取得工人运动的领导权。

In the early period after its founding, the ACP achieved considerable success in organizing and leading the workers’ movement. It once became the leader of six major trade unions, including the Construction Workers’ Union, and organized a series of massive strikes to fight for the legitimate rights and interests of workers. Had this momentum continued, it would not have been easy for Perón, who rose to power on the basis of fascism, and his Justicialist Party to wrest the leadership of the workers’ movement from the ACP. Regrettably, the leadership of the workers’ movement ultimately slipped through the ACP’s fingers and was usurped by Perón and his Justicialist Party under the banner of Justicialism. The fundamental reason lies in the prevalence of Soviet-style dogmatism within the ACP, which rendered it incapable of acting independently and autonomously.

在建党初期，阿共组织和领导工人运动可谓成就斐然，一度成为以建筑工人工会为代表的六大工会的领导者，为争取工人合法权益组织了一系列声势浩大的大罢工。按照这个势头发展下去，以法西斯主义起家的庇隆及其正义党未必能轻易地从阿共手中夺走工人运动的领导权。遗憾的是，工人运动的领导权最终还是与阿共失之交臂，并被打着正义主义旗号的庇隆及其正义党所窃取。根本原因在于阿共党内苏式教条主义盛行，无法独立自主地行动。

On this point, the renowned Argentine Marxist José Aricó argued that the different political lines of the Comintern in various periods had a decisive influence on the ACP’s leadership of the workers’ movement. For example, the Comintern’s 6th Congress in 1928 put forward the “Third Period” theory, advocating a line of “class confrontation.” Following this, the ACP strengthened its ties with the working class and expanded its base of support among the workers. In accordance with the instructions of the Comintern’s 6th Congress, the ACP established its own trade union federation in 1929, the National Workers’ Trade Union Unity Committee, thereby forming a tripartite balance with the anarchist trade union federation and the socialist reformist trade union federation. In 1932 and 1933, the National Workers’ Trade Union Unity Committee organized two major strikes in the city of Buenos Aires, expanding the ACP’s influence. Regrettably, in 1935, the Comintern’s 7th Congress demanded that communist parties in various countries implement a “Popular Front,” which led to class collaboration in practice and ultimately disarmed the workers’ movement ideologically. The ACP dissolved the National Workers’ Trade Union Unity Committee it led and joined the largest trade union federation in Argentina at the time, the General Confederation of Labor. Although the 1936 Buenos Aires construction workers’ strike enhanced the ACP’s prestige both domestically and internationally, in retrospect it was in fact the ACP’s “swan song” in leading the workers’ movement.

对此，阿根廷著名的马克思主义者何塞•阿里科认为，共产国际不同时期的政治路线对阿共领导工人运动有决定性的影响。比如，1928年共产国际“六大”提出“第三时期”理论，主张“阶级对抗”路线，阿共据此加强了与工人阶级的联系，扩大了党在工人阶级中的支持基础。根据共产国际“六大”的指示，阿共在1929年成立了自己领导的工会联盟——全国工人阶级工会团结委员会，从而与无政府主义工会联盟和社会党改良主义工会联盟成鼎足之势。1932和1933年，全国工人阶级工会团结委员会分别在布宜诺斯艾利斯市组织了两次大罢工，扩大了阿共的影响力。遗憾的是，1935年共产国际“七大”要求各国共产党实行“人民阵线”，导致实践中的阶级合作主义，最终在意识形态上解除了工人运动的武装。阿共解散其领导的全国工人阶级工会团结委员会，加入阿根廷当时最大的工会联盟——全国总工会。尽管1936年布宜诺斯艾利斯市建筑工人大罢工提高了阿共在国内外的声望，但事后观之，它实为阿共在领导工人运动方面的“天鹅之歌”。

What the Argentine Communist Party (ACP) and other left-wing forces did not anticipate was the rapid rise of Peronism in the 1940s. Wielding military-political power with lightning force, it on the one hand suppressed, bought off, and split the original trade union leaders, while on the other hand establishing pro-Perón “parallel unions.” When the ACP was enthusiastically forming a popular front against fascism and neglecting workers’ economic demands, Perón used his advantageous position of controlling the state apparatus to introduce a series of social reform programs that improved workers’ living conditions in a timely manner. Not only that, but Perón also started from the legal system, requiring all trade unions to register with the government, otherwise they would be illegal organizations, facing severe consequences such as being banned, having their activities suspended, being forcibly dissolved, and having their leaders imprisoned. Through these measures, both soft and hard, Perón thoroughly defeated the ACP and other left-wing parties, firmly grasping the leadership of the Argentine workers’ movement in his own hands. The ACP strongly condemned Perón’s selective and unrestrained satisfaction of certain demands of the lower classes, regarding it as demagogic, class-collaborationist, and corporatist, whose purpose was merely to achieve centralized state control over trade unions, rather than truly changing the exploited and oppressed situation of the working class. Even from today’s perspective, these views of the ACP undoubtedly contain some correct elements, but regarding how to respond to the challenge of Peronism and how to recapture the leadership of the workers’ movement from Peronism, the Argentine orthodox left, represented by the ACP, was always at a loss and could only suffer repeated defeats at the hands of Perón and later Peronists.

令阿共等左翼力量始料未及的是，庇隆主义在20世纪40年代迅速崛起，挟军政权力并以雷霆之势，一方面打压、收买和分化原工会领导人，另一方面建立亲庇隆的“平行工会”。当阿共热心组建反法西斯的人民阵线而忽视工人的经济诉求时，庇隆则利用其掌握国家机器的有利条件，适时推出改善工人生活条件的一系列社会改革方案。不止如此，庇隆还从法律制度入手，要求所有工会都必须向政府登记，否则就是非法组织，面临被取缔、停止活动、强行解散、领导人入狱等严重后果。通过这些软硬不一的措施，庇隆彻底击败了阿共等左翼政党，并将阿根廷工人运动的领导权牢牢掌握在自己手中。阿共强烈谴责庇隆的这种有选择性、无节制满足底层群众某些要求的做法，认为它是蛊惑人心的、阶级调和的、法团主义的，其目的不过是实现国家权力对工会的集中控制，而非真正改变工人阶级被剥夺和被压迫的处境。即使在今天看来，阿共的这些看法无疑具有一些正确的成分，但在如何应对庇隆主义的挑战，如何从庇隆主义手中重新夺回工人运动的领导权，以阿共为代表的阿根廷正统左翼始终一筹莫展，只能一败再败于庇隆及后来的庇隆主义者。

Secondly, the 1940s and 1950s were an era of vigorous rise of nationalism in Argentina, yet the ACP placed itself in opposition to nationalism, thus losing to Perón and his Justicialist Party, who raised the banner of nationalism.

其次，20世纪40、50年代是阿根廷民族主义蓬勃兴起的年代，阿共却站到了民族主义的对立面，从而败于树立民族主义大旗的庇隆及其正义党。

In the 1940s and 1950s, the tide of nationalism in Argentina was just unfolding. The ACP, due to its adherence to left-wing internationalism, did not fully utilize this irresistible wave of the times, but instead criticized it. For example, regarding the gauchos, who were shaped by nationalists as a national symbol of Argentina, the important ACP intellectual Aníbal Ponce believed: “The gauchos, colluding with the Church (which knew how to use the gauchos’ barbarism) and the feudal lords (who knew how to bind the gauchos to their own interests), are without a doubt the most terrible enemies of the revolution.”

20世纪40、50年代，阿根廷的民族主义大潮方兴未艾。阿共因固守左翼国际主义，没有充分利用这股势不可挡的时代浪潮，反而对其进行了批判。比如，对于被民族主义者塑造为阿根廷民族象征的高乔人，阿共党内重要的知识分子阿巴尼尔•庞塞认为：“高乔人与教会（教会知道如何利用高乔人的野蛮）和封建主（封建主知道如何将高乔人与自己的利益捆绑在一起）沆瀣一气，毫无疑问是革命最可怕的敌人。”

Influenced by the Soviet Communist Party’s then-proposed policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the United States, the “Democratic Union” that the ACP helped form actually included the US ambassador to Argentina, Spruille Braden, who pursued a policy of intervention in Argentina. This undoubtedly gave Perón a great pretext to attack the ACP, and Perón thus firmly established his tough-guy image as an opponent of US imperialism and a nationalist. When the ACP and other opposition parties raised the slogan “Anti-fascism means anti-Perón,” Perón responded with “Perón or Braden,” using this as his campaign slogan for the 1946 election, ultimately defeating the opposition by a huge margin.

由于受到苏共当时提出的与美国“和平共处”主张的影响，阿共参与组建的“民主同盟”中竟然包括了奉行对阿干涉主义的美国驻阿根廷大使布雷登。这无疑给了庇隆攻击阿共以极大的口实，庇隆由此牢固确立了他反对美帝国主义和民族主义者的硬汉形象。当阿共等反对派提出“反法西斯就是反庇隆”的时候，庇隆则回应以“庇隆还是布雷登”，并以此作为他1946年大选的竞选口号，最终以极大优势击败了反对派。

Thirdly, the 1960s and 1970s were the revolutionary era in Latin America, but the Argentine Communist Party abandoned armed struggle, adopted a policy of appeasement towards the military government, and prematurely bid farewell to revolution, greatly damaging the ACP’s political prestige.

再次，20世纪60和70年代是拉美地区的革命年代，但阿根廷共产党却放弃了武装斗争，对军政府采取绥靖政策，过早告别革命，极大地损害了阿共的政治声望。

The 1960s and 1970s were the “revolutionary era” for Argentina and the entire Latin American region. The Cuban Revolution led by Castro and Guevara greatly inspired left-wing forces in Latin America, prompting the struggle strategies of the regional left to become more radicalized. However, the ACP still adhered to its propositions of so-called “peaceful coexistence” with the bourgeoisie and establishing a democratic alliance. For instance, in August 1967, at the Conference of the Latin American People’s Solidarity Organization in Havana, ACP leader Rodolfo Ghioldi condemned those “petty-bourgeois nationalists” who believed that Latin American countries “must skip the stages of land revolution, anti-imperialist revolution, and democratic revolution and directly engage in socialism,” and he also implicitly referred to the Cuban Revolution as a “supreme adventurism.” Although historical practice has proven that the successful experience of the Cuban Revolution—represented by the “foco theory” summarized by Guevara, Debray, and others—was difficult to replicate in more Latin American countries, this is not a legitimate reason for the ACP to abandon armed struggle. Argentina at that time had two urban guerrilla groups that had a significant impact in the Latin American region—the Montoneros and the People’s Revolutionary Army—neither of which was led by the ACP.

19 6 0、70年代是阿根廷和整个拉美地区的“革命年代”。卡斯特罗和格瓦拉领导的古巴革命极大地鼓舞了拉美地区的左翼力量，促使地区左翼的斗争策略趋于激进化。但是，阿共依然坚持所谓与资产阶级“和平共处”、建立民主同盟等主张。比如，1967年8月，在哈瓦那召开的拉美人民团结会议上，阿共领导人鲁道夫•焦尔迪谴责了那些认为拉美国家必须“超越土地革命、反帝革命、民主革命这些阶段而直接搞社会主义”的“小资产阶级民族主义者”，他还暗指古巴革命是一次“极端冒险主义”。虽然历史实践已经证明，古巴革命的成功经验——以格瓦拉、德布雷等人总结的“游击中心主义”为代表——很难复制到更多的拉美国家，但这不是阿共放弃武装斗争的正当理由。阿根廷当时有两个在拉美地区产生重要影响的城市游击队——蒙托内罗和人民革命军——都不是阿共领导的。

What is more, in order to prevent the emergence of an ultra-right regime in Argentina similar to Pinochet’s in Chile, the ACP did not hesitate to adopt an appeasement strategy towards the military government established in 1976, affirming the “National Reorganization Process” proposed by the military government and supporting the bureaucratic-authoritarian system established under the name of “civil-military government.” The ACP at that time believed that when the domestic national bourgeoisie was incapable of fulfilling the tasks of the democratic revolution, the advanced elements within the armed forces could be incorporated into the democratic alliance to play a progressive role. The ACP judged that Argentina at that time was at a crossroads between rebuilding democracy and Pinochetism, and cooperating with the Videla faction within the military was an important means to thwart the seizure of power by extreme nationalist factions like domestic “Pinochetism.” However, the ACP’s appeasement strategy did not achieve the expected results. In December 1981, when the hardliner Galtieri came to power and began to favor the US and oppose the Soviet Union, the ACP only then began to clearly oppose the military government and advocate for an early return to civilian rule.

更有甚者，为了防止阿根廷出现类似智利皮诺切特式极右政权，阿共不惜对1976年建立的军政府采取绥靖策略，肯定军政府提出的“国家重组进程”，支持以“文武政府”为名建立的官僚威权体制。阿共当时认为，当本国民族资产阶级无法胜任民主革命任务时，武装力量中的先进部分可以被纳入民主同盟，发挥进步作用。阿共判断，当时的阿根廷正处在重建民主与皮诺切特主义的十字路口，而与军队中的魏地拉派合作，是挫败本国“皮诺切特主义”等极端民族主义派别攫取权力的重要手段。然而，阿共的绥靖策略没有达到预期效果，1981年12月，强硬派加尔铁里上台后开始亲美反苏，阿共这才开始明确反对军政府并主张尽早回归文官政治。

In other words, during the revolutionary era that was in full swing in Argentina and the entire Latin American region, the Argentine Communist Party became a bystander or even an absentee of the revolution, even becoming one of the very few left-wing parties that did not advocate revolution. As the Revolutionary Communist Party of Argentina, which broke away from the ACP, criticized in 1968: “These understandings and practices of the ACP lead to obvious and profound opportunist deviations, causing the party to go from defeat to defeat, to the point that the party cannot play, or even loses, its role as an effective vanguard of the working class and the people at critical moments… This deviation has led the party to become, for a long time, the tail of different bourgeois groups (whether liberal or nationalist)… It believes that the bourgeoisie is capable of initiating the revolutionary process in our country, thereby in fact delaying the struggle for the leadership of the working class.” To prematurely bid farewell to revolution in the revolutionary era is undoubtedly regrettable.

换言之，在阿根廷和整个拉美地区如火如荼的革命年代，阿根廷共产党成了革命的旁观者乃至缺席者，甚至成了极少数不主张革命的左翼政党。正如从阿共中脱离出来的阿根廷革命共产党在1968年所批判的：“阿共的这些认识和实践导致明显而深刻的机会主义偏差，使得该党从失败走向失败，以至于党在关键时刻不能发挥乃至丧失了作为工人阶级和人民的有效先锋队的作用……这种偏差导致党长期沦为不同资产阶级群体（无论是自由主义还是民族主义）的尾巴……它认为资产阶级有能力开启我们国家的革命进程，从而在事实上迟滞了争取工人阶级领导权的斗争。”在革命年代过早地告别了革命，这无疑是令人遗憾的。

Finally, since the 1980s, Argentina and the Latin American region have entered the democratic era, and the Argentine Communist Party once again missed development opportunities, failing to grow rapidly into a ruling party like other left-wing parties in the region.

最后，20世纪80年代以来是阿根廷和拉美地区的民主时代，阿根廷共产党再次痛失发展机遇，未能像地区其他左翼政党那样快速成长为执政党。

Since the mid-1980s, the theme of the times had quietly shifted from war and revolution to peace and development. The democratization process in Latin American countries was in full swing, becoming an important part of what Huntington called the “Third Wave.” Following Perón, the Justicialist Party, under the leadership of Menem, returned to the center of state power. Menem adopted neoliberal reforms according to the needs of the situation, achieving a certain degree of success. In the early 21st century, due to the failure of neoliberal reforms, a spectacular “pink tide” formed in the Latin American region. The Justicialist Party, under the leadership of Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, bravely stood at the forefront of the left-wing tide. However, the ACP once again misjudged the world situation and the domestic situation, missing development opportunities. After breaking free from the control of the Soviet Communist Party in the 1980s, it re-advocated war and revolution; in the 1990s, it opposed Menem’s market-oriented reforms; in the early 2000s, it opposed Kirchner’s so-called “political dictatorship.” It was not until Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was in power that the ACP changed its political attitude and began to support a series of measures by the Justicialist Party government to protect labor rights. But by this time, the ACP could hardly achieve anything politically and could only be reduced to a minor supporting role in the ruling coalition led by the Justicialist Party. The ACP was a member of the ruling coalition in the most recent left-wing government, but it no longer had the strength to challenge mainstream political parties and aspire to state power. After the Justicialist Party lost the 2023 election, the ACP also returned from a party participating in government to an opposition party.

20世纪80年代中期以来，时代主题已经悄然转换，由战争与革命变为和平与发展。拉美地区各国民主化进程如火如荼，成为亨廷顿所说的“第三波”的重要组成部分。继庇隆之后，正义党在梅内姆领导下再次回归国家权力中心。梅内姆根据形势需要采取新自由主义改革，取得了一定成功。21世纪初，由于新自由主义改革的失败，拉美地区形成了蔚为壮观的“粉红色”浪潮，正义党在基什内尔、克里斯蒂娜领导下勇立左翼大潮的潮头。然而，阿共对世界大势和本国形势再次发生误判，痛失发展机遇。它在20世纪80年代摆脱苏共控制后重新主张战争和革命，20世纪9 0年代反对梅内姆的市场化改革，20世纪初反对基什内尔的所谓“政治独裁”。直到克里斯蒂娜执政，阿共才转变政治态度，开始支持正义党政府维护劳工权利的一系列举措，但此时的阿共在政治上已经难有作为，只能沦为正义党领导的执政联盟中的一个小配角。阿共在最近一届左翼政府中是执政联盟中的一员，但已经不再具有挑战主流政党、问鼎国家权力的实力。当正义党失掉2023年大选后，阿共也从参政党再次回归在野党。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 语

The renowned British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm once said: “Every communist party is the product of a marriage between two difficult partners — the national left and the October Revolution.” In fact, Hobsbawm’s remark is most apt when applied to the Argentine Communist Party, which has a century-long history, except that this was a failed “marriage.” On the one hand, the Argentine Communist Party made a brilliant debut under the impetus of the October Revolution, taking the lead in Latin America. Having weathered countless storms and upheavals over more than a hundred years without collapsing, this in itself is a great achievement that can be called a miracle. In this sense, it is fully worthy of being called a century-old party. On the other hand, the Argentine Communist Party has long been plagued by dogmatism and sectarianism, lacking an enterprising spirit and repeatedly missing opportunities for development. There are many profound political lessons to be drawn from why the Argentine Communist Party failed to become a centenary major party, but its deep entrenchment in dogmatism is fundamental. Chiefly because of dogmatism, it treated external directives as infallible guides, which led to rampant sectarianism and a lack of enterprising spirit, ultimately preventing the localization of Marxist theory and the exploration of a socialist path suited to its own national conditions. The labels “Creole communism” and “outward-oriented party” became an unbearable burden that the Argentine Communist Party long carried. Because the party could not successfully transform from left-wing internationalism into a national socialist party, it ultimately could only be relegated to a supporting role in the left-wing coalition led by the country’s largest nationalist party — the Justicialist Party. From this perspective, the Argentine Communist Party’s century-long history contains both rich lessons and profound warnings, which are worth our summary and absorption. (Notes omitted)

英国著名的马克思主义史家艾瑞克•霍布斯鲍姆说过：“每个共产党都是两个艰难妥协的伴侣——民族左翼和十月革命——联姻的产物。”实际上，霍布斯鲍姆的这句话用在拥有百年历史的阿根廷共产党身上是再恰切不过了，只不过这是一次失败的“联姻”。一方面，阿根廷共产党在十月革命的激荡下闪亮登场，引领拉美地区风气之先，一百多年来走过无数惊涛骇浪而屹立不倒，这本身就是一项堪称奇迹的伟大成就。在这个意义上，它作为百年老党当之无愧。另一方面，阿根廷共产党长期深受教条主义、宗派主义的困扰，缺乏进取精神，屡失发展机遇。阿共之所以未能成为百年大党，有很多深刻的政治教训，但深陷教条主义是根本性的。主要由于教条主义，奉外部指示为圭臬，导致宗派主义的猖獗和进取精神的缺乏，最终未能实现马克思主义理论的本土化，也未能探索出一条符合本国国情的社会主义道路。“克里奥尔共产主义”“外向型政党”的标签成为阿共长期背负的不堪承受之重。由于阿共不能很好地从左翼国际主义转型为民族的社会主义政党，最终只能沦为本国最大的民族主义政党——正义党——领导的左翼联盟的一个配角。由此看来，阿共的百年历史既有丰富教益，又有深刻教训，值得我们总结和汲取。（注释略）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑