Henry’s Phenomenological Reading of Marx

In response to Althusser’s “symptomatic reading” and in opposition to Althusser’s “ruptural” reading of Marx’s entire system of thought, Henry attempts, through phenomenological method, to interpret Marx’s entire thought as a system of philosophy of evidence. Henry holds that different theoretical concepts within Marx’s system of thought possess a foundational relationship. At the specific level of analytical argumentation, Marx’s texts and concepts exhibit an “analytical implicative relation” and an “essential foundational relation.” Althusser’s “symptomatic reading” is a psychoanalytic-style deep reading that goes beyond the literal surface reading to grasp what has not appeared; it means piercing through the fog of ideology to read the “blanks” in the words Marx has already written. Henry, by contrast, attempts, through phenomenological reduction, to return to the essence of thought-evidence that possesses “essential characteristics,” that is, to return to the “essence” of Marx’s own thought, which is the foundational concept or “essence” that explains other non-foundational or non-essential concepts. This essential foundational relation is not a causal explanation but a relation of transcendental possibility. Husserl holds that, through phenomenological reduction, one can discover that consciousness can transcend immediate empirical givenness through sensuous intuition, and can also transcend the sensuous sphere through eidetic intuition to obtain essential knowledge. Henry holds that in Marx there is a foundational concept that serves as “evidence-essence”: the actuality of the living individual.

针对阿尔都塞的“症候式阅读”，并反对阿尔都塞对马克思整个思想体系的“断裂式”解读，亨利尝试通过现象学方法把马克思的整个思想解读为一种明见性的哲学体系。亨利认为马克思的思想体系中的不同理论概念存在一种奠基性关系。在具体的分析论证层次，马克思的文本和概念存在一种“分析性蕴含关系”和“本质奠基关系”。阿尔都塞的“症候式阅读”是通过超越公开字面阅读的精神分析式的深层阅读，去把握未曾显现的东西，它意味着越过意识形态的迷雾，去读出马克思已写下文字中的“空白”。而亨利尝试通过现象学还原回到具有“本质特征”的思想明见性本质之中，即回到马克思本人思想的“本质”之中，它是解释其他非奠基性概念或非本质的基础概念或“本质”。这种本质奠基关系不是一种因果解释，而是一种先验可能性关系。胡塞尔认为，通过现象学还原，可以发现意识能够通过感性直观超越直接的经验给予，也可以通过本质直观超越感性领域获得本质性认识。亨利认为在马克思那里有一个作为“明见性本质”的基础概念：生命个体的现实性。

The Concept of “Actuality” as the Transcendental Origin of History

作为历史先验起源的“现实性”概念

An important textual basis for Henry’s reading of Marx is: “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.” Henry holds that if one confines oneself to an ideological reading, one will overlook the fact that Marx’s thought is an ontological philosophical system constantly seeking the actuality of the human being. From the early texts, especially Marx’s theoretical transcendence of Hegel and Feuerbach in *The German Ideology*, to the later period of *Capital*, Marx constantly seeks a foundation for the becoming of history. For example, for Marx, “economic production” is not actual production and therefore cannot constitute “the basis of political history and the history of thought.” The examination of history that is seen as forming the logical result of the text easily leads one to believe that the existence of history is constructed by class struggle, so that class itself is simultaneously the driving force of history and its “explanation.” In this summary, what is overlooked is the origin of class; in fact, class itself can never constitute a principle at the level of existence and cognition, because it is itself established upon and dependent on a principle of production. One of Marx’s philosophical achievements is to have clarified this relation. According to this reading, the theoretical basis of the analysis in *Capital* is an ontological concept in the sense of a phenomenology of historical genesis. Therefore, one cannot rely entirely on chronological order and the appearance or non-appearance of certain concepts in a series of texts to argue that there is a “rupture” in Marx’s system of thought.

亨利对马克思解读的一个重要文本依据是“任何人类历史的第一个前提无疑是有生命的个人的存在”。亨利认为，如果局限于意识形态的解读，就会忽略马克思的思想是一个不断寻求人的现实性的存在论哲学体系。从早期文本，特别是《德意志意识形态》中马克思对黑格尔与费尔巴哈的理论超越，到后期的《资本论》时期，马克思不断为历史性的生成寻求一种基础。例如，对马克思来说，“经济生产”并不是实际的生产，因此不能构成“政治史和思想史的基础”。被看作形成了文本逻辑结果的关于历史的考察易于使人相信历史的存在是被阶级斗争构建的，因此阶级本身便同时是历史的动力和“解释”。在这一总结中，被忽视的是阶级的起源，事实上阶级本身绝不能在存在和认识的层次构建一个原则，因为它们本身便建立于一个生产性原则之上并依赖于此原则，马克思的哲学成就之一便是澄清了这一关系。根据这一解读，《资本论》分析的理论基础是一种历史发生现象学意义上的存在论概念。所以不能完全依靠年代顺序和某些概念在一系列文本中的出现或不出现，认为马克思的思想体系存在“断裂”。

Henry holds that different concepts in Marx’s works occupy different ontological levels according to their theoretical positions, and the concepts that appear in succession constitute a transcendental philosophy of historical genesis. These concepts constitute not a linear history but a history of origins, that is, a history of “transcendental origins.” As the transcendental foundation of historical genesis, the concept of the “actuality” of the individual life acquires in Marx an ontological significance that transcends the traditional metaphysical dichotomy of matter and spirit: “The first method of observation proceeds from consciousness, regarding consciousness as the living individual. The second method of observation, which conforms to actual life, proceeds from actual, living individuals themselves, and regards consciousness only as their consciousness.” In a methodological sense, “the method of observation that conforms to actual life” is consistent with Husserl’s attempt, through the method of phenomenological reduction, to transcend the matter-form dichotomy and thereby discover the field of transcendental consciousness as absolute being. In his critique of traditional metaphysics, Marx unconsciously employs a method of reduction and discovers the concept of “actuality” as the ontological foundation. Therefore, Marx’s critique of Hegel’s dialectics is by no means a simple inversion of head and foot, but rather uses his genius-like insight to construct an entirely new ontological philosophy. Husserl, for his part, constructs phenomenological reduction as an operable systematic method. Consequently, the unconscious use of the method of reduction—which requires a genius-like insight—acquires an operability in phenomenology. Henry holds that Marx’s examination of the four factors of historical premises and historical relations (the production of material life, the creation of new needs, the family, and social relations) is a phenomenology of historical genesis. However, because Marx lacks a phenomenological ontology of original passivity, the terminology with which the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* criticizes Hegel remains Feuerbachian, and the mode of existence of life and the ultimate driving force of historical becoming are not clarified. But in *The German Ideology*, Marx clearly expresses his thought, and the unity of historical genesis and the primordial relation of the subject is further clarified.

亨利认为，马克思著作中的不同概念依据自身的理论位置处于不同的存在论层次，相继出现的概念构成了一种先验的历史发生哲学，这些概念构成的不是线性的历史，而是起源的历史，即一种“先验起源”的历史。作为历史发生的先验基础，个体生命的“现实性”概念在马克思那里获得了一种超越传统形而上学物质与精神二分的存在论意义：“前一种考察方法从意识出发，把意识看做是有生命的个人。后一种符合现实生活的考察方法则从现实的、有生命的个人本身出发，把意识仅仅看做是他们的意识。”在方法论的意义上，“符合现实生活的考察方法”与胡塞尔通过现象学还原方法超越质料—形式二分从而发现作为绝对存在的先验意识领域的尝试是一致的。在对传统形而上学的批判中，马克思不自觉地运用一种还原方法，发现了作为存在论基础的“现实性”概念。因此，马克思对黑格尔辩证法的批判绝不是一种简单的头足互换的颠倒，而是利用其天才般的洞见构建了一种全新的存在论哲学。胡塞尔则把现象学还原构建为一种可操作的系统性方法。因而，不自觉的还原方法的运用——这需要一种天才洞见——在现象学中具有了一种可操作性。亨利认为，马克思对历史前提以及历史关系的四个因素（物质生活的生产、新的需要、家庭关系、社会关系）的考察是一种历史发生现象学。但是，由于马克思那里缺少一种原初被动性的存在论现象学，所以《1844年经济学哲学手稿》批判黑格尔的术语仍然是费尔巴哈式的，生命的存在方式和历史生成的最终动力没有得到澄清。但在《德意志意识形态》中，马克思清晰地表达了自己的思想，历史发生与主体原初关联的统一性也得到进一步澄清。

Actuality and Historicity

现实性与历史性

In the sense of historical genesis, the concept of “actuality” manifests itself in the socio-historical process as: “a definite mode of production or a definite industrial stage is always combined with a definite mode of co-operation or a definite social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a ‘productive force.’” This is a co-existence that is historically determined. At the same time, the production of human beings themselves is an actual productive activity that is historically determined: “Men produce the means of subsistence they require, and thereby indirectly produce their actual material life itself. The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find and have to reproduce.” The possible basis of productive forces at different socio-historical stages must be traced back (reduced) to the “mode of co-operation” of human beings, and the “mode of co-operation” of human beings can be reduced to the practical activity of concrete living individuals. Therefore, human actuality is both constitutive and constituted, but in the sense of transcendental origin, it is living individuals who determine history, not the reverse. This is driven by the “transcendental philosophical motive” of returning to the ultimate premise of history and is a field of evidence brought about by the method of observation that conforms to actual life (reduction).

在历史发生学的意义上，“现实性”概念在社会历史进程中表现为“一定的生产方式或一定的工业阶段始终是与一定的共同活动的方式或一定的社会阶段联系着的，而这种共同活动方式本身就是‘生产力’”。这是一种被历史地规定的共同存在。同时，人自身的生产是一种被历史地规定的现实性生产活动，“人们生产他们所必需的生活资料，同时也就间接地生产着他们的物质生活本身。人们用以生产自己必需的生活资料的方式，首先取决于他们得到的现成的和需要再生产的生活资料本身的特性”。不同社会历史阶段生产力的可能性基础要回到（还原为）人的“共同活动的方式”，而人的“共同活动的方式”可以还原为具体生命个体的实践活动，所以人的现实性既是构成性的又是被构成的，但在先验起源的意义上，是有生命的个人决定历史，而不是相反。这是由回到历史最终前提的“先验哲学动机”推动并通过符合现实生活的考察方法（还原）带来的明见性领域。

Marx says: “Men are actual, active men, who are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its most remote forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being, and the being of men is their actual life-process.” The process of historical becoming is manifested as the actual life-process of active men, but this actual life-process is not historical events recorded by others in the historiographical sense, but rather a historical experience constituted by active men and which in turn constitutes the actuality of men themselves.

马克思说：“人们是现实的，从事活动的人们，他们受自己的生产力和与之相适应的交往的一定发展——一直到交往的最遥远的形态——所制约。意识在任何时候都只能是被意识到了的存在，而人们的存在就是他们的现实生活过程。” 历史的生成过程就表现为从事活动的人的现实生活过程，但这一现实生活过程不是历史学意义上被他者所记录的历史事件，而是由从事活动的人构成并反过来构成人自身现实性的历史性体验。

Although Hegel proposed that substance is subject, his dialectic is the self-activity of absolute spirit itself, the self-manifestation of absolute spirit accomplished in the difference of its self-opposition. Hence Hegel’s explanation of the occurrence of history lacks the actuality of ontology. Through an ontological reduction, Marx discovered the ultimate root of the occurrence of history: the actual life individual (the non-ideological individual). The actuality of the individual is an evident “essence” that is generated in history and obtains self-determination, that is, an open temporal existence, rather than the atemporal existence of the Platonic Idea. Husserl, through phenomenological reduction, discovered the temporal mode of existence of pure consciousness, but lacked an analysis of historical generation; in particular, the primal impression–retention–protention horizon structure of inner time-consciousness manifests itself as presence in the mode of making-present, and historical generation is condensed in the absence of retention. Heidegger, through the analysis of Dasein’s historicity, saw the ontological determination of “temporality” and “historicity” for Dasein, but historicity seems to depend on Dasein’s temporality, so the historical process may be dissolved into Dasein’s existential structure, and the life process that originates from man and constitutes man’s actuality may also be dissolved into Dasein’s sole and certain mode of being of “being-toward-death.”

虽然黑格尔提出实体即主体，但他的辩证法是绝对精神的自我活动自身，是绝对精神在自我对立的差异性中完成的自我显现，所以黑格尔对历史发生的解释缺乏存在论的现实性。通过一种存在论还原，马克思发现了历史发生的最终根源：现实的生命个体（非意识形态的个体）。个体的现实性是一种在历史中生成并得到自我规定的明见性“本质”，即一种开放的时间性存在，而非柏拉图理念式的非时间性存在。胡塞尔通过现象学还原发现了纯粹意识的时间性存在方式，但缺少了历史生成分析，特别是内时间意识的原印象—滞留—前摄视域结构表现为当下化的在场，历史性生成被凝结在滞留的不在场之中；海德格尔通过此在历史性分析看到了“时间性”和“历史性”对此在的存在论规定性，但历史性似乎依附于此在的时间性，所以历史过程可能会被消融于此在的生存论结构之中，作为来源于人并构成人的现实性的生活过程也很有可能消融于此在唯一确定的“向死而生”的存在方式之中。

In Marx, history in the sense of the phenomenology of time is a historical possibility that transcends the past and opens toward the future; man’s actuality is constantly historically determined and generated, and is experienced by man. Only in the sense of the occurrence of history does the individual’s subjective historical experience obtain a genuinely historical meaning. Yet Henry’s “history” within the horizon of a purely phenomenological method inevitably risks abstraction. From the perspective of historical materialism, in a genuine community, the contingency of life conditions relative to the individual (the loss of freedom) brought about by the division of labor in class society is overcome, and man finds the necessity of his own existence, that is, freedom itself.

在马克思那里，时间现象学意义上的历史是超越过去并向未来敞开的历史可能性，人的现实性不断被历史地规定和生成，并被人所经验。也只有在历史发生的意义上，个人主观历史体验才获得了一种真正的历史性意义，但亨利纯粹的现象学方法视域中的“历史”，难免有抽象之嫌。在唯物史观看来，在真正的共同体中，阶级社会的劳动分工所带来的生活条件相对于个人的偶然性（自由的丧失）被克服，人找到了自身存在的必然性，即自由本身。

(The author is an associate professor at the School of Marxism, Central China Normal University.)

（作者系华中师范大学马克思主义学院副教授）

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧