Similarities and Differences: Merleau-Ponty’s and Marx’s Theories of the “Object”

Marxist philosophy expresses the object starting from human perceptual activity. Merleau-Ponty believes that “Marx needed to introduce the concept of the human object, which was later adopted and further developed by phenomenology,” and he consciously inherited the theory that treats things as objects of human activity. Therefore, both Marx’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of the object contain a kind of transcendental reduction. However, the two philosophers have certain differences in their theories concerning the conditions for the appearance of the object and the mode of its appearance; they diverge in their attitudes toward taking relations of production as the foundational content that grounds the object. Comparing Marx’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of the object, tracing the intellectual-historical connection between Marx and phenomenology, reveals the complementarity of the two lines of thought and also highlights the advantages of Marxist philosophy.

马克思哲学从人的感性活动出发来表达对象。梅洛-庞蒂认为，“马克思需要引入人的对象这一概念，它后来被现象学袭用并进一步发展”，他也自觉继承了将物当作人的活动对象的理论。所以，马克思和梅洛-庞蒂的对象理论都包含一种超越论还原。但是，两位哲学家对于对象显现条件、显现方式的理论具有一定的差异；他们对于以生产关系为对象奠定基础内涵上的态度存在分歧。比较马克思和梅洛-庞蒂的对象理论，勾连出马克思和现象学的思想史关联，展现出两种思想的互补性，也能凸显出马克思哲学的优势。

Congruence in the Mode of Appearance of the Object

对象显现方式上的契合性

Marx holds that the “object” is always the object of perceptual activity, or the object of labor. Merleau-Ponty holds that the object is the object of perceptual activity. Both take the condition for the appearance of the object to be human “activity,” thereby achieving a similar phenomenological transcendental reduction of the thing. Specifically, the congruence of their theories of the object is manifested in four aspects.

马克思认为，“对象”始终是感性活动的对象，或者劳动的对象。梅洛-庞蒂认为，对象是知觉活动的对象。二者都将对象的显现条件当作人的“活动”，实现了相似的对物的现象学超越论还原。具体来说，他们对象理论的契合表现为四个方面。

First, perceptual activity is the original encounter between human beings and things, the basic condition for the appearance of the object. Marx believes that “how the object becomes his object for him depends on the nature of the object and the nature of the essential force corresponding to it.” [1]1 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 300. The relationship between human perceptual activity (essential force) and the object possesses direct actuality. This relationship is originally one; in activity, the essential force and the object are not theoretically separated. Merleau-Ponty believes that the condition for the appearance of the object is perceptual activity as the original relationship between human beings and things. Perception is a “system” of relations formed by the encounter between the body and the human being; in this system, the object and the body are unified. The human being has a capacity for perceptual appearance relative to things: the perceptual capacity of the body or the body schema. The body and the object are in an original relation of unity, so both the perceptual capacity and the object can only emerge in perceptual activity.

第一，感性活动是人与物的原初相遇，是对象显现的基本条件。马克思认为，“对象如何对他来说成为他的对象，这取决于对象的性质以及与之相适应的本质力量的性质”。人的感性活动能力（本质力量）与对象的关系具有直接现实性。这种关系是原初一体的，在活动中本质力量或对象并未被理论化地分离。梅洛-庞蒂认为，对象的显现条件是作为人和物的原初关系的知觉活动。知觉是身体与人相遇形成的关系“系统”，这个系统中对象与身体是统一的。人相对于物有一种感性显现的能力：身体的知觉能力或身体图示。身体与对象是原初的统一关系，所以知觉能力和对象都只能在知觉活动中出场。

Second, the object is the intentional correlate of perceptual activity; it is the unity of immanence and transcendence. In Marx’s theory, the object generally functions as the object “intended” in perceptual activity: “the senses have become directly in their practice theoreticians.” [2]2 Ibid., p. 301. Perceptual activity grasps the content of the object in intention, so the object possesses “immanence” for perceptual activity. At the same time, the intended object possesses a transcendence that is “external” to the human being, but this can only be demonstrated through the passivity of the senses and the temporality of perceptual activity. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty also holds that the thing, as the correlate of activity, indicates that it can only appear on the basis of perceptual activity. The correlate of perceptual activity is also the object intended in sensation, so it possesses immanence. Moreover, the object of the activity’s intention can also grasp transcendence through temporality: “the real lends itself to an infinite exploration; it is inexhaustible.” [3]3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Donald A. Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 342.

第二，对象是感性活动所意向的相关项，它是内在性与超越性的统一。在马克思的理论中，对象一般作为感性活动中被“意向”对象：“感觉在自己的实践中直接成为理论家”。感性活动在意向中把握到了对象的内涵，因此对象对于感性活动具有“内在性”。同时，被意向的对象具有“外在于”人的超越性，但他只能通过感性的受动性和感性活动的时间性来证明。同样，梅洛-庞蒂也认为物作为活动的相关项，表明了它只能在知觉活动基础上显现。知觉活动的相关项也是在感觉中被意向的对象，因此它具有内在性。而且，活动意向的对象也可以通过时间性去把握超越性：“实在适合于一种无限的探索，它是不可穷尽的”。

Third, the tool, as a special kind of object, becomes part of the human being’s capacity for activity. When the human being directs perceptual activity toward the object, the tool also becomes a special kind of object. Marx holds that the tool is subject to human perceptual capacity and is an extension of that capacity: the tool is “enveloped in the flames of labor, assimilated to labor as its own body, endowed with life to function in the labor process in accordance with the concepts and missions appropriate to it.” [4]4 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 296. Similar to Marx, Merleau-Ponty holds that the tool, as a special kind of object, becomes part of the perceptual capacity when it acts on things. For example, when discussing the blind man’s cane, he argues that “the cane is no longer an object that the blind man perceives, but a tool with which he perceives. The cane is an appendage of the body, an extension of the bodily synthesis.” [5]5 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 144. Therefore, both hold that the tool possesses a duality of “capacity” and object.

第三，工具作为一种特殊的对象，成为人的活动能力的一部分。人通过感性活动指向对象时，工具也成为一种特殊的对象。马克思认为，工具受制于人的感性能力，是人的感性能力的延伸：工具“被劳动的火焰笼罩着，被劳动当作自己的躯体加以同化，被赋予活力以在劳动过程中执行与它们的概念和使命相适合的职能”。与马克思类似，梅洛-庞蒂认为，工具作为一种特殊的对象，在作用于物时已经成为知觉能力的一部分。比如，在谈论手杖时，他认为“手杖不再是盲人知觉到的一个物体，而是他以之进行自觉的一个工具。手杖是身体的一个附件、是身体综合的一种延伸”。因此，二者都认为工具具有“能力”和对象二重性。

Fourth, the mode of appearance of the object for human beings differs from that for other species; the appearance of the object for human beings has more possibilities. Marx holds that the power of human perceptual activity differs from that of animals: “animals produce only according to the measure and need of the species to which they belong, while man knows how to produce according to the measure of any species.” [6]6 Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” p. 277. Human activity can transcend the limitation of a single measure; the appearance of the object in perceptual activity possesses comprehensiveness and more possibilities. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty holds that “what animal behavior lacks is precisely this possibility of diversified expression of the same theme,” [7]7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 126. while human beings possess the possibility of multiple activities that shift perspectives and paths, so the appearance of the object in human activity possesses diversity.

第四，人对对象的显现方式不同于其他物种，人对对象的显现具有更多可能性。马克思认为，人的感性活动力量不同于动物：“动物只是按照它所属的那个种的尺度和需要来构造，而人却懂得按照任何一个种的尺度来进行生产。”人的活动能够超越某一个单纯尺度的限制，对象在感性活动中的显现具有全面性和更多的可能。同样地，梅洛-庞蒂认为“动物行为欠缺的正是同一个主题的多样化的表达的这种可能性”，人则具有转换视角和路径的多种活动的可能，所以对象在人的活动中的显现具有多样性。

Differences in the “Object”

“对象”的差异

The theories of the object of Marx and Merleau-Ponty still have important differences. On the one hand, the content of perceptual activity differs between Marx and Merleau-Ponty, giving rise to a difference between the object of production and the object of perception. On the other hand, the environment in which the object appears differs between the two theories, giving rise to a difference between the content of relations of production and the content of general space in the object.

马克思与梅洛-庞蒂的对象理论仍具有重要的差异。一方面，马克思和梅洛-庞蒂的感性活动的内涵不一样，出现了生产的对象和感知的对象之间的差异。另一方面，两者理论的对象显现的环境不同，产生了对象的生产关系内涵和一般空间内涵的差异。

First, the produced object or the perceived object: differences in the mode of appearance of the object.

第一，被生产的对象抑或被感知的对象：对象显现方式的差异。

Marx holds that the world of objects is produced by labor, while Merleau-Ponty holds that human perceptual activity is first of all the original perceptual unity between human beings and things, and the object appears in the intentionality of bodily activity. Specifically, the produced object and the perceived object differ in three aspects: mode of existence, historicity, and the way they ground the natural sciences.

马克思认为，对象世界是被劳动生产出来的，梅洛-庞蒂则认为人的感性活动首先是人和物之间的原初知觉统一，对象在身体的活动意向性中被显现。具体来说，生产的对象与知觉的对象在存在方式、历史性、对自然科学的奠基方式三个方面表现出差异。

First, in terms of the original mode of existence, the difference between the two objects is that between a “shaped” object and a “manifested” object. Marx holds that “in order to appropriate natural material in a form useful for his own life, man sets in motion the natural forces belonging to his body—arms, legs, head, and hands.” [8]8 Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 283. “The product of labor is labor fixed in an object, materialized labor; this is the objectification of labor.” [9]9 Ibid., p. 287. In Marx’s theory of the object, the object exists in the mode of being shaped in perceptual activity. In Merleau-Ponty’s theory, the object-thing exists in the intentionality of bodily activity. For example, in a room, “it is only by sending out a multitude of intentional threads from my body that it can continue to exist around me as a familiar domain.” [10]10 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 131. The body schema, at a pre-logical level, makes the thing and its properties manifest.

首先，从原初的存在方式来讲，两种对象之间是被“塑形”的对象和被“显形”的对象的差别。马克思认为，“为了在对自身生活有用的形式上占有自然物质，人就使他身上的自然力——臂和腿、头和手运动起来”。“劳动的产品是固定在某个对象中的、物化的劳动，这就是劳动的对象化。”马克思的对象理论中对象是以在感性活动中被塑形的方式存在。梅洛-庞蒂理论中的对象物在身体的活动意向性中存在。比如，在一个房间中，“我的身体向它发出大量的意向之线， 它才能作为熟悉的领域在我的周围继续存在”。身体图示在前逻辑的层面使得物及其属性显形。

Second, the two objects differ in historicity in terms of transparency and semi-transparency. Marx holds that the world of objects is the world of perceptual activity: “the sensuous world is by no means something given directly from all eternity, ever the same, but the product of industry and the state of society.” [11]11 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 39. Therefore, in Marx’s theory, the historicity of the sensuous object is transparent; it is born in the history of industry or productive activity. However, in Merleau-Ponty’s theory, the historicity of the thing is semi-transparent or opaque. He acknowledges that bodily capacity has its historical causes: “there is in me a pre-constituted set of sediments.” [12]12 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 131. But the produced object is not the sole cause of the formation of perceptual capacity; the historicity of perceptual capacity and its objects is complex and opaque. Therefore, sedimentation possesses an irreducible “tacit” character; it is a given state that can only be discovered and used in perceptual activity.

其次，两种对象在历史性上具有透明和半透明的差别。马克思认为，对象世界就是感性活动的世界，“感性世界决不是某种开天辟地以来就直接存在的、始终如一的东西，而是工业和社会状况的产物”。因此，马克思的理论中感性对象的历史性是透明的，它在工业或生产的活动的历史中诞生。但是，梅洛-庞蒂理论中物的历史性具有半透明或者不透明性。他承认身体能力有其历史的原因：“在我这里有一个预先构造的各种积淀。”但是，生产的对象不是感性能力的形成的唯一原因，感性能力及其对象的历史性是复杂的、不透明的。因此，积淀具有不可还原的“不言明”性，是只能在知觉活动中被发现、被使用的既有状态。

Finally, the two theories of the object ground the natural sciences in different ways. Marx holds that perceptual activity continuously produces materials for scientific activity and lays the foundation for science. The materials of production have three functions for the natural sciences: providing objects for study, shaping the “intuitive capacity” for research, and providing the means of subsistence needed by researchers. Therefore, without the industry and commerce of production, there would be no natural science. Merleau-Ponty focuses more on exploring the mode of perceptual manifestation of objects and their relations in natural scientific theories. Any theoretical expression of science has an object-basis in perceptual activity. Perception “presupposes our pre-scientific experience of the world, just as each of these words and each of the terms in a physical formula does.” [13]13 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 103. Therefore, the “object” in scientific theory cannot fully explain the “objective basis” of perceptual activity.

最后，两种对象理论对自然科学的奠基方式不同。马克思认为，感性活动不断为科学活动生产材料，为科学奠定基础。生产的材料对自然科学有三方面的作用：提供可研究的对象，塑造研究的“直观能力”，提供研究者所需的生活资料。因此，没有生产的工业和商业就不会有自然科学。梅洛-庞蒂更侧重于探讨自然科学理论中对象及其关系的知觉显形方式。任何科学的理论表达都有一个知觉活动的对象基础。知觉“就像物理公式中的每一个一样，这些词中的每一个都预设了我们的前科学的世界经验”。因此，科学理论中“对象”不能完全解释知觉活动的“客观基础”。

Second, grounding by relations of production or endowment of meaning by the general environment: original differences in the environment of the object’s emergence.

第二，生产关系奠基抑或一般环境赋义：对象出场的环境的原初差异。

Marx holds that social relations are the foundational environment determining the meaning of objects, and that the object’s reification of and liberation of the human being must be viewed through the lens of relations of production. Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, carries through the theory of the body schema to its conclusion in order to elucidate the connotation of the object, and maintains that the object’s role in the reification and freedom of the human being lies in the human being’s “tolerability.”

马克思认为，社会关系是决定对象含义的基础环境，而且需通过生产关系来看待对象对人的物化和解放。梅洛-庞蒂则将身体图示的理论贯彻到底来阐明对象的内涵，并认为对象对于人的物化和自由的作用在于人的“可忍受性”。

First, the difference between relations of production and general environment as the core horizon of manifestation makes the basic connotations of the two kinds of objects vastly different. Marx holds that the shaping of objects by sensuous activity can only be applied within social relations of production. Social relations determine what human beings can possess and what they can do, also limit human beings’ capacity for sensuous activity, and fundamentally prescribe the connotation of the object. Moreover, Marx also criticizes the capitalist from the perspective of the exploitation of surplus labor time. Merleau-Ponty likewise acknowledges the environmental character of the object, but he holds that the environment is the concrete environment carried by the body, and that the environment has the characteristics of change and openness. At the same time, the environment itself is complex; the foundational structure of priority and causality can only be “posterior to” the manifestation of the perceptual environment, does not possess uniqueness, and the connotation founded by some prioritized environment likewise does not possess uniqueness or complete truth.

首先，作为核心显现视域的生产关系和一般环境的差异，使得两种对象的基础内涵差别巨大。马克思认为，感性活动对于对象的塑形只能在社会性的生产关系中被应用。社会关系决定了人能拥有什么和能做什么，也限制了人的感性活动能力，从基础上规定了对象的内涵。而且，马克思也从剩余劳动时间剥削的角度批判了资本家。梅洛-庞蒂也承认对象的环境性，但他认为环境是身体携带的具体环境，环境具有变化、开放的特征。同时，环境本身是复杂的，优先性的因果性的奠基结构只能是“后在于”知觉环境的显现，并且并不具有唯一性，被某种优先的环境奠基的内涵也不具有唯一性和彻底的真理性。

Second, the divergence on the question of the foundational connotation of relations of production in the object determines that Marx and Merleau-Ponty have sharply different attitudes toward the object’s role in reifying the human being. Marx holds that the object, as an external “contingency,” dominates the worker as maker. “All the conditions of existence of contemporary society have become something contingent, which the individual proletarian is unable to control,” causing human beings to forget the origin of the object’s production and to pursue the object in a distorted way. Merleau-Ponty holds that the human being necessarily bears an environment, and that universal contingency does not lead to the reification of the human being. Moreover, the invasion of the object into perception is merely a normal modality of perception; while being invaded, the human being manifests the thing and at the same time manifests its own capacity. Not only that, but the deception of the object with respect to human consciousness is second-order for perceptual activity, and the deception of the object with respect to human consciousness exhibits individual differences.

其次，对生产关系在对象的基础性内涵问题上的分歧，决定了马克思和梅洛-庞蒂在对象物化人的作用上的态度迥异。马克思认为，对象作为外在的“偶然性”，宰制了作为制造者的工人。“当代社会的全部生存条件都已变成一种偶然的东西，单个无产者是无法加以控制的”，使得人忘记了对象的产生根源和对于对象的扭曲追逐。梅洛-庞蒂认为，人必然背负着一个环境，普遍的偶然性没有导致人被物化。而且，对象对知觉的入侵仅仅是一种知觉的正常样态，人在被入侵的同时显现了物，同时也显现了自身的能力。不仅如此，对象对人的意识的欺骗对于知觉活动来说是二阶的，而且对象对人的意识的欺骗具有个体差异。

Finally, whether one affirms the foundational connotation of the object’s relations of production makes Marx and Merleau-Ponty sharply divergent on the question of whether the object can realize human freedom and liberation. Marx holds that under the conditions of private property, the object has a reifying effect on the human being. Changes in private-property society only yield a relative liberation of freedom; the human being remains dominated by contingent social objects. The demise of capitalism and human freedom and liberation in communism require the development of productive forces as a precondition. Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, holds that human liberation cannot be explained by the binding and unbinding of external causality, because under causality there is no freedom. The world, as situation, both delimits the history, space, and content of the perceptual situation and is further restructured in perceptual activity; freedom is thereby manifested. At the same time, because of the existence of situation and human tolerance, freedom and liberation are never complete.

最后，是否肯定对象的生产关系的基础内涵，使得马克思和梅洛-庞蒂在对象能否实现人的自由与解放问题上观点迥异。马克思认为，私有制条件下对象对人具有物化作用。私有制社会的变迁只有自由的相对解放，人仍然被偶然的社会对象所宰制。资本主义的灭亡和共产主义中人的自由与解放需要以生产力的发展为前提。梅洛-庞蒂则认为，人的解放不能用外在因果的束缚及其解脱的方式来解释，因为因果论之下无自由。世界作为处境，既限定了知觉处境的历史、空间与内容，也在知觉活动中得以进一步重构，自由就展现了出来。同时，由于处境和人的容忍度的存在，自由和解放不会彻底。

The Significance of Comparing the Theories of the “Object”

比较“对象”理论的意义

A comparison of Marx’s theory of the labor object and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the perceptual object is conducive to further grasping the intellectual-historical connection between Marx’s philosophy and phenomenology. At the same time, this comparison can reflect the mutual complementarity and unity of the two theories of the object. Of course, it can also highlight the superiority of Marx’s theory of the labor object over the theory of the perceptual object.

对马克思的劳动对象理论和梅洛-庞蒂的知觉对象理论的比较，有利于进一步把握马克思哲学与现象学的思想史关联。同时，这种比较能折射出两种对象理论的互相补充和统一。当然，也能彰显出马克思的劳动对象理论对于知觉对象理论的优势。

First, it embodies phenomenology’s inheritance and transformation of Marx’s theory of the object. Marx treats the object as a unity of the sensuous and the rational, as an object originally referred to in the encounter between thing and human being, laying the cornerstone for Marx’s entry onto the path of modern philosophy. Phenomenology inherits Marx’s approach of placing the object on the basis of the manifestation of the “fact itself” [Sache selbst] where subject and object are not yet divided. Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual phenomenology attaches great importance to the sensuous activity of the body as the original phenomenology of the encounter between human being and thing; in this respect it is extremely similar to Marx. Therefore, revealing the convergence of the two objects can provide a glimpse of the intellectual lineage of German classical philosophy, Marx’s philosophy, and phenomenology in modern thought, and show how Marx’s opening of a new research approach to “thinghood” has been carried forward in modern philosophy.

第一，体现现象学对马克思的对象理论的继承和转化。马克思将对象当作感性与理性的结合体、当作原初在物与人相遇中被指涉的对象，奠定了马克思走进现代哲学道路上的基石。现象学继承了马克思将对象放置到主客未分的“事实本身”基础上显现的思路。梅洛-庞蒂的知觉现象学，十分重视身体的感性活动作为原初人与物的相遇现象学，这一点与马克思极为类似。因此，对二者对象的契合的揭示，可以一窥德国古典哲学、马克思哲学、现象学这一近现代思想的脉络，展现马克思开启对“物性”的新研究思路在现代哲学中的发扬光大。

Second, it demonstrates the complementarity of Marx’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of the object. First, the theories of the mode of existence of the object complement each other. Marx holds that the human being’s shaping of the object is manifested through direct sensuous activity, while Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the manifestation of the object’s concrete attributes such as color and sound in intuition; the two theories can complement each other. Second, the historicity of the two kinds of objects forms a complementarity. Marx presents the history of the object as the history of human labor production, while Merleau-Ponty holds that the history of the object is revealed in action within concrete situations; concreteness complements Marx’s universal logic. Third, the theories of the foundation of the objects of natural science form a complementarity. Marx founds the objects of natural scientific research on the production of tools and materials, while Merleau-Ponty founds the objects of science on pre-reflective perceptual activity. The use of tools and materials is always a pre-reflective bodily activity, and pre-reflective bodily activity changes with the materials of production, so the two also promote each other.

第二，展现马克思与梅洛-庞蒂的对象理论的互补性。其一，对象的存在方式理论相互补充。马克思认为人对对象的塑造以直接的感性活动体现出来，而梅洛-庞蒂则注重对象的具体的颜色、声音等属性在直觉中的显形，两种理论可以相互弥补。其二，两种对象的历史性形成互补。马克思将对象的历史展示为人的劳动生产的历史，而梅洛-庞蒂认为对象的历史在具体处境的行动中被揭示，具体性与马克思的普遍的逻辑性形成互补。其三，对自然科学对象奠基的理论形成互补。马克思从工具和材料的生产为自然科学的研究对象奠基，而梅洛-庞蒂则从前反思的知觉活动为科学对象奠基。工具和材料的使用都是前反思的身体的活动，而前反思的身体活动会因为生产的材料而发生改变，所以二者也是相互促进的。

Third, it reveals the theoretical emphases and advantages of Marx’s philosophy relative to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. First, Merleau-Ponty underestimates the foundational role of relations of production in the connotation of the object. Merleau-Ponty treats causal “laws” as products of reflective statistics, but this overlooks the relative necessity of artificially arranged “social causality.” Second, Merleau-Ponty relatively neglects the reification of the human being by the object and its mechanisms. Merleau-Ponty does not explain how objects enhance or limit human capacities. Marx, by contrast, elaborates the reification of the human being by objects such as tools, capital, and money, which are determined by relations of production. Third, Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the relationship between the object and freedom lacks a more multidimensional consideration. Merleau-Ponty’s exposition of the degree of freedom and of the pathways for overcoming reification is insufficient. Marx holds that the extension of free time or the expansion of the measure of freedom both depend on the transformation and construction of the world of objects.

第三，揭示马克思哲学相对于梅洛-庞蒂的现象学的理论重点和优势。其一，梅洛-庞蒂低估了生产关系对对象内涵的奠基作用。梅洛-庞蒂认为，将因果性的“规律”当作反思的统计学的产物，但这忽视了人为安排的“社会因果”的相对必然性。其二，梅洛-庞蒂较为忽视对象对人的物化及其机制。梅洛-庞蒂没有说明对象如何增强或者限制人的能力。马克思则阐述了被生产关系决定的工具、资本、货币等对象对人的物化。其三，梅洛-庞蒂对对象与自由的关系辨析缺乏更立体的思考。梅洛-庞蒂对自由的程度、对解除物化的途径阐述不足。马克思认为，自由时间的延长或自由尺度的扩大，都依赖于对象世界的改造和建设。

(The author is an associate professor at the School of Marxism, Fudan University.)

（作者系复旦大学马克思主义学院副教授）

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧