Habermas’s Revision of the Consensus Theory of Truth and Its Contemporary Implications

The development of Habermas’s theory of truth can be roughly divided into three stages: the period of *Knowledge and Human Interests*, the period of the consensus theory of truth, and the period of *Truth and Justification* (*Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*). Domestic academic research on his theory of truth has mostly focused on the first two periods, while lacking a detailed examination of his important discussions in the third period. In the *Truth and Justification* period, Habermas made significant revisions to the consensus theory of truth, instead understanding truth as a concept of action norms based on everyday practice. This theory breaks through the epistemological framework of truth, emphasizing the practicality and ethicality of truth, providing important logical support for his later political philosophy and the domain of social critique, and paving the way for his attempt to reconstruct democratic politics by achieving universal interests. Therefore, clarifying the logic of Habermas’s revision of the consensus theory of truth is particularly necessary.

哈贝马斯真理理论的发展，大致可分为三个阶段：《认识与兴趣》时期、真理共识论时期和《真理与辩护》（Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung）时期。国内学界对其真理理论的考察多集中于前两个时期，对他第三个时期的重要论述却缺乏详尽考察。在《真理与辩护》时期，哈贝马斯对真理共识论进行了重要的修正，转而将真理理解为一种建立在日常实践基础上的行动规范概念。这一理论突破了真理的认识论框架，强调真理的实践性与伦理性，为他后期的政治哲学思想与社会批判论域提供了重要逻辑支撑，也为其以达成普遍利益的方式来重建民主政治的尝试铺平了道路。因此，厘清哈贝马斯真理共识论的修正逻辑显得尤为必要。

Furthermore, through this revision, Habermas not only transcends traditional conceptions of truth but also provides important theoretical resources for addressing the challenge of the regression of intersubjective communicative action in the digital age. The rational dialogue, consensus-building, and reflective critique he emphasizes can help subjects, in an environment of information overload and false information, verify the authenticity of information through dialogue and practice, thereby rebuilding the rationality of truth consensus. Therefore, on the basis of clarifying the theoretical logic, further considering how his theory can provide an important theoretical foundation and practical guidance for addressing the challenge of the regression of intersubjective communicative action in the digital age is also a key question this paper aims to address.

此外，通过这一修正，哈贝马斯不仅超越了传统的真理观念，更为应对数字时代主体间交往行动倒退的挑战提供了重要的理论资源。其强调的理性对话、共识构建与反思性批判，能够帮助主体在信息过载与虚假信息的环境中，通过对话与实践验证信息的真实性，重建真理共识的合理性。因此，在理论逻辑的阐明基础上，进一步思考其理论何以为应对数字时代主体间交往行动倒退的挑战提供重要理论基础与实践指引，亦是本文的重要问题指向。

Thus, clarifying why Habermas, in *Truth and Justification* published in 1999, negates the epistemological concept of truth and affirms truth as a concept of action norms based on the lifeworld of everyday practice holds significant theoretical importance for understanding the logical developmental trajectory of Habermas’s theory of truth. This paper attempts to analyze the logical path of Habermas’s revision of the consensus theory of truth and elaborate on its unique theoretical characteristics. On this basis, it further considers how the rational dialogue, consensus-building, and reflective critique he emphasizes can provide an important theoretical foundation and practical guidance for addressing the challenge of the regression of intersubjective communicative action in the digital age.

由此，厘清哈贝马斯为何会在1999年出版的《真理与辩护》中否定认识论意义上的真理概念，指认真理是一种建立在日常实践的生活世界基础上的行动规范概念，对于厘清哈贝马斯真理理论的逻辑发展脉络具有重要的理论意义。本文试图通过剖析哈贝马斯修正真理共识论的逻辑进路，阐述其独特的理论特质。并在此基础上，进一步思考其强调的理性对话、共识构建与反思性批判，何以为应对数字时代主体间交往行动倒退的挑战提供重要理论基础与实践指引。

I. The Self-Negation of the Consensus Theory of Truth

一、真理共识论的自我否定

Habermas’s consensus theory of truth, drawing on the positive achievements of the linguistic turn in modern philosophy, attempts to construct a new consensus-based theory of truth to break through the theoretical dilemmas faced by traditional truth theories. However, due to internal contradictions in the logical path of its theoretical construction and a lack of a realist foundation, it ultimately led him to negate and revise the consensus theory of truth.

哈贝马斯真理共识论借助现代哲学中语言哲学转向的积极成果，试图建构一种全新的共识性真理理论来突破传统真理理论面临的理论困境。但由于其理论建构的逻辑进路存在内在矛盾，且缺乏实在论基础，导致他最终走向了对真理共识论的否定与修正。

In the epistemological turn of modern philosophy, the more influential theories of truth include the correspondence theory of truth, the coherence theory of truth, and the pragmatic theory of truth. But in Habermas’s view, these theories all have insurmountable theoretical difficulties: First, the correspondence theory of truth holds that “a proposition is true if it corresponds to the facts.” However, Habermas argues that this view is essentially an ontological theory of truth (ontologischen Wahrheitstheorien), with important defects such as over-reliance on the empirical intuition of naive realism, inability to determine whether linguistic statements correspond to real things according to objective criteria and to judge truth or falsehood, and falling into a circular linguistic trap. Second, the coherence theory of truth holds that truth manifests as the coherence within a system of propositions; “a proposition is true if it coheres with other propositions.” But whether rationalist or empiricist, both have problems they cannot solve: the rationalist coherence theory of truth only deals with formal truth in the sense of pure ideas, thus cannot explain empirical truth, while empirical truth must not only meet the linguistic and logical conditions of propositions but also take the reality described by the proposition as the ultimate basis for judgment. Finally, the pragmatic theory of truth holds that “what is useful is true,” emphasizing judging the truth of theories, propositions, ideas, etc., from the perspective of utility. But Habermas argues that this approach, which treats instrumentality and practicality as the main characteristics of truth, is an infinite subjectivization and vulgarization of truth.

在近代哲学认识论转向中，影响力较大的真理理论有真理符合论、真理融贯论和真理实用论。但在哈贝马斯看来，这几种理论都存在着难以克服的理论困难：首先，真理符合论主张“如果一个命题与事实相符合，那它就是真理”。但哈贝马斯认为这种主张在本质上是一种本体论的真理理论（ontologischen Wahrheitstheorien），存在着过度依赖朴素实在论的经验直觉，无法根据客观标准来判定语言陈述是否与实在事物相符，并判断真假、陷入一种语言的循环怪圈等重要缺陷；其次，真理融贯论认为真理表现为命题体系内部的融贯性，“一个命题若与其他命题相融贯，这个命题就是真命题”。但无论是唯理论还是经验论，都有其无法解决的问题：唯理论的真理融贯论只探讨纯粹观念意义上的形式性真理，因而不能解释经验性真理的问题，而经验性真理不仅要合乎命题的语言、逻辑等条件，还要以命题描述的实在为最终的判定依据；最后，真理实用论主张“有用即真理”，强调从效用的层面去判断理论、命题、观念等的真理性。但哈贝马斯认为，这种将工具性和实用性视作真理的主要特征的做法是对真理的无限主观化、庸俗化。

In response to the above problems, Habermas explicitly proposes the primary (and essential) core thesis of the construction of the consensus theory of truth: the consensus theory of truth takes achieving consensus and demonstrating an epistemological concept of consensus-based truth as its theoretical goal. He puts it this way: “I may ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if every other person with whom I could enter into dialogue ascribes the same predicate to the same object. In order to distinguish true from false consensus, I rely on the judgment of others—that is, on the judgment of all those with whom I could enter into dialogue (here I counterfactually include all possible dialogue partners, when my life history [Lebensgeschichte] is coextensive [koextensiv] with the history of the human world [Menschenwelt]). The truth condition of statements is the potential agreement (Zustimmung) of all others.” To achieve this theoretical goal, certain methodological tools are needed.

针对以上问题，哈贝马斯明确提出了真理共识论理论建构首要的（也是本质的）核心论题：真理共识论以达至共识、论证一种认识论意义上的共识性真理概念为理论目标。他是这样说的：“我可以将某个谓语宣判给某个对象，当且仅当任何一个和我进行对话的人把同一个谓语宣判给同一个对象。为了区分真假共识，我要依靠其他人的判断——也就是说，我要依靠所有与我进行对话者的判断（在这里我反事实地包含了可能遇到的所有对话者，当我的生活经历［Lebensgeschichte］和人类世界［Menschenwelt］的历史同延［koextensiv］时）。陈述的真理条件是所有其他人潜在的同意（Zustimmung）。”而要实现这一理论目标，需要借助一定的方法论工具。

Drawing on relevant achievements in linguistics and hermeneutics, Habermas proposes universal pragmatics as the methodological foundation. This is the second core thesis of the construction of his consensus theory of truth. Analysis based on universal pragmatics mainly involves two issues: First, based on the theoretical requirement of “achieving consensus among subjects,” universal pragmatics’ analysis of speech takes “mutual understanding” as a prerequisite. In the sense of universal pragmatics, mutual understanding involves the following validity claims: truth (Wahrheit), rightness (Richtigkeit), and sincerity (Wahrhaftigkeit). Thus, the meaning of truth is embodied in the redemption of the validity claim of utterances in speech acts. Here, the “redemption” of the validity claim means that in communicative action, the speaker’s statement must simultaneously satisfy the above three validity claims for communicative action to proceed. Second, to demonstrate an epistemological concept of consensus-based truth, truth must be reducible to the epistemological meaning of “truth.”

哈贝马斯在吸取语言学和解释学相关成果的基础上，提出了作为方法论基础的普遍语用学。这便是其真理共识论建构的第二个核心论题。立足普遍语用学进行分析，主要涉及两个问题：一是基于“主体间达致共识”这一理论要求，普遍语用学对言语的分析以“相互理解”为前提。在普遍语用学意义上，相互理解涉及以下有效性要求：真实性（Wahrheit）、正确性（Richtigkeit）和真诚性（Wahrhaftigkeit）。由此，真理的意义就体现为：言语行动中话语有效性要求的兑现。在此，有效性要求的“兑现”是指：在交往行动中，言说者的陈述必须同时满足以上三个有效性要求，交往行动才能继续进行。二是要论证一种认识论意义上的共识性真理概念，那么真理就必须可以被还原为认识论之“真实性”的意义。

It can be seen that the achievement of consensus-based truth requires that the speaker of the argumentative discourse must possess the characteristic of truthfulness. But at the same time, whether the speaker’s discourse has the characteristic of truthfulness can only be judged in the ongoing speech act or dialogue. Therefore, once the truthfulness claim is questioned, we cannot accurately distinguish whether the achieved consensus is a true (wahren) consensus or a false (falschen) consensus. In response, Habermas immediately proposes the third core thesis of the construction of his consensus theory of truth: an “ideal speech situation” (ideale Sprechsituation) is also needed to test the above validity claims. The so-called ideal speech situation means that every participant has equal and open opportunities to enter the speech situation; at the same time, in the ideal speech situation, participants are free from any external coercive or manipulative forces when engaging in dialogue and argumentation.

由此可见，共识性真理的达成要求论证话语的言说者必须具有真实性特征。但同时，言说者话语是否具有真实性特征又只能在进行着的言语行动或对话中才能得到判断。因此，一旦真实性要求被质疑，我们就无法准确区分达成的共识是真实（wahren）的共识还是虚假（falschen）的共识。对此，哈贝马斯紧接着提出了其真理共识论建构的第三个核心论题：还需要一个“理想的言谈情境”（ideale Sprechsituation）来对以上几个有效性要求进行检验。而所谓理想的言谈情境，即每个参与者都拥有平等和开放的机会进入言谈情境；同时，在理想的言谈情境中，参与者在进行对话、论辩时不会有任何外部的强制性或操纵性的力量干扰。

In order to better expound the three core theses above, Habermas proposes two attitude presuppositions: the “performative attitude” (performative Einstellung) and the “reflexive attitude” (reflexive Einstellung). The performative attitude emphasizes the presupposed beliefs that are unavoidable in everyday practical life. We must, under the “performative attitude,” believe that proposition “p” is unconditionally true, while under the “reflexive attitude” we question whether proposition “p” is false. For example, the sky will not fall down; this is a kind of latent performative attitude. “In everyday practice, as we have seen, socialized individuals rely on the certainty of action, and as long as this certainty is supported by knowledge that is accepted without reservation, it can sustain itself. The grammatical fact corresponding to this is that when we assert ‘p’ in the ‘performative attitude,’ we must unconditionally believe that ‘p’ is true.” [1]1 Jürgen Habermas, *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung: Philosophische Aufsätze* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), p. 42. [Translator’s note: The English rendering follows the German original; the Chinese text cites a Chinese translation.] However, relying solely on the performative attitude cannot explain why the proposition “the sky will not fall down” is correct—that is, “why, once a proposition is rationally accepted under the conditions of rational discourse, we can regard the explicitly raised claim that ‘p’ is true as justified.” This requires using a reflexive attitude to test “why proposition ‘p’ is true,” wherein the reflexive attitude emphasizes testing validity claims under ideal speech situations.

为了更好地论述以上三个核心论题，哈贝马斯提出了两种态度预设：“施为态度”（Performative Einstellung）和“反身态度”（Reflexive Einstellung）。施为态度强调在日常生活实践中无法抗拒的预设的信念。我们必须在“施为态度”下相信命题“p”无条件为真，而在“反身态度”下则质疑命题“p”为假。例如，天空不会塌下来，这就是一种潜在的施为态度，“在日常实践中，正如我们所看到的，社会化的个体依赖于行动的确定性，只要他们被毫无保留地接受的知识所支持，这些确定性就能维持它自身。与此相对应的语法事实是，当我们以‘施为态度’提出断言‘p’时，我们必须无条件地相信‘p’为真”。然而，仅仅依靠施为态度并不能解释为什么“天空不会塌下来”这一命题是正确的，即“为什么一旦命题在理性话语的条件下被理性接受，我们就可以认为明确提出的‘p’为真的主张是正确的”。这就要求用一种反身态度来对“命题‘p’为何为真”进行检验，其中，反身态度重点强调在理想的言谈情境中对有效性要求进行检验。

But the above exposition implies two presupposed conditions, which cause Habermas to conflate the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude, thereby leading to a logical contradiction in his theoretical argument. First, he presupposes a rejection of skepticism. In his exposition, Habermas only points out that skepticism faces the predicament of self-defeat, but does not further develop his own argument on this point. This is akin to saying “I know all the words in the world, because the words I don’t know are not words”—that is, it has the suspicion of a “begging the question” argument that directly takes its own viewpoint as evidence. Second, the “necessary a priori” he presupposes is limited only to form. If pragmatics only emphasizes formal meaning, then it does not necessarily entail validity claims with various contents. Starting from these two presupposed conditions, Habermas believes that there exists a relationship of “material implication” between the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude.

但以上论述隐含了两个预设条件，这导致哈贝马斯混淆了施为态度和反身态度，进而致使其理论论证出现了逻辑矛盾。第一，他预设了对怀疑论的拒绝。哈贝马斯在论述时只指出了怀疑论面临着自我挫败的困境，但并没有就此对自己的观点进一步展开论证，这就好比“我认识世界上所有的字，因为我不认识的字都不是字”，即有直接将自身观点当作论据的“丐题论证”嫌疑；第二，他所预设的“必然的先天性”只局限于形式上。如果语用学只强调形式上的意义，那么它就并不必然地蕴含具有各种内容的有效性要求。从这两个预设条件出发，哈贝马斯认为，在施为态度和反身态度之间存在着一种“实质蕴含”的关系。

However, it is precisely this conclusion that invites the self-negation of the consensus theory of truth. With regard to this conclusion, extreme skeptics can completely refuse to acknowledge these two validity presuppositions, while moderate skeptics can choose to acknowledge the first validity presupposition but refuse the second. Yet the second validity presupposition is precisely the prerequisite condition for Habermas’s argument for his principle of universalization. It is obvious that if the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude are in a relationship of mutual “material implication,” then this is equivalent to saying that truth is identical to justification. However, in the epistemological sense, truth necessarily requires that it can be reduced to the meaning of validity. According to Habermas’s account, justification is in essence a rational consensus reached intersubjectively, and this rational consensus simply cannot be reduced to the meaning of validity. It can be said that if Habermas proceeds from the conclusion that “truth is identical to justification,” he not only cannot effectively argue for a normative truth in the epistemological sense, but also cannot provide a self-consistent account of his own consensus theory of truth. Of course, Habermas quickly became aware of this problem and promptly turned to self-criticism and revision of the consensus theory of truth.

然而，正是这一结论招致了真理共识论的自我否定。对于这一结论，极端的怀疑论者完全可以拒绝承认这两种有效性预设，温和的怀疑论者也可以选择承认第一个有效性预设而拒绝第二个有效性预设。但是，第二个有效性预设却恰恰是哈贝马斯论证其普遍性原则的前提条件。显而易见的是，如果施为态度和反身态度是相互“实质蕴含”的关系，那么就相当于说，真理是等同于辩护的。然而，在认识论意义上，真理必然要求可以被还原为真实性的意义。根据哈贝马斯的说法，辩护在本质上是主体间达致的合理性共识，而这种合理性共识根本无法被还原为真实性的意义。可以说，如果哈贝马斯从“真理等同于辩护”这一结论出发，不仅无法有力论证一种认识论意义上的规范性真理，更无法对自身的真理共识论进行自圆其说。当然，哈贝马斯很快意识到了这个问题，并迅速转向对真理共识论的自我批判与修正。

II. The Non-Thematization and Contextualization of the Lifeworld

二、生活世界的非主题化与情境化

As mentioned above, conflating the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude is the key to the problem in Habermas’s argument. To solve the problem, it is necessary to re-explain these two attitudes and their relationship. In Habermas’s view, the reason he conflated the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude is that his argument lacked a realist foundation. Accordingly, he chooses to introduce the concept of the “lifeworld” as the realist foundation of his argument, regarding the lifeworld as a “quasi-transcendental” existence between the transcendental and the empirical, considering it the prerequisite for pragmatics and semantics, and thereby re-explaining the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude.

前文已经提及，混淆施为态度和反身态度是哈贝马斯论证出现问题的关键，想要解决问题，就必然要对这两种态度及其关系进行重新说明。在哈贝马斯看来，他之所以会混淆施为态度和反身态度，是由于自己的论证缺少了一种实在论基础。据此，他选择引入“生活世界”概念作为论述的实在论基础，将生活世界看作是一个介于先验与经验的“准先验”存在，认为它是语用学和语义学的前提，进而对施为态度和反身态度进行重新说明。

In essence, the dual character of the lifeworld lies in that it “simultaneously constitutes the horizon of speech situations and the source of interpretive achievements, and it itself can only be reproduced through communicative action.” [2]2 Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 189. On the one hand, the objective reality of the world always appears as a necessary presupposed “background knowledge.” On the other hand, the lifeworld as this background knowledge is always the source from which participants in communicative action define and determine their own situated context.

从本质上看，生活世界的双重特征在于，它“同时构成了言语情境的视域和诠释成就的源泉，而它自己也只有通过交往行动才能再生产”。一方面，世界的客观实在性总是作为必要的预设的“背景知识”出现；另一方面，作为这种背景知识的生活世界总是交往行动参与者定义和确定自身所处情境的来源。

From the first level, the lifeworld is the realist foundation of Habermas’s pragmatic argument, possessing the essential characteristic of “non-thematization,” emphasizing the “performative attitude.” As a kind of background knowledge, it is the latent background premise of people’s everyday communicative action, and therefore requires adopting a performative attitude, unconditionally believing in its validity. Through this, Habermas emphasizes that in people’s illocutionary acts, that background knowledge with normative connotations is always presupposed a priori as a pragmatic condition, thereby explaining the “always already” character of the performative attitude. But it must be noted that although the lifeworld is “non-thematic” knowledge, this does not mean it will forever remain non-thematized or in a “weedy” state. Because questioning will continuously emerge from the lifeworld through subjects’ everyday communicative practice—that is, it will continuously be “thematized.” This indicates that questioning is precisely the doubt, query, or problem that emerges from the lifeworld, the thematized expression of problems. Hence, eliminating questioning becomes the key to revising the consensus theory of truth, and this requires explaining the second level (i.e., the contextualization level of the lifeworld).

从第一个层面看，生活世界是哈贝马斯语用学论证的实在论基础，具有“非主题化”的本质特征，强调“施为态度”。它作为一种背景知识，是人们日常交往行动的潜在背景前提，因而需要采取一种施为态度，无条件地相信其真实性。借此，哈贝马斯强调，在人们的以言行事行为中，那种具有规范性内涵的背景知识总是先天地作为一个语用学条件而得到预设，以此来对施为态度的“总是已在”特性进行说明。但必须注意，生活世界虽然是“非主题”的知识，却并不意味着它会永远保持非主题化或“杂草丛生”的状态。因为质疑会随着主体的日常交往实践而在生活世界中不断地凸显出来，即不断地“主题化”。这说明，质疑就是由生活世界中凸显出来的怀疑、疑问或问题，是问题的主题化表现。由此，消除质疑就成为修正真理共识论的关键，这就必须对第二个层面（即生活世界的情境化层面）展开说明。

From the second level, once participants in communicative action encounter a “mutational” situation, they need the “reflexive attitude” among dialogical subjects to repair the ruptured background knowledge. Social interaction must occur within specific situations; therefore, participants in communicative action need to continuously determine their own situated context based on the lifeworld. Generally speaking, time and space are relatively fixed, determinable situations. For example, a teacher asks a student to go to the laboratory to get experimental equipment and sets a round-trip time limit of 10 minutes. Assuming the teacher’s speech act satisfies the validity claims of discourse (i.e., truth, rightness, and sincerity), the student must first consider the distance from the classroom to the nearest laboratory and the time required for the round trip. The spatial distance between the classroom and the laboratory is fixed, and the round-trip time can generally be determined. This verifies the validity of the teacher’s utterance under the determined situation.

从第二个层面看，交往行动的参与者一旦遇到“突变”的情境，就需要对话主体间的“反身态度”来修复破裂的背景知识。社会互动需要发生在特定情境中，因此，交往行动的参与者需要根据生活世界来不断确定自身所处的情境。一般而言，时间、空间是较为固定、可以确定的情境。例如，教师让同学去实验室拿实验用具，并且限定往返时间为10分钟。假定教师的言语行为满足话语有效性要求（即真实性、正确性和真诚性），该同学首先就要考虑从教室到最近的实验室的距离、来回需要花费的时间。教室与实验室的空间距离固定，往返时间一般也就可以确定。这就在确定情境的情况下验证了教师话语的有效性。

However, besides time and space, there also exist some indeterminate, sudden situations. For example, if the nearest laboratory is closed today, then the student must revise the plan and re-determine the space and time where the experimental equipment can be obtained. This kind of indeterminate situation changes as different themes emerge. Habermas defines these situations as “action situations,” which possess a dynamic horizon-like character. This dynamic horizon generates numerous large and small situations, constituting the center of the lifeworld, and is a partial reflection of the lifeworld restricted within a certain theme. This dynamic situation can shatter the certainties that were originally taken for granted as mutually accepted in the lifeworld: “Once these certainties are removed from the framework we take for granted in the lifeworld, and are thus no longer naively accepted, they become many questionable hypotheses.” [3]3 Habermas, *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*, p. 48. In today’s era of rapid informatization, information has become computer language that can be encoded and decoded. When subjects participate in communicative action, they often do not even need to determine the spatiotemporal situation, but even more sudden situations in the digital world will still emerge endlessly, making it all the more necessary to discuss dynamic situations.

然而，除时间、空间外，还存在着一些不能确定的、突发的情境。例如，最近的实验室今天休息，那么该同学就必须修改计划，重新确定可以拿到实验用具的空间和时间。这种具有不确定性的情境会随着不同主题的凸显而发生变化。哈贝马斯将这些情境定义为“行动的情境”，它具有一种动态的视域性特征。这种动态视域生成了一个个大大小小的情境，构成了生活世界的中心，是限制在某一主题中的生活世界的部分反映。这种动态的情境会打破生活世界原本被理所当然地共同接受的确定性，“一旦这些确定性从我们在生活世界中认为理所当然的框架中剔除，从而不再被朴素地接受，它们就会变成许多可以质疑的假设”。在信息化高速发展的今天，信息已经成为可以被编码—还原的计算机语言，主体在参与交往行动时，很多时候甚至不需要确定时空情境，但数字世界中更多突发的情境仍会源源不断涌现出来，这就更需要对动态情境展开讨论。

We can understand the above definition of situation as follows: if the non-thematic character of the lifeworld is a manifestation of a static “viewing” horizon, then questioning is a manifestation of a dynamic “acting” situation. The situation of action indicates that “only when practice fails and contradictions arise can the truth or falsity of a proposition become a topic of discussion.” Therefore, relying solely on the non-thematic character of the lifeworld cannot resolve our questioning of validity claims; to eliminate questioning, it must be carried out in the situation of action. The emergence of the action situation signifies the prominence of questioning, and to eliminate questioning, it must be achieved through “dialogue” between participants in communicative action. Thus, dialogue is extracted from the lifeworld when validity claims are not questioned, and is specifically used to deal with the questioning that has become prominent.

我们可以这样来理解上述情境界定：如果说生活世界的非主题化是一种静态的“观看”视域的展现，那么质疑就是一种动态的“行动”情境的展现。行动的情境表明，“只有在实践失败、矛盾出现时，命题的真伪才能成为讨论的话题”。所以，仅仅依靠生活世界的非主题化特征无法解决我们对有效性要求的质疑，想要消除质疑，必须在行动的情境中进行。行动情境的出现意味着质疑的凸显，而要消除质疑，则必须通过交往行动参与者之间的“对话”。由此，对话就在有效性要求不受到质疑的情况下从生活世界中抽离出来，专门用于处理凸显出来的质疑。

It can be said that the function of dialogue is to eliminate the uncertain, “situational” character that has become prominent in the lifeworld; it is the field where reflexive attitudes take effect. When a validity claim that is taken for granted and commonly accepted in the lifeworld is questioned, communicative action temporarily withdraws from the lifeworld and enters into intersubjective dialogue. In dialogue, questioning must be eliminated through the reflexive dialogue and argumentation process between speakers. At this point, the participants in communicative action undergo a temporary identity transformation, shifting from actors to interlocutors engaged in deliberation, and they dialogue and debate over the questioning that has become prominent. In this way, performative attitudes and reflexive attitudes are respectively placed in the lifeworld and dialogue, forming a new correspondence:

可以说，对话的功能在于消除生活世界中凸显出来的、不确定的“情境化”特征，是反身态度发挥作用的场域。当在生活世界中被理所当然地共同接受的有效性要求受到质疑时，交往行动就会从生活世界中暂时抽离出来，进入主体间的对话中。在对话中，质疑需要通过言说者相互间反思性的对话、论辩过程而得以消除。此时，交往行动的参与者就实现了暂时的身份转变，从行动者转变为参与商谈的对话者，并就凸显出来的质疑进行对话、辩论。这样一来，施为态度和反身态度就被分别放置到生活世界和对话中，形成了一种新的对应关系：

Performative attitude → “Assertion ‘p’ is true” → Lifeworld

施为态度→“断言‘p’为真”→生活世界

Reflexive attitude → “Assertion ‘p’ is true” is correct → Dialogue

反身态度→“断言‘p’为真”是正确的→对话

It is not difficult to find that Habermas’s division of the determinate situation of the lifeworld is rather crude. This is closely related to the fact that his concept of the lifeworld is borrowed from Husserl’s and Schütz’s concepts of the lifeworld. On the one hand, he wants to introduce the phenomenological and social-phenomenological concept of the lifeworld to explain his own rational social critical theory; on the other hand, he believes that the phenomenological lifeworld is “a concept borrowed from epistemology to construct the world” and must be transformed before it can be applied. In other words, he wants to incorporate both the “viewing” perspective of the lifeworld in the phenomenological sense and the “acting” perspective in the social-phenomenological sense into his own theory, but he does not fully agree with either perspective. This leads him, when dividing time, space, and action situations, to rather simply cut apart Schütz’s and Husserl’s views. He retains Schütz’s distinction of the social world based on time and space, but abandons Schütz’s deeper distinction between the four world concepts of “consociates,” “contemporaries,” “predecessors,” and “successors”; at the same time, he only retains the dynamic “horizonal” character of Husserl’s lifeworld.

不难发现，哈贝马斯对生活世界所确定情境的划分是比较粗糙的。这与他生活世界概念援引自胡塞尔以及舒茨的生活世界概念具有密切联系。他一方面想要引入现象学和社会现象学的生活世界概念来对自身理性的社会批判理论进行说明；另一方面又认为现象学的生活世界是“一种从认识论那里借过来建构世界的概念”，必须加以改造才能适用。换言之，他既想要将生活世界在现象学意义上的“观看”视角和在社会现象学意义上的“行动”视角都纳入自身理论中，又不完全认同这两种视角。这就导致他在划分时间、空间和行动情境时，较为简单地切割了舒茨与胡塞尔的观点。他保留了舒茨基于时间、空间对社会世界的区分，但抛弃了舒茨对“同在”“同代”“前人”和“后人”这四个世界概念的深层次区分；同时，他又只保留了胡塞尔生活世界动态的“视域性”特征。

The above measures fully demonstrate Habermas’s theoretical intention: to extract dialogue from the lifeworld, regard it as a temporary field for resolving questioning that has emerged from the lifeworld, and thereby solve the logical problems that arise in the process of justifying validity claims. This is actually using a “theory of the disposal of doubt in truth” (Entsorgungstheorie der Wahrheit) to revise his consensus theory of truth. Of course, after eliminating questioning, we must still return to the lifeworld; “even if we can choose to withdraw from dialogue and discussion, we can never withdraw from the practical demands of the lifeworld.” It can be seen that the non-thematic character of the lifeworld has a more fundamental status relative to dialogue as a situational theme. Viewed in this way, the lifeworld, as the background knowledge from which questioning emerges, can also be understood as a kind of “situation.” However, unlike dialogue as a concrete situation, the lifeworld is a “capital-letter” situation that contains situations; dialogue that eliminates questioning presupposes the existence of the lifeworld.

上述举措充分展现出哈贝马斯的理论意图：将对话从生活世界抽离出来，视其为解决从生活世界中凸显出来的质疑的临时场域，并以此来解决有效性要求论证过程中出现的逻辑问题。这实际上是用一种“真理观中的消除质疑论”（Entsorgungstheorie der Wahrheit）来对其真理共识论进行修正。当然，消除质疑之后，我们仍旧要回到生活世界之中，“即便我们可以选择退出对话与讨论，但始终无法退出生活世界的实践要求”。可见，生活世界的非主题化特征相对于对话这一情境化主题而言具有更基础的地位。这样来看，其实生活世界作为质疑凸显的背景知识，我们也可以将其理解为一种“情境”。只不过与作为具体情境的对话不同，生活世界是一种包含了情境的“大写的”情境，消除质疑的对话以生活世界的存在为前提。

III. The “Truth of Action” in the Shift of Situations

三、情境转换中的“行动的真理”

For Habermas, truth is always a “regulative idea” (Regulative Idee), which requires that truth has a normative dimension in essence. After re-explaining performative attitudes and reflexive attitudes, he begins to redefine truth normatively. But at the same time, he opposes Gadamer’s approach of choosing either “truth” or “method,” and instead advocates combining epistemology and methodology. This requires that normative truth also includes a factual dimension. In this regard, Habermas attempts to elaborate from two aspects:

在哈贝马斯那里，真理始终是一个“规范性理念”（Regulative Idee），这就要求真理在本质上具有规范性维度。在重新说明了施为态度和反身态度后，他开始重新为真理下了一个规范性定义。但同时，他又反对伽达默尔在“真理”与“方法”中任选其一的做法，而主张认识论与方法论相结合。这就要求规范性真理同时还需包含事实性维度。对此，哈贝马斯试图从两个方面来展开论述：

On the one hand, the demonstration of the normative meaning of truth shifts from the cognitive to the non-cognitive. According to the consensus theory of truth, a proposition is correct because it can be agreed to or recognized by all relevant persons. But in reality, this is not the case; it is precisely because a proposition is correct that we should agree to it. Habermas thus realizes that the concept of truth does not necessarily have to be epistemological. Consequently, Habermas further adopts a “pragmatic turn” (Pragmatischer Wende), pointing out that truth is not an epistemological concept, but a pragmatic concept of action norms. Habermas does this out of a critique of Richard Rorty’s view of truth; in his view, Rorty’s “pragmatic turn” is not a turn to pragmatics, but to empirical pragmatism. What he wants to do is to transcend this pragmatist turn, as a “realist after the pragmatic turn,” to truly propose a truth of action that leaves room for normative validity and the problem of discourse foundations.

一方面，对真理的规范性意义的论证从认知性转向非认知性。根据真理共识论，一个命题是正确的，是因为它能够被所有相关的人同意或认同。但实际上却并非如此，恰恰因为一个命题是正确的，我们才应该同意该命题。哈贝马斯由此意识到，真理概念并不一定非得是认识论意义上的。于是，哈贝马斯进一步采用了“语用转向”（Pragmatischer Wende），指出真理不是认识论的概念，而是语用学意义上的行动规范概念。哈贝马斯此举出于对理查德·罗蒂真理观的批判，在他看来，罗蒂真理观的“语用转向”（pragmatic turn）并不是转向语用学，而是转向经验实用主义。而他想要做的，就是超越这种实用主义转向，作为一名“实用主义转向之后的实在论者”来真正提出一种为规范有效性和话语基础问题留有余地的行动真理。

Regarding the above revision, Apel comments as follows: Habermas’s key concept in the German text is “Entsorgung” rather than the English “disposal.” This is a “theory of the disposal of doubt” (Entsorgungstheorie) of argumentative dialogue, “which enters into the theory of universal pragmatics (and Peirceanism), according to which the argumentation process is guided by the ‘regulative idea’ of seeking truth.” Through Apel’s analysis, we can see: first, Habermas no longer regards truth as an epistemological concept, but as a pragmatic norm of action; second, although truth is no longer an epistemological concept, it still retains the justificatory function in the epistemological sense. Thus, Habermas replaces the previous concept of “epistemic truth in a pragmatic perspective” (Der epistemische Wahrheitsbegriff in pragmatischer Perspektive) with the concept of “pragmatic truth” (Der pragmatische Wahrheitsbegriff).

对于上述修正，阿佩尔如此评价道，哈贝马斯的关键概念在德语文本中的用词为“Entsorgung”而非英语中的“disposal”。这是一种论证对话的“消除质疑理论”（Entsorgungstheorie），“它将进入到普遍语用（和皮尔士主义）理论之中，根据这一理论，论证过程由寻求真理的‘规范性理念’引导”。透过阿佩尔的分析，我们可以看到：一是哈贝马斯不再将真理视作认识论意义上的概念，而是将其视作一种语用学意义上的行动规范；二是虽然真理不再是认识论概念，但它仍旧保留了认识论意义上的辩护作用。由此，哈贝马斯就用“行动的真理”（Der pragmatische Wahrheitsbegriff）概念取代了之前的“语用学视角中的认识论真理”（Der epistemische Wahrheitsbegriff in pragmatischer Perspektive）概念。

At this point, Habermas no longer confines himself to defining cognitive truth, but begins to emphasize the practical utility that truth can exert in the lifeworld and in dialogue. In dialogue, we can know “the ‘warning’ use of the truth predicate and the fallibility of our assertions”; in the practical situations of everyday life (the lifeworld), “the unconditionality of truth becomes clearly apparent”; in the process of action, we have no room for doubt about truth, and once we no longer cross a bridge or no longer drive a car, it must be “based on a hypothetical judgment position arising from our questioning.” In this context, the dual attributes of truth naturally emerge.

这时，哈贝马斯便不再拘泥于为认知性真理下定义，而开始强调真理在生活世界与对话中能够发挥出来的实际效用。在对话中，我们能够知道“真之谓词的‘警戒’用法以及我们主张的可错性”；而在日常生活的实践情境（生活世界）中，“真理的无条件性会明显地显现出来”；在行动过程中，我们对真理没有怀疑的余地，而一旦我们不再穿过一座桥或不再驾车行驶，就必然是“基于一种由于我们的质疑产生的假言判断的立场”。在此种语境中，真理的双重属性就自然地浮现了出来。

On the other hand, a normative truth necessarily exhibits two attributes: reflexivity and action certainty. So, how to elaborate a truth that both emphasizes normative meaning and meets the needs of everyday action? Habermas focuses his attention on the participants in communicative action, attempting to make a breakthrough through their identity transformation (i.e., the transformation between “actor” and “interlocutor”) in the lifeworld and in dialogue. (Table 1 omitted)

另一方面，一种规范性真理必然展现出两种属性：反思性和行动确定性。那么，如何论述一种既强调规范性意义，又要满足日常行动需求的真理呢？哈贝马斯将目光聚焦于交往行动的参与者，试图通过他们在生活世界与对话中的身份转换（即“行动者”和“对话者”的转换）来进行突破。（表1略）

First, from the perspective of the lifeworld, communicative action is “a general mechanism of social integration in everyday life,” while the lifeworld is the background field deeply rooted in the communicative action of people’s everyday practical life. At the same time, the lifeworld possesses three basic characteristics—absoluteness, totalizing force, and holism—which require a conviction in the reality of the objective world, that is, they require participants in communicative action to exist as realists. This means that what the lifeworld demands is not a reflecting subject but an acting subject. In Wittgenstein’s words, “If I do an experiment, I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes,” because “the apparatus is indeed present and precise” is the latent condition for the feasibility of the action “doing the experiment.”

首先，从生活世界看，交往行动是“日常生活中的社会整合的某种一般性机制”，生活世界则是深深地扎根于人们日常生活实践的交往行动中的背景场域。同时，生活世界具有绝对性、总体化力量和整体论观念这三个基本特征，要求一种确信客观世界的实在性，即要求交往行动的参与者作为一个实在论者而存在。这意味着，生活世界要求的不是反思的主体，而是行动的主体。按照维特根斯坦的说法，“如果我做实验，我就不会怀疑我眼前的仪器的存在”，因为“仪器是确实存在且精确的”是“做实验”这一行动确实可行的潜在条件。

Second, from the perspective of discourse, this unquestionable validity claim in the lifeworld is merely a “naïve” attitude, which limits the motivation of participants in communicative action to criticize and reflect. Therefore, when the “questioning” in the lifeworld becomes problematized, the acting subject must enter into discourse: “Only when they move from action to discourse do participants adopt a reflective attitude and raise objections to the now-thematized truth of a contested proposition on the basis of reasons for and against.” At this point, the identity of the participant in communicative action temporarily shifts from an acting subject to a reflecting subject, that is, from an actor to a discussant. The task of the discussant is: to master “all relevant information and consider all relevant reasons,” to be convinced that “all potential objections to proposition ‘p’ have been exhausted,” to eliminate everyone’s “motivation to continue arguing,” and thereby “to remove the uncertainty that has emerged from the lifeworld.” That is to say, “When the participants in an argument become convinced of the legitimacy of an originally contested validity claim, they can be brought by the unforced force of the better argument to the point of a change of perspective.” At this point, the participant in communicative action shifts back from a discussant to an actor and returns once again to the everyday lifeworld.

其次，从对话看，生活世界中的这种不可置疑的有效性要求只不过是一种“朴素”的态度，这种朴素态度限制了交往行动参与者批判、反思的动机。因此，当生活世界中的“质疑”问题化时，行动的主体就必须进入对话中，“只有当他们从行动过渡到话语时，参与者才会采取反思的态度，并根据支持和反对的理由对有争议的命题的现在主题化的真理提出异议”。此时，交往行动参与者的身份就从行动的主体暂时转换为反思的主体，即从行动者转变为对话者。对话者的任务是：掌握“所有相关信息并考虑所有相关理由”、确信“反对命题‘p’的潜在异议都已经穷尽”、消除大家“继续争论的动机”，进而“免除由生活世界中突显出来的不确定性”。这就是说，“当论证的参与者对一个原本具有争议的有效性要求的正当性产生确信时，他就能够被更好的论证的不受约束的力量带到观点转化的那个节点上面”。这时，交往行动参与者又会从对话者转为行动者，再次返回到日常的生活世界中。

Finally, after completing the identity shift of “actor—discussant—actor,” the participant in communicative action can shed the temporary reflexive attitude and return to the process of communicative action that is convinced of the reality of the objective world, once again dealing with the world “naïvely.” At this time, whether it is dissent between “us” or dissent between “us” and “them,” once resolved, it can generate the possibility of merging different worlds together.

最后，在实现了“行动者—对话者—行动者”的身份转换后，交往行动参与者就可以摘除暂时性的反身态度，而重新回到确信客观世界实在性的交往行动过程之中，再次“朴素地”与世界打交道。此时，无论是“我们”之间的异议，还是“我们”与“他们”之间的异议，都能够在得到解决的情况下，产生使不同的世界交融在一起的可能性。

Habermas believes that this skillfully resolves the contradiction between truth and justification: on the one hand, the unconditionality of truth is placed in the performative attitude of being convinced of the reality of the objective world in everyday practical life; on the other hand, the rational acceptability of justification is restricted to the reflexive attitude of discourse. Thus, the unconditionality of truth and the rational acceptability of justification are respectively established in the identity shift of the participant in communicative action. At this point, the contradictory relationship between truth and justification is transformed into a learning process of constantly carrying out a “change of perspective” (Wechsel der Perspektive) in the process of everyday communicative action and discourse. (Figure 1 omitted)

哈贝马斯认为，这样就巧妙地化解了真理和辩护之间的矛盾：一方面，将真理的无条件性放置到日常生活实践中确信客观世界实在性的施为态度中；另一方面，将辩护的合理可接受性限制在对话的反身态度中。由此，真理的无条件性与辩护的合理可接受性就分别在交往行动参与者身份的转换中得以成立。此时，真理与辩护之间的矛盾关系就被转换为一种在日常交往行动过程和对话中不断进行“观点转换”（Wechsel der Perspektive）的学习过程。（图1略）

Once we accept this premise, we no longer appeal the meaning of truth to an epistemological judgment that “cannot be wrong again,” but instead emphasize continuously eliminating doubts and reaching consensus in discourse, and transforming this consensus into the certainty of action. Consensus thus becomes a bridge for participants in communicative action to return to the lifeworld; it redeems the validity claim of truth in discourse and therefore possesses a trans-subjective universal validity.

一旦我们接受了这个设定，就不会再将真理的意义诉诸认识论上“不会再错”的判断，而是强调在对话中不断消除质疑、取得共识，并将这种共识转化为行动的确定性。共识由此变成了交往行动参与者重新回到生活世界的桥梁，它在对话中兑现了真理的有效性要求，因而具有一种跨主体的普遍有效性。

At this point, the logical thread of Habermas’s revision of the consensus theory of truth is fully revealed: first, the consensus theory of truth, when arguing for “cognitive truth,” lacks a realist foundation, leading to the self-negation of the consensus theory of truth; second, Habermas introduces the concept of the “lifeworld” and proceeds to revise it from its two aspects of “non-thematization” and “contextualization”; finally, through the identity shift of the participant in communicative action between the lifeworld and discourse, he proposes a concept of “truth of action” in a non-cognitive sense. If this logical argument of Habermas holds, then the certainty of action and reflexivity can both be incorporated into the concept of truth and manifested through the “truth of action.” We can not only jointly recognize the truth of propositions in communicative action but also avoid measuring this truth with an epistemological standard.

至此，哈贝马斯修正真理共识论的逻辑脉络就已经完全显现出来：首先，真理共识论在论证“认识的真理”时缺乏实在论基础，招致了真理共识论的自我否定；其次，哈贝马斯引入“生活世界”概念，从其“非主题化”与“情境化”两个面向来着手进行修正；最后，他通过交往行动参与者在生活世界与对话中的身份转换，提出了一种非认知性意义上的“行动的真理”概念。如果哈贝马斯这一论述逻辑成立，那么行动的确定性和反思性就可以同时被纳入真理概念之中，并通过“行动的真理”展现出来。我们不仅可以在交往行动中共同认可命题的真理性，还能够避免用一种认识论的标准来衡量这种真理性。

It can be said that, amid the many voices that question, dissolve, and deconstruct truth, Habermas has consistently upheld the position of truth and continuously explored the possibility of a social-action turn in philosophical epistemology; this process itself possesses special significance. It is a positive attempt to break through the “logic of observation” of pure philosophy of consciousness and move toward the “logic of action” of social action theory. The reason he proposes the “truth of action” is precisely to endow social action with normative significance and to emphasize continuous criticism and reflection in action. In fact, the problem of action is the problem of practice. Through the “truth of action,” Habermas not only connects his own epistemology with critical social theory but also lays the theoretical foundation for the subsequent development of his discourse ethics and political philosophy. On a concrete level, based on the non-cognitive turn in the meaning of truth, he pursues the normative meaning of truth by taking the validity claim of rule-governed speech acts as a condition and the normative content implicit in speech acts in pragmatics as a clue. If we not only attend to how language presents itself but also to the mediating role of language as communication, even if we ultimately cannot fully argue for an epistemological concept of truth, we can still jointly unfold an interpretation of the objective world in language-mediated communicative action and interact with others in everyday practical life. In this way, the validity claims raised in communicative action can equally exert their realist foundation and promote solidarity in life-practice between subjects.

可以说，在质疑、消解、解构真理的诸多声音中，哈贝马斯始终坚持真理立场，不断探索哲学认识论社会行动转向的可能性，这一过程本身就具有特殊的意义。这是一次打破纯粹意识哲学“旁观的逻辑”脉络、走向社会行动理论“行动的脉络”的积极尝试。他之所以提出“行动的真理”，就是想要赋予社会行动以规范性意义，强调行动中的不断批判与反思。事实上，行动的问题就是实践的问题，哈贝马斯通过“行动的真理”，不仅将自身的认识论与批判的社会理论联结起来，还为其之后的对话伦理学、政治哲学的理论发展奠定了理论基础。从具体层面看，他基于真理意义的非认知性转向，以一种遵守规则的言语行动的有效性要求为条件，以语用学中言语行动所隐含的规范性内容为线索，实现对真理规范性意义的追求。如果我们不仅注意到语言如何呈现，还注意到语言作为沟通的媒介作用，即便最终无法彻底论证一种认识论意义上的真理概念，我们也可以在以语言为媒介的交往行动中共同展开对客观世界的阐释，并且在日常生活实践中与他人相互交往。这样一来，在交往行动中提出来的有效性要求同样能够发挥出其实在论基础，促进主体与主体之间生活实践的团结。

IV. The Challenge of the Regression of Inter-Subjective Communicative Action in the Digital Age and Its Response

四、数字时代主体间交往行动倒退的挑战及其应对

Overall, the “action turn” of Habermas’s consensus theory of truth exhibits unique theoretical characteristics in the course of his theoretical development. As a breakthrough from his own theoretical difficulties, this theory not only reflects his profound understanding of the close integration of truth and method but also highlights his theoretical orientation of guiding social action through philosophical reflection. Entering the digital age, the regression of inter-subjective communicative action has become a real challenge that cannot be ignored. This regression is not only manifested in the reduction of rational dialogue and consensus-building between subjects but also poses a profound threat to social harmony and stability. Against this background, Habermas’s thought on the “truth of action” demonstrates unique theoretical value. Its emphasis on rational dialogue, consensus construction, and reflexive criticism precisely provides a theoretical foundation and practical guidance for addressing the challenge of the regression of communication in the digital age.

总体而言，哈贝马斯真理共识论的“行动转向”在其理论发展历程中展现出独特的理论特质。作为对自身理论困境的突破，这一理论不仅体现了其对真理与方法紧密结合的深刻理解，更凸显了其以哲学反思指导社会行动的理论取向。进入数字时代，主体间交往行动的倒退已成为一个不容忽视的现实挑战。这种倒退不仅表现为主体间理性对话与共识达成的减少，更对社会和谐稳定构成了深刻威胁。在这一背景下，哈贝马斯“行动的真理”思想展现出独特的理论价值。其强调的理性对话、共识构建与反思性批判，恰恰为应对数字时代交往倒退的挑战提供了理论基础与实践指引。

First, the information explosion in the digital age, while expanding people’s knowledge boundaries, has increased the cognitive load and affected the process of rational reflection and consensus-building. More importantly, although access to information has become unprecedentedly convenient, truly deep, truth-bearing knowledge often requires a long time and considerable effort to acquire. As people’s dependence on the internet and the digital world deepens, the problems of information overload and the proliferation of false information become increasingly prominent. This not only makes information filtering difficult but may also lead to individual cognitive fatigue, even triggering negative social emotions, and seriously affecting intersubjective communicative action. For example, after information is disseminated and reposted online, the original speaker’s intention is often stripped away, thereby affecting or even hindering communication and exchange between subjects. Language, as the primary carrier of human communication, when digitized, strips information from the subject itself, further affecting social interaction and trust between subjects. As scholar Byung-Chul Han puts it: “Digital total networking and total communication do not make it easier to encounter the Other. On the contrary, they make it easier to pass by the stranger and the Other, to ignore their existence, to find the same, the like-minded, thereby causing our horizon of experience to narrow increasingly.” [8]8 Byung-Chul Han, a contemporary German-born South Korean philosopher and cultural theorist known for his critiques of digital society and neoliberalism. Once false information fills the lifeworld, it affects the rationality and fairness of intersubjective communicative action. Faced with this reality, Habermas’s reflections on the role-switching of actors between the lifeworld and the context of dialogue become particularly important. When actors cannot distinguish the truth or falsehood of information, they can temporarily withdraw from the certainty of the lifeworld, enter the context of dialogue, and jointly engage in reflection and dialogue with other actors to reach a rationality that both parties can accept, thereby improving their ability to identify false information. This dialogical mode of thinking provides important theoretical resources for addressing the challenge of false information in the digital age.

首先，数字时代的信息爆炸虽然拓展人们知识边界，但是加重了认知负荷，影响了理性反思和共识的建构过程。更为重要的是，尽管信息获取变得前所未有的便捷，但真正具有深度、真理性的知识却往往需要漫长的时间和精力才能获得。随着人们对网络和数字世界的依赖日益加深，信息过载与虚假信息的泛滥问题愈发突出，这不仅使得信息筛选变得困难，更可能导致个体认知疲劳，甚至引发消极的社会情感，严重影响主体间的交往行动。例如，信息通过网络传播与转载后，原始演讲者的意图往往会被剥离，进而影响甚至阻碍主体间的沟通与交流。语言作为人类沟通的主要载体，其数字化转化将信息从主体本身中剥离，则进一步影响着主体间的社交与信任关系。正如学者韩炳哲所言：“数字化的全联网（Totalvernetzung）和全交际（Totalkommunikation）并未使人们更容易遇见他者。相反，它恰恰更便于人们从陌生者和他者身边经过，无视他们的存在，寻找到同者、志同道合者，从而导致我们的经验视野日渐狭窄。”而一旦虚假信息充斥着生活世界，就会影响主体间交往行动的理性与公正性。面对这一现实，哈贝马斯关于行动者在生活世界与对话语境中的身份转换反思显得尤为重要。当行动者无法辨认信息的真伪时，可以暂时抽离生活世界的确定性，进入对话语境，与其他行动者共同展开反思与对话，达成双方能够共同接受的合理性，从而提升对虚假信息的辨识度。这种对话性思维方式为应对数字时代的虚假信息挑战提供了重要的理论资源。

Second, the operation of algorithmic mechanisms further dissolves the common context on which intersubjective communicative action depends. Social media, by collecting user behavior data and preferences, constructs customized information streams, forcibly transforming the originally “non-thematized” background of the lifeworld into thematized content. This transformation turns presuppositions such as social norms and values, which originally served as background knowledge, into specific themes within the information stream. The result is that users gradually passively accept recommended content and find it difficult to maintain an unconditional acceptance of background knowledge. At the same time, algorithmic recommendation mechanisms cause the information and viewpoints users encounter to become increasingly homogeneous, gradually trapping them in an “information cocoon.” [9]9 “Information cocoon” (信息茧房) refers to a state of intellectual isolation resulting from personalized algorithms that limit exposure to diverse viewpoints. This not only weakens the foundational role of the “shared lifeworld” between subjects but also severely affects the development of their critical thinking. The “reflexive attitude” proposed by Habermas can play an important role here. The core of this reflexive attitude lies in: the initiative of the subject, the stimulation of critical thinking, and the importance of dialogue. Through the reflexive attitude, the subject no longer passively accepts the background knowledge of the lifeworld but actively judges the authenticity and validity of the lifeworld, questioning and revising the background knowledge that was originally taken for granted, thereby promoting communication and mutual understanding between subjects. This stimulation of critical thinking and promotion of dialogue helps subjects, in an environment of algorithmic recommendations and information cocoons, to restore their cognition of the foundation of the shared lifeworld and to rebuild rational consensus and social connections between subjects.

其次，算法机制的运作进一步消解了主体间交往行动所依赖的共同语境。社交媒体通过收集用户行为数据和偏好，构建定制化的信息流，强行将原本“非主题化”的生活世界背景转化为主题化的内容。这种转化使得原本作为背景知识的社会规范、价值观念等预设，成为信息流中的具体主题。这样导致的结果是，用户逐渐被动接受推荐内容，难以保持对背景知识的无条件接受态度。同时，算法推荐机制使得用户接触到的信息和观点趋于一致，逐渐陷入“信息茧房”困境。这不仅削弱了主体间“共同生活世界”的基底作用，也严重影响了其批判性思维的发展。哈贝马斯所提出的“反身态度”在此恰能发挥重要作用。其反身态度的核心在于：主体的主动性、批判性思维的激发与对话的重要性。通过反身态度，主体不再被动接受生活世界的背景知识，而是主动判断生活世界的真实性与有效性，质疑并修正原本被理所当然地接受的背景知识，进而促进主体间的沟通和相互理解。这种批判性思维的激发与对话的促进，有助于主体在算法推荐与信息茧房的环境中恢复对共同生活世界基底的认知，重建主体间的理性共识与社会联系。

Finally, the continuous reinforcement of algorithmic recommendations and information cocoons has also promoted the rise of dataism and data fetishism, making the digital consensus on truth between subjects increasingly fragile. It is evident that the consensus on truth in the digital age is more likely to become the result of technological manipulation rather than the manifestation of truth. This trend profoundly echoes Wellmer’s critique of the “ideal speech situation” in Habermas’s consensus theory of truth. [10]10 Albrecht Wellmer, a German philosopher and critical theorist, known for his critiques of Habermas’s theory of communicative action and the ideal speech situation. Even if algorithmic platforms formally satisfy the procedural conditions of the “ideal speech situation,” such as open registration and equal rights to speak, they may still lead to the generation of false consensus. Therefore, the consensus on truth in the digital age needs to transcend purely discursive argumentation and shift toward a verification paradigm of “action coordination.” In this regard, Habermas’s important revision of the consensus theory of truth, especially the dual perspective of “cognition-action,” provides an important theoretical and practical framework for addressing the fragility of truth consensus and the problem of false consensus. Through this perspective, users can actively engage in practice and collaborative action in dialogue and communication with other actors, verifying whether the information streams brought by algorithmic recommendations and “information cocoons” conform to the logic and validity of the real world, identifying false information, and avoiding the generation of false consensus. At the same time, the dual perspective of “cognition-action” can not only protect users’ independent thinking and critical judgment abilities but also enable users to better understand the connotation of truth through practical action in the digital environment, achieving the maintenance and development of truth consensus.

最后，算法推荐与信息茧房的不断强化，还推动了数据主义与数据拜物教思潮的兴起，使主体间的数字化真理共识愈发脆弱。显而易见的是，数字时代的真理共识更容易沦为技术操控的结果，而非真理的显现。这种趋势与维尔默对哈贝马斯真理共识论中“理想的言谈情境”的批判形成了深刻呼应。即便算法平台在形式上满足开放注册、平等发言权等“理想的言谈情境”的程序条件，也可能导致虚假共识的产生。因此，数字时代的真理共识需要超越纯粹的言论论证，转向“行动协同”的验证范式。对此，哈贝马斯对真理共识论的重要修正，尤其是“认知—行动”的双重视角，为应对真理共识的脆弱性和虚假共识问题提供了重要的理论与实践框架。通过这一视角，用户可以在与其他行动者的对话与沟通中，积极展开实践和协作行动，验证算法推荐和“信息茧房”带来的信息流是否符合真实世界的逻辑与有效性，识别虚假信息，避免虚假共识的产生。同时，“认知—行动”的双重视角不仅能够保护用户的独立思考与批判性判断能力，还能够使用户在数字环境中通过实际行动更好地理解真理的内涵，实现真理共识的维系与发展。

In summary, the concept of building rational consensus through dialogue and communication can, in the digital age, reconstruct cognitive resonance and social connections between subjects, effectively curbing the trend of communicative regression. The innovation of Habermas’s theory lies in its ability to both maintain the inheritance of the critical spirit of traditional Marxism and adapt to the new practical demands of the digital age, providing theoretical support and practical guidance for solving real-world problems.

综上所述，通过对话与沟通构建理性共识的理念，能够在数字化时代重建主体间的认知共鸣与社会联系，有效遏制交往倒退的趋势。哈贝马斯这一理论的创新性在于，其既能保持对传统马克思主义批判精神的继承，又能适应数字化时代的新实践需求，为解决现实问题提供理论支持与实践指导。

(This article is a phased result of the Fujian Province Youth Social Science Fund Project “A Reinterpretation of Habermas’s View of Truth” (Project No. FJ2024C148) and the Central University Basic Scientific Research Business Expenses Project “A Study of Habermas’s Epistemological Thought and Its Contemporary Value” (Project No. ZK1058).)

（本文系福建省青年社会科学基金项目“哈贝马斯真理观的再诠释研究”（项目号：FJ2024C148）、中央高校基本科研业务费项目“哈贝马斯认识论思想及其当代价值研究”（项目号：ZK1058）的阶段性成果）

(Author’s bio: Huang Meidi, Assistant Professor, School of Marxism, Xiamen University.)

（作者简介：黄美笛，厦门大学马克思主义学院助理教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心