An Analysis of the Techno-Feudalism Trend of Thought: A New Form of Monopoly Capitalism

Since entering the digital age, the Western left has been continuously searching for new theoretical frameworks aimed at explaining the new changes in capitalism and finding an exit to a new society from within them. Among these, the techno-feudalism perspective proposed by scholars such as Cédric Durand and Yanis Varoufakis is the most prominent strain among the many theoretical trends in recent years. Whether judged by research interest or social influence, techno-feudalism as a theoretical endeavor has been relatively successful. In terms of theoretical content, a series of analyses and judgments by techno-feudalism also quite accurately outline various new features of the digital age, providing profound insights for understanding the crux and maladies of contemporary capitalism. However, upon careful analysis, it becomes clear that many of the concepts and issues involved in techno-feudalism do not exceed the scope of Marx’s thought, and many judgments not only fail to follow Marx’s analytical logic but even move in the opposite direction.

自步入数字时代以来，西方左翼一直在探寻新的理论框架，旨在阐释资本主义的新变化，并从中找到通往新社会的出口。其中，塞德里克·迪朗(Cédric Durand)、雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)等学者提出的技术封建主义观点是近年来众多理论思潮中最为瞩目的一脉。无论从研究旨趣，还是社会影响力看，技术封建主义作为一项理论尝试无疑是较为成功的。而从理论内容上看，技术封建主义的一系列分析与论断也较为精准地勾勒出数字时代的种种新面相，为理解当代资本主义的症结弊病提供了深刻见地。然而，如果细致剖析，就会发现技术封建主义所涉及的诸多概念和问题均没有超出马克思的思考范畴，许多判断不仅没有延续马克思的分析理路，甚至走向了反面。

I. Techno-Feudalism: An Attempt to Conceptualize a New Form of Capitalism

一、技术封建主义：概念化资本主义新形态的尝试

As a trend of thought, techno-feudalism is the latest attempt by contemporary Western left-wing scholars to conceptualize a new form of capitalism. Its background is the epochal progress, large-scale application, and profound reshaping of people’s production and life by digital technologies such as the Internet, the Internet of Things, big data, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence. Yanis Varoufakis, former Greek finance minister and economist, repeatedly emphasizes in his book *Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism* that the core question he wants to discuss is: “Will the technological network system composed of facilities such as electronic computers make capitalism more unshakable? Or will it ultimately expose the fatal weaknesses of capitalism?” Unlike theoretical viewpoints and propositions such as digital capitalism, platform capitalism, and digital imperialism, proponents of techno-feudalism argue that capitalism has not moved forward but has regressed to a worse era exhibiting feudal characteristics. However, apart from the views of right-wing scholars standing on the political position of capitalism, the views of left-wing scholars holding the understanding of techno-feudalism are also not entirely consistent. For example, the renowned French economist Durand only calls it the “techno-feudal hypothesis” and defines concepts such as “feudal,” “refeudalization,” and “rent” very cautiously; in contrast, Varoufakis appears more radical, directly declaring that techno-feudalism has killed capitalism: “My hypothesis is that capitalism is dead, that is, its dynamics no longer dominate our economy.” Nevertheless, the discussions of Western left-wing scholars around techno-feudalism still share many commonalities, which can be summarized as “three discoveries.”

作为一股思潮，技术封建主义是当代西方左翼学者概念化资本主义新形态的最新尝试。其提出背景是互联网、物联网、大数据、云计算和人工智能等数字技术的跨时代进展、大规模应用及其对人们生产生活的深度重塑。希腊前财政部长、经济学家瓦鲁法基斯在其《技术封建主义：谁杀死了资本主义?》(Technofeudalism:What Killed Capitalism)一书中反复强调，他要讨论的核心问题是：电子计算机等设施构成的技术网络体系“是否会使得资本主义变得更加不可撼动?还是终将暴露资本主义的致命弱点?”不同于数字资本主义、平台资本主义和数字帝国主义等理论观点和主张，技术封建主义论者认为资本主义并没有向前发展，而是已经倒退回更糟糕的、展现出封建特征的时代。不过，除去站在资本主义政治立场上的右翼学者的主张，持有技术封建主义认识的左翼学者观点也不完全一致。比如，法国著名经济学家迪朗仅将其称为“技术封建主义假说”,并对“封建”“再封建化”与“地租”等概念作了十分审慎的界定；与之不同的是，瓦鲁法基斯显得更为激进，他直接宣布技术封建主义已经杀死了资本主义，“我的假说就是资本主义已经死掉了，也就是它的动力如今不再支配我们的经济”。尽管如此，西方左翼学者围绕技术封建主义的论述仍有不少共性，可以总结为“三个发现”。

First, the discovery of a transformation in the mode of capitalist profit extraction.

第一，发现资本主义利润攫取模式的转变。

The core thesis of techno-feudalism is the identification of “feudal” characteristics in the digital age, and the basis for this judgment is that tech giants, by virtue of digital technology, occupy a monopoly position in the global economic system, thereby changing the main profit model within the capitalist economic structure. Specifically, from the perspective of the extraction mechanism, tech giants no longer directly hire and exploit workers like traditional industrial capitalists, but instead extract technological rents from value chain links through their monopoly position. As Durand states: “Although the exploitation of labor still plays a central role in the formation of global surplus value, the current particularity lies in capital using capture mechanisms to profit from this global total of surplus value, while reducing its direct participation in exploitation and detaching from the production process.” Varoufakis argues that tech enterprises obtain a kind of “cloud rent” based on their monopoly of digital technology. From the perspective of the relationship of benefit transfer, this extraction model resembles that of feudal-era landed aristocrats; the “cloud lord” only needs to rely on control over the cloud domain to continuously obtain a “tribute” of profits from peripheral or subsidiary capitalists.

技术封建主义的核心论点是对数字时代“封建”特征的指认，而这一判断的立足点是科技巨头凭借数字技术占据了全球经济体系中的垄断地位，以此改变了资本主义经济结构中的主要盈利模式。具体而言，从攫取机制上看，科技巨头不再像传统产业资本家那样直接雇佣和剥削劳动者，而是通过垄断地位从价值链环节中赚取技术租金，如迪朗所言：“尽管对劳动力的剥削在全球剩余价值的形成过程中仍然发挥着核心作用，但当前的特殊性在于资本利用捕获机制，从这个全球性的剩余价值总量中获利，同时又可以减少其对剥削的直接参与并脱离生产过程。”瓦鲁法基斯则认为科技企业基于垄断数字技术获得了一种“云租金”。从利益输送关系上看，这种攫取模式类似于封建时代的地主贵族，“云端领主”只需凭借对云端领地的控制，就能够源源不断地获得外围或者附属资本家的利润“朝贡”。

Second, the discovery of an adjustment in capitalist class relations.

第二，发现资本主义阶级关系的调整。

Proponents of techno-feudalism believe that not only have digital capitalists transformed into cloud landlords, but the proletariat on the other side of the class antagonistic relationship is also undergoing a qualitative change. In Varoufakis’s view, within the proletariat there is a distinction between “cloud proletarians” and “cloud tenants.” The former refers to workers who still labor in traditional workplace settings, but whose labor process is subject to intervention and even direct control by platform technology; the latter refers to digital users who spontaneously work hard every day, producing valuable data for cloud capital, continuously and uncompensatedly contributing their time, energy, and intelligence to the reproduction of cloud capital. In short, whether digital laborers or digital users, their own labor processes and behavioral habits are guided and controlled by technology, and the relationship between the proletariat and digital capitalists thus transforms into a relationship of dependency similar to that of serfs on lords in the feudal era; the former, while receiving the lord’s protection, also uncompensatedly offer their labor and most of their output. Durand actually puts forward a similar proposition and hints at the difference in “autonomy” between digital users and digital laborers. He believes that producers face absolute constraints; any company and platform worker becomes part of the digital environment. The restrictions on consumers are not absolute, but staying away from big data will marginalize one’s position in society, which is no different from the choice faced by medieval peasants between dependency and flight. Overall, proponents of techno-feudalism are deeply convinced that the change in class relations reflects a qualitative change at the level of relations of production: “The dependence of individuals and organizations on the monopolistic control structure of data and algorithms constitutes the foundation of digital relations of production.”

技术封建主义论者认为，不仅数字资本家化身为云端地主，而且位于阶级对立关系另一端的无产阶级也发生着质的改变。在瓦鲁法基斯看来，无产阶级内部有“云端无产者”和“云端佃农”之分。前者指的是仍在传统行业工作场所中劳动的工人，但劳动过程受到平台技术的干预乃至直接控制；后者则指那些每天自发地辛勤劳作，为云资本生产宝贵数据的数字用户，他们持续无偿地为云端资本的再生产付出时间、精力和智慧。简言之，无论是数字劳工还是数字用户，自身的劳动过程和行为习惯都受到技术的引导、控制，无产阶级与数字资本家的关系也就转变为类似封建时代农奴对地主的依附关系，前者在接受地主庇佑的同时，也无偿献出自己的劳动和大部分产出成果。迪朗实际上也提出了类似主张，并暗示数字用户与数字劳工在“自主性”方面的区别。他认为，生产者面临着绝对的约束，任何公司和平台工作者都成为数字环境的一部分；针对消费者的限制虽然不绝对，但是远离大数据就会让自己在社会中的位置边缘化，这与中世纪农民面临的依附还是逃离选择别无二致。总的来说，技术封建主义论者深信阶级关系变化反映了生产关系层面的质变，“个人和组织对数据和算法垄断性控制结构的依赖，构成了数字生产关系的基础”。

Third, the discovery that the pillars of capitalism—markets and profits—are shrinking and collapsing.

第三，发现资本主义的支柱——市场和利润——正在萎缩、崩塌。

On the one hand, proponents of techno-feudalism argue that the “cloud domain” is eroding the market. Varoufakis pointed out in an interview: “A new system is replacing capitalism.” In his book, he uses a small town as a metaphor: “All the shops there, even all the buildings, belong to a person named Jeff (i.e., Jeff Bezos—author’s note).” This is clearly an identification of the tech giants that control digital platforms, algorithmic technology, and intelligent networks. There, all people’s actions and thoughts are subject to algorithmic intervention and control; within the entire spatial scope, there is no longer the conversation, negotiation, bargaining, and self-organization that exist in a traditional free market. The algorithm becomes the supreme monopolist and arbiter, replacing the market’s “invisible hand.” Any subject that does not obey algorithmic commands and supervision will be expelled from this domain and lose the means of survival. On the other hand, proponents of techno-feudalism believe that “cloud rent” has already replaced profit. Varoufakis’s basic judgment is that “for the first time since the rise of capitalism two and a half centuries ago, profit is no longer the fuel of the global economic engine, no longer the driving force of investment and innovation.” Relying on their absolute monopoly position, tech giants control the economic lifeline, tower over other industrial and commercial capitalists, and extract large amounts of “rent” by relying on the cloud domain.

一方面，技术封建主义论者认为“云端领地”正在侵蚀市场。瓦鲁法基斯在一次访谈中指出：“一个新的体系正在取代资本主义”。他在著作中以一个小镇作为隐喻，“那里所有的商店，甚至所有的建筑，都属于一个叫杰夫(即杰夫·贝索斯——作者注)的人”,这显然是对掌握数字平台、算法技术和智能网络的科技巨头的指认。在那里，所有人的行为和想法都受到算法的干预和控制，整个空间范围内也不再拥有传统自由市场存在的交谈、协商、讨价还价和自组织，算法成为至高无上的垄断者和裁决者，取代了市场这只“看不见的手”,任何不服从算法指令和监管的主体，都将被驱逐出这一领域而断送维持生存的手段。另一方面，技术封建主义论者认为“云端地租”已经取代利润。瓦鲁法基斯的基本判断是，“自两个半世纪前资本主义兴起以来，利润第一次不再是全球经济引擎的燃料，不再是投资和创新的驱动力”。凭借着绝对的垄断地位，科技巨头控制了经济命脉，凌驾于其他产业和商业资本家之上，依靠云领地攫取大量“租金”。

Clearly, techno-feudalism has become an intellectual whirlwind, successfully sparking a new round of critical discussion on the relationship between digital technology and capitalism. Left-wing proponents of techno-feudalism mostly possess a theoretical self-awareness of Marxism. For instance, Varoufakis states: “This book (i.e., *Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism*) is entirely consistent with the Marxist political economy tradition. I wrote it as a Marxist scholarly work.” Durand also states: “I chose to start from a pair of classical concepts—what Marx called ‘relations of production,’ and the associated ‘productive forces.’” Although these confessions are sincere, we must still return to the theoretical lineage of Marxism to understand the various characteristics and contradictions manifested by the development of the times, and to scrutinize the role and influence of digital technology giants within the global economic structure against the backdrop of technological change, thereby revealing the insights and shortcomings of the techno-feudalist perspective.

显然，技术封建主义已然成为一股思想旋风，成功掀起了对数字技术与资本主义关系的新一轮批判性讨论。左翼技术封建主义论者大多有着马克思主义的理论自觉，如瓦鲁法基斯表示：“这本书(即《技术封建主义：谁杀死了资本主义》)完全符合马克思主义政治经济学传统。我把它写成了马克思主义学术著作。”迪朗也表示：“我选择从一对经典概念入手——马克思所称的‘生产关系’,以及与之相关联的‘生产力’。”这些自白尽管诚恳真挚，但我们还是要回到马克思主义的理论脉络中去理解时代发展所呈现出的种种特征和矛盾，审思技术变迁背景下数字科技巨头在全球经济结构中的角色与影响，以此揭示技术封建主义观点的创见和不足。

II. Functional Capitalists Rather Than “Feudal Lords”: Digital Technology Giants in the Circulation of Capital

二、职能资本家而非“封建领主”:资本循环中的数字科技巨头

From the perspective of Marx’s theory of capital circulation, capital that produces or realizes surplus value is called functional capital, which mainly includes two forms: industrial capital and commercial capital. Industrial capital directly participates in production, while commercial capital serves the circulation of commodities. The fundamental nature of digital technology giants is that of functional capitalists. To achieve capital accumulation, enterprises must continuously participate in the process of capital circulation, intervening in production and circulation links to appropriate more surplus value. However, the core argument of techno-feudalist theorists is that the role of technology giants in the production and distribution of surplus value has undergone a qualitative transformation: they are no longer drivers of competition and innovation but have become “lords” who rely on technological monopoly to extract rent from industrial and commercial capitalists. This judgment not only overlooks the structural position of technology giants within the global production network of capitalism but also blurs the division and differentiation within the bourgeoisie itself.

在马克思主义资本循环理论视域下，生产或实现剩余价值的资本称为职能资本，主要包括产业资本与商业资本两种形式。产业资本直接参与生产，商业资本服务于商品流通。数字科技巨头的底色是职能资本家，为了实现资本积累，企业需不断地参与资本循环过程，介入生产和流通环节以占有更多剩余价值。然而，技术封建主义论者的核心观点，是认为科技巨头在剩余价值生产和分配中的作用发生了质的转变，不再是竞争和创新的推动者，而成为依靠技术垄断向产业资本家和商业资本家征收租金的“领主”。这一判断不仅忽视了科技巨头在资本主义全球生产网络中的结构性位置，也模糊了资产阶级内部的分工和分化。

(I) Digital Technology Giants as Industrial Capitalists: Organizing the R&D and Application of Digital Technology

(一)作为产业资本家的数字科技巨头：组织数字技术研发和应用

The first identity of digital technology giants is that of industrial capitalists, which needs to be understood on two levels. First, from the perspective of the form of movement of money, the monetary investment of technology giants successively passes through three forms—money capital, productive capital, and commodity capital—following the formal stipulations of the circuit of industrial capital. In the purchase stage, technology giants purchase means of production and labor power in the commodity market and labor market, respectively. The former mainly involves procurement from equipment manufacturers or R&D institutions; for example, in 2023, Google’s parent company (Alphabet) spent approximately $20 billion on information and communication technology, most of which was used to purchase software, information services, networks, and communication equipment from suppliers. The latter refers to hiring qualified technical laborers. In the production stage, labor power is combined with various means of production (elements) such as computers, storage devices, and data to produce technological products including algorithms, technical networks, and intelligent control platforms, according to market needs—such as various types of apps, smart devices, and professional technical services. In the sales stage, technology companies return to the market to sell smart products, algorithmic software, or technical services, completing the valorization of capital. According to Marx’s formula for the circuit of capital, digital capital undergoes a complete circuit, and in this process, it completes the exploitation of laborers, appropriating surplus value without compensation and realizing capital valorization. Throughout the entire circuit, technology giants are not “landlords” standing aloof and unproductive, but “capitalists” active in all links, playing the role of organizers of digital technology R&D and providers of its application.

数字科技巨头的第一身份是产业资本家，这需要从两个层面进行理解。首先，从货币的运动形式上看，科技巨头的货币投入相继经历货币资本、生产资本和商品资本三种形态，遵循产业资本循环的形式规定。在购买阶段，科技巨头分别在商品市场和劳动力市场购买生产资料、劳动力。前者主要向设备生产商或研发机构进行采购，如2023年谷歌母公司(Alphabet)在信息与通信技术方面的支出约为200亿美元，其中大部分用于从供应商处购买软件、信息服务、网络和通信设备等;后者则指雇佣合格的技术劳工。在生产阶段，劳动力与计算机、存储器和数据等各种生产资料(要素)结合，根据市场需要生产出包括算法、技术网络和智控平台在内的技术产品，如各类型APP、智能设备和专业技术服务。在销售阶段，技术公司重新回到市场上将智能产品、算法软件或技术服务销售出去，完成资本增殖。根据马克思的资本循环公式，数字资本经历了一个完整的循环，并在这一过程中完成了对劳动者的剥削，无偿占有了剩余价值并实现资本增殖。整个循环过程中，科技巨头不是游离在外、不事生产的“地主”,而是活跃于所有环节的“资本家”,扮演着数字技术研发组织者和应用提供者的角色。

Second, from the perspective of value production and distribution, the goal of technology giants is to seize the surplus value produced by hired labor power. On the one hand, technology giants directly appropriate the surplus value created by technical laborers. Unlike traditional industries, the digital technologies and services produced by technology companies mainly exist as “intangible assets” in non-physical forms such as code and algorithms. Why is this kind of technical or mental labor, which does not produce physical commodities, regarded as productive labor? When analyzing the labor of transporting commodities, Marx pointed out: “The result of the labor employed in transport is a change in the use-value… This is a determination related to the use-value of the commodity.” Defining transport labor as productive labor is precisely because “labor forms a technically necessary connection with the use-value of the commodity”; otherwise, the commodity would not be a commodity, and its use-value could not be realized. Similarly, the digital technologies that are produced or created have been integrated into machines and tools, forming part of constant capital and playing a role in the formation of the use-value of commodities. Therefore, the R&D labor of digital technology also creates value; otherwise, equipment could not become smart equipment. On the other hand, technology giants can plunder the surplus value created by digital laborers peripheral to the technology giants (mainly digital platforms). In the view of techno-feudalist theorists, this is “rent” paid by industrial capitalists and digital laborers to technology giants. In reality, capitalist accumulation has always had both productive and unproductive forms: there is productive accumulation occurring in the sphere of production, as well as unproductive accumulation that plunders surplus value through non-productive means such as the use of violence or speculation. It is precisely by relying on digital technology monopoly that technology giants can plunder other capitalists and laborers without directly intervening in production. In short, regardless of the method by which technology giants extract profits, the essence is the appropriation of surplus value created by hired labor power—this is precisely the core characteristic of the capitalist mode of production.

其次，从价值生产和分配上看，科技巨头的目标是攫取雇佣劳动力生产的剩余价值。一方面，科技巨头直接占有技术劳工创造的剩余价值。与传统产业不同，科技公司生产的数字技术及服务主要是以代码、算法等非实体形态存在的“无形资产”。为什么将这种不生产实体商品的技术或脑力劳动视为生产性劳动呢?马克思在分析商品运输劳动时指出：“运输所使用的劳动的结果就是使用价值的改变……这就是与商品的使用价值有关的规定。”将运输劳动界定为生产性劳动，正是因为“劳动与商品的使用价值在技术上形成一种必要的关联”,否则商品就不成为商品，使用价值也不能够实现。同样，生产或创造出来的数字技术已经融入机器和工具之中，构成不变资本的一部分，在商品使用价值的形成过程中发挥着作用。因此，数字技术的研发劳动也创造价值，否则设备就不能成为智能设备。另一方面，科技巨头可以掠夺围绕在科技巨头(主要是数字平台)外围的数字劳工创造的剩余价值。在技术封建主义论者看来，这是产业资本家和数字劳工向科技巨头缴纳的“租金”。实际上，资本主义的积累方式一直都有生产性与非生产性之分：既有发生在生产领域的生产性积累，也有通过使用暴力、投机等非生产性手段来掠夺剩余价值的非生产性积累。正是凭借数字技术垄断，科技巨头才能够在不直接介入生产的条件下，对其他资本家、劳工进行掠夺。总之，科技巨头不论是以何种方式攫取利润，本质都是占有雇佣劳动力创造的剩余价值，这正是资本主义生产方式的核心特征。

(II) Digital Technology Giants as Commercial Capitalists: Facilitating Information Matching and Supply-Demand Alignment

(二)作为商业资本家的数字科技巨头：促进信息对接与供需匹配

Digital technology giants also play the role of commercial capitalists, carving out a portion of commercial profit from the total surplus value realized in society. Marx described the transformation of commodities into money as “the commodity’s dangerous leap,” pointing out that “if this leap fails, it is not the commodity that is damaged, but the commodity owner.” On the basis of data analysis, digital technology giants strive to improve the efficiency of information and supply-demand matching, promote transactions of commodities and services, accelerate the realization of surplus value, and to a certain extent alleviate the contradiction of the commodity’s “leap.” On the one hand, technology giants build digital platforms to help merchants or service providers connect with consumers, achieving supply-demand matching through commodity display, service introduction, information search, and customer communication. On the other hand, technology giants use the user data they control to develop an attention economy: they not only cooperate with traditional commercial capital to expand commodity exposure but also cultivate influencers, host marketing events, and design algorithms to attract and allocate traffic, thereby guiding mass consumption choices and even shaping consumption habits. Only by building massive digital platforms and complex algorithmic systems, and mastering vast amounts of user data and market information, can they accurately analyze market demand, predict consumption trends, and accordingly formulate effective business strategies and promotion mechanisms. Clearly, although technology giants appear to collect rent using the cloud domain, in fact, they must provide technical services such as traffic generation, promotion, and sales for individuals or enterprises selling commodities or services, in order to carve out their own portion from the realized surplus value.

数字科技巨头也扮演着商业资本家的角色，在社会实现的剩余价值总量中分割商业利润。马克思把商品转化为货币形容成“商品的惊险的跳跃”,指出“这个跳跃如果不成功，摔坏的不是商品，但一定是商品占有者”。数字科技巨头在数据分析的基础上致力于提高信息与供求匹配效率，促进商品和服务交易，加速剩余价值的实现，一定程度上缓解了商品“跳跃”的矛盾。一方面，科技巨头搭建数字平台，帮助入驻商家或服务提供者连接消费者，通过商品展示、服务介绍、信息搜索和客服沟通等方式，实现供需匹配；另一方面，科技巨头利用掌握的用户数据发展注意力经济，不仅与传统商业资本合作，扩大商品曝光度，同时培育网红、举办营销活动，设计算法吸引和分拨流量，以此引导大众的消费选择甚至形塑消费习惯。只有在构建庞大数字平台和复杂算法系统的基础上，掌握海量用户数据和市场信息，才能够精准地分析市场需求、预测消费趋势，并据此制定有效的商业策略和推广机制。显然，科技巨头看似利用云端领域收取租金，事实上要为售卖商品、服务的个体或企业提供引流、宣传和销售方面的技术服务，才能在实现的剩余价值中分割属于自己的一部分。

Thus it can be seen that tech giants, as commercial capitalists, have two characteristics. First, relying on their own monopoly position in the digital technology sector, they jointly appropriate the surplus value created by wage workers together with other industrial and commercial capitalists, and participate in the average distribution of profit. This also reflects the difference between tech giants and “feudal lords”; the latter, after leasing land to capitalists, often only need to sit back and collect rent, without needing to maintain the land. It is precisely around the maintenance of land that capitalists and landlords engaged in repeated struggles and long-term historical conflicts. Whether as industrial capitalists or commercial capitalists, digital tech giants have not transformed into complete “free-riders”; they always maintain productivity in the technological field, continuously investing high-skilled labor and substantial funds to maintain and upgrade platforms, networks, and equipment, and to analyze data. Second, tech giants are either merging or have already merged multiple functions such as advertising, promotion, and sales services, while simultaneously cooperating with other commercial capitals to construct a highly influential commercial network with strong user stickiness. Looking back at history, commercial capital separated from industrial capital; some industrial capitalists no longer directly participated in production but instead used their own capital to specialize in the buying and selling of commodities. The change brought by digital technology lies in that it has prompted a historic recombination of industrial capital and commercial capital within the economic entity of the digital tech giant.

由此可见，科技巨头作为商业资本家有两个特点。一是依靠自身在数字技术领域的垄断地位，与其他产业和商业资本家共同占有雇佣工人所创造的剩余价值，参与利润的平均分配。这也体现了科技巨头与“封建领主”的不同，后者把土地租给资本家后，往往只需坐收租金即可，并不需要对土地进行维护。恰恰是围绕土地的养护，资本家和地主之间进行了反复博弈和长期的历史斗争。而不论是作为产业资本家还是商业资本家，数字科技巨头都没有转变为完全的“坐收渔利”者，始终在技术领域保持着生产性，持续投入高技能劳动力和大量资金，对平台、网络和设备进行维护升级，对数据展开分析。二是科技巨头正在或已经兼并了广告宣发、销售服务等多种职能，同时与其他商业资本合作，构建起一个极具影响力且用户黏性强的商业网络。回顾历史，商业资本从产业资本中分离出来，一部分产业资本家不再直接参与生产，而是利用自己的资本专门从事商品买卖。数字技术带来的变化在于，它促使产业资本和商业资本在数字科技巨头这一经济实体上实现了历史性的重新组合。

(3) Competition and innovation remain the basic means for tech giants to achieve capital accumulation

(三)竞争与创新仍是科技巨头实现资本积累的基本手段

Compared with capitalism’s “eternal uncertainty and agitation,” the feudal era was largely characterized by developmental stagnation. Proponents of techno-feudalism see the rigid hierarchical structure under technological monopoly and believe that the economic system is stagnating due to the loss of competitive and innovative momentum. For instance, Varoufakis argues: “These cloud capitalists have also escaped the market pressure to produce cheaper and better commodities, and no longer need to constantly worry about competitors launching products to steal their customers.” On the contrary, the digital economy has flourished on the basis of competition and innovation, and competition among tech giants continues and is intensifying.

相较于资本主义“永远的不安定和变动”,封建时代很大程度上以发展停滞为特征。技术封建主义论者看到了科技垄断下僵化的等级结构，认为经济体系正由于丧失竞争和创新动力而停滞不前。如瓦鲁法基斯认为：“这些云端资本家还摆脱了生产更便宜且更好商品的市场压力，不必经常担心竞争对手将推出产品抢走他们的顾客。”与此恰恰相反，数字经济是在竞争和创新的基础上蓬勃发展起来的，且科技巨头间的竞争仍在持续并日趋激烈。

First, digital capital cannot avoid competition. Although digital enterprises and platforms do not focus on producing material products, they have an infinite pursuit of algorithm operation speed, matching efficiency, and data collection and analysis capabilities. Developing software and programs with distinctive features is the core competitiveness for attracting users and generating revenue. Varoufakis also attempts to further explain that this competition “is not because it charges cheaper fees or provides higher-quality ‘friendship’ or connections,” and that “competition between territories should not be conflated with market competition.” However, he overlooks the exclusivity of attention and users’ rights of choice and exit. Regarding exclusivity, when users enter the cloud domain or enjoy services provided by a certain digital platform, most cannot simultaneously use other platforms. That is, source data is not infinite; there is intense competition among tech giants in attracting user attention (or usage time). Taking digital social media as an example, whichever platform can provide the most timely, effective, and interesting content will gain more loyal users and longer usage time. Regarding the right of choice and exit, users can register for multiple platforms with similar or even identical functions simultaneously; after entering a certain cloud domain, they are not unable to exit but can switch and replace at any time. Their degree of dependence depends on whether the digital platform can continuously provide users with expectations or satisfaction. The feedback mechanism thus forces enterprises to continuously update algorithms, improve matching efficiency, and adjust at any time according to user habits—this is a market behavior that meets the needs of capital accumulation.

首先，数字资本不能避免竞争。数字企业及平台虽然不专注于生产物质产品，但对算法的运算速度、匹配效率和数据搜集分析的能力都有着无限追求，而开发具备特色功能的软件、程序更是吸引用户、赚取收益的核心竞争力。瓦鲁法基斯也试图进一步阐释这种竞争“不是因为它收费更便宜或提供更高品质的‘友谊’或联系”,“不应将领地之间的竞争与市场竞争混为一谈”。然而，他忽视了注意力的排他性，以及用户的选择和退出权利。就排他性来看，当用户进入云领域或享受某一数字平台提供的服务时，大多无法在同一时刻利用其他平台。也就是说，源数据并非无穷无尽，科技巨头间在吸引用户注意力(或使用时长)方面存在极大竞争。以数字社交媒体为例，哪一个平台可以提供最及时、最有效、最有趣的内容，就能收获更多的忠实用户、更长的使用时间。就选择和退出权来看，用户可以同时注册多个功能相近甚至相同的平台，进入某个云领域之后也并非不能退出，而是可以随时切换更替，其依附程度取决于数字平台能否持续性给予用户期待或满足。反馈机制也就倒逼企业不断更新算法，提升匹配效率，同时根据用户的使用习惯随时进行调整，这是符合资本积累需要的市场行为。

Second, tech giants must maintain the impetus for innovation. Digital enterprises cannot, like feudal lords, construct closed, self-contained technological territories that exclude the outside world, nor can they merely be satisfied with building cyberspace and infrastructure. They must spare no effort to optimize algorithm programming and system architecture, continuously innovating technology to seize the commanding heights of the market. In particular, the influx of large amounts of idle financial capital into the cloud computing field not only accelerates the pace of innovation but also makes digital competition more intense. The “uncertainty and agitation” in the cloud domain is even greater than in traditional industries. Globally, a macroeconomic survey by McKinsey across 40 countries shows that digital capital investment accounted for only 0.8% of surveyed countries’ GDP in 2005, but by 2013 this share had reached 8.5%. At the enterprise level, among the top ten global R&D spenders in 2023, eight were digital tech giants or related upstream and downstream enterprises; Amazon alone invested $85.622 billion in technology and infrastructure (including R&D). From 2019 to 2022, Google’s R&D expenditures were $26 billion, $27.6 billion, $31.6 billion, and $39.5 billion respectively. In 2023, this figure reached $45.4 billion, equivalent to Bolivia’s total economic output for the same year. It is worth noting that, in addition to independent innovation, tech giants can also use their massive funds to merge or acquire new innovative startups, blocking competitors from mastering potentially disruptive technologies. Whether newly invented or acquired technologies can be applied often depends on the tech giant’s cost-benefit assessment; this behavior of hindering innovation is also a capital accumulation strategy based on corporate self-interest.

其次，科技巨头必须保持创新动力。数字企业不能像封建时代的领主那样，构建出封闭自守、排斥外界的技术领地，也不能仅仅满足于建立网络空间和基础设施。它们必须不遗余力地优化算法编程与系统架构，不断革新技术以占领市场制高点。尤其是大量金融闲置资金涌入云计算领域，不仅加速了创新步伐，也使得数字竞争更加激烈。云领域的“不安定和变动”相较传统产业有过之而无不及。从全球范围看，麦肯锡对40个国家的宏观经济调查表明，2005年数字资本投资仅占受调查国家GDP的0.8%,2013年占比已经达到8.5%。在企业层面，2023年全球研发支出最大的十家企业中，八家是数字科技巨头或上下游相关连企业，仅亚马逊一家就向技术和基础设施(包括研发)投入了856.22亿美元。2019年—2022年谷歌的研发支出分别为260亿、276亿、316亿和395亿美元。在2023年，这一数字已经达到454亿美元，相当于玻利维亚同年的经济总量。值得注意的是，科技巨头除了自主创新以外，还可以动用规模庞大的资金兼并或收购新型科创企业，阻击竞争对手掌握潜在颠覆性技术。新发明或新收购的技术能否得到应用，又往往取决于巨头的成本收益评估，这种阻碍创新的行径也是一种基于企业私利的资本积累策略。

3. Wage Workers, Not “Feudal Serfs”: Labor and Digital Users Under Technological Control

三、雇佣劳动者而非“封建农奴”:技术控制下的劳工与数字用户

While redistributing economic power, digital technology also reshapes labor forms. On the one hand, wage workers are no longer confined to factory workshops and office buildings; instead, using mobile phones or computers, they can work anywhere with an internet connection. On the other hand, various new occupations have emerged, from programmers, data annotators, and AI trainers to e-commerce sellers, online streamers, and content creators. These jobs based on smart devices blur the boundaries between labor and entertainment, production and life.

数字技术在重新分配经济权力的同时，也重塑着劳动形态。一方面，雇佣劳动者不再局限于工厂车间和写字楼，而是借助手机或电脑，在任何可以连接网络的地方进行工作；另一方面，各种新兴职业涌现出来，从程序员、数据标注员、人工智能训练师，到电商卖家、网络主播、内容创作者，这些基于智能设备的工作模糊了劳动和娱乐、生产和生活间的界限。

(1) Cloud Technology Controls Digital Labor as Producers

(一)云端技术控制作为生产者的数字劳工

Proponents of techno-feudalism argue that digital tech giants can no longer directly intervene in the labor process, or that their relationship with wage workers has become distant. For example, Varoufakis argues: “The reproduction of cloud capital, however, does not involve wage labor.” Such judgments deviate from the facts. Cloud technology not only directly controls a large number of productive laborers but also influences the labor process of various occupational positions on the basis of transforming the labor market.

技术封建主义论者认为数字科技巨头可以不再直接介入劳动过程，或者说与雇佣劳动者的关系变得疏离。例如，瓦鲁法基斯认为：“云端资本的再生产却可以不涉及雇佣劳动”。这类判断偏离了事实，云端技术不仅直接控制着大量生产性劳工，还在变革劳动力市场的基础上影响着各职业岗位的劳动过程。

Specifically, digital labor can be divided into two major categories: one is based on online network platforms, where workers can allocate tasks or work online or remotely, including knowledge services, design and software development, image annotation, etc.; the other is based on location-based platforms, where tasks are completed by workers at designated geographic locations, such as ride-hailing, courier and food delivery, and in-home domestic services. Tech giants have close technological and power relations with both types of digital labor. At the technological level, only by investing large amounts of time and energy can employees maintain the production and reproduction of digital capital, and can digital technology, intelligent networks, and terminal equipment continue to operate and be continuously updated. It is precisely due to technological needs that tech giants, whose organic composition of capital is far higher than that of traditional industries, still must maintain a huge number of employees. In 2023, Amazon had over 1.5 million employees, Google over 180,000, and Meta nearly 70,000. As a product of capitalist relations of production, digital labor sustains the production and reproduction of capitalism; only by relying on digital labor can tech giants appropriate and distribute surplus value. As some scholars have pointed out: “The capital valorization of techno-feudalism still lies in the extraction of surplus value, which is essentially no different from Marx’s era of industrial capitalism; the difference lies in the expansion of the channels and objects of surplus value extraction.” In contrast, feudal serfs’ labor was mostly used to produce products meeting basic living needs, with the surplus portion being expropriated and possessed by feudal lords in the form of surplus products.

具体而言，数字劳工可分为两大类：一类基于在线网络平台，工人可在线或远程实现任务或工作的分配，包括知识服务、设计和软件开发、图像标注等；另一类基于位置的平台，任务由工人在指定的地理位置完成，如网约车、快递外卖和上门家政服务等。科技巨头与这两类数字劳工都存在紧密的技术关系和权力关系。在技术关系层面，员工只有付出大量的时间和精力，才能维持数字资本的生产和再生产，数字技术、智能网络及终端设备才能持续运行和不断更新。正是出于技术需要，资本有机构成远远高于传统产业的科技巨头依旧要维持庞大的雇员数量。2023年，亚马逊员工超过150万人，谷歌员工超过18万人，元宇宙员工近7万人。作为资本主义生产关系下的产物，数字劳工维系的是资本主义的生产和再生产，科技巨头只有依靠数字劳工才能占有和分配剩余价值。正如有学者指出：“技术封建主义的资本增殖性仍在于对剩余价值的获取，这与马克思所处的工业时代在本质上并无区别，其不同之处在于剩余价值的获取途径和对象有所扩展。”反观封建农奴，其劳动大多用于生产满足基本生活所需的产品，超出部分以剩余产品的形式被封建领主剥夺和占有。

At the level of power relations, tech giants possess direct control over digital laborers. Beyond directly employed labor, the more controversial issue is how to understand the relationship between tech giants, after their platformization, and the labor force engaged in “flexible employment.” Legally, no labor relationship exists between the platform and individual laborers, but digital platforms impose de facto supervision and control over the labor force. The service agreement terms unilaterally provided by the platform not only stipulate working hours, wages, customer service etiquette, applicable law, and data ownership—matters directly related to the working conditions of digital laborers—but also determine workers’ job grades, commission amounts, and daily experience through algorithmic and rating management. At the same time, the operational mechanism of platform enterprises involves obtaining demand intentions from consumer users, allocating these to providers of products or services, and then having the platform and laborers share the revenue upon completion. This is no different from the traditional industrial logic of “order-taking, allocation, production,” except that, formally, wages are transformed into laborers’ individual income, and enterprise profits are transformed into platform commissions. This formal change cannot conceal the substantive capital-labor relationship; the so-called absence of an employment relationship is merely a strategy by digital capital to exploit technological advantages and legal loopholes to reduce the cost of employing labor.

在权力关系层面，科技巨头对数字劳工拥有直接控制权。除了直接雇佣劳动力之外，较具争议的是如何理解科技巨头平台化后，与“灵活就业”劳动力的关系。在法律上，平台与个体劳动力不存在劳动关系，但是，数字平台对劳动力施加了事实意义上的监管与控制。平台单方面提供的服务协议条款不仅规定了工作时间、工资、客户服务的礼仪规范、可适用的法律和数据所有权等与数字劳工工作条件直接相关的事项，还通过算法和评级管理决定着从业者的工作等级、提成额度和日常体验。与此同时，平台企业的运行机制是从消费用户处获得需求意向，并将其分配给产品或服务的提供者，完成后再由平台和劳动者进行收入分成。这与传统产业“接单-分配-生产”的逻辑并无二致，只不过在形式上，工资转化为劳动者的个体收入，企业利润转化为平台抽成。这种形式上的变化并不能掩盖实质上的劳资关系，所谓不存在雇佣关系不过是数字资本利用技术优势和法律漏洞，减少雇佣劳动力成本的策略。

(II) Digital Users as Reproducers of Labor Power in Cyberspace

(二)网络空间中作为劳动力再生产者的数字用户

Digital users are undoubtedly important contributors to the construction of cyberspace. Proponents of techno-feudalism keenly note the importance of data and data-producing behavior. For example, Yanis Varoufakis argues that the most valuable part of cloud capital is precisely not the material-level equipment, but rather the diverse and wide-ranging data, such as “stories posted on Facebook, videos uploaded to TikTok and YouTube, photos on Instagram, jokes and insults on Twitter, and reviews on Amazon.” Tech giants organize technical employees to create an interconnected cloud world, but without the participation and use of digital users, the cloud would be merely an empty shell with a technical architecture but no actual content, unable to become a genuinely new space.

数字用户无疑是构建网络空间的重要贡献者。技术封建主义论者敏锐地注意到数据和生产数据行为的重要性，例如瓦鲁法基斯认为云端资本最有价值的部分恰恰不是那些物质层面的设备，而是各种各样、来源广泛的数据，如“发表在脸书上的故事、上传到TikTok和YouTube上的影片、Instagram上的照片、推特上的笑话和辱骂、亚马逊上的评论”。科技巨头组织技术员工创造了万物互联的云端世界，但若没有数字用户的加入和使用，云端就只能是具有技术架构而无实际内容的空壳，不能成为真正意义上的新空间。

Another viewpoint of techno-feudalism proponents misunderstands the Marxist category of labor. They argue that producing data in the cloud domain constitutes unpaid labor, and that dependence on digital technology is a sign of digital users degenerating into modern “feudal serfs.” If we return to the Marxist theory of the reproduction of labor power, this argument clearly does not hold. Under the capitalist mode of production, wage laborers are both producers of commodities and reproducers of labor power. To ensure that labor power continues to be invested in production without atrophy, the reproduction of labor power requires necessary rest, entertainment, and education. At the phenomenal level, digital users entering the cloud domain appear as digital consumption or data production, but for the majority of users, they do not act with the purpose of labor; rather, they aim to meet their own life needs and social requirements, achieving the reproduction of labor power with the help of digital platforms. On the one hand, by sharing and obtaining information, digital users can complete physical and mental rest and relaxation through the processes of communication and entertainment. On the other hand, many daily life needs that satisfy the reproduction of labor power—such as healthcare, diet, education, and transportation—are integrated into digital platforms, and digital users must rely on corresponding cloud services to sustain their survival and development. Objectively, the online behavior and interactions of digital users provide valuable data resources for the production and reproduction of digital capital, becoming part of cyberspace. However, this behavior is fundamentally different from material labor and productive labor in the Marxist sense. The techno-feudalism proponents erroneously equate the behavior of digital users in cyberspace with labor in the feudal era. This not only fails to truly reveal the nature of digital users’ leisure, entertainment, and self-creative activities in cyberspace but also dissolves the boundaries between production and life, labor and consumption, thereby obscuring class distinctions and capital-labor contradictions.

技术封建主义论者的另一观点则误解了马克思主义的劳动范畴，他们认为在云端领域生产数据是一种无偿劳动，对数字技术的依赖则是数字用户沦为现代“封建农奴”的征兆。如果回到马克思主义的劳动力再生产理论，这一论点显然不成立。在资本主义生产方式中，雇佣劳动者既是商品生产者，也是劳动力再生产者。为了保证劳动力在不萎缩的状态下继续投入生产，劳动力的再生产离不开必要的休息、娱乐和教育。在现象层面，数字用户进入云端领域表现为数字消费或数据生产，但对于大部分用户来说，他们并非抱着劳动的目的，而是为了满足自身的生活需求和社交需要，在数字平台的帮助下实现劳动力再生产。一方面，通过分享和获取信息，数字用户可以在交流、娱乐的过程中完成身体、心灵的休息和放松；另一方面，许多满足劳动力再生产的日常生活需要，如医疗、饮食、教育和出行等都接入数字平台之中，数字用户必须依赖相应的云端服务才能维持生存和发展。客观上，数字用户的在线行为和互动为数字资本的生产和再生产提供了宝贵的数据资源，成为网络空间的一部分，但这种行为与马克思主义意义上的物质劳动、生产劳动有着本质区别。技术封建主义论者错误地将数字用户在网络空间中的行为等同于封建时代的劳动，不仅不能真正揭示数字用户在网络空间休闲娱乐与自我创作活动的性质，也消解了生产和生活、劳动与消费的界限，掩盖了阶级差别和劳资矛盾。

(III) Capital’s Domination of Labor: From the Labor Process to Daily Life

(三)资本支配劳动力：从劳动过程到日常生活

The phenomenon of the proletariat’s dependence on cloud capital, as revealed by techno-feudalism proponents, reflects the strengthening of capital’s power to dominate laborers in the digital age. This intensification manifests both in the labor process becoming increasingly beyond the control of laborers themselves and in the direct intrusion of capital’s power into laborers’ daily lives.

技术封建主义论者所揭示的无产阶级对云端资本的依附现象，反映了数字时代资本支配劳动者权力的加强，这种强化既表现为劳动过程愈加不受劳动者自身的控制，也表现为资本权力对劳动者日常生活的直接侵入。

With the support of digital technology, the real subsumption of digital laborers under capital deepens further. To appropriate more surplus value, capitalists must forcibly extend workers’ labor time beyond the cost of reproducing labor power, which requires capitalists to impose corresponding management and supervision on laborers. In his analysis of mechanized large-scale production, Marx pointed out: “Science, the immense natural forces, the mass of social labor, are all embodied in the system of machinery, and together with it constitute the ‘master’s’ power.” Under capitalist relations of production, technological progress only strengthens the control of technology owners over labor power, and digital technology elevates this control to a new level. First, the precise management of labor time and the labor process. Every link of digital labor can be converted into data; algorithmic systems can automatically classify laborers, evaluate performance, and determine rewards and punishments, transforming traditional interpersonal management models into more efficient and severe digital discipline. Second, the de-socialization of labor becomes increasingly prominent. The widespread application of machinery and automated assembly lines led to the de-skilling of workers, while digital technology further fragments digital laborers into isolated individuals. Laborers form a deep binding relationship with digital platforms, making it difficult not only to independently establish close ties with the market and consumers but also severely limiting mutual connections among workers. Third, the mobility trend of the industrial reserve army intensifies significantly. Digital technology makes the industrial reserve army a true “call-at-will, discard-at-will” reservoir of labor power, and this low-cost yet legal employment model becomes the core competitiveness of tech giants’ capital accumulation.

在数字技术加持下，数字劳工对资本的实际隶属进一步深化。资本家为了更多地占有剩余价值，必须强制延长工人的劳动时间以超过劳动力再生产的成本，这就要求资本家对劳动者施加相应的管理和监督。马克思在分析机器化大生产时指出：“科学、巨大的自然力、社会的群众性劳动都体现在机器体系中，并同机器体系一道构成‘主人’的权力。”在资本主义生产关系下，技术进步只会加强技术所有者对劳动力的控制权，数字技术则将控制提升到新的高度。其一，劳动时间与劳动过程的精准化管理。数字劳动的各个环节均可被转化为数据，算法系统能够自动对劳动者进行层级划分、绩效评估及奖惩判定，传统的人际管理模式转变为更加高效、严厉的数字化规训。其二，劳动的去社会化特征日益显著。机器与自动化流水线的广泛应用导致了工人的去技能化，而数字技术则进一步将数字劳工分割为孤立的个体。劳动者与数字平台形成深度的绑定关系，不仅难以独立地与市场、消费者建立紧密联系，工人间的相互联结也受到严重限制。其三，产业后备军的流动性趋势显著加剧。数字技术使得产业后备军真正成为“召之即来、用之即弃”的劳动力蓄水池，这种低成本却又合法的用工模式成为科技巨头资本积累的核心竞争力。

At the same time, tech giants, through the privatization and commercialization of data, achieve increasingly precise intervention in workers’ daily lives. In cyberspace, the massive amounts of data generated by digital users browsing web pages, sharing information, and participating in discussions are converted by digital enterprises into enormous economic benefits and social power. Tech giants use data analysis technology to deeply grasp users’ basic information, behavioral habits, consumption preferences, value orientations, and emotional dynamics. They guide user behavior through algorithms and continuously optimize intervention mechanisms using data, aiming to precisely match information, create consumer desires, and even directly shape users’ consumption habits and value concepts. This intervention has transcended the realm of ideology and penetrated into people’s daily lives. People have become accustomed to algorithmic guidance and manipulation, finding it difficult to perceive the discomfort of being controlled and even harder to find ways to escape. Techno-feudalism proponents accurately capture the era-specific characteristic of digital users’ high dependence on cloud technology, but this does not mean that cloud capitalists are equivalent to feudal lords. From the perspective of technological colonization, in order to open up new markets, create new growth potential, and maximize profits, tech giants use digital technology to penetrate more aspects of human life. This is essentially the commodification and marketization of non-commodified private time and space. In other words, digital users, like digital laborers, have become an important component of the capitalist production system, and their behaviors and habits sustain the production and reproduction of digital capital.

与此同时，科技巨头通过对数据的私有化和商业化，实现了对工人日常生活愈发精确的干预。在网络空间中，数字用户浏览网页、分享信息、参与讨论所产生的海量数据，被数字企业转化为巨大的经济利益和社会权力。科技巨头利用数据分析技术，深入掌握用户的基本信息、行为习惯、消费偏好、价值取向以及情感动态等关键信息，通过算法引导用户行为，并利用数据持续不断地优化干预机制，旨在精准匹配信息、制造消费欲望，甚至直接形塑用户的消费习惯和价值观念。这种干预已经超越了意识形态的范畴，渗透到人们的日常生活中。人们已经习惯于算法的引导和操控，难以察觉被控制的不适，更难找到摆脱的方法。技术封建主义论者精准地抓住了数字用户高度依赖云端技术的时代特征，但这并不意味着云端资本家就等同于封建领主。从技术殖民的角度来看，为了开拓新市场、创造新的增长潜力并寻求利润最大化，科技巨头利用数字技术渗透到人类生活的更多层面，本质上是对非商品化私人时间和空间的商品化、市场化。换句话说，数字用户与数字劳工一样，已经成为资本主义生产体系中的重要组成部分，他们的行为和习惯维系着数字资本的生产和再生产。

IV. Monopoly Capitalism, Not Techno-Feudalism: Digital Tech Giants Constructing Global Monopoly

四、垄断资本主义而非技术封建主义：数字科技巨头构筑全球垄断

By relying on digital technology, tech giants have broken through the boundaries of time, space, and industry on a global scale at an unprecedented speed and scale, constructing a vast global monopoly system. As Lenin stated, “One of the most typical characteristics of capitalism is the rapid development of industry and the very swift concentration of production into ever-larger enterprises.” [12]12 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), Chapter 1, “Concentration of Production and Monopolies.” This trend is even more pronounced in the digital era: not only are production and sales decisions increasingly controlled and influenced by tech giants, but knowledge and technology are also concentrating in the hands of a few tech companies at an unprecedented speed. On the surface, tech giants appear to occupy the cloud domain and reap the benefits effortlessly, as if promoting a “re-feudalization” of society. However, from the perspective of Marxist theory, this is an inevitable result of the global expansion of digital capitalism.

科技巨头凭借数字技术，以前所未有的规模和速度，在全球范围内突破时空与行业的界限，构建起庞大的全球垄断体系。正如列宁所言，“资本主义最典型的特点之一，就是工业蓬勃发展，生产集中于愈来愈大的企业的过程进行得非常迅速”。这一趋势在数字时代更为明显：不仅生产和销售决策日益受到科技巨头的控制与影响，知识和技术也以前所未有的速度向少数科技公司集中。从表象上看，科技巨头似乎占据云端领地坐享其成，仿佛推动了社会的“再封建化”。然而，从马克思主义理论视角看，这是数字资本主义全球扩张的必然结果。

(I) Monopolizing Cyberspace: Expansion and Division of the Cloud Domain

(一)垄断网络空间：云端领域的扩张和瓜分

Tech giants such as Google, Amazon, and Apple, leveraging their powerful data-processing capabilities and algorithmic advantages, dominate the cloud market. At the technical level, tech giants employ methods including an appropriation mechanism based on internal R&D, an acquisition mechanism based on external mergers and acquisitions, and a locking mechanism based on intellectual property rights to monopolize technology and consolidate their first-mover advantage in the cloud domain. At the strategic level, they squeeze out small and medium-sized competitors through means such as traffic allocation, massive subsidies, investment and equity participation, and setting industry standards, while precisely pushing advertisements and services to continuously expand their market share.

谷歌、亚马逊、苹果等科技巨头凭借强大的数据处理能力和算法优势，在云端市场占据主导地位。技术层面，科技巨头采取包括基于内部研发的占有机制、基于外部并购的获取机制和基于知识产权的锁定机制等方式垄断技术，巩固自身在云端领域的先发优势。战略层面，它们通过流量分配、巨额补贴、投资参股、制定行业标准等手段，排挤中小竞争对手，精准推送广告和服务，不断扩大市场份额。

Currently, cyberspace and the R&D and production of its core supporting facilities have been carved up by leading enterprises. There are approximately 10 to 15 top-tier global cloud service providers. In terms of cloud infrastructure used by applications and websites, the three giants of Silicon Valley in the United States collectively control nearly 70% of the world’s cloud computing market. As of the first quarter of 2024, Amazon Web Services held a 31% share of the global market, while Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud accounted for 25% and 11%, respectively. In digital services, tech giants hold leading positions in their respective advantageous fields. “Giant enterprises have gained control over specific markets, essentially becoming gatekeepers controlling access to these markets, and setting rules for a large number of enterprises, public services, and communities trapped in a powerful gravitational field.” [13]13 This is a quotation from a source cited by the author, likely a critical analysis of platform capitalism or digital market gatekeeping. For example, in the search engine field, Google holds nearly 92% of the market share; in application operating systems, Google and Apple divide the market, holding 70.5% and 29% of the shares, respectively; in the digital advertising market, Google alone has a 39% share, while Amazon and Meta hold 7% and 18%, respectively; the concentration in the e-commerce sector is relatively lower, with Alibaba holding a 24% share and Amazon 13%; social media competition is fierce, with Google and Meta holding 14% and 44% of the market share, respectively, while ByteDance, which has risen from behind, has seen its share increase to 11%. At the regional and national levels, the monopoly concentration of tech giants is even higher. For instance, Google occupies 90% of the search market in Europe, Brazil, and India; in the United Kingdom, 90% of consumers use Amazon for online shopping.

当下，网络空间及其核心配套设施的研发生产已经被头部企业瓜分。全球顶级云端服务提供商大约有10—15家，在应用程序和网站使用的云基础设施方面，美国硅谷三巨头就合计控制着世界近70%的云计算市场。截至2024年第一季度，亚马逊网络服务占据全球市场份额的31%,微软Azure、谷歌云分别占比25%和11%。在数字服务方面，科技巨头在各自的优势领域占据领导地位，“巨头企业获得了对特定市场的控制权，本质上成为控制进入这些市场的守门人，并为被困在强大引力场中的大量企业、公共服务和社区制定规则”。例如，在搜索引擎领域，谷歌独占近92%的市场份额；应用操作系统方面，谷歌和苹果二分天下，分别占有70.5%和29%的市场份额；数字广告市场中，谷歌一家即有39%的份额，亚马逊和元宇宙则分别占有7%和18%;电子商务领域集中度相对较低，其中阿里巴巴占有24%的份额，亚马逊为13%;社交媒体竞争激烈，谷歌和元宇宙各自拥有14%和44%的市场份额，后来居上的字节跳动的份额已经上升到11%。在区域和国家层面，科技巨头的垄断集中度要更高。例如，欧洲、巴西和印度90%的搜索市场已被谷歌占有;在英国，90%的消费者在线购物会使用亚马逊。

The widespread application of digital technology has also greatly promoted the cloudification of various aspects of social production and daily life. Algorithms and cloud storage technology have not only digitized the planning, booking, communication, and transaction processes of traditional industries such as retail, transportation, dining, education, housing, and healthcare but have also profoundly transformed the operational models and business processes of these industries. By controlling cloud infrastructure and algorithms, tech giants directly or indirectly hold the initiative in these fields and actively lay out future industries, attempting to turn the cloud space into a comprehensive platform capable of accommodating various industries and services. Tech giants seem to play the role of supreme “monarchs” or “lords,” exerting influence over all walks of life. However, control is also an inherent logic of the capitalist mode of production—from controlling labor power to controlling the industrial chain—without needing to resort to feudal categories. Tech giants follow the logic of monopoly capital expansion aimed at maximizing profits. They use means such as venture capital, technological monopoly, and data commodification to pursue the maximization of corporate and shareholder interests. This is precisely a manifestation of capitalist relations of production, not a feudalization of production relations.

数字技术的广泛应用也极大地推动了社会生产与日常生活各个环节的云端化。算法与云存储技术不仅使零售、出行、餐饮、教育、居住及医疗保健等传统产业的规划、预约、沟通及交易流程实现数据化，还深刻变革了行业的运营模式与业务流程。科技巨头通过控制云基础设施、算法，直接或间接地掌握了这些领域的主动权，并积极布局未来产业，试图把云空间打造成可以容纳各种产业及服务的综合平台。科技巨头似乎扮演着至高无上的“君王”或“领主”角色，对各行各业施加着影响。然而，控制也是资本主义生产方式的内在逻辑——从控制劳动力到控制产业链——无需诉诸封建范畴。科技巨头遵循的是以利润最大化为目标的垄断资本扩张逻辑，它们利用风险投资、技术垄断和数据商品化等手段，追求企业和股东利益的最大化，这恰恰是资本主义生产关系的体现而非生产关系的封建化。

(II) Dominating the Physical Territory: The Politicization of Cloud Power

(二)支配实体疆域：云端权力的政治化

Tech giants are not satisfied with merely concentrating power in the cloud. At the economic level, they not only use digital technology to become commercial intermediaries and technical service providers for traditional industries but also deeply intervene in the development of the physical economy through means such as investment and mergers and acquisitions. Consequently, many tech giants have transcended their identity as purely digital enterprises. Taking Amazon as an example, its subsidiaries are extensively involved in multiple fields such as media and entertainment, e-commerce, cloud computing, logistics, grocery retail, healthcare, home services, and equipment services, covering almost all aspects of life. The comprehensive layout of tech giants in both the cloud and physical industries further consolidates their monopoly position in the economic network and ensures their sustained control over the industrial chain.

科技巨头并不满足于云端权力的集中。在经济层面，它们不仅利用数字技术成为传统产业的商业中介和技术服务提供者，还通过投资、并购等手段深度介入实体产业的发展。因此，众多科技巨头已超越了单纯的数字企业身份。以亚马逊为例，其旗下公司广泛涉足媒体娱乐、电子商务、云计算、物流、杂货零售、卫生保健、家居服务及设备服务等多个领域，几乎覆盖生活的所有环节。科技巨头全方位布局云端与实体产业，也进一步巩固了它们在经济网络中的垄断地位，保证了对产业链条的持续控制力。

More importantly, tech giants also aspire to enter the political sphere, attempting to directly intervene in national politics and policy to serve their own visions and intentions. On the one hand, they proactively respond to scrutiny from regulatory agencies and antitrust lawsuits. To this end, the strategy of tech companies is quite clear: hire a large number of lawyers and lobbyists to circumvent or even eliminate unfavorable policies. In the first nine months of 2024, Meta’s lobbying spending reached a record $18.9 million, a 29% increase compared to the same period in 2023. At the same time, Meta also hired 65 lobbyists, meaning that for every eight members of Congress, there is one lobbyist with an interest-related connection to Meta. In Europe, according to data released by the non-governmental organizations Corporate Europe Observatory and LobbyControl, as the EU’s digital policy regulatory oversight has intensified, tech companies’ lobbying expenses have increased to €113 million per year, with the top ten digital companies accounting for more than one-third of all lobbying expenditures. On the other hand, tech giants use personnel connections to directly intervene in and influence politics. Their common method is to use the revolving door—the flow of employees between public sector positions and private sector positions—to recruit former regulators or send employees to work in government departments. One study found that 18% of appointed personnel in the U.S. Department of Commerce are registered lobbyists, most of whom are core employees from major tech companies. A similar trend can be seen in Europe, where large tech companies hire former politicians, civil servants, and political advisors as corporate political strategists. The most notable phenomenon in recent years is cloud capitalists personally entering the political arena. In 2024, Elon Musk, as one of the world’s foremost wealthy businessmen, controls multiple technology companies including Tesla and SpaceX. He not only spent at least $270 million to support Trump’s presidential campaign but also used the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), which he acquired, to comment on and denounce various political events, and to impose technical sanctions and lawsuits against various opposing opinions. After Trump was elected President of the United States, Musk was also appointed to assist the new administration in leading the formation of the “Department of Government Efficiency,” aimed at reducing the size of the federal government. Thus, in global political affairs, the role of tech giants is not only becoming increasingly active and cannot be ignored but is also a key force influencing decision-making and public opinion.

更为重要的是，科技巨头同样希望涉足政治领域，试图直接干预国家政治和政策服务自身的愿景和意图。一方面，它们主动应对来自监管机构的审查和反垄断诉讼。为此，科技公司的策略相当明确：雇佣大批律师和游说者以规避甚或取消对自身的不利政策。2024年前9个月，元宇宙的游说支出达到创纪录的1890万美元，比2023年同期游说开销增长了29%。与此同时，元宇宙还雇佣了65名说客，相当于每八名国会议员中就有一名说客与元宇宙存在利益关联。欧洲方面，根据非政府组织欧洲企业观察站(Corporate Europe Observatory)和游说控制(LobbyControl)发布的数据，随着欧盟数字政策的监管力度加大，科技公司的游说费用已增至每年1.13亿欧元，前十大数字公司的游说总支出就占所有游说支出的1/3以上。另一方面，科技巨头利用人事关系直接介入和影响政治。它们惯用的方式是通过旋转门——雇员在公共部门职位和私营部门职位间的流动——招募前监管者或派驻员工进入政府部门从事服务工作。一项研究发现，美国商务部总任命人员中有18%是注册说客，其中大多是来自各大科技公司的核心员工。在欧洲也可以看到类似的趋势，大型科技公司聘请前政客、公务员和政治顾问作为企业的政治战略家。近年最为瞩目的现象是云端资本家亲自入场接手政治事务。2024年，埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)作为世界首屈一指的富商，掌握着包括特斯拉、SpaceX在内的多家技术公司。他不仅花费至少2.7亿美元支持特朗普竞选总统，还利用自己收购的社交媒体X(原Twitter),参与各种政治事件的评论和声讨，并对各种反对意见发起技术制裁与诉讼。在特朗普当选美国总统后，马斯克也被任命协助新一届政府领导组建“政府效率部”,旨在缩小联邦政府规模。由此可见，在全球政治事务中，科技巨头的角色不仅日益活跃成为不能忽视的角色，还是影响决策和民意的关键力量。

(III) Digital Tech Giants Become the Hub of Global Monopoly Capitalism

(三)数字科技巨头成为全球垄断资本主义的枢纽

There is no doubt that, with the deep integration of digital technology and capitalist relations of production, tech giants have become the core of the global capitalist accumulation system. On the one hand, tech giants maintain the basic structure of the global capitalist division of labor. Wage labor is the main body that produces surplus value, and the center-periphery system of capitalism has not undergone a fundamental transformation. On the other hand, global production and distribution power is concentrated in the hands of tech giants. Tech giants with core digital technologies far surpass traditional industrial giants in energy, industry, and transportation not only in market share and profitability but also demonstrate stronger capabilities in controlling supply chains. Moreover, tech giants rapidly expand their business in the financial services sector, using their vast user databases, digital capabilities, and innovative investment and financing business methods to compete with banks. Lenin, when analyzing imperialism, pointed out: "All the other countries of the world are more or less the debtors and tributaries of these four countries, these four 'pillars' of international banking, these four world financial capitals." [14]14 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Chapter 3. Proponents of techno-feudalism similarly recognize this; they argue that tech giants have begun to become the "pillars" of the economic network, and society as a whole has formed a new pyramid structure and revenue chain. At the very top stand the "cloud capitalists" as the "creditors" of the digital age, below them are industrial capitalists relying on cloud technology, and at the bottom are the exploited laborers.

毫无疑问，伴随数字技术与资本主义生产关系的深度融合，科技巨头已然成为全球资本主义积累体制的核心。一方面，科技巨头维持了全球资本主义生产分工的基本架构。雇佣劳动是生产剩余价值的主体，资本主义的中心-外围体系没有发生根本转变。另一方面，全球生产和分配权力向科技巨头集中。拥有数字核心技术的科技巨头不仅在市场份额、盈利能力方面远超能源、工业和运输等领域的传统产业巨头，在对供应链的掌控上也展现出更强实力。不仅如此，科技巨头在金融服务领域迅速扩张业务，并利用庞大的用户数据库、数字能力和创新投融资业务方式，与银行形成竞争态势。列宁在分析帝国主义时曾指出：“世界上其他各国，差不多都是这样或那样地成为这4个国家、这4个国际银行家、这4个世界金融资本的‘台柱’的债务人和进贡者了。”技术封建主义论者同样认识到这一点，他们主张科技巨头开始成为经济网络中的“台柱”,整个社会形成了一套崭新的金字塔结构和收益链条，站在最顶端的是作为数字时代“债权人”的“云端资本家”,下面分别是依靠云端技术的产业资本家和被剥削的劳工。

The monopoly power of digital tech giants also shows signs of reshaping state structures. Under the discourse of efficiency and refinement, the cloudification of the state has become an option for government governance. Governments sign collaboration contracts with tech companies, requiring enterprises to provide technological "solutions" for social governance and promoting the cloudification of public services. However, this process is also one in which public power is transformed into a commodity; a large amount of funds is transferred to tech companies as private profit. The vast amounts of data generated during the digitization of public services are also obtained cheaply or even for free by tech giants. While digital technology enhances governance efficiency, it also reduces government responsibility, as if public life only needs to be adjusted into data and algorithms to be regulated and properly handled with the help of technology. Some scholars have pointed out, "State cloudification originates from a naked neoliberal logic, that is, following the 'cloud responsibility model,' actively entrusting the state's responsibility for its data to large tech companies. This move is also supported by market-oriented discourse, which views different departments of the state as profit-seeking, agile, and flexible tech companies, rather than government agencies responsible for the welfare of citizens." [15]15 This is a paraphrase of a scholarly argument; the original source is not specified in the text. Furthermore, a closer "alliance" between state power and digital technology may give rise to a new form of state power—the "digital Leviathan"—posing new crises for individual autonomy and rights.

数字科技巨头的垄断权力也有重塑国家结构的迹象。在效率和精细化的话语下，国家云端化成为政府治理的一种选择。政府与科技公司签订协作合同，要求企业为社会治理提供技术“解决方案”,推动公共服务云端化。然而，这一过程也是公共权力转化为商品的过程，大量资金转移到科技公司成为私人利润；公共服务数字化过程中产生的大量数据也被科技巨头廉价甚至无偿获取。数字技术在提升治理效能的同时，也在减轻政府的责任，似乎公共生活只需调整为数据、算法，就能够在技术的帮助下得到调节和妥善处置。有学者指出，“国家云化源于一种赤裸裸的新自由主义逻辑，即遵循‘云责任模型’,积极将国家对其数据的责任委托给大型科技公司。这一举措同样受到市场导向话语的支持，这些话语将国家的不同部门视为追求利润、敏捷灵活的科技公司，而不是负责公民福利的政府机构。”此外，国家权力和数字更加紧密的“结盟”可能催生出一种新的国家权力形态——“数字利维坦”,个人的自主性及权利也就面临着新的危机。

The power of tech giants is capitalist in nature, absolutely not feudal in nature. The explosive innovation and development of digital technology have caused a "revolutionization" of the entire capitalist society. A small number of tech companies control the research, development, and application of digital technology, thereby extracting increasing profits. However, tech giants have always been a part of the global capitalist market, following the basic logic of capital accumulation, with the goal still being the surplus value created by wage labor. As levers coordinating global production and influencing world society, the power and control mechanisms of tech giants far exceed the scope of "feudal lords." The concentration of capital and power in a few giant enterprises conforms to the basic characteristics of monopoly capitalism. The features and evolutionary paths of tech giants in terms of monopoly form, output content, means of oppression, and methods of plunder are highly consistent with the logic of capital analyzed by Marx and the characteristics of monopoly dissected by Lenin—we are still in the highest stage of capitalism.

科技巨头的权力是资本主义性质而绝不是封建主义性质的。数字技术的爆发式创新和发展，让整个资本主义社会正在发生着“革命化”,一小部分科技公司控制了数字技术研发和应用，并据此攫取越来越多的利润。但科技巨头始终是全球资本主义市场中的一分子，遵循着资本积累的基本逻辑，追逐的目标仍是雇佣劳动创造的剩余价值。作为协调全球生产和影响世界社会的杠杆，科技巨头的权力和控制机制远远超出“封建领主”的范畴。资本和权力向少数巨头企业集中符合垄断资本主义的基本特征，科技巨头在垄断形态、输出内容、压迫手段、掠夺途径等方面呈现出的特征与演变路径，与马克思所分析的资本逻辑以及列宁所剖析的垄断特征都高度契合——我们仍处在资本主义的最高阶段。

Conclusion

结语

Varoufakis believes that techno-feudalism is "essentially different from capitalism," and therefore it "can help us see key aspects of the real world... and also help us understand a great power struggle that will very likely determine the face of the world in this century." [16]16 Yanis Varoufakis, *Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism*, 2023. His intention is naturally to better explain the world with the help of this new category of techno-feudalism and to find a path of liberation that meets historical conditions and the needs of the times. Precisely because of this, Varoufakis and other proponents of techno-feudalism "abandon" Marx's basic categories and analytical paths, and the final result can only be completely off the mark.

瓦鲁法基斯认为，技术封建主义“本质上有别于资本主义”,因此它“能帮助我们看清现实世界的关键面向……还能帮助我们理解一场极可能决定本世纪世界面貌的巨大权力斗争”。他的意图自然是希望借助技术封建主义这一新的范畴更好地解释世界，并找到满足历史条件、符合时代需要的解放路径。正因如此，瓦鲁法基斯等技术封建主义论者“放弃”马克思的基本范畴和分析路径，最终结果只能是南辕北辙。

First, capitalism is a complete set of relations of production, and tech giants are still the bricks and tiles that constitute the edifice of capitalism. Marx pointed out that "the specific manner and method in which this combination [of laborers and means of production] is accomplished distinguishes the different economic epochs of the social structure." [17]17 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume II, Chapter 1. Digital tech giants have not overturned the mode of combination between the means of production and laborers, nor have they changed the special roles played by material means of production and living labor power in the production process. Tech giants are not "lying flat" landlords; what they pursue is still the surplus value produced by capital employing labor, and the distribution of surplus value depends on the ownership of the means of production and the class struggle between them. Techno-feudalism is a static depiction of digital capitalism; it cannot fully reveal the internal logic and contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, nor can it explain the dynamic changes among classes under conditions of technological evolution.

第一，资本主义是一整套生产关系，科技巨头仍是构成资本主义大厦的砖瓦。马克思曾指出，劳动者和生产资料“实行这种结合的特殊方式和方法，使社会结构区分为各个不同的经济时期”。数字科技巨头并未颠覆生产资料和劳动者的结合方式，也没有改变物的生产资料和活的劳动力在生产过程中所起的特殊作用。科技巨头不是“躺平”的地主，其所追逐的仍是资本雇佣劳动力生产的剩余价值，而剩余价值的分配取决于生产资料的所有权及其各阶级之间的斗争。技术封建主义是对数字资本主义的静态刻画，不能完整揭示资本主义生产方式的内在逻辑和矛盾，也难以解释技术演进条件下各阶级之间的动态变化。

Second, tech giants have become rentiers at the top of the social pyramid, but their fundamental interests are consistent with those of other capitalists. Tech giants rose during the process of capital constructing the digital domain to achieve capital valorization and accumulation; they are the result of capital concentration and technological monopoly caused by the forward march of the capitalist mode of production. The bourgeoisie has thus further differentiated, with digital capitalists occupying a strong position in the economic network. The power to distribute surplus value is reshuffled within the bourgeoisie, with some power of traditional industrial, commercial, and financial capitalists being transferred and concentrated in the hands of digital capitalists. However, the antagonistic relationship between the bourgeoisie and the working class has not changed, nor has the former's control and exploitation of the latter. The techno-feudalist perspective does not fully examine the common interests of the bourgeoisie and their impact on class struggle.

第二，科技巨头成为社会金字塔顶端的食利者，但它们与其他资本家的根本利益是一致的。科技巨头是资本在建构数字领域以实现资本增殖和资本积累的过程中崛起的，是资本主义生产方式向前推进引致的资本集中和技术垄断造成的结果。资产阶级由此进一步分化，数字资本家在经济网络中占据了强势地位，剩余价值的分配权力在资产阶级内部重新洗牌，传统产业、商业资本家和金融资本家的部分权力向数字资本家转移和集中。但是，资产阶级与工人阶级之间的对立关系没有变，前者对后者的控制和剥削没有变，而技术封建主义观点并未充分审视资产阶级的共同利益及其对阶级斗争的影响。

Third, from the perspective of the path of liberation, the view of "cloud uprising to overthrow techno-feudalism" proposed by proponents of techno-feudalism is, to a certain extent, conservative. For example, Varoufakis argues that, constrained by the dominance of cloud capital over the world, it is insufficient to merely unite the proletariat; it is necessary to unite "the traditional proletariat and the cloud proletariat, as well as the cloud tenant farmers, and at least part of the vassal capitalists." [18]18 Yanis Varoufakis, *Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism*, 2023. At the same time, he points out that due to the physical isolation of cloud tenant farmers and the cloud proletariat, it is necessary not only to mobilize in the cloud but also to use cloud systems and technology to carry out actions. Undoubtedly, Varoufakis attempts to provide a set of actionable action plans for the struggle of the proletariat in the digital age. However, these conceptions have flaws. On the one hand, Varoufakis's vision of unity is essentially a digital-age bourgeois revolution, falling short of the Marxist sense of human emancipation. On the other hand, Varoufakis is overly optimistic about the possible effects of cloud mobilization and lacks sufficient estimation of potential obstacles and the enormous sacrifices required.

第三，从解放路径看，技术封建主义论者提出的“推翻技术封建主义的云起义”观点，一定程度上是保守的。例如，瓦鲁法基斯认为，受制于云端资本对世界的支配，仅将无产阶级团结起来是不够，必须联合“传统的无产阶级和云端无产者，还有云端佃农，以及至少部分附庸资本家”。同时他指出，由于云端佃农和云端无产者的实体隔离，不仅需要进行云端动员，还要利用云端系统和科技展开行动。毫无疑问，瓦鲁法基斯尝试为数字时代的无产阶级抗争提供一套能够落地的行动方案，但是，这些构想存在缺陷。一方面，瓦鲁法基斯的联合想象本质上是一种数字时代的资产阶级革命，达不到马克思主义意义上的人类解放；另一方面，瓦鲁法基斯对云端动员可能产生的效果过于乐观，对潜在的阻碍和需要付出的巨大牺牲缺乏充分估计。

Overall, as a theoretical attempt, techno-feudalism reveals at the phenomenal level the core characteristics and real contradictions of tech giants in the digital age. However, applying the concept of “feudalism” to the developmental process of capitalism is neither consistent with theoretical logic nor in accordance with historical facts; it is a trans-historical philosophy. The fundamental reason why proponents of techno-feudalism misread capital and labor, and misjudge profit and the market, is their failure to understand the developmental nature of capitalism. Of course, we cannot deny the intellectual insights of the techno-feudalism thesis. Its theoretical limitations also remind us that we should not use form to obscure essence. Therefore, we must adhere to the analytical framework of Marxism, examine the connections and contradictions among digital tech giants, digital labor, and digital capital, clarify how digital technology creates conditions for the global linkage of workers, and explore corresponding struggle strategies around the dynamics and weaknesses of digital capitalism, thereby finding an exit to a new society.

总的来说，技术封建主义作为理论尝试，在现象层面揭示了数字时代科技巨头的核心特质与现实矛盾，但用“封建”概念套用于资本主义的发展进程，既不符合理论逻辑，也违背历史事实，是一种超历史哲学。技术封建主义论者对资本和劳动的误读，对利润和市场的误判，根本原因是他们未能理解资本主义的发展性。当然，我们不能否认技术封建主义论的思想创见，其理论上的局限也提醒我们，不应以形式去模糊本质。因此，我们必须坚持马克思主义的分析脉络，审视数字科技巨头、数字劳工和数字资本的关联及矛盾，明晰数字技术如何为劳动者的全球联结创造条件，并围绕数字资本主义的动力和弱点探索相应的斗争策略，从而找到通往新社会的出口。

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑