Techno-Feudalism and the Problem of “General Intellect” in the Era of the Digital Economy

At the dawn of the internet, many envisioned it as a transformative force that would democratize information and empower individuals, thereby bringing about a more open and democratic society. In his 1995 book *Being Digital*, Nicholas Negroponte optimistically predicted that the empowering nature of digital existence would bring new hope and dignity. However, over time, the internet has gradually fallen under the control of a small number of digital oligarchs. The unprecedented distributed information collection and control architecture dominated by these digital oligarchs has become an omnipresent, invisible “big Other” embedded in everyday life. What was once seen as a new frontier for openness and democratization has gradually become a site of concentrated power and wealth. This economic form dominated by digital oligarchs has recently been conceptualized by some foreign scholars as “techno-feudalism,” sparking widespread discussion.

在互联网兴起之初，许多人曾将其设想为一种变革性力量，认为它将推动信息民主化并赋能个人，从而带来一个更加开放和民主的社会。尼古拉斯·尼葛洛庞帝(Nicholas Negroponte)在其出版于1995年的《数字化生存》(Being Digital)一书中，便曾乐观地预言数字化生存的赋权本质将带来新的希望和尊严。然而，随着时间的推移，互联网逐渐被少数数字寡头所掌控。由这些数字寡头所主导的前所未有的分布式信息收集和控制架构，成为嵌入日常生活之中的、无所不在的隐形“大他者”。曾经被视为开放与民主化新边界的领域，如今却逐渐成为权力和财富集中的场所。这种被数字寡头主宰的经济形态最近被一些国外学者概念化为技术封建主义(Techno-Feudalism),引起了广泛的讨论。

This article attempts to take the concept of techno-feudalism as an entry point to analyze the exploitative logic and power structure of the digital economy. First, it will discuss the core characteristics of techno-feudalism, analyzing how it constructs a new economic form centered on “rent extraction” through the monopolization of platform resources and user data. Subsequently, it will critically examine this concept, pointing out its theoretical limitations in historical analogy and its simplified understanding of monopolistic digital platforms. On this basis, the article further reveals the essential problem involved in the concept of techno-feudalism, namely the privatization of “general intellect” in the era of the digital economy and its inherent tensions. Finally, it attempts to excavate the liberating potential of collective intelligence and social cooperation from within the contradictions of techno-feudalism as a new developmental form of capitalism, providing new theoretical insights for the mechanisms of value creation and the transformation of social structures in the digital economy.

本文试图以技术封建主义概念为切入点，剖析数字经济的剥削逻辑与权力结构。首先，本文将讨论技术封建主义的核心特征，分析其如何通过对平台资源和用户数据的垄断，构建一种以“租金提取”为核心的新型经济形态。继而，本文对该概念进行批判性审视，指出其在历史类比中的理论局限，以及对垄断数字平台的简化理解。在此基础上，本文进一步揭示技术封建主义概念所涉及的本质性问题，即数字经济时代“一般智力”的私有化及其内在张力。最后，本文尝试在技术封建主义作为资本主义新发展形态的矛盾中，挖掘出集体智慧与社会合作的解放潜能，为数字经济中的价值创造机制和社会结构的变革提供新的理论启示。

I. The Proposal of Techno-Feudalism and Its Core Characteristics

一、 技术封建主义的提出及其核心特征

The concept of techno-feudalism has gained attention in recent years, mainly thanks to discussions by scholars such as Yanis Varoufakis and Cédric Durand. In their view, under the monopoly of internet giants over platforms and data, the digital economy is gradually moving towards an exploitative model centered on rent extraction, thereby forming a techno-feudalist model that replaces capitalism.

技术封建主义这一概念在近年引发关注，主要得益于雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)和塞德里克·迪朗(Cédric Durand)等学者的讨论。在他们看来，在互联网巨头对平台与数据的垄断下，数字经济正逐渐走向以租金提取为核心的剥削模式，从而形成了替代资本主义的技术封建主义模式。

Durand’s book *Techno-Feudalism* is the first work in international academia to systematically expound on the issue of techno-feudalism. In this book, Durand conducts an in-depth analysis of rent-seeking behavior in the digital economy, pointing out how digital platforms extract rent by monopolizing key infrastructure without directly participating in production. For example, by controlling digital infrastructure (such as search engines, markets, and cloud services), platforms act as “gatekeepers” and charge access fees to businesses and users. He distinguishes four types of rent: intellectual property rent, natural monopoly rent, differential rent on intangible assets, and dynamic innovation rent. Besides identifying the key mechanisms of rent-seeking behavior, Durand also emphasizes the role of user-generated content in this process. He points out that user-generated data is collected and monetized by platforms, forming a core part of their rent-seeking behavior. Network effects and platform dominance further reinforce this model. As platforms scale up, their value increases, users and businesses become locked in, which further consolidates their market power. Thus, this system has created a new digital rentier class that extracts wealth through control over digital infrastructure rather than through productive activities, leading to increased inequality and further market concentration. Therefore, Durand directly states: “The boom of the digital economy is fueling a vast rentier economy, not because information is a new source of value, but because of the control over information and knowledge—knowledge monopoly has become the most advantageous means of capturing value.”

迪朗的《技术封建主义》一书是国际学术界第一本系统阐述技术封建主义问题的著作。在该书中，迪朗对数字经济中的寻租行为进行了深入分析，指出数字平台如何在不直接参与生产的状况下通过垄断关键基础设施来提取租金。例如通过对数字基础设施(如搜索引擎、市场和云服务)的控制，平台充当“守门人”,并向企业和用户收取访问费用。他区分了四种租金类型，即知识产权租金、自然垄断租金、无形资产的级差地租和动态创新租金。除了识别寻租行为的关键机制，迪朗还强调了用户生成的内容在其中的作用。他指出，用户生成的数据被平台收集并货币化，构成了其寻租行为的核心部分。而网络效应和平台主导地位则进一步强化了这一模式。随着平台规模的扩大，其价值增加，用户和企业被锁定，这进一步巩固了它们的市场力量。可见，这一系统已经创造了一个新的数字租金阶级，该阶级通过对数字基础设施的控制来提取财富，而不是通过生产性活动，这导致了不平等的加剧和市场的进一步集中化。因此，迪朗直接指出：“数字经济的繁荣正在助长庞大的食利者经济，并不是因为信息是新的价值来源，而是因为对信息和知识的控制——知识垄断已经成为获取价值的最有利的手段。”

Following Durand, Varoufakis’s 2024 book *Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism* focuses on how the traditional capitalist model has transformed into a new economic order he calls techno-feudalism. In this new order, rent extraction replaces profit as the core driving force. This transformation is driven by the rise of cloud capital, where large tech companies accumulate wealth by controlling platforms and extracting rent from users and small capitalists, rather than by creating new goods or services. By controlling access to digital platforms, tech giants like Apple, Google, and Amazon extract rent from consumers and producers, which Varoufakis terms cloud rent. This rent-based system resembles feudal structures, where lords extracted rent from peasants by providing access to land. Ultimately, a new class structure emerges, with cloud lords at the top, vassal capitalists serving them, and consumers and workers reduced to cloud serfs in the digital economy.

在迪朗之后，瓦鲁法基斯于2024年出版的《技术封建主义：什么杀死了资本主义》则侧重讨论传统资本主义模式如何转变为他称之为技术封建主义的新经济秩序。在这一新秩序中，租金提取取代了利润成为核心驱动力。这一转变是由云资本(Cloud Capital)的兴起推动的，其中，大型科技公司通过控制平台并从用户和小资本家那里提取租金来积累财富，而不是通过创造新的商品或服务。通过控制对数字平台的访问，像苹果、谷歌和亚马逊这样的科技巨头从消费者和生产者那里提取租金，瓦鲁法基斯将其称为云租金(Cloud Rent)。这种基于租金的系统类似于封建结构，即领主通过提供土地的使用权从农民那里提取租金的结构。最终，一个新的阶级结构形成了，云地主处于顶端，附庸资本家服务于他们，而消费者和工人则在数字经济中沦为云农奴。

Varoufakis argues that cloud rent is the fee that vassal capitalists (small producers) must pay to cloud lords (owners of large tech platforms) for access to their platforms or cloud fiefs. This creates a new form of economic exploitation: under capitalism, workers are exploited by capitalists; under techno-feudalism, even capitalists become vassals of the cloud lords, forced to pay rent for market access controlled by tech giants. Furthermore, the content and data generated by the unpaid labor of cloud serfs (platform users) also contribute to the accumulation of cloud capital, making exploitation ubiquitous. In Varoufakis’s view, the fundamental shift here is the victory and replacement of capitalist profit by feudal rent. He argues that while profit is vulnerable to market competition, rent derives from privileged access to limited resources or platforms, allowing cloud lords to continuously extract wealth without creating anything new. This transformation from profit-driven capitalism to rent-based techno-feudalism redefines the global economy.

瓦鲁法基斯认为，云租金是附庸资本家(小生产者)必须支付给云地主(大科技平台所有者)的费用，以获得其平台或云封地的访问权。这创造了一种新的经济剥削形式：在资本主义下，工人被资本家剥削；而在技术封建主义下，连资本家也成为云地主的附庸，被迫支付租金以获得由科技巨头控制的市场准入权。此外，来自云农奴(平台用户)无偿劳动所产生的内容和数据也促进了云资本的积累，使剥削变得无所不在。在瓦鲁法基斯看来，这里的根本转变是封建性的租金对资本主义利润的战胜和替代。他认为，虽然利润易受市场竞争影响，但租金来自对有限资源或平台的特权访问，使得云地主无需创造任何新事物便能持续提取财富。这种从以利润为驱动的资本主义向以租金为基础的技术封建主义的转变，重新定义了全球经济。

Thus, the core issue of techno-feudalism lies in its restructuring of the logic of value creation and distribution in the digital economy through rent extraction. In this model, internet giants continuously strengthen their control over digital infrastructure and resource access rights through platform monopolization, commodification of user data, algorithmic manipulation, and intellectual property control, thereby achieving sustained value accumulation without directly participating in production. This not only leads to a high concentration of wealth and power, forming a division between cloud lords and cloud serfs in the digital economy, but also further exacerbates market monopoly and social inequality, even eroding space for innovation and overall social welfare.

可见，技术封建主义的核心问题在于其通过租金提取重构了数字经济的价值创造和分配逻辑。在这一模式下，互联网巨头通过平台垄断、用户数据的商品化、算法操纵以及知识产权控制等手段，不断强化对数字基础设施和资源访问权的掌控，从而实现价值的持续积累，而无需直接参与生产。这不仅导致了财富和权力的高度集中，形成了数字经济中的云地主和云农奴之间的分化，还进一步加剧了市场垄断和社会不平等，甚至侵蚀了创新的空间与社会整体的福祉。

However, does the concept of techno-feudalism fully capture the complexity of the digital economy? Does its prominent emphasis on rent extraction, to some extent, overlook other dynamic mechanisms brought about by technological development? For instance, productive changes driven by technological innovation, or economic growth generated by network effects. Furthermore, does this conceptual framework overemphasize the analogy of “feudalism” while neglecting the continued role of capitalist logic in the contemporary digital economy? In response to these questions, we will engage in a critical discussion of the concept of techno-feudalism, analyzing its theoretical blind spots and potential limitations in capturing the reality of the digital economy.

然而，技术封建主义这一概念是否全面捕捉了数字经济的复杂性?其对租金提取的突出强调，是否在某种程度上忽视了技术发展带来的其他动力机制?比如技术创新带来的生产性变革，或网络效应带来的经济增长等等。此外，这一概念框架是否过于强调“封建主义”的类比而忽视了当代数字经济中资本主义逻辑的持续作用?针对这些疑问，我们将对技术封建主义概念展开批判性探讨，分析其在捕捉数字经济现实时的理论盲点与潜在局限。

II. The Dual Fallacies of the Concept of Techno-Feudalism

二、技术封建主义概念的双重谬误

As noted above, rent extraction is indeed a widespread problem in the current digital economy. However, whether techno-feudalism is an appropriate conceptualization of this phenomenon remains to be assessed. The concept of techno-feudalism has limitations in two respects: first, it misreads the nature of feudalism and its ground rent; second, it simplifies the rent-extraction methods of digital platforms, neglecting their productive aspects.

正如前文所述，租金提取确实是当下数字经济中的一个普遍问题。但是技术封建主义是否是对这一现象的恰当概念化，却仍然有待评估。技术封建主义概念在以下两方面存在局限：首先，它误读了封建主义及其地租的性质；其次，它简化了数字平台的租金抽取方法，忽视了平台的生产性。

(1) A Historical Misreading of Feudalism

(一)对封建主义的历史性误读

According to the definition given by F. L. Ganshof in his classic work *What Is Feudalism?*, feudalism historically refers to a political system based on private land ownership. In this system, vassals pledged loyalty and service (mainly military service) to their lords, and the lords granted the vassals a property right over a piece of land in return for their political allegiance. Thus, both the vassal and the fief became the two elements of feudalism, with the former being the cause of the latter. Marc Bloch, in *Feudal Society*, proposed a broader understanding of feudalism. He argued that feudalism “can fundamentally be understood as a network of dependency relations” that existed not only between lords and vassals but also “permeated all social ranks,” including the nobility, clergy, and peasants. But regardless of the differences in their views, they both understood feudalism as a form of extra-economic coercion; that is, feudalism cannot be reduced to a form of ownership but must be understood at the level of the politico-legal superstructure.

根据弗朗索瓦·冈绍夫(F.L. Ganshof)在其经典著作《何为封建主义?》中的定义，封建主义在历史上指的是一种建立在土地私有制之上的政治体系。在这种体系中，封臣向封君效忠服役(主要是军役),而封君也给封臣授予一片土地的物权，以回报其政治效忠。因此，封臣与封土都成了封建制的两个要素，而前者是后者的原因。马克·布洛赫(Marc Bloch)则在《封建社会》中提出了一种对封建主义的广义理解。他主张封建主义“从根本上可以被理解为一种依附关系网”,它不仅存在于封君与封臣之间，而且“贯穿于社会各等级”之间，包括贵族、教士与农民之间。但无论他们之间的观点存在多大差异，他们都把封建主义理解为一种超经济强制，也就是说，不能把封建主义还原为一种所有制形式，而是应该从政治-法律上层建筑的层面来理解。

According to the above definition, the notion of techno-feudalism undoubtedly misunderstands feudalism, because it simply reduces feudalism to a form of economic exploitation based on rent extraction, without noticing that what dominates the feudal system is the political relationship between different classes. As Perry Anderson has pointed out, all pre-capitalist societies used extra-economic coercion (i.e., custom, religion, politics, law, etc.) to extract the surplus product; only capitalism created a purely economic form of exploitation. The notion of techno-feudalism fails to recognize that the essence of feudalism lies not in the presence or absence of ground-rent, but in the class relations and political relations behind rent extraction.

根据上述定义，技术封建主义的说法无疑错误理解了封建主义，因为它简单地把封建主义理解为一种建立在租金提取之上的经济剥削，而没有注意到主导封建体系的是不同阶级之间的政治关系。正如佩里·安德森(Perry Anderson)所指出的，资本主义之前的所有社会都是用超经济强制(即习俗、宗教、政治和法律等)来攫取生产剩余，只有资本主义创造了一种纯粹经济的剥削形式。技术封建主义的说法没有认识到，封建主义的本质并不在于地租的有无，而是在于地租提取背后的阶级关系和政治关系。

In fact, although rent extraction is an ancient phenomenon, it has accompanied the development of capitalism throughout. In Marx’s analysis of the capitalist economic system, land, labor, and capital have always been the three core elements, with rent, wages, and profit respectively constituting the income of the owners of these three elements. Among them, both rent and profit are transformed forms of the surplus value created by the laborer. However, although rent has existed from ancient times to the present, its form has continuously developed with history. Marx clearly distinguished the difference between feudal and capitalist forms of rent: the former was extracted through direct political dependency, while the latter is extracted through market exchange. In this sense, the existence of rent has never been a marker for distinguishing different social formations; only the form of rent is. Rent extraction based on purely economic relations is a completely new phenomenon of modern capitalism, and the rent in techno-feudalism takes precisely the form of commercial rent in capitalist society; it reflects an ability to appropriate surplus value in the production process, rather than being based on extra-economic coercion such as custom, religion, and politics, which are the core characteristics of feudalism.

实际上，地租提取虽然是一个古老的现象，但它却一直伴随着资本主义发展的始终。在马克思对资本主义经济体系的分析中，土地、劳动与资本一直都是最核心的三大要素，地租、工资与利润分别构成这三个要素所有者的收入。其中，地租和利润都是劳动者创造的剩余价值的转化形式。然而，地租虽然从古到今都一直存在，但它的形式却随着历史而不断发展。马克思明确区分了封建主义和资本主义地租形式的差别，前者是通过直接的政治依附来攫取的，而后者是则是通过市场交换来提取的。在这个意义上，地租的存在从来不是区分不同社会形态的标志，只有地租的形态才是。建立在纯粹经济关系之上的租金提取是一种现代资本主义的全新现象，而技术封建主义中的租金采取的正是资本主义社会中商业地租的形式，它反映的是一种在生产过程中剥夺剩余价值的能力，而不是基于习俗、宗教和政治等超经济强制，后者才是封建主义的核心特征。

(2) Neglect of the Productive Character of Platforms

(二)对平台生产性的忽视

In the digital economy, not only does the form of rent extraction differ from feudalism, but its method of extraction is also completely different from feudalism. The core argument of techno-feudalism is that platform companies primarily extract rent by monopolizing the right to use digital infrastructure, just as feudal lords owned land. But this comparison oversimplifies the nature of these digital giants. Feudal lords relied heavily on the static extraction of rent from land without engaging in productive activities. In contrast, digital platform companies produce the platform’s architecture, data, and services. For example, companies like Amazon are not only intermediaries that extract rent from sellers using their marketplace but also highly productive enterprises innovating across industries, with fields ranging from cloud computing to logistics to artificial intelligence. Therefore, platforms cannot simply be understood as factors of production like land but should also be regarded as commodities; the revenue digital giants obtain from platforms should not simply be understood as rent but also as profit. Consequently, the rent-extraction behavior of the digital economy has not exceeded the scope of capitalism.

在数字经济中，不仅租金提取的形式不同于封建主义，其提取方法也完全不同于封建主义。技术封建主义的核心观点是，平台公司主要通过垄断数字基础设施的使用权来攫取租金，就像封建领主拥有土地一样。但这种比较过于简化了这些数字巨头的性质。封建领主在很大程度上依赖于从土地上静态提取租金，而不从事生产性活动。与之不同的是，数字平台公司会对平台的架构、数据和服务进行生产。例如，亚马逊等公司不仅是从使用其市场的卖家那里提取租金的中介机构，而且还是跨行业创新的高产企业，其涉猎领域从云计算到物流，到人工智能。因此，平台不能仅仅被理解为土地这样的生产要素，还应被视为商品；数字巨头从平台获得的收入也不应仅仅被理解为租金，还应被理解为利润。因此，数字经济的租金提取行为并未超出资本主义的范畴。

In his 2017 book *Platform Capitalism*, Nick Srnicek formally proposed the concept of “platform capitalism” to understand the operational models of digital platforms such as Amazon, Google, and Uber. Platform capitalism refers to a new mode of accumulation in which digital platforms act as intermediaries, extracting, processing, and monetizing data while facilitating interactions between different users, such as consumers, advertisers, and workers. These platforms create markets through the commodification of data, labor, and services, and utilize network effects to capture profits. It can be seen that platforms are not rent-seeking entities akin to feudal landlords, as techno-feudalist theory claims, but productive capitalist enterprises that invest in technology and infrastructure, continuously innovate, and extract surplus value through digital business models to maximize profits. As Srnicek argues, these platforms are deeply embedded in the traditional capitalist logic of expansion and accumulation.

尼克·斯尔尼塞克 (Nick Srnicek) 在2017年出版的《平台资本主义》一书中正式提出“平台资本主义”(Platform Capitalism)这个概念，用以理解亚马逊、谷歌和优步等数字平台的运作模式。平台资本主义指的是一种新的积累模式，在这种模式中，数字平台充当中介，提取、处理数据并将其货币化，同时促进消费者、广告商和工人等不同用户之间的互动。这些平台通过对数据、劳动力和服务的商品化来创造市场，并利用网络效应获取利润。可见，平台并不像技术封建主义理论所认为的那样，是类似于封建地主的寻租实体，而是生产性资本主义企业，它们投资于技术和基础设施并不断创新，通过数字商业模式提取剩余价值，实现利润最大化。正如斯尔尼塞克所认为的，这些平台深深植根于扩张和积累的传统资本主义逻辑中。

It is precisely in this sense that Jeremy Gilbert argues that conceptualizing the problem of rent extraction in the digital economy as platform capitalism is more appropriate than techno-feudalism. In his view, the digital platform economy is not a break with capitalism but the latest development of capitalism. Evgeny Morozov similarly argues that although these companies rely on rent extraction, they still operate within the capitalist framework. Unlike non-productive feudal lords, these companies make massive investments in technology and infrastructure and pursue profits through competition and innovation. Although platforms do enjoy monopoly power, they must continuously innovate and reinvest to maintain their dominant position. Failure to do so leaves them vulnerable to disruption by competitors, as demonstrated by the rise of new platforms like ByteDance, which are challenging established platforms like Meta. This competitive pressure drives digital giants to invest heavily in technology and infrastructure, constantly innovating to maintain and expand their technological capabilities and market coverage. In Gilbert’s view, these characteristics are more consistent with the expansionary and competitive nature of capitalism than with the static, non-productive rentier model associated with feudalism. Therefore, in the revenue of platform companies, profit and rent coexist. Although modern digital platforms share similarities with feudal structures in terms of rent-seeking, their business models combine rent extraction with the pursuit of profit, which is far more complex than feudalism.

也正是在此意义上，杰里米·吉尔伯特(Jeremy Gilbert)主张，将数字经济中的租金提取问题概念化为平台资本主义比技术封建主义更合适。在他看来，数字平台经济不是与资本主义决裂，而是资本主义的最新发展。叶夫根尼·莫罗佐夫(Evgeny Morozov)同样认为，尽管这些公司依赖于租金提取，但它们仍然在资本主义框架内运作。与非生产性的封建领主不同，这些公司在技术和基础设施上进行大量投资，并通过竞争和创新来追求利润。虽然平台确实享有垄断权力，但它们必须不断创新和再投资，以维持其主导地位。如果做不到这一点，就会被竞争对手扰乱市场，字节跳动等新平台的崛起就证明了这一点，它们正在挑战元宇宙等老牌平台。这种竞争压力促使数字巨头在技术和基础设施方面竞相投入巨资，不断创新，以保持和扩大其技术能力和市场覆盖范围。在吉尔伯特看来，这些特点更符合资本主义的扩张性和竞争性，而不是与封建主义相关的静态、非生产性的租佃模式。因此，在平台公司的收入中，利润和租金并存。尽管现代数字平台与封建结构在寻租方面存在相似之处，但它们的商业模式是将租金提取与利润追求结合在一起，这远比封建主义更为复杂。

Through the above analysis, it can be seen that the method of rent extraction in the digital economy is not homogeneous with the extra-economic coercion of the feudal era; on the contrary, these platforms still operate within the logic of capitalist competition and expansion. It is precisely this dimension of productivity and market competition that prevents them from being simply regarded as “rent owners” akin to feudal lords. Therefore, concepts such as platform capitalism or cognitive capitalism may more accurately describe the complex forms of exploitation in the digital age.

通过上述分析可以看出，数字经济中的租金提取方式与封建时代的超经济强制并不具备同质性；相反，这些平台仍在资本主义的竞争与扩张逻辑中运作。正是这种生产性与市场竞争的维度，使它们无法被简单地视为封建领主式的“租金所有者”。因此，诸如平台资本主义或认知资本主义(Cognitive Capitalism)等概念，或许更能准确描述数字时代的复杂剥削形式。

(3) The Prerequisite for Rent-Seeking in the Digital Economy: Appropriating Scarcity

(三)数字经济的寻租前提：占有稀缺性

Although the concept of techno-feudalism fails to accurately summarize the problems of the digital economy era, a rent-seeking process has indeed emerged in the digital economy. Therefore, merely refuting the concept of techno-feudalism and arguing that the platform economy remains productive cannot fully respond to the core concern raised by techno-feudalism: how does the digital economy generate rent-seeking behavior?

虽然技术封建主义概念未能精准概括数字经济时代的问题，但无论如何，数字经济中确实出现了一种寻租过程。因此，仅仅批驳技术封建主义概念，认为平台经济仍然是生产性的，并不能完全回应技术封建主义提出的核心关切：数字经济是如何产生寻租行为的?

All rent-seeking presupposes the possession of scarce resources, and the same is true of rent-seeking in the platform economy. Scarce resources such as land are formed naturally; their scarcity derives from the inherent finiteness of natural resources themselves. However, by contrast, scarce resources such as platform infrastructure, platform big data, technological patents, and user groups are artificially produced, and their scarcity is also manufactured through platform companies’ monopolistic possession, algorithmic control, or intellectual property control. In other words, the scarce resources that platform companies lease out are not, in essence, truly scarce resources; rather, they are endowed with scarcity only in the process of privatizing public resources.

任何寻租都是以对稀缺资源的占有为前提的，平台经济中的寻租亦是如此。诸如土地这样的稀缺资源是自然形成的，它的稀缺性源于自然资源本身的有限性。然而，与之不同的是，平台基础设施、平台大数据、技术专利和用户群这样的稀缺资源却是人为产生的，其稀缺性也是通过平台公司的垄断占有、算法控制或知识产权控制所制造出来的。换言之，平台公司所出租的稀缺资源，本质上并非真正意义上的稀缺资源，而是在其对公共资源进行私有化的过程中，才被赋予了稀缺性。

Take the formation of big data as an example. Big data is composed of a vast collection of information such as personal data, user behavior, and content; these data are continuously created in the process of individual interaction with digital platforms. In the digital economy, personal data has become the most valuable commodity, which can be widely applied in various commercial scenarios such as targeted advertising, machine learning, and predictive analytics. From browsing the internet and posting social media content to online shopping, every interaction by users continuously generates data. However, the commercial value generated by these data produced by the public is entirely appropriated by platform companies, and the revenue also belongs to them. As Tiziana Terranova points out, labor exploitation in the modern digital economy is embodied in the platform’s uncompensated appropriation of user-generated content and data.

以大数据的形成为例。大数据是由个人信息、用户行为和内容等大量信息集合构成，这些数据是个体与数字平台互动的过程中被不断创造出来的。在数字经济中，个人数据已成为最具价值的商品，它可以广泛应用于定向广告、机器学习、预测分析等多种商业场景。从浏览互联网、发布社交媒体内容，到线上购物，用户的每一次互动，都在持续生成数据。然而，这些由公众生成的数据所产生的商业价值，却完全被平台公司占有，收益也归其所有。正如蒂兹纳·特拉诺瓦(Tiziana Terranova)指出的，现代数字经济中的劳动剥削体现在平台对用户生成内容和数据的无偿占有上。

Digital platforms collect and store large amounts of personal data without obtaining users’ informed consent, while claiming ownership of these data, and then transform them into private commodities for sale or lease. Shoshana Zuboff conceptualizes this phenomenon as “surveillance capitalism,” used to describe a new economic model that takes human experience as free raw material for commercial exploitation. Digital platforms possess enormous control over data and intellectual labor, causing wealth to become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few monopoly giants. As Morozov criticizes, platforms monopolize society’s intellectual labor and knowledge production by controlling digital infrastructure and user data. It is evident that although these companies do not directly generate data, through exclusive control over data collection and analysis, they successfully shape it into a scarce resource. Thus, big data becomes a typical example—a resource produced by the public but privatized and monopolized. The problem of privatization of public resources is not limited to the field of big data but runs through all aspects of the digital economy. For example, open-source software libraries, jointly maintained by the public, have become a core component of platform infrastructure construction; many key technological patents are actually the results of publicly funded research or the crystallization of collective intelligence. However, most of these public resources produced by the public are monetized, privatized, and controlled in the hands of a few monopoly giants.

数字平台在未获得用户知情同意的情况下，收集并储存大量个人数据，同时声称对这些数据拥有所有权，进而将其转化为私有商品，用于出售或租赁。肖珊娜·祖伯夫(Shoshana Zuboff)将这种现象概念化为“监视资本主义”(Surveillance Capitalism),用以描述一种将人类体验作为免费原材料供商业开发的新型经济模式。数字平台对数据和智力劳动具有巨大的控制力，使财富日益集中在少数几家垄断巨头手中。正如莫罗佐夫所批判的，平台通过控制数字基础设施和用户数据，垄断了社会的智力劳动和知识生产。显 而易见，这些公司虽并不直接生成数据，却通过对数据收集和分析的排他性控制，成功将其塑造为一种稀缺资源。由此，大数据成为一个典型例子——一种由公众生产但被私有化并垄断的资源。公共资源私有化问题并非仅限于大数据领域，而是贯穿于数字经济各个环节。例如，由公众共同维护的开源软件库，已成为平台基础设施建设的核心组成部分；许多关键技术专利，实际上是公共财政资助的研究成果，或集体智慧的结晶。然而，这些由公众生产的公共资源却多数都被货币化、私有化，掌控在少数垄断巨头手中。

III. The Privatization of “General Intellect” and Its Consequences

三、“一般智力”的私有化及其后果

The concept of techno-feudalism both misreads the nature of feudal land rent and oversimplifies the methods of rent extraction by digital platforms. However, the concept of techno-feudalism reveals a new phenomenon, namely, the widespread existence of rent-seeking behavior based on “enclosure of knowledge” in the digital economy. The root of this rent-seeking behavior lies in the privatization of public resources, which embodies the conflict between the public nature of general intellect and its privatization.

技术封建主义概念既误读了封建主义地租的性质，也简化了数字平台的租金攫取方法。但技术封建主义概念揭示了一个新现象，即数字经济中普遍存在着基于“知识圈地”的寻租行为。这种寻租行为的根源在于公共资源的私有化，它体现了一般智力的公共性与其私有化之间的冲突。

(1) The Contradiction between the Public Nature and Privatization of General Intellect

(一)一般智力的公共性与私有化矛盾

Marx first proposed the concept of “general intellect” in the “Fragment on Machines” of the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), analyzing the central position of technology and knowledge in the capitalist production system. He wrote: “The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it.” This passage clearly reveals the productive character of general intellect as social knowledge, namely, that it not only drives technological progress but also reshapes social conditions and modes of production. In Marx’s view, general intellect does not originate from the isolated creation of individual genius but is a system of public knowledge gradually formed by society in the process of scientific discovery and technological progress. It possesses a high degree of publicness; however, once it is objectified in machines and technological systems, it significantly reduces dependence on direct human labor. In this sense, the technological development driven by general intellect becomes, in turn, a force that exploits workers, directly or indirectly strengthening capital’s control over the production process. This contradiction highlights the dual character of general intellect in capitalist production: it is both the crystallization of society’s overall creativity and an important tool for capital to pursue surplus value.

马克思在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》的“机器论片段”中首次提出“一般智力”概念，以分析技术与知识在资本主义生产体系中的核心地位。他写道：“固定资本的发展表明，一般社会知识，已经在多么大的程度上变成了直接的生产力，从而社会生活过程的条件本身在多么大的程度上受到一般智力的控制并按照这种智力得到改造。”这段论述清晰地揭示了一般智力作为社会知识的生产性特征，即它不仅推动了技术的进步，也重塑了社会条件和生产方式。在马克思看来，一般智力并非源于个体天才的孤立创作，而是社会在科学发现、技术进步过程中逐步形成的公共知识体系。它具有高度的公共性，然而一旦其物化于机器和技术系统，便会显著降低对直接人类劳动的依赖。在此意义上，由一般智力所推动的技术发展，反过来成为剥削劳动者的力量，直接或间接强化了资本对生产过程的控制。这个矛盾突显了一般智力在资本主义生产中的双重属性：既是社会整体创造力的结晶，也是资本追逐剩余价值的重要工具。

The root of this contradiction lies in the capitalist production system’s appropriation of collectively created social knowledge. The bourgeoisie, through its ownership of the means of production, privatizes “technology embodying general intellect” in order to extract surplus value and maintain its dominant position over the production process. This gives rise to a fundamental conflict: although general intellect, as the crystallization of collective labor, is naturally public in nature, it is enclosed as private property within the capitalist framework. This further highlights the profound tension between the publicness and privatization of knowledge and technological progress.

这一矛盾的根源在于资本主义生产体系对社会共同创造的集体性知识的占有。资产阶级通过其对生产资料的所有权，将“体现一般智力的技术”私有化，以获取剩余价值并维持对生产过程的支配地位。由此形成了一种根本性冲突：尽管一般智力作为集体劳动的结晶，天然具有公共属性，却在资本主义架构中被圈地化为私人财产。这进一步凸显了知识与技术进步在公共性与私有化之间的深刻张力。

(2) The Enclosure of Knowledge in the Era of the Digital Economy

(二)数字经济时代的知识圈地

In the context of the digital economy, information, data, platforms, and algorithms have become important means of production. Consequently, capital’s “enclosure movement” has also shifted from the possession of physical equipment to the monopolization of patents, copyrights, data, and platforms, enclosing and commodifying knowledge resources that were originally public in nature.

在数字经济背景下，信息、数据、平台与算法等已经成为重要的生产资料。由此，资本的“圈地运动”也随之从对实体设备的占有，变为对专利、版权、数据和平台的垄断，将原本具有公共属性的知识资源封闭化和商品化。

The rise of digital networks has greatly promoted the dissemination and creation of knowledge, and the emergence of the free software movement and P2P networks demonstrates the potential of cooperative production models. However, in order to maximize profits, capital strives to absorb and transform this “free” or shared “positive externality” into private revenue. As Yann Moulier-Boutang criticizes: “Absorbing positive externalities becomes the number one problem of value.” The collection and closed use of user data by large digital platforms constitutes a renewed “enclosure” of public resources.

数字网络的兴起极大地促进了知识的传播与创造，自由软件运动与P2P网络的出现则表明了合作生产模式的潜力。然而，资本为了获取最大限度的利润，会努力将这种“免费”或共享的“正外部性”吸纳并转化为私有收益。正如扬·穆里埃-布唐(Yann Moulier-Boutang)所批判的：“吸纳正外部性成为价值的头号问题。”大型数字平台对用户数据的收集与封闭使用，就形成了对公共资源的再次“圈占”。

With the deepening of the digital economy, intellectual property law has become an important legal tool for enclosing and commodifying knowledge. Tech giants typically hold extensive patent portfolios and defend their market positions through strategic litigation, a practice known as the “second enclosure.” By accumulating large numbers of patents, tech giants create “patent thickets”—overlapping networks of intellectual property rights that make it difficult for others to innovate without infringement. It is precisely in this new form that we see more clearly that when the immateriality and reproducibility of knowledge collide with capital’s demand for intellectual property rights, the contradiction becomes sharper: on the one hand, knowledge is inherently shareable and diffusible; on the other hand, capital, with the help of patent law, copyright law, and platform rules, extracts surplus value through exclusive control, thereby forming a new monopoly mechanism.

随着数字经济的深化，知识产权法成为封闭与商品化知识的重要法律工具。科技巨头通常拥有广泛的专利组合，并通过战略诉讼来捍卫其市场地位，这种行为被称为“第二次圈地”。通过积累大量专利，科技巨头创建了“专利丛林”——重叠的知识产权网络，使他人难以在不侵权的情况下进行创新。正是在这一新形态下，我们更清晰地看到，当知识的非物质性和可复制性与资本对知识产权的需求发生碰撞时，矛盾会变得更加尖锐：一方面，知识本质上具有可共享、可扩散的特征；另一方面，资本却在专利法、版权法与平台规则的帮助下，通过排他性控制攫取剩余价值，并由此形成新的垄断机制。

(3) The Crisis and Potential of the Digital Economy

(三)数字经济的危机与潜力

In the digital economy environment, intellectual property, platform monopolies, and surveillance capitalist practices all embody the encroachment on the public nature of the “general intellect.” Elements such as big data, social media content, and user behavior data are essentially co-created by the public, yet they are treated by platform enterprises as private assets to be sold or leased. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri had long insight into this; in works such as *Empire*, they argued that while the development of globalization and information technology makes collective intellectual labor the core of productive forces, it also intensifies capital’s control over common resources. Žižek goes further, stating directly: “When wealth becomes increasingly disproportionate to the direct labor time spent producing it, the result… is that the profit extracted from exploiting the working class is gradually transformed into rent, a rent that is the product of the privatization of the ‘general intellect’ and other common resources.”

在数字经济环境下，知识产权、平台垄断与监控资本主义实践都体现了对“一般智力”公共性的蚕食。大数据、社交媒体内容以及用户行为数据等要素，本质上是社会公众共同创造的，却被平台企业当作私有资产进行出售或租赁。迈克尔·哈特(Michael Hardt)和安东尼奥·奈格里(Antonio Negri)对此早有洞见，他们在《帝国》等作品中主张，全球化和信息技术的发展使得集体智力劳动成为生产力的核心的同时，也加剧了资本对公共资源的控制。齐泽克更进一步直言：“当财富与生产这些财富所花费的直接劳动时间越来越不成比例时，其结果……是剥削工人阶级所获得的利润被逐渐转化为租金，这种租金是‘一般智力’及其他公共资源被私有化的产物。”

Cognitive capitalism theory also offers a rather profound insight into this. In the context of the digital age, Boutang further elaborates on the position of the general intellect in contemporary capitalism, emphasizing the shift in value production from traditional material labor to intellectual labor characterized by immateriality, collectivity, and publicness. Boutang points out that the core of contemporary capitalism lies in its dependence on collective knowledge and innovation. He writes: “This characteristic inserts knowledge as a public or ‘free’ product—in other words, open access—into the heart of market relations.” In Boutang’s view, the essence of knowledge lies in sharing and being usable by all, while traditional forms of appropriation and commodification struggle to fully control it, which also triggers a more profound struggle between capital and the public nature of the general intellect.

认知资本主义理论对此也有颇为深刻的洞察。布唐在数字时代背景下，进一步阐释了一般智力在当代资本主义中的地位，强调价值生产从传统的物质劳动转向以非物质性、集体性和公共性为特征的智力劳动。布唐指出，当代资本主义的核心在于对集体知识与创新的依赖。他写道：“这一特征将知识作为一种公共或‘免费’产品——换句话说，开放获取——插入了市场关系的核心。”在布唐看来，知识的本质在于共享与可被所有人使用，而传统的占有与商品化形式却难以对其进行完全控制，这也引发了资本与一般智力的公共性之间更为深刻的博弈。

Carlo Vercellone, who also focuses on this contradiction, places emphasis on the structural tension between the general intellect and contemporary capitalism. He stresses that traditional models of value and ownership struggle to adapt to immaterial, decentralized, and difficult-to-enclose cognitive labor. Vercellone writes, “The principal fixed capital has been transformed into ‘human beings themselves,’ whose minds contain society’s accumulated knowledge.” This emphasis on “human beings themselves” as carriers of knowledge implies that while capital appropriates knowledge resources, it also needs to exert deeper control over the laboring subject. Consequently, capital must rely on various training, incentive, and control mechanisms to “extract” and “lock in” the intellectual output of laborers. This significantly increases control costs and uncertainty. Furthermore, the appropriation of human beings themselves leaves potential space for transcending the capitalist mode of production: if knowledge and creativity can be shared and diffused in a freer manner, it may shake the existing structure of exploitation.

同样关注这一矛盾的卡洛·维尔切隆(Carlo Vercellone)则将焦点置于一般智力与当代资本主义的结构性张力之上。他强调，传统价值与所有权模式难以适应非物质性、分散化且难以封闭的认知劳动。维尔切隆写道，“主要的固定资本已转化为‘人自身’,这个人头脑中蕴含着社会的积累知识”。这种对“人自身”作为知识载体的强调，意味着资本在占有知识资源的同时，也需要对劳动主体进行更深层次的控制。因此，资本需要依靠各种培训、激励与管控机制，来“挖掘”并“锁定”劳动者的智力产出。这样一来，管控成本与不确定性大幅上升。此外，对人自身的占有也为超越资本主义的生产模式留下潜在空间：如果知识和创造力能够以更自由的方式共享和扩散，便可能撼动现有的剥削结构。

Moreover, the overextended intellectual property in the digital age restricts the circulation and innovation of knowledge. As Vercellone points out: “By artificially creating scarcity of resources, new ownership relations of knowledge hinder the progress of knowledge.” This strategy of creating scarcity not only weakens the deep potential of knowledge as a common resource but also further strengthens capital’s dominance over the value production process. Traditional labor theory of value is based on measurable labor time, whereas in the digital economy, intellectual cooperation and immaterial labor increasingly occupy a central position, making them difficult to simply quantify or commodify like industrial labor. This confronts capital with a deeper crisis in measuring and controlling new production processes.

此外，数字经济时代过度扩展的知识产权限制了知识的流通和创新，正如维尔切隆所指出的：“通过人为制造资源的稀缺性，知识的新所有权关系阻碍了知识的进步。”这种稀缺化策略不仅削弱了知识作为公共资源所具有的深层潜力，也进一步强化了资本对价值生产过程的主导。传统的劳动价值理论基于可度量的劳动时间，而在数字经济中，智力合作与非物质劳作日益占据中心地位，因此无法像工业劳动那样被简单量化或商品化，这使资本在衡量与控制新型生产过程时面临更深刻危机。

Thus, in the digital economy, the logic of capital centers on the privatization and enclosure of knowledge, while the logic of cognitive labor is based on the free circulation, collective cooperation, and open sharing of knowledge resources. These two logics are fundamentally contradictory: cognitive labor thrives in an environment where knowledge is open and accessible, whereas capital seeks to maximize profits through enclosure mechanisms. This opposition not only constitutes the source of instability and contradiction in cognitive capitalism but also makes it difficult to reconstruct the traditional dialectical relationship between labor and capital in the new production environment. For this very reason, contemporary capitalism, on the one hand, intensifies the tension between capital and labor, and on the other hand, within the potential of the general intellect and social cooperation, it nurtures the possibility of breaking through the logic of capitalist production.

可见，在数字经济中，资本的逻辑以知识的私有化和封闭为核心，与之相对，认知劳动的逻辑则基于知识的自由流通、集体合作和知识资源的开放共享。这两种逻辑本质上是矛盾的：认知劳动在知识公开、可访问的环境中得以繁荣，而资本则试图通过封闭机制实现利润的最大化。这一对立不仅构成了认知资本主义的不稳定性和矛盾根源，也使得劳动与资本的传统辩证关系难以在新的生产环境中重建。也正因此，当代资本主义一方面加剧了资本与劳动之间的张力，另一方面又在一般智力与社会合作的潜能中，孕育着突破资本主义生产逻辑的可能性。

In summary, the privatization and enclosure of the “general intellect” in the digital economy reflects a new form of exploitation formed by capital through the “enclosure” of knowledge and monopolization. This process is based on the appropriation of common resources, transforming society’s collective knowledge and creativity into the private property of a few enterprises, thereby reshaping the structure of economic power and the distribution order. This form of exploitation reveals the core essence of techno-feudalism, namely, controlling social creativity through exclusive monopolies, and profoundly exposes the inherent contradiction between the logic of labor and capital in the digital economy. However, within this contradiction also lies the possibility of liberation: the publicness and openness of society’s collective intelligence fundamentally resists capital’s enclosure and control over it, providing a potential path for exploring cooperative and decentralized production models that transcend techno-feudalism. This contradiction not only reveals the inherent limitations of techno-feudalism but also offers important insights for rethinking value creation, data governance, and the future direction of social cooperation in the digital economy.

综上，数字经济中对“一般智力”的私有化和封闭，反映出资本通过知识“圈地”与垄断形成的新剥削形式。这一过程以对公共性资源的占有为基础，将社会集体知识与创造力转化为少数企业的私有财产，从而重塑经济权力结构和分配秩序。这种剥削形式彰显了技术封建主义的核心实质，即通过排他性垄断对社会创造力进行控制，深刻揭示了数字经济中劳动与资本逻辑之间的内在矛盾。然而，在这种矛盾中也蕴含着解放的可能性：社会集体智慧的公共性与开放性，从根本上抵制资本对其的封闭与控制，为探索超越技术封建主义的合作性和去中心化生产模式提供了潜在路径。这种矛盾不仅揭示了技术封建主义的内在局限，也为重新思考数字经济中的价值创造、数据治理以及社会合作的未来方向提供了重要启示。

Conclusion

结语

The romantic vision of “internet empowerment” once held by technological optimists has become increasingly fragile under the giant waves of big data and algorithmic monopolies. The actual picture of the digital economy shows that capital’s “enclosure” of common resources has not disappeared; on the contrary, it has strengthened the private appropriation of the general intellect through intellectual property, data enclosure, and platform monopolies. In recent years, with the widespread application of generative artificial intelligence and large language models in social life, this logic of exploitation has further escalated. The training foundation of large language models is precisely the convergence of massive public data and social knowledge—this is another magnificent emergence of the general intellect in the era of artificial intelligence. Capital giants, relying on their monopoly over algorithms, computing power, and data acquisition, incorporate the knowledge content widely existing in the public sphere and created daily by countless individuals and groups into training corpora, further consolidating the new type of commercial hegemony in the digital economy era.

当年技术乐观主义者对“互联网赋权”的浪漫憧憬，在大数据与算法垄断的巨浪下已变得日益脆弱。数字经济的现实图景显示，资本对公共资源的“圈地”不仅没有消弭，相反，其还通过知识产权、数据封闭和平台垄断等方式，强化了对一般智力的私有化占有。近年来，随着生成式人工智能与大语言模型在社会生活中的广泛应用，这种剥削逻辑进一步升级。大语言模型的训练基础也正是海量的公共数据与社会知识的汇聚，这是一般智力在人工智能时代的又一次恢宏登场。资本巨头依托对算法、算力和数据获取的垄断，将广泛存在于公共领域、由无数个体与群体日常创造的知识内容收编为训练语料，进一步巩固了数字经济时代的新型商业霸权。

In this process, the public attribute of the general intellect is further eroded, and the logic of privatization intensifies accordingly. This is an escalation of the logic of exploitation, but also an opportunity for the reconstruction of publicness. It is precisely in the deepening of this contradiction that a new possibility emerges. As scholars like Boutang and Vercellone point out, the collaborative, networked, and not-fully-quantifiable nature of cognitive labor creates a potential opportunity to break through the constraints of traditional capitalism. In this sense, the “general intellect” contains the genes of collaboration and sharing, and also nurtures the imaginative space for breaking through the logic of capital.

在这一过程中，一般智力的公共属性被进一步侵蚀，私有化逻辑则随之加剧。这是剥削逻辑的升级，也是公共性重构的契机。正是在这样的矛盾深化中，一种新的可能性崭露头角。正如布唐与维尔切隆等学者所指出的，认知劳动的协作性、网络性与不可完全量化性，为突破传统资本主义的束缚创造了潜在契机。在此意义上，“一般智力”内含协作与共享的基因，也同时孕育着突破资本逻辑的想象空间。

Thus, the publicness of the general intellect has not dimmed in the process of techno-feudalism’s development; on the contrary, it has been further highlighted in the upsurge of large language models: it is both the fundamental resource of generative AI and the source of power for creating new social relations and modes of production. The key lies in whether we can, at the institutional and technological levels, re-excavate the public essence of the general intellect and prevent it from continuing to be absorbed by capital into monopolistic profit-making machines. To better excavate the public essence of the general intellect at the institutional and technological levels, some existing explorations are gradually unfolding. For example, the initial attempts at platform cooperativism are an important practice centered on the “re-publicization” of the digital economy. Although this practice has not yet formed a scale sufficient to overturn the existing capital order, it opens up an imaginative space for transcending capitalism: through more democratic technological platforms, the redistribution and sharing of public data resources, and the redefinition of the rights and interests of collaborative laborers, the era of the digital economy may give birth to new social forms.

可见，一般智力的公共性非但没有在技术封建主义的发展进程中黯淡，反而在大语言模型的热潮中进一步凸显：它既是生成式AI的根本资源，也是创造新社会关系和生产方式的力量源泉。关键在于，我们能否在制度和技术层面重新挖掘一般智力的公共本质，避免其继续被资本吸纳进垄断性盈利机器之中。为了更好地在制度与技术层面挖掘一般智力的公共本质，现有一些探索正逐步展开。例如，平台合作主义(platform cooperativism)的初步尝试，便是围绕数字经济“再公共化”的重要实践。这一实践虽尚未形成足以颠覆既有资本秩序的规模，却为我们打开了超越资本主义的想象空间：通过更具民主性质的技术平台、公共数据资源的再分配与共享，以及对协作劳动者权益的再定义，数字经济时代有可能孕育出新的社会形态。

Only by recognizing and protecting the open character inherent in this collective creativity, through the coordination of multiple subjects and the critique of and resistance to the logic of exploitation, can we continuously nurture new forces of transformation within the digital economy. Perhaps only in this way can we rediscover the deeply hidden spark of commonality within the internet ideal that is being steadily eroded by technological monopoly, and move toward a future that transcends capitalism.

只有承认并保护这种集体创造力所蕴含的开放特质，通过多元主体的协同和对剥削逻辑的批判与抵抗，才可能在数字经济内部不断孕育新的变革动力。或许唯有如此，我们才能在被技术垄断不断消磨的互联网理想中，重新发现那份深藏的公共性火种，迈向一种超越资本主义的未来。

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑