Advances in Research on the Digital Economy by Foreign Left-Wing Scholars

The highly innovative, strongly penetrating, and broadly covering development of the digital economy is reshaping economic restructuring and the transformation of social production and lifestyles. Discussions of the digital economy can be traced back to some works by left-wing scholars in the 1970s, which constitute an important foundation for our analysis of the digital economy today. For example, the concept of the "audience commodity" proposed by Dallas Smythe, the founder of the political economy of communication, became the starting point for studying the category of "digital labor"; the concept of "immaterial labor" proposed by Maurizio Lazzarato first theorized the labor of producing information and cultural content; Tiziana Terranova formally proposed the concept of "digital labor"; and Dan Schiller's *Digital Capitalism* became a pioneering work of capitalist critique in the digital age. Alongside the intelligent development of digital platforms, foreign left-wing scholars, adhering to research traditions, have closely focused on issues such as labor control under technological change, the conditions of workers, the evolution of platform monopoly trends, and the future of digital capitalism. This article systematically reviews relevant research and the latest achievements by foreign left-wing scholars in recent years, aiming to accurately describe the progress and trajectory of academic research abroad and to provide clues for advancing theoretical research on the digital economy.

数字经济的高创新性、强渗透性、广覆盖性发展，牵动着经济结构调整和社会生产生活方式转变。对于数字经济的讨论可以追溯至1970年代左翼学者们的一些工作，其研究构成了今天我们分析数字经济的重要基础。例如，传播政治经济学鼻祖达拉斯·斯麦兹（Dallas Smythe）提出的“受众商品”（audience commodity）概念成为研究“数字劳动”范畴的起点,莫里齐奥·拉扎拉托（Maurizio Lazzarato）提出的“非物质劳动”（immaterial labor）概念首次将生产信息文化内容的劳动理论化,蒂齐亚纳·泰拉诺瓦（Tiziana Terranova）正式提出了“数字劳动”（digital labor）概念,丹·席勒（Dan Schiller）的《数字资本主义》成为数字化时代资本主义批判的先驱。伴随着数字平台的智能化发展，国外左翼学者秉承研究传统，密切关注技术变革下的劳动控制、劳动者境况、平台垄断趋势演变、数字资本主义未来发展等问题。本文系统梳理了近年来国外左翼学者的相关研究和最新成果，以期准确描述国外学界的研究进展和轨迹，为推进数字经济的理论研究提供线索。

I. The Upgrading of Labor Control and "Manufacturing Consent" under Algorithmic Enhancement

一、算法加持下劳动控制和“制造同意”的升级

The development of algorithmic technology has provided new possibilities for labor control, with more personalized and flexible algorithmic surveillance constructing a "panopticon" in the digital age. The new-style "game of making out" under algorithmic enhancement shapes workers' identification with labor rules, but workers also explore means of resisting algorithmic management.

算法技术的发展为劳动控制提供了新的可能，更加个性化、灵活化的算法监控构筑起数字时代的“全景监狱”。算法加持下的新式“赶工游戏”塑造了工人对劳动规则的认同，但工人也探索着抵抗算法管理的手段。

(1) Algorithmic Control: The "Panopticon" of the Digital Age

（一）算法控制：数字时代的“全景监狱”

From the perspective of technological change, digital platforms can be regarded as the machine systems of the 21st century, the essence of which is a complex technological network driven by algorithms. Algorithms, as the core of digital platforms, connect users and service providers, manage and control the labor process, thereby facilitating changes in the form of labor organization.

从技术变革的层面考虑，数字平台可以被视为21世纪的机器系统，这一系统的本质是由算法驱动的复杂技术网络。算法作为数字平台的核心，连接用户与服务提供商，管理和控制劳动过程，从而促成劳动组织形式的变革。

Through algorithmic management and surveillance systems, platforms are able to implement more complex and flexible labor control mechanisms. Scholars such as Katherine C. Kellogg point out that compared with traditional control methods, algorithmic control is more comprehensive, instantaneous, interactive, and opaque. Platforms can guide employees through algorithmic recommendations and restrictions, evaluate employee performance through algorithmic recording and rating, and reward or punish employees through algorithmic substitution and rewards. With the help of algorithms, platforms can adopt diversified wage pricing strategies, including dynamic wage pricing based on labor demand and wage pricing adjusted through algorithmic wage experiments. Zephyr Teachout summarizes these mechanisms as "algorithmic personalized wages." Given that algorithmic control further implements the core ideas of traditional control methods, such as the separation of management and execution and the decomposition of the labor process, left-wing scholars have used terms such as "Taylorization of white-collar work," "assembly line in the mind," "electronic sweatshop," "Taylorist information control," and "digital cage" to vividly describe algorithmic control.

借助算法管理和监控系统，平台得以实施更加复杂、灵活的劳动控制机制。凯瑟琳·C.凯洛格（Katherine C.Kellogg）等学者指出，比起传统的控制手段，算法控制更具全面性、即时性、交互性、不透明性，平台可以通过算法推荐、算法限制来指导员工，通过算法记录、算法评级来评估员工的表现，通过算法替代、算法奖励实现对员工的赏罚。借助算法，平台可采取多样化的工资定价策略，包括基于劳动需求的动态工资定价、基于算法工资实验调整工资定价等，泽菲尔·提绍特（Zephyr Teachout）将这些机制概括为“算法差异化工资”（algorithmic personalized wages）。鉴于算法控制进一步贯彻了管理与执行相分离、劳动过程分解等传统控制手段的核心思想，左翼学者们使用“白领工作的泰勒化”“头脑中的装配线”“电子血汗工厂”“泰勒信息控制”“数字牢笼”等词汇对算法控制进行了形象的描述。

Digital surveillance, as a new type of control means under algorithmic technology, prominently reflects the upgrading of algorithmic control compared with traditional control means and further exacerbates the power asymmetry between labor and capital. Compared with previous automated facilities, computers continuously generate information during operation, thereby making activity processes transparent. Computer learning behavior based on real-time information has become an important part of daily business activities. In this regard, Shoshana Zuboff uses "surveillance capitalism" to summarize the stage of information capitalism we are in, arguing that surveillance capitalism relies on big data as the basis of its accumulation logic, using data to predict and influence people's behavior, thereby generating revenue, controlling markets, and realizing capital accumulation. Digital platforms can obtain data through real-time tracking, recording conversations, biometric identification, customer feedback, and other means, creating a situation of information asymmetry between labor and capital. Combined with the opacity of algorithmic decision-making processes, employees are often placed in a "digital black box," lacking mastery of the overall work process and frequently falling into uncertainty and anxiety. Regarding this situation, Rabih Jamil, following the concept of the "panopticon" of Jeremy Bentham and Michel Foucault, calls the digital surveillance system the "algopticon." For example, Uber's surveillance system is a typical algopticon, where Uber's algorithm system resembles the watchtower of a panopticon, geofencing technology divides the city into multiple areas for demand forecasting and pricing adjustments, and drivers' mobile phones are used for data collection, thereby achieving round-the-clock monitoring of drivers. The algopticon represents a prominent trend in the development of modern labor control, namely, using digital technology to enhance the monitoring and regulation of the labor process while reducing reliance on traditional labor laws.

数字监控作为算法技术下的新型控制手段，突出体现了算法控制相较于传统控制手段的升级，也进一步加剧了劳资之间的权力不对等。比起此前的自动化设施，计算机在运作中会不断产生信息，从而使得活动过程透明化，基于实时信息的计算机学习行为已经成为日常商业活动的重要组成部分。对此，肖莎娜·祖博夫（Shoshana Zuboff）用“监视资本主义”（surveillance capitalism）来概括我们所处的信息资本主义阶段，认为监视资本主义依赖大数据作为其积累逻辑的基础，借助数据预测和影响人们的行为，从而产生收入，控制市场，实现资本积累。数字平台可以通过实时跟踪、记录对话、生物识别、客户反馈等方式获取数据，这就造成了劳资双方信息不对称的局面，结合算法决策过程的不透明性，员工往往置身“数字黑箱”内，缺乏对工作整体流程的掌握，时常陷入不确定和焦虑之中。对于上述情况，拉比·雅米尔（Rabih Jamil）沿用杰里米·边沁（Jeremy Bentham）和米歇尔·福柯（Michel Foucault）的“全景监狱”概念，把数字监控系统称为“算法全景监狱”（algopticon）。例如，Uber的监控系统就是一个典型的算法全景监狱，其中，Uber的算法系统类似于全景监狱的监视塔，地理围栏技术将城市划分为多个区域，进行需求预测和定价调整，司机的手机被用于数据收集，进而实现对司机的全时段监控。算法全景监狱代表了现代劳动控制发展的一种突出趋势，即利用数字技术增强对劳动过程的监控和调节，同时减少对传统劳动法律的依赖。

Algorithmic control further exacerbates workers' labor alienation and group differentiation. In the mechanical system of digital platforms, the labor process is organized according to the logic of machines and algorithms, and employees become "living appendages" of the machines. Simon Schaupp proposes the concept of "cybernetic proletarianization" to describe the process by which workers transform their production knowledge into data through programming, which is then integrated into digital control systems. The production knowledge transformed into data form becomes company property independent of the workers, thereby achieving the goal of data replacing human labor. Therefore, "part of the labor process of the digital proletariat is to make themselves redundant." In addition to leading to a decline in work skills, algorithmic control also brings employees problems such as irregular working hours, overwork, sleep deprivation, social isolation, and unsociability. These negative effects may spread from gig work to formal employment environments, thereby exacerbating economic and racial inequality and undermining labor solidarity.

算法控制进一步加剧了工人的劳动异化和群体分化。在数字平台的机械系统中，劳动过程依照机器和算法的逻辑来组织，员工成为机器的“活生生的附件”。西蒙·绍普（Simon Schaupp）提出了“控制论无产阶级化”（cybernetic proletarianization）的概念，用于描述工人将自身的生产知识通过编程转化为数据、进而集成到数字控制系统的过程，而转化为数据形式的生产知识将成为独立于工人的公司财产，从而实现数据替代人力的目标。因此，“数字无产阶级劳动过程的一部分就是让自己变得多余”。算法控制除了导致工作技能的下降之外，还给员工带来了工作时间不规律、过度劳动、睡眠不足、社会孤立、不合群等问题。这些负面影响可能会从零工工作传播到正式就业环境中，从而加剧经济和种族不平等，损害劳动团结。

(2) The Upgrading of "Manufacturing Consent" and Workers' Resistance Strategies

（二）“制造同意”的升级与工人的抵抗策略

As early as the late 1970s, Michael Burawoy pointed out that the smooth progress of the labor process could no longer be explained solely from the perspective of coercion. Workers are not entirely passive participants in the "game of making out"; coercion and consent should be combined to understand the interactive relationship between capital and wage labor in the production field. A spontaneous consent to the rules of the "game" explains the "mutual willingness" of active cooperation in production. Around the turn of the century, some scholars developed Burawoy's theory of the "game of making out," proposing concepts such as "sex games," "the transparency game," and "the game of musical chairs" to depict the shaping of consent under different circumstances in the workplace.

早在1970年代末，迈克尔·布若威（Michael Burawoy）便指出，仅从强制的角度已经无法解释劳动过程的顺利进行，工人不是完全消极被动地参与“赶工游戏”,应当将强制与同意结合起来理解生产场域中资本与雇佣劳动的互动关系，一种自发的、对“游戏”规则的同意解释了生产中“两相情愿”的积极合作行为。世纪之交前后，一些学者发展了布若威的“赶工游戏”理论，提出了“性别游戏”（sex games）、“透明度游戏”（the transparency game）、“抢椅游戏”（the game of musical chairs）等概念，用以刻画工作场合中不同情境下的同意塑造。

After entering the digital era, the intervention of algorithms has expanded the field of work, enriched the forms of games, created new types of speed-up games, and further upgraded the “manufacture of consent.” Valeria Pulignano and others have proposed the concept of the “digital tournament,” used to describe the fierce competition faced by freelancers on platforms. This competition is in fact also an upgraded version of the speed-up game: after consenting to the rules of the game, so-called freelancers are in reality digital workers whose overtime labor and unpaid labor have been rationalized. Compared with traditional factories, algorithms play a core role in the shaping of consent on digital platforms such as Uber and YouTube. In traditional labor environments, workers’ consent may be generated through direct supervision and managerial pressure, whereas platform workers typically face indirect control through algorithmic management, with direct supervision absent. The flexibility of indirect supervision grants workers more autonomy, but the constant adjustment of algorithms also requires workers to engage in continuous learning; this process of adaptation is also a process of the continuous production of workers’ consent. Uber typically gamifies the process of guiding labor, for example, by setting challenges and rewards to incentivize drivers to achieve specific goals. A driver’s choice to participate in the game reflects their consent to the game’s rules. On YouTube, the fruits of creative labor can be converted into income through advertising revenue sharing, brand sponsorships, and other means; the degree of dissemination of video works thus becomes a resource to be contested. Even though bloggers can improve video quality by using high-end peripherals and professional software, and attract viewers’ attention by optimizing tags and descriptions, generating income through video production still involves risks. Updates to platform algorithms and shifts in popular content are both uncertain, reflecting the complexity and variability of game rules under the加持 of algorithms.

进入数字时代后，算法的介入拓展了工作场域，丰富了游戏形式，创造了新式赶工游戏，使得“制造同意”进一步升级。瓦莱里娅·普利尼亚诺（Valeria Pulignano）等人提出了“数字锦标赛”（digital tournament）的概念，用于描述自由职业者在平台上面临的激烈竞争，这种竞争事实上也是一种升级版的赶工游戏，在同意了游戏规则后，所谓自由职业者事实上是超时劳动、无偿劳动被合理化的数字工人。与传统工厂相比，算法在Uber、Youtube等数字平台的同意塑造中扮演了核心角色。在传统劳动环境中，劳动者的同意可能通过直接监督和管理层的压力产生，而平台劳动者通常面临算法管理的间接控制，直接监督是缺失的。间接监督的灵活性赋予了劳动者更多自主性，但算法的不断调整也要求劳动者持续学习，这种适应过程也是劳动者同意的持续产生过程。Uber通常会将指导劳动的环节游戏化，例如，通过设置挑战和奖励来激励司机达成特定目标，司机选择参与游戏即反映了他们对游戏规则的同意。Youtube上的创意劳动成果可以通过广告分成、品牌赞助等方式转化为收入，视频作品的传播度因此而成为被争夺的资源，即便博主们可以通过使用高级外设、专业软件来提高视频质量，通过优化标签和描述等方式来吸引观众的注意力，但通过制作视频获取收入仍存在风险，平台算法的更新、流行内容的更迭都具有不确定性，这反映了算法加持下游戏规则的复杂性和多变性。

However, workers do not simply consent to the rules and adapt to algorithms. While algorithms “manufacture consent,” they also generate new resistance strategies among digital workers. Finding platform loopholes to circumvent regulation is a typical strategy. Freelancers on platforms such as Upwork can find ways to bypass the platform’s reputation metrics by forming online alliances with clients to manipulate the performance evaluation system. At the same time, social media has become an important medium for workers to connect, assemble, and organize resistance movements. The British “Game Workers Unite” union uses social media such as Discord and WhatsApp to share algorithmic information, expand industry influence, and organize online petitions and offline protests. The American Walmart union “OUR Walmart” uses online platforms to connect employees across different stores, thereby building a sense of class solidarity and organizing strikes and other protest activities. Workers in the Honduran garment industry use digital tools such as email, Skype, and WhatsApp to establish extensive collective connections and action networks. In addition, workers can use legal means to fight for rights in the workplace. The British “Foster Care Workers Association” secured basic rights such as minimum wage, paid leave, and whistleblower protection through legal mobilization. Finally, workers in the same field can use digital means to form industry networks and optimize work strategies.

然而，工人并不只是一味地同意规则和适应算法，算法在“制造同意”的同时也制造出数字工人新的抵抗策略。寻找平台漏洞绕过监管就是典型策略之一。自由职业者在Upwork等平台能够找到绕过平台声誉度量的方法，通过与客户形成在线联盟来操纵绩效评估系统。同时，社交媒体成为工人联络、集会、组织抵抗运动的重要媒介。英国“游戏工人联合工会”（Game Workers Unite）利用Discord和Whatsapp等社交媒体分享算法信息，扩大行业影响力，组织在线请愿、线下抗议等活动。美国沃尔玛工会“我们的沃尔玛”（OUR Walmart）活动通过网络平台连接不同门店的员工，以此建立阶级团结感，组织动员罢工等抗议活动。洪都拉斯服装行业的工人通过电子邮件、Skype、WhatsApp等数字工具来建立广泛的集体联系和行动网络。此外，工人还可以借助法律手段争取工作场合的权益。英国“寄养护理工作者协会”（Foster Care Workers）通过法律动员争取到了最低工资、带薪休假、吹哨人保护等基本权利。最后，同一领域的工人可以利用数字手段组建行业网络，优化工作策略。

II. Changes in the Situation of Workers under Digital Economic Conditions

二、数字经济条件下劳动者的境况变化

The rise of the gig economy has brought a dual impact on workers. Greater economic inclusivity has provided some workers with more flexible employment opportunities, but this flexibility has also become a source of precarity. Left-wing scholars emphasize that the gig worker group is complex, and research should fully consider the heterogeneity within this group. Furthermore, the proliferation of digital media has rapidly elevated digital labor and prosumers to a core issue in the digital economy; these concepts have also become powerful tools for left-wing scholars to expose the exploitation of free labor by platforms.

零工经济的崛起给工人带来了双重影响，更高的经济包容性为一些工人提供了更加灵活的就业机会，但这种灵活性也成为不稳定的源泉。左翼学者强调，零工工人群体具有复杂性，在研究中应当充分考虑这一群体内部的异质性。此外，数字媒体的普及使数字劳动和产消者迅速跃升为数字经济的一个核心议题，这组概念也成为左翼学者揭露平台剥削免费劳动的有力工具。

(1) The Gig Economy and Precarious Work

（一）零工经济与不稳定工作

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, social development has exhibited two overlapping trends: long-term underemployment and a rapid increase in internet penetration. These two trends have jointly contributed to the rise of the gig economy. The dual impact of the gig economy on workers is a focal point of discussion among left-wing scholars. Some scholars argue that the gig economy has greater economic inclusivity and may increase employment opportunities for certain groups (e.g., those who have difficulty finding work in the local labor market). Steven Vallas and Juliet B. Schor refute the mainstream view that unilaterally regards the gig economy as a “precarity accelerator,” arguing that some workers use platform work as a supplementary income source to reduce debt or accumulate savings, which actually reduces workers’ precarity. The lower the workers’ dependence on the platform, the more likely the gig economy is to play a role in mitigating precarity.

自2008年全球金融危机以来，社会发展呈现长期就业不足和互联网普及度快速提升的趋势，这两种趋势叠加，共同助推了零工经济的崛起。零工经济给工人带来的双重影响是左翼学者讨论的一个焦点。一些学者认为，零工经济具有更高的经济包容性，可能增加某些人群（例如在本地劳动力市场难以找到工作的人）的就业机会。史蒂文·瓦拉斯（Steven Vallas）和朱丽叶·朔尔（Juliet B.Schor）驳斥了一味将零工经济视作“不稳定加速器”的主流观点，认为一些工人将平台工作作为全职工作的补充收入来源，从而减少了债务或积累储蓄，这实际上减轻了工人的不稳定性。工人对平台的依赖程度越低，零工经济就越有可能发挥减轻不稳定性的作用。

However, more scholars still emphasize the precarity and powerlessness that the gig economy brings to workers. Some scholars criticize the official discourse that portrays the gig economy as a model enhancing individual freedom of employment, such as promoting the idea that the gig economy provides greater independence and flexibility, allowing workers to “be their own boss.” The freedom promoted by such discourse obscures the dominated position workers occupy and the systemic risks they face. Compared with formal employees, gig workers lack institutional resources to resist the various coercive powers they encounter. Therefore, the discourse about the gig economy enhancing freedom is largely a fiction, because it conceals the problems of labor market instability, deteriorating working conditions, and lack of labor protection brought about by the gig economy. Informalization and precarization are becoming two sides of the same phenomenon. Gil Felix’s concept of “super-circulation” describes the expansion in the quantity and spatial extension of labor circulation, as well as the acceleration of buying and selling in the labor market. The acceleration of circulation means that the hiring and firing of workers becomes more frequent, and workers’ transitions between different jobs, industries, and regions become more rapid. In the context of super-circulation, workers are required to possess more skills and greater adaptability in order to quickly integrate into the ever-changing work environment.

但是，更多学者仍强调零工经济给工人带来的不稳定性和无权地位。一些学者批判了将零工经济作为提升个体自由就业模式的官方话语，如宣扬零工经济能够提供更多的独立性和灵活性、让工人“做自己的老板”等。此类话语所宣扬的自由掩盖了工人所处的被支配地位和面临的系统性风险。相较于正式雇员，零工工人缺乏制度化资源来抵御他们所面临的各类强制权力。因此，关于零工经济提升自由度的话语更大程度上是一种虚构，因为它掩盖了零工经济带来的劳动市场不稳定、劳动条件恶化和劳动保障缺失的问题，非正式化和不稳定化正在成为同一现象的两个侧面。吉尔·费利克斯（Gil Felix）提出的“超级流通”（super-circulation）概念，描述了劳动力流通数量的扩展和空间的延伸，以及劳动力市场买卖加速的现象。流通的加速意味着劳动力的雇佣和解雇变得更加频繁，劳动者在不同工作、行业和地区之间的转换也变得更加迅速。在超级流通的背景下，劳动者被要求具备更多的技能和更强的适应性，从而快速融入不断变化的工作环境。

Compared with earlier research, recent studies on the gig economy pay more attention to the heterogeneity of the labor group. Gig workers are not a homogeneous group; different workers may have different social and cultural backgrounds, different skills and qualifications, different work motivations and needs, and different working hours and work patterns. This heterogeneity is crucial for understanding workers’ behavior. For example, workers highly dependent on platforms are more likely to face problems such as income instability and unclear career prospects than those who use platform work as a side job; these workers are more inclined to participate in union activities and collective action to fight for better working conditions and rights protection, while workers with lower dependence on platforms adopt a more passive and indifferent attitude toward collective action. Some scholars provide an analytical framework for understanding worker heterogeneity, dividing workers into platform-dependent workers, platform-based workers, false self-employed workers, and independent self-employed workers based on two dimensions: the degree of workers’ dependence on the platform and their work status. This framework helps to understand the differences in power and work decision-making methods among different types of gig workers on the platform.

与早期研究相比，近年来的零工经济研究更加关注劳动群体的异质性。零工工人并非同质群体，不同工人可能拥有不同的社会和文化背景、不同的技能和资格、不同的工作动机和需求，以及不同的工作时间和工作模式。这种异质性对于理解工人的行为至关重要，例如，高度依赖平台的工人比将平台工作作为兼职的工人更容易面临收入不稳定、职业前景不明朗等问题，这些工人更加倾向于参与工会活动和集体行动，以争取更好的工作条件和权益保护，而对平台依赖程度较低的工人则对集体行动采取较为消极冷漠的态度。有学者提供了一个理解工人异质性的分析框架，根据工人对平台的依赖程度和工人的工作状态两个维度划分出平台依赖型工人、平台基础型工人、虚假自雇型工人、独立自雇型工人，这一框架有助于理解不同类型的零工工人在平台中的权力大小以及工作决策方式的差异。

(2) Prosumers in Digital Platforms

（二）数字平台中的产消者

The concept of the “prosumer” was first proposed by Alvin Toffler to describe the phenomenon of the merging of the roles of producer and consumer in post-industrial society. Toffler believed that people’s consumption behavior increasingly serves the process of product creation and production. George Ritzer and Nathan Jurgenson further developed the concept of the “prosumer.” They pointed out that capitalist society has completed the transition from a production society to a consumption society and is currently undergoing a transition from a consumption society to a prosumer society. It is worth noting that Web 2.0 is not the scene where prosumer activity was born, nor was Toffler’s concept of the “prosumer” specifically aimed at the Web 2.0 scene. However, given the rapid development and widespread popularization of the internet and digital technology, Web 2.0 can currently be regarded as the most active site of prosumer activity. In short, the core phenomenon captured by the concept of the “prosumer” is the increasingly blurred boundary between production and consumption in modern society.

“产消者”概念最早由阿尔文·托夫勒（Alvin Toffler）提出，用以描述后工业社会中生产者与消费者角色交融的现象。托夫勒认为，人们的消费行为越来越多地服务于产品的创造和生产环节。乔治·里策尔（George Ritzer）和拿单·于尔根松（Nathan Jurgenson）进一步发展了“产消者”的概念。他们指出，资本主义社会已经完成了从生产社会向消费社会的转向，当前正在经历从消费社会向产消社会的转向。值得注意的是，WEB 2.0并非产消活动诞生的场景，托夫勒口中的“产消者”概念也并不是针对WEB 2.0场景的，但考虑到互联网和数字技术的快速发展和迅速普及，WEB 2.0目前可以被视为产消活动最活跃的场所。总之，“产消者”概念捕捉到的核心现象是现代社会中生产与消费界限日益模糊。

The focus of left-wing scholars’ discussion of the prosumer issue is the rise of a new business model centered on data extraction, and the problem of platform appropriation of free labor under this business model. Orçun Kasap and Altug Yalcintas have proposed the concept of “commodification 2.0” to summarize the business model in which large internet companies extract value by extracting user data. The commodification 2.0 model blurs the boundaries between producers, consumers, and copyright holders, as well as the boundaries between working time and leisure time, and between rent and profit. This not only challenges traditional business models and intellectual property protection models, but also challenges the concepts of the corporation and labor organization throughout the entire period of industrial capitalism. Christian Fuchs has distinguished four forms of labor in society as a whole—wage labor, slave labor, domestic labor, and users’ unpaid digital labor—and then proposed the concept of the “organic composition of labour” to measure the ratio of unpaid labor time to paid labor time in an economy. The “organic composition of labour” reflects the degree of capitalist economy’s dependence on unpaid labor. Unpaid labor has always been an inherent part of the capitalist system, and the work of digital platforms is to legitimize more and more unpaid labor. Although prosumers create value for social media platforms, they are not compensated for it; this phenomenon is a core issue in the digital labor debate.

左翼学者讨论产消者问题的焦点是以数据提取为核心的新商业模式的崛起，以及这种商业模式下平台占有免费劳动的问题。奥尔琼·卡萨普（Orçun Kasap）和阿尔图·亚尔钦塔斯（Altug Yalcintas）提出了“商品化2.0”（commodification 2.0）的概念，用于概括大型互联网公司通过提取用户数据来获取价值的商业模式。商业化2.0模式模糊了生产者、消费者和版权持有人之间的界限，也模糊了工作时间与休闲时间、租金与利润之间的界限，这不仅是对传统商业模式和知识产权保护模式的挑战，更是对整个工业资本主义时期公司和劳动组织观念的挑战。克里斯蒂安·福克斯（Christian Fuchs）划分了整个社会中的四种劳动形态，即工资劳动、奴隶劳动、家务劳动、用户无偿数字劳动，进而提出了“劳动的有机构成”（organic composition of labour）概念，用于衡量一个经济体中未支付劳动时间与支付劳动时间的比例，“劳动的有机构成”反映了资本主义经济对未支付劳动的依赖程度。无薪劳动一向是资本主义体系固有的一部分，数字平台的工作就是把越来越多的无薪劳动合法化。尽管产消者为社交媒体平台创造了价值，但他们并未因此获得报酬，这一现象是数字劳动辩论中的一个核心问题。

While the concept of the “prosumer” has been widely welcomed, it has also been controversial. Some scholars have raised objections from the standpoint of classical labor theory of value. Nick Srnicek opposes calling the prosumer activities of social media users “labor,” because these activities do not bear the pressures of capitalist standards and requirements, such as streamlining production processes, reducing costs, and increasing productivity. Bartosz Mika argues that only when labor power is purchased as a commodity can the labor of wage workers in commodity production be regarded as abstract labor that creates value. According to this logic, although users’ activity traces on social media create data and potential commercial value for the platform, these activities themselves do not directly produce commodities or services that can be exchanged on the market; therefore, these behaviors should not be regarded as productive labor. Mika suggests that the complex socio-economic relations in the digital scene should not be oversimplified, and that the role of the prosumer should be reconsidered and redefined within the broader context of the social division of labor and distribution relations.

“产消者”概念在广受欢迎的同时也备受争议，部分学者从经典劳动价值论的立场提出了质疑。尼克·斯尔尼塞克（Nick Srnicek）反对将社交媒体用户的产消活动称为劳动，因为这些活动并未承受资本主义标准和要求带来的压力，如精简生产过程、降低成本、提高生产力等。巴尔托什·米卡（Bartosz Mika）认为，只有当劳动力被作为商品购买时，雇佣劳动者在商品生产中的劳动才能被视为创造价值的抽象劳动。依照这一逻辑，用户在社交媒体上的活动足迹虽然为平台创造了数据和潜在的商业价值，但这些活动本身并不直接产生可以在市场上交换的商品或服务，因此这些行为不应被视为生产劳动。米卡建议，不应过于简化数字场景下复杂的社会经济关系，应当在更广泛的社会分工和分配关系的背景下重新考虑和定义产消者的角色。

III. The Multiple Faces of Platform Organization and Its Monopoly Trend

三、平台组织的多重面貌及其垄断趋势

As the core organizational form of the digital economy, digital platforms have attracted considerable attention from left-wing scholars. Foreign left-wing scholars have described the multiple faces of platform organization from different dimensions, with related discussions focusing on exposing the monopoly trend of digital platforms and analyzing the mechanisms of digital platform monopoly.

数字平台作为数字经济的核心组织形式，备受左翼学者们关注。国外左翼学者从不同维度描述了平台组织方式的多重面貌，相关讨论侧重于对数字平台垄断趋势的揭露，以及对数字平台垄断机制的分析。

(I) The Multiple Faces of Digital Platforms

（一）数字平台的多重面貌

Left-wing scholars have analyzed platform organization from multiple perspectives. Steven Vallas and Juliet B. Schor use five metaphors to summarize the faces of digital platforms as presented in existing literature, including “incubators of entrepreneurialism,” “the digital cage,” “accelerants of precarity,” “institutional chameleons,” and “permissive potentates.”

左翼学者从多种视角对平台组织方式进行了分析。史蒂文·瓦拉斯（Steven Vallas）和朱丽叶·朔尔（Juliet B.Schor）用五个隐喻概括了数字平台在现有文献中呈现出的面貌，包括“创业孵化器”（incubators of entrepreneurialism）、“数字牢笼”（the digital cage）、“不稳定加速器”（accelerants of precarity）、“制度变色龙”（institutional chameleons）、“宽容的君主”（permissive potentates）”。

The metaphor of “incubators of entrepreneurialism” describes the state of monopolistic competition among platform organizations. Digital technology reduces transaction costs, facilitates the participation of people with idle resources in the market and the monetization of resources, thereby weakening the dominant position of traditional corporate models and making it possible to build social networks based on micro-entrepreneurs. Scholars such as Prishnee Armoogum have proposed the concept of “mutual forbearance” to describe a new form of collusion among large platforms. To avoid competing in each other’s core areas, large platforms choose not to enter or to enter cautiously into each other’s markets. This self-restraint can reduce competitive pressure on the platforms, thereby maintaining high profits without formal collusion. Some scholars argue that the state of monopolistic competition is insufficient to describe the current situation of the platform economy; the platform economy has already formed a hierarchical power structure: large platforms and financial capital are at the top, controlling key resources and funds, and unequal exchange may be an important factor in consolidating the monopoly position of large platforms; small platforms are in the middle, relying on large platforms and financial capital to maintain operations; other market participants and users are at the bottom, and their behavior is strongly influenced by platform rules and algorithms.

“创业孵化器”隐喻描述了平台组织间的垄断竞争状态。数字技术降低了交易成本，便利了拥有闲置资源的人参与市场、实现货币资源化，从而削弱了传统企业模式的主导地位，使得构建基于微型创业者的社会网络成为可能。普里什尼·阿穆古姆（Prishnee Armoogum）等学者提出了“相互容忍”（mutual forbearance）的概念，用于描述大型平台之间的新型合谋形式。大型平台为了避免在对方平台的核心领域内竞争，选择不进入或谨慎进入对方市场，这种自我约束能够减少平台的竞争压力，从而在没有正式合谋的情况下维持高利润。部分学者认为，垄断竞争状态不足以描绘平台经济现状，平台经济已经形成了一个权力结构层级：大型平台和金融资本位于顶层，控制着关键资源和资金，而不平等交换可能是大型平台巩固垄断地位的重要因素；小型平台位于中层，依赖大型平台和金融资本维持运营；其他市场参与者和用户位于底层，他们的行为受到平台规则和算法的强烈影响。

Metaphors such as “permissive potentates,” “the digital cage,” and “accelerants of precarity” describe the labor-capital relations and class conflicts within platform organizations. Digital platforms establish infrastructure to manage economic transactions, adopt more open forms of employment, abandon direct control over work methods, working hours, etc., grant workers greater autonomy, but at the same time retain core functions such as task allocation, data collection, and service pricing. Their governance mechanisms exhibit new characteristics of concentrated power but dispersed control. Algorithms give enterprises stronger control, exacerbate information asymmetry, and reduce workers’ ability to resist, evade, and challenge the company. At the same time, digital platforms can evade some traditional responsibilities toward employees through flexible employment. Correspondingly, workers lose guarantees such as minimum wages, pensions, and medical insurance, and their lives fall into increasingly precarious circumstances.

“宽容的君主”“数字牢笼”“不稳定加速器”等隐喻描述了平台组织内部的劳资关系与阶级冲突。数字平台建立基础设施管理经济交易，采取了更加开放的雇佣方式，放弃了对工作方法、工作时间等方面的直接控制，赋予工人更大的自主权，但同时保留了任务分配、数据收集、服务定价等核心职能，其治理机制呈现出权力集中但控制分散的新特点。算法赋予了企业更强的控制权，加剧了信息不对称，降低了工人抵抗、逃避、挑战公司的能力；同时，数字平台可以通过灵活雇佣逃避对雇员的一些传统责任，相应地，工人失去了最低工资、退休金、医疗保险等保障，生活陷入日益脆弱的境况。

The metaphor of the “institutional chameleon” describes the different characteristics of platform organizations in different national, social, and institutional environments. Differences in institutional background and culture may cause platform enterprises to exhibit vastly different behavioral patterns and socio-economic effects in different regions; therefore, the analysis of digital platforms must avoid simplistic, one-sided technicist interpretations. We are currently in the early stage of the transformation of platform economic regulation, where regulatory expansion is gradually replacing the neoliberalism that has been mired in crisis for at least a decade. In this process, filling the vacuum in platform governance and legitimation becomes a key task. Fabian Ferrari particularly emphasizes the important role of the state in regulating platform organizations, arguing that the state should strike a balance between encouraging innovation and preventing the abuse of market dominance in platform governance; the state is not only a regulator but also plays the roles of facilitator, buyer, and producer.

“制度变色龙”隐喻则描述了平台组织在不同的国家、社会、制度环境中的不同特性。制度背景和文化的差异可能使得平台企业在不同地区的行为模式及其所带来的社会经济效益大相径庭，因而对数字平台的分析需要避免简单化、片面化的技术主义解读。当前正处于平台经济监管转型的早期阶段，监管扩张正逐步取代深陷危机至少十年之久的新自由主义。在这个过程中，填补平台治理与合法化真空成为关键任务。法比安·法拉利（Fabian Ferrari）特别强调国家在平台组织监管方面的重要作用，认为国家在平台治理中应在鼓励创新与防止滥用市场支配地位之间找好平衡点，国家不仅是监管者（regulator）,还同时扮演着引导者（facilitator）、购买者（buyer）和生产者（producer）的角色。

(II) Analysis of the Monopoly Mechanisms of Digital Platforms

（二）数字平台的垄断机制分析

Among the different dimensions of analyzing digital platforms, the monopoly mechanisms of leading platforms are the most discussed topic among left-wing scholars. Unlike the 1990s, when the world’s largest companies were concentrated in the energy and automotive industries, today most large companies are platform companies, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent. Regarding these digital platforms, scholars point out that industry characteristics such as economies of scale, network effects, and data accumulation may lead to natural monopolies, while platform behaviors under different governance models—such as intellectual property control, data possession, and strategic acquisitions—bring about artificial monopolies; natural monopolies and artificial monopolies are often intertwined. Left-wing scholars analyze the monopoly mechanisms of digital platform enterprises from different perspectives, which can be broadly categorized into platform natural monopolies and platform governance models.

在分析数字平台的不同维度中，头部平台的垄断机制是左翼学者最为关注的话题。与1990年代世界上规模最大的公司集中于能源和汽车行业不同，今天，大型公司大部分是平台公司，如谷歌、亚马逊、脸书、苹果、微软、百度、阿里巴巴、腾讯等公司。针对这些数字平台，学者们指出，规模经济、网络效应、数据积累等行业特征可能导致自然垄断，知识产权控制、数据占有、战略性收购等不同治理模式下的平台行为则会带来人为垄断，自然垄断与人为垄断往往是交织在一起的。左翼学者们从不同角度分析了数字平台企业的垄断机制，大致可以归结为平台自然垄断和平台治理模式。

In terms of platform natural monopolies, the scale effects and network effects of the digital industry provide platforms with inherent advantages in capturing broad markets. As platform companies gain market share, they also accumulate vast amounts of user data, which can be used to further optimize products and services. For example, digital advertising, as a powerful tool for platforms to accumulate user data, not only helps platforms attract consumers and collect real-time data but also provides revenue for platforms, enabling cross-subsidization of free services. The more consumer data Amazon collects, the more accurately it can predict consumers’ next needs; the more user data Google and Facebook possess, the more targeted the advertisements they provide; the very nature of big data itself determines a higher degree of market concentration. Additionally, some platforms adopt strategies of ecosystem bundling and infrastructuralization, controlling key digital infrastructure and bundling more and more services within applications to strengthen the dependence of users and other platforms on themselves. Regarding platform natural monopolies, Gerald Berk and AnnaLee Saxenian argue that antitrust law should encourage platforms to shift from centralized models to decentralized ecosystems, promoting innovation by making cooperation more attractive than mergers.

在平台自然垄断方面，数字行业的规模效应和网络效应为平台占据广阔市场提供了先天优势。平台公司在获得市场份额的同时，也积累起庞大的用户数据，这些数据能够用于产品和服务的进一步优化。例如，数字广告作为平台积累用户数据的有力工具，既能帮助平台吸引消费者、收集实时数据，又能为平台提供收入，实现对免费服务的交叉补贴。亚马逊收集的消费者数据越多，就越能精准地预测消费者的下一个需求；谷歌和脸书拥有的用户数据越多，提供的广告就越具有针对性，大数据本身的特性便决定了较高的市场集中度。此外，一些平台采用生态捆绑、基础设施化的战略，控制关键的数字基础设施，在应用程序中捆绑越来越多的服务，来加强用户和其他平台对自身的依赖性。对于平台自然垄断，杰拉尔德·伯克（Gerald Berk）和安娜李·萨克森尼安（AnnaLee Saxenian）主张，反垄断法应当鼓励平台从中心化模型转向去中心化生态系统，通过使合作比合并更有吸引力来促进创新。

In terms of platform governance models, the goal of maximizing market value and the support of financialization forces strengthen the monopoly position of platforms. Under an investment model centered on company market value, valuation often takes precedence over revenue streams, and expansion and monopoly often take precedence over profitability. Financial capital such as venture capital, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds, often based on their assessment of monopoly rent levels, assist or compel platform companies to achieve scale expansion and market monopoly through acquisitions, thereby reaching the goal of maximizing company market value. Leading platform enterprises also often invest a large portion of their monopoly rents in financial assets; in their 2019 balance sheets, marketable securities and other financial assets accounted for over 40% of the total assets of Google and Facebook. These enterprises consolidate their monopoly positions through strategic acquisitions, forming a self-reinforcing cycle of financial monopoly capital. Cecilia Rikap argues that intellectual property rents and financialization complement each other, jointly strengthening the monopoly position of platform companies. On the one hand, rents obtained by platform companies through intellectual property can enhance their market value, increasing their attractiveness in financial markets. On the other hand, capital provided by financial markets enables companies to increase R&D investment, further strengthening their market power. Furthermore, some platform companies transfer intellectual property to low-tax countries to reduce tax burdens, which is also part of their financialization strategy.

在平台治理模式方面，市值最大化目标以及金融化力量的支持加强了平台的垄断地位。在以公司市值为中心的投资模式下，估值时常优先于收入流，扩张和垄断时常优先于盈利能力。风险投资、私募股权、主权财富基金等金融资本往往根据其评估的垄断租金水平协助或逼迫平台公司通过收购行为实现规模扩张和市场垄断，从而达到公司市值最大化的目标。头部平台企业也常常将很大一部分垄断租金投资于金融资产，在2019年资产负债表中，有价证券等金融资产占据了谷歌和脸书总资产的40%以上。这些企业通过战略性收购来巩固自身的垄断地位，这就形成了一种金融垄断资本自我强化的循环。塞西莉亚·里卡普（Cecilia Rikap）认为，知识产权租金与金融化相辅相成，共同加强了平台公司的垄断地位。一方面，平台公司通过知识产权获得的租金可以提升其市场价值，提高公司在金融市场的吸引力。另一方面，金融市场提供的资本使公司能够增加研发投入，进一步增强其市场力量。此外，一些平台公司将知识产权转移至低税率的国家以减少税负，这也是其金融化策略的一部分。

IV. Where Is Digital Capitalism Heading?

四、数字资本主义向何处去

Since Schiller proposed the concept of “digital capitalism,” left-wing scholars have widely used this concept to conduct holistic research on the capitalist social structure under digital technology. Below, we focus on the pathological analysis of the internal contradictions of digital capitalism by foreign left-wing scholars, while also introducing the governance strategies for digital capitalism and the prospects for digital socialism proposed by foreign left-wing scholars.

自席勒提出“数字资本主义”概念以来，左翼学者们广泛运用这一概念对数字技术下的资本主义社会结构进行整体性的研究。下面我们将关注国外左翼学者对数字资本主义内在矛盾的病理分析，同时介绍国外左翼学者提出的数字资本主义治理策略及数字社会主义展望。

(I) Critique of Digital Capitalism

（一）数字资本主义批判

Left-wing scholars typically use “digital capitalism” to describe how the capitalist economic system conducts social reproduction through digital means. Key features of digital capitalism include platform companies becoming enterprise-market hybrids, big data becoming the primary raw material, intangible fixed capital occupying a central position, algorithmic control and regulation, the blurring of the boundary between rent and profit, the blurring of the boundary between working time and leisure time, and free labor becoming a source of profit.

左翼学者通常用“数字资本主义”来描述资本主义经济体系如何通过数字化手段进行社会再生产，数字资本主义的关键特征包括平台公司成为企业—市场混合体、大数据成为主要原料、无形固定资本占有中心地位、算法控制和监管、租金与利润界限的模糊、工作时间与休闲时间界限的模糊、免费劳动成为利润来源等。

Left-wing scholars often analyze the accumulation logic, class conditions, and social contradictions of digital capitalism from the perspective of the mode of production. Aitor Jiménez González extends Lawrence Lessig’s concept of “code as law,” arguing that algorithms are the private law of the digital age, lacking the backing of state authority yet becoming tools for entrepreneurs to supervise workers. Correspondingly, the groups subjected to legitimate exploitation under platform capitalism become the “digital proletariat”; whether they are Deliveroo riders, Uber drivers, online university professors, or operators in Amazon logistics centers, they all become an exploited class trapped within algorithmic systems because they do not possess the means of production in the digital age. Gary Yeritsian borrows the concept of the “new spirit of capitalism” from French sociologists Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, pointing out that this management discourse and practice system, which emphasizes labor participation, has expanded from the formal workplace to the internet, and from employees to users. The new spirit of capitalism changes workers’ understanding and attitudes toward work by emphasizing autonomy, making them more willing to accept flexible and precarious forms of work. Bartosz Mika points out that although digital capitalism accelerates the digitization of the production process, the fragmentation of employment, and the precarization of work, the essence of capitalism has not changed; digital capitalism remains governed by the accumulation logic of capitalism, relying on continuous technological innovation and user participation, while simultaneously exacerbating the instability of labor conditions and social inequality. These two aspects together constitute the internal contradictions of the accumulation model of digital capitalism. Christopher Wimmer offers a similar view, arguing that although digitization has improved people’s living conditions in many contexts, digital capitalism remains closely tied to the logic of capitalist competition and exploitation; the problem lies not in technology itself, but in the fact that the development and application of technology are governed by the logic of capitalism.

左翼学者们往往从生产方式出发分析数字资本主义的积累逻辑、阶级状况、社会矛盾等问题。艾托·希门尼斯·冈萨雷斯（Aitor Jiménez González）扩展了劳伦斯·莱西希（Lawrence Lessig）提出的“代码即法律”（code as law）概念，认为算法即数字时代的私法，没有国家权威的支撑，却能成为企业家监管工人的工具。相应地，受到平台资本主义合法化剥削的群体成为“数字无产阶级”（digital proletariat）,无论是Deliveroo的骑手、Uber的司机、在线大学的教授，还是亚马逊物流中心的操作员，都因不掌握数字时代的生产资料而成为受困于算法系统的被剥削阶级。加里·耶里齐安（Gary Yeritsian）借用法国社会学家吕克·博尔坦斯基（Luc Boltanski）和夏娃·夏佩洛（Éve Chiapello）的“新资本主义精神”概念指出，这一强调劳动力参与的管理话语和实践体系已经从正式的工作场所扩展到互联网，从员工扩展到用户。新资本主义精神通过强调自主性改变了劳动者对工作的认识和态度，使他们更愿意接受灵活、不稳定的工作形式。巴尔托什·米卡（Bartosz Mika）指出，尽管数字资本主义加速了生产过程的数字化、就业的碎片化、工作的不稳定化，但资本主义的本质并未变化，数字资本主义仍然受资本主义积累逻辑的支配，依赖不断的技术创新和用户参与，同时加剧着劳动条件的不稳定和社会不平等，这两方面共同构成了数字资本主义积累模式的内在矛盾。克里斯托弗·维默（Christopher Wimmer）提出了相似的看法，认为尽管数字化在许多场景下改善了人们的生活条件，但数字资本主义仍然与资本主义的竞争和剥削逻辑紧密相连，问题不在于技术本身，而在于技术的发展和应用被资本主义逻辑支配。

(II) Governance of Digital Capitalism and Prospects for a Future Society

（二）数字资本主义治理与未来社会展望

Left-wing scholars’ practical proposals concerning digital capitalism roughly unfold in two directions: governing digital capitalism and envisioning digital socialism. “Platform cooperativism,” proposed by Trebor Scholz and others, is a digital version of traditional cooperativism that uses the algorithms of platform capitalism to serve a platform cooperative model of operation, aiming to promote decentralization, democratic common ownership, and fair value distribution. Under platform cooperativism, algorithms would be used to better coordinate the interests of all parties and improve cooperative efficiency, rather than merely to maximize profits under platform capitalism. Michel Bauwens and Vasilis Kostakis criticize the limitations of platform cooperativism operating within a closed copyright system and advocate incorporating it into a broader model of open cooperativism. Evangelos Papadimitropoulos further argues that, on the basis of the open cooperativism model, achieving genuine transformation requires embedding ethical and political culture into institutional design to promote the realization of both individual and collective common interests. Proposals for governing digital capitalism mostly proceed from legislation and regulation. K. Sabeel Rahman and Kathleen Thelen put forward strategies to address the instability brought by digital capitalism, including redefining employment relationships, improving labor organization, expanding the scope of labor law, promoting industry-wide collective bargaining, strengthening antitrust enforcement, regulating venture capital and private equity, and raising consumer awareness of data privacy. Marcus Gilroy-Ware suggests that the left should better learn production technologies, seize the technological initiative, and change the situation in which social media is dominated by commercial interests. Martin J. Conyon argues that the government should play a certain interventionist role in protecting personal data privacy; for example, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) could serve as a legislative model for data privacy protection. In addition, companies should fully emphasize the importance of transparency and user consent in data privacy protection, explaining the purpose of data use in a clear and understandable manner before obtaining data, and processing user data only with user consent.

左翼学者关于数字资本主义的实践方案大致从治理数字资本主义和展望数字社会主义两个方面展开。“平台合作主义”（platform cooperativism）是特雷博·肖尔茨（Trebor Scholz）等学者提出的一种利用平台资本主义的算法为平台合作运营模式服务的数字版传统合作主义，旨在促进去中心化、民主共有和公平的价值分配。在平台合作主义下，算法将被用于更好地协调各方利益、提高合作效率，而不仅仅是为了实现平台资本主义下的利益最大化目标。米歇尔·博旺（Michel Bauwens）和瓦西里斯·科斯塔基斯（Vasilis Kostakis）批评了平台合作主义在封闭版权体系下运作的局限性，主张将其纳入更广泛的开放合作主义模型。埃万盖洛斯·帕帕迪米特罗普洛斯（Evangelos Papadimitropoulos）进一步指出，在开放合作主义模型的基础上，为了实现真正的变革，需要将伦理和政治文化嵌入到制度设计中，促进个体与集体共同利益的实现。治理数字资本主义的方案多从立法和监管方面着手。K.萨比勒·拉曼（K.Sabeel Rahman）和凯瑟琳·泰伦（Kathleen Thelen）从重新定义雇佣关系、改善劳动组织、扩大劳动法适用范围、推动行业范围的集体谈判、强化反垄断执法、监管风险投资和私募股权、提高消费者数据隐私意识等方面提出了应对数字资本主义带来的不稳定性的策略。马库斯·吉尔罗伊-韦尔（Marcus Gilroy-Ware）建议，左翼应当更好地学习生产技术，掌握技术主动权，改变社交媒体被商业利益主导的局面。马丁·J.科尼恩（Martin J.Conyon）认为，政府应当在保护个人数据隐私方面起到一定的干预作用，例如欧盟的《通用数据保护条例》（GDPR）可以作为保护数据隐私的立法模型。此外，公司应当充分重视透明度和用户同意在数据隐私保护中的重要性，在获取数据前，必须以清晰、易懂的方式说明数据用途，并在获得用户同意的情况下处理用户数据。

The rapid development of big data and the internet has enriched discussions and research on digital socialism. Some of the 20th-century debates on the economic feasibility of socialism seem to be resolvable through technological means in the digital age. Evgeny Morozov points out that digital technology may enable economic coordination to no longer rely on the price mechanism but to be achieved through direct data exchange and algorithmic processing; this shift could provide new organizational principles for a socialist economy. Kees van der Pijl argues that information and knowledge are inherently social, and the market should not be the sole regulator of the modern economy; using big data and information technology, a flexible central planning system can be created that, combined with individual preferences, can achieve more effective resource allocation while preserving individual freedom and creativity. Nevertheless, many scholars also point out that technology itself is not a panacea for solving problems; it must be designed and implemented in conjunction with socialist values and goals. Silvia Rief argues that data analysis and algorithms cannot automatically solve problems of economic planning and governance; it is necessary to combine them with the restructuring of economic institutions and a critical analysis of the objectification and commodification of technoscience before data and algorithms can be used to realize socialism.

大数据和互联网的迅速发展使得围绕数字社会主义的讨论和研究更加丰富。20世纪关于社会主义经济可行性的部分争论似乎在数字时代能够通过技术手段得以解决。叶夫根尼·莫罗佐夫（Evgeny Morozov）指出，数字技术可能使经济协调不再依赖价格机制，而是通过直接的数据交流和算法处理来实现，这种转变可能为社会主义经济提供新的组织原则。基斯·范德皮尔（Kees van der Pijl）认为，信息和知识本质上是社会的，市场不应该是现代经济的唯一调节者，利用大数据和信息技术可以创建一个灵活的中央规划系统，系统与个体偏好相结合，就能在保持个体自由和创造力的同时实现更有效的资源分配。尽管如此，许多学者也指出，技术本身并不是解决问题的万能钥匙，而是需要结合社会主义的价值观和目标来设计和实施。希尔维亚·里夫（Silvia Rief）认为，数据分析和算法并不能自动解决经济规划和治理问题，需要结合对经济机构的重组和对技术科学客观化和商品化的批判性分析，才有可能借由数据和算法实现社会主义。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

The upgrading of algorithmic control and “manufacturing consent,” changes in the living conditions of digital workers, the multiple faces of platform organizations and their monopolistic tendencies, and the critique of digital capitalism and prospects for a future society constitute the latest threads we have traced in the research progress on the digital economy.

算法控制及“制造同意”的升级、数字劳动者生存境况的变化、平台组织的多重面貌及垄断趋势、数字资本主义批判及未来社会展望构成了我们追踪数字经济研究进展的最新线索。

First, the development of control technologies and the upgrading of “manufacturing consent” reveal the evolution of zones of struggle and spaces of cooperation in the production process. The addition of algorithmic technology enables platforms to implement control measures that are more comprehensive, instantaneous, interactive, and opaque. Digital surveillance, as a typical form of algorithmic control, constructs an “algorithmic panopticon” [11]11 The “algorithmic panopticon” (算法全景监狱) is a metaphor adapting Michel Foucault’s concept of the panopticon to the digital age, describing how algorithmic systems enable continuous, asymmetrical surveillance and behavioral control of workers by platform owners. in the digital age. Workers on the one hand accept and adapt to algorithmic rules in pursuit of higher income, and on the other hand resist the oppression of algorithms to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests.

首先，控制技术的发展及“制造同意”的升级展现了生产过程中斗争地带与合作空间的演变。算法技术的加持使得平台可以实施更具全面性、即时性、交互性、不透明性的控制手段，数字监控作为算法控制的典型，构筑出数字时代的“算法全景监狱”。工人一面接受和适应算法的规则以追求更高的收入，一面反抗算法的压迫以维护合理的权益。

Second, the development of new forms of labor means that the protection of workers’ rights and interests faces new challenges under the conditions of the digital economy. The gig economy brings problems such as job instability, deteriorating working conditions, and lack of social security. Differences in skills and qualifications, as well as in work motivations and needs, are key to understanding how different labor groups are differentially affected by the gig economy. At the same time, the blurring of the boundary between production and consumption among workers in the digital economy has sparked controversy over digital labor and value creation.

其次，新劳动形态的发展意味着数字经济条件下劳动者的权益保护受到新挑战。零工经济带来了工人工作不稳定、劳动条件恶化和社会保障缺失等问题，不同的技能和资格、不同的工作动机和需求等因素是理解不同劳动群体受零工经济差异化影响的关键；同时，数字经济中劳动者生产与消费界限的模糊引发了围绕数字劳动与价值创造的争议。

Third, left-wing scholars describe the multiple faces of platform organizational forms, with the monopoly mechanism of digital platforms being a focal point of discussion. The state of monopolistic competition and power structures among platform organizations, the labor-capital relations and class conflicts within platform organizations, and the different characteristics of platform organizations in different institutional environments all present rich dimensions for depicting the image of platform organizations. Factors such as the characteristics of platform organizations and the financialization of platforms have led to monopolistic tendencies among platform enterprises. Left-wing scholars have analyzed the monopoly mechanisms of giant technology companies from perspectives such as natural monopoly of platforms and corporate governance models.

再次，左翼学者描述了平台组织形式的多重面貌，数字平台的垄断机制是讨论的一个焦点。平台组织间的垄断竞争状态与权力结构、平台组织内的劳资关系与阶级冲突、平台组织在不同制度环境中的不同特性展现了描述平台组织形象的丰富维度。平台组织特点以及平台金融化的发展等因素带来了平台企业垄断趋势，左翼学者从平台自然垄断和企业治理模式等方面对巨型科技企业的垄断机制进行了分析。

Finally, through a critical analysis of digital capitalism, left-wing scholars point out that, by means of digitalization, the capitalist economic system has expanded production and accumulation, while also creating a digital proletariat and more complex social contradictions. Legislation, regulation, data privacy protection, and labor law reform can be regarded as governance schemes for digital capitalism, while the development of digital technology has also sparked more exploration of transcending capitalism and realizing digital socialism.

最后，通过对数字资本主义的批判性分析，左翼学者指出，借助数字化手段，资本主义经济体系扩大了生产和积累，也创造了数字无产阶级以及更复杂的社会矛盾。立法、监管、数据隐私保护、劳动法改革等可以被视为数字资本主义的治理方案，而数字技术发展也引发了更多对超越资本主义、实现数字社会主义的探索。

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑