The Quasi-Cause of Affect, or the Empty Set of the Situation? — A Comparison of Deleuze’s and Badiou’s Conceptions of the Event

That contemporary event-philosophy has become a philosophical event is no accident. The event itself originates in the questioning of the problem of the “excess” of the present-at-hand, tracing back to an entirely new triadic structure of “both … and at the same time …,” while simultaneously inquiring into the law by which the non-present-at-hand, which has not yet occurred, repeatedly arrives, and confronting the co-present fissure that ceaselessly emerges between the present-at-hand and the non-present-at-hand. The problem of the “excess” of the present-at-hand is the common point of departure for both Deleuze’s and Badiou’s conceptions of the event, and it is also a problem that the methodological schools of phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalysis, structuralism, post-structuralism, and deconstruction, following Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, have all striven to resolve. Although Deleuze and Badiou move in two different directions — toward the “relative nothing” and the “void” — both take their stand on the ground of Marxist historical materialism, criticizing the illusory nature of the “One” established by Hegel’s “supersensible world,” and gazing at the fissures in the system of “self-consciousness,” “ethical substance,” “absolute spirit,” and “trinity” (hereafter referred to as the triadic structure) that it thereby governs. Any triadic structure constituted by a metaphysics of presence — whether Kant’s synthesis of apprehension in intuition, synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and synthesis of recognition in the concept, or Hegel’s final synthesis — belongs to the synthesis of the “capital-One” under the mechanism of “onto-theo-logy” (Wu Xiaoming).

当代事件哲学成为哲学事件并非偶然。事件本身源于对在场“溢出”问题的发问，追溯全新的“既……,同时又……”的三一体结构，同时追问不在场者尚未发生、重复到场的规律，直面在场者和不在场者之间不断涌现出场的共在裂缝。在场的“溢出”问题，是德勒兹和巴迪欧事件观共同的思考基点，也是黑格尔、马克思辩证法之后，现象学、存在主义、精神分析学、结构主义、后结构主义、解构主义等方法论学派，共同致力解决的问题。尽管德勒兹和巴迪欧走向了“相对的无”和“空”两个不同方向，但他们都立足于马克思唯物史观的立场，批判黑格尔“超感官世界”所建立的“一”的虚幻性，凝视由此统摄的“自我意识”“伦理实体”“绝对精神”“三位一体”体系(以下简称三一体)的裂隙。任何在场形而上学综合所构成的三一体，无论是康德直观中领会的综合、想象中再生的综合、概念中认定的综合，还是黑格尔的最后综合，都隶属于“存在-神-逻辑学”(吴晓明)机制下“大写的一”的综合。

Comparative studies of the two thinkers’ conceptions of the event, both domestically and internationally, currently exhibit two entirely different tendencies. In foreign academic circles, Deleuze and Badiou exist as a kind of fraternal pairing; indeed, as Badiou himself says, “Comparing the two of us is not absurd; this is gradually becoming a public conviction” (Badiou, 2018a, p. 6). Žižek, a mutual friend of both, reveals the common materialist character of their two conceptions of the event: “In their view, the affirmation of the independence of the meaning-event level is not a compromise with idealism, but a necessary theme of a genuine materialism” (Žižek, 2019, p. 78). Žižek has excavated the Spinozist and Hegelian elements in Deleuze; he argues that the “One” buried deep within Deleuze’s “body without organs” is constantly approaching Hegel, and that Deleuze replaces Hegel’s final synthesis with a “disjunctive synthesis” (Deleuze, 2004, p. XVI). Žižek also analyzes Badiou’s triadic structure of “being-world-event” (Žižek, 2013, p. 71), but does not endorse Badiou’s “positive serene attitude” (ibid., p. 82) toward events of social transformation, because the generic temporal quartet of the event can only be an “attention deficit disorder” (ibid., p. 81).

目前国内外对两位思想家的事件观比较研究，呈现两种完全不同的态势。德勒兹与巴迪欧在国外学界俨然如兄弟般对偶存在，诚如巴迪欧自己所言，“比较我们俩人并不是荒谬的，这渐渐成为公开的信念”(巴迪欧，2018年a, 第6页)。作为两人共同好友的齐泽克，揭示了两种事件观共同的唯物主义性质，“在他们看来，对于意义-事件层面的独立性的肯定，并不是一种与唯心主义的妥协，而是一种真实的唯物主义的必要主题”(齐泽克，2019年，第78页)。齐泽克对德勒兹的斯宾诺莎和黑格尔因素进行了发掘，他认为德勒兹深埋于“无器官身体”深处的“一”,正不断接近黑格尔，并用“离散性综合”(Deleuze, 2004, p.XVI)替代黑格尔的最后综合。齐泽克也对巴迪欧的“存在-世界-事件”(齐泽克，2013年，第71页)的三一体结构进行了剖析，但不赞同巴迪欧对社会变革事件采取“积极的泰然态度”(同上，第82页),因为事件的类性时间四重奏，只能是“注意缺失紊乱”(同上，第81页)。

Within Chinese academic circles, comparative research on the two conceptions of the event is currently at a stage awaiting departure. Both at home and abroad, no overall consensus has yet been formed on their innovations in subjectivity grounded in the body, intuition, and difference; on the historical opening toward repetition, multiplicity, and the exception at the fissure; or on their analyses of the internal drive of the surplus of presence, such as immanence, force, and cause. Deleuze’s and Badiou’s thinking on the event is a non-sensible and at the same time non-rational direct thinking of the descent of Hegel’s supersensible world into the sensible world; a rethinking of Heidegger’s authentic being-with as impossible; a capable thinking that explores historical laws, enhances historical initiative, and constructs a new historical subject; and, moreover, a thinking of the limit concerning the excess and surplus of presence, a thinking of the emergence of the potential of the non-present-at-hand that truly astonishes the actuality of the present-at-hand, and an affective thinking that unfolds a community with a shared future for mankind. A comparative study of the two philosophers’ conceptions of the event around these issues has important practical significance for our perspective on world-historical development and for breaking through the focal and difficult problems in the critique of capitalist modernity.

国内学术界对两种事件观的比较研究，目前处于尚待启程的阶段。国内外对两者建基于身体、直观、差异的主体性创新，对重复、多元、例外于裂隙处的历史性敞开，以及对内在、强力、原因等在场剩余的内驱力剖析，尚未形成整体性共识。德勒兹与巴迪欧的事件之思，是黑格尔超感官世界下降到真实世界的非感性的同时也是非理性的直思，是对海德格尔不可能共在的本真的再思，是探索历史规律、增强历史主动、建构历史新主体的能思，更是关于在场溢出与剩余的极限之思，把握不在场的潜能之真实惊异于在场之现实的出场之思，展开人类命运共同体的情感之思。围绕这些问题展开两位哲学家事件观的比较研究，对我们透视世界历史发展，突破资本现代性批判的焦点、难点问题，具有重要的现实意义。

I. The Rebirth of the Subject of the Event: Body, Intuition, and Difference

一、事件的主体重生：身体、直观与差异

From a materialist perspective, the occurrence of an event cannot first bypass the active body. Only the body can bear the irresistible internal forces, and then, through the intuition of the body, reconstruct the field in absolute non-conceptual difference, or in the difference of multiple differences. The event is not a process of the subject, but a process of subjectivation; it no longer simply replaces the body of the subject manipulated by the supersensible world with the fleshly body. Both Deleuze and Badiou hold that the subject is in constant metamorphosis, opening up the process of subjectivation through the self-transformation of the internally active body, intuition, and difference; when the subject becomes a subject that is surveyed (in Foucault’s sense), it simultaneously possesses the real power to ceaselessly exceed the field, pushing the old subject to become a “‘germinal’ subject” (Deleuze, 2018, p. 137) or a “subject of revival” (Žižek, 2013, p. 66).

唯物主义视域中的事件发生，首先无法绕开的是能动的身体。只有身体才能承载无可阻挡的内部力量，进而通过身体的直观，在绝对无概念的差异，或诸多差异的差异中重构场域。事件不是主体的进程，而是主观化的进程，它不再单纯地用肉体的身体，代替被超感官世界操纵的主体的躯体。德勒兹和巴迪欧都认为，主体是不断蜕变的，通过内在能动的身体、直观、差异的自我蜕变，敞开主观化进程；当主体沦为被环视的主体(福柯语)时，它也同时拥有不断溢出场域的真实力量，推进旧的主体成为“‘萌芽的’主体”(德勒兹，2018年，第137页)或“复兴的主体”(齐泽克，2013年，第66页)。

1. The “Body” That Cannot Be Set Aside

1.无法抛开的“身体”

Spinoza’s triadic structure of “substance, cause, force” and Husserl’s phenomenological “intuition” still have a clear presence in Deleuze. Deleuze embodies their fusion in the depths of “affect.” Deleuze’s Spinoza complex is especially evident in his argument for the importance of the “body.” The “body without organs” he proposes is a finite mode of the differentiation of Spinoza’s substance, that is, a further development of the active “mind” and “body.” Deleuze argues that Spinoza elevates the “body” to a status equal to the “mind” that possesses active concepts; this is not a devaluation of thought in relation to extension, but a devaluation of consciousness in relation to the relations of thought. The importance of the “body” lies in the discovery of the unconscious, making clear that consciousness is by nature the locus of illusion. What surges beneath Spinoza’s strata of consciousness is the “cause” buried deep within the “body,” capable of breaking through the soil. “Cause” is the “force” by which the body persists in its extension and the concept or idea persists in its thought, the force of the agent. The reason Deleuze uses the “body without organs” to replace various abstract subject-consciousnesses and intentional consciousnesses is that consciousness can only determine and perceive “something,” not the “nothing” that always remains unknown. Phenomenology, by means of “having judgment,” temporarily suspends the “is-judgment” of speculative dialectics, aiming to exhaust the intentional objects of the surplus of presence. Although it provides a certain foundation for the Idea, it still commits the error of reducing to some transcendental or transcendent principle and making a prior judgment. In reality, only in the “body” does there exist the essence of “affect,” which interpenetrates with the mind, is durational and fluid, and thereby constitutes the essential affections in relations. This is something no consciousness can change, and it is also the foundation of Deleuze’s materialism. The immense energy and anonymous murmur surging within the body may not directly deconstruct the subject, but Deleuze deliberately follows Heidegger’s and Foucault’s step of the subjectless, using subjectivation to replace the abstract capital-Subject and its consciousness; if there is a subject, it is an unidentifiable subject. At the same time, inspired by psychoanalysis’s absorption of the telluric energy of phenomenology of spirit, Deleuze holds that the goal of ethics is not to reconstruct a moral order, but directly the state of the body in the here-and-now relation and its immanent order. In this way, subjectivation renders the subject unidentifiable, capable only of constant rebirth. In this regard, individual eternal essences, particular relations of motion and rest, and extensive bodies constitute a new triadic structure that mirrors Spinoza’s “substance, cause, force,” transforming Hegel’s old triadic structure of “substance, subject, absolute.”

斯宾诺莎“实体、原因、力”的三一体，与胡塞尔现象学的“直观”,在德勒兹这里依然有清晰的身影。德勒兹于“情动”深处，体现了它们的融合。德勒兹的斯宾诺莎情结，尤其体现在“身体”的重要性论证中。他提出的“无器官身体”,是斯宾诺莎实体分殊的有限样态，即能动性“心灵”与“身体”的进一步发展。德勒兹认为斯宾诺莎把“身体”提高到与具有能动概念的“心灵”相等同的地位，并非是思想对于广延关系的贬值，而是意识对于思想关系的贬值。“身体”的重要性在于对潜意识之发现，明确意识在本性上就是幻觉之所在。在斯宾诺莎意识岩层下涌动着的，是深埋在“身体”中那能够破土而出的“原因”。“原因”是身体得以坚持其广延，概念或观念能够坚持其思想的行动者之“力”。德勒兹之所以用“无器官身体”,替代诸抽象的主体意识和意向意识，是因为意识可确定和可知觉的只是“有事”,而不是始终保持未知状态的“无事”。现象学通过“具有判断”暂且中止思辨辩证法的“是判断”,意在穷尽在场剩余的意向对象。尽管它对理念进行了某种奠基，但还是犯了向某种先验或超验原则还原且进行先行判断的错误。实际上，只有在“身体”中，才具有与心灵互通、绵延且流变着的“情动”本质，进而构成关系中的本质的情状。这是任何意识也无法改变的，也是德勒兹唯物主义的基础。身体内部涌动着的巨大能量及其匿名低声，也许并不直接解构主体，但德勒兹着意追随海德格尔、福柯的无主体步调，用主体化替代抽象大写的主体及其意识，如果有主体，那也是无可识别的主体。同时，德勒兹在精神分析学汲取精神现象学大地能量的启示下，认为伦理学的目的不是重建道德秩序，而直接就是此时此地关系中的身体状态及其内在秩序。这样，主观化使主体无法识别，只能不断再生。就此而言，个别的永恒本质、特有的动与静的诸关系、广延的诸身体，构成与斯宾诺莎“实体、原因、力”相互映照的新三一体，转变了黑格尔的“实体、主体、绝对”的旧三一体。

Unlike Deleuze’s approach of returning to the Spinozist triad through the body (in fact indirectly returning to Hegel), Badiou places the body within the “historical-social situation” (Badiou, 2013, p. 13). In his meditation on Hegel, he also uses a Hegelian art to display spiritual force. He employs metaphors and metonymies from the dramas of Aristophanes and others to dissect the surplus of the present; he also combines Heidegger’s perspective of “being situated” to explore the role of the body and language that constitute drama in the presentation and representation of historical situations. In *The Second Trial of Socrates*, Badiou uses the actor’s “body” to perform a “tautological” language, recreating Socrates’ “diving in the abyss of thought” (Badiou, 2018c, p. 63) and the warm-spring-like “full impetus” (ibid., p. 145). Badiou uses four generic procedures to stipulate that “every subject is an artistic subject, a scientific subject, a political subject, or a subject of love” (Badiou, 2014a, p. 82). This is the subject at the finite moment of the generic procedure, a historical, plural subject. Only on this basis can one constitute “the being of truth, i.e., generic multiplicity” (Badiou, 2014b, p. 34) and establish the triad of “being, subject, and truth” (Badiou, 2014a, p. 81). Among these, the artistic subject is mainly constructed through art forms such as poetry and drama, and the body becomes the “material pledge” of language (Badiou, 2012, p. 66). If language exists in the capital letter, then the body also exists in the capital letter. Badiou prefers to use “body-in-truth” (corps-sujet) [4]4 Badiou’s term *corps-sujet* (literally “body-subject”) refers to the body as it becomes the material bearer of a truth procedure, distinct from the merely organic or biological body. The Chinese translation used here is 合体 (literally “united body” or “incorporated body”). (Badiou, 2014b, p. 42) to express the body, and raises the question: “In the becoming of the body that is immanent to the world, to what indication shall we make this body listen?” (ibid., p. 43). The body dispositif-ed by the technical world is a one-dimensional, surveyed body, which conceals an active, glorious body, i.e., the “body-in-truth.” Just as the dramatic subject flows out absoluteness and truth through the bodily ritual of the “body,” the subject of love likewise transmits the beautiful idea of life through the bodily ritual of the body. The generic finite plural subject indicates that the “emergence” of truth can only be attributed to the “body of truth,” or the “subjectivizable body” (ibid., p. 34). In summary, “apart from the being of truth, there exist only bodies and languages” (ibid., p. 53). This is also the foundation of Badiou’s materialism. The author believes that he is committed to curing Hegel’s “pathos” (also translated as emotion, pathos, etc.) in a Hegelian way, curing the concept by “grasping” the concept. This is also a reproduction of Hegel’s bodily spirit (see Hegel, pp. 435-436) that combines force and beauty, the pure upward life impulse of the mysterious ritual “wandering” with Hegel’s blood and flesh, transforming through the duality of the body into a reborn subject. Deleuze and Badiou, through the process of subjectivation, cause the surveyed subject to be reborn.

与德勒兹通过身体回到斯宾诺莎三一体(实则间接回到黑格尔)的方式不同，巴迪欧把身体置入“历史社会情势”(巴迪欧，2013年，第13页)中，在对黑格尔的沉思中，亦用黑格尔式的艺术展现精神力量。他用阿里斯托芬等的戏剧中的隐喻、换喻对在场剩余进行剖析；又结合海德格尔“置身”视角，探索构成戏剧的身体和语言，对历史性情势的呈现和再现作用。在《苏格拉底的第二次审判》中，巴迪欧以演员的“身体”表演“重言式”语言，重现苏格拉底在“思想的深渊中潜水”(巴迪欧，2018年c, 第63页)的温泉式的“全部冲劲”(同上，第145页)。巴迪欧用四种类性程序规定了“每一个主体都是艺术主体、科学主体、政治主体或爱的主体”(巴迪欧，2014年a, 第82页),这是类性程序有限时刻的主体、 具有历史性的多元主体，在此基础上才能构成“真理的存在，即类性的多 元性”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第34页),建立“存在、主体和真理”(巴迪欧，2014年a, 第81页)的三一体。其中，艺术主体主要通过诗歌、戏剧等艺术建构，身体成为语言的“物质抵押品”(巴迪欧，2012年，第66页)。如果语言存在大写，那么身体也存在大写。巴迪欧更愿意使用“合体”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第42页)来表述身体，并提出了问题：“在内在于世界之中的身体的生成中，我们要让这个身体听从于什么的指示?”(同上，第43页)被技术世界装置的身体，是单向度、被环视的身体，遮蔽了一个积极的、荣耀的身体，即“合体”。正如戏剧主体通过“身体”的肢体仪式，流淌出绝对 性和真理；爱的主体同样以身体的肢体仪式，传递出美好的生活理念。类性的有限多元主体，预示真理的“出场”只能归于“真理的身体”,或“可主体化的身体”(同上，第34页)。概言之，“除了真理存在之外，只存在身体和语言。”(同上，第53页)这也是巴迪欧唯物主义的基础。笔者认为，他致力于以黑格尔的方式治愈黑格尔的“疾病”(又译情致、悲情等),以对概念的“抓取”治愈概念。这也是黑格尔结合了力与美的身体性(参见黑格尔，第435-436页)精神的再现，“游荡”着黑格尔血和肉的神秘仪式的纯粹的向上生命冲力，通过身体的两重性，蜕变出重生的主体。德勒兹和巴迪欧通过主体化过程，使被环视的主体重生。

2. What Is “Intuition”

2.何谓“直观”

One of the main purposes of Deleuze’s dissection of the body is to safeguard the intuition within the body. Kant believed that sensible intuition cannot intuit categories; Husserl, on the other hand, elevated sensible intuition to categorical intuition, i.e., intellectual intuition, and then enriched the active categorical intuition into eidetic intuition, where eidetic variation and internal time-consciousness are interconnected, grasping the essential attributes of imaginative variation. This shares a similar subtlety with Hegel’s grasping of categorical intuition on the basis of practice, and also inspired Bergson’s intuition of time and the intuition of life presented on this basis. “Intuition leads us to the very depths of life” (Bergson, p. 178). On the question of intuition, Deleuze not only has a strong Spinoza complex but also exhibits a deeper Bergson complex. Why Bergson and not Heidegger? Although it seems so close to Heidegger, Deleuze believes that Heidegger’s formal indication is mixed with too much of the transcendental nature of phenomenological reduction, thereby obscuring the intuitive manifestation of time. Deleuze grasps two intuitive elements in Bergson’s time that are without reasoning and without mediation: one is being given by itself; the other is “repetition” (Deleuze, 2018, p. 25; Chinese translation slightly modified). Thus, intuition is internal and durational. The internal guards the motive force and impetus of life; duration points to the continuous movement of becoming; similarly, the internal points to the given narcissistic self, and duration points to the constantly repeating death drive. Deleuze’s intuition of time is also not Kant’s “representation that can only be given through a single object” (Deng Xiaomang, p. 349). Because the intuition of time is an instantaneous intuition, it does not necessarily follow a before-and-after succession. Although it can only detach from representation and ascend to the Idea by means of duration, i.e., “continuity,” and “prescribes an ideal cause for continuity” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 295), intuition itself is only an instantaneous sensation and apprehension, “occurring only through a single moment of sensation rather than through the successive synthesis of many sensations, and therefore not proceeding from parts to the whole” (ibid., p. 390). The intuition of time as the ideal cause is no longer Descartes’ intuition, which is isolated from any idea, not attached to any vague “ground” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 57), lucid within the mind, and of the natural light type. It is not a “fleeting glance” (Badiou, 2018a, p. 45), but directly faces the given multiplicity and ambiguity, facing the “chaosmos” (see Deleuze, 2019a, p. 107). Deleuze grounds Descartes’ “I think” and “I am” with the cause of the given; it is precisely this passive self that can ground the “I think” and “I am,” because “the complementarity of the narcissistic self and the death drive defines the third synthesis” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 202). The “third synthesis of time,” which cuts through the sky like lightning, is Aion; the passive self “is split by the pure empty form of time. In this form, it is the correlate of the passive self that appears in time” (ibid., p. 156). Intuition can distinguish between clear ground and ambiguous ground; only by reactivating the “already past” part that is vividly swallowed up by the clear ground, i.e., the continuous ambiguous ground part, can one complete the intuition of time filled with discrete elements, open and multiple, revealing the internal, living intuition. If previous forms of intuition “identified external differences that cannot be reduced to the conceptual order,” then “these differences are still ‘internal’ differences” (ibid., p. 53). Therefore, only the intuition of time can summon the irreducible, constantly overflowing “internal intensive quantity” (ibid., p. 54) and its “eternal reconnection” (Badiou, 2018a, p. 46). This internal intensive quantity is an internal force; unlike Spinoza’s indestructible *causa sui*, it is capable of constant repetition and eternal reconnection, confronting negativity, and rising to an ontological, affirmative “quasi-cause” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 86).

德勒兹对身体进行剖析的一个主要目的，是守护身体内部的直观。康德认为感性直观，无法对范畴进行直观；胡塞尔则把感性直观，提升为范畴直观，也就是知性直观，再把能动性的范畴直观充实为本质直观，本质变更与内时间意识相互联结，把握想象变更的本质属性。这与黑格尔在实践基础上把握范畴直观，有异曲同工之妙，也启示了柏格森的时间直观，以及在此基础上呈现的生命直观。“直觉却把我们引向生命的最深处。”(柏格森，第178页)在直观问题上，德勒兹不仅有着浓厚的斯宾诺莎情结，而且展现了更深层的柏格森情结。为什么是柏格森，不是海德格尔?尽管看起来那么接近海德格尔，但是德勒兹认为海德格尔的形式显示，掺杂了太多的现象学还原的先验性，反而遮蔽了时间的直观显现。德勒兹把握了柏格森时间之中无推理、无中介的两个直观要素：一是被自身给予；二是“重复”(德勒兹，2018年，第25页。中译文略有改动)。因而直观是内部的、绵延的。内部守护生命的动因和冲力，绵延指向连续性的生成运动；同样，内部指向被给予的自恋自我，绵延指向不断重复的死亡欲力。德勒兹的时间的直观也不是康德“只能通过唯一的对象被给予的表象”(邓晓芒，第349页)。因为时间直观是瞬间直观，并不必然前后相继。尽管它借由绵延即“连续性”,才能脱离表象上升为理念，并且“为连续性规定了一个理念性原因”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第295页),但直观本身只是瞬间的感觉和领会，“只是凭借一瞬间的感觉而不是通过许多感觉的相继综合而发生，因而不是从诸部分到整体地进行的”(同上，第390页)。作为理念原因的时间的直观，也不再是笛卡尔的隔离了任何观念的、不附着任何含混“基底”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第57页)的、澄明于心灵内的、自然光式的直观。它不是“惊鸿一瞥”(巴迪欧，2018年a, 第45页),而是直接面对被给予的杂多、含混，面对的是“混沌宇宙”(参见德勒兹，2019年a, 第107页)。德勒兹为笛卡尔的“我思”和“我在”奠基了被给予的原因，正是这个被动自我，才能为“我思”与“我在”奠基，因为“自恋自我和死亡欲力的互补性界定了第三综合”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第202页)。如闪电般划破长空的“第三时间综合”,就是阿依昂(Aion),被动自我“被时间的纯粹空形式割裂。在这种形式下，它是出现在时间之中的被动自我的相关物”(同上，第156页)。直观能够区别清晰基底与含混基底的区分，唯有重新激活“业已逝去”的、被活生生地吞没于清晰基底的部分，也就是连续性的含混基底部分，才能完成充斥着离散元素的、敞开式的、多样性的时间的直观，展现出内在的、生命的直观。以往的直观形式，如果在其中“辨识出了不能被还原为概念秩序的外在差异”,那么“这些差异仍然是‘内部’差异”(同上，第53页)。因而，只有时间的直观，才能呼唤无法还原的内在的不断溢出的“内强量”(同上，第54页)及其“永恒的再连接”(巴迪欧，2018年a, 第46页)。这内强量是内在强力，与斯宾诺莎坚不可摧的自因不同，它是能够不断重复、永恒再连接的，是与否定性相互对抗，是上升到本体论的、肯定性的“准原因”(Deleuze, 1990, p.86)。

Badiou grasps the Althusserian multiple subject through the “direct affect” (Badiou, 2012, p. 113) that is “inexplicable” and directly connected to the “body,” diffused throughout language and poetry. But unlike Althusser, this multiple subject is filled with passion and, through the fissures of being, ceaselessly constructs a completely new “situation” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 643). However, the body itself has a dual nature, and thus Badiou cannot endorse Deleuze’s intuition, which begins from the interior of the body and combines Spinoza’s self-causation with Bergson’s duration of time. Badiou even explicitly opposes intuition. For Deleuze, intuition is the key to guaranteeing historical duration, but for Badiou, history necessarily passes through the rupture of the historical situation. Corresponding to the multiplicity of the subject, Badiou points to four types of situation (cf. Badiou, 2014c, p. 52) and their two natures (cf. Badiou, 2018b, pp. 643-644). The natural situation and the neutral situation are of a factual nature; the historical situation and the generic situation are of an evental nature. Only the evental situation can puncture and bore holes in knowledge, creating fissures in the objective earth. “Neither intuition nor language can guarantee the pure multiple” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 59). Whether it is the object of intuition or the capacity for intuition, it only produces “a pseudo-presentation in which the coherent and the incoherent, being and non-being, are indistinguishable from each other” (ibid., p. 60). A certain incoherent time shows that the event is possible only through a special procedure of organized control. This is “fidelity.” Time, guided by the result of its operation, controls from beginning to end when the special procedure is introduced into the “paradoxical multiple” (ibid., p. 262). People can only intervene and retroactively trace back to the event, where “objects” and “relations” finally find their belonging, through this special procedure — that is, the generic procedure immanent to the faithful procedure — in the uncertainty of time and the mutation of the “post-event.” The duality of time itself brings about the duality of fidelity, and even the duality of the historical situation. Here Badiou differs from Deleuze: if time were merely the simple intuition of the “One,” it could not, through its own duality, establish a meta-ontology of the multiple-as-multiple that stands in opposition to the One.

巴迪欧通过“无法解释”且与“身体”直接连接在一起的、弥漫于语言和诗歌中的“直接的情感”(巴迪欧，2012年，第113页),把握阿尔都塞式的多元主体。但与阿尔都塞不同的是，这多元化的主体充满着激情，并且通过存在的裂隙处不断去建构全新的“情势”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第643页)。但是身体本身有两重性，因而巴迪欧无法赞同德勒兹始于身体内部，又结合了斯宾诺莎的自因和柏格森的绵延的时间的直观。巴迪欧甚至旗帜鲜明地反对直观。德勒兹的直观是保证历史绵延的关键，但是历史在巴迪欧这里，是必然经由历史性情势的断裂。与主体多重性相对应，巴迪欧指出了四重情势(参见巴迪欧，2014年c, 第52页)及其两种性质(参见巴迪欧，2018年b, 第643-644页)。自然情势与中性情势是事实性质，历史性情势和类-完美情势是事件性质。只有事件性的情势才能在知识上穿刺、打洞，使客观性的大地产生裂隙。“无论是直观还是语言都无法来保证纯多”。(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第59页)无论是直观的对象，还是直观的能力，只会产生“一种连贯和不连贯、存在与非在彼此不分的伪呈现”(同上，第60页)。某种不连贯的时间，显示了事件通过有组织的控制的特殊程序才有可能。这就是“忠实性”。时间以运作的结果为引导，从头到尾控制着何时把特殊程序引入“悖论性的多”(同上，第262页)。人们只能在时间的不确定性和突变的“后事件”中，通过这个特殊程序也就是内生于忠实程序的类性程序，介入、回溯到让“对象”和“关系”终有归途的事件。时间自身的双重性，带来了忠实性的双重性，乃至历史性情势的双重性。巴迪欧在此与德勒兹不同，如果时间只是“大写的一”的单纯直观，就无法通过自身的双重性建立起与一相对抗的、多之为多的元-本体论。

3. Confronting “Difference” Itself

3.直面“差异”本身

Difference is an unavoidable moment in Hegelian dialectics. When movement passes from objectivity to actuality, difference necessarily arises; only after difference is sublated upward and inward into identity can the subject establish itself and achieve identity with substance. Heideggerian existentialism, building on Husserl’s “to the things themselves,” demonstrates the groundlessness of identity through the pre-reflective “ontological difference.” Deleuze’s difference, by contrast, stems from respect for and guardianship of intuition. Difference is absolutely non-conceptual difference, also differential difference, minimal difference. It is not the specific difference that determines alterity, nor the difference of matter; nor is it the generic difference that cannot enter into any relation of opposition, nor the indivisible individual difference — all of these belong to conceptual difference. Differential difference is established on “infinitely small difference,” occurs in the empty form of time, and is the “difference of the indifferent” that finds its own concept (cf. Deleuze, 2019a, pp. 61, 65, 62, 89, 34). Difference, through differential singularities, constructs a continuum of minimal differences. But as pure limitation, it can only lead to a “relative nothing” whose occurrence is unknown. Upon the “singularities of the continuum” of differential minimal differences, the “ideal event” (cf. Deleuze, 1990, p. 36, pp. 50-52) of the “relative nothing” is born. The ideal event is not an active present “thing” or “fact”; we cannot say it exists but only that it inheres or persists. Hence it is the Aion of minimal difference and infinite divisibility. “This minimum is appropriate to a non-being, it is a ‘passive’ entity and a passive result. … Time must be grasped twice, in a complementary and mutually exclusive fashion. The first time it must be grasped as the living, co-present, active body of pleasure or suffering; the second time it must be understood as the whole entity infinitely divisible into past-future, and as the incorporeal effect infinitely divisible into bodies, actions, and passions” (Deleuze, 2013, p. 14). The ideal event, which exists extra in the Being of beings, cannot be actualized in present reality. This paradox is called the “Meno paradox,” because Meno knows how to extract the most beautiful and most brilliant non-being from the present Being of beings. Due to this activity, the “nothing” of the “relative nothing” is a “creative nothing.”

差异是黑格尔辩证法的不可绕过的环节，当运动从对象性进入到现实性，就必然产生差异性；在差异性向着同一性向上、向内收回之后，主体才能建立自身，与实体完成同一。海德格尔存在主义在胡塞尔的“直面实事本身”基础上，通过反思前的“存在论差异”,论证了同一性的无根。德勒兹的差异，则源自对直观的尊重和守护，差异是绝对无概念的差异，也是微分差异、最小差异。它不是确定他异的种差、质料的差异；也不是无法进入到任何相反关系的属差、不可分割的个体差异，这些都隶属于概念性的差异。微分差异建立于“无限小的差异”,发生于空时间形式，是找到自身概念的“无差异的差异”(参见德勒兹，2019年a, 第61、65、62、89、34页)。差异以微分的奇点，构建起最小差异的连续体。但是作为纯粹限制，它也只能引向一个未知其发生的“相对的无”。在微分化了的最小差异的“连续体的奇点”上面，“相对的无”的“理念事件”(cf.Deleuze, 1990,p.36,pp.50-52)诞生。理念事件不是活动着的在场之“事物”或“事实”,我们不能说它存在而只能说它内衍或持续，因而这是最小差异并且无限可分的阿依昂。这个“最小值适合于一个非在，是‘被动’实体和被动结果。……时间必须同时以互补和互斥的方式被把握两次。第一次是它必须被把握为活生生的、共当下在场的、能动的快乐或遭受的痛苦的身体；第二次是它必须被理解为可无限分割进过去-未来的整体实体，以及无限分割进身体、行动、激情，所构成的无形影响”(Deleuze, 2013, p.14)。在大写存在中额外存在的理念事件，却无法实现于当下的现实中。这一悖论被称为“美诺悖论”,因为美诺知道，如何从在场的大写存在中，汲取出最美丽、最辉煌的非在。由于这一能动性，“相对的无”的“无”,就是“创造性的无”。

Badiou’s “difference” no longer revolves around the transcendental principle of the supersensible world to argue the relation between identity and difference; instead, he uses the “Two” (cf. Badiou, 2014b, pp. 127-129) to express difference that cannot be identified. Hence, duality has a foundational status in Badiou’s thought. He holds that the logic of the world is a multiple assembled from various “differences of difference,” and that only by respecting differentiation can one construct a new subject through the equally dual “body.” The particularity brought by differentiation need not be regularization; regularization can only bring identity politics controlled by appellation. Differentiation unfolds through “atomic logic,” presenting the most minute parts of the present-at-hand, while simultaneously throwing itself into the “tension of existence.” For example, in the construction of the political subject, people must, like Merleau-Ponty, declare that “history never needs recognition” (ibid., pp. 89, 126). Because any recognition can ultimately only be recognition of the “One.” The political subject respects difference rather than sublating it, realizes love and tolerance for the difference of difference (rather than the identity of difference), and escapes identity politics. Thus the event, in the manner of the “empty set,” opposes the whole and its instantiation, and ontologically resists any form of the “One.” The event is established in the process of the subjectivation of the body; it is the indifference after differentiation or pluralization that growls in the future. Hence only the “post-event” marked by the subjectivated body, not the event itself, can be synchronous with the present. The multiple of the present-at-hand confronts “difference and pre-objectivity,” while the “void” confronts indifference and “the total absence of objects” (Badiou, 2014b, p. 83). The process of subjectivation lies in the difficult self-struggle of the faithful subject, the reactive subject, and the obscure subject [5]5 Badiou distinguishes three types of subjects in relation to an event: the faithful subject (who continues the evental truth procedure), the reactive subject (who denies the event), and the obscure subject (who attempts to destroy the event and its consequences). See Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 52-66. within the situation (cf. ibid., p. 122; Chinese translation slightly modified), and then, through the “post-event,” the subject is reborn. This is the creative “Great Subject.”

巴迪欧的“差异”,不再围绕超感官世界的超验原理，论证同一与差异的关系，而是用“大写的二”(参见巴迪欧，2014年b, 第127-129页)表达无法被同一的差异。因而，双重性在巴迪欧思想中具有基础性地位。他认为世界的逻辑是各种“差异的差异”集合而成的多，并且认为只有尊重差异化，才能借由同样具有双重性的“合体”建构新主体。差异化带来的特殊性，并不必是规则化，规则化只能带来被指称掌控的身份政治。差异化是经由“原子逻辑”,展开当下在场能够呈现的最细微部分，同时投身于作为“实存的张力”之中。例如在政治主体建构中，人们要像梅洛-庞蒂那样去宣布“历史从来不需要承认”(同上，第89、126页)。因为无论何种承认，最后只能是对“大写的一”的承认。政治主体尊重差异而非扬弃差异，实现对差异的差异(而非差异的同一)的爱和包容，摆脱身份政治。因而事件以“空集”的方式，与整体及其具现相互对立，并且从本体论层面对抗任何形式的“大写的一”。事件则建立在身体的主体化进程中，是在未来低吼的差异化或多元化后的无差异。因而只有主体化身体标识的“后事件”,而不是事件，才能够与当下同步。在场的此在之多面对的是“差异和前客观性”,“空”面对的则是无差异和“对象的整体缺席”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第83页)。主体化进程，在于经历情势中的忠实主体、反应主体、模糊主体(参见同上，第122页。中译文略有改动)的艰难的自我搏斗之后，通过“后事件”重生主体，这正是创生性的“大主体”。

2. The Objective Fissure of the Event: Repetition, Multiplicity, Exception

二、事件的客体裂隙：重复、多元、例外

The “door” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 68) through which the event haunts is also described by most event philosophers as a “fissure.” This in fact connects to the broad social-historical realm. The author’s line of thought here is: the previous stage has analyzed the process of subjectivation of the event; this stage will therefore explore the objective fissure of the event. Repetition, multiplicity, and exception are three important markers through which Deleuze and Badiou jointly perceive the fissure in the objective field.

事件出没于的“门”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第68页),也被大多数事件哲学家描述为“裂隙”。这实则关联起广阔的社会历史。这里笔者的思路是，上一阶段已剖析了事件的主体化进程，那么这一阶段将探讨事件的客体性裂隙。重复、多元、例外，是德勒兹和巴迪欧共同透视客体性场域发生裂隙的三个重要标识。

1. Repetition: Creation or Fidelity

1.重复：创造还是忠实

Repetition is originally Plato’s anamnesis of the soul, the awakening of Hegel’s absolute recollection, thereby proving immortality and imperishability. Then how is Hegel’s absolute recollection, cut off by the Lethean waters of the river of forgetfulness in the underworld, to be awakened? Freud has already demonstrated the necessity of the unconscious breaking into the conscious, preconscious, and subconscious processes. But how the unconscious penetrates through the conscious, preconscious, and subconscious to dive beneath the bottomless river of the underworld is a difficult problem. Only the “force” of the “internal intensive quantity” within instinct can grasp it. Deleuze holds that the unconscious is differential, the unconscious of micro-perception under minute differences, and only in the suddenly降临的 [descending] irreducible third synthesis can the third transcendence be completed. This means that under the drive of the internal force of the unconscious, the self initiates an empty form of time, an event in the continuous instant. (See ibid., pp. 158–162) Echoing Badiou’s dramatic argumentation, Deleuze’s concept of “repetition” can also be deeply linked to drama; both seem to carry out an innovative repetition of Marx’s “tragedy” and “comedy” in the *Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. Tragedy and comedy are also Deleuze’s two most basic repetitions. However, Marx moves toward the irony and critique of historical reality, while the latter moves toward the forceful affirmation of nature and spirit. The tragedy and comedy in Hegel’s art-religion point respectively to the irony of self-negation and the certainty of self-consciousness in reflection that withdraws inward. But Deleuze borrows the terminology of psychoanalysis, transforming them into the unknown knowledge of “not knowing what he knows” and the nature of “repressed knowledge.” Thereby he converts individual psychoanalysis into schizoanalysis for the critique of capitalist ideology. In the practice of repetition, time and space are reduced to media; hence this is not the unity of Hegel’s observed rational physiognomy and phrenology, but rather “that which contains in itself all the forces of nature and spirit” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 33); in psychoanalytic terms, the important result of examining the phenomenon of repetition is the discovery of the death drive in which Thanatos and Eros mirror each other. Eros can only be experienced through repetition; Thanatos, as a transcendental principle, gives Eros through the mode of occurring via repetition: “For repetition, the death drive has the value of an originary positive principle; it is the domain and meaning of repetition” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 35). The death drive is the transcendental principle capable of surpassing the pleasure principle and the reality principle; it replaces any transcendent or capitalist-ideologized empirical object with its silent, immense low murmur. Above the two most basic repetitions, there is also the highest, third repetition, “repetition based on difference and the excess in the Idea” (ibid., p. 41). This is repetition based on the conditions of conceptual identity and negativity, repetition that eternally returns in excess, repetition moving toward the “one” of “absolute non-conceptual difference” (ibid., p. 34), and also practical repetition based on human communicative action and comprehensive liberation. Whether difference or repetition, both point to creative repetition grounded in the excess and surplus of presence, requiring no movement of return.

重复最初是柏拉图的灵魂回忆，是黑格尔的绝对回忆的唤醒，以此证明不灭和不朽。那么，如何唤醒黑格尔那被冥河的忘川之水隔绝的绝对回忆?弗洛伊德已经证明了无意识冲入到意识和前意识、潜意识进程的必然性。但是无意识如何通过意识、前意识和潜意识，潜入深不见底的冥河之下，这是一个难题。唯有本能中“内强量”的“强力”才能把握。德勒兹认为无意识是微分化的，是微小差异下的微知觉的无意识，只有在突然降临的无法还原的第三综合中，才能完成第三超越。这意味着自我在无意识的内强力驱动下，引发的空时间形式，瞬间中连续的事件。(参见同上，第158-162页)与巴迪欧的戏剧论证手法相呼应，德勒兹的“重复”概念也能深度链接到戏剧中，他们仿佛都对马克思《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中的“悲剧”“喜剧”进行创新式重复。悲剧和喜剧也是德勒兹的两次最基本重复。不过马克思走向的是对历史现实的反讽和批判，后者则走向对自然和精神的强力认定。黑格尔艺术宗教中的悲剧和喜剧，分别指向自我否定的反讽、向内收回的反思的自我意识的确定。但是德勒兹借鉴了精神分析学术语，把它们转变为“不知道他所知道”的未知的知识，与“被压抑的知识”的本性。由此他把个体性的精神分析，转换为对资本主义意识形态批判的精神分裂分析。在重复的实践中，时间和空间沦为媒介，因而这不是黑格尔观察的理性的面相学与骨相学的统一，而是“在自身中包含着自然与精神的所有强力的东西”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第33页);用精神分析学的术语来说，对重复现象考察的重要结果，是发现塔纳托斯和爱洛斯相互映射的死亡欲力。爱洛斯只能通过重复被体验，作为先验原则的塔纳托斯，将通过重复发生的方式给予爱洛斯：“对于重复来说，死亡欲力有着源始的实定原则的价值，它才是重复的领域和意义。”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第35页)死亡欲力才是能够超越快乐原则和现实原则的先验原则，它用静默的巨大低声，替代任何超验的或被资本主义意识形态化了的经验的对象。在最基本的两次重复之上，还有最高的第三种重复，“以差异和理念中的过剩为本的重复”(同上，第41页),这是超越了概念的同一性和否定性条件为本的重复，是在溢出中永恒回归的重复，是走向“一”的“绝对无概念的差异”(同上，第34页)的重复，也是基于人的交往行动和全面解放的实践重复。无论是差异还是重复，都指向以在场的溢出、剩余为基底的，无需任何回复运动的创造性重复。

Badiou is unwilling to use the term “repetition,” which heavily overlaps with metaphysics, because it is truly incapable of expressing the creativity of the event; instead, he uses “fidelity” to express the real, surging, and recurring inner force. In the author’s view, Badiou uses “count” to critique the eternal return of the Same, just like “the stone of Sisyphus,” interpreting its own destiny of the “capital One” through eternal self-repetition. This destiny of identity necessarily requires a big Other as its support, and its object of critique is precisely the Hegelian universal, absolute “One.” The correspondence between Badiou’s matheme of the multiple and Hegel’s dialectical logic can be set out as follows: “One” metaphorically refers to the abstract and unified “absolute Idea”; the “count-as-one” in the situation requires a “constitution of the one,” implying that the latter is the modality of the former; “the operation of constituting the one is the only operation that can be applied to any multiple considered as existing” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 118), implying that “constituting the one” can concretely apply the “count-as-one” to the “existing multiple”; “count-as-one” metaphorically refers to Hegel’s differential identity; in the “count-as-one” within the “situation,” in the state of the constitution of continuous multiplicity, it “is counted as one,” the latter being the “count of the count,” making the “result of the one” the “one itself” (ibid., p. 122), responding to the singularity behind Hegel’s objective movement, that is, the “one of the one” (ibid.). Therefore, the count of the count is self-counting, completing the “meta-structure” of eternal return, which is precisely the “state of the situation” (ibid.). Regarding the presentation of the multiple, there is a duality of “appearance” within the count: “presentation” in the “situation,” and “re-presentation” of “presentation” in the “state of the situation.” The existing “one” is the “coherent multiple” that is “presented and re-presented,” and the “multiple of the one” that is “presented but not re-presentable”; these represent the “elements of the multiple”; but within the latter, an uncertain “excess” part is concealed, which becomes the “supernumerary” of the multiple, the “part of the multiple” or set that is “not presentable but only re-presentable,” i.e., the “sub-multiple” (ibid., p. 64). The multiple that is “not yet” or “still to come” does not exist; it is merely the constitution of continuous multiplicity and the developmental state of the situation. Therefore, in terms of the ontological structure of the situation, the multiple that cannot exist can only be named the void, suturing the situation to its non-existent yet also non-separated state. This determines the duality and paradoxical naming of the state of the situation. The supernumerary is not the original structure. Fidelity is the repetition of the law of the “count”; the subject is the process linked by the intervening event and the faithful procedure; within the faithful procedure is concealed the unrecognizable, unsplittable “new-multiple” (ibid., p. 416). Deleuze’s “one” of the “relative nothing” capable of continuous creative repetition is, for Badiou, only traceable in the fictional “not yet” and “still to come” as a “state,” forming a “meta-multiple” (ibid., p. 129) different from the “sub-multiple”; the procedure of fidelity to the count of the situation causes the multiple to necessarily exist or repeat within the situation, while the state excavates the wandering void in ontology; this is the “tension of existence.”

巴迪欧不愿意使用与形而上学高度重合的“重复”一词，因为它实在无力表明事件的创造性，而是用“忠实”来表现不断涌动、再现的内在力量的真实。在笔者看来，巴迪欧用“计数”,批判同一者永恒轮回，正如那“西西弗斯的石头”,以永恒的自我重复，来诠释自身命运的“大写的一”。这同一性的命运必然需要一个大他者作为支柱，其批判的对象正是黑格尔式的普全的、绝对的“一”。巴迪欧的数元逻辑与黑格尔的辩证逻辑的关系可对应如下：“一”,暗喻抽象而大一统的“绝对理念”;情势中的“计数为一”需要“构成一”,暗示后者就是前者的模态；“构成一的运算是唯一可以应用到任何被认为是实存的多之上的运算”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第118页),暗指“构成一”能够把“计数为一”具体化应用于“实存的多”之上；“计数为一”暗指黑格尔的差异性同一，在“情势”中的“计数为一”,在连续性多元的构成的状态中，就“被计数为一”,后者是“对计数的计数”,使“一的结果”就是“自身的一”(同上，第122页),回应黑格尔的对象性运动背后的单一性，也就是“一之一”(同上)。因此对计数的计数就是自我计数，完成永恒轮回的“元结构”,也正是“情势状态”(同上)。就多的呈现而言，计数中就存在着“现”的两重性：“情势”中的“呈现”,以及“情势状态”中关于“呈现”的“再现”。实存的“一”是“被展现并被再现”的“连贯性的多”,以及“被展现不可被再现”的“一之多”,它们代表“多的元素”;但在后者中又隐匿着不确定的“溢出”的部分，这部分就成为多的“赘余”,是“不可展现只可再现”的“多的部分”或集合，即“亚-多”(同上，第64页)。“尚未”“尚需”的多不实存，只是连续性的多的构成和情势的发展状态。因此就情势的本体论结构而言，无法实存的多只能被命名为空，缝合了情势同其未实存、但也未分离的状态。这决定了情势状态的双重性和悖论性命名。赘余并不是原初的结构。忠实就是对“计数”法则的重复，主体是被介入的事件与忠实程序关联起来的过程，在忠实程序中蕴藏着不可辨认、无法分裂的“新-多”(同上，第416页)。德勒兹那可不断创造性重复的“相对的无”的“一”,在巴迪欧这里，只能在虚构的“尚未”“尚需”中被追溯为一种“状态”,形成不同于“亚-多”的“元-多”(同上，第129页),忠实于情势的计数的程序使多在情势中必然性地实存或重复，状态则在本体论中发掘游荡的空，这便是“实存的张力”。

2. Multiplicity: Toward the “One” or the “Super-One”

2.多元：走向“一”还是“超-一”

Deleuze’s differential difference is a plural, generative “event = X.” The manifest form of the “event” is passive, plural and diverse; yet behind the dispersion of the plural there lies a unified “One” as its foundation: the force buried deep in Hegel’s black night of the earth and polished by Nietzsche into the “noon” is precisely the will to power. The “affections” (affectio) and “affects” (affectus) of the field are catalyzed by the will to power; the generative drive from the historical “strata” (Deleuze and Guattari, p. 1), “fold” (Deleuze, 2006, p. 101), and “line of flight” (Deleuze and Guattari, p. 1) is the will to power; what necessarily returns in the accidental throw of the dice can only be the will to power. In the dice game, the throw is the sole activity, an intuitive affirmation of the whole, and the site that can prove the eternal return of the ideal event is necessarily immanent within the accidental, indeterminate event “X.” Deleuze’s “event” exists as a “quasi-cause,” just as Lacan’s “objet petit a”; the “event” can gush forth through the “symptom” of the gap in the field of presence. It is invisible and intangible, but it is there and repeats itself in the infinitive mode. It can be said that it is precisely the infinitive event that Deleuze metaphorizes as the throw of the dice. In the accidental result of this constantly occurring throwing activity, there is the necessity of the infinite truth of the “One” and the eternal return of the “will to power.” Hence, the event is the “One” within the plural infinitive “X.” As a necessity within contingency, it differs from Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment, Husserl’s passive synthesis, and Hegel’s final synthesis toward the absolute. As Žižek puts it, this is a “synthesis of dispersion” where the form is scattered but the spirit gathers. This leads the infinitive event of dispersed plurality and infinitely differential difference ultimately toward the indivisible whole of the “One,” the ideal event. This is also the reason Deleuze styled himself a metaphysician in a certain sense.

德勒兹的微分差异，是多元的生成性的“事件=X”。“事件”的表现形态是被动的、多元和多样的；但多元的离散性背后有着统一的“一”作为基础：深埋在黑格尔黑夜大地，被尼采擦亮为“正午”的力，正是强力。场域的“情状”和“情动”以强力催化；从历史的“层”(德勒兹、加塔利，第1页)、“褶”(德勒兹，2006年，第101页)、“逃逸线”(德勒兹、加塔利，第1页)的生成驱力是强力；在偶然掷骰中的必然回归的东 西，也只能是强力。在掷骰游戏中，掷是唯一的活动，是对整体的直观的肯定，能证明向理想事件的永久回归的位点，必然内在于偶然的不定的事件“X”之中。德勒兹的“事件”作为“准原因”而存在，正如拉康的“渐小客体a”,“事件”可以通过在场裂隙的“症候”喷涌出来。它看不见摸不着，但就在那里并且以不定式的方式，重复发生。可以说，正是不定式的事件，才被德勒兹隐喻为掷骰。这个不断发生的抛掷活动的偶然结果中，有着无限的真理的“一”和永恒回归的“强力”的必然性。因而，事件是多元不定式“X”中的“一”。它作为一种偶然中的必然，不同于康德的先天综合判断，胡塞尔的被动综合分析，也不同于黑格尔走向绝对的最后综合，诚如齐泽克所言，这是形散神聚的“离散性的综合”。这就导致了离散的多元性、无限微分的差异性的不定式的事件，最终走向不可分割的整体的“一”的理想事件。这也是德勒兹自封为某种意义的形而上学家的缘由。

Contrary to Deleuze’s view that the event is the “becoming” of the plural “X” in the infinitive, Badiou does not hold that the event itself is the multiple. If there exists an abnormal multiple different from that subsumed under structure, being, and logic, it can only be the evental “site” (Badiou, 2014b, p. 107). This “site” is the “evental site,” linking the “event” and the “situation.” It can only occur in a historical situation that is abnormal relative to natural situations and neutral situations. The multiple of the historical situation possesses a unique instability; it is also a “point of extraction” that the metastructure of the situational state, which secures identity and necessity through a second count, “has failed to grasp” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 217). This “completely abnormal multiple,” as a “site,” lies on the edge of the “void,” and no other elements related to it are presented in the historical situation. Therefore, “this multiple of the evental site exists, but that which is under this multiple does not exist” (ibid., p. 218). The evental site is a “founding multiple”; it separates the event from the void and becomes the “supernumerary One” (超一) that can name the void (ibid., p. 227). The structure and ultimate essence of the “supernumerary One” is the “Great Two” (大二) (ibid., p. 258), a “capitalized Two” written in “singularity” (Badiou and Žižek, p. 21). The multiple is no longer the elements and sets of a multiple subsumed under any structured capitalized One, but a “generic multiplicity,” making the multiple a name for practice. Badiou’s event thus differs ontologically from Deleuze’s ideal event. With respect to the empty set, the “Great Two” is a transitive set, such that the singleton set with only one “element,” as a “part” of the “Great Two,” is included in the binary set itself; part and element thus form a relation of equality; but this equality is not an existing identity, only the “supernumerary One.”

与德勒兹认为事件就是作为不定式的多的“X”的“生成”相反，巴迪欧并不认为事件本身就是多。如果存在一种不同于结构、存在、逻辑统摄下的异常的多，那只能是事件“位点”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第107页)。这“位点”就是“事件位”,关联起“事件”和“情势”。它只能发生在与自然情势、中性情势相异常的历史性情势中。历史性情势的多具有独有的不稳定性，也是以二次计数确保同一性和必然性的情势状态的元结构“所未能把握的”“抽离出来的点”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第217页)。这“完全异常的多”作为一个“位点”,处于“空”的边缘，没有其他与其相关的元素展现在历史性情势之中。因此，事件位的“这个多存在，但这个多之下的东西却不存在”(同上，第218页)。事件位，就是一个“奠基性的多”,它使事件与空分离，并成为能够命名空的“超-一”(同上，第227页)。“超-一”的结构和最终本质是“大二”(同上，第258页),是用“独体性”(巴迪欧、齐泽克，第21页)书写的“大写的二”。多，不再是任何结构化的大写的一统摄的多的元素与集合，而是“类性多元”,使多成为一个关于 实践的名字。巴迪欧的事件，因而与德勒兹的理想事件产生本体论意义上的差异。就空集而言，“大二”是一个可递集合，使只有一个“元素”的单元集，作为“大二”的“部分”包含于二元集自身之中，部分与元素就形成了全等关系；但这个全等不是实存着的同一，只是“超-一”。

3. Exception: Becoming or Rupture

3.例外：是生成还是断裂

Deleuze’s movement of repetition is in fact a creative practical movement that breaks the perspective of the subject; the outward movement is no longer an objectifying or intentional movement, but expands the volume of the object plane, called the movement of the plane of consistency. Deleuze’s “repetition belongs to humor and irony; it is by nature … an exception” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 15). The exception opposes all established rules as something special, manifesting a “singular point” at a turning point; “it is itself a system of differential relations,” and it is “the distribution of singular points or singularities (Idea-events)” (Deleuze, 2018, p. 137). Before the Idea-event is differentiated in reality, it is already fully “differentiated” (ibid.); the Idea-event, through the logic of the “distinct-obscure” (ibid.; translation slightly modified) that has been differentiated, confronts the “relative nothing” of the chaotic universe; the excess of repetition stimulates the overflow of the exceptional Idea-event. Similar to Bergson’s creative evolution, Deleuze’s exception arouses wonder and the extraordinary in reality; it is an exception of continuity within the indivisible whole entity that becomes divisible through infinite divisibility. This is no longer “there is nothing new under the sun” or the déjà vu of “the new is like the old,” but rather “the old is like the new” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 38). The creative “becoming” manifested in the temporal intuition of the body “belongs only to Being or duration, and concerns only the becoming of states within Being” (Deleuze, 2004, p. 45). It is aroused by “essence” into “affect,” stirring up “affections” between interacting subjects, and propelling the “event” of historical reality into becoming. The will to power is the “essence” that constantly repeats in overflow. The overflow of presence, or the eternal repetition of excess, is just like the quantum flow in quantum physics; the line of flight constituted by quantum flow is a curve, prior to bodies and surfaces, constructing the objective war machine, the plane of consistency, and the nomadic smooth space, breaking through the constraints of “strata” and “fold,” moving toward the “exception.” In this space, people roam and live freely. The flow is the driving force of the war machine that propels world history onto the stage; micropragmatics is the ideological form expressing this driving force. Repetition as the event, through the singularity, creativity, and universality of the exception, engages in an ontological confrontation with the generality that establishes laws.

德勒兹的重复运动实则是打破主体环视角度的创造性的实践运动，向外的运动不再是对象化或意向性的运动，而是拓展了客体平面的容积，称为容贯平面的运动。德勒兹的“重复属于幽默和反讽；它从本性上说……,是例外”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第15页)。例外反对诸既有规则的特殊之物，展现一种处于转折的“奇异点”,“它自身就是微分关系系统”,并且是“特异点或奇异点(理念事件)之分布”(德勒兹，2018年，第137页)。理念事件在现实中被分化之前，也已经是完全“被微分了的”(同上),理念事件通过被微分化的“独有-模糊”(同上。中译文略有改动)逻辑，来面对混沌宇宙的“相对的无”的事件，对过剩的重复，激发了例外的理念事件的溢出。与柏格森的创造进化论类似，德勒兹的例外在现实中激起了惊异和非凡，是因无限可分而成为不可分割整体实体中的连续性的例外。这不再是太阳底下无新事，或似曾相识的“新事如旧”,而是“旧事如新”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第38页)。身体的时间直观显现下的创造性“生成”,“它只属于存在或绵延，而且只涉及存在中的状态之生成”(德勒兹，2004年，第45页)。它由“本质”激发起“情动”,激荡起交互主体之间的“情状”,推进历史现实的“事件”生成。强力是在溢出中，不断重复的“本质”。对在场的溢出，或过剩的永恒重复，恰如量子物理学中的量子流，量子流构成的逃逸线是曲线，优先于体和面，构筑了客体性的战争机器、容贯平面、游牧式的平滑空间，冲破“层”和“褶”的束缚，走向“例外”。人们在这个空间中自由自在地游牧和生活。流是战争机器推动世界历史不断出场的动力，微观语用学则是表达这一动力的思想形态。作为事件的重复通过例外的奇异性、创造性及普遍性，与制定法则的一般性进行本体论层面的对抗。

Similarly, Badiou holds that the truth that really exists, as opposed to the so-called truth that exists in reality, is the “exception” to the laws of the world (Badiou, 2014b, p. 103), expressing the “fissure” that the limit of the capacity of the existing state of the situation must inevitably arrive at. The exception is faithful only to the event itself, because the event does not occur within the “normal state” that proceeds step by step. Political engagement, traumatic love, poetic creation, and the mathematical discovery of the empty set are all exceptions. It is especially emphasized that “the axiom of the empty set is an exception” in algebra (Badiou, 2018b, p. 595). Then, how does a given multiple “carry out an operation that is an exception to the transcendental law?” (Badiou, 2014b, p. 106) Badiou, using breathtaking mathematical-logical formulas, demonstrates the illusory nature of the truth-value of historical metaphysics; the foundational structure of the operation of the exception lies in the distinction between “belonging” and “inclusion.” As mentioned above, within every regime that can be counted, there is one exception: the empty set. The mathematical empty set corresponds to the philosophical proposition of real existence: the void is precisely the proper name of being. The characteristic of “void” is demonstrated by the “empty set”; it cannot be presented or represented by the “state of the situation,” and must be known through “generic” and “forcing” (Badiou, 2018b, pp. 22, 23). The void is not nothing, or non-being, because it can still be presented through counting; nothing is merely “non-being,” not the void. The fissure opened by Deleuze’s empty time-form is transformed here by Badiou into “non-being.” Badiou, using the proper name “void,” explores the “event” that is absent and cannot “belong” to any “state of the situation.” Therefore, the “event” can only be “included in” the “exception” of the fissure of the historical state of the situation. This is fundamentally different from Deleuze’s logic of the “One” that, through the fissure of presence, explores the emergence of the absent event behind its appearance. In Badiou’s view, although Deleuze’s event possesses the attributes and modalities of the multiple, the driving force behind the “affect” that brings the event forth is the unique “One,” which has nothing to do with creation; rather, “creation is the nodal point of the problem of choice (or decision), the problem of distance (or fissure), and the problem of the exception (or event)” (Badiou and Žižek, p. 12).

同样，巴迪欧认为真实存在的真理，而非现实存在的所谓真理，就是世界的法则的“例外”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第103页),表述其现有情势之容量极限必然到来的“裂隙”。例外，只忠实于事件本身，因为事件不会发生于按部就班的“常态”。政治的参与、创伤性的爱、诗歌的创作、数学空集的发现，都是例外。尤其要强调的是，代数中的“空集公理是个例外”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第595页)。那么，一个既定的多，如何“进行例外于超验性法则的操作?”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第106页)巴迪欧用令人叹为观止的数理逻辑公式，证明了历史形而上学真值的虚幻性，例外操作的基础架构在于对“属于”和“包含于”的区分中。上文提到，在一切可以被计数的体制中，有一个例外：空集。数学空集，切合了真实存在的哲学命题：空，正是存在的专名。“空”的特征，被“空集”所证明；它不能被“情势”展现和再现，需要经过“类性”和“力迫”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第22、23页)来被认识。空不是无，或非在，因为依旧可以被计数呈现出来，无只是“乌有”,而不是空。德勒兹的空时间形式敞开的裂缝，在巴迪欧这里化为“乌有”。巴迪欧以“空”这一专名，探索不在场且无法“属于”任何“情势”的“事件”。所以，“事件”只能“包含于”历史性情势之裂隙的“例外”。这与德勒兹通过在场裂隙，探讨不在场事件之出场背后的“一”的逻辑，有着根本区别。在巴迪欧看来，德勒兹的事件，尽管具有多的属性和样态，但是使事件出场的“情动”背后的推动力，是唯一的“大写的一”,这与创造无关，而“创造就是选择(或决断)问题、距离(或裂缝)问题、例外(或事件)问题的纽结点”(巴迪欧、齐泽克，第12页)。

III. The Inner Drive of the Event: Immanence, Force, Cause

三、事件的内驱力：内在、强力、原因

Whether it is Deleuze’s event or Badiou’s event, both use the force of immanence to connect the process of the regeneration of the subject and the fissure of the object. Whether it is a subjectless historical process or a multi-subject historical process, there surges within the body a fundamental cause that is distinct from the traditional cause that takes the other as its result, and from the self-cause that takes itself as its result. In their approach to and distance from Hegel, they unfold a new materialist attempt; Deleuze is called democratic materialism, and Badiou calls himself Platonic materialism.

无论是德勒兹的事件，还是巴迪欧的事件，都以内在性的强力，联系起主体再生和客体裂隙的进程。无论是无主体的历史进程还是多元主体的历史进程，都在身体内部涌动着一个与传统以他者为结果的原因，以及以自身为结果的自因相区别的根本原因。在对黑格尔的远离与接近中，他们展开一种新的唯物主义尝试，德勒兹被称为民主唯物主义，巴迪欧自称为柏拉图式的唯物主义。

1. Immanence: Rhizomatics and the Descending Dialectic

1.内在：根茎学与递降的辩证法

Under Deleuze’s intuitive manifestation of time, the event is a movement of immanent becoming; the immanent event occupies a position through “singularity,” expressing the repetition of “individuation” and subjectivation. The “affect” of immanence without a capital Subject, and the “affections” that mutually influence and stir each other, cause the rigid line, bent by the layers of external forces, to curve back again into the life of immanence itself. The first two meanings of “affection” both face and are influenced by the external environment; only in the passive joy of the third connotation can active joy be produced, transforming the power of being affected into the power of acting. The “affections” in social intercourse, the mutual emotional stirrings, are rooted in the “rhizome” deep within the earth (Deleuze and Guattari, p. 6); the rhizome connects this thousand plateaus, these millions of atomic individuals. The rhizome grows in the earth, draws nourishment from Mother Earth, and fuses the mysterious ritual of bread and wine with the mysterious ritual of blood and flesh into an upward life-force of immanence, causing the “war machine” to transcend the “desiring machine,” and “becoming” to cross the temporal axis of past, present, and future; the various layers of the external environment are penetrated by the new life of “affect.” It uses liberated potential difference to complete the dialectical cycle of the event: territorialization, deterritorialization, reterritorialization.

德勒兹的时间的直观显现下的事件是内在性生成运动，内在性事件通过“独异性”占位，表达“个人化”和主体化的重复。无大写主体的内在性的“情动”,与相互影响和激荡的“情状”,使外部之被层的力量压弯了的僵化线，再次弯曲回归到内在性的生命自身中。“情状”的前两种含义都面对外部环境并受环境影响，只有在第三种内涵的被动快乐中才能产生主动快乐，把受动的力量转换为行动的力量。社会交往中的“情状”,相互之间的情感激荡植根于大地深处的“根茎”(德勒兹、加塔利，第6页),由根茎联结起这千高原，这千万个原子个人。根茎，生长于大地中，在大地之母中汲取养分，把面包与酒的神秘仪式与血和肉的神秘仪式，融合为内在性的向上的生命强力，使“战争机器”超越了“欲望机器”,“生成”跨越了过去、现在和将来的时间轴，外在的环境诸层被“情动”的新生命穿透。它以解放了潜能的差异，完成辖域、解域、再结域之事件的辩证循环。

Badiou’s immanence constitutes a methodology that descends from the abstract One to the multiple, a “materialist dialectic” that contends with totality (Badiou, 2014b, p. 94). This materialist dialectic is also often regarded as a “‘descending’ philosophical methodology” (Vernon and Calcagno, p. 36), a descending dialectic that descends, arrives, and enters into the “generic multiplicity” from the “One.” The immanent methodology implies the emergence of multiple subjects at infinitely locatable evental sites, and also calls for the authentic presence of the remainder of presence, the authentic presence that Heidegger deemed impossible. The immanent methodology also implies that the so-called totality is nothing but a named non-being. Although, like Deleuze, Badiou exhibits certain infinitely subdivided immanences, this is not intuitive immanence, but an immanence that reverses the transcendental pressure of the supersensible world, forming a methodological confrontation with the spiraling, ascending, abstract dialectic. Immanence is a “force” that depressurizes the whole of reality, punching holes in the knowledge of concrete totality (Badiou, 2018b, p. 6), and also a generic collection of multiple subjects, opposing the logical process of reaching a totality that fits seamlessly with identity through a coercive, interlocking ascent. How to unstitch the seam, i.e., to untie the necessity stitched into identity? This is precisely the “fissure of rupture” (Badiou, 2014a, p. 55) itself, which is the totality of being; it is within this that the wandering void is produced, which is not being-in-the-world, but “being-in-the-true” (ibid., p. 56).

巴迪欧的内在性构成一种从抽象的一下降到多的方法论，与整体性相抗衡的“唯物主义辩证法”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第94页),这一唯物主义的辩证法也经常被视作“‘递降的’哲学方法论”(Vernon and Calcagno, p.36),这是从“大写的一”中下降、降临、临境到“类性多元”的递降的辩证法。内在的方法论意味着可无限定位的事件点的多元主体的涌现，也是呼唤在场剩余的、海德格尔不可能存在的本真到场。内在的方法论也意味着，所谓的整体，不过是被命名的乌有。尽管与德勒兹一样，巴迪欧展现了某些无限细分的内在，但这不是直观的内在，而是逆转超感官世界的超验压力的内在，与螺旋式上升的、抽象的、递升的辩证法形成方法论对抗。内在是对现实全体的降压，在具体总体的知识上打洞的“力量”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第6页),也是类性的多元主体集合，反对以强制性的环环相扣的递升，达到与同一性合缝的整体的逻辑进程。何以解缝，即解开被缝合到同一性中的必然性?这就是作为存在的总体的“断裂性的裂缝”(巴迪欧，2014年a, 第55页)本身，正是在其中产生了游荡不定的空，这不是在世中存在，而是“在真-中-存在”(同上，第56页)。

2. Force: Eternal Return and “Generic-Forcing”

2.强力：永恒回归与“类性-力迫”

Deleuze draws from Spinoza the nourishment of Nietzsche, dissecting the “conscious impulse” (Deleuze, 2004, p. 24) and the “cause” that drives this impulse from behind, and using action to manifest that ineffable emotional state. “Affection” is the capacity to receive affections; under the distinction between passivity and activity, it is the transformation of the power of being affected and the power of acting. This transformation corresponds to the third connotation of affection; the driving force of the transformation is “affect,” and it can only come from passive affections. Passivity includes joy and pain; the process of transformation from passivity to activity has a locus of force, which can only produce active joy outward from the experience of passive joy. The power of acting is an active power within the passive, not the power of a substantive entity in objectified movement. The power of acting can ascend to happiness and love. This passivity is the given passive self, and what is given by the self is nothing other than force. Deleuze uses “power,” “the infinite of the instant,” “the eternity of the moment” (Deleuze, 2019a, p. 19) to express this force. Drawing nourishment from Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge, Deleuze believes that history forms strata through integration, a product of the structure of geological layers. In the process of sedimentation, folding occurs. This fold is the ripple stirred up on the sea surface by a ship, the necessary fold that cuts from the outside of the ship into the interior. In Foucault’s “panoptic prison,” the identifiable visible and the determinable utterable are the main sediments of the strata; what is sedimented is nothing other than “knowledge,” “force,” and “self.” On the one hand, Deleuze releases force from the depths of the earth’s plains, realizing the composition of the nomadic “steppe”; on the other hand, he expels God from force, driving the fold to be distorted and unfolded again into a line, transforming the capital Subject into a “germinal subject,” stirring up nomadic peoples in the resonance of affections, galloping joyfully across the steppe.

德勒兹从斯宾诺莎处吸取到尼采的养分，把“意识着的冲动”(德勒兹，2004年，第24页),及其背后推动这个冲动的“原因”剖析出来，并以行动展现那不可名状的情感状态。“情状”是接受影响的性能，在被动性和主动性的分野下，是受动力和行动力之转换。这一转换对应于情状的第三个内涵，转换的驱动力是“情动”,并且它只能来自被动性的情状。被动性包括快乐和痛苦，从被动向主动转换过程具有一个力量位点，只能由被动的快乐体验，向外产生主动的快乐。行动力是被动之中的主动力量，而非对象化运动的实体力量。主动力量能够上升为幸福和爱。这个被动就是被给予的被动自我，而被自身给予的除了强力，别无他物。德勒兹用“乘方”“一次的无限”“瞬间的永恒”(德勒兹，2019年a, 第19页),来表述这一强力。德勒兹从福柯的知识考古学汲取养分，认为历史通过积分形成积层，是地质层的结构产物。在沉积过程中发生了褶。这褶是船在海面上荡漾起来的波痕，是在船的外部，切入内部的必然折叠。在福柯的“环视监狱”中，可辨识的可见者，可决定的可述者，都是层的主要沉积物，被沉积下来的无非是“知识”“强力”和“自我”。德勒兹一方面把强力从大地原野深处释放出来，实现游牧“草原”的构图；一方面把神从强力中祛除，以驱动褶再次被流歪曲展开为线，把大写主体转变为“萌芽主体”,在情状共振中激荡起游牧民族，在草原上快乐驰骋。

On the basis of generic multiplicity, Badiou uses the “generic-forcing” procedure to subjectivize the subject into the “great subject,” pointing toward the “empty” subject that is not yet present at the point of rupture, and linking it to the invisible and the unsayable in Foucault’s “diagram” and Deleuze’ “geographic map.” It is especially the unsayable that is the source from which subjectivization arises. Badiou points out that “the final link between the indiscernible and the undecidable is the trace of the great subject in ontology” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 529). The presence of the “void” represents absence, and the gap between absence and presence cannot be “sutured” in existence (Badiou, 2014a, p. 37); it can only be sutured through the paradoxical naming of the “void,” in order to attain the “super-One” of the great Two. The generic procedure produced by the evental “super-One” can in no case coincide with the presentation procedure. The generic procedure is endogenous to the infinite affirmative results of the faithful procedure; the great subject is born from the subject. Badiou links the subject to the “super-One,” the void to being, and truth to the indiscernible. The indiscernible and undecidable sudden event is “that which forces the event to determine the real of the situation” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 531). If the “situation” represents the objective natural and social field, then the “great subject” is the site of the field of thought; the “void” exists within both, and through the generic extension of the “great subject” in the “situation,” forcing is realized, and forcing in turn, through generic extension, determines the real of the “situation,” i.e., the “void.” “Without the void, philosophy could not be the field of thought” (Badiou, 2014c, p. 67). But the result of philosophy remains immanent, because “this void is only a positive opposite, the void of action, the void of operation” (ibid., p. 55). Only the active power of the great subject, which is “void, split, non-substantial and non-reflexive” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 4), can expose the gap that cannot be sutured in existence.

巴迪欧在类性多元基础上，运用“类性-力迫”程序，把主体主观化为“大主体”,指向断裂处的还不在场的“空”主体，关联起位于福柯“图表”和德勒兹“地理图”中不可见者和不可述者。尤其是不可述者，才是主体化发生的根源。巴迪欧指出，“在不可辨识之物和不可决定之物之间的最后的关联就是在本体论中大主体存在的轨迹”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第529页)。“空”的在场代表不在场，不在场和在场之间的裂缝无法在实存中“缝合”(巴迪欧，2014年a, 第37页),只能以“空”的悖论式命名进行缝合，以便达到大二的“超-一”。事件性的“超-一”产生的类性程序，在任何情况下也无法与呈现程序相一致。类性程序内生于忠实程序的无限的肯定性的结果，大主体脱胎于主体。巴迪欧将主体与“超-一”、空与存在、真理与不可辨识物相关联。不可辨识和不可决定的突发事件，是“力迫着事件决定着情势的真实”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第531页)。如果“情势”代表了客观的自然和社会场域，那么“大主体”就是思想场域的发生地，“空”存在于两者之中，通过“大主体”在“情势”中的类性延展实现力迫，力迫又以类性延展反过来决定“情势”的真实，即“空”。“没有了空，哲学就不可能是思想的场域”(巴迪欧，2014年c, 第67页)。但是哲学的结果依然是内在的，因为“这种空只是一种积极的对立面，即行动的空，操作的空”(同上，第55页)。只有“空的、分裂的、非实体的和非反思的”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第4页)大主体的行动力量，才能去暴露在实存中无法缝合的裂缝。

3. Cause: Essence or Event

3.原因：本质还是事件

Deleuze’s thousand plateaus, constructed by affect, come from an internal quasi-cause. The quasi-cause is not a “cause” of forms that must be inferred from other results, nor is it a “self-cause” inferred from itself as a result (Spinoza, p. 1); rather, as the cause of the cause that is essence, it drives the event to emerge. “So-called knowledge is knowledge through causes” (Deleuze, 2019b, p. 79). The cause makes it necessary for me, by means of this “power” (Deleuze, 2004, pp. 60, 120), to achieve self-preservation. The cause is power; “power is identical to essence” (Deleuze, 2019b, p. 82). Essence does not need any external cause to attain necessary existence; it is the immanent power, i.e., “force.” It is active and is the necessary existence of action. “Force” is the “same connection” among causes, embodying the powerful will of an immanent “principle of identity or equality, the identity of being or the unity of the ontological” (ibid., p. 103). The “quasi-cause,” as an immanent, self-possessed “force,” is a “surplus cause” that overflows and cannot be reduced to any present cause. Hence it is an “ideal cause” that penetrates into the surplus of presence and realizes a “reversible causality” (Deleuze, 2013, p. 17), i.e., the “quasi-cause.” The “quasi-cause” produces “incorporeal effects” and is the essence of “affect.” Affect belongs to the third connotation of “affection,” yet it is the site where affection can become affection. “The active causes of these infinite affections come from substance itself” (Deleuze, 2019b, p. 88). Within the “various affections” (Deleuze, 2004, p. 120), it unleashes a vast anonymous energy, enabling the subject, in the process of social interaction, to open up modes of emotional identification, to open up the schizoanalysis of capitalism, to establish a thousand plateaus of mutual agitation and connection, so that rhizomes are linked, intellect purified, soul clarified, and subject reborn.

德勒兹的由情动建构的千高原，来自内部的准原因。准原因不是必须由其他结果推论而出的诸形式的“原因”,也不是以自身为结果推论而出的“自因”(斯宾诺莎，第1页),而是作为本质这一原因的原因，推动事件出场。“所谓认识，就是通过原因而认识”(德勒兹，2019年b, 第79页)。原因，使我必然地借由这个“力量”(德勒兹，2004年，第60、120页)实现自我保存。原因是力量，“力量同于本质”(德勒兹，2019年b, 第82页)。本质不需借由任何外在原因达到必然存在，它就是内在性力量即“强力”。它是主动的，并且是行动的必然存在。“强力”是诸原因之间的“相同连接”,体现了内在的“同一性或平等性原则，存有的同一性或本体的统一性”(同上，第103页)的强大的意志力量。作为内在的、自身的强力的“准原因”,是溢出来的、无法被还原为任何在场原因的“剩余原因”。因而是深入到在场剩余，并实现“可逆的因果关系”(Deleuze, 2013, p.17)的“理念性原因”,也就是“准原因”。“准原因”产生“无形影响”,是“情动”的本质。“情动”隶属于“情状”的第三种内涵，却是“情状”之所以能够成为“情状”的发生地所在。“这些无限的情状的主动原因来自于实体自身”(德勒兹，2019年b, 第88页)。它在“诸般情状”(德勒兹，2004年，第120页)中，发挥着巨大的匿名能量，使主体在社会交往过程中，打开情感认同的方式，敞开资本主义的精神分裂分析，建立相互激荡连结的千高原，使根茎相连、理智涤清、灵魂清澈、主体重生。

Badiou’s “event,” which contingently surpasses the “One,” is the “cause” that activates all present elements, as a “floating, indeterminate motivation” (Badiou, 2018b, p. 74) that does not belong to any present situation. On the one hand, the event is the empty name, and the event can activate the void; on the other hand, it inserts itself between the void and itself. It is both the name of the void and the “super-One” of the structure of presentation. The real is universal, producing purely contingent events; truth is inaugurated in the event, linking the contingent and the eternal. It is at the “interior-exterior” of the historical situation; “in the fold of order, it shows the being of non-being, i.e., existence” (ibid., p. 228). The event, as cause itself, is also the potential of the “super-One,” the incoherent real of being, and the occurrence of an interrupted count, pointing toward the fragmented “de-non-being” in existence. The split “great Two,” determined by the original “interval of suspension,” is a “meta-ontology” that simultaneously excludes and includes mathematics and ontology.

巴迪欧偶然超越“一”的“事件”,是激活一切在场元素的“原因”,作为“游离不定的动因”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第74页),而不属于任何在场情势。一方面，事件是空的名称，并且事件可以激活空；另一方面，它让自己介入到空与自身之间。它既是空的名称，也是呈现结构的“超-一”。真实是普世的，产生纯偶然性的事件；真理在事件中开创，连结偶然和永恒。它在历史性情势的“内部-外部”,“在秩序的挠中，它显示了非存在的存在，即生存”(同上，第228页)。作为原因本身的事件，也是“超-一”的潜在，是存在的不连贯的真实，也是被打断的计数的发生，指向的是在实存中的碎片化的“去非在”。原初的“悬置的间”决定的分裂的“大二”,是同时排斥和接纳了数学和本体论的“元-本体论”。

IV. Differences Between Deleuze’s and Badiou’s Conceptions of the Event and Their Implications

四、德勒兹与巴迪欧的事件观差异及其启示

Both Deleuze and Badiou possess a certain “new triadic” thought, which reconstructs Spinoza’s triad of substance, cause, and power in some way. Deleuze’s new triad is affect, nomadic space, and force; Badiou’s is being, world, and event. The two appear to have enormous differences, yet they are a pair of “uncanny partners” (Badiou, 2018a, p. 7). Both, coincidentally, through the perspective of subject rebirth and object volume, and taking the invisible immanent force as the third term, construct a new triad as “1+1+a,” and through the overflow and surplus of the third term, present and expose the event. The two conceptions of the event first show a high degree of consistency within the framework of the “new triad.” Both Deleuze’s and Badiou’s conceptions of the event are materialist conceptions of the event with a historical developmental perspective; both oppose negative speculative dialectics and objective idealism. Their convergence with historical materialism is mainly manifested in the following: first, history develops internally, and a comprehensive critique of capitalism requires an overall confrontation with capitalist ideology, cutting through the thorny thicket of reification [40]40 The term “reification” (物化, *wuhua*) here translates the concept of *Verdinglichung* as developed by Georg Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), referring to the process by which social relations appear as objective properties of things under capitalism. covered by modern capital civilization; second, the new subject is founded on the community of individuals and its immanent powerful will; third, the driving force of history is the bodily, creative action of the community; fourth, world history can only reconstruct the field dominated by instrumental reason through the warm mutual affection between human beings.

德勒兹与巴迪欧都有某种“新三一体”思想，对斯宾诺莎的实体、原因、力的三一体存在某种重构性。德勒兹的新三一体是情动、游牧空间、强力；巴迪欧的则是存在、世界、事件。两者看似有着巨大差异，却是一对“吊诡的搭档”(巴迪欧，2018年a, 第7页)。他们不约而同通过主体重生、客体容积视角，加以看不见的内在强力为第三项，以“1+1+a”构建新的三一体，通过第三项的溢出和剩余，呈现和暴露事件。两种事件观在“新三一体”构架中首先体现出高度的一致性。德勒兹和巴迪欧的事件观都是具有历史发展视域的唯物主义事件观，他们都反对否定性的思辨辩证法和客观唯心主义，他们与历史唯物主义的契合主要体现在：其一，历史是内部发展的，对资本主义进行全面反思，就必须整体对抗资本主义意识形态，斫去被资本现代文明布满的物化荆棘；其二，新主体建立在诸个体的共同体及其内在的强大意志力上；其三，历史的动力是共同体的身体力行的创造性行动；其四，世界历史经由人与人之间互爱的温情，才能重构被工具理性统治的场域。

Yet what is called paradox means that although they are endogenously similar, they are also full of differences. First, is the event a continuum of infinite differentiations of a whole entity, or a “rupture” in a historical situation that opposes the whole? That is, does the event operate by differential calculus, or by algebraic sets? Different modes of argumentation conceal different epistemological lineages. Deleuze’s event, like Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge, breaks without rupturing, and is therefore a post-structuralist epistemology. Badiou’s rupture between being and the event-situation is a foundation for the epistemological break; in this respect, it is closer to the structuralist epistemology of his teacher Althusser. The generic subject and so on are also a further inheritance of Althusser’s historical overdetermination and multiple subjects. Second, is the fissure of the event stitched together in the “empty time-form” of a “relative nothing,” or is it exposed in the “void” of the state of the situation? That is, is the event a nothing of continuity, or a void of discontinuity? The author holds that Deleuze’s “relative nothing” resembles Derrida’s “non-being,” meaning that in a specific time and space, this nothing is realized in some special way. Badiou, by contrast, opposes “non-being,” because it is merely a “nothing” in the sense of naming; one can “go to non-being” rather than “go to being” or directly “non-be.” Time is not an empty form linking being and non-being; the principle of time is the “sole foundation” of the event (Badiou, 2018b, p. 263). Third, how does the ruptured fissure carry out objective activity? Badiou’s conception of the event is the opposite of Deleuze’s: it cannot use an empty time-form to infinitely differentiate and “fill in” the “fissure”; the existing crack can only be exposed, intervened in, and retroactively grasped, not chosen, judged, or filled in. Structurally, Deleuze’s rupture of the object is a Foucault-style laminated rupture that is continuous without being continuous, but Badiou’s is an Althusserian structural rupture. Even more paradoxical is that Badiou firmly declares himself “on the side of the anti-humanist front of Althusser, Foucault, and Lacan” (Badiou, 2014b, p. 80), yet in practice he moves toward the opposite side, that of the humanist Sartre.

然而，所谓吊诡，意味着他们尽管内生性相似，但也充满了差异。其一，事件是整体实体的无限微分的连续，还是对抗整体的历史性情势的“断裂”?也就是说，事件用微分计算，还是用代数集合?不同的论证方式，隐藏了不同的认识论脉络。德勒兹的事件似福柯知识考古学那样断而不裂，故而是后结构主义的认识论。巴迪欧的存在与事件的情势断裂，是对认识论断裂的奠基，就此而言，与他的老师阿尔都塞的结构主义认识论更为接近。大二、类性主体等，也是对阿尔都塞历史多元决定、多元主体的进一步传承。其二，事件裂隙缝合于“相对的无”的“空时间形式”,还是暴露在情势状态的“空”?也就是说，事件是连续性的无，还是非连续性的空?笔者认为，德勒兹的“相对的无”类似于德里达的“非在”,意味着在特定时空下，以某种特殊的方式去实现这个无。巴迪欧则反对“非在”,因为这只是命名意义上的“乌有”,人们可以“去非在”,而不是“去存在”或直接地“非在”。时间不是连结存在与非在的空形式，时间原则是事件的“唯一的根基”(巴迪欧，2018年b, 第263页)。其三，断裂性的裂缝如何进行对象性的活动?巴迪欧与德勒兹的事件观相反，它无法用一个空时间形式来无限微分和填补“裂隙”,实存的裂缝只能被暴露、介入、回溯，而不是选择、判断、填空。就结构而言，德勒兹的客体断裂，是福柯式连而不续的积层式断裂，但巴迪欧则是阿尔都塞式的结构性断裂。更为吊诡的是，巴迪欧坚定地宣称自己“站在阿尔都塞、福柯、拉康那种反人道主义的阵线”(巴迪欧，2014年b, 第80页),在实践中，他却走向了与之相对立的人道主义的萨特这一方。

In the dazzling constellation of French thought, the theories of this paradoxical pair tower aloft. Their little pantheon gathers the intellectual essences of literature, history, philosophy, mathematics, physics, and other fields, as well as the theoretical achievements of various methodologies. There remains considerable room for research into the conceptions of the event of Deleuze and Badiou and the gains and losses of their theories; here we can only glimpse a part. In any case, when we attend to the purpose and driving force of historical development, we must not allow historical materialism to deviate from its axis and rotate away from the real earth, ignoring the dialectical laws of development of productive forces and relations of production.

在群星璀璨的法国思想界中，这对吊诡搭档之理论昂霄耸壑。在他们的小万神殿中汇聚文史哲、数理化等领域的思想精髓，以及诸方法论的理论成果。对德勒兹和巴迪欧的事件观及其理论得失的剖析，尚有很大的研究空间，在此只能管窥一斑。无论如何，我们在关注历史发展的目的和动力时，不能让唯物史观脱离现实大地偏轴旋转，无视生产力和生产关系的辩证发展规律。