马克思主义研究网Marxism Research Network

Unofficial English translation by DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM · source marxism.cass.cn

Rethinking the Explanatory Models of Contemporary Chinese Clean Governance Theory

彭斌、朱亚娇:当代中国廉政理论解释模式的再思考

· · Discipline Inspection Studies · 22 min read

Existing theoretical research on clean governance in China has basically examined the causes

我国现有的廉政理论研究基本上是从“制度”“权利”“道德”及“阶级”等视角考察腐败的成因和发生机制,探讨反腐败的行动逻辑、动力机制和实践策略。上述研究都将权力滥用作为腐败的成因,进而从制度、权利、道德及阶级的角度提出制约和监督权力的反腐败措施。实际上,腐败行为和反腐败行动都是在既定的权力关系网络中实施的,都需要相关的行动者生产、激活或运用相应的权力才能实现其目标。然而,从权力的性质上讲,那种导致腐败行为的权力与实施反腐败行动的权力是完全不同的,前者属于支配性权力(power as domination),而后者则属于反支配性权力(power as anti-domination)。在这种意义上,腐败就是腐败主体将其职权异化为支配性权力以谋取私利的行为,反腐败则是党和政府生产、激活或运用反支配性权力以预防和惩治腐败行为。基于此,本文将在考察学术界现有的以制度、权利、道德及阶级为核心的廉政解释模式的基础上,从反支配性权力的角度阐释腐败与反腐败的行动逻辑和动力机制,比较分析以反支配性权力为核心的反腐败理念与以制度、权利、道德及阶级分析为核心的廉政理念之间的异同,以期深化和拓展学术界现有的反腐败理论研究。

I. Analysis of Explanatory Models of Clean Governance Theory in Contemporary China: A Brief Summary and Exposition

一、当代中国廉政理论解释模式分析:简要的归纳与阐述

A brief analysis of existing domestic scholarly research on anti-corruption theory can, based on differences in the causes of corruption, mechanisms of occurrence, and the logic of anti-corruption action, motivational mechanisms, and practical strategies, be summarized into four explanatory models of clean governance theory centered on “institutions,” “rights,” “morality,” and “class.”

简要地分析国内学者现有的反腐败理论研究,可以依据腐败的动因、发生机制与反腐败的行动逻辑、动力机制与实践策略等方面的差异,将其概括为以“制度”“权利”“道德”及“阶级”为核心的四种廉政理论解释模式。

1. The Explanatory Model of Clean Governance Theory Centered on Institutions

1.以制度为核心的廉政理论解释模式

In research on corruption and anti-corruption issues, whether the behavior of actors conforms to existing clean governance rules and regulations is the primary question to be explored. Comrade Deng Xiaoping once profoundly pointed out, “Good institutions can prevent bad people from running amok; bad institutions can prevent good people from fully doing good deeds, and may even drive them to the opposite.” [1]1 Deng Xiaoping, “On the Reform of the Party and State Leadership System” (1980). In this sense, institutions inevitably exert a decisive influence in the process of corruption and anti-corruption, and advancing anti-corruption work through institutional construction has thus become a basic choice of the Party and government. He Zengke once analyzed the causes of corruption from an institutional perspective, stating, “The persistently high incidence of corruption and the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts are closely related to the serious inadequacy of our country’s current national clean governance institutional system in supervising and constraining power, and in preventing and punishing corruption.” [2]2 He Zengke, “On the Construction of a National Clean Governance System,” Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism, no. 6 (2009). It can be seen that building a complete, scientifically standardized, and efficiently operating clean governance institutional system is an inevitable requirement for anti-corruption. Precisely because institutions have functions such as determining corrupt behavior, standardizing anti-corruption actions, and achieving the normalization of anti-corruption, and can ensure that anti-corruption actions have strong targeting, stability, and operability, as well as possess normativity, legitimacy, and effectiveness, the aforementioned researchers analyze corruption and anti-corruption issues with institutions at the core, forming the classic “institutional anti-corruption” explanatory model of clean governance theory.

在关于腐败与反腐败问题的研究中,行为主体的行为是否符合现有的廉政规章制度,是需要探讨的首要问题。邓小平同志曾经深刻地指出,“制度好可以使坏人无法任意横行,制度不好可以使好人无法充分做好事,甚至会走向反面”。在这种意义上,制度必然会在腐败和反腐败的过程中产生决定性影响,通过制度建设推进反腐败工作也就成了党和政府的基本选择。何增科就曾从制度的角度分析腐败的成因,“腐败现象居高不下和反腐成效的有限性同我国目前的国家廉政制度体系在监督和制约权力、预防和惩治腐败方面的有效性严重不足有着密切的关系”。可见,构建系统完备、科学规范、运行高效的廉政制度体系是反腐败的必然要求。正是由于制度具有判定腐败行为、规范反腐败行动、实现反腐常态化等功能,能够保障反腐败行动具有较强的针对性、稳定性和可操作性,并具备规范性、正当性和有效性, 所以,上述研究者才会以制度为核心分析腐败与反腐败问题,并形成了经典的“制度反腐败”廉政理论解释模式。

In the explanatory model of clean governance theory centered on institutions, institutions are the core element for explaining corruption and anti-corruption phenomena. That is, corruption is usually attributed to the existing institutional system being insufficiently sound, or to certain actors violating established institutional arrangements for private gain; anti-corruption is the anti-corruption subject implementing anti-corruption actions according to established institutional arrangements to prevent, supervise, and punish corrupt actors who violate institutional norms. In this sense, the motivational mechanism of anti-corruption lies in the fact that actors implementing anti-corruption actions trust the relevant institutional arrangements of the state and government, and by resorting to corresponding institutions and legal norms, they prevent and punish corrupt behavior in an orderly and compliant manner. Therefore, the key to anti-corruption strategies and advancement measures lies in the Party and government specifically plugging the institutional gaps that lead to various corruption problems, establishing and improving various anti-corruption legal norms, systems, and mechanisms to prevent and punish all types of corrupt behavior that violates institutional norms. It should be noted that in existing clean governance research, some scholars analyze anti-corruption issues from the perspective of the rule of law, advocating for the construction of a complete system of anti-corruption legal norms and using rule-of-law thinking, rule-of-law methods, and legal means to prevent and punish corruption. However, such views essentially do not go beyond the scope of the anti-corruption explanatory model centered on institutional analysis, and this article also incorporates them into the “institutional anti-corruption” explanatory model of clean governance theory.

在以制度为核心的廉政理论解释模式中,制度是解释腐败与反腐败现象的核心要素,即腐败通常被归结为既有的制度体系不够健全,或者某些行动者违反既定的制度安排谋取私利而导致的;反腐败则是反腐败主体依据既定的制度安排实施反腐败行动,预防、监督和惩治腐败主体违反制度规范的行为。在这种意义上,反腐败的动力机制在于,那些实施反腐败行动的行为主体信赖国家和政府的相关制度安排,通过诉诸相应的制度与法律规范,有序、合规地预防和惩治腐败行为。所以,反腐败的策略和推进措施的关键在于,党和政府要对那些导致各种腐败问题的制度空隙进行针对性完善,建立健全各种反腐败的法律规范和体制机制,预防和惩处各种违反制度规范的腐败行为。需要指出的是,在现有的廉政研究中,还有一些学者从法治的角度分析反腐败问题,主张构建完备的反腐败法律规范体系,运用法治思维、法治方式和法律手段预防和惩治腐败。不过,像这样的观点在本质上依然没有超出以制度分析为核心的反腐败解释模式的范畴,本文也将其纳入“制度反腐败”的廉政理论解释模式。

2. The Explanatory Model of Clean Governance Theory Centered on Rights

2.以权利为核心的廉政理论解释模式

There are also quite a few researchers who explore corruption and anti-corruption phenomena from the perspective of rights, describing corruption as an act that infringes upon the rights of certain actors and interpreting anti-corruption as actions to defend those rights. Ren Jianming once pointed out, “In any society where power is corrupt, the basic rights of citizens cannot be guaranteed; the essence of power abuse determines that it ultimately infringes upon the public interest of society and the private rights of individual citizens.” [3]3 Ren Jianming, “Anti-Corruption and the Protection of Citizens’ Rights,” China Legal Science, no. 4 (2004). Sun Shiyan also believes, “All types and forms of corruption damage all kinds of human rights, including collective rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. … Everyone is a victim of corruption and the human rights damage it causes.” [4]4 Sun Shiyan, “Corruption and Human Rights,” Human Rights, no. 3 (2014). Analyzed from the perspective of rights, anti-corruption means that certain actors use their civil rights to prevent and punish corrupt behavior, preventing other actors from using power to commit corrupt acts that infringe upon their rights. Huang Qisong and Sun Yongning pointed out in this sense, “The absence of rights is an important reason for the ‘successive waves’ of corruption and also a reason for the high cost of anti-corruption,” and “anti-corruption should correct the alienation of power … use rights to constrain power,” and “it is very important to make rights present in the anti-corruption process, rather than absent.” [5]5 Huang Qisong and Sun Yongning, “Rights Anti-Corruption: A New Perspective on Anti-Corruption,” Journal of Guizhou University (Social Sciences), no. 5 (2015). It can be seen that the above research explains corruption and anti-corruption phenomena based on the discourse of “rights.” It both describes and explains the phenomenon of corrupt acts infringing upon citizens’ rights and reveals and analyzes the value and role of rights in anti-corruption actions. Therefore, it can be summarized as the “rights anti-corruption” explanatory model of clean governance theory.

也有相当多的研究者从权利的角度探讨腐败与反腐败现象,将腐败描述为侵害某些行动者权利的行为,将反腐败解释为捍卫其权利的行动。任建明曾经指出,“凡是权力腐败的社会,公民的基本权利是无法得到保障的,权力滥用的本质决定其最终侵犯的是社会的公共利益和公民个体的私人权利”。孙世彦也认为,“所有类型和形式的腐败都损害各类人权,包括集体权利,经济、社会和文化权利以及公民权利和政治权利。……任何人都是腐败及其导致的对人权的损害的受害者”。从权利的角度分析,反腐败也就是某些行动者运用其公民权利预防和惩治腐败行为,防止其他行动者运用权力实施腐败行为以侵犯其权利。黄其松和孙永宁就曾在这种意义上指出,“权利的缺位是让腐败‘前腐后继’的重要原因,而且也是反腐败成本高昂的原因”,“反腐败应该矫正权力的异化……以权利制约权力”,“让权利在反腐败的过程中在场,而不是缺位就显得很重要了”。由此可见,上述研究都是基于“权利”的话语阐释腐败与反腐败现象,它既描述和阐释了腐败行为侵犯公民权利的现象,也揭示和分析了权利在反腐败行动中的价值和作用,因而可以归纳为“权利反腐败”的廉政理论解释模式。

In the explanatory model of clean governance centered on rights, corruption occurs because power-abusing acts infringe upon citizens’ rights. The internal driving force of anti-corruption lies in the strong willingness of certain actors to defend and safeguard their own rights, and the anti-corruption process is considered “the process by which the people reclaim their own rights.” [6]6 A paraphrase of the Marxist view that the proletariat reclaims political power from the bourgeoisie. In such an explanation, the reason rights can become the motivational mechanism for anti-corruption is mainly that they can form a constraining relationship with power, playing a role in preventing and punishing power abuse. This is like what Bodenheimer pointed out: “By widely distributing rights among individuals and groups to achieve the dispersion and balance of power, because when such a rights structure is established, the law will strive to protect it from serious interference and destruction.” [7]7 Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law (Harvard University Press, 1962). According to this logic, anti-corruption must enhance citizens’ awareness of their rights, guarantee citizens’ rights to information, participation, and supervision, and promote the democratization and rule-of-law-based decision-making.

在以权利为核心的廉政解释模式中,腐败是由于权力滥用行为侵犯了公民权利而发生的,反腐败的内在动力在于某些行动者具有捍卫和维护自身权利的强烈意愿,而反腐败过程则被认为是“人民重新夺回自己权利的过程”。在这样的解释中,权利所以能够成为反腐败的动力机制,主要在于它与权力之间能够形成制约关系,可以起到防止和惩治权力滥用的作用。这就像博登海默指出的,“通过在个人和群体中广泛分配权利以达到权力的分散和平衡,因为当这样一种权利结构建立起来时,法律就会努力保护它,使其免受严重的干扰和破坏”。依据这样的逻辑,反腐败就必须增强公民的权利意识,保障公民的知情权、参与权和监督权,推进决策民主化和法治化。

3. The Explanatory Model of Clean Governance Theory Centered on Morality

3.以道德为核心的廉政理论解释模式

In social life, both corrupt acts and anti-corruption actions arise within corresponding ethical and moral contexts and are influenced by the ethical and moral concepts of the actors. Therefore, whether social actors possess a sense of integrity and self-discipline, and whether their behavior conforms to moral and professional ethical norms, becomes a very important issue. Based on this, a considerable number of researchers have described the corrupt motives of social actors from the perspective of moral ethics and have elaborated on the anti-corruption mechanisms and measures that should be adopted in terms of moral and ethical norms. Guo Xuede once analyzed and pointed out that “the corrupt behavior of some leading cadres may, in its specific manifestations, be economic corruption or moral degeneration, but its deep-seated cause is the wavering of ideals and convictions and the deterioration of ideology and politics. Once a person’s ideals and convictions waver, they lose their political and moral steadfastness… and under various temptations and erosions, they degenerate and become a corrupt element.” [8]8 Guo Xuede, “On the Moral Causes of Corruption among Leading Cadres and the Path of Moral Anti-Corruption,” *Zhongzhou Journal*, no. 2 (2010). Precisely because the occurrence of corrupt behavior has moral and ethical causes, anti-corruption must also obtain corresponding moral and ethical support. Thus, morality becomes an important perspective for analyzing corruption and anti-corruption phenomena, and “moral anti-corruption” becomes an important explanatory model of clean governance theory.

在社会生活中,无论腐败行为还是反腐败行动,都是在相应的伦理道德情境中产生的,都受到行动者的伦理道德观念影响。所以,社会行动者是否具备廉洁自律意识,其行为是否遵循道德和职业伦理的规范,就成为非常重要的问题。基于此,相当多的研究者从道德伦理的角度描述了社会行动者的腐败动机,阐述了在道德伦理规范方面应当采取的反腐败机制和措施。郭学德曾经分析指出,“一些领导干部的腐败行为从具体表现形式上看可能是经济贪腐、生活腐化,但其深层次原因是理想信念的动摇和思想政治上的变质。一个人的理想信念动摇了,就会丧失政治和道德上的坚守……以至于在各种诱惑和腐蚀下腐化堕落,成为一个腐败分子”。正是由于腐败行为的发生具有道德伦理方面的原因,反腐败也必须获得相应的道德伦理方面的支持,所以,道德就成为分析腐败与反腐败现象的重要视角,“道德反腐败”也就成为一种重要的廉政理论解释模式。

According to the explanatory model of clean governance theory based on moral anti-corruption, corruption stems from the moral and ethical distortion of certain actors. Anti-corruption requires establishing corresponding moral and ethical norms, strengthening ideological and moral education, so that the values and behavior of actors conform to social public morality and professional ethical norms, prompting them to be honest and self-disciplined. Li Jianhua proposed that “the regulation of human behavior by morality has the characteristics of breadth, frequency, flexibility, and profundity… only with moral psychological immunity can the abuse of power be fundamentally prevented.” [9]9 Li Jianhua, “On the Moral Prevention and Control Mechanism of Power Corruption,” *Ethics Research*, no. 2 (2006). Tang Tuhong also pointed out in this sense that anti-corruption must “cultivate a reasonable political and ethical culture, eradicate the ethical and cultural roots of power corruption,” and “establish a correct concept of power morality, and exercise the people’s power reasonably.” [10]10 Tang Tuhong, “On the Ethical Roots of Power Corruption and Its Governance,” *Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition)*, no. 1 (2006). It can be seen that in the explanatory model of clean governance theory centered on moral analysis, anti-corruption requires both strengthening ideological and moral education to enhance the moral cultivation of state public servants, enterprise management personnel, social organization staff, and ordinary citizens, and cultivating a fine moral culture to create an ethical and moral environment of integrity and self-discipline.

依据道德反腐败的廉政理论解释模式,腐败来自于某些行动者在道德伦理方面的扭曲,反腐败就需要确立相应的道德伦理规范,加强思想道德教育,使行动者的价值观念和行为符合社会公共道德和职业伦理规范,促使其廉洁自律。李建华提出,“道德对人的行为的调节具有广泛性、经常性、灵活性、深刻性等特点……有了道德的心理防疫,才能从根本上防止权力滥用”。唐土红也在这种意义上指出,反腐败要“培育合理的政治伦理文化,铲除权力腐败的伦理文化根源”,“树立正确的权力道德观,合理地行使人民的权力”。由此可见,在以道德分析为核心的廉政理论解释模式中,反腐败既需要加强思想道德教育,提升国家公务人员、企业管理人员、社会团体工作人员和普通民众的道德修养,又需要培育优良的道德文化,营造廉洁自律的伦理道德环境。

4. The Explanatory Model of Clean Governance Theory Centered on Class

4.以阶级为核心的廉政理论解释模式

In real life, class is a key element in the social structure. It involves the structural relationships of social actors in terms of power, resources, discourse, etc., and influences and shapes actors’ value preferences and behavior. In the phenomenon of corruption, the subjects of corruption live within the social structural system, and their corrupt preferences and behavior are inevitably influenced by their structural position in society and related class concepts or consciousness. Therefore, some researchers also examine the issue of corruption and anti-corruption from the perspective of class analysis. Li Chongfu once emphasized that social science research needs to adhere to and apply the method of class analysis, and that some Party members and cadres “fall one after another” [11]11 “Fall one after another” (前腐后继) is a pun on the common phrase “前仆后继” (one falls, another steps into the breach), replacing “仆” (fall) with “腐” (corrupt) to describe a succession of corrupt officials. because they are eroded and corrupted by the decadent ideas of the exploiting classes. Wang Chuanli also proposed in this sense that “anti-corruption analysis that excludes class analysis and the fundamental social system will inevitably be superficial and vulgar, making it difficult to grasp the essence of the corruption phenomenon and difficult to design effective strategies for governing corruption.” [12]12 Wang Chuanli, “Class Analysis and Anti-Corruption in Contemporary China,” *Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC*, no. 3 (2011). These studies centered on class analysis can be summarized as the explanatory model of clean governance theory of “class anti-corruption.”

在现实生活中,阶级是社会结构中的关键性要素,它会涉及社会行动者在权力、资源、话语等方面的结构性关系,影响和塑造行动者的价值偏好与行为。在腐败现象中,腐败主体是生活在社会结构体系之中的,其腐败偏好和行为必然受到他们在社会中的结构性位置以及相关阶级观念或意识的影响。所以,也有研究者从阶级分析的角度考察腐败与反腐败问题。李崇富就曾强调指出,社会科学研究需要坚持和运用阶级分析方法,有些党员干部“前腐后继”就是受到剥削阶级腐朽思想的侵袭腐蚀而堕落变质的。王传利也在这种意义上提出,“排斥阶级分析和社会根本制度的反腐分析,难免表面化、庸俗化,很难把握腐败现象的本质,很难设计出有效的治理腐败方略”。这些以阶级分析为核心的研究,可以归纳为“阶级反腐败”的廉政理论解释模式。

In the study of clean governance theory centered on class analysis, contemporary researchers not only focus on the corrupt behavior of certain actors who abuse power, but also on the influence of the ideology and culture of the exploiting classes on the subjects of corruption and their behavior. They emphasize analyzing the roots and characteristics of corruption from the perspective of the exploiting system and exploiting classes, and then propose corresponding anti-corruption strategies and measures. Some researchers have pointed out that “corruption, by its nature, is the thought and behavior of the exploiting classes… the root of corruption is the exploiting system,” “the root of corruption under the socialist system is still the exploiting system, and the various factors related to the exploiting system and exploiting classes that inevitably still exist in real society,” and “exploiting the fruits of the labor of the working people is an important feature of corruption.” [13]13 Li Chongfu, “On the Class Roots of Corruption and the Socialist Anti-Corruption Strategy,” *Studies on Marxism*, no. 4 (2012). According to this view, anti-corruption requires not only punishing corrupt elements and corrupt acts, but also adhering to the socialist system and eliminating the influence of the exploiting system and exploiting classes in economic, social, cultural, and moral aspects. This means that in the clean governance theory model centered on class analysis, the institutional design and strategic analysis of anti-corruption need to examine both the corrupt behavior of certain actors and the various structural roots that lead to corrupt behavior, fundamentally changing the unreasonable social structure and corresponding institutional arrangements to avoid social polarization. That is to say, anti-corruption must both prevent and punish the corrupt behavior of certain actors and optimize the social structure, promote social equality and common prosperity, and fundamentally eradicate the social soil that breeds corrupt behavior.

在以阶级分析为核心的廉政理论研究中,当代研究者不仅关注于某些行动者滥用权力的腐败行为,而且关注剥削阶级的思想文化对于腐败主体及其行为的影响,强调从剥削制度和剥削阶级的角度分析腐败的根源和特征,进而提出相应的反腐败策略和措施。有研究者就曾指出,“腐败按其本质是剥削阶级的思想和行为……腐败的根源是剥削制度”,“社会主义制度下腐败的根源,仍然是剥削制度,是现实社会中仍不可避免地存在着的各种同剥削制度、剥削阶级相关的因素”,“剥削劳动人民成果是腐败的重要特征”。依据这样的观点,反腐败不仅需要惩处腐败分子和腐败行为,而且需要坚持社会主义制度,消除剥削制度与剥削阶级在经济、社会、文化与道德等方面的影响。这就意味着,在以阶级分析为核心的廉政理论模式中,反腐败的制度设计与策略分析既需要考察某些行动者的腐败行为,同时又需要考察各种导致腐败行为的结构性根源,从根本上改变不合理的社会结构以及相应的制度安排,避免社会两极分化。也就是说,反腐败既要预防和惩处某些行动者的腐败行为,也要优化社会结构,促进社会平等与共同富裕,从根本上铲除滋生腐败行为的社会土壤。

II. Constructing an Anti-Domination Power System: An Analysis of Clean Governance Theory from the Perspective of Anti-Dominating Power

二、构建反支配的权力体系:以反支配性权力为视角的廉政理论分析

By examining the above explanatory models of clean governance theory, we can argue that although existing studies of clean governance theory often examine the relationship between corruption and power, and discuss that the root of corruption lies in the abuse of power, there are still certain theoretical misunderstandings in their understanding and recognition of the relationship between power and corruption. Specifically, existing studies often, intentionally or unintentionally, equate power with the ability to dominate the will and behavior of others, and equate the relationship between actors endowed with power and actors subject to power with a relationship of domination and subordination. This is like what Max Weber pointed out when elaborating on the concept of power: “Power means any opportunity within a social relationship to carry out one’s own will even against resistance, regardless of what this opportunity is based on.” [14]14 Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 1 (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997), 81. This means that power is a one-dimensional act implemented by the power subject against the power object. The power subject is in a dominant position with power, possessing a dominating ability to compel the power object to submit to its will, and can even arbitrarily interfere with the behavior of the power object, while the power object is in a powerless position. According to such a view of power, power inevitably becomes the root of corruption. Acton once proposed that “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” and “power, whether religious or secular, is a depraved, shameless, and corrupting force.” [15]15 Lord Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2011), 286. In this sense, it becomes very difficult to analyze the operational logic, strategies, and mechanisms in the process of corruption and anti-corruption with power as the core, and to propose corresponding anti-corruption measures. Therefore, anti-corruption theories that restrict and supervise power can only be proposed from perspectives such as institutions, rights, morality, and class.

通过考察上述廉政理论解释模式,我们可以认为,虽然既有的廉政理论研究往往都考察了腐败与权力之间的关系,论述了腐败的根源在于权力滥用,但是,它们对于权力和腐败之间关系的理解和认识仍然存在着一定的理论误区。具体而言,既有研究往往有意无意地将权力等同于一种支配他人意志和行为的能力,将被赋予权力的行动者与服从权力的行动者之间的关系等同于支配与被支配的关系。这就像马克斯·韦伯在阐述权力概念时所指出的,“权力意味着在一种社会关系里哪怕是遇到反对也能贯彻自己意志的任何机会,不管这种机会是建立在什么基础上”。这意味着,权力是一种权力主体针对权力客体实施的单向度的行为,权力主体处于拥有权力的支配性地位,具有一种能够强迫权力客体服从其意志的支配性能力,甚至可以任意干涉权力客体的行为,而权力客体则处于无权无势的地位。依据这样的权力观,权力必然成为腐败的根源。阿克顿就曾提出,“权力导致腐败,绝对权力导致绝对的腐败”,“权力,不管它是宗教的还是世俗的,都是一种堕落的、无耻的和腐败的力量”。在这种意义上,也就很难以权力为核心分析腐败与反腐败过程中的运作逻辑、策略和机制,并提出相应的反腐败措施,因而只能从制度、权利、道德及阶级等角度提出制约和监督权力的反腐败理论。

Theoretically speaking, the main reason why existing clean governance research finds it difficult to analyze anti-corruption actions from the perspective of power is that such research usually equates power with domination, and therefore struggles to distinguish between the power that leads to corruption and the power that implements anti-corruption measures, and fails to provide a concrete explanation and account of the nature and modes of application of different powers in the processes of corruption and anti-corruption. What needs to be explored theoretically is: is power merely equivalent to domination? Do social actors only experience a relationship of domination-submission in power relations? Are both the power that leads to corruption and the power that implements anti-corruption actions forms of domineering power? In reality, in social life, any actor possesses a certain degree of agency and can mobilize certain economic, social, cultural, or symbolic resources to facilitate the realization of their will. In this sense, when some actors attempt to dominate others according to their own will, those who might be subjected to domination are not entirely powerless; they too can mobilize their own resources to carry out counter-domination actions, thereby influencing the domineering behavior of certain actors, even thwarting their intended goals, or altering established structural relations. This implies that actors who engage in counter-domination actions not only possess the intention and capacity for counter-domination but also form a counter-domination-domination relationship with the dominators, thereby shaping a counter-dominating power. Thus, in terms of the nature of power, power can manifest not only as domineering power but also as counter-dominating power. Based on this, it is necessary to discuss the specific nature of power in the processes of corruption and anti-corruption, and to explain their differences and characteristics.

从理论上讲,既有的廉政研究之所以难以从权力的角度分析反腐败行动,主要原因在于,它们通常将权力等同于支配,因而难以区分那种导致腐败的权力与那种实施反腐败的权力之间的差异,难以对腐败与反腐败过程中不同权力的性质及其运用方式进行具体的阐释和说明。需要在理论上探讨的是,难道权力仅仅等同于支配吗?难道社会行动者在权力关系上仅仅只存在支配—服从的关系吗?难道那种导致腐败的权力与实施反腐败行动的权力都属于支配性权力吗?实际上,在社会生活中,任何行动者都具有一定的能动性,都能够动员某些经济、社会、文化或符号方面的资源以期促成其意愿的实现。在这种意义上,当某些行动者试图以自己的意志来支配其他行动者的时候,那些可能受到支配的其他行动者并非完全无能为力,他们也可能动员自身的资源实施反支配的行动,从而影响某些行动者的支配性行为以至于挫败其预期目标,甚至改变既定的结构性关系。这就意味着,那些实施反支配行为的行动者实际上既具有反支配的意图和能力,又与支配者之间构成了反支配—支配的关系,因而塑造出一种反支配性权力。由此可见,从权力的性质上讲,权力不仅会表现为支配性权力,而且可能表现为一种反支配性权力。基于此,就需要对腐败与反腐败过程中权力的具体性质开展讨论,阐释两者的差异和特征。

Generally speaking, academia believes that corruption results from the abuse of power by certain actors entrusted with official positions: “Corruption is the abuse of public power and public resources by public officials for private purposes.” [16]16 Hu Angang, *China: Fighting Against Corruption* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2001), p. 16. From the perspective of domineering power, the corrupt behavior of subjects who abuse public power and resources for private purposes is realized by alienating the authority entrusted to them into a domineering power under their own control. Specifically, corrupt subjects often implement corrupt behavior by exerting influence and control over the processes of agenda-setting, decision-making, or implementation. For example, the special documentary *National Supervision* [17]17 *National Supervision* is a special documentary jointly produced by the Publicity Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission and China Central Television, first aired in January 2020, exposing major corruption cases., jointly produced by the Publicity Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission and China Central Television, disclosed the case of Lai Xiaomin, former chairman of China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd., stating that “Lai Xiaomin used his personnel power to exclude dissidents and appoint people by favoritism, treating the state-owned enterprise as his own private domain,” and “often made decisions directly himself, and even when matters were brought to meetings, he acted arbitrarily and refused to listen to any opposing opinions.” [18]18 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission Website, “*National Supervision* Episode 1: Unveiling the Flagrant Acts of Lai Xiaomin, Former Chairman of Huarong,” January 12, 2020. Like all corrupt subjects, Lai Xiaomin essentially alienated his official authority into a domineering power for personal gain, thereby engaging in corrupt practices such as power-for-money deals and cronyism.

通常而言,学术界认为腐败是由于某些被赋予职权的行动者滥用权力所导致的,“腐败是公职人员出于私人目的而滥用公共权力和公共资源的行为”。从支配性权力的角度上讲,腐败主体为私人目的而滥用公共权力和公共资源的腐败行为是通过将其被赋予的职权异化为自身控制的支配性权力而实现的。具体而言,腐败主体往往是通过对议程设置、决策制定或执行的过程施加影响和控制的方式实施腐败行为的。例如,中央纪委国家监委宣传部和中央电视台联合摄制的《国家监察》专题片,在披露中国华融资产管理股份有限公司原董事长赖小民的案件时指出,“赖小民用手中的人事权,排挤异己、任人唯亲,将国有企业当作自己的私人领地”,“经常自己直接拍板,即使上会也是独断专行,听不进任何反对意见”。正如所有腐败主体那样,赖小民实际上就是将其职权异化成谋取私利的支配性权力,进而实施权钱交易、任人唯亲等腐败行为。

In real life, both corrupt behavior and anti-corruption actions are conducted within corresponding power systems, and both require actors to produce, activate, or apply corresponding power to achieve their goals. However, the power that leads to corrupt behavior and the power that implements anti-corruption actions are fundamentally different in nature. The power wielded by corrupt subjects no longer possesses public character; it is alienated into a domineering power under their control. To counter such domineering power, anti-corruption efforts must “highlight the constraining relationship of anti-corruption power over other powers.” [19]19 Hou Feng, “On the Construction of Anti-Corruption Power,” *Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 1993, No. 3. This is as Montesquieu pointed out: “To prevent the abuse of power, power must be checked by power.” [20]20 Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, trans. Zhang Yanshen (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 154. Yet “anti-corruption power” is no longer domineering power in nature; it is counter-dominating power. Currently, the existing anti-corruption institutional mechanisms of the Party and government essentially construct a counter-dominating power system, enabling certain actors to mobilize economic, social, cultural, and symbolic resources to produce, activate, and apply counter-dominating power, thereby preventing and punishing corrupt subjects who alienate their official authority into domineering power to commit corrupt acts. From a theoretical perspective, the above analysis can also be considered a new interpretation of the concept of power-based anti-corruption.

在现实生活中,腐败行为与反腐败行动都是在相应的权力体系中进行的,都需要行动者生产、激活或运用相应的权力才能实现其目标。不过,那种导致腐败行为的权力和实施反腐败行动的权力是具有本质差异的。腐败主体所运用的权力不再具有公共性,而是被异化为其控制的支配性权力。针对这样的支配性权力,反腐败就必须“突出反腐败权力对其他权力的制约关系”。这就像孟德斯鸠指出的那样,“要防止滥用权力,就必须以权力约束权力”。然而,“反腐败权力”在性质上讲不再是一种支配性权力,而是反支配性权力。当前,党和政府既有的反腐败体制机制实际上就是通过构建反支配的权力体系,使某些行动者能够动员经济、社会、文化与符号等方面的资源以生产、激活和运用反支配性权力,预防和惩治腐败主体将其职权异化为支配性权力以实施腐败行为。从理论的角度上讲,上述分析也可以被认为是权力反腐败理念的新阐释。

Constructing a counter-dominating power system involves both institutional mechanisms within the political system and the production and application of counter-dominating power outside the political system. China’s political system contains rich counter-dominating mechanisms, serving as an important guarantee for the Party and government’s anti-corruption practice. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC [21]21 The 18th National Congress of the CPC was held in November 2012, marking the beginning of the New Era under Xi Jinping’s leadership and a major intensification of anti-corruption efforts., the Party and government have continuously improved and perfected anti-corruption institutional mechanisms, successively adopting a series of intra-Party regulations and national laws, including the *Eight-Point Regulations of the Political Bureau of the 18th Central Committee on Improving Work Style and Maintaining Close Ties with the Masses*, the *Code of Integrity and Self-Discipline of the Communist Party of China*, the *Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Intra-Party Supervision*, and the *Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China*. They have deepened the reform of the national supervision system, established the National Supervisory Commission, and built a centralized, unified, authoritative, and efficient anti-corruption system. From the perspective of power, this is essentially the Party and government shaping a counter-dominating power system by integrating anti-corruption resources, optimizing institutional setups, clarifying scopes of responsibility, and standardizing power operation mechanisms, thereby more effectively preventing and punishing corrupt behavior. At the same time, the Party and government also actively promote anti-corruption actions by producing, activating, and applying counter-dominating power through resources outside the political system. In actual corruption phenomena, corrupt subjects often alienate the authority entrusted to them into a domineering power under their control to seek personal gain through agenda control, policy formulation, and implementation, thereby subjecting the legitimate interests, opinions, or positions of relevant masses and cadres to domination and control, resulting in losses to national interests. This stimulates a strong anti-corruption will among some cadres and masses, prompting them to take counter-dominating actions—reporting clues about corrupt subjects through letters and visits or tip-offs, exposing corrupt acts through media or online platforms, or safeguarding their legitimate rights and interests through judicial proceedings. Such counter-dominating actions may activate counter-dominating mechanisms within the political system, prompting relevant functional departments to adopt anti-corruption measures, negating and punishing those corrupt subjects who alienate official authority into domineering power and commit corrupt acts. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, Party and government discipline inspection and supervision departments at all levels have continuously expanded channels for mass participation in anti-corruption by improving inspection and patrol systems and perfecting online reporting mechanisms. It is evident that the production, activation, and application of counter-dominating power outside the political system constitute a solid foundation and source of strength for the Party and government in governing corruption.

构建反支配的权力体系既涉及政治体制内部的体制机制建设,又涉及政治体制外部反支配性权力生产与运用的问题。我国政治体制内部蕴含着丰富的反支配机制,是党和政府进行反腐败实践的重要保障。党的十八大以来,党和政府不断健全和完善反腐败的体制机制,相继通过了《十八届中央政治局关于改进工作作风、密切联系群众的八项规定》《中国共产党廉洁自律准则》《中国共产党党内监督条例》和《中华人民共和国监察法》等一系列党规国法,深化国家监察体制改革,成立国家监察委员会,构建起集中统一、权威高效的反腐败体系。从权力的角度分析,这实际上就是党和政府通过整合反腐败资源、优化机构设置、明确职责范围、规范权力运行机制来塑造反支配的权力体系,从而更加有效地预防和惩治腐败行为。与此同时,党和政府也积极通过政治体制外部的资源生产、激活和运用反支配性权力来推进反腐败行动。在实际的腐败现象中,腐败主体往往通过议程控制、政策制定和执行等方式将其被赋予的职权异化为自身控制的支配性权力以谋取私利,从而使相关群众和干部正当的利益、意见或立场受到支配和控制,致使国家利益遭受损失。这就会激发部分干部和群众强烈的反腐败意愿,促使他们采取反支配的行动,通过信访、举报等方式反映腐败主体的问题线索,或者通过媒体、网络等形式揭露腐败主体的腐败行为,或者通过司法诉讼的途径维护自身合法权益。像这样的反支配行动就可能会激活政治体制内部的反支配机制,促使相关职能部门采取反腐败措施,否定和惩治那些将职权异化为支配性权力并实施腐败行为的腐败主体。党的十八大以来,党和政府的各级纪检监察部门通过健全巡视巡查制度、完善网络举报等方式,不断拓展群众参与反腐败的渠道。可见,政治体制外的反支配性权力的生产、激活与运用是党和政府治理腐败的坚实基础和力量源泉。

In summary, whether anti-corruption mechanisms are within or outside the political system, they are both important components of the counter-dominating power system constructed by the Party and government. The strategy of the Party and government in constructing a counter-dominating power system to implement anti-corruption is a systematic project, requiring the comprehensive application of a series of measures such as perfecting institutions, improving the rule of law, rectifying work style and enforcing discipline, strengthening supervision, and optimizing social structures. Of course, the practice of implementing power-based anti-corruption through constructing a counter-dominating power system cannot be achieved overnight; it is “always on the road” [22]22 “Always on the road” is a phrase used by Xi Jinping to describe the ongoing and unending nature of the anti-corruption campaign, first used in January 2013 at the Second Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection., requiring long-term, step-by-step efforts by the Party and government to gradually realize it.

综上所述,无论是政治体制内部还是政治体制外部的反腐败机制,它们都是党和政府构建的反支配的权力体系的重要组成部分。党和政府构建反支配的权力体系以实施反腐败的方略是一项系统性的工程,需要综合运用完善制度、健全法治、正风肃纪、强化监督和优化社会结构等一系列举措。当然,通过构建反支配的权力体系实施权力反腐败的实践也不可能是一蹴而就的,而是“永远在路上”,需要党和政府通过长期的、一点一滴的努力来逐步实现。

III. A Reanalysis of Power-Based Anti-Corruption Clean Governance Theory

三、权力反腐败的廉政理论再分析

In existing clean governance theoretical research, explanatory models centered on institutions, rights, morality, and class analysis have all emphasized certain important factors in the anti-corruption struggle, treating them as key elements to examine the causes and mechanisms of corruption, and to explain the logic of action, driving mechanisms, and practical strategies of anti-corruption. This article will re-examine existing anti-corruption explanatory models from the perspective of power, using the concept of counter-dominating power to analyze and elucidate them.

在既有的廉政理论研究中,以制度、权利、道德及阶级分析为核心的廉政理论解释模式都强调了反腐败斗争中的某些重要因素,并且将其作为关键性要素来考察腐败的成因和发生机制,阐释反腐败的行动逻辑、动力机制与实践策略。本文将从权力的视角重新审视既有的反腐败解释模式,运用反支配性权力的观点对其进行解析和说明。

In the institutional anti-corruption explanatory model of clean governance theory, corruption arises because the existing institutional system is insufficiently sound or because corrupt actors violate the corresponding institutional norms, while anti-corruption consists in those actors who implement anti-corruption actions resorting to the corresponding institutional norms to prevent and punish corrupt behavior. Analyzed from the perspective of power, whether corruption results from an insufficiently sound institutional system or from corrupt actors violating institutional norms, its essence can still be summarized as certain corrupt actors alienating their official authority into dominating power to seek private gain; the reason certain actors resort to the corresponding institutional norms to carry out anti-corruption actions lies in the fact that such institutional norms can provide them with institutionalized channels to activate, mobilize, and employ counter-dominating power, thereby punishing those actors who use dominating power to commit corruption. Although counter-dominating power can also be produced, activated, and employed outside the existing institutional system, it is not equivalent to non-institutionalized power located outside the system; its production, activation, and employment usually require corresponding institutional guarantees from the Party and government. When the Party and government purposefully establish and improve various anti-corruption rules, regulations, institutions, and mechanisms, the essence is to guarantee, through various institutionalized channels, that certain actors can produce, activate, and employ counter-dominating power from both inside and outside the system to implement anti-corruption actions. Thus, anti-corruption practice centered on institutional construction provides institutionalized channels for the production, activation, and employment of counter-dominating power, and enhances the degree of institutionalization and standardization of the production, activation, and employment of counter-dominating power in the process of establishing and improving various institutions.

在制度反腐败的廉政理论解释中,腐败是由于既有的制度体系不够健全或腐败主体违背相应的制度规范所导致的,而反腐败则是那些实施反腐败行为的行动者诉诸相应的制度规范以预防和惩治腐败行为。从权力的角度分析,无论是既有的制度体系不够健全还是腐败主体违背相应的制度规范而导致腐败行为,其实质依然可以归纳为某些腐败主体将其职权异化为支配性权力以谋取私利;而某些行动者之所以会诉诸相应的制度规范开展反腐败行动,其原因则在于,像这样的制度规范能够为其激活、动员和运用反支配性权力提供制度化的渠道,从而惩治那些运用支配性权力实施腐败行为的行动者。尽管反支配性权力也可以在既有的制度体系外被生产、激活和运用,但它并不等同于处于制度体系之外的非制度化权力,它的生产、激活和运用通常需要党和政府给予相应的制度保障。党和政府有针对性地建立健全各种反腐败的规章制度和体制机制,其本质是通过各种制度化的渠道保障某些行动者能够生产、激活和运用体制内和体制外的反支配性权力以实施反腐败行动。由此可见,以制度建设为核心的反腐败实践为反支配性权力的生产、激活与运用提供了制度化的渠道,并在建立健全各项制度的过程中增强反支配性权力生产、激活与运用的制度化和规范化程度。

In the rights-centered explanatory model of clean governance theory, corrupt actors inevitably harm the legitimate rights of certain members of society in the course of abusing their authority, while anti-corruption is embodied in protecting and safeguarding the legitimate rights of members of society from unlawful infringement and deprivation. It must be emphasized that in real society, “the actual form of rights must take power factors as a necessary condition”; that is, all rights do not exist naturally; they can only exist in reality through the grant, recognition, or tacit approval of the corresponding state organs, and they must also be protected and safeguarded through the actions of the corresponding state organs. Otherwise, any so-called “rights” can only remain in a state of what ought to be, awaiting realization. The same applies to members of society using rights to combat corruption in anti-corruption practice: the protection and safeguarding of their rights are inseparable from the active role of the relevant state organs. As some scholars have pointed out, no country can effectively curb corruption solely by relying on individual citizens exercising their rights without employing state power; for rights-based anti-corruption to be effective, it must presuppose and rely on the existence of a power-based anti-corruption system. Analyzed from the perspective of power, in the process of corruption and anti-corruption, the reason corrupt actors can infringe upon the rights of certain members of society is mainly that they can alienate their granted authority into their own dominating power; the process by which certain members of society resist corruption by asserting their rights is in fact a process of producing, activating, and employing counter-dominating power from within or outside the political system, thereby resisting and punishing those actors who use dominating power to infringe upon their rights. In other words, those actors who assert their rights must resort to the corresponding state organs, producing, activating, and employing counter-dominating power to safeguard their rights, thereby achieving the goal of anti-corruption.

在以权利为核心的廉政理论解释中,腐败主体在滥用其职权的过程中必然会损害某些社会成员的合法权利,反腐败则体现为保障和维护社会成员的合法权利免受不法侵害和剥夺。需要强调的是,在现实社会中,“权利的现实形态须以权力因素为必要条件”,即所有权利都不是自然而然存在的,必须通过相应的国家机关的授予、承认或默许才能真实地存在,同时也必须通过相应的国家机关的行动才能得以保障和维护。否则,任何所谓的“权利”都只能处于应然的、有待实现的状态。在反腐败实践中,社会成员通过运用权利反腐败亦是如此,其权利的保障和维护都离不开相关国家机关的积极作用。正如有学者指出,没有任何国家可以不运用国家权力,单靠国民个人运用权利就能有效遏制腐败;权利反腐要发挥效能,须以权力反腐体制的存在作为前提和依托。从权力的角度分析,在腐败与反腐败的过程中,腐败主体之所以能够侵害某些社会成员的权利,主要是由于他们能够将其被赋予的职权异化为自身的支配性权力;某些社会成员通过主张其权利进行反腐败的过程实际上就是生产、激活与运用政治体制内部或外部的反支配性权力的过程,以此抵制和惩治那些运用支配性权力侵害其权利的行动者。换句话说,那些主张自身权利的行动者必须诉诸相应的国家机关,通过生产、激活和运用反支配性权力才能来维护其权利,从而实现反腐败的目的。

In the moral anti-corruption explanatory model of clean governance theory, corruption arises under corresponding ethical and moral conditions; therefore, anti-corruption must emphasize the construction of clean governance ethics and morality, fortifying the ethical and moral defense line of “not daring to be corrupt” [23]23 “Not daring to be corrupt” (不敢腐) is one of the three pillars of the CPC’s anti-corruption strategy, alongside “not being able to be corrupt” (不能腐) and “not wanting to be corrupt” (不想腐), representing deterrence, institutional prevention, and moral cultivation respectively.. In reality, the power-based anti-corruption analysis centered on constructing a counter-dominating power system also attaches great importance to the role of ethics and morality. In practice, whether actors alienate their authority into dominating power to seek private gain, or produce, activate, or employ counter-dominating power to advance the anti-corruption struggle, both occur within given moral and ethical contexts and also require support from specific moral and ethical values. From a psychological perspective, the dominating behavior of corrupt actors is an external manifestation of their social dominance orientation, which is formed within corresponding moral contexts and ethical atmospheres. A moral context or ethical atmosphere “can be understood as a certain moral logic within a specific field, as well as the psychological atmosphere and spiritual orientation that the subject feels within that logical field.” In this sense, morality and ethics are important situational factors that enable actors’ social dominance orientation to manifest: a certain adverse moral and ethical context may intensify actors’ social dominance orientation, while a certain favorable moral and ethical context may reduce the degree of actors’ social dominance orientation, or even lead actors to form anti-dominance or counter-dominance orientations. Therefore, for social actors to produce, activate, or employ counter-dominating power, they must obtain support from those counter-dominating and anti-dominating ethical and moral norms, and negate and discard those ethical and moral norms that prompt actors to form a social dominance orientation. Currently, the Party and government are deeply advancing the construction of clean governance culture, emphasizing family tradition construction, promoting the revolutionary spirit, and inheriting the red genes [24]24 “Red genes” (红色基因) is a Party metaphor for the revolutionary traditions, values, and spirit inherited from the CPC’s early history, particularly from the Yan’an period and the founding of the People’s Republic.; these practices are in fact activating and excavating excellent ethical and moral traditions and cultural resources, thereby helping to eradicate the soil for the survival and development of dominating power, and providing ethical and moral support and a cultural foundation for constructing a counter-dominating power system.

在道德反腐败的理论解释中,腐败是在相应的伦理道德环境下产生的,所以,反腐败就必须重视廉政道德建设,筑牢“不想腐”的伦理道德防线。实际上,以构建反支配的权力体系为核心的权力反腐败分析也非常重视伦理道德的作用。在现实中,不论是行动者将其职权异化为支配性权力以谋取私利,还是生产、激活或运用反支配性权力以推进反腐败斗争,都是在既定的道德伦理情境下进行的,同时也需要特定的道德伦理价值予以支撑。从心理学的角度上讲,腐败主体的支配行为是其社会支配倾向的外在表现形式,而社会支配倾向则是在相应的道德情境和伦理氛围中形成的。道德情境或者伦理氛围“可以理解为在特定场域中的某种道德逻辑,以及主体在该逻辑场域中感受到的心理气氛和精神指向”。在这种意义上,道德伦理是使行动者的社会支配倾向得以发挥的重要情境性因素:某种不良的道德伦理情境可能会使行动者的社会支配倾向更加强烈,而某种良好的道德伦理情境则可能使行动者的社会支配倾向的程度降低,甚至使行动者形成去支配的或者反支配的倾向。所以,社会行动者生产、激活或运用反支配性权力就必须获得那种反支配的和去支配的伦理道德规范的支持,否定与摒弃那些促使行动者形成社会支配倾向的伦理道德规范。当前,党和政府深入推进廉政文化建设,重视家风建设,弘扬革命精神,传承红色基因,这些做法实际上都是激活和发掘优秀的伦理道德传统与文化资源,从而有助于铲除支配性权力生存和发展的土壤,为构建反支配的权力体系提供伦理道德支撑和文化基础。

In social life, the production, employment, and activation of any power occur within a specific social structure and are necessarily constrained by that specific social structure. Class is a very important structural factor; it arises from differences in the economic, social, cultural, or symbolic resources people possess, often reflecting structural domination in social stratification, and thus can explain the structural causes of corruption. Regarding the mechanism of corruption’s occurrence, the ideology and culture of the exploiting classes inevitably erode certain actors’ cognitive orientation toward power, prompting them to form a psychological structure and value preference that equates power with dominating others, thereby strengthening their willingness to commit corrupt acts. Regarding anti-corruption measures, the clean governance theory centered on class analysis emphasizes eliminating the influence of the exploiting system and exploiting classes in economic, social, cultural, and moral aspects, and preventing social polarization, which lays a social-structural foundation for the production, activation, and employment of counter-dominating power. That is to say, the class-based anti-corruption perspective not only negates those rules and procedures that may lead to dominating power, but also negates that social structure which may produce dominating power, thereby establishing a corresponding social-structural environment for the production, activation, and employment of counter-dominating power. In fact, the Party and government’s adherence to the concept of shared development and promotion of the realization of common prosperity for all the people is precisely providing a solid social foundation for constructing a counter-dominating power system.

在社会生活中,任何权力的生产、运用与激活都是在特定的社会结构中进行的,必然受到特定社会结构的约束。阶级是非常重要的结构性因素,它是由于人们占有的经济、社会、文化或符号等方面的资源差异所导致的,往往体现出社会分层中的结构性支配问题,因而能够说明腐败得以发生的结构性原因。在腐败的发生机制上,剥削阶级的思想文化必然会侵蚀某些行动者的权力认知倾向,促使其产生将权力等同于支配他人的心理结构与价值偏好,强化其实施腐败行为的意愿。在反腐败的措施上,以阶级分析为核心的廉政理论强调消除剥削制度与剥削阶级在经济、社会、文化与道德等方面的影响,防止社会两极分化,这就为反支配性权力的生产、激活和运用奠定了社会结构方面的基础。也就是说,阶级反腐败的观点不仅否定那些可能导致支配性权力的规则与程序,而且否定那种可能产生支配性权力的社会结构,从而为反支配性权力的生产、激活和运用确立起相应的社会结构环境。事实上,党和政府坚持共享发展的理念,推动实现全体人民共同富裕,就是为构建反支配的权力体系提供坚实的社会基础。

In sum, when exploring the mechanisms of corruption’s emergence and the action logic, driving mechanisms, and practical strategies of anti-corruption, the concept of power-based anti-corruption centered on constructing an anti-dominance power system in fact incorporates factors such as institutions, rights, morality, and class into the production, activation, and application of power for analysis, revealing how these factors influence social actors and the operation of related power. This also means that the concept of power-based anti-corruption inherently contains an action logic centered on Party leadership, guaranteed by institutional and legal construction, supported by the protection of citizens’ rights, based on moral construction, and focused on optimizing social structure. In this sense, it is not opposed to or mutually exclusive with explanatory models of clean governance centered on institutions, rights, morality, and class, but rather mutually complementary and integrated. Therefore, the concept of power-based anti-corruption centered on constructing an anti-dominance power system can not only deepen and expand the existing understanding of the relationship between power and corruption in clean governance research, eliminating possible cognitive biases regarding power and corruption, but also help propose a systematic approach to governing corruption, constructing an explanatory model of clean governance theory that possesses explanatory power, generality, and comprehensiveness.

总之,在探讨腐败的发生机制与反腐败的行动逻辑、动力机制和实践策略时,以构建反支配的权力体系为核心的权力反腐败理念,实际上是将制度、权利、道德、阶级等因素纳入权力的生产、激活和运用过程予以分析,揭示出这些因素是如何影响社会行动者以及相关权力运作的。这也意味着,权力反腐败的理念内在地蕴含着以党的领导为核心、以制度与法律建设为保障、以维护公民权利为依托、以道德建设为基础、以优化社会结构为重点的行动逻辑。在这种意义上,它与以制度、权利、 道德、阶级为核心的廉政解释模式不是相互对立、相互排斥的,而是相互补充、互相融合的。因此,以构建反支配的权力体系为核心的权力反腐败理念不仅可以深化和拓展现有廉政研究中关于权力与腐败关系的理解,消除可能存在的关于权力与腐败的认知偏差,而且还有助于提出一种系统性的治理腐败的思路,构建一种具有解释力、概括性与综合性的廉政理论解释模式。

Source: *Learning and Exploration*, Issue 2, 2022

文章来源:《学习与探索》2022年第2期

Online Editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑:静穆

Notes

  1. Deng Xiaoping, “On the Reform of the Party and State Leadership System” (1980). ↩
  2. He Zengke, “On the Construction of a National Clean Governance System,” Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism, no. 6 (2009). ↩
  3. Ren Jianming, “Anti-Corruption and the Protection of Citizens’ Rights,” China Legal Science, no. 4 (2004). ↩
  4. Sun Shiyan, “Corruption and Human Rights,” Human Rights, no. 3 (2014). ↩
  5. Huang Qisong and Sun Yongning, “Rights Anti-Corruption: A New Perspective on Anti-Corruption,” Journal of Guizhou University (Social Sciences), no. 5 (2015). ↩
  6. A paraphrase of the Marxist view that the proletariat reclaims political power from the bourgeoisie. ↩
  7. Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law (Harvard University Press, 1962). ↩
  8. Guo Xuede, “On the Moral Causes of Corruption among Leading Cadres and the Path of Moral Anti-Corruption,” *Zhongzhou Journal*, no. 2 (2010). ↩
  9. Li Jianhua, “On the Moral Prevention and Control Mechanism of Power Corruption,” *Ethics Research*, no. 2 (2006). ↩
  10. Tang Tuhong, “On the Ethical Roots of Power Corruption and Its Governance,” *Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition)*, no. 1 (2006). ↩
  11. “Fall one after another” (前腐后继) is a pun on the common phrase “前仆后继” (one falls, another steps into the breach), replacing “仆” (fall) with “腐” (corrupt) to describe a succession of corrupt officials. ↩
  12. Wang Chuanli, “Class Analysis and Anti-Corruption in Contemporary China,” *Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC*, no. 3 (2011). ↩
  13. Li Chongfu, “On the Class Roots of Corruption and the Socialist Anti-Corruption Strategy,” *Studies on Marxism*, no. 4 (2012). ↩
  14. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 1 (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997), 81. ↩
  15. Lord Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2011), 286. ↩
  16. Hu Angang, *China: Fighting Against Corruption* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2001), p. 16. ↩
  17. *National Supervision* is a special documentary jointly produced by the Publicity Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission and China Central Television, first aired in January 2020, exposing major corruption cases. ↩
  18. Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission Website, “*National Supervision* Episode 1: Unveiling the Flagrant Acts of Lai Xiaomin, Former Chairman of Huarong,” January 12, 2020. ↩
  19. Hou Feng, “On the Construction of Anti-Corruption Power,” *Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 1993, No. 3. ↩
  20. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, trans. Zhang Yanshen (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1961), p. 154. ↩
  21. The 18th National Congress of the CPC was held in November 2012, marking the beginning of the New Era under Xi Jinping’s leadership and a major intensification of anti-corruption efforts. ↩
  22. “Always on the road” is a phrase used by Xi Jinping to describe the ongoing and unending nature of the anti-corruption campaign, first used in January 2013 at the Second Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. ↩
  23. “Not daring to be corrupt” (不敢腐) is one of the three pillars of the CPC’s anti-corruption strategy, alongside “not being able to be corrupt” (不能腐) and “not wanting to be corrupt” (不想腐), representing deterrence, institutional prevention, and moral cultivation respectively. ↩
  24. “Red genes” (红色基因) is a Party metaphor for the revolutionary traditions, values, and spirit inherited from the CPC’s early history, particularly from the Yan’an period and the founding of the People’s Republic. ↩
  25. “Clean governance” (廉政, *lianzheng*) is a standard term in Chinese political discourse referring to the integrity and probity of Party and state officials, often paired with “anti-corruption” (反腐败) in official documents.