The Ancient Chinese Supervision System: Evolution, Characteristics, and Insights

The Proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, reviewed and approved at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, proposes to improve the Party and state supervision system and strengthen the regulation and supervision of the allocation and operation of power. The term “supervision” (jiancha) originally meant to look into water to straighten one’s appearance and to inspect plants and trees, naturally carrying the connotation of looking down from above with meticulous attention. From the perspective of the attributes of power, supervisory power, alongside political powers such as legislative, executive, and judicial power, delineates the different functions of social public power. It is the power specifically to oversee state public officials, to constrain their conduct in order to improve work efficiency, and to maintain political order. The supervision system, in a narrow sense, is a normative system for reporting and punishing illegal and derelict conduct by state public officials, including personnel arrangements, scope of authority, and application of law. In a broad sense, it should refer to the complete supervisory function, that is, a key link in the national governance system. In ancient China, the supervision system was mainly used to ensure the normal operation of the state apparatus of the ruling class, to consolidate the supremacy of imperial power by urging the unified implementation of laws and decrees, and to regulate the expansion of official power by adhering to the guiding principles of discipline and ritual and severely punishing unauthorized actions and usurpation of authority. It not only held a prominent and independent political status but also formed a complete organizational system and clear functional division of labor. The content of supervision was very broad, involving official duties, finance and military affairs, social customs, and ideology and culture, covering areas such as legislative decision-making, administrative recommendations, and judicial trials. The methods of supervision were diverse, including reporting and accusing, regular performance assessments, and circuit inspections, achieving internal standardization and having laws to follow. Continuously promoting the creative transformation and innovative development of fine traditional Chinese culture and drawing on the historical wisdom of the ancient Chinese supervision system merits our in-depth consideration.

党的二十届四中全会审议通过的《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议》提出，完善党和国家监督体系，加强对权力配置、运行的规范和监督。监察之义，本为临水正容、览审草木，自然带有以上视下、细致入微的内涵。从权力属性来看，监察权同立法权、行政权、司法权等政治权力并列，划分了社会公共权力的不同功能，是专门监督国家公职人员的权力，约束其行为以提高工作效率，并维护政治秩序。监察制度，从狭义上讲，是对国家公职人员违法失职行为进行检举与惩戒的规范体系，包括人员设置、职权范围、法律适用等；从广义上讲，则应指向完整的监察功能，即国家治理体系中的关键一环。在中国古代，监察制度主要被用来保障统治阶级国家机器的正常运转，通过督促法律与政令的统一执行来巩固皇权至上，通过恪守纲纪礼仪与严惩矫制擅权来调控官吏权力扩张，既具有突出与独立的政治地位，也形成完备的组织体系与明确的职能分工。监察内容十分广泛，涉及职官职责、财政军事、社会风俗、思想文化，涵盖了立法决策、行政建议、司法审判等领域。监察方式多种多样，包括检举控告、定期考课、巡回监察等，做到了内部规范、有法可依。不断推进中华优秀传统文化的创造性转化和创新性发展，借鉴中国古代监察制度的历史智慧，值得我们深入思考。

I. The Evolution of the Ancient Chinese Supervision System

一、中国古代监察制度的演变

The ancient Chinese supervision system originated early and was meticulously designed, reflecting a high degree of development in political civilization. In the social form of primitive democracy, supervision relied entirely on the power of reverence for the leader, the customary forces formed collectively, and moral forces to fulfill its functions. During the slave society, there already existed public opinion supervision, auxiliary supervision, and the establishment of supervisory officials with local supervision. Thereafter, it can be divided into the embryonic period of the pre-Qin era, the formative period of the Qin and Han dynasties, the mature period of the Sui and Tang dynasties, the transformative period of the Song dynasty, and the complete period of the Ming and Qing dynasties. It roughly went through three stages: the turbulent formation of establishing rules and institutions, the vigorous development of integration and improvement, and the strict and standardized integration and completion. The Han, Tang, and Ming dynasties are the most typical, each representing the distinctive characteristics of their respective historical stages.

中国古代监察制度起源较早且设计严密，体现出政治文明的高度发达。在原始民主的社会形态中，监察完全依靠对首领的崇拜力量、共同形成的习惯力量及道德力量来实现其职能。奴隶社会时已存在舆论监督、辅佐监督及设置监察官并实行地方监察。此后又可分为先秦萌芽时期、秦汉形成时期、隋唐成熟时期、两宋转化时期、明清完备时期，大致经历了建章立制的动荡形成、融合完善的蓬勃发展、严格规范的整合大成三个阶段，以汉代、唐代、明代最为典型，分别代表了各自历史阶段的鲜明特色。

(I) The Embryonic Period of the Pre-Qin Era

（一）先秦萌芽时期

Regarding the question of the time of the emergence of the ancient Chinese supervision system, there is the Xia-Shang theory, which holds that the supervision system of the Shang dynasty over its vassal states and fiefs involved “supervisors” (jian) appointed by the Shang king to oversee sacrifices during his external tours of inspection, and “scribes” (shi) in each vassal state and fief, along with temporarily dispatched envoys, to monitor the commanders of local armies. There is the Western Zhou theory, which holds that in the long era of rule by rites, the Son of Heaven, as the supreme political leader, was also subject to supervision, including various forms such as “heavenly supervision” (tian jian) and “scribal supervision” (shi jian), often not vested in a single official. There is the Warring States theory, which holds that during the Warring States period, there existed a supervision system where local supervision and local inspection ran in parallel. In fact, as early as the legendary era of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors, there existed public opinion supervision by the people, as the saying goes, “Xuanyuan had the discussions of the Mingtai, and Fangxun had the inquiries of the Qushi, all to broadly consult those below.” [1]1 Xuanyuan is another name for the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi), a legendary ruler and cultural hero in Chinese mythology. Fangxun is another name for the sage-king Yao. The Mingtai and Qushi were legendary structures or venues where rulers were said to have consulted with the people. The “flag for announcing good words,” the “drum for those wishing to remonstrate,” and the “wood for criticism” recorded in transmitted texts were also channels for ancient tribal leaders like Yao and Shun to adopt remonstrances, becoming the earliest forms of primitive democratic rights. [2]2 These are legendary devices said to have been set up by the sage-kings Yao and Shun to allow the common people to offer criticism and advice to the ruler. As for the establishment of official positions, during the time of the Yellow Emperor, “left and right grand supervisors were appointed to oversee the myriad states,” which were precisely supervisory officials dispatched by the council of elders, the highest authority organ. [3]3 The Yellow Emperor (Huangdi) is a legendary ruler and cultural hero credited with numerous inventions and the founding of Chinese civilization. Although later historical records inevitably contain elements of embellishment, the idea that supervision could safeguard the common interests of the tribal alliance should have become a social consensus at the time, and remonstrance also became the main way for clan members to participate in social management. Supervision in the slave society included different forms such as remonstrance supervision, auxiliary supervision, and theocratic supervision. During the Western Zhou, “collecting poems to observe popular customs” was a means of admonishing the Son of Heaven by gathering public opinion. [4]4 This refers to the practice, described in the Rites of Zhou, of sending officials to collect folk songs from the various states to gauge public sentiment and the effectiveness of governance. However, with the continuous strengthening of autocratic monarchy, the widespread supervision through “slander” by the people was gradually replaced by the narrow remonstrance system of the bureaucratic stratum, and functional institutions assisting the ruler were also formed. Respected elders in positions such as the “Three Dukes and Four Assistants” had a certain supervisory role. [5]5 The “Three Dukes” (san gong) were the three highest-ranking officials in the Zhou court, traditionally the Grand Tutor, Grand Preceptor, and Grand Protector. The “Four Assistants” (si fu) were a group of senior advisors to the king. Religion also became an effective means of constraining monarchical power. The Xia had the “Zhi Zong,” and the Zhou had the “Six Grand Officers,” and the function of priestly nobles in correcting violations and omissions cannot be ignored. [6]6 The “Zhi Zong” was a ritual official in the Xia dynasty. The “Six Grand Officers” (liu tai) were the six highest-ranking officials in the Zhou court, responsible for various state functions including ritual, astronomy, and archives. In addition, the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties established supervisory officials in both the capital and localities, such as the “Bao Shi” who remonstrated against the king’s evils, and the “Fang Bo” who supervised a region. [7]7 The “Bao Shi” was an official in the Zhou dynasty responsible for educating the crown prince and remonstrating with the king. The “Fang Bo” was a regional lord or governor in the Zhou feudal system. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the practice of recruiting and supporting scholars flourished, and the court supervisory institutions were increasingly enriched. The “Da Xing” and “Da Jian” of the state of Qi had supervisory powers, which laid a solid foundation for the reform and strengthening movements of the various states. [8]8 The “Da Xing” was an official in charge of receiving guests and managing diplomatic relations in the state of Qi. The “Da Jian” was an official responsible for remonstrance and advice. Looking at the supervision system of the pre-Qin period, the phenomenon of top-down supervision existed for a long time, undergoing an evolutionary process from obscure to clear. It included tours of inspection and covert investigations, as well as flexible supervision methods such as conferring posthumous titles and offering advice. There also appeared censors (yushi) in charge of impeachment, supervisory laws and regulations for punishing officials, and diverse forms of supervisory activities.

围绕中国古代监察制度的产生时间问题，有夏商说，认为商王朝对封国方国的监察制度是以商王设立的“监”官对外出巡守时的祭祀进行监督，又以各封国方国的“史”官及临时派遣的使者掌握对地方军队统帅的监控。有西周说，认为在漫长的礼治时代，天子这一最高政治领袖同样是接受监督的对象，包括“天监”“史监”等多种监察形式，往往不主一官。有战国说，认为战国时期存在监察地方与视察地方相平行的监察制度。其实早在传说中的三皇五帝时代，就存在民众的舆论监督，所谓“轩辕有明台之议，放勋有衢室之问，皆所以广询于下也”。传世文献记载的“告善之旌”“欲谏之鼓”“诽谤之木”，也均是尧、舜等古代部落首领采纳谏言的渠道，成为原始民主权利的最早形式。至于职官的设置，黄帝时“置左右大监，监于万国”，正是由作为最高权力机关的议事会所派出的监察官。虽然后世史书难免有附会之嫌，但监督可以维护部落联盟的共同利益应已成为当时的社会共识，谏言也成为氏族成员参与社会管理的主要途径。奴隶制社会的监督则包括言谏监督、辅佐监督、神教监督等不同形式。西周时“陈诗以观民风”，便是通过收集舆论来规谏天子。但随着君主专制的不断强化，广泛的国人“诽谤”监督逐渐被官僚阶层的小范围言谏制度所取代，也形成了辅佐国君的职能机构，“三公四辅”等德高望重的长老具有一定监督作用。宗教更成为制约君主权力的有效手段，夏有“秩宗”，周有“六太”，僧侣权贵的纠治违失功能不容忽视。此外，夏、商、周三代还在王都与地方设有监察官，如谏诤王恶的“保氏”，监察一方的“方伯”。春秋战国时期，招贤养士之风盛行，宫廷监察机构日渐充实，齐国的“大行”“大谏”即有监督权，这为各国的变法图强运动奠定了坚实的基础。纵观先秦时期的监察制度，自上而下的监察现象长期存在，经历了一个从隐晦到明朗的进化过程，包括巡守巡行与暗中考察，又有制谥规劝等柔性监察方式，还出现了职掌纠察的御史，惩官治吏的监察法规，形式多样的监察活动。

(II) The Formative Period of the Qin and Han Dynasties

（二）秦汉形成时期

The Qin and Han dynasties, as the beginning of the unified centralized imperial dynasty, saw the continuous strengthening of the role and status of power supervision activities in the entire operation of the regime. The differentiation between the corresponding organs and the organs of power execution also intensified, manifested in the increase in the number of personnel and the clarification of internal division of labor. A complete supervision system from the central to the local level was established, such as the Censorate (yushitai) headed by full-time supervisory officials and the system of the Thirteen Regional Inspectors (cishi) under Emperor Wu of Han. At the same time, relatively independent supervisory laws and regulations were formed, covering the punishment of crimes and the management of officials. However, problems also existed, such as the mixing of supervisory officials’ powers and the overlapping of supervisory institutions. Specifically, the deliberative system established in the Qin dynasty played a certain role in remonstrance supervision, and the Han dynasty even issued edicts to broadly recruit “those who speak directly and remonstrate strongly.” The censor system was created. In the Qin dynasty, the Censor-in-Chief (yushi dafu) was established in the court, responsible for leading the censors to “impeach” all officials according to regulations, and there were also local supervisory censors (jianjun yushi) in the commanderies. The Han dynasty fully utilized the check-and-balance mechanism between the Censor-in-Chief and the Chancellor, who mutually supervised each other. The central supervisory organs grew increasingly large. During the Eastern Han, the Prefect of the Masters of Writing (shangshu ling), the Censor-in-Chief (yushi zhongcheng), and the Colonel of the Capital (sili xiaowei) were known as the “Three Who Sit Alone,” all possessing supervisory functions. [9]9 The “Three Who Sit Alone” (san du zuo) were so called because they were the only officials allowed to sit alone on a mat during court audiences, signifying their high status and independent authority. Their main duties included rectifying laws and regulations, managing the formulation of statutes, impeaching violations and omissions, investigating illegal activities, evaluating all officials, recommending talents, handling major cases, adjudicating doubtful cases, arresting bandits, and supervising military campaigns. Local supervisory organs also began to take shape. During the reign of Emperor Wu of Han, the “Six Articles of Inquiry” clearly stipulated the scope of the regional inspectors’ investigations. [10]10 The “Six Articles of Inquiry” (liu tiao wen shi) were the six categories of misconduct that the regional inspectors (cishi) were authorized to investigate among local officials and powerful families. As for the Wei, Jin, Southern and Northern Dynasties period, although the supervisory organs became completely independent organizationally and were initially unified, with their powers also expanded, local supervision was weakened. The regional inspectors even evolved into local administrative officials, bringing hidden dangers to the survival of the dynasties. The era of autocracy by military strongmen brought about the aristocratic clan-ization of the supervision system. The Chancellery (menxia sheng) and the Secretariat of Remonstrance (jishu sheng), whose function was “to offer remonstrances and correct errors,” became the decision-making and deliberative organs of the aristocratic ruling class. Remonstrance became increasingly important while impeachment became less so. The establishment of censorate organs, adapting to the needs of the powerful ministers, exhibited strong instability and arbitrariness.

秦汉时期作为大一统中央集权王朝的开创伊始，权力监督活动在整个政权运行中的地位与作用不断加强，其相应机关同权力执行机关之间的分化也有所加剧，表现为人员数量的增加与内部分工的明确，建立起从中央到地方的完整的监察系统，如以专职监察官为首脑的御史台、十三州部刺史等制度，同时形成了相对独立的监察法规，涉及犯罪惩治、职官管理等内容，但也存在监察官事权混杂、监察机构重叠等问题。具体来说，秦代建立的议事制度起到了一定的言谏监督作用，汉代更曾有谕令广招“直言极谏之士”。御史制度得以创立，秦代在朝中设御史大夫，负责率众御史按章“举劾”百官，地方上还有监郡御史。汉代充分发挥御史大夫与丞相互为监临的制衡机制，中央监察机关日渐庞大，东汉时的尚书令、御史中丞、司隶校尉号称“三独坐”，都拥有监察职能，主要职责包括典正法度、掌制律令、纠弹违失、察举非法、考课百官、举荐人才、治理大狱、鞫谳疑案、讨捕盗贼、督军征战等。地方监察机关也初具规模，汉武帝时期的“六条问事”明确规定了刺史察举的范围。至于魏晋南北朝时期，监察机关虽在组织上完全独立并初步统一，职权也有所扩大，但地方监察却受到削弱，州部刺史甚至演变为地方的行政长官，为王朝的存续带来隐忧。军事权臣专制的时代特点带来监察制度的门阀化，以“献纳谏正”为职掌的门下省与集书省成为士族最高统治者的决策谋议机关，规谏日重而纠举日轻，御史机关的设置为适应权臣的需要，呈现出较强的不稳定性与随意性。

(III) The Mature Period of the Sui and Tang Dynasties

（三）隋唐成熟时期

During the Sui and Tang dynasties, the supervisory system was primarily based on the "Three Courts System" of the Censorate—the Court of Tribunal, the Court of Palace Attendants, and the Court of Investigation—supplemented by the organization of remonstrance officials. The local supervisory system of the Ten Circuits [11]11 The Ten Circuits (shidao) were the administrative divisions of the Tang dynasty for local supervision, established in 627 AD. also became increasingly complete, manifesting as the combination of supervisory power with judicial power to check administrative power, and the formation of related systems for the selection and management of supervisory officials. Compared with the Han and Ming dynasties, the Tang supervisory system exhibited characteristics such as progressing from gradual completeness to the weakening of institutional power and the declining status of censors, becoming increasingly independent, standardized, and legalized, with greater emphasis on local supervision. Specifically, the supervisory organs of the Sui dynasty were already key to supporting imperial power. In the Tang, the Chancellery, which exercised the highest supervisory power, became a balancing force within the highest authority organs, possessing legislative-related powers such as assisting the emperor, overseeing all officials, correcting errors and omissions, and regulating ritual and law. The emperor not only directly controlled central administrative and military power but also directly wielded supervisory power, using the authority of supervisory organs to control the power of the chancellor, thereby achieving the goal of strengthening centralization. The powers of the Censorate included impeaching and prosecuting officials, adjudicating lawsuits, and reviewing rituals. A rigorous supervisory system from the central to local levels was also restored. The Sui had the Office of the Censorate for Circuits, and the Tang had investigating censors. Local supervisory districts increased, and local supervisory commissioners held supervisory, administrative, judicial, military, and personnel powers, ultimately leading to the Tang dynasty's demise at the hands of the separatist forces of the military governors (jiedushi). [12]12 Military governors (jiedushi) were regional military commanders who, from the mid-Tang period onward, accumulated civil, military, financial, and supervisory powers, leading to de facto independent kingdoms that eventually contributed to the dynasty's fall. During the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, the Secretariat-Chancellery became the highest decision-making body. The censorate system was disrupted by the usurpation of power by military governors, supervisory power gradually atrophied, and the supervisory system achieved nothing.

隋唐时期的监察制度以御史台中的台院、殿院、察院“三院制”为主，又辅以言谏官组织，十道巡按的地方监察系统也日益完备，表现为监察权与司法权结合并掣肘行政权，监察官的选任与管理更形成了相关制度。同汉代与明代相比，唐代的监察制度具有从规模逐渐完备到机构权力削弱、御史地位下降等特点，日益独立化、规范化、法治化并更加重视地方监察。具体来说，隋代的监察机关已是支撑皇权的关键，唐代行使最高监察权的门下省更成为最高权力机关中的制衡力量，拥有辅佐皇帝、总典吏职、驳正违失、监管礼法等立法相关职权，皇帝不仅直接掌握中央行政权与军权，还能直接驾驭监察权，借助监察机关的职权来控制相权，达到强化中央集权的目的。御史台的职权则包括纠举百僚、推鞫狱讼、审查礼仪等。从中央到地方的严密监察系统也得以恢复，隋代有司隶台，唐代有监察御史，地方监察区划有所增加，地方监察史拥有监察权、行政权、司法权、军事权、人事权，最终使唐王朝葬身于藩镇割据势力之中。五代十国时期，中书门下成为最高决策机关，御史制度受到藩镇势力擅权的影响而紊乱，监察权日渐萎缩，监察制度毫无建树。

(IV) The Transformation Period of the Two Song Dynasties

（四）两宋转化时期

A major transformation of the supervisory system during the Two Song dynasties was the gradual merger of the powers of the censorate and the remonstrance bureaus, which had been separate since the Qin and Han dynasties. This placed greater constraints on administrative power. The judicial power of the supervisory system also expanded further, and safeguards for the implementation of supervisory regulations were improved and perfected. A crisscrossing supervisory network was established at all local levels, reflecting the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. The merger of the censorate and remonstrance bureaus in the Song was an inevitable result of historical development, aimed at better supervising and constraining imperial power, chancellor power, and military power, better maintaining court discipline and the normal distribution of power, and ending the fragmentation and division of supervisory power in previous eras. The blending of functions such as censors discussing affairs and remonstrance officials impeaching and correcting not only raised the status of supervisory power but also promoted the development of the supervisory system. Specifically, the Song Chancellery newly acquired the power to remonstrate and correct errors and omissions of all officials, taking on the responsibility of prior supervision. The remonstrance system reached its peak in the Song, with institutions becoming unprecedentedly complex. Censors also began to concurrently hold remonstrance powers, with specially appointed remonstrance censors possessing the authority to "discuss affairs and strike down evil." [13]13 "Discuss affairs and strike down evil" (lunshi jixie) refers to the power of Song remonstrance censors to discuss state affairs and impeach corrupt or evil officials. The practice of impeaching based on hearsay [14]14 Impeaching based on hearsay (fengwen yanshi) was a practice, especially prevalent in the Song dynasty, where censors could impeach officials based on unverified rumors or reports, without needing concrete evidence. became prevalent for a time, and rulers generally adopted a policy of protecting those who spoke out. Local supervision was directly controlled by the emperor. Circuits had "walking and riding receivers" (zouma chengshou), [15]15 "Walking and riding receivers" (zouma chengshou) were Song dynasty imperial agents dispatched to circuits to monitor military and civilian affairs, reporting directly to the emperor. prefectures had vice prefects (tongpan), [16]16 Vice prefects (tongpan) were Song dynasty officials in prefectures who shared administrative authority with the prefect and had the power to report directly to the central government, acting as a check on local power. judicial cases had the Criminal Investigation Bureau's (tixing si) [17]17 The Criminal Investigation Bureau (tixing si) was a Song dynasty circuit-level agency responsible for judicial oversight and the review of legal cases. law inspectors, and financial matters had fiscal commissioners (zhuanyun shi). [18]18 Fiscal commissioners (zhuanyun shi) were Song dynasty circuit-level officials responsible for tax collection, grain transport, and financial oversight, also exercising supervisory functions over local officials. In particular, the practice of investigating and correcting illegal acts and dereliction of duty in the economic sphere pioneered the establishment of separate audit institutions within later supervisory departments. During the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties, northern and southern cultures merged, presenting a supervisory landscape that emphasized impeachment and correction while downplaying remonstrance. The Yuan dynasty abolished the Chancellery, rendering the originally powerful and high-ranking Supervising Secretary (jishizhong) [19]19 The Supervising Secretary (jishizhong) was a high-ranking official in the Chancellery, originally responsible for reviewing and vetoing imperial edicts and memorials. nominal. However, the status of the Censorate was elevated, with powers divided among three branches: the Censorate, the Secretariat, and the Bureau of Military Affairs. The powers of investigating censors were both broad and weighty. The Yuan also established the system of Branch Censorates (xing yushitai), [20]20 Branch Censorates (xing yushitai) were regional branches of the central Censorate established by the Yuan dynasty to supervise local governments in vast territories. forming a three-tier supervisory network of the Central Censorate, Branch Censorates, and Circuit Supervisory Officials. The "Rules and Precedents for the Censorate" (Xiantaigeli) [21]21 The "Rules and Precedents for the Censorate" (Xiantaigeli) was a comprehensive set of regulations promulgated in 1271 by Kublai Khan, defining the structure, powers, and procedures of the Yuan Censorate. promulgated by Kublai Khan served as the basic regulations for the Censorate's exercise of supervisory power, comprising thirty-six articles. The constitutional section stipulated the scope of authority and status of the Censorate, while the regulatory section comprised laws for correcting official errors and punishing official illegality. Supervisory work became increasingly legalized.

两宋时期监察制度的重大转化是秦汉以来一直处于分离状态的台谏之权逐渐合一，使监察权对行政权构成了更大制约，监察系统的司法权也进一步扩大，监察法规的实施保障措施得以健全与完善，各级地方还建立起纵横交错的监察网络，体现出分权制衡的原则。宋代的台谏合一是历史发展的必然结果，即为了更好监督与制约皇权、相权、军权，更好维护朝廷纲纪与正常的权力分配，结束前代监察权分散与割裂的局面，而御史言事与谏官纠弹等职权的混同既提高了监察权的地位，也促进了监察制度的发展。具体来说，宋代的门下省新辟对百官违失谏正的职权，有了事前监察的职责。言谏制度在宋代发展至顶峰，机构庞杂到前所未有的程度。御史也开始兼有言谏的职权，专置言谏御史，有“论事击邪”之权。风闻言事一时盛行，统治者对言事者大多采取保护的政策。地方监察由皇帝直接控制，路有走马承受，州有通判，狱讼有提刑司检法官，财赋有转运使，特别是对经济领域违法失职的纠察实践，开创了后代监察部门中分设审计机构的先河。辽金元时期，南北文化相融合，呈现出重纠弹而轻言谏的监察格局。元代取消了门下省，原本位高权重的给事中名存实亡。御史台的地位却有所提高，同中书省、枢密院三权分置，监察御史的职权既广且重，元朝还建立了行御史台制度，形成了中央御史台、行御史台、道监察官的三级监察网络。元世祖颁布的《宪台格例》是御史台行使监察权的基本法规，共三十六条，宪纲部分规定了御史台的职权范围与地位，条例部分则为纠正百官违失、惩处百官非法的法规，监察工作日益法制化。

(V) The Completion Period of the Ming and Qing Dynasties

（五）明清完备时期

The supervisory system of the Ming and Qing dynasties included the "One Court System" of the Chief Surveillance Bureau (duchayuan), [22]22 The Chief Surveillance Bureau (duchayuan) was the central supervisory organ in the Ming and Qing dynasties, replacing the earlier Censorate. the supervision of the Six Ministries by the Six Offices of Scrutiny (liuke jishizhong) [23]23 The Six Offices of Scrutiny (liuke jishizhong) were six supervisory offices in the Ming and Qing dynasties, each assigned to oversee one of the Six Ministries, with powers to veto and correct ministerial actions. operating in parallel with the Thirteen Circuit Investigating Censors (shisan dao jiancha yushi), [24]24 The Thirteen Circuit Investigating Censors (shisan dao jiancha yushi) were Ming dynasty censors assigned to supervise the thirteen provincial-level circuits, later expanded to fifteen in the Qing. and the merger of the Offices of Scrutiny and the Censorate (kedao heyi). [25]25 The merger of the Offices of Scrutiny and the Censorate (kedao heyi) was a Qing dynasty reform that integrated the previously separate Six Offices of Scrutiny into the Chief Surveillance Bureau, centralizing supervisory power. This reflected the high degree of completion of the supervisory system. The powers of supervisory organs expanded greatly, covering areas such as personnel appointments and dismissals, judicial auditing, grain transport and customs, military colonization, and ideological scholarship. It also saw the emergence of特务 surveillance agencies like the Eastern Depot (dongchang) and the Embroidered Uniform Guard (jin yi wei). [26]26 The Eastern Depot (dongchang) and the Embroidered Uniform Guard (jin yi wei) were Ming dynasty imperial secret police and特务 agencies, directly controlled by the emperor, used for surveillance of officials and commoners alike. Constrained by extreme autocratic imperial power, the Ming supervisory system was meticulously structured and its enforcement methods were harsh. The tentacles of supervision even extended from the bureaucracy to the common people. In terms of organizational structure, the Ming created the Office of Transmission (tongzheng shisi), [27]27 The Office of Transmission (tongzheng si) was a Ming dynasty agency that served as a channel for communication between the emperor and the bureaucracy, handling memorials and imperial decrees. responsible for issuing imperial decrees, communicating lower-level sentiments, receiving memorials, and participating in important state affairs. The Six Offices of Scrutiny for Personnel, Revenue, Rites, War, Justice, and Works possessed powers of veto and correction (fengbo quan), [28]28 The power of veto and correction (fengbo quan) was the authority of the Six Offices of Scrutiny to review and return imperial edicts or ministerial actions deemed improper. impeachment, judicial authority, and remonstrance. At the local level, the Provincial Surveillance Commissions (ticheng anchashi si) [29]29 Provincial Surveillance Commissions (ticheng anchashi si) were Ming and Qing dynasty provincial-level judicial and supervisory organs. handled supervision and penal administration. Additionally, investigating censors were specially dispatched to conduct circuit inspections, and the system of grand coordinators (xunfu) [30]30 Grand coordinators (xunfu) were Ming dynasty officials temporarily dispatched to oversee provincial civil and military affairs, later becoming permanent provincial governors in the Qing. was created to check local government power. In terms of supervisory regulations, the "Constitutional Guidelines and Regulations" (Xiangang tiaoli) [31]31 The "Constitutional Guidelines and Regulations" (Xiangang tiaoli) was a Ming dynasty code of supervisory regulations, first promulgated in 1439, detailing the powers and conduct of censors. promulgated by Emperor Yingzong of Ming and the supervisory sections of the "Collected Statutes of the Great Ming" (Da Ming huidian) [32]32 The "Collected Statutes of the Great Ming" (Da Ming huidian) was a comprehensive administrative and legal code of the Ming dynasty, compiled and revised over successive reigns. revised under Emperor Shenzong, clearly stipulated the organizational structure, operational precedents, scope of authority, work details, supervisory discipline, and rewards and punishments for supervisory organs. These became the code of conduct for supervisory officials at the time. As for the Qing dynasty, it formally completed the institutional reform of merging the Offices of Scrutiny and the Censorate, and state centralization was unprecedentedly strengthened. Supervisory organs possessed powers such as deliberating on state affairs, correcting errors and omissions, overseeing administration, evaluating officials, impeaching officials, jointly adjudicating major cases, redressing injustices, and auditing accounts. Supervisory regulations included the "Imperially Authorized Regulations for the Censorate" (Qinding taigui), [33]33 The "Imperially Authorized Regulations for the Censorate" (Qinding taigui) was a Qing dynasty code of supervisory regulations, first compiled in 1743, serving as the fundamental law for the Censorate. the "Regulations of the Chief Surveillance Bureau" (Duchayuan zeli), [34]34 The "Regulations of the Chief Surveillance Bureau" (Duchayuan zeli) was a Qing dynasty collection of precedents and detailed rules for the operation of the Chief Surveillance Bureau. and the supervisory sections of the "Collected Statutes of the Qing" (Qing huidian), [35]35 The "Collected Statutes of the Qing" (Qing huidian) was the comprehensive administrative code of the Qing dynasty, containing laws and regulations for all government organs, including supervisory ones. which can be regarded as a comprehensive compendium of national supervisory codes.

明清时期的监察制度包括都察院“一院制”、以六科给事中监察六部并与十三道监察御史并施、科道合一等，体现出监察制度的高度完备，监察机关的职权高度膨胀，涉及人事黜陟、司法审计、漕运关税、屯田军事、思想学术等不同领域，还出现了厂卫等特务监察。在极端君主专制的皇权制约下，明代监察制度设置严密、监察手段执行严苛，监察的触角甚至从百司延伸到百姓之中。组织机构方面，明代创设通政使司，掌出纳帝命、通达下情、受理章奏、参与要政。吏、户、礼、兵、刑、工六科给事中有封驳权、劾奏权、司法权、言谏权。地方上的提刑按察使司掌监察与刑政，又有监察御史专门巡按地方，还创设巡抚之制以制约地方政权。监察法规方面，明英宗颁布的《宪纲条例》与明神宗修订的《大明会典》中的监察部分，对监察机关的组织建置、运作事例、职权范围、工作细则、监察纪律、奖惩待遇等都有明确规定，成为当时监察官吏的行动准则。至于清代，正式完成了台谏合一的制度变革，国家集权空前强化。监察机关拥有议决国是、驳正违失、监察行政、考核官吏、弹劾官吏、会谳重案、辩明冤枉、审查会计等职权。监察法规包括乾隆年间的《钦定台规》《都察院则例》及《清会典》中的监察部分，堪称国家监察法典的集大成之作。

II. Characteristics of the Supervisory System of Ancient China

二、中国古代监察制度的特征

Against the backdrop of "rule by man" (renzhi), [36]36 "Rule by man" (renzhi) refers to a system of governance based on the personal virtue and discretion of the ruler and officials, as opposed to "rule by law" (fazhi). a fundamental political characteristic of feudal society, supervision was an important function through which the state organization exercised its rule. Although the supervisory system of ancient China centrally embodied the state will of the ruling class, it also integrated the demands of the whole society, acting as a regulator and balancer among various power and interest relations. Therefore, to summarize the historical characteristics of the ancient Chinese supervisory system, it is necessary to grasp the thread of relationships based on the expansive tendency of power. By approaching from the perspectives of the boundaries, structure, and subjects of power, understanding the internal laws of coordination and division within power relations, focusing on the power confrontations between administration and supervision, and between the central and local authorities, as well as the conflicts of interest between individuals and institutions, and between individuals and law, can one gain insights by moving from specific points to a broader picture.

在“人治”这一封建社会基本政治特征的背景下，监察是国家组织实行统治的重要职能。中国古代监察制度虽集中体现出统治阶级的国家意志，却也是综合了全社会的要求，充当着诸多权力与利益关系之间的调节器与制衡器。因此，若想总结中国古代监察制度的历史特征，还需在权力之扩张倾向的基础上把握好关系这一线索，从权力的边界、格局、主体等角度切入，理解权力关系中协调与分割的内在规律，聚焦行政与监察、中央与地方之权力对抗，以及个人与制度、法律之利益冲突，方能在以点带面中有所收获。

(I) From the Perspective of Power Boundaries: The Ongoing Problem of the Administrativeization of Local Supervisory Power Threatens Political Security

（一）从权力边界来看，地方监察权行政化问题持续威胁政治安全

The problem of supervisory officials over local areas encroaching on local military and political power, or local military and political magnates assuming supervisory authority over local areas, was common in ancient China. Qian Mu, when examining the gains and losses of successive dynasties' politics, noted the phenomenon of central supervisory officials becoming local administrative chiefs; their original intent was centralization of power, but as the evolution reached its extreme, the tail became too big to wag, and they even rebelled against the central government. During the Qin and Han dynasties, the commandery governors and kingdom chancellors, as well as county magistrates and chiefs, were both local administrative heads and the highest supervisory officials within their jurisdictions. The Regional Inspectors (cishi) already held dual functions of supervision and local administration, leading to a situation where supervisory power and administrative power within local administrative organs were merged into one. The Du You (circuit supervisors) and Ting Yuan (county supervisors) served concurrently as local supervisory officials and subordinates of commandery and county chiefs, even causing supervisory power to submit to administrative power. In particular, the Regional Inspector system was originally designed to establish fixed offices to facilitate complaints and reports from officials and commoners, to be subordinate to the central government to avoid hierarchical interests with local areas, to define the scope of supervision to prevent the mixing of powers, to have low rank but heavy authority and generous rewards to facilitate supervision and impeachment, and to conduct regular tours of inspection to strike at key points. Yet in practice, it often underwent alienation, deviating from its original design. From the late Western Han onward, the supervisory authority of Regional Inspectors increasingly expanded, gradually breaking free from the restrictions of the "Six Articles of Inquiry." [37]37 The "Six Articles of Inquiry" (liutiao wenshi) were the statutory scope of authority for Regional Inspectors in the Han dynasty, limiting their investigations to six specific categories of misconduct by commandery-level officials and local magnates. By the late Eastern Han, Regional Inspectors' unauthorized interference in local administration shifted from illegal to legal, as the emperor explicitly granted them the power to act as commandery governors and military authority. During the Wei and Jin periods, Regional Inspectors often held the title of General and established offices (kaifu), concurrently controlling military and civil affairs, with subordinates numbering over a thousand soldiers and over ten thousand officials, participating in the surging struggles for hegemony. By the Tang dynasty, there was the expansion of the Military Commissioners (jiedushi) and the power of the藩镇 (fanzhen, regional military governors). The establishment of Military Commissioners was originally intended to defend against incursions by ethnic minorities along the borders, with circuits (dao) as their administrative areas, yet they often concurrently served as Surveillance Commissioners (guanchashi) of the supervisory circuits, holding military, financial, administrative, and supervisory powers, gradually developing into藩镇 forces. The "An Lushan Rebellion" [38]38 The An Lushan Rebellion (755–763) was a devastating rebellion led by the Tang Military Commissioner An Lushan, which severely weakened the Tang dynasty and led to the rise of regional military governors. severely damaged the foundations of the Tang empire, and the Xuanwu Military Commissioner, Liang King Zhu Wen, destroyed the Tang, ushering in the era of division known as the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, where military organs became the axis of state machinery. In the Ming dynasty, when Grand Coordinators (xunfu) were first established, they only indicated a dispatched mission nature, primarily supervising river works, grain supplies, military affairs, etc., while Supreme Commanders (zongdu) were titles for overseeing military affairs, and their posts were abolished once the task was completed. However, to suppress local rebellions, these temporary positions gradually became permanent, evolving into the highest local military and civil officials. In the Qing dynasty, the Governors-General (zongdu) and Governors (xunfu), as frontier magnates (fengjiang dali), additionally held the title of supervisory officials of the central Censorate (duchayuan), enjoying unparalleled status and power. Thus, it can be seen that, alongside the simplification of supervisory organs and the diversification of supervisory methods, the ancient Chinese supervision system exhibited a contradictory trend: the continuous concentration and strengthening of central supervisory power alongside the increasing disintegration and weakening of local supervisory power. This was mainly manifested in the evolution of the Han dynasty's Regional Inspectors, who had supervisory functions, into the highest local administrative officials (zhoumu); the evolution of the Tang dynasty's circuits (dao), which had supervisory functions, into the highest local administrative divisions; and the evolution of the Ming and Qing dynasties' Grand Coordinators and Supreme Commanders, who had supervisory functions, into the highest level of local administrative officials. This changed the relative independence of supervisory power, causing feudal separatism and bureaucratic corruption. Although it was conducive to suppressing uprisings and resistance activities, it was essentially a regression in feudal official governance. The root cause of the problem lay in the system itself: the unidirectional supervision from top to bottom, where the noble governed the base, determined by the rigid hierarchical system, was a problem the feudal ruling class could never solve. It was also necessary to establish a check-and-balance relationship where official positions were linked but interests were opposed, to limit powers to prevent excessive interference and to sever the long-formed ties of shared interests. From the perspective of power operation, the central-authorization supervision system, the central-resident supervision system, and the central-circuit supervision system were all constrained by internal administrative supervision institutions, which also made it difficult to curb the inaction and aberrant abuse of supervisory power, thereby affecting the rise and fall of dynasties.

监察地方之官侵夺地方军政大权或地方军政大吏监理地方监察之权的问题在中国古代屡见不鲜。钱穆在考察历代政治得失时即关注到中央监察官成为地方行政长官的现象，其本意在中央集权，而演变所极，却尾大不掉，甚至反抗中央。秦汉时期，郡国守、相与县令、长既是地方行政长官，也是辖区内的最高监察官，刺史更兼有监察与地方行政的双重职能，已出现地方行政机构的监察权与行政权合二为一的情况，督邮、廷掾兼为地方监察官与郡县长官的属吏，甚至使得监察权屈从于行政权。特别是刺史制度，本应是设置固定治所便于吏民检举告发，隶属中央避免同地方产生上下级利害关系，规定监察范围以防止事权混杂，秩卑却权重赏厚利于督察劾举，定期巡行考察可以击中要害，但在实践中却往往发生异化，背离设计初衷。自西汉末年起，刺史的督察权日趋扩大，逐渐脱离“六条问事”的限制。东汉末年，刺史越权干预地方行政的情况由非法转为合法，皇帝明令授予其代行郡守的权力与兵权。魏晋时期的刺史多带将军开府，兼掌军政与民政，手下将过千人、吏过万人，参与到风起云涌的争霸之中。及至唐代，又有节度使及藩镇势力的膨胀。设置节度使本来意在防御边境少数民族的侵扰，以道为管辖区，却往往直接兼任监察区划中的观察使，有军权、财权、行政权、监察权，逐渐发展为藩镇势力。“安史之乱”重创了大唐基业，宣武节度使梁王朱温灭唐，开启了五代十国的割据时代，军事机关成为国家机器运转的轴心。明代巡抚初设时仅表明差遣职务的性质，主要监督河道、粮饷、军务等工作，总督即为监理军务的称号，事毕即罢。但为了镇压地方叛乱，临时职官逐渐固定化，演变为地方最高军政长官。清代之总督与巡抚，更以封疆大吏的身份叠加中央都察院监察官之衔，地位权势无上尊荣。可见，伴随着监察机构的单一化与监察手段的多元化，中国古代监察制度呈现出中央监察权不断集中加强与地方监察权日益解体削弱的矛盾态势，主要表现为两汉时期有监察性质之州刺史向地方最高行政长官州牧的演变，唐代有监察性质之道向地方最高行政区划之道的演变，明清时期有监察性质之督抚向地方最高一级行政长官的演变，这改变了监察权的相对独立性，造成封建割据与吏治腐败，虽有利于镇压起义与反抗活动，实质上却是封建吏治上的倒退。而问题产生的根源则是制度本身，即由森严的等级制度所决定之以贵治贱与自上向下的单向性监察，始终是封建统治阶级无法解决的问题，还应确立职务联系却利益相异的钳制关系，限制职权以防止过多干预并割裂日久形成的利害休戚。从权力运行来看，中央授权监察体制、中央常驻监察体制、中央巡回监察体制都受限于内部行政监督制度，这也造成监察权不作为与变异滥用难以遏制的现象，进而影响王朝的兴衰。

(2) From the perspective of the power structure, the continuously improved inspection system was conducive to maintaining central authority.

（二）从权力格局来看，不断完善的巡视制度有利于维护中央权威

The inspection system (xunshi zhidu) was one of the main forms of the ancient Chinese supervision system. The monarch directly controlled supervisory power, severing the relationship of shared interests between supervisors and the supervised at the local level. Following principles such as mutual checks between internal and external, and mutual control between upper and lower levels, it evolved from temporary dispatched personnel to permanent local posts, continuously expanding its scope through the combination of routine inspections and special inspections, and the selection of inspection officials became increasingly strict. From a historical perspective, the ancient Chinese inspection system sprouted in primitive society, took shape in the Qin and Han dynasties, was perfected in the High Tang, and was strengthened in the Ming and Qing dynasties, gradually evolving into inspection institutions, functions, and legal regulations with Chinese characteristics. Legend has it that during the time of Emperor Shun, there was already a "tour of inspection every five years" (wuzai yi xunshou) to examine the political achievements and public virtue of local lords. The Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties had "tours of inspection in all directions" (sifang xunshou). The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods had the "system of touring counties" (xunxian zhi zhi), intended to correct illegalities and evaluate officials. During the Qin and Han dynasties, imperial "tours of inspection" (xunxing) continued, forming a multi-layered inspection system. In the Western Han, Regional Inspectors toured their circuits to investigate illegal activities, including "counterfeiting coins," "unjust court decisions," "unclean officials," "unequal corvée labor," "encroaching on and plundering the people," and "spreading rumors of portents," directly targeting local powerful families. Moreover, beyond the statutory content, Regional Inspectors were not allowed to exceed their authority in investigations and impeachments. Bao Xuan, the Governor of Yuzhou (Yuzhou mu) under Emperor Ai of Han, was impeached and dismissed for exceeding the articles and infringing on authority, "acting on behalf of the two-thousand-stone officials in handling lawsuits." [39]39 "Two-thousand-stone officials" (erqian shi) was a Han dynasty rank designation for high-level officials, including commandery governors, indicating their annual salary grade. In the Sui dynasty, the Censorate of Circuit Officials (sili tai) exercised supervisory power according to the "Six Articles of Circuit Inspection" (xuncha liu tiao), and the scope of investigations also expanded. The Tang dynasty established a permanent local circuit inspection system with circuit-by-circuit tours of investigation. The Song dynasty stipulated that circuit supervisors (jiansi) must tour all areas under their jurisdiction within a specified time and could not stay too long in one place. The Yuan dynasty had Surveillance Commissioners (suzheng lianfang shi) who conducted inspections of their assigned areas. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, various inspection methods were used interchangeably; the Investigating Censors (xun'an yushi) were directly responsible to the emperor, serving as the emperor's eyes and ears. Overall, compared with the current inspection system of the CPC, the main differences in the ancient Chinese inspection system lie in the establishment of inspection institutions, the scope of power and responsibilities of inspection personnel, and the methods and approaches of inspection work. In terms of institutional periodization, it underwent important stages from sparse to dense: routinization, institutionalization, independence, specialization, standardization, and comprehensiveness. It exhibited characteristics such as increasingly perfected institutional construction, the increasingly common phenomenon of low-ranking inspection officials supervising high-ranking ones, increasingly strict selection criteria, increasingly flexible and effective methods, and increasingly clear definitions of responsibilities and powers. These have implications for the contemporary inspection system.

巡视制度是中国古代监察制度的主要形式之一，由君主直接掌握监察权，割裂了地方上监督者与被监督者之间的利害关系，依照内外相维、上下相制等原则，经历了从临时派遣人员到固定常驻地方的演变，在例行巡视与专项巡视的结合中不断扩大范围，巡视官吏的选任也日益严格。从历史脉络来看，中国古代巡视制度萌芽于原始社会，形成于秦汉，完备于盛唐，强化于明清，逐步演化出具有中国特色的巡视机构、职能及法律规章制度。传说舜时便已“五载一巡狩”，考察地方诸侯的政绩与公德。夏、商、周三代有“四方巡守”。春秋战国时期有“巡县之制”，意在纠治不法、评价官吏。秦汉时期，帝王“巡行”依旧，形成了层次分明的巡视体系。西汉时刺史巡行所部，监察不法之事，包括“铸伪钱”“狱不直”“吏不廉”“徭役不平”“侵渔百姓”“妖祥讹言”等内容，直指地方豪强。且在法定内容之外，刺史不得越权察举。汉哀帝时的豫州牧鲍宣，便因越条侵权，“代二千石署吏听讼”而被弹劾免职。隋代司隶台按“巡察六条”行使监察权，纠察的范围也有所扩大。唐代设置了分道巡按的经常性地方巡回监察制度。宋代规定监司要在指定时间内巡遍所辖地区，且不得逗留过长时间。元代有肃政廉访使对所属地区进行巡察。明清时期，多种巡视方式交互使用，巡按御史直接向皇帝负责，成为天子的耳目之官。整体来看，中国古代巡视制度同党的现行巡视制度相比，主要差异是巡视机构的设置、巡视人员的权力大小与职责任务、巡视工作的方式方法等。制度分期上则经历了由疏到密的惯例化、制度化、独立化、专业化、规范化、全面化等重要阶段，具有制度建设日趋完善、巡视官吏以小监大现象日趋普遍且选拔日趋严苛、方式方法日趋灵活有效、职责权限日趋明晰等特点，对当今的巡视制度具有启示意义。

(3) From the perspective of the power subject, increasingly strict selection and management expanded the supervisory official corps.

（三）从权力主体来看，日益严格的选任与管理壮大了监察官队伍

Ancient China always attached importance to the selection and management of supervisory officials, and transmitted texts contain no shortage of records concerning groups of “model officials” and “harsh officials.” The so-called “model official” means “one who is compliant, compliant with public law above and compliant with human sentiment below.” Most of these officials had engaged in supervisory work and possessed distinctive characteristics such as an upright and outspoken moral cultivation, broad learning and ritual-legal cultural quality, and rich experience and good administrative performance. Regarding the political virtue of censors, the Tang dynasty emphasized uprightness, the Ming dynasty emphasized loyalty to the sovereign, and the Qing dynasty emphasized integrity and diligence. In terms of cultural quality, during the Han and Wei periods those who achieved high marks in the policy examination were mostly appointed as censors, while from the Sui-Tang through the Ming-Qing periods, successful candidates in the imperial examinations were given heavy preference. In terms of administrative experience, there was a general shift from experience in high-level posts to experience in grassroots posts. Through institutional provisions such as selection procedures, assessment rewards and punishments, and re-supervision, on the one hand, supervisory officials with outstanding political virtue were repeatedly promoted; on the other hand, punishments for supervisory officials who failed to detect wrongdoing, made false accusations, engaged in corruption, or recommended unqualified persons for office were also very severe. Methods of avoidance and rotation were more conducive to giving play to the effectiveness of the supervisory system and played a certain role in curbing bureaucratic corruption. The appointment of supervisory officials originally had no fixed pattern, but with the strengthening of centralization of power, it gradually came to be done by imperial decree. Behind the phenomenon of relatively rapid promotion was an increased severity of punishment for violations of discipline and law. The scope of avoidance in appointment included posts, relatives, and place of origin, and was broader than that for ordinary civil officials. Strict qualifications and age requirements were also an important guarantee of a high-quality supervisory official corps, such as restricting officials who had been disciplined from re-entering the supervisory system. Overall, ancient Chinese supervisory officials were not only the executive subjects who concretely carried out supervisory activities but also key figures in the national governance system and the chain of power allocation. A clear and effective system for selecting supervisory officials was a successful experience in national governance; the formulation of relevant standards was closely related to the allocation of state power and the requirements of professionalization; and reasonable methods and meticulous restrictions were guarantees that supervisory officials could achieve independence and give full play to the effectiveness of supervision. Specifically, the management of the ancient Chinese supervisory official system was characterized by verticality; supervisory officials were simultaneously supervised by the emperor and by legal discipline. Although there were many conditions and restrictions, their official rank showed a trend of gradual increase; by the Qing dynasty, the Left Censor-in-Chief had already been elevated to the high rank of Senior First Grade. Moreover, the incentive system was an important element in the design of the supervisory system. Through measures such as implementing high-standard selection criteria, high-level appointment procedures, conferring important status and major powers, and generously rewarding competent officials, the sense of honor and mission of supervisory officials could be maximally stimulated, causing them to be loyal to the state and to diligently fulfill their duties.

中国古代历来重视监察官的选任与管理，传世文献中不乏关于“循吏”“酷吏”群体的记载，所谓“循，顺也，上顺公法，下顺人情也”。其中大部分官吏均从事过监察工作，具有刚正不阿与直言敢谏的气节修养、博学多识与明于礼法的文化素质、丰富的经验与良好的治绩等鲜明特点。针对御史的政治品德，唐代讲求正直、明代讲求忠君、清代讲求廉勤。文化素质方面，汉魏时期多以对策高第者为御史，隋唐至明清则重用进士。从政经历方面，大体经历了从高层从政经历到基层从政经历的变化。通过选任程序、考核奖惩及再监察等制度规定，一方面，使具有优秀政治品德的监察官屡有晋升；另一方面，对于监察官失察、诬告、贪赃、贡举非人等问题的处罚也十分严厉，回避与轮换的方式更有利于发挥监察制度的效能，对吏治腐败起到了一定的遏制作用。监察官的任用本无定式，伴随着中央集权的加强，逐渐由皇帝敕授。在较快升迁现象的背后，是对违纪违法的加重处罚。其任职回避范围包括职务、亲属、地籍等，较一般文官更广。严格的资历限制与年龄要求也是高质量监察官队伍的重要保障，如限制被处分的监察官重新进入监察系统。整体来看，中国古代监察官既是具体实施监察活动的执行主体，又是国家治理体系与权力配置链条上的关键角色，明确有效的监察官选任制度是国家治理的成功经验，相关标准的制定同国家权力的配置与职业化的要求密切相关，合理的方式与细致的限制更是监察官取得独立性并充分发挥监察成效的保障。具体来说，中国古代监察官制度在管理上具有垂直性，监察官同时受到皇帝与法纪的监督，虽有诸多条件限制，品秩却呈现出逐步提高的趋势，清代的左都御史已增秩为从一品的高官。而激励制度更是监察制度设计中的重要内容，通过实行高规格的选任标准、高级别的任用程序、赋予重要地位与重大职权、厚赏称职官吏等措施，可以最大限度地激发监察官的荣誉感与使命感，令其忠于社稷并恪尽职守。

III. Lessons from the Ancient Chinese Supervision System

三、中国古代监察制度的启示

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, we have unswervingly advanced comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, deeply promoted the great new project of Party building in the New Era, achieved a series of theoretical, practical, and institutional innovations, constructed a system for comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, and opened up a new realm of self-revolution for a century-old major party. To improve the system for comprehensive and strict governance of the Party is to implement the general requirements for Party building in the New Era, ensure that the Party occupies the leadership core position of exercising overall leadership and coordinating all efforts in the national governance system, and embody the Party Central Committee’s high degree of consciousness in using the spirit of reform and strict standards to govern the Party and in using the Party’s self-revolution to lead social revolution. By summarizing the achievements made in building the system for comprehensive and strict governance of the Party since the New Era and analyzing the new situations and new tasks faced, studying the ideas and measures for improving the system for comprehensive and strict governance of the Party is not only an inherent requirement for a comprehensive and systematic layout and coordinated and efficient advancement of Party governance but also a strategic measure to solve the unique problems of a large party and build a stronger and more powerful Marxist political party, and moreover an urgent need to respond to domestic and international risks and challenges and advance Chinese-path modernization. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that systematic thinking and scientific methods should be used to advance Party governance covering all content, all objects, all responsibility chains, and all systems, further achieving complete elements, complete functions, scientific norms, and efficient operation. It is necessary to improve the organizational system that is connected from top to bottom and has strong execution; improve the education system that consolidates the foundation, cultivates the root, gathers hearts, and molds the soul; improve the supervision system that exerts precise force and addresses both symptoms and root causes; improve the institutional system that is scientifically complete, effective, and practical; and improve the responsibility system with clear subjects and clear requirements. The ancient Chinese supervision system was rooted in the soil of fine traditional Chinese clean governance culture. Although it was difficult to escape the fate of rise and fall in the course of dynastic changes, it also showed an overall trend of systematization. Its gains and losses in constructing a leadership system, forming an implementation system, strengthening an institutional system, and optimizing a cultural system can all provide lessons for contemporary China in deepening the reform of the national supervision system and improving the institutional normative system for the Party’s self-revolution.

党的十八大以来，我们坚定不移推进全面从严治党，深入推进新时代党的建设新的伟大工程，取得一系列理论创新、实践创新、制度创新成果，构建起全面从严治党体系，开辟了百年大党自我革命新境界。健全全面从严治党体系，就是要落实新时代党的建设总要求，确保党在国家治理体系中居于总揽全局、协调各方的领导核心地位，体现出党中央坚持用改革精神和严的标准管党治党、以党的自我革命引领社会革命的高度自觉。通过总结新时代以来全面从严治党体系建设取得的成就并分析面临的新形势新任务，研究健全全面从严治党体系的思路和举措，既是管党治党全面系统布局、协同高效推进的内在要求，也是解决大党独有难题、建设更加坚强有力的马克思主义政党的战略举措，更是应对国内外风险挑战、推进中国式现代化的迫切需要。习近平总书记指出，要用系统思维、科学方法推进管党治党内容全涵盖、对象全覆盖、责任全链条、制度全贯通，进一步做到要素齐全、功能完备、科学规范、运行高效。要健全上下贯通、执行有力的组织体系，健全固本培元、凝心铸魂的教育体系，健全精准发力、标本兼治的监管体系，健全科学完备、有效管用的制度体系，健全主体明确、要求清晰的责任体系。中国古代监察制度植根于中华优秀传统廉政文化的土壤中，虽在朝代更替中难以摆脱兴衰起伏的命运，却也呈现出体系化的整体趋势，其在领导体系建构、执行体系形成、制度体系强化、文化体系优化等方面的得失，均可为当代中国深化国家监察体制改革，完善党的自我革命制度规范体系提供启示。

(i) A centralized and unified leadership system must be constructed, and the supervisory organization network must be made denser

（一）要建构集中统一的领导体系，织密监察组织网络

In ancient China, supervisory power essentially originated from imperial power; its degree of perfection depended on policy, and the exercise of its powers required protection. Under circumstances where a situation of mutual checks and balances between highly concentrated monarchical power and the exercise of administrative supervisory power failed to form, it often led to power corruption, turning supervision into a tool of power struggle for the emperor to control officials and for officials to attack each other, and moreover creating a breeding ground for officials shielding each other and for corruption and bribery. The recurring problem of the administrativization of local supervisory power often became the last straw that broke the imperial power, turning the “self-revolution” originally intended to consolidate centralization and stabilize society into a “self-destruction” of power division, separatist rule, and popular resentment. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, by improving the Party’s leadership system, the Party’s leadership methods have become more scientific, the whole Party has become more unified in thought, more united politically, and more consistent in action, always ensuring the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, ensuring that the Party plays the leadership core role of exercising overall leadership and coordinating all efforts, and significantly enhancing the Party’s political leadership, ideological guidance, mass organization, and social appeal. It is evident that if we are to break out of the historical cycle [40]40 The “historical cycle” (历史周期率) refers to the pattern of rise and fall observed in Chinese dynastic history, a concept famously discussed by Mao Zedong in 1945 with Huang Yanpei, who suggested that the CPC would need to find a new path to avoid this cycle. and explore effective paths for the Party to achieve self-purification, self-improvement, self-renovation, and self-enhancement under conditions of long-term governance, and forever maintain the Party’s advanced nature and purity, we should uphold and improve the Party’s leadership over discipline inspection and supervision work, promote the institutionalization and rule-of-law-based governance of Party leadership, and ensure that central and local decrees are unified, operations are smooth, execution is efficient, and vitality is full. The key to improving the institutional normative system for the Party’s self-revolution lies in adhering to governing the Party with institutions and regulations, and improving the supervision system with unified Party leadership, full coverage, authoritative authority, and efficient operation. This requires that in the practice of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and law-based governance in all respects, efforts be made to expand the scope of supervision, integrate supervisory forces, give play to the political and organizational functions of Party organizations at all levels, use intra-Party supervision to drive other forms of supervision, strengthen top-down organizational supervision, improve bottom-up democratic supervision, give play to the role of supervision at the same level, improve the national supervision organizational structure, and make the combination of self-supervision and popular supervision a powerful driving force for the Party’s self-revolution in the New Era. The first Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China, reviewed and passed in 2018, is precisely a powerful practice of the major decision made by the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core to deepen the reform of the national supervision system. The formulation of the National Supervision Law upholds the organic unity of intra-Party supervision and national supervision, fixes the institutional mechanism for the centralized and unified leadership of the Party over anti-corruption work, transforms institutional advantages into governance effectiveness, and is a strategic measure to advance the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity.

中国古代监察权本质上出于皇权，其完善程度取决于政策，职权行使有待于保护，在君主权力高度集中与行政监察权力运用之间未能形成相互制约态势的情况下，往往导致权力腐败，使监察成为皇帝控制官吏、百官相互攻讦的权斗工具，更会产生官官相护、贪赃枉法的土壤。而地方监察权行政化问题的反复出现，又往往会成为压垮皇权的最后一根稻草，使本意在巩固集权、稳定社会的“自我革命”变成分权割据、民怨沸腾的“自我要命”。党的十八大以来，通过健全党的领导制度体系，党的领导方式更加科学，全党在思想上更加统一、政治上更加团结、行动上更加一致，始终确保党中央权威和集中统一领导，确保党发挥总揽全局、协调各方的领导核心作用，党的政治领导力、思想引领力、群众组织力、社会号召力显著增强。可见，若想跳出历史周期率，探索党在长期执政条件下进行自我净化、自我完善、自我革新、自我提高的有效路径，永葆党的先进性和纯洁性，便应坚持和完善党对纪检监察工作的领导，推进党的领导制度化、法治化，保证中央和地方各级政令统一、运行顺畅、执行高效、充满活力。而完善党的自我革命制度规范体系的关键又在于坚持制度治党、依规治党，健全党统一领导、全面覆盖、权威高效的监督体系。这就要求在全面从严治党与全面依法治国的实践中，着力扩大监察范围、整合监察力量，发挥各级党组织的政治功能和组织功能，以党内监督带动其他监督，强化自上而下的组织监督，改进自下而上的民主监督，发挥同级监督的作用，健全国家监察组织架构，使自我监督和人民监督相结合成为新时代党的自我革命的强大动力。2018年审议通过的首部《中华人民共和国监察法》，正是以习近平同志为核心的党中央作出的关于深化国家监察体制改革的重大决策的有力实践。国家监察法的制定，坚持党内监督与国家监察有机统一，把党对反腐败工作集中统一领导的体制机制固定下来，把制度优势转化为治理效能，是推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的战略举措。

(ii) An independent and professional implementation system must be formed, and the foundation of the supervisory team must be consolidated

（二）要形成独立专业的执行体系，夯实监察队伍基础

The ancient Chinese supervision system took centralization of power as its purpose, regarded supervisory power as the power over governance, and regarded supervisory officials as the officials who oversee officials. It made explorations in both the independence of the supervisory system and the specialization of supervisory officials. Although in its design it pursued having laws to rely on, administration according to law, ensuring administrative efficiency, and imposing sanctions and punishments for administrative errors, it was ultimately dependent on imperial power, inherently containing the contradiction between hierarchical order and the game of checks and balances, and could never truly realize the supervision of power, especially the highest power. The strengthening of supervisory power also failed to become a good strategy for preventing and combating corruption, and even disrupted normal administrative and judicial order. The root cause lay in the political system of unified power, which created a lack of an internal mechanism for power restraint. Through long-term and unremitting exploration, especially the successful practice of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party since the 18th National Congress of the CPC [41]41 The 18th National Congress of the CPC was held in 2012, marking the beginning of the New Era under Xi Jinping's leadership and the launch of the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party campaign., the Communist Party of China in the New Era has formed a more complete set of systems and mechanisms for effectively restraining and supervising the operation of power. The main symbols are the "Norms for Political Life Within the Party Under the New Situation" and the "Regulations on Intra-Party Supervision of the Communist Party of China," both passed in 2016. History has repeatedly proven that the restraint and supervision of the operation of state power must begin with the restraint and supervision of the operation of the ruling party's power. Intra-Party supervision is the source of life for maintaining the Party's health forever. The absence of intra-Party supervision will inevitably lead to the weakening of Party leadership, the deficiency of Party building, and the inadequacy of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party. The Party managing cadres is an important principle for upholding the Party's leadership. The Party must not only manage the cultivation, promotion, and use of cadres but also educate, manage, and supervise cadres, and, moreover, handle cadres who violate discipline or the law. This requires taking asking the people about governance as the starting point, taking integrity and efficiency as the goal, taking being good at learning as the driving force, and making efforts in areas such as achieving precise supervision, perfecting supporting supervision laws and regulations, enriching supervision methods and means, and carefully selecting and strictly choosing supervisory cadres. It is necessary to achieve pre-arrangement, immediate awareness during the process, and post-event standardization, to solve problems related to the coverage of the scope of supervision targets and the self-supervision of supervisory organs, and to focus on building a high-quality supervisory team through ideological and political education, professional capability training, and professional ethics cultivation.

中国古代监察制度以集权为宗旨，将监察权视为治权之权，将监察官视为治官之官，在监察体制的独立化与监察官的专职化上均有所探索。其虽在设计上追求有法可依、依法行政、保证行政效率并对行政失误进行处分与制裁，但终究是依附于皇权，天生存在尊卑有序与制衡博弈的矛盾，无法真正实现对权力尤其是最高权力的监督。监察权的强化也未能成为防治腐败的良策，甚至扰乱了正常的行政与司法秩序，其根源在于权力一体化的政治制度造成缺乏权力制约的内在机制。经过长期不懈的探索，特别是党的十八大以来全面从严治党的成功实践，新时代的中国共产党形成了更加完备的对权力运行进行有效制约和监督的一整套体制机制，主要标志是2016年通过的《关于新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则》和《中国共产党党内监督条例》。历史反复证明，对国家权力运行的制约和监督，必须从对执政党权力运行进行制约和监督做起。党内监督是永葆党的肌体健康的生命之源，党内监督的缺位，必然导致党的领导弱化、党的建设缺失、全面从严治党不力。而党管干部是坚持党的领导的重要原则，党既要管干部的培养、提拔、使用，还要对干部进行教育、管理、监督，更要对违纪违法的干部作出处理。这就要求以问政于民为起点、以廉洁高效为旨归、以善于学习为动力，从致力实现精准监督、健全配套监察法规、丰富监察方式方法、精选严择监察干部等方面发力，做到事前安排、事中即觉、事后规范，解决好监察对象范围覆盖与监察机关自我监督的相关问题，着力从思想政治教育、业务能力培训、职业道德培育入手来建设高素质监察队伍。

(III) It is necessary to strengthen a standardized and reasonable institutional system and tighten the cage of the supervision system

（三）要强化规范合理的制度体系，扎紧监察制度笼子

The ancient Chinese supervision system, through thousands of years of development and evolution, gradually became interlinked in terms of supervision content, procedures, and scope, systematically covering the entire field of ancient Chinese official management. In particular, the inspection tour system [42]42 The inspection tour system (xunshi zhidu) was a key feature of ancient Chinese supervision, where centrally appointed officials would periodically tour provinces to investigate local officials and report back to the emperor. could not only punish illegal activities in local areas but also serve the function of recommending talent for the central government, reflecting unique institutional advantages. If contemporary China wants to consolidate the institutional cornerstone for improving the level and effectiveness of national governance and ensuring that the power endowed by the people is always used to seek happiness for the people, it must tighten the institutional cage, establish and improve the intra-Party institutional system, take maintaining the authority and seriousness of the Party Constitution as the fundamental requirement, improve intra-Party regulations, perfect the mechanism for concretizing, refining, and normalizing political supervision, perfect the working mechanism for promoting the simultaneous advancement of not daring to be corrupt, not being able to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt [43]43 "Not daring to be corrupt, not being able to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt" is a three-pronged anti-corruption framework promoted by the CPC, combining deterrence, institutional prevention, and ideological education., perfect the mechanism for jointly investigating and handling unhealthy tendencies and corruption problems, perfect the joint punishment mechanism for key bribe-givers, and perfect the mechanism for pursuing fugitives and recovering stolen assets. It is also necessary to strengthen the main responsibility and supervisory responsibility for comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, perfect the supporting system for strengthening the supervision of "top leaders" and leading groups, deepen the reform of the grassroots supervision system and mechanism, oppose privileges, and prevent the abuse of power. Furthermore, it is essential to be good at using the rule-of-law thinking and rule-of-law methods to oppose corruption, promote the organic connection between discipline enforcement and law enforcement and criminal justice, promote national anti-corruption legislation, and ensure the rigid operation of the legal system. It can be said that it is precisely the rich practice of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party that has laid a solid foundation for the innovation of intra-Party laws and regulations. By promoting the institutionalization of the Party, the scientific, institutionalized, and standardized level of Party building has been significantly improved.

中国古代监察制度历经千年来的发展演变，在监察内容、程序、范围上逐渐环环相扣，系统覆盖了中国古代职官管理的全领域。特别是巡视制度，既可以起到惩治地方不法行为的作用，还带有为中央举荐人才的功能，体现出独特的制度优势。而当代中国若想筑牢提升治国理政水平和效能的制度基石，确保人民赋予的权力始终用来为人民谋幸福，便要扎好制度笼子，建立健全党内制度体系，以维护党章的权威性和严肃性为根本要求，完善党内法规，健全政治监督具体化、精准化、常态化机制，完善一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐工作机制，健全不正之风和腐败问题同查同治机制，完善对重点行贿人的联合惩戒机制，健全追逃追赃机制。还要强化全面从严治党主体责任和监督责任，健全加强对“一把手”和领导班子监督配套制度，深化基层监督体制机制改革，反对特权，防止滥用职权。更要善于用法治思维和法治方式反对腐败，推进执纪执法和刑事司法有机衔接，推进反腐败国家立法，让法律制度刚性运行。可以说，正是全面从严治党的丰富实践，为党内法规制度创新奠定了坚实基础。通过推动党的制度建设，党的建设科学化、制度化、规范化水平明显提高。

(IV) It is necessary to optimize a cultural system that reflects the interplay of ancient and modern times and activate the source of supervision culture

（四）要优化古今辉映的文化体系，活化监察文化源泉

Chinese civilization is the only great civilization in the world that has continued unbroken and developed to this day in the form of a state. Studying ancient Chinese supervision culture is an inherent requirement for building the modern civilization of the Chinese nation. As an important component of the national legal system, the supervisory function often takes integrity or its absence as the main criterion for evaluating official governance. Power deviation is the primary cause of corruption, and the root of its breeding and spread lies precisely in the weakness of power supervision. From the very beginning of its establishment, the ancient Chinese supervision system formed a power allocation structure where supervisory power and organs coexisted with state power and organs. This has a natural relevance to contemporary discipline inspection and supervision work and should also be considered from perspectives such as the construction of ethics and the rule of law at the ideological level, the construction of the supervision system at the institutional level, and the cultivation of professional personnel at the technical level. This requires summarizing and refining the basic principles and laws of development of discipline inspection and supervision, examining the evolution and comparison of ancient and modern systems, and conducting research on key areas such as inspection tours and supervision laws and regulations. Guided by the goal of developing and perfecting the socialist supervision system with Chinese characteristics, and combining the achievements and experience of the Party's clean governance and anti-corruption struggle in the New Era with the Party Central Committee's concrete measures to continuously deepen the reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system, efforts should be made to form a series of practical, institutional, and theoretical achievements, continuously improving the level of discipline inspection and supervision work. As an emerging discipline in the field of philosophy and social sciences, the construction of the first-level discipline of discipline inspection and supervision should apply an interdisciplinary research paradigm, adopt methods such as literature research and case studies, base itself on the experiences and lessons from the ancient Chinese supervision system, and manifest Chinese style and Chinese manner. Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era is not only the Marxism of contemporary China and the Marxism of the 21st century but also the essence of Chinese culture and the Chinese spirit of the times. How to further promote the creative transformation and innovative development of ancient Chinese supervision culture, making it a key link in strengthening the construction of a clean culture in the New Era, and creating a new form of human civilization through clean governance civilization, will undoubtedly be an important future research direction for discipline inspection and supervision, worthy of our continued attention and in-depth consideration.

中华文明是世界上唯一绵延不断且以国家形态发展至今的伟大文明，研究中国古代监察文化是建设中华民族现代文明的应有之义。监察职能作为国家法制的重要组成部分，往往以清廉与否作为评判吏治的主要标准。权力越轨是产生腐败的首要原因，其滋生蔓延的根源正在于权力监督的乏力。中国古代监察制度自建立伊始，就形成了监察权力、机关与国家权力、机构相伴而生的权力配置结构，其与当代纪检监察工作具有天然相关性，还应从思想层面的伦理法治建设、体制层面的监察系统构建、技术层面的专业人员培养等角度加以思考。这就需要对纪检监察的基本原理与发展规律进行概括提炼，考察古今制度的演进与比较，针对巡视巡察、监察法规等重点领域开展研究，以发展和完善中国特色社会主义监督制度为导向，结合新时代党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争的成就经验及党中央持续深化纪检监察体制改革的切实举措，力求形成一系列实践成果、制度成果、理论成果，不断提高纪检监察工作水平。而作为哲学社会科学类的新兴学科，纪检监察学一级学科建设更应运用跨学科研究范式，采取文献研究、案例研究等方法，立足于中国古代监察制度中的经验与教训，彰显出中国风格与中国气派。习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想不仅是当代中国马克思主义、二十一世纪马克思主义，更是中华文化和中国精神的时代精华，如何进一步推动中国古代监察文化的创造性转化、创新性发展，使之成为加强新时代廉洁文化建设的关键一环，以廉政文明创造人类文明新形态，必将是纪检监察学未来重要的研究方向，值得我们持续关注与深入思考。

Author's brief biography: Qu Xiaoshuang, Lecturer at the Department of Party Building, Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC (National Academy of Governance), and Researcher at the Anti-Corruption Research Center, Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC (National Academy of Governance).

作者简介：曲晓霜，中共中央党校（国家行政学院）党的建设教研部讲师、中共中央党校（国家行政学院）反腐败研究中心研究员。