Separation of Religion and Politics, or Unification of Religion and Politics? — The Nationalist Government’s Policy Deliberations on the Relationship between Politics and Religion in Tibet
政教分离,抑或政教合一?——国民政府对西藏政治和宗教关系的政策考量*
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Republic of China began to implement a constitutional system. At that time, however, China’s border regions still contained many political systems inconsistent with this principle, the most prominent of which was the Tibetan system of unification of religion and politics. The current academic literature contains many research results on this system, but the evolution of this system after the early 20th century, especially the Nationalist Government’s attempt to transform it by upholding the principle of separation of religion and politics with the goal of political integration, represents a gap in academic research. This article attempts to provide an overall examination of the process by which the Nationalist Government, acting in accordance with the basic spirit of separation of religion and politics, sought to transform the Tibetan system of unification of religion and politics, and thereby to present the state of religion and politics in Tibetan society before the democratic reform.
I
The so-called separation of religion and politics is a general principle and political-moral foundation of secular states. Its significance lies in prohibiting the designation of any particular religion as a state religion, maintaining separate norms and spheres between the state and religion, and forbidding the “politicization of religion” and the “religionization of politics.” [1]1 The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (蒙藏委员会) was the central government agency of the Republic of China (1912-1949) responsible for administering the affairs of Mongolia, Tibet, and other frontier regions. The so-called unification of religion and politics refers to the system of unification of religion and politics. The Tibetan system of unification of religion and politics germinated during the period of the Sakya local regime in the Yuan dynasty and formally took shape as the Gelug school’s system of unification of religion and politics in 1751. The great power over religion and politics in the Tibetan region was essentially concentrated in the hands of the Dal
At the beginning of its establishment, the Republican government continued the Qing dynasty's policy of political integration under the banner of the "Five Races Under One Union." On April 22, 1912, Yuan Shikai declared that henceforth the Republican government would no longer treat Mongolia and Tibet as tributary dependencies: "Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, and other regions should naturally be planned and coordinated to achieve the unification of internal administration and to aspire to the great harmony of the nation." To this end, "the Republican government does not establish a separate ministry for frontier affairs, originally regarding Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang as equal to the interior provinces; in the future, all political affairs of these localities shall fall within the scope of internal administrative affairs," transferring the affairs formerly under the jurisdiction of the Court of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, before the local administrative system was uniformly regulated, matters concerning "Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang" were still to be handled according to old precedents.[5] Yuan Shikai treated Tibet and other regions as equivalent to the interior, seeking to "standardize" the local administrative systems of Mongolia and Tibet in order to achieve the ideal of "unification of internal administration" and "great harmony of the nation." In February 1913, in a "practical strategy" for governing Tibet addressed to the 13
This intention was even more clearly reflected in the governing program of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, the central institution of the National Government responsible for border affairs such as those of Mongolia and Tibet. On February 23, 1929, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, in its governing program for the period of political tutelage, planned to "reform the old administrative systems of Mongolia and Tibet," while simultaneously "protecting the property of lamaseries" and "giving preferential treatment to religious leaders."⑨ In this program, the Commission clearly adhered to the principle of separation of politics and religion, not only stipulating politics and religion separately, but also explicitly proposing to reform the old administrative system of Tibet (i.e., the system of unification of politics and religion). In the view of the Commission, "the administrative systems and official organizations of Mongolia and Tibet form a separate system, which, having been followed to the present day, is no longer suitable. The Commission should, with all its efforts, implement political tutelage in all matters concerning Mongolia and Tibet, discarding the old and instituting the new."⑩ To this end, in the "Chronological Table of Political Tutelage Work," the Commission further formulated a six-year plan (1930-1935) for implementing the separation of politics and religion in Mongolia and Tibet. That is, the first period (ending in 1930): first, investigate the original administrative systems of Mongolia and Tibet; second, investigate the state of administrative power and religious power; third, propagate the reform of the administrative systems of Mongolia and Tibet. The second period (ending in 1931): first, establish a new administrative system; second, separate administrative power and religious power. The third period (ending in 1932): first, implement the renaming of administrative organs; second, implement the separate governance of politics and religion. The fourth period (ending in 1933): first, inspect the administrative conditions after reform. The fifth period (ending in 1934): proceed according to the overall plan separately. The sixth period (ending in 1935): continue the work of the fifth period.(11) The principle of "separate governance of politics and religion" or separation of politics and religion was clearly embodied here. In June 1929, Liu Puchen, a member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and later the head of the office of the Special Commissioner to Tibet, in a keynote speech on "the fundamental policy of the central government for controlling Mongolia and Tibet," proposed that the central government should "first separate politics and religion in Tibet, and then various matters will have a clue," and then could follow the example of Mongolia in establishing autonomous organs such as councils or assemblies, "gradually leading the Tibetan people to break away from the rule of religious leaders."(12) This speech further demonstrated the ultimate goal of the National Government to implement an administrative system reform of separating politics and religion in Tibet.
However, in the early years of the Republic, the local government of Tibet positioned its relationship with the central government as a purely religious so-called "patron-priest relationship" [3], or "offering-receiving relationship", denying any political subordinate relationship, hoping thereby to exclude central intervention and preserve the system of unification of religion and politics. Against this backdrop, the local government of Tibet, headed by the 13th Dalai
Although the National Government prepared to implement political integration in Tibet based on the separation of religion and politics, due to the domestic situation at the time and the estrangement between the Tibet region and the central government, the necessary preconditions for promoting the separation of religion and politics were clearly lacking. Therefore, the National Government adopted a policy of appeasement and conciliation toward Tibet, temporarily acquiescing to Tibet's system of unification of religion and politics. In September 1929, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission recognized that "the political and religious powers and authority of the
After the establishment of the Nationalist Government, it was first occupied with eliminating the original warlord separatist forces and basically ended the chaotic situation of more than a decade of incessant internal strife and frequent government changes in China, but it then immediately fell into the quagmire of "suppressing the Communists." At that time, the Nationalist Government lacked the strength and leisure to attend to the border regions, yet it had a relatively clear understanding of the grave situation there. Chiang Kai-shek once pointed out that "China's border regions have problems in every aspect" and believed that "the methods for solving border problems, viewed from their focal points, are no more than two: one is the rigid application of power, and the other is the flexible policy of conciliation. If the state's strength is ample and there is leisure to attend to the borderlands, the first method can naturally be adopted, and everything would be no problem; but today, in the revolutionary period, our strength is insufficient, and to solve border problems, we can only resort to policy. If there is an appropriate policy, although border problems cannot be thoroughly solved, they can at least be prevented from worsening, making them easier to solve in the future." Under the circumstances at the time, Chiang believed that only a "laissez-faire policy of permitting border autonomy" could be adopted, "for if autonomy is permitted, the border peoples will delight in freedom, be accustomed to tradition, and there will still be room for conciliation and control."(17) The "flexible policy of conciliation" was clearly an inheritance of the basic principles used by many central dynasties before the Qing to handle border ethnic issues, a continuation of China's traditional border governance policy. The only difference was that Chiang believed that when strength was sufficient, a forceful and active strategy of integrating the border regions could be adopted. The principles for handling border issues articulated by Chiang Kai-shek profoundly reflected the Nationalist Government's inability to manage border issues such as Tibet in the early days of its establishment. However, this did not mean that the Nationalist Government abandoned its basic policy of reforming Tibet's theocratic system and implementing the separation of religion and politics. In essence, the Nationalist Government did not regard the theocratic system as the natural system for Tibet during the period of political tutelage. The "Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for the Period of Political Tutelage," which had the nature of a constitution and was promulgated on June 1, 1931, stipulated: "The local systems of Mongolia and Tibet shall be separately determined by law in accordance with local conditions."(18) This provision in fact left room for the Nationalist Government to change Tibet's theocratic system, and in a sense denied the legitimacy of that system. At the Western Frontier Conference in September 1932, the Nationalist Government clearly stated its intention to "improve the administrative system of Tibet" and expressed three expectations for Tibetan compatriots, among which it stated: "Tibet's political system should also be improved, so that Tibetan compatriots can lead a modern political and economic life. Its historically inherited fine culture should be preserved, but the theocratic or unreasonable politics and customs that hinder the progress of civilization have no possibility of existing today."(19) This "theocratic or unreasonable politics and customs" clearly referred to the social condition of Tibet's theocratic system and the supremacy of religion. The Nationalist Government believed that this condition hindered the progress of Tibetan society and therefore sought to "improve" Tibet's political and religious system, separating politics from religion and introducing elements of modern society into Tibet. Although this expectation did not explicitly state the intention to implement the separation of religion and politics in Tibet, it contained a value orientation toward changing the theocratic system. However, under the historical circumstances of the time, this policy orientation released by the Nationalist Government merely indicated the central government's basic attitude toward Tibet's original backward system and had no practical significance for Tibet itself, which was in a state of estrangement from the central government.
II
At the end of 1933, the 13th Dalai
On 28 August 1934, Huang Musong arrived in Lhasa. The Nationalist Government expected that this trip would politically seek to “restore the original subordinate relationship between the central government and Tibet”; “if there are any aspects of Tibet’s local political organization that are not yet proper, detailed measures for improvement should be discussed in accordance with central government decrees, taking local special circumstances into consideration.” (24) The so-called “Tibet’s local political organization” clearly refers to the local government structure under the system of unification of politics and religion. The Nationalist Government intended to “improve” Tibet’s political situation in accordance with central government decrees and Tibet’s local realities. However, no matter how the improvement was carried out or to what degree, it conflicted with the mentality of the Tibetan local government, which stubbornly adhered to the system of unification of politics and religion. The Tibetan local government, adhering to the positioning of a “patron-priest relationship,” refused to acknowledge any political subordinate relationship with the central government, thereby resisting the infiltration of central political influence and safeguarding the system of unification of politics and religion. On 6 October 1934, when Huang Musong asked Zemo Kalön [3] “what is Tibet’s political relationship with the central government,” the de facto power holder of Tibet, Zemo Kalön, replied: “Externally, we can use our entire strength, but internally, Tibetans very much wish to continue the patron-priest relationship and do not want people from the interior to seize Tibetans’ rights.” (25) Zemo’s words indicate that the Tibetan local government still harbored lingering fears about the modernizing reforms carried out under the principle of separation of politics and religion during the New Policies of the late Qing dynasty, which had transformed Tibet’s system of unification of politics and religion. They were very worried that the central government would dominate Tibet’s political and religious authority, and thus were highly alert to any political intervention by the central government. In a telegram to the Executive Yuan, Huang Musong regarded Zemo’s words as “advocating complete autonomy for Tibet.”
Shortly thereafter, Tibet convened a “popular assembly” and, in the form of a collective resolution, stated its basic attitude toward the central government: first, that the Five Races Under One Union [4] was unsuitable for Tibet’s political-religious system, indicating an inability to cooperate; second, that Tibet was an “independent state,” unwilling to accept central government interference, and that the central government could not establish offices or station troops in Tibet; third, that the relationship between the central government and Tibet was a “patron-priest relationship.” (26) The Tibetan local government clearly believed that the central government under the republican constitution adhered to the principle of separation of politics and religion and modern democratic ideas. Fearing that acknowledging a political subordinate relationship with the central government would endanger Tibet’s system of unification of politics and religion, it vigorously upheld the so-called “patron-priest relationship.” On 17 October, the Tibetan local government stated to Huang Musong that Tibet was a “Buddhist state,” and that “its path of implementation requires the execution of unification of politics and religion. Changing it to the laws and regulations of the Republic would cause great contradictions for both religion and politics.” (27) The Tibetan local government not only regarded itself as a “Buddhist state” but also opposed the unification of politics and religion to the republican system of the Republic of China, strongly emphasizing the irreconcilability between the two. Regarding this concern of the Tibetan local government, Huang Musong repeatedly stated that the Republic of China had no conflict with Tibet
On the eve of his departure from Tibet, Huang Musong, in accordance with the principle of "moderate autonomy," presented the central government's policy framework for Tibet to the local
After Huang Musong returned to Nanjing, he was promptly appointed Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. On October 2, 1935, in the "Instructions for the Special Commissioner Escorting the Panchen Lama Back to Tibet, Cheng Yun, on Entering Tibet," which he helped draft and which was promulgated by the Executive Yuan, it was clearly stated that "the National Government may, in accordance with the wishes of Tibetan officials and people, permit the maintenance of their inherent system of government and religion"; "the National Government, within the scope permitted by national law, respects Tibetan religion"; "the procedures for treating
Through the bloody struggle of the Chinese people during the War of Resistance against Japan, China’s international standing was greatly enhanced, ranking alongside Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as one of the four great powers. The National Government became more confident in handling frontier ethnic affairs. On May 21, 1945, the Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang adopted a declaration announcing that “Outer Mongolia and Tibet shall be granted a high degree of autonomy.” [3] A high degree of autonomy became an important policy of the National Government in handling the Tibet issue for a period after the war. On August 24, in a speech titled “Completing the Principle of Nationalism and Maintaining World Peace,” Chiang Kai-shek reiterated the resolution of the Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang and declared: “If the Tibetan people express their desire for autonomy at this time, our government will, in accordance with our sincere tradition, grant them a high degree of autonomy. If in the future they achieve the economic conditions for independence, the National Government will, following the precedent of Outer Mongolia, help them attain independent status.” [4] The National Government’s high-profile announcement of the “high degree of autonomy” policy at this time was clearly intended to ensure that, as the post-war wave of international nationalism began to emerge, Tibet would accept the central government’s policy of a high degree of autonomy, avoid taking the path of seeking secession, and thereby be incorporated into the constitutional framework of post-war China. In fact, as subsequent historical developments show, the “high degree of autonomy” policy announced through Chiang Kai-shek’s mouth was merely a gesture by the National Government, or rather a propaganda strategy. Given that Outer Mongolia had already seceded under the name of a “high degree of autonomy,” the National Government could not and would not allow Tibet to achieve “independent status” under the guise of a “high degree of autonomy.” Moreover, this “high degree of autonomy” gradually disappeared from the National Government’s policy platform, evolving into “local autonomy.”
In August 1945, the National Government convened the Mongolian and Tibetan Local Conference, which adopted the “Draft Plan for a High Degree of Autonomy for the Tibet Region.” In this draft, the National Government declared that “on the premise of maintaining the integrity of the national territory, the central government permits a high degree of autonomy for the Tibet region,” clearly stipulating the powers of the local
After the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, following Sun Yat-sen’s steps for founding the nation, the National Government began to implement constitutional government nationwide, and in December 1946 formulated the Constitution of the Republic of China. This constitution specially stipulated: “The system of autonomy of Tibet shall be guaranteed.” (41) What exactly this “system of autonomy” referred to was not explicitly defined in the constitution as the system of unification of religion and politics, which left room for maneuvering in changing Tibet’s system of unification of religion and politics during the process of implementing autonomy. At the constitutional revision conference, the Tibetan delegation submitted nine opinions to the central government, among which, taking Tibet as a “place where the Buddha’s Dharma is practiced,” they requested the central government to “permit all original political and religious powers of Tibet to continue to be managed
According to the spirit of the Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek’s speech on August 24, 1945, the National Government ordered the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission to be responsible for “conducting research on the system of Tibetan self-government and preparing the means to safeguard it.” [3] Regarding the system of theocracy implemented in Tibet, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission held: “It has its historical origins, geographical environment, and social background; it has evolved over a long time, and political customs are in harmony. The central government’s policy toward Tibet respects the people’s beliefs and customs, accommodates the local inherent political and religious form, and provides legal safeguards, in order to stabilize local order and enhance the well-being of the people.” [4] Starting from this premise, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission believed that the system of Tibetan self-government stipulated in the Constitution “naturally refers to the current theocratic system in Tibet,” but “the actual scope of this system and how its relationship with the central government should be clearly defined” remained to be studied. [5] However, if the theocratic system were determined to be the system of Tibetan self-government stipulated in the Constitution, then the central government would have to preserve Tibet’s original political form, which would obviously contradict the basic concepts of modern constitutional government and also conflict with the principle of separation of church and state in the previously promulgated “Postwar Plan for Political Facilities in Mongolia and Tibet.” Therefore, on October 26, 1948, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission again stated: “Whether the so-called system of Tibetan self-government refers to the current theocratic system in Tibet… remains to be studied.” [6] The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission was indecisive between maintaining Tibet’s theocratic system or incorporating Tibet into political integration according to constitutional concepts. This contradictory attitude actually reflected the National Government’s difficult mindset in handling the relationship between politics and religion in Tibet.
Regardless of how the National Government defined Tibet’s system of self-government, the local government of Tibet believed that the system that should be implemented in Tibet was its inherent theocratic system, and therefore maintained a high degree of vigilance against any intention to change the theocratic system. Especially after the Reting Incident in 1947, [7] what the local government of Tibet sought was no longer “high autonomy” but “independence and self-reliance,” and it attempted to demonstrate its stance to the international community through activities such as participating in the Asian Relations Conference and sending a trade delegation abroad, [8] thereby seeking to permanently maintain the already rigid and backward theocratic system. Toward the central government, the local government of Tibet also continuously expressed its attitude of upholding the theocratic system, stating that “Tibet is a land where the Buddha’s teachings flourish; please allow the original political and religious powers of Tibet to continue to be managed
The Nanjing National Government, inheriting Sun Yat-sen’s behest, hoped to implement modern constitutional governance throughout the country, and, in the form of promoting local self-government, introduce the concepts of democracy and republic into Tibet, transforming Tibet’s original political and religious conditions. It expected not only to reform Tibetan Buddhism itself, liberating people from blind religious faith and shaping their democratic consciousness, but also to use this to change Tibet’s long-standing system of unification of religion and state, break the political pattern in which politics and religion were fused and political and religious power was concentrated in the hands of a single person, and achieve political integration between Tibet and the interior, thereby resisting the aggression and infiltration of Tibet, Chinese territory, by external forces such as Britain. It should be said that this principle of the National Government reflected the historical necessity of modern China’s construction of a nation-state. However, the National Government lacked effective control over Tibet and was fundamentally unable to extend its rule there. Under these circumstances, implementing the principle of separation of religion and state to transform Tibet’s system of unification of religion and state clearly lacked the necessary conditions, so that the “flexible policy of conciliation and control” proposed by Chiang Kai-shek in 1934 became the main thread of the National Government’s governance of Tibet. Although the National Government was a republican government with a modern constitutional character, in governing the borderlands it never escaped the traditional mold of pacification and conciliation, and removing Tibet’s “special form” of administration and stripping away the traditional relationship between politics and religion in Tibet became the ideal goal of the National Government’s governance of Tibet.
However, the Tibetan local government, under the pretext of insisting that its relationship with the central government was only one of “patron and priest” or “donor and recipient,” resolutely rejected central government interference in the internal affairs of the Tibetan locality, thereby safeguarding the system of unification of religion and state. Religion held an unquestionably dominant position in the daily spiritual life of the Tibetan monk and lay populace and in the upper political structure; maintaining religion, that is, the system of unification of religion and state, became the fundamental purpose of the Tibetan local government. Mr. Liu Shengqi once pointed out that a considerable portion of the privileged class in Tibet suspected “whether the present central government would still come to maintain their religion,” and moreover, “what frightened them most was that once the central government’s power reached Tibet, whether the power of this special class would be completely eliminated. They did not clearly understand what a democratic republican system of government was, but they had personally seen that the sacred and inviolable Qing emperor had been reduced to a commoner, and all the once-glorious princes and high ministers had vanished without a trace. Then, once Tibet became the same as the interior, would they and everything they now had also vanish without a trace?” [3] Mr. Liu’s words should reveal the hidden anxieties deep in the hearts of the Tibetan monk and lay upper strata. Moreover, the
Historically, ever since the formation of the system of union of religion and state in Tibet, periods when separation of religion and state was implemented all occurred after forceful intervention by the central government. Whether to implement union of religion and state or separation of religion and state basically depended on the degree of forceful intervention by the central government. During the period of rule by the National Government, with domestic troubles and foreign invasions coming one after another, the central government had neither the time nor the strength to act as an intervening force to break this "stagnant" situation. To promote separation of religion and state in a society like Tibet, where conservative forces were quite powerful, it was necessary to rely on the strong support of the central government. This central government was not the central government of the late Qing dynasty, nor any of the successive Republican governments, but the New China founded in 1949. From the time the central government suppressed the rebellion in the Tibet region in 1959 to the formal establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965, Tibet truly achieved separation of religion and state, and the system of union of religion and state that had been in place for nearly seven hundred years truly became history.
(This article received careful guidance from my esteemed teacher, Mr. Zhou Weizhou. I hereby express my heartfelt gratitude!)
Notes:
① Han Dayuan, "On the Constitutional Value of the Principle of Separation of Religion and State," *Law Science*, No. 10, 2005.
② Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan, *The System of Union of Religion and State in Tibet*, November 1947, p. 6.
③ Shen Zonglian and Liu Shengqi, *Tibet and the Tibetans*, trans. Liu Xiaoqing, China Tibetology Publishing House, 2006, p. 126.
④ China Tibetology Research Center et al., eds., *Compilation of Archival Historical Materials on Relations between the Tibet Region and the Central Government since the Yuan Dynasty*, China Tibetology Publishing House, 1994, p. 1622.
⑤ See China Tibetology Research Center et al., eds., *Compilation of Archival Historical Materials on Relations between the Tibet Region and the Central Government since the Yuan Dynasty*, p. 2346.
⑥ See China Tibetology Research Center et al., eds., *Compilation of Archival Historical Materials on Relations between the Tibet Region and the Central Government since the Yuan Dynasty*, p. 2359.
⑦ For details, see the "Constitution of the Republic of China" (promulgated October 10, 1923), in Xu Zhengguang, ed., *Compilation of Important Policies on Mongolia and Tibet since the Republic of China*, published by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 2001, p. 10.
⑧ Second Historical Archives of China, ed., *Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China*, Series 5, Volume 1, Politics (2), Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House, 1994, pp. 84-85.
⑨ See "Program of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the National Government for the Period of Political Tutelage (February 23, 1929)," Archives of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the National Government, 141/95, held in the Second Historical Archives of China.
⑩ "Explanatory Notes" attached to the "Annual Schedule of Political Tutelage Work of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission during the Period of Political Tutelage," July 1929, held in the Archives of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
(11) See "Explanatory Notes" attached to the "Annual Schedule of Political Tutelage Work of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission during the Period of Political Tutelage," July 1929, held in the Archives of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
(12) See *The Premier's Bequeathed Instructions on Mongolia and Tibet and the National Government's Laws and Decrees on Mongolia and Tibet*, compiled and printed by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 1934, p. 310.
(13) Zhu Shaoyi, *A Record of What I Saw and Heard in Lhasa*, Commercial Press, 1947, p. 28.
(14) China Tibetology Research Center et al., eds., *Compilation of Archival Historical Materials on Relations between the Tibet Region and the Central Government since the Yuan Dynasty*, pp. 2584-2585.
(15) China Tibetology Research Center et al., eds., *Compilation of Archival Historical Materials on Relations between the Tibet Region and the Central Government since the Yuan Dynasty*, pp. 2477-2478.
(16) China Tibetology Research Center et al., eds., *Compilation of Archival Historical Materials on Relations between the Tibet Region and the Central Government since the Yuan Dynasty*, p. 2518.
(17) Chiang Kai-shek, "China's Border Issues" (March 7, 1934), in Qin Xiaoyi, ed., *Complete Collection of President Chiang Kai-shek's Thought and Speeches*, Vol. 12, published by the Central Cultural Supplies Agency, 1984, pp. 105-108.
(18) "Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China during the Period of Political Tutelage," in Xu Zhengguang, ed., *Compilation of Important Policies on Mongolia and Tibet since the Republic of China*, p. 19.
(19) Huang Fensheng, *New Gazetteer of Mongolia and Tibet*, Zhonghua Book Company, 1938, p. 430.
(20) This refers to Outer Mongolia, under the influence of the Soviet Union, implementing separation of religion and state, prohibiting the reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, confiscating monastery property, forcibly ordering lamas to return to lay life, and causing great destruction to Tibetan Buddhism.
(21) Compiled by the China Tibetology Research Center et al., *Collection of Archival Historical Materials on the Relationship between the Central Government and Local Tibet since the Yuan Dynasty*, p. 2585.
(22)(23) [US] Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State*, trans. Du Yongbin, China Tibetology Publishing House, 2005, p. 168.
(24) Kong Qingzong, “A Record of Huang Musong’s Entry into Tibet,” *Selected Historical Materials on Tibet*, Vol. 5, p. 78.
(25) Jointly compiled by the China Tibetology Research Center and the Second Historical Archives of China, *Selected Archives on the Funeral and Memorial of the
(26) See China Tibetology Research Center and Second Historical Archives of China, eds., *Selected Archives on the Funeral Ceremonies for the Thirteenth
(27) Compiled by the China Tibetology Research Center and the Second Historical Archives of China: *Selected Archives on the Funeral and Memorial Ceremonies
原文
20世纪初,中华民国开始实行宪政制度,而此时中国的边疆地区还存在着许多与这一原则不相符合的政治制度,西藏政教合一制度就是其中最为突出的一种。目前学术界对这一制度有很多研究成果,但关于该制度在20世纪初以后的演变,尤其是国民政府以政治统合为目标、奉行政教分离原则对此制度的改造尝试,则是学术界研究的空白点。本文尝试对国民政府根据政教分离的基本精神,企图对西藏的政教合一制度进行改造的过程予以总体考察,并以此展示民主改革前西藏社会的政教状况。
一
所谓政教分离,是世俗国家的一般原则与政治道德基础,其意义在于禁止把某一特定宗教定为国教,国家与宗教之间保持各自的准则与领域,禁止“宗教的政治化”与“政治的宗教化”。①所谓政教合一,是指政教合一制度而言。西藏的政教合一制萌芽于元代萨迦地方政权时期,在1751年正式形成了格鲁派的政教合一制,西藏地方的政教大权基本上集中于达赖喇嘛手中,西藏地方政府的官吏均是僧俗并用,而且僧官地位较同等之俗官为高。“贵族虽掌握政治之实权,然其行为绝不能逾越宗教之轨范,宗教之权力实超越于政治,政治不过为宗教阐教宏法之工具而已。”②正如民国时期在藏工作多年的柳陞祺先生所言,西藏是“一块由神组成,被神统治,为神服务的土地。寺庙的权力是至高无上的”。③清朝前期,这一制度在维护西藏地方稳定、巩固边防等方面曾发挥过积极作用。但是近代以来,随着中国边疆危机的日益严重,如何巩固边疆,加强对边疆地区的有效控制,实现内地与边疆地区的政治一体化,成为清末以来历届中央政府关注的主要问题。1904年英军入侵西藏后,清朝开始改变“因俗而治”的统治原则,曾拟在西藏推行以政教分离为主要内容的近代化改革,将达赖、班禅尊为藏中教主,辖理教权,分其世俗权力于驻藏大臣。正所谓“不必遽改西藏之地为行省,而不可不以治行省之道而治之”,④进而实现西藏与内地的政治一体化。这严重损害了西藏的政教合一制,遭到西藏地方僧俗上层的强烈反对。随着辛亥革命的爆发,清朝在西藏推行政教分离的设想也以失败告终。
民国政府成立之初在“五族共和”的旗帜下,继续清朝的政治一体化政策。1912年4月22日,袁世凯宣布:今后民国政府不再以藩属对待蒙藏,“蒙藏回疆各处,自应统筹规划,以谋内政之统一,而冀民族之大同”。为此,“民国政府于理藩不设专部,原系视蒙、藏、回疆与内地各省平等,将来各该地方一切政治,俱属内务行政范围”,将原理藩院所辖事务交归内务部辖理。但在地方制度未经划一规定以前,“蒙藏回疆”应办事宜,均仍照旧例办理。⑤袁世凯将西藏等地与内地等同视之,谋求“划一”蒙藏地方制度,以期达到“内政之统一”和“民族之大同”的理想境界。1913年2月,民国政府在致十三世达赖喇嘛的治藏“实策”中,提出“恢复佛爷封号,仍为释教宗主”,认可达赖在宗教上的崇高地位,而拟派员赴藏商谈“应兴应革之善后”则透露出民国政府并无意永远保留西藏旧有的政教制度,⑥并为此设立蒙藏事务局(后改成蒙藏院)对其进行“规划设治”,甚至1923年将在西藏等地推行省县制明文载入国家的根本大法——《中华民国宪法》。⑦这表明,民国政府推行西藏行政制度改革的终极目标是等同内地的省制,即“内政之统一”;同时还表明即便是军阀混战不断的民国政府,也在追求西藏与内地的政治一体化。其后成立的南京国民政府谋求将三民主义推行于全国,完成政治、经济和文化的一体化,建成中华民族的民族国家,并以此作为施政的主要目标。1929年3月,国民党在决议案中宣布将在西藏等边疆地区实行三民主义,虽然西藏等地“人民之方言习俗,与他省不同,在国家行政上,稍呈特殊之形式,然在历史上地理上及国民经济上则固同为中华民族之一部”。国民党承诺:“诚以扶植各民族经济、政治、教育之发达,务期同进于文明进步之域,造成自由统一的中华民国”。⑧这份关于“蒙藏与新疆”的政治决议案认识到了西藏与内地的不同之处,所谓国家行政上的“特殊之形式”,显然是指西藏的政教合一制度;该决议强调要在西藏推行三民主义,发展西藏的政治、经济及教育事业,进而实现西藏与内地的一体化,“同进于文明进步之域”。该决议案揭示了国民政府对西藏的政教合一制进行改造的基本意图。
这种意图更加明显地体现在国民政府主管蒙藏等边疆事务的中央机构蒙藏委员会的施政纲领中。1929年2月23日,蒙藏委员会在其训政时期施政纲领中筹划“革新蒙藏旧行政制度”,同时“保护喇嘛庙产”和“优待宗教领袖”。⑨在这份纲领中,蒙藏委员会显然秉承政教分离的原则,不仅将政治与宗教分开予以规定,而且明确提出对西藏的旧行政制度(即政教合一制)进行革新。在蒙藏委员会看来,“蒙藏行政制度,官署组织,另成系统,沿习至今,已不相宜。本会对于蒙藏一切设施,自应尽力,推行训政,除旧布新”。⑩为此,在《训政工作分配年表》中,蒙藏委员会进一步制定了对蒙藏实施政教分离的六年计划(1930-1935),即第一期(1930年底止):一调查蒙藏原有行政系统;二调查行政权与宗教权之状况;三宣传革新蒙藏行政制度。第二期(1931年底止):一釐定行政新系统,二划分行政权与宗教权。第三期(1932年底止):一实行改定行政机关之名称,二实行政教分治。第四期(1933年底止):一视察革新后之行政状况。第五期(1934年底止)按全体计划分别进行。第六期(1935年底止)继续第五期的工作。(11)“政教分治”或者政教分离原则在此得以明确体现。1929年6月,蒙藏委员会委员、后任驻藏专使行辕负责人的刘朴忱在“中央统制蒙藏的根本政策”的主题演讲中,提出中央对西藏“先要政教分离,然后各事才有头绪”,然后可以仿照蒙古设立参事会或参议会等自治机关,“逐渐的领导西藏人脱离宗教首领的统治”。(12)此演讲更是表明了国民政府将在西藏推行政教分离行政制度改革的最终目标。
然而,民初西藏地方政府将其与中央之间的关系定位于纯粹宗教意义上的所谓“檀越关系”,或称为“供施关系”,否认存在政治上的从属关系,希望以此排除中央的干预,维护政教合一制度。在此背景下,以十三世达赖喇嘛为首的西藏地方政府自1913年开始对该制度进行“缝缝补补”式的近代化改革,谋求增强西藏抵制外来干涉的实力。但是借助改革而实力增强的军事集团企图发动政变,剥夺达赖喇嘛的世俗政权,只保留其宗教统治权。这一未遂政变使达赖喇嘛认识到近代化的结果很可能会直接损害政教合一制的存在和发展,加之寺院集团保守势力的反对,促使其逐渐中止了近代化改革。此外,在改革中,达赖喇嘛还谋求强化对西藏各地的控制,迫使九世班禅出走内地,这样就出现了西藏的政教大权在历史上首次基本排除了中央政府的政治干预和班禅的分治,而集中到达赖喇嘛一人的手中,“造成第五辈达赖以后教主权力最盛之时期”。(13)达赖喇嘛在《告全藏官民书》中也总结说:他“孜孜不懈,竭尽能力,谋教政之巩固与发展民众之福利,迄今廿余年来,教政昌兴”。(14)“教政昌兴”是达赖喇嘛孜孜以求的目标,应该说西藏的政教合一制度在他统治时期得到了巩固和加强。从整个历史发展视域来看,这一时期政教合一制度呈现出“回光返照”式的繁荣景象。这也就是南京国民政府成立时所面对的西藏政教合一制度的状况。
尽管国民政府准备在西藏推行以政教分离为基础的政治统合,但是由于当时的国内形势以及西藏地方与中央的隔阂状况,推行政教分离显然缺乏必要的先决条件。因此,国民政府对西藏采取了怀柔、羁縻的放任政策,暂时默认了西藏的政教合一制度。1929年9月,蒙藏委员会承认“达赖、班禅在西藏之政教权限一切如前”,“中央以达赖、班禅为西藏政教之首领”。(15)次年7月30日,国民政府再次重申“达赖、班禅在西藏政教上之权利概仍其旧”。(16)在这些政策中,国民政府均未正面提及西藏政教合一制,仅以承认达赖、班禅政教权限“一切如前”、“概仍其旧”的字眼,暂时尊重和默认了西藏在行政上的“特殊之形式”,冀图在维持西藏政教合一的前提下,向西藏地方政府释出善意,怀柔和笼络西藏上层,逐渐消除中央与西藏地方之间的隔阂,进而谋求恢复中央对西藏的有效治权。缘何采取此种策略,这与国民政府成立之初所面临的形势密不可分。
国民政府成立后,先是忙于消灭原有的军阀割据势力,并基本上结束了中国十余年来内乱不断、政府更迭频繁的混乱局面,但紧接着便陷入了“剿共”的泥潭。此时,国民政府尚无实力和余暇顾及边疆地区,但是对边疆的严峻形势有着较为清醒的认识。蒋介石曾指出“中国之边疆各方面皆有问题”,认为“解决边疆问题之方法,就其侧重之点观察,不外两种:一即刚性的实力之运用,一即柔性的政策之羁縻。如果国家实力充备,有暇顾及边陲,当然可以采用第一种手段,一切皆不成问题;但吾人今当革命时期,实力不够,欲解决边疆问题,只能讲究政策,如有适当之政策,边疆问题虽不能彻底解决亦可免其更加恶化,将来易于解决”。在当时形势下,蒋介石认为只能采取“允许边疆自治之放任政策”,“放任自治,则边民乐于自由,习于传统,犹有羁縻笼络之余地”。(17)“柔性的政策之羁縻”显然是继承了清以前诸多中央王朝处理边疆民族问题的基本方针,是对中国传统治边政策的沿用。唯一不同之处在于,蒋介石认为当具备实力之后,则可以采取强硬的统合边疆的积极策略。蒋介石所阐述的边疆问题处理原则深刻反映了国民政府成立之初在处理西藏等边疆问题上的力不从心。但这并不意味着国民政府放弃了革新西藏政教制度、实施政教分离的基本政策。从本质上来说,国民政府并不认为政教合一制为训政时期西藏的当然制度。1931年6月1日具有宪法性质的《中华民国训政时期约法》规定:“蒙古、西藏之地方制度,就地方情形,另以法律定之”。(18)这一规定实际上为国民政府改变西藏的政教合一制留下了回旋余地,在某种意义上否认了政教合一制之合法性。在1932年9月的西防会议上,国民政府明确表示要“改善西藏行政制度”,并表达对西藏同胞的三点期望,其中提到:“西藏政制,亦应加以改善,使藏地同胞,得营其现代政治、经济之生活。其历史上,遗留之优美文化,固应保存,而其为碍文明进步之神权的或不合理的政治与习尚,在今日实无存在之可能云云。”(19)此“神权的或不合理的政治与习尚”显然是指西藏政教合一、宗教至上的社会状况。国民政府认为这一状况阻碍了西藏社会的进步,因而应对西藏的政教制度加以“改善”,将政治与宗教剥离,将现代社会的因素引入西藏。这一期望虽未明确表示要在西藏推行政教分离,但其中所蕴含的却是改变政教合一状况的价值取向。然而在当时的历史情景下,国民政府所释放出来的这一政策取向仅仅表明中央对西藏原有落后制度的基本态度,对与中央处于隔膜状态的西藏本身不具有任何实际意义。
二
1933年底,十三世达赖喇嘛圆寂。国民政府派遣参谋本部次长黄慕松前往拉萨册封和致祭达赖喇嘛,并趁便解决中央与西藏地方之间的关系问题。在其到达前夕,西藏地方政府刚刚挫败了可能危害政教合一制度的龙厦的改革尝试。西藏的保守势力如同惊弓之鸟一样对改变政教合一制的任何企图均保持着高度警惕。达赖喇嘛生前曾极为担忧西藏的政教事业,为西藏前途“不寒而栗”,认为当时在外蒙古发生的事情(20)“难保不在西藏发生”,如果那样,“吾藏隆盛之教业、寺院及民众均必破坏无遗,即贵族世家,亦将作为奴隶,吾数千年以来西藏之正统,将成为历史上之名词。思念及此,真令人无限危惧”。因此,达赖提出西藏要谋“教政之巩固发展”和“全藏之消灾祈福”。(21)达赖喇嘛显然已经认识到了政教合一制在当时历史环境下所面临的危险和挑战。在其圆寂后,西藏地方政府的首要职责是“使西藏的完整像达赖喇嘛圆寂之前那样得到维护”。(22)正如梅•戈尔斯坦所言:“黄慕松入藏使拉萨当局既抱着希望又感到不安”。(23)这句话颇能说明西藏失去政教重心后当权者的矛盾心态。
1934年8月28日黄慕松到达拉萨。国民政府期望黄此行在政治方面谋求“恢复中央与西藏原有之统属关系”;“西藏地方政治组织如有未臻妥善之处,应依据中央法令,参酌当地特殊情形,详议改善办法”。(24)所谓的“西藏地方政治组织”显然是指政教合一制下的地方政府架构。国民政府拟根据中央法令和西藏地方实际,对西藏的政治状况进行“改善”。然而,无论如何改善,改善的程度如何,均是与西藏地方政府所抱持的固守政教合一制的心态相冲突。西藏地方政府秉承着“檀越关系”的定位,拒绝承认其与中央之间存在政治从属关系,以此抵制中央政治影响的渗入,借以维护政教合一制。1934年10月6日,当黄慕松询问泽墨噶伦“西藏对于中央之政治关系如何”时,西藏的实权人物泽墨噶伦回答说:“对外可用整个力量,但内部则藏人甚愿继续檀越关系,而不愿内地人侵夺藏人之权”。(25)泽墨此言说明,西藏地方政府对清末新政时奉行政教分离原则对西藏政教合一制进行的近代化改造仍心有余悸,很担心中央主导西藏地方的政教大权,因而对中央政府的任何政治介入均十分警觉。黄慕松在致行政院的电文中,认为泽墨此言是“主张西藏完全自治”。
此后不久,西藏召开“民众大会”,并以集体决议的形式表明对中央的基本态度:一是以五族共和不适合西藏政教制度,表示不能合作;二是西藏为“自主之国”,不愿中央政府干涉,中央政府不能在西藏设官驻兵;三是中央政府与西藏为“檀越关系”。(26)西藏地方政府显然认为共和宪制下的中央政府奉行的是政教分离原则和近代民主理念,担心在承认对中央的政治从属关系后,会危及西藏的政教合一制,因而极力秉持所谓的“檀越关系”。10月17日,西藏地方政府向黄慕松表示,西藏是“佛教国家”,“其施行途径,须有政教合一之执行。改变为民国之法规,于教于政,均有极大方悖之处”。(27)西藏地方政府不仅以“佛国”自居,而且将政教合一与民国共和制度对立,极力强调二者之间的不可调和性。对于西藏地方政府的这种忧虑,黄慕松多次表示中华民国与西藏政教制度之无抵触,且中央将许西藏以“适当之自治权”,并一再声明“中央并无改西藏政制为民主制度之意”,(28)希望打消西藏地方政府的疑虑,但并未成功。
在离藏前夕,黄慕松按照“适度之自治”原则,将中央对西藏的政策框架交给西藏地方政府。其中,对于西藏政教制度,黄慕松声明:一是共同尊崇佛教,予以维护及发扬;二是保持西藏原有政治制度,可许西藏“自治”,于西藏“自治”权限范围内之行政,中央可勿干预。(29)黄慕松将尊崇佛教与保持西藏原有政治制度分开叙述,避免直接触及政教合一制,同时承诺给予“适度之自治”,但中央将收回的某些权力,如外交、国防、交通、重要官员任命,及派遣大员常川驻藏。由于这将损害西藏政教权力高度集中的政教合一制度,所以受到西藏地方当局反对也就不足为怪了。因此,直至黄慕松离藏,西藏地方当局依然坚持“汉藏平等檀越关系”、“不得改变西藏政教制度”,(30)“政府须答应不将西藏改为行省”(31)等基调。在是维持旧有的政教合一制,还是依照中央法令改善西藏政教制度的问题上,黄慕松与西藏地方当局发生了正面的交锋,各抒己见,但难以调和。
黄慕松返回南京后,随即被任命为蒙藏委员会委员长。1935年10月2日在其参与制定的、由行政院颁布的《特派护送班禅大师回藏专使诚允入藏训条》中,明确提出“国民政府得依西藏官民之愿望,允许维持其固有之政教制度”;“国民政府在国法之允许范围内,尊崇西藏宗教”;“达赖、班禅之待遇程序及在西藏政教上之职权,概仍旧制”。(32)与此前黄慕松入藏时国民政府所颁布的指令相比,“详议改善”西藏地方政治组织办法的立场不见了踪影,而是宣布尊崇西藏佛教,并有条件地承认了西藏固有的政教制度之合法性。抗日战争全面爆发后,国民政府更是无暇处理西藏问题,对其政教制度更加明确地表示“准其依照旧时佛法规范治理,绝不轻以新时代政制、政理变更其固有之政治机构与社会组织”。(33)这从侧面也说明,国民政府一直持有企图按照现代社会的组织架构对西藏的政教制度进行变革的意向,其中自然含有政教分离的基本精神。
从黄慕松与西藏地方政府的交涉情况看,西藏地方政府对国民政府中央存在很深的疑忌和误会。因此,国民政府在秉持“中央对藏固有之权,决不放弃”(34)的前提下,将“收拾人心,树立信用”作为抗战时期对藏工作的基本意旨。对此,蒙藏委员会委员长吴忠信在检讨国民政府对藏政策时曾指出:“西藏政教、语文及风俗习惯,与内地不同,故应付之法,亦应因其性习而施之。大抵初在勿触其忌,勿启其疑,施之以恩,示之以信,晓之以利害,而后在维护其政教之原则下,徐导其协作,进而使其服从。”(35)国民政府的这种小心翼翼的治藏策略体现在吴忠信的“奉使入藏谈话要旨”中。此要旨仅要求吴忠信坚持“西藏为中国领土之一部,但中央不将西藏划为省区,可按照特种地方自治,允许西藏维持其政教制度”。在具体的内容方面,除坚持设置驻藏办事大员外,交通、国防、外交及重要官吏的任命权等或者没有提及,或者措辞更加谨慎。(36)这与黄慕松入藏时国民政府的指示及给予西藏的“适度之自治”相比,在立场上更加灵活。似乎可以认为,国民政府在抗战的特殊时期,更加注重对西藏施以“柔性的政策之羁縻”。而抗战胜利后,这种态度发生了较为明显的改变。
三
通过抗日战争期间中国人民的浴血奋战,中国在国际上的地位也随之有了很大的提升,与英、美、苏并列为世界四大强国,国民政府在处理边疆民族事务方面也更加自信。1945年5月21日,国民党第六次全国代表大会通过宣言,宣布“赋予外蒙、西藏以高度自治之权”。(37)高度自治成为战后一段时期内国民政府处理西藏问题的重要政策。8月24日,在《完成民族主义维护世界和平》的演讲中,蒋介石再次重申国民党“六大”决议,并宣布:“如果藏人此时表达自治的愿望,我们政府将遵照我们真挚的传统,赋予其高度自治。如果未来他们实现了可以独立的经济条件,国民政府按外蒙古例将帮助其获得独立地位。”(38)国民政府此时高调宣布“高度自治”政策,显然是希望在战后国际民族主义浪潮开始出现之际,西藏能够接受中央的高度自治政策,避免走向谋求分裂之路,进而将其纳入战后中国的宪制轨道。实际上,从此后的历史发展来看,通过蒋介石之口宣布的“高度自治”政策仅仅是国民政府的一种姿态,或者说是一种宣传策略。鉴于外蒙古已以“高度自治”为名分裂出去,国民政府不可能也不会允许西藏借“高度自治”实现“独立之地位”,而且这种“高度自治”最终渐渐消失于国民政府的政策纲领中,演变为“地方自治”。
1945年8月,国民政府召开蒙藏地方会议,会议通过了《西藏地方高度自治方案草案》。在此草案中,国民政府宣称“在国家领土完整之前提下中央允许西藏地方高度自治”,明确规定西藏地方政府的权限,充实西藏原有的“人民大会”为地方议会,西藏国防、外交权收归中央,官员的任命比照内地由中央简任或荐任,对西藏人民的信仰习俗予以保护,西藏宗教领袖的转世事宜由中央依照旧例办理,等等。(39)在冠以“高度自治”之名的该草案中,国民政府实际上已经将一直谋求推行的地方自治的内容嵌入其中,而使所谓的“高度自治”沦为更具普遍意义上的“地方自治”。该草案不仅没有提及政教合一制,而且类似“政教制度”这种将政治与宗教相提并论的语句也不见踪影。可以说,国民政府在此已经基本否定了政教合一制在新时期的合法性地位。同年9月,国民政府颁布了《战后蒙藏政治设施方案》,其中将西藏划为“特别自治区”,并依照政教分离原则,进一步表明改变西藏政教合一制度的立场:“中央对于西藏特别自治区之宗教发展,取绝对放任主义,惟宗教与政治应以分治为原则,宗教领袖及各寺院,不得干涉政治及司法”。(40)国民政府在此进一步对西藏地方的政教合一制表明中央的基本态度,即对西藏的政治和宗教实施政教分离或者政教分治。可以说,上述方案的出台在某种意义上表明国民政府已经基本放弃了“高度自治”的政策,而开始考虑在西藏推行既与内地地方自治类似而又具有一定西藏地方特点的制度。
抗战胜利后,按照孙中山的建国步骤,国民政府开始在全国推行宪政,并于1946年12月制定了《中华民国宪法》。该宪法特别规定:“西藏自治制度,应予以保障。”(41)这种“自治制度”到底指什么,宪法并未明确规定是指政教合一制,这就为在推行自治过程中改变西藏的政教合一制留下了回旋余地。在修宪会议上,西藏代表团向中央提交了九条意见,其中以西藏为“行佛法之地”,要求中央“对西藏原有政教各权,准照旧由西藏达赖佛管理”。就此,国民政府承诺:“关于西藏政教一切旧有成规,中央历来尽力维护,绝无意加以变更,西藏达赖喇嘛之教权自应照旧维护,俾臻隆盛。”(42)国民政府一方面承诺绝无意变更西藏的政教成规,但一方面又仅仅表态照旧维护达赖之教权,而对其所拥有的世俗权力则避而不谈,这难免有点自相矛盾。国民政府如此表态,恰恰表明其内心仍然希望在西藏推行政教分离,之所以承诺不改变西藏政教旧有成规,仅仅是为了将西藏纳入中央宪制轨道的应付之辞。
根据国民党“六大”及蒋介石1945年8月24日的讲话精神,国民政府命令蒙藏委员会负责“从事西藏自治制度之研究工作,并准备所以保障之道”。(43)对于西藏实行的政教合一制,蒙藏委员会认为:“盖有其历史渊源、地理环境及社会背景,推演已久,政俗相安,中央对藏政策在尊重人民之信仰及习俗,因应地方固有之政教形态而予以合法保障,以求安定地方之秩序,及增进人民之福祉。”(44)由此出发,蒙藏委员会认为宪法所规定的西藏自治制度“自系指西藏现行政教合一制而言”,只是“此种制度实际之范畴以及与中央政府之关系应如何明确规定”则尚待研究。(45)但是,如果确定政教合一制即为宪法所规定的西藏自治制度,则中央政府就须保持西藏的政治原貌,这显然有悖于近代宪政的基本理念,与先前颁布的《战后蒙藏政治设施方案》中的政教分离原则也是相矛盾的。因此,1948年10月26日,蒙藏委员会又认为:“所谓西藏自治制度是否指西藏现行之政教合一制而言……则尚待研究。”(46)蒙藏委员会在维持西藏的政教合一制,还是按照宪政理念将西藏纳入政治一体化之间举棋不定。这种矛盾态度其实反映了国民政府在如何处理西藏政治与宗教关系上的艰难心态。
无论国民政府如何认定西藏的自治制度,西藏地方政府认为西藏的应行制度就是其固有的政教合一制,因而对任何改变政教合一制的意图均保持着高度的警觉。尤其是1947年热振事件后,西藏地方政府谋求的已经不再是“高度自治”,而是“自立自主”,并通过参加泛亚洲会议、派遣商务代表团出访等活动向国际社会表明其立场,企图以此永远维持已经僵化落后的政教合一制。相对中央,西藏地方政府也不断表明其维护政教合一制的态度,称“西藏系盛行佛法之地,请中央对西藏原有政教各权准照旧由西藏达赖佛管理”;(47)“西藏乃政教政力自主自遵之圣地佛国”,(48)“西藏乃佛法圣地自治自主之国”。(49)对于这些言论,蒙藏委员会承认西藏在历史上曾存在过特殊的政教制度,但强调在西藏应推行地方自治,并反对西藏以“佛法圣地”自称为“国”的主张。(50)随着国共战争中国民党军在战场上的颓势日现,国民政府有心但无力改变西藏的政教合一状况。1949年7月8日的“驱汉”事件标志着国民政府作为中央政府处理西藏事务的终结。
四
南京国民政府秉承孙中山遗教,希望将近代宪政思维推行于全国,并以推行地方自治的形式,将民主与共和的理念引入西藏,改造西藏原有的政治和宗教状况,期望不仅对藏传佛教本身进行改造,解脱人们对宗教的盲目崇信,塑造其民主观念,而且还要借此改变西藏长期存在的政教合一制度,打破政治和宗教融为一体、政教权力集中于一人之手的政治格局,实现西藏与内地的政治一体化,从而抵御英国等外来势力对中国领土西藏的侵略和渗透。应该说,国民政府的此项原则反映了近代中国构建民族国家的历史必然。然而,国民政府对西藏缺乏有效的控制,根本无力将其统治延伸到西藏。在这种情况下,按政教分离原则对西藏的政教合一制进行改造显然缺乏必要条件,致使蒋介石在1934年提出的“柔性的政策之羁縻”成为国民政府治理西藏的主要脉络。国民政府虽然是具有近代宪制性质的共和政府,但是在治边方面从未摆脱传统怀柔、羁縻的窠臼,祛除西藏行政上的“特殊之形式”、剥离西藏政治与宗教的传统关系,成为国民政府治藏的理想目标。
然而,西藏地方政府在坚持其与中央只有“供施关系”或“檀越关系”的幌子下,坚决排斥中央插手西藏地方的内部事务,借以维护政教合一制度。宗教在西藏僧俗各界民众的日常精神生活、上层政治建筑中有着不容置疑的优势地位,维护宗教也即是政教合一制成为西藏地方政府的根本宗旨。柳陞祺先生曾指出,在西藏的特权阶级中,相当大一部分人怀疑“现在的中央是否还会来维持他们的宗教”,而且“最使他们感到恐惧的一点,是中央的势力一旦到达西藏之后,他们这特殊阶级的权力是否将被全部消灭。他们不甚明了所谓民主共和的政体是怎么回事,但他们却亲见神圣不可侵犯的清朝皇帝已被夷为平民,所有煊赫一时的王公大臣已销声匿迹,而不知所往。那么等到西藏与内地一般化了之后,是否他们和他们现在的一切亦将随之而不知所往了呢?”(51)柳先生的这段话应该道出了隐藏在西藏僧俗上层内心深处的担忧。加之,十三世达赖喇嘛生前曾叮嘱西藏官民要力谋“教政之巩固发展”,而这实际上成为后十三世达赖时代西藏地方政府所追求的中心任务。奉行民主共和的中央是否会像苏联对外蒙古的影响一样,毁灭西藏的政教合一制度,剥夺贵族和寺院的特权呢?应该说,此疑问常常萦绕在这一时期西藏僧俗上层的头脑之中挥之不去。除此之外,当时的西藏社会也缺乏改变时状的内在动力。“在这块佛光普照的大地上,世俗社会是为宗教社会而存在的,不能本末倒置。”(52)在佛教轮回、因果观念的深刻影响下,人们“咸认今世所身受者,为前世所行之果,而今世所行者又为来世所受之因,以是各阶级之人对于其本身所属之阶级咸视为命定,而能上下相安,无所怨尤”。(53)在这种情势下,实施政教分离、改变政教合一制度,没有外部中央政府力量的介入是很难实现的。简而言之,西藏政教合一制下的封建农奴制社会缺乏自我革新的力量源泉。
从历史上看,自西藏政教合一制度形成后,凡实行政教分离的时期,均是中央政府强力介入后出现的。是实行政教合一,还是实行政教分离,基本取决于中央政府的实力介入程度。国民政府统治时期,内忧外患不断,作为中央政府,无暇也无力充当打破这种“一潭死水”局面的介入力量。要想在西藏这个保守势力相当强大的社会推行政教分离,需要依靠中央政府的强力支持,这个中央政府不是清末中央政府,也不是历届民国政府,而是1949年成立的新中国。自1959年中央政府平定西藏地方的叛乱开始,到1965年西藏自治区正式成立,西藏真正实现了政教分离,实行了近七百年的政教合一制度才真正成为历史。
(本文经过恩师周伟洲先生的悉心指导,在此表示衷心感谢!)
注释:
①韩大元:《试论政教分离原则的宪法价值》,《法学》2005年第10期。
②行政院新闻局:《西藏的政教合一制》,1947年11月,第6页。
③沈宗濂、柳陞祺著,柳晓青译:《西藏与西藏人》,中国藏学出版社2006年版,第126页。
④中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,中国藏学出版社1994年版,第1622页。
⑤参见中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第2346页。
⑥参见中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第2359页。
⑦详情参见《中华民国宪法》(1923年10月10日公布),徐正光主编:《民国以来蒙藏重要政策汇编》,“蒙藏委员会”2001年发行,第10页。
⑧中国第二历史档案馆编:《中华民国史档案资料汇编》,第五辑第一编政治(二),江苏古籍出版社1994年版,第84-85页。
⑨参见《国民政府蒙藏委员会训政时期施政纲领(1929年2月23日)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/95,中国第二历史档案馆藏。
⑩《训政时期蒙藏委员会训政工作分配年表》所附“说明书”,1929年7月,西藏自治区档案馆藏。
(11)参见《训政时期蒙藏委员会训政工作分配年表》所附“说明书”,1929年7月,西藏自治区档案馆藏。
(12)参见《总理对于蒙藏之遗训及国民政府对于蒙藏之法令》,蒙藏委员会1934年编印,第310页。
(13)朱少逸:《拉萨见闻记》,商务印书馆1947年版,第28页。
(14)中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第2584-2585页。
(15)中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第2477-2478页。
(16)中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第2518页。
(17)蒋介石:《中国之边疆问题》(1934年3月7日),秦孝仪主编:《先总统蒋公思想言论总集》卷12,“中央文物供应社”1984年版,第105-108页。
(18)《中华民国训政时期约法》,徐正光主编:《民国以来蒙藏重要政策汇编》,第19页。
(19)黄奋生:《蒙藏新志》,中华书局1938年版,第430页。
(20)指外蒙古在苏联的影响下,实行政教分离,禁止哲布尊丹巴呼图克图转世,没收寺院财产,强令喇嘛还俗,对藏传佛教造成极大破坏。
(21)中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第2585页。
(22)(23)[美]梅•戈尔斯坦著、杜永彬译:《喇嘛王国的覆灭》,中国藏学出版社2005年版,第168页。
(24)孔庆宗:《黄慕松入藏纪实》,《西藏文史资料选辑》第五辑,第78页。
(25)中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《十三世达赖圆寂致祭和十四世达赖转世坐床档案选编》,中国藏学出版社1991年版,第80页。
(26)参见中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《十三世达赖圆寂致祭和十四世达赖转世坐床档案选编》,第89页。
(27)中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《十三世达赖圆寂致祭和十四世达赖转世坐床档案选编》,第91页。
(28)参见中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《十三世达赖圆寂致祭和十四世达赖转世坐床档案选编》,第94页。
(29)参见中国第二历史档案馆、中国藏学研究中心合编:《黄慕松吴忠信赵守钰戴传贤奉使办理藏事报告书》,中国藏学出版社1993年版,第41-42页。
(30)参见中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《十三世达赖圆寂致祭和十四世达赖转世坐床档案选编》,第98页。
(31)参见中国哲学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第2683-2684页。
(32)中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《九世班禅内地活动及返藏受阻档案选编》,中国藏学出版社1992年版,第209-210页。
(33)中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《九世班禅内地活动及返藏受阻档案选编》,第428页。
(34)中国藏学研究中心、中国第二历史档案馆合编:《十三世达赖圆寂致祭和十四世达赖转世坐床档案选编》,第145页。
(35)《吴忠信撰对藏政策之检讨与意见(1939年8月4日)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/2922,中国第二历史档案馆藏。
(36)参见《行政院抄发吴忠信奉使入藏谈话要旨十一项训令(1939年9月)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/2935,中国第二历史档案馆藏。
(37)《中国国民党历次代表大会及中央全会资料》下,光明日报出版社1985年版,第911页。
(38)英国印度事务部档案,IOR,L/PS/12/4194,Ext.4789/1945,Pres.Chiang Addresses Supreme National Defence Council, Central News, August 25,1945.
(39)参见《国民政府蒙藏地方高度自治案会议拟定西藏地方高度自治方案草案(1945年8月)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/2558,中国第二历史档案馆藏。
(40)《战后蒙藏政治设施方案》,1945年9月8日,《外交部档案》,档号:172-1/0001/019/48,“国史馆”藏。转引自黎裕权:《驻藏办事处的设置、功能与影响——兼论国民政府的西藏政策(1939-1949)》,中国文化大学史学研究所硕士论文,2004年,第111页。
(41)《中华民国宪法》(国、藏文合刊),1947年4月,西藏自治区档案馆藏。
(42)《蒙藏委员会一九四七年重大措施报告(藏事部分)(1948年2月)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/109。
(43)(44)《蒙藏委员会一九四七年重大措施报告(藏事部分)(1948年2月)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/109。
(45)参见《国民政府蒙藏委员会一九四七年度重要工作报告(藏事部分)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/109,中国第二历史档案馆藏。
(46)《蒙藏委员会一九四九年工作计划藏事部分稿(1948年10月26日)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/111,中国第二历史档案馆藏。
(47)《蒙藏委员会一九四七年重大措施报告(藏事部分)(1948年2月)》,国民政府蒙藏委员会档案,141/109,中国第二历史档案馆藏。
(48)中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,中国藏学出版社1994年版,第3034页。
(49)中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第3057-3058页。
(50)参见中国藏学研究中心等编:《元以来西藏地方与中央政府关系档案史料汇编》,第3057-3058页。
(51)柳陞祺:《西藏政治》,《柳陞祺藏学文集》,中国藏学出版社2008年版,第469页。
(52)沈宗濂、柳陞祺著,柳晓青译:《西藏与西藏人》,第123页。
(53)行政院新闻局:《西藏的政教合一制》,1947年11月,第5页。
责任编辑 王佳菲
Notes
- The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (蒙藏委员会) was the central government agency of the Republic of China (1912-1949) responsible for administering the affairs of Mongolia, Tibet, and other frontier regions. ↩
- "Political tutelage" (训政) refers to the second stage of Sun Yat-sen's three-stage theory of political development (military unification, political tutelage, constitutional democracy), during which the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) would guide the people in local self-government and political education before the establishment of a constitutional government.