Similarities and Differences between Terrorism and Cults

Definitions of terror and worship

恐怖与膜拜的定义

To understand terrorists and cult followers, one must first give an appropriate definition to both. The U.S. legal definition of a terrorist organization is unsatisfactory, as it considers terrorists fundamentally to be persons who commit terrorist crimes. The European Union’s definition is more helpful: “A terrorist organization is ‘a structured organization of more than two persons established over a period of time…which commits terrorist offences,’ including murder, kidnapping, damaging public property, urban violence, and attempts to coerce, seriously alter or destroy the political, economic or social structures of a country” (BBC News, 20 September 2001).

要了解恐怖分子和膜拜信徒，首先要给二者下一个适当的定义。美国对恐怖组织的法律定义并不能使人满意，它认为恐怖分子从根本上说是实施恐怖犯罪的人员。欧盟的定义更有帮助一些：“恐怖组织是一种‘由两人以上实施恐怖袭击的……结构性组织’，这些袭击包括谋杀、绑架、破坏公共财产、城市暴力，并企图胁迫，严重改变或破坏国家的政治、经济和社会结构”（2001年9月20日BBC新闻）。

Definitions of cults in North America and Western Europe:

北美和西欧关于膜拜的定义：

An organization or movement that holds extreme or excessive devotion to a person, idea or thing, and uses unethical means of persuasion and control (e.g., cutting off contact with relatives and friends, weakening willpower, using special methods to enhance suggestion and attachment, applying strong organizational pressure, controlling information, suppressing individuality and judgment, increasing attachment to the organization and cultivating fear of leaving it, etc.), in order to achieve the leader’s goals, causing actual or potential harm to its members, their families, and the community. (West and Langone, 1986)

极端或过分信仰某个人物、观点或事物，并使用非道德控制手段进行劝说和控制（例如，隔断与亲友的联系，削弱意志，使用特殊的方法加强暗示和加强依附，运用强大的组织压力，控制信息，压制个性和判断，增强对组织的依附性及培养脱离组织的恐惧感等），实现首领的目的，对其成员及其家庭、社区造成实际或潜在损害的组织或运动。（维斯特和兰戈尼，1986年）

One immediately notices that a cult organization can be a terrorist organization, and a terrorist organization can be a cult organization. However, the difference between the two lies in the different emphasis of strategy: one is outward-oriented, focusing on what the organization does to non-members; the other is inward-oriented, focusing on what the organization does to its members. A terrorist organization may use the practices of a cult organization, but its purpose is to achieve political change, not to expand its own size and wealth. In fact, many terrorist organizations tend to leave few traces and carefully select their members based on their reliability and usefulness to the organization’s goals.

人们立刻就会注意到，膜拜组织可以是恐怖组织，恐怖组织也可以是膜拜组织。然而，二者的区别在于策略重点的不同：一个是外向型的，重点着眼于组织对于非成员的所作所为；一个是内向型的，重点着眼于组织对其成员的所作所为。 恐怖组织可以使用膜拜组织的做法，其目的是实现政治变革，而不是扩大自己的规模和财富。实际上，很多恐怖组织都倾向于少留痕迹，根据成员的可靠性及其对于组织目标的有用性，谨慎选择自己的成员。

A cult or evil cult organization may also wish to change society, and may even occasionally use terrorist means to achieve its goals, as did Japan’s “Aum Shinrikyo.” [1]1 Aum Shinrikyo: a Japanese doomsday cult that carried out the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. However, the primary purpose of a cult is self-preservation and member expansion. Anyone who can ultimately accept cult control and pledge absolute loyalty to the organization can be recruited into it. Therefore, “Aum Shinrikyo” can be defined as an evil cult organization that uses terrorist means, while Peru’s “Shining Path” [2]2 Shining Path: a Maoist guerrilla group in Peru that waged an insurgency from 1980 to the 1990s. is considered a terrorist organization with a cult-like leader. Most terrorist organizations do not have cult-like leaders, because such a structure is very fragile and prone to rapid collapse. For example, because the personality cult around Abimael Guzmán [3]3 Abimael Guzmán: the founder and leader of Shining Path, captured in 1992. was too extreme, the entire “Shining Path” movement quickly failed after his arrest. Non-terrorist political groups can also develop into large-scale cult organizations. Tourish and Wohlforth propose that political cults generally have a rigid belief system and an ideology that cannot be revised. Within a political cult, there are elite figures who possess authority, are not bound by organizational rules, and exploit lower-level members for personal gain. Such organizations also idolize a living or deceased figure as possessing absolute wisdom. Strictly religious cults also share these characteristics. In this sense, religious cults and political cults are very similar; both predict the end of the world. Such extreme views lead their followers to believe that, in the face of imminent catastrophe, they must take extreme actions to save humanity.

膜拜或邪教组织可能也会希望变革社会，甚至会像日本的“奥姆真理教”那样，偶尔使用恐怖主义手段来实现其目标。但是，膜拜的首要目的是自我保存和成员扩充。只要最终能接受膜拜控制并对组织绝对效忠的人，都可以被招募到组织当中。因此，“奥姆真理教”可以被定义为使用恐怖手段的邪教组织，而秘鲁的“光辉道路派”则被认为是拥有类似于膜拜首领的恐怖组织。大多数恐怖组织并没有类似邪教的首领，因为这种结构非常脆弱，容易迅速溃灭。例如，由于对阿比马尔•古兹曼的个人崇拜太过严重，整个“光辉道路”运动在他被捕后就迅速走向失败。 非恐怖主义的政治团体也会发展成为大规模的膜拜组织。图尔里什和沃尔福斯提出，政治膜拜一般具有强硬的信仰体系，以及无法修正的意识形态。政治膜拜内部存在精英人物，他们拥有权威，不受组织规则的约束，盘剥低级成员以获取个人利益。这种组织还会将某个活着或已死去的人物作为拥有绝对智慧的偶像。严格意义上的宗教膜拜也具有这些特征。从这个意义上说，宗教膜拜和政治膜拜非常类似，二者都会预言世界末日的到来。如此极端的观点使其追随者相信，面对即将到来的灭顶之灾，他们必须采取极端的行动来拯救人类。

Similar recruitment methods of terror and cults

恐怖与膜拜类似的招募方法

When recruiting personnel, Islamic terrorist organizations exhibit certain cult-like characteristics. Like cult organizations, terrorist organizations focus their recruitment on young people in their teens and twenties. However, recruitment methods vary depending on the specific organization. Many recruits come from Arab countries, where they see social corruption and feel hopeless about the future. Many of them have been to the West, or even settled there, and they despise Western materialism and sexual openness. They believe that secularism corrupts life, while Islam emphasizes virtue and harmony.

在招募人员的时候，伊斯兰恐怖组织具有某些膜拜的特征表现。如同膜拜组织那样，恐怖组织把招募的重点放在十几、二十几岁的年轻人身上。然而，招募的方法因具体组织的不同而有所差别。许多应招人员来自阿拉伯国家，他们看到社会腐败，对前途感到绝望。他们中很多人都曾到过西方，甚至在西方定居，他们蔑视西方的物质主义以及对性的开放。他们认为，世俗主义会使生命腐败，而伊斯兰教则强调了美德与和谐。

Published accounts of the situation of “Al-Qaeda” [4]4 Al-Qaeda: the Islamist militant organization founded by Osama bin Laden, responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. members indicate that they are usually young people who aspire to noble morality and a society of fairness, justice, and devout faith. The conventional concept of success in society does not inspire them; instead, they want to reshape society and themselves, abandon the Western way of life, and begin wearing the uniform clothing of believers, growing beards, and donning traditional attire. “We must follow the proper Islamic dress code, because this is the way to revive Islam and end the influence of infidels.” Al-Qaeda seeks out like-minded individuals and absorbs them as extreme Islamic believers. At the same time, Al-Qaeda members also distance themselves from their families and society at large, believing that “we” are absolutely different from “them,” who are full of evil. Representatives of the Taliban [5]5 Taliban: an Islamist political and military group that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 and returned to power in 2021. and Al-Qaeda monitor Islamic society, searching for these devout individuals to train them to fight for the Islamic nation and sacrifice their lives when necessary.

已出版的关于“基地”成员的情况描述表明，我们通常是年轻人，希望得到高尚的道德，希望有公平正义、信仰虔诚的社会。社会传统的成功观念并不能给我们以激励，相反，我们想重塑社会和我们自己，摒弃西方的生活方式，开始穿着信徒的统一服装，留胡须，戴传统的服饰。“我们必须遵循适当的伊斯兰装束要求，因为这是复兴伊斯兰教、结束异教影响的方式。”“基地”组织寻求与之观点相同的人，吸收其成为极端的伊斯兰信徒。同时，“基地”组织成员也避开家庭和广大社会，认为我们与他们绝对不同，他们充满了邪恶。塔利班的代表和“基地”组织监视着伊斯兰社会，从中寻找这些虔诚的个体加以训练，为伊斯兰国度而战斗，并在需要的时候牺牲生命。

The second type of recruit consists of people marginalized by Western society. Islamists provide comfort and support to these people. These are typically Europeans, often from immigrant families, struggling at the bottom of society. Many have criminal records and have been in prison. These individuals may be secular Muslims or new Muslim converts, holding extreme views of the world. Islamists actively seek them out and cultivate them. French prosecutor Jean-Louis Bruguière, a specialist in studying terrorist organizations, explained:

第二种应招人员由被西方社会边缘化的人员组成。伊斯兰主义者向这些人提供安慰和支持。这些人是典型的欧洲人，通常来自移民家庭，在社会的底层挣扎。很多人都有过犯罪记录，都曾经入狱。这些人员可能会是一些世俗穆斯林或新的穆斯林信徒，他们对世界看法极端。伊斯兰主义者在积极的搜寻并培养他们。法国检察官Jean-Louis Bruguiere是专门研究恐怖组织的专家，他解释说：

(The recruit) has no job. He possesses no information and has no hope for the future. One day, he meets an interesting guy who knows a lot about Islam. (The recruiter) says to him, “I can offer you something, assign you a task for your future.” They explain Islam, give meaning to his life in the world, and teach him skills, then say, “In the future, you will achieve a goal for us.” For Al-Qaeda, some European countries became focal points for specific operations, such as forgery (Spain and Belgium), deployment to Afghanistan (the United Kingdom), operational bases (France), and credit card fraud (Spain).

（招募对象）没有工作。他们并不拥有信息，对未来不抱希望。一天，他遇到个有趣的家伙，对伊斯兰教知之甚多。（招募人员）对他说，“我可以向你提供一些东西，为你的未来派给你一件任务。”他们讲解伊斯兰教，给他们的生命赋予世界意义，并教给他技能，然后说，“在将来你要为我们实现一个目标”。对“基地”组织而言，一些欧洲国家成了特定行动的重点，如伪造（西班牙和比利时）、向阿富汗部署（英国）、作战基地（法国）以及信用卡诈骗（西班牙）。

The third type of recruit comes from South Asia, consisting of locals who are often deceived by lies. Some foreign recruits, after being captured by NATO forces, actually believed they were there to fight against Chinese, Russians, or Indians.

第三类人员来自南亚地区，由当地人组成，他们通常受到谎言的欺骗。一些外国的应招人员在被北约军队抓获后，竟认为自己是去那里同中国人、俄国人或印度人作战的。

The last type of recruit comes from Islamist families or institutions, where they are raised to participate in jihad. [6]6 Jihad: an Islamic term meaning "struggle," often used by militant groups to refer to holy war. A large number of volunteers grow up in extremist schools, such as those supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It seems common for parents to send their children to jihad and accept their fate of death. One Islamist mother said: “In the name of God, I am willing to sacrifice my son, even if he is my dearest. For my six sons, I hope they join the Islamic jihadist organizations, even if they sacrifice themselves, I will not regret it.”

最后一类人员来自伊斯兰主义者的家庭或机构，他们被培养参加圣战。大量的志愿者都是在极端主义的学校中成长起来，如巴基斯坦和沙特阿拉伯支持的那些学校。家长让自己的孩子参加圣战，让其接受死亡的命运，这种现象看上去很普遍。一位伊斯兰主义者的母亲这样说：“以上帝的名义，我愿意牺牲我的儿子，即使他是我的至爱也在所不惜。对于我的六个儿子，我希望他们加入伊斯兰圣战者组织，即使他们牺牲了，也在所不惜。”

We should be alert to the fact that Islamists are actively seeking support within the United States. In 1999, the respected Islamic scholar Hisham Kabbani [7]7 Hisham Kabbani: a Lebanese-American Islamic scholar and Sufi leader, known for his criticism of extremism. stated that 80% of mosques and charitable organizations in the U.S. are in the hands of extremists, posing a threat to national security. Islamist propaganda is everywhere. Almost all of the Islamic literature cited in this article can be found either online or in Muslim restaurants within three miles of the author’s home.

我们应当警觉地注意到，伊斯兰主义者正积极在美国的内部寻求支持。1999年，令人尊敬的伊斯兰学者希斯罕姆•卡比亚尼曾说，美国80％的清真寺和慈善团体都掌握在极端分子手中，已对国家安全构成了威胁。伊斯兰主义者的宣传随处可见。本文所援引的几乎所有的伊斯兰文献，既可在网上找到的，也可在作者家周围3英里之内的穆斯林餐饮店里找到。

Terrorist training and control

恐怖的训练和控制

Before the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the al-Qaeda organization had a very safe haven to train recruits. Once selected, recruits were trained in groups or sent to Afghanistan for a full set of military training. Military training included urban warfare, explosives, and even training in weapons of mass destruction. Training lasted four to six weeks. Trainees were indoctrinated to sacrifice themselves for the Islamic nation. Individual needs and national consciousness were suppressed. Trainees were taught to kill infidels.

阿富汗的塔利班政府倒台之前，“基地”组织有很安全的避风港来训练应招人员。一旦被选中，应招人员就以小组为单位接受训练，或到阿富汗接受全套的军事训练。军事训练包括城市作战、爆破，甚至包括大规模杀伤性武器的训练。训练用时4到6周。受训人员虔诚地接受为伊斯兰国度牺牲的教导。个人需求和国家意识受到压制。受训人员被教导要杀死异教徒。

Those young men understand that the reward for fighting you Americans will be twice that for fighting others. They want to kill you and enter paradise, and they seek nothing else. Infidels like you, enemies of God like you, cannot remain in the same hell as the executors of justice (Osama bin Laden, 1996).

那些年轻人明白，同你们美国作战的回报将是同其他人作战的两倍。他们要杀死你们，进入天堂，除此之外别无他求。像你们这样的异教徒，像你们这样的上帝的敌人，与正义的执行者不可能呆在同一个地狱中（本•拉登，1996）。

Recruits were divided into several groups: the poor and poorly educated would become Taliban infantry soldiers, while the educated and more sophisticated would become al-Qaeda members. These people understood the enemy, understood the outside world, could become part of non-Islamic society, or plan and lead military operations, such as the large-scale massacre of 9/11. Organization members received traditional intelligence and guerrilla warfare training, including codes, intelligence drops, security, and forgery.

应招人员被分成几组：贫穷的、没受过什么教育的人会成为塔利班的步兵士兵，而受过教育、更为老练的人则会成为“基地”组织成员。这些人了解敌人，了解外部世界，能够成为非伊斯兰社会的一员，或者策划领导军事行动，如9.11大规模的屠杀行动。组织成员接受传统的情报和游戏战训练，诸如密码、情报投放、安全及伪造。

Captured terrorist manuals confirm reports from various media that, even while on the battlefield, terrorists are organized into tiny units, isolated from society, obtain additional funds through despicable theft, and use inflammatory rallies and propaganda videos to boost morale. Like other elite military units, members pledge loyalty to squads or combat cells to minimize dissent. Limited language skills and lack of free time further alienate them from the society they target. However, many al-Qaeda members have spent long periods in the West, and their sense of alienation is entirely a product of fanaticism. For example, a journalist noted that a wounded Saudi soldier in a Pakistani hospital could speak New York slang fluently.

已缴获的恐怖分子手册证实了各种媒体的报道，尽管处在战场之中，恐怖分子被组织成微小的单位，远离社会，通过卑劣的偷盗获取额外的资金，并利用煽动性的集会及宣传录像带来激发斗志。就像其它精锐的军事单位一样，组织成员向班组或作战单元效忠，以最大程度的减小分歧。有限的语言技巧和缺少空闲时间，使得他们与作为袭击目标的社会进一步疏离。但是，很多“基地”组织成员在西方呆过很长时间，他们心中的疏离感则完全是狂热的产物。例如，一位记者曾注意到，一个在巴基斯坦医院中负伤的沙特籍士兵，可以非常娴熟的讲纽约土话。

The Personality Cult of al-Qaeda

“基地”组织的个人崇拜

As Islamists, the views of al-Qaeda members, though extreme, are essentially accepted and praised within Islamic society. They distance themselves from the corrupt materialist society and from Western social structures. They are taught to hate non-Muslims and those who betray Muslims. They believe the answer to problems lies in complete acceptance of the Quran as God's ordained law, creating a righteous society.

作为伊斯兰主义者，“基地”组织成员的观点虽然极端，但在本质上是被伊斯兰社会接受并称颂的。他们远离物质主义的腐败社会，远离西方的社会结构。他们被教导要憎恨非穆斯林以及背叛穆斯林的人。他们相信，问题的答案在于完全接受《可兰经》，把它作为上帝规定的戒律，创建一个合乎正道的社会。

Rather than being a cult leader, bin Laden was a devout Muslim. He abandoned wealth and comfort to fight against the atheist Soviet Union for Islam. His phased victories demonstrated that Islam had not declined, but through selfless decisions, trust in Allah, and waging war, could defeat a powerful nation. He captured the Muslim imagination, drawing fighters to him to fight and die for his ideals. Many Muslims regarded bin Laden as a Robin Hood figure, naming their children after him, and speaking approvingly of his defense of Islam. On videotapes, he was a quiet and decorous aesthete, simply citing Quranic verses and discussing the current world situation. Like leaders of other terrorist organizations, bin Laden played an indispensable motivational role within the organization, identifying the values to be realized and interpreting the struggle from a strategic and comprehensive perspective.

与其说本•拉登是一个邪教首领，不如说他是一个虔诚的穆斯林。他抛弃了财富和安逸，为了伊斯兰教与无神论的苏联人作战。他的阶段性胜利说明，伊斯兰教不仅没有衰落，而且通过无私的决定、对安拉的信任和进行战争，能够打败一个强大的国家。他吸引了穆斯林的想象，使得那些战士来到他身边战斗并死去，以实现他的理想。很多穆斯林把本•拉登当成绿林好汉，按照他的名字给自己的孩子起名，赞许地谈论着他保卫伊斯兰教的行为。在录像带上，他是一个安静而得体地唯美主义者，简单的提示着古兰经的内容，谈论着当今世界的形势。就像其他恐怖组织的首领一样，本•拉登在组织中起着不可或缺的激励作用，他指明需要实现的价值，并从战略和综合的角度来阐释斗争。

Bin Laden's success lay in his ability to gather and organize young people seeking a pious society, guiding them toward the path of jihad he envisioned. In his view, this jihad was merely a war to defend and expand the Islamic nation. He provided these volunteers with training; the United States and Western Christianity were their main enemies, world Jewry their primary threat, and the existing governments of the Islamic world opponents to be eliminated. Good and evil were so clearly delineated, and the fighter stood at the center of this "cosmic war."

本•拉登的成功在于，他能够聚集并组织起那些追寻虔诚社会的年轻人，指引他们走向他所设想的圣战之路。在他看来，这场圣战不过是一场战争，用来保卫和扩张伊斯兰国度。他向这些志愿者提供培训，美国和西方基督教是他们的主要敌人，世界犹太主义则是他们的首要威胁，而伊斯兰世界的现存政府是需要消灭的对手。善良与邪恶被如此清晰地划分，而战士则处在这场“宇宙之战”的中心。

Muslims are waging a war for Allah against an enemy far more powerful than themselves, so bin Laden claimed that all means are just and all targets are legitimate. To support his view, bin Laden repeated Iraqi propaganda that "UN sanctions starved Muslim children"; he also wept for dead Palestinians. But in reality, he had no sympathy for either regime. Bin Laden considered killing American women and children justified because the United States had also killed women and children at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

穆斯林正在为安拉进行一场战争，其对手远比他们强大的多，所以本•拉登声称，所有的手段都是公正的，所有的目标都是合法的。为支持他的观点，本•拉登重复了伊拉克的宣传“联合国的制裁饿死了穆斯林儿童”；他还为死去的巴勒斯坦人而痛哭。但实际上，他对这两个政权没有一丝同情。本•拉登认为杀害美国妇女和儿童是正当的，因为美国在广岛和长崎也杀害过妇女和儿童。

Al-Qaeda is a Suicidal Cult

“基地”组织是一种自杀性邪教

On September 11, 2001, suicide attackers struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In Arab society, such suicide attackers were not hard to find. A Hamas leader once said, "Our biggest problem is that crowds of young people come knocking, vying to go."

2001年9月11日，自杀袭击者攻击了世贸中心和五角大楼。在阿拉伯社会，这样的自杀袭击者并不难找到。哈马斯领导人曾说，“我们最大的问题是，成群的年轻人找上门来，争着要去”。

Unfortunately, in today's Islamic extremist forces, suicide attacks have become a moral act. They are praised and glorified by certain religious organizations in the Middle East, and even by secular terrorist organizations. Bin Laden believed they would prove the difference between religion and secularism:

不幸的是，在当今的伊斯兰极端势力中，自杀袭击已经变成了一种道义行为。他们被中东的某些宗教组织、甚至被世俗的恐怖组织歌颂赞美。拉登相信，他们会证明宗教和世俗的不同：

These young people are different from your fighters. Your problem is how to persuade your army to fight; our problem is how to restrain our young people, making them wait their turn to join the battle. These young people are praiseworthy (Osama bin Laden, 1996).

这些年轻人和你们的战士不同。你们的问题是，如何说服你们的军队去战斗；而我们的问题是，如何约束我们的年轻人，让他们等轮到自己时再去参加战斗。这些年轻人是值得称赞的（本•拉登，1996）。

"Sacrificing oneself for jihad" is a duty taught to Islamic children in religious education. The Palestinian calendar features illustrations of "martyrs," and children recite their names. Volunteers for these operations are regarded as "living martyrs," receiving great respect; backing down is morally impossible and would bring shame upon their families. Thus, fighters concentrate on completing their mission and ritual, realizing their faith. In Palestine, the death of a suicide attacker is announced in official newspapers, like a marriage announcement to the "black-eyed" virgins waiting in paradise. A powerful organization, including its emotional support, peer recognition, a process of positive psychological reinforcement, and artificially determined locations—all these are key to mission completion. Al-Qaeda never suffers pangs of conscience over killing fellow Muslims or involving unsuspecting Muslims in suicide attacks. Al-Qaeda not only considers indiscriminate killing justified but also sees nothing wrong with killing believers who once supported their movement. Bin Laden explained:

“为圣战牺牲自己”是一种义务，这是伊斯兰儿童接受的宗教教育。巴勒斯坦的日历上有“烈士”的插图，孩子们吟诵着他们的名字。志愿参加这些行动的人被当作“活的烈士”，获得很大的尊敬；退缩在道义上是不可能的，将使他们的家庭蒙受耻辱。这样，战士就会集中精力完成他们的任务和祭典，实现他们的信仰。在巴勒斯坦，自杀袭击者的死讯在官方报纸上宣布，就像是在向“黑眼睛”的处女宣布结婚的消息，她们正在天堂等待。强有力的组织，包括它的情感支持，同辈人的认可，积极的心理强化过程，人为的决定地点——这一切都是任务完成的关键。 杀害穆斯林同胞、或将毫不知情的穆斯林卷入到自杀袭击当中，“基地”组织从不会为此受到良心的谴责。“基地”组织不仅认为滥杀无辜是正当的，而且觉得杀害那些曾支持过自己运动的信徒也没什么不对。本•拉登解释到：

Islamic teachings say that Muslims should not live long in the lands of infidels. The target of the 9/11 attacks was not women and children. Its main target was two symbols of America, symbols of its economic and military power (Mear, 2001).

伊斯兰的教义说，穆斯林不应该在异教徒的国度里生活很长时间。9.11袭击的目标并不是妇女和儿童。其主要目标是美国的两个标志，是美国经济和军事力量的象征。（米尔，2001）

Although civilians always associate suicide attacks with terrorism, many armies have used similar means when facing a more powerful enemy. Countries that have used or currently use suicide tactics include North Korea, Iraq, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Imperial Japan during World War II. The human bombs of contemporary Islamic society are directly inherited from Iran, which used people as mine-clearing devices during the Iran-Iraq War. Historically, there have been many military operations where the participants' chances of survival were very slim.

虽然平民百姓总是把自杀袭击和恐怖主义相联系，但很多军队在面对更为强大的敌人时，也曾使用过类似的手段。过去或现在曾使用过自杀手段的国家，包括北朝鲜、伊拉克、伊朗、苏联以及二战中的日本帝国。当代伊斯兰社会的人体炸弹直接传承于伊朗，他们在两伊战争时期曾把人作为清除地雷的装置。历史上有很多军事行动，其参与者幸存下来的可能性都很小。

A terrorist organization is a suicidal cult, but with a difference. Because sacrificial acts are glorified, al-Qaeda does not need to require its members to choose death, as a cult would. For the attack on America to succeed, it was necessary to encourage and entice participants to sacrifice themselves, without the coercion and suppression of a cult leader.

恐怖组织是一种自杀式的邪教，但又有区别。因为牺牲行为受到颂扬，“基地”组织就无需像邪教那样，要求其成员选择死亡。对美国的袭击要想取得成功，就要鼓励诱惑参与者献身，而不需要邪教头目的强迫和压制。

Terrorism and Cults: Differences and Similarities

恐怖与邪教：差异和相同之处

The “Al-Qaeda” organization is a representative terrorist organization, differing from ordinary terrorist organizations only in its scale and global reach. It possesses many characteristics of political, moral, and religious terrorist movements, but it also exhibits some features of a cult.

“基地”组织是一个具有代表性的恐怖组织，只是其规模和遍及全球的活动范围与一般恐怖组织不同。它具有很多政治、道德和宗教恐怖主义运动的特征，但它还有一些邪教的特征。

Al-Qaeda believes that the world is engaged in a universal struggle between good and evil. Osama bin Laden may have been seeking a final confrontation—seeking the battlefield of Armageddon (the final judgment day in the New Testament) for the decisive battle between good and evil. By launching extremely cruel and inhumane terrorist attacks, he provoked a large-scale American counterattack, thereby uniting the sympathetic Muslim world around him. Alternatively, bin Laden believed that a bold terrorist offensive would drive the United States back to an isolationist policy, allowing him to freely deal with secular governments in the region that had betrayed Islam. In either case, bin Laden’s reasoning is similar to that of Aum Shinrikyo and all cults that prophesy the end of the world.

“基地”组织认为，世界正处在善与恶的普遍斗争之中。本•拉登可能正在寻求最后的对决——寻求哈米吉多顿（《新约全书》中最后审判日前）善与恶大决战的战场。他通过发动极其残忍的非人道的恐怖袭击，引发美国大规模的反击，这样就可以把同情他的穆斯林世界团结到周围。或者，拉登认为，勇敢的恐怖进攻会使美国退回到孤立主义的政策上去，从而使他能够自由地对付本地区背叛伊斯兰教的世俗政府。无论哪种情况，拉登的推断都同“奥姆真理教”及所有预言世界末日的邪教类似。

Other features that terrorist organizations share with cults include: recruiting cynical young people; using deceptive methods in recruitment; preaching morality within the organization while dehumanizing those outside; isolation and segregation, training their members as holy warriors, and claiming that all answers to problems come from a single theoretical root or social form. Many other organizations also exhibit similar characteristics to varying degrees, even among elite groups and organizations.

恐怖组织与邪教相类似的其它特征包括：招募愤世嫉俗的年轻人；在招募中使用欺骗手段；在组织内讲道德，而对外界失去人性；孤立与隔绝，将其成员训练成圣战战士，宣称所有问题的答案都来自单一的理论根源或社会形式。其它很多组织在不同程度上也具有类似的特征，甚至在由精英组成的组织和团体中也存在。

Al-Qaeda, along with terrorist organizations in general, differs from most cults in several respects. Terrorist organizations exaggerate and typify political and religious views within society, endorsing the theory that “external forces cause social upheaval.” The organizational system of terrorist organizations differs from that of cults; they must rely on extensive grassroots organizations and broad popular support. Saudi wealthy individuals and “charitable organizations” provide funding to Al-Qaeda, while Muslims offer them moral support. Although the leaders of terrorist organizations are inspiring, Muslims and organization members do not “deify” them, nor do they believe they possess special powers or divinely granted abilities from Allah. By using violence, bin Laden articulated Islamist doctrine and clearly presented a vision of a better world. Although bin Laden had the authority to issue religious rulings, he did not add new content. He did not claim to be the “guide” reshaping the justice of the earth. Whether bin Laden is dead or not, his story does not end. The world watches him, and a new, more powerful religious cult and fanaticism may emerge from this.

“基地”组织连同一般的恐怖组织，与大多数邪教有几个方面的不同。恐怖组织夸大而又典型的代表了社会中的政治和宗教观点，认同“外部力量造成其社会动荡”的理论。恐怖组织与邪教的组织体系不同，他们必须依靠广泛的基层组织和广大群众的支持。沙特富人及“慈善团体”向“基地”组织提供资金，而穆斯林则向他们提供道义上的支持。尽管恐怖组织首领具有激励作用，但穆斯林和组织成员不会把他“神化”，也不认为他具有特异功能或安拉赋予的特殊力量。本•拉登通过使用暴力，表达伊斯兰主义的学说，清晰展示出美好世界的前景。虽然拉登自己有权宣布教规指令，但他并不会添加新的内容。他并没有宣称自己是重塑地球正义的“指导者”。无论拉登是否死亡，他的故事都不会结束。世界在关注着他，一个新的更为强大的宗教膜拜与狂热或许会由此产生。

Lessons and Experiences to Draw Upon

可以借鉴的经验和教训

After the death or loss of aura of a cult or cult leader, the cult organization either collapses or integrates into mainstream society. If bin Laden dies, the armed forces of the Islamic movement will lose their effective organizer, and Al-Qaeda may suffer irreparable losses. But the Islamic movement will continue, because it is the main ideological line of contemporary Islamic theory.

在膜拜或邪教首领死亡或失去光环后，膜拜或邪教组织要么溃灭，要么融入主流社会。如果本•拉登死亡，那么伊斯兰运动武装力量将会失去其有效的组织者，“基地”组织或许会遭受无法挽回的损失。但伊斯兰运动仍会继续，因为那是当代伊斯兰理论的主要思想路线。

There is an ongoing civil war within Islam over how to successfully govern Islamic society. Although bin Laden’s violent actions were primarily directed at the West, his ultimate goal was to purge corrupt secular governments from Islamic society and replace them with Islamic law. His terrorist actions targeted the West, but his focus was on Islamic society. Whether his views have a future in Islamic society depends on Islamic society itself.

关于如何成功治理伊斯兰社会，伊斯兰教内部正在进行一场内战。虽然本•拉登的暴力行动主要针对西方，其最终目标却是清除伊斯兰社会中腐败的世俗政府，并用伊斯兰法律代替它们。他的恐怖行动针对西方，而他关注的焦点却是伊斯兰社会。他的观点在伊斯兰社会是否有前途，还得取决于伊斯兰社会本身。

This war over the core meaning of Islam may last for generations. As the pro-bin Laden website Azzam.com stated on November 20, 2001:

这场关于伊斯兰教核心含义的战争可能会持续几代人。正如支持本•拉登的网站Azzam.com在2001年11月20日所说：

The war in Afghanistan will be the beginning of a protracted war that will last for years, perhaps decades, and will end with the victory of Muslim believers and the Islamic nation. This is not only our optimistic view, but also part of our religious faith. We believe that, although the infidels may hate this statement, Islam will achieve final victory.

阿富汗战争将是一场持久战争的开端，这场战争将会持续数年，或许会持续几十年，并将以穆斯林信徒和伊斯兰国度的胜利而告终。这不仅是我们乐观的看法，还是我们宗教信仰的一部分。我们相信，尽管异教徒们可能会讨厌这种说法，但伊斯兰教会取得最终胜利。

Westerners have to admit that the author’s claim about the duration of the war is correct, but they very much hope that the prediction about the outcome of the war is wrong.

西方人不得不承认，作者有关战争时间的说法是正确的，但却非常希望有关战争结果的预测是错误的。

No external force can determine the future of Islam. They can attempt to consolidate moderate Islamic regimes by increasing trade and improving relations (even with countries currently excluded by them). Iran is an Islamic society hostile to the United States, but it is also striving to promote democracy; for this reason alone, it is qualified to receive diplomatic and political recognition.

没有一种外部力量能决定伊斯兰的未来。它们可以通过增进贸易、改善关系（甚至同目前被它们排除在外的国家）来尝试巩固温和的伊斯兰政权。伊朗是一个敌视美国的伊斯兰社会，但它也在努力推进民主，仅此一点，它就有资格获得外交上和政治上的承认。

Foreign aid can also be used to build schools and provide secular governments with the cultural foundation they need. Arab and Muslim schools often educate students to hate Jews and Christians and to glorify war and violence. Al-Qaeda typically finds ready recruits in these schools. According to estimates by Pakistani officials, among the tens of thousands of religious schools in the country, 10 to 15 percent are almost entirely factories for training “holy warriors.”

还可以利用外国援助兴建学校，向世俗政权提供其所需要的文化基础。阿拉伯和穆斯林的学校经常进行仇恨犹太人和基督徒、颂扬战争和暴力的教育。“基地”组织在这些学校中通常会找到现成的应招人员。根据巴基斯坦官员的预计，在该国成千上万所的宗教学校之中，有10％到15％的学校几乎完全是教育“圣战”战士的工厂。

The national narratives written by Arab countries and peoples not only tell students about their current situation but also convey important social ideals. These stories point young people toward the idols they should worship. The West can help rewrite Arab history textbooks to speak less about war and more about humanitarian values. Moreover, the West should examine Islamic popular culture, as well as its own culture, to find solutions that reduce the view that violence is a viable option.

阿拉伯国家和人民编写的民族故事，不仅向学生们讲述他们的现状，还告诉他们重要的社会理想。这些故事向年轻人指明了要崇拜的偶像。西方可以帮助编写阿拉伯的历史教科书，使其少讲述些战争，多讲述些人道主义的价值。而且，西方应当审视一下伊斯兰的大众文化，同时审视一下自己的文化，寻找解决方法，减少那些认为暴力是可行选择的观点。

Al-Qaeda is not the final threat to modern secular culture. We must acknowledge that armed fanaticism is perhaps the greatest current threat, often arising from enthusiasm for blind ideology or religion. Armed fanaticism ignores rational debate and evidence and makes no concessions.

“基地”组织并不是现代世俗文化的最后威胁。我们必须承认，武装起来的狂热主义或许是当前的最大威胁，它往往发端于对盲目意识形态或宗教的热情。狂热主义无视理性的辩论和证据，也不会做出让步。

The United States is very cautious about monitoring religious movements. The Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right to refuse to accept government investigations. Therefore, intelligence agencies do not monitor religious movements; they only monitor terrorist organizations, and they only call these organizations terrorist when they commit violence. Americans cannot expect the government to detect potential religious violent movements in their early stages.

对于监视宗教运动，美国的态度非常谨慎。宪法规定，公民有权选择拒绝接受政府的调查。因此情报部门并不会监视宗教运动，监视的仅是恐怖组织，并且只有当它们实施暴力的时候才把这些组织称作恐怖组织。美国人不能指望政府发现处于发展初期的潜在的宗教暴力运动。

When religious or ethnic movements move toward violence, academia should warn the government. Based on Al-Qaeda, I propose seven early warning signs:

当宗教或民族运动朝着暴力的方向发展时，学术界应该向政府发出警告。以“基地”组织为根据，我提出七条预警标志：

First, without a doubt, injustices suffered by past generations become the cause of current actions. This is very evident in Al-Qaeda. It is also reflected in some political and Christian movements in the United States.

第一， 毋容置疑，过去几代人受到的不公正对待成为现在行为的原因。这在“基地”组织身上表现的非常明显。在美国的一些政治及基督教运动中也有所体现。

Second, the political arena becomes the battlefield for the cosmic struggle between good and evil. Again, this is clearly evident in Al-Qaeda and in Christian terrorist organizations within the United States.

第二， 政治舞台成为宇宙间善与恶交锋的战场。同样，这在“基地”组织及美国国内的基督教恐怖组织身上，也有明显的体现。

Third, violence is justified as fulfilling God’s will.

第三， 暴力因实现上帝的旨意而成为正当行为。

Fourth, historical war heroes are elevated or transformed into religious symbols. For example, Islamists frequently mention the military exploits of Saladin and Muhammad.

第四， 历史上的战争英雄被提升为或变成宗教标志。例如，伊斯兰主义者经常提及萨拉丁和穆罕默德的军事功勋。

Fifth, religious movements begin to intensify paramilitary or military training.

第五， 宗教运动开始强化准军事的或军事方面的训练。

Sixth, relying on assistance from non-members, terrorist organizations can sustain the operation of their grassroots units and combat units, meaning the organization reflects certain social views and is praised by society. Al-Qaeda and the “Army of God” both have similar characteristics.

第六， 依靠非成员的援助，恐怖组织足以维持其基层单位和战斗单位的运转，这意味着该组织反映了一定的社会观点，并受到社会的称颂。“基地”组织和“上帝军”都具有类似的特征。

Seventh, the organization’s leader, representative, or role model possesses vision and is violent.

第七， 组织的首领、代表或效仿对象具有远见，并具有暴力性。

Notes:

注释：

① This article is derived from *Cultic Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2003. The Chinese translation was provided by Geng Geng, a council member of the Chinese Atheism Association, with abridgments.

① 本文源自《膜拜问题研究与评论》 2003年第2卷1期。中文翻译稿由中国无神论协会理事耿耿提供，有删节。

② The United States announced that Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in the early hours of May 1, 2011. In the post-bin Laden era, the shadow of terrorism persists. The purpose of publishing this article is to further educate the public on recognizing and preventing terrorist and cult organizations.

② 美国宣布，“基地”组织头目本•拉登2011年5月1日凌晨被美军击毙。后拉登时代，恐怖主义的阴影依旧。对公众进一步开展认知和防范恐怖和邪教组织的教育，是刊登此文的目的。

Author’s biography: Christopher M. Centner, senior intelligence analysis expert at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, graduated from the Joint Military Intelligence College in Washington, D.C., and earned a Master’s degree in Political Science from Auburn University (Montgomery, Alabama). He has published multiple analytical reports on chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, and combined arms in the *Intelligence Community*.

作者简介：克里斯托弗. M. 森特那（Christopher M. Centner），美国国防情报局高级情报分析专家，毕业于华盛顿特区联合军事情报学院，在奥本大学 （亚拉巴马州蒙哥马利市） 获得政治学硕士学位。曾在《情报界（Intelligence Community）》多次发表关于化学武器、核武器以及综合武器的分析报告。

Translator’s biography: Geng Geng, council member of the China Atheism Society, freelance writer.

译者简介：耿耿，中国无神论学会理事，自由撰稿人