Religion and International Relations in the Age of Globalization

Some international relations scholars, commenting on the impact of the global religious resurgence since the second half of the 20th century on traditional religious studies and international relations theory, have remarked: “We live in a world that should not exist.” [1]1 The original Chinese phrase “本不应存在的世界” is a direct quotation from a scholar, implying that the contemporary prominence of religion contradicts the secular assumptions of mainstream international relations theory. Since the birth of international relations as a discipline in the West, religion has long been a research subject neglected, marginalized, and even “exiled” by Western international relations theory. This exclusion of religion can be traced back to the origins of modern international relations. In the Westphalian international relations system, which emerged from the end of European wars, the birth of nation-states, and the “sanctification” of national sovereignty, religion no longer had a place; and in the state-centric international relations theory that reflects this system, religion naturally held little significance. However, in recent decades, the global religious resurgence and the worldwide trend of non-secularization, especially the occurrence of the September 11 attacks, have to a considerable extent changed people’s views on religion and international issues, bringing religion back from the so-called “Westphalian exile” to the “center of international relations.” Religion is not only considered “another form of continuation of politics” but has also become a resource contested by various parties on the international stage. [2]2 The phrase “政治的另一种形式的延续” (another form of continuation of politics) is a paraphrase of Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means, applied here to religion. In the view of some international relations scholars, “the challenge posed by the global religious resurgence to international relations theory is comparable to the theoretical challenges triggered by the end of the Cold War or the emergence of globalization.” [3]3 This is a direct quotation from an international relations scholar, emphasizing the theoretical significance of the religious resurgence.

有国际关系学者谈到20世纪下半叶以来的全球宗教复兴对传统宗教学和国际关系理论的冲击时评价道：“我们生活在一个本不应存在的世界。”①从国际关系作为一门学科在西方诞生以来，宗教就一直是被西方国际关系理论长期忽视、边缘化甚至“放逐”的研究对象。这种对宗教的排斥可以追溯到近代国际关系的起源。在产生于欧洲战争结束、民族国家诞生、国家主权被“神圣化”的威斯特伐利亚国际关系体系中，宗教不再具有一席之地，而在折射此种国际关系体系的、以国家为中心的国际关系理论中，宗教自然也无足轻重。然而近几十年来全球宗教复兴和世界性非世俗化趋势，尤其是九一一事件的发生，在相当大的程度上改变了人们对宗教与国际问题的看法，使宗教从所谓“威斯特伐利亚的放逐”回归“国际关系的中心”。宗教不仅被认为是“政治的另一种形式的延续”，而且还成了国际舞台上各方争抢的资源。②在有的国际关系学者看来，“宗教全球复兴对国际关系理论的挑战堪比冷战结束或全球化初现所引起的理论挑战”。③

This article attempts to provide a relatively comprehensive analysis of the current state and research approaches of religion’s influence on international relations in the age of globalization. It first elaborates on the challenges and even subversions posed by the “return of religion” in international relations to traditional religious concepts and the existing international relations system; second, it introduces and discusses research approaches to religion and international relations; and finally, it briefly analyzes the impact of the global religious resurgence and the “return of religion” in international relations on China.

本文试图对全球化时代宗教影响国际关系的现状和研究路径做较全面的分析，首先阐述国际关系的“宗教回归”对传统宗教观念和现行国际关系的挑战甚至颠覆；其次介绍和讨论宗教与国际关系的研究路径；最后简析全球宗教复兴和国际关系“宗教回归”对中国的影响。

I. The “Return of Religion” in International Relations

一、国际关系的“宗教回归”

Scott M. Thomas, a scholar studying religion and international relations, once defined the phenomenon of “the global resurgence of religion” as follows: “The global resurgence of religion refers to the increasing prominence and persuasiveness of religion, such as the growing importance of religious beliefs, practices, and discourse in personal and public life; the increasing role of religious or religion-related figures, non-state groups, political parties, communities, and organizations in domestic politics; and the fact that this resurgence is occurring in ways that have significant implications for international politics.” [4]4 This is a direct quotation from Scott M. Thomas, defining the global resurgence of religion. Since the 1970s, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the global resurgence of religion has been changing the global religious landscape and even the face of international relations in many ways, and has had a partially subversive or “semi-subversive” impact on the existing structure of international relations and traditional views of religion. We can understand this “semi-subversive” nature from the following five aspects.

研究宗教与国际关系的学者斯科特•M•托马斯(Scott M. Thomas)曾对“全球宗教复兴(the global resurgence of religion)”现象做了以下界定：“全球宗教复兴指宗教日益具有显要性和说服力，如在个人和公共生活中日见重要的宗教信念、实践和话语，宗教或与宗教有关的人物、非国家团体、政党、社区和组织在国内政治中日益增长的作用以及这一复兴正以对国际政治具有重大影响的方式发生。”④20世纪70年代尤其是冷战结束以来宗教的全球复兴正在从多方面改变全球宗教布局乃至国际关系的面貌，并且对现行国际关系结构以及人们对宗教的传统观念造成具有部分颠覆性或“半颠覆性”的影响。我们可从以下五个方面来认识此种“半颠覆性”。

(A) The global religious resurgence has to some extent subverted traditional secularization theory.

(一)宗教全球复兴在某种程度上颠覆了传统世俗化理论

For a long time, religion was believed to decline with modernization and economic development. However, the actual situation is the opposite; religion has risen rather than fallen under the impact of modernization and economic development. Large-scale religious revivals have mainly occurred in Christianity (especially Pentecostalism), Islam, and folk religions, while the sustained growth and political awakening of conservative factions within Christianity and Islam are the two most striking phenomena in the world religious sphere since the second half of the 20th century. Some Western scholars have even alarmingly claimed that if the above religious growth trends continue, by 2020, 54.2% of the world’s population would be Christians and 37.76% would be Muslims. [5]5 These are projected figures cited from a Western scholar, illustrating the perceived growth trends of Christianity and Islam. Even in “godless Europe,” which is called a typical example of “secularization” and a negative example of “sacralization” where “Christian faith has collapsed,” not only are “immigrant churches” and new religions growing, but traditional religions such as Catholicism have also shown signs of revival. [6]6 “Godless Europe” and “Christian faith has collapsed” are paraphrases of common characterizations of European secularization; “immigrant churches” refers to religious communities formed by immigrants. Consequently, phrases like “the re-enchantment of the world,” “religious transnationalism and the decline of the state,” “religious nationalism confronting the secular state,” and “a new Cold War where religious conflict replaces ideological conflict” have spread rapidly, flooding news reports and academic publications worldwide, almost completely replacing the once-fashionable phrases from 50 years ago such as “the decline of Christendom,” “God is dead,” and “the advent of a post-Christian or even post-religious era,” becoming new labels of the times. Various theories of “non-secularization,” “anti-secularization,” “post-secularization,” and “sacralization” have emerged, seemingly becoming the popular paradigm for religious studies in academic circles worldwide. The global resurgence of religion is the sociological foundation for religion’s influence on international relations, its replacement of ideology as the basis for large-scale political mobilization of the masses, and its role in “changing foreign policy debates on diplomacy, national security, democracy promotion, and development aid.” [7]7 This is a direct quotation from a scholar, describing the policy impact of the religious resurgence.

长期以来，宗教被认为将随着现代化和经济发展而衰退，然而实际情况却与之相反，宗教在现代化和经济发展的冲击下不降反升。大规模宗教复兴主要发生于基督教(尤其是五旬节派)、伊斯兰教以及民间宗教，而基督教和伊斯兰教保守派的持续增长和政治觉醒，则是20世纪下半叶以来世界宗教领域最引人注目的两大景观。有西方学者甚至危言耸听地声称，如果上述宗教增长趋势能够持续，到2020年，世界人口的54.2%将是基督宗教徒，37.76%将是伊斯兰教徒。⑤即使在被称为“世俗化”典型和“神圣化”反面教材、“基督教信仰业已崩盘”的“无神的欧洲”，不仅“移民教会”和新兴宗教不断增长，传统宗教如天主教等也出现了复兴的迹象。⑥于是乎“世界的复魅”、“宗教跨国与国家式微”、“宗教民族主义对抗世俗国家”、“宗教冲突取代意识形态冲突的新冷战”等说法不胫而走，开始充斥于世界各国的新闻报道和学术出版物，几乎完全取代了50年前曾风靡一时的“基督教王国衰退”、“上帝已死”、“后基督教甚至后宗教时代的来临”等话语而成为时代的新标签，各种“非世俗化”、“反世俗化”、“后世俗化”和“神圣化”理论纷纷出台，俨然成为各国学界宗教研究的流行范式。宗教的全球复兴是宗教影响国际关系、并且取代意识形态而成为民众大规模政治动员以及“改变关于外交、国家安全、民主推进和发展援助的外交政策辩论”⑦的社会学基础。

However, amidst the diverse academic and non-academic clamor about the “globalizing God,” traditional secularization theory has not disappeared; rather, it has made a comeback through various revised versions, such as “new secularization,” “elite secularization,” “long-term secularization,” and “secularization in wealthy countries.” Like various non-secularization theories, these seek support from countless opinion polls and empirical studies. [8]8 “New secularization,” “elite secularization,” “long-term secularization,” and “secularization in wealthy countries” are terms for revised secularization theories that attempt to account for persistent religiosity. For instance, sociologists of religion Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, in their widely cited work, point out that the secularization trend among global intellectual elites contrasts sharply with the general religiosity of populations in various countries. With few exceptions, the widening gap between wealthy countries (“secular societies”) and poor countries (“sacred societies”) is not only economic but also religious and theological. Based on extensive empirical research on 76 countries representing nearly 80% of the world’s population, the two scholars propose the “existential security hypothesis,” arguing that the life experiences of people in poor, insecure societies differ from those in wealthy, secure societies; the former enhances the importance of religious values, while the latter diminishes it. [9]9 The “existential security hypothesis” is a theory proposed by Norris and Inglehart linking religiosity to feelings of vulnerability. In fact, the distinction between secularization and sacralization is not absolute. Another group of sociologists of religion, N. J. Demerath III and Rhys H. Williams, adopt a more moderate stance, arguing that there is a dialectical relationship between the two, more one of interdependence than mutual exclusion; in reality, one trend can only be fully understood against the backdrop of the other. Criticizing, based on extensive empirical research in Springfield, New England, USA, the traditional secularization model for overemphasizing the opposition between secularization and sacralization, the two scholars argue that at the individual, institutional, community, and cultural levels, there are trends of both secularization and sacralization, but overall, the secularization trend is stronger than the sacralization trend. Therefore, so-called religious revival is merely a short-term sacralization reaction to the long-term secularization trend that the United States and Western societies are undergoing. [10]10 This is a summary of Demerath and Williams’s empirical study and their critique of the traditional secularization model. In fact, the so-called sacralization or non-secularization model also emphasizes the binary opposition between the sacred and the secular. This article does not intend to engage in the theoretical debate on secularization but merely aims to illustrate that the controversy over the so-called global religious resurgence is far from settled; hence, its impact on traditional secularization theory is only “semi-subversive.”

不过，在众口铄金的“全球化上帝”的各种学术和非学术声浪中，传统世俗化论不仅并未销声匿迹，而且还通过各种修正版的世俗化论如“新世俗化”、“精英世俗化”、“长期世俗化”、“富国世俗化”等卷土重来，并且与各种非世俗化论一样，都在难以计数的民意调查和实证研究中寻求支撑点。⑧如宗教社会学者皮帕•诺里斯(Pippa Norris)和罗纳德•英格尔哈特(Ronald Inglehart)在其广被引用的著作中就指出，全球知识精英世俗化趋势与各国民众的普遍向教形成鲜明的对照。除个别例外，富国(“世俗社会”)与穷国(“神圣社会”)之间日益扩大的差距不仅是经济上的，也是宗教和神学上的。两位学者在对占世界人口总数近80%的76个国家的大量实证研究的基础上提出“存在性安全论(the existential security hypothesis)”，认为贫弱和不安全社会的民众与富强和安全社会的民众的生活经验不同，前者提升而后者降低了宗教价值观的重要性。⑨其实世俗化和神圣化的区分并不绝对。另一组宗教社会学者德梅拉思三世(N. J. Demerath Ⅲ)和里斯•威廉斯(Rhys H. Williams)就采取较为折中的立场，认为两者之间存在着辩证的关系，更多的是相互依存而不是相互排斥，实际上一种趋势只有在另一种趋势的衬托下才能被充分理解。两位学者在对美国新格兰地区斯普林菲尔德城进行大量实证研究的基础上批评道，传统世俗化模式过于强调世俗化与神圣化的对立，而实际上在个人、机构、社区和文化四个层面既有世俗化也有神圣化的趋势，但就总体而言世俗化趋势要强于神圣化趋势，因此所谓宗教复兴只是美国和西方社会正在经历的长期世俗化趋势的短期神圣化反应。⑩实际上所谓神圣化或非世俗化模式又何尝不在渲染神圣与世俗的二元对立。本文无意介入关于世俗化的理论之争，只是想说明所谓全球宗教复兴的争议远未止息，因此其对传统世俗化的理论只具“半颠覆性”的影响。

(B) The global religious resurgence has to some extent subverted the Westphalian international relations system.

(二)全球宗教复兴在某种程度上颠覆了威斯特伐利亚国际关系体系

Modern international relations are built upon the so-called Westphalian assumption, and the global religious revival has, to some extent, partially overturned the unwritten rule of international relations that religion does not intervene in international affairs. As a product of the end of the Thirty Years' War in Europe, the Peace of Westphalia and the legacy established over nearly two centuries (or the Westphalian consensus) replaced the supremacy of divine authority with so-called sovereignty supremacy, recognizing and establishing the principle of state authority to replace transnational religious authority, and no longer treating religion as the basis of foreign policy or a legitimate source of international conflict. The core of the modern international system, based on and derived from the Peace of Westphalia, is to ensure the principle of state sovereignty through the establishment of a complete set of international rules and institutions, and not to recognize transnational ideologies that challenge state sovereignty in terms of people's political loyalty. Ironically, although the political and legal structures constructed by the Peace of Westphalia privatized religion and limited its role in international affairs, they "nationalized religion by making it the basis for organizing the modern state." [11]11 The Peace of Westphalia (1648) ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe and established the principle of state sovereignty, which became the foundation of modern international relations. The "Westphalian assumption" refers to the expectation that religion would be a private matter and not a factor in interstate relations.

现代国际关系是建立在所谓威斯特伐利亚假设之上的，全球宗教复兴也在某种程度上部分颠覆了宗教不干预国际事务的国际关系潜规则。作为欧洲三十年战争结束的产物，《威斯特伐利亚和约》以及通过近两个世纪才确立的遗产(或威斯特伐利亚共识)，以所谓主权至上取代神权至上，承认和确立了国家权威原则以取代跨国宗教权威，不再把宗教作为外交政策基础以及国际冲突的合法性来源。以《威斯特伐利亚和约》为基础和来源的现代国际制度的核心，就是通过建立一整套国际规章制度来确保国家主权原则，并且不承认在人们的政治忠诚上挑战国家主权的跨国意识形态。具有讽刺意味的是，《威斯特伐利亚和约》所建构的政治和法律结构尽管使宗教私人化并限制其在国际事务中的作用，却“以宗教为组织现代国家的基础而将其国有化”。(11)

However, religion, which played an important role in the formation of the concept of state sovereignty, now challenges it in turn. The global religious revival is reshaping the "empty public square" in the international relations system, posing a threat to existing international relations principles and rules and institutions. On the opposing side, it is generally believed that the challenge of transnational religion is currently mainly manifested as non-Western religions or civilizations confronting the Western beliefs and values on which the international community is built, or challenging the Western secular interpretation of international institutions. Therefore, the "new Cold War" is sometimes interpreted as a war of the religious East against the secular West. For the vast majority of non-Western countries, what transnational religion currently weakens is not actually state sovereignty, but the secular nation-state or the so-called "hegemony of totalitarian states." [12]12 The "new Cold War" is a term used by some scholars to describe a perceived ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the West and non-Western powers, often framed in cultural or civilizational terms. However, on issues of human rights, especially religious freedom, the spearhead of the "new Cold War" is mainly directed at non-Western countries. Since the end of the Cold War, so-called violations of human rights and religious freedom are becoming more "acceptable" reasons for certain Western countries to engage in political and military intervention in other countries. Since the 21st century, advocating the so-called "responsibility to protect" has been prevalent in Western countries. Some scholars even claim that "perhaps, apart from the prevention of genocide after World War II, no concept in the field of international norms has spread faster and wider than the responsibility to protect (abbreviated as R2P)." [13]13 The "responsibility to protect" (R2P) is a global political commitment adopted by the UN in 2005 to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Various religious organizations based on faith and values naturally become active advocates of such "international norms." The Sudan movement initiated by American religious groups was a comprehensive practice of the "responsibility to protect" theory, advocated mainly by the West in the early 21st century, based on the humanitarian principle that the international community has the responsibility to protect civilians of sovereign states from mass atrocities. However, due to Western unilateral actions without UN authorization in places like Kosovo and Iraq, the pursuit of self-interested "imperialist agendas," and the militarization of so-called humanitarian intervention, their identity as bearers of the "responsibility to protect" international norm has been seriously questioned, also making the strengthening of sovereignty the "last line of defense for developing countries against an unequal world." [14]14 Kosovo refers to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, which was conducted without UN Security Council authorization. Iraq refers to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, also without explicit UN authorization. Some scholars point out that although "globalization" and transnational actors and processes, including religion, have become very important in shaping the foreign policies of various countries, the mainstream view in academia is that the nation-state, which dominates the international system and serves as the "main unit of territorial security and administration," still "sets the basic rules and defines the environment in which transnational actors must operate." [15]15 The "empty public square" is a concept from political theorist Richard John Neuhaus, referring to the exclusion of religious voices from public discourse in secular societies. In current international relations, religious factors, whether in the diplomacy of various countries or in bilateral or multilateral relations, are still secondary factors or factors given less consideration. Religion is far from being a "hard currency" comparable to political, military, and economic factors in contemporary international relations.

然而对国家主权观念形成起重要作用的宗教，现在却反过来对其提出了挑战。宗教的全球复兴正在改变国际关系体系中“空荡荡的公共广场”，对现行的国际关系原则和规章制度形成威胁。就其对立面而言，一般认为跨国宗教的挑战目前主要表现为非西方宗教或文明对抗国际社会建立在其上的西方信仰和价值观，或挑战对国际制度的西方的世俗解释，因此“新冷战”有时被解读为宗教东方反对世俗西方之战；对广大非西方国家而言，跨国宗教目前所削弱的实际上还不是国家主权，而是世俗的民族国家或所谓“极权国家的霸权”。(12)不过在人权尤其在宗教自由问题上，“新冷战”的锋芒却主要指向非西方国家，冷战结束以来所谓侵犯人权和宗教自由正在变成西方某些国家对他国进行政治和军事干涉的更加“可被接受”的理由。21世纪以来，倡导所谓“保护责任(responsibility to protect)”在西方国家盛行一时，有学者甚至称“也许除二次大战后防止种族灭绝外，在国际规范领域还没有一种理念比保护责任(简称R2P)传播得更快和更广”。(13)基于信仰和价值观的各种宗教组织自然而然地成为此种“国际规范”的积极倡导者，由美国宗教团体发起的苏丹运动就是在21世纪初主要由西方所鼓吹的国际社会基于人道主义原则具有使主权国家平民免受大规模暴行的“保护责任论”的全面实践。不过，由于西方在科索沃、伊拉克等地在未经联合国授权的情况下的单边行动、推行基于私利的“帝国主义议程”以及所谓人道主义干预军事化举措，使其作为“保护责任”国际规范承担者的身份备受质疑，也使加强主权成为发展中国家“反对不平等世界的最后防线”。(14)有学者指出，尽管“全球化”以及包括宗教在内的跨国行为体和跨国进程在形塑各国的对外政策方面已十分重要，但学界的主要观点是，在国际体系中占支配地位、作为“疆土安全和行政主要单位”的民族国家仍“在制定基本规则并且界定跨国行为体必须在其中运作的环境”。(15)在当前的国际关系中，宗教因素无论在各国外交还是在双边或多边关系中都还是次要因素或较少考虑的因素。宗教还远非当代国际关系中能与政治、军事和经济等因素并称的“硬通货”。

(III) The shift in the center of gravity of the global religious population has partially overturned the traditional layout of world religions.

(三)全球宗教人口重心的转移部分颠覆了世界宗教的传统布局

Globalization has brought about a massive global population shift, a massive global industrial shift, and a massive global religious shift, and these three shifts are closely interconnected. According to Andrew F. Walls, an authoritative scholar of the international missionary movement, the so-called "Great European Migration" in world population lasted for five centuries. This not only redrew the pattern of world trade and the map of international politics in a way favorable to Europe but also expanded the sphere of influence of Christianity globally. The so-called "reverse great shift" that began in the second half of the 20th century—large-scale migration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to Europe and America—has also changed the flow of global culture and religion. While making Western Christianity increasingly take on non-Western forms and expressions, the traditional religions of the aforementioned regions have gradually become religions of Western countries. [16]16 Andrew F. Walls (1928–2021) was a prominent historian of Christian missions and world Christianity, known for his work on the shift of Christianity's center to the Global South. The southward movement of Western dominant religions (Christianity, Mormonism, etc.) and the northward movement of Eastern dominant religions (Islam, Buddhism, the Baháʼí Faith, Hinduism, Taoism, and several new religions, etc.) intersect, rewriting and expanding the roster of world religions, becoming one of the most notable signs of the global religious revival. [17]17 The Baháʼí Faith is a monotheistic religion founded in 19th-century Persia, emphasizing the spiritual unity of all humankind.

全球化带来了全球人口大转移、全球产业大转移以及全球宗教大转移，而这三大转移之间又有着极为密切的联系。按照国际传教运动权威学者安德鲁•F•沃尔斯(Andrew F. Walls)的说法，在世界人口方面的所谓“欧洲大迁移”持续达五个世纪之久，这不仅以对欧洲有利的方式重新划分了世界贸易的格局和国际政治的版图，而且在全球扩张了基督宗教的势力范围。而从20世纪下半叶开始的所谓“反向大转移”即亚非拉国家向欧美的大规模移民也改变了全球文化和宗教的流向，在使西方基督教具有越来越多的非西方形式和表述的同时，上述地区的传统宗教也渐次成为西方国家的宗教。(16)西方主导宗教(基督宗教、摩门教等)的南下和东方主导宗教(伊斯兰教、佛教、巴哈伊教、印度教、道教及若干新兴宗教等)的北上互相交叉，改写并扩充了世界性宗教的花名册，成为全球宗教复兴最显著的标志之一。(17)

Just like the European population shift, the so-called "reverse great shift" also has political, economic, religious, and international relations implications. The rise of the Christian church in developing countries, known as the "Third Church," and the new missionary movements it promotes have, to a considerable extent, overturned the traditional image of missionary movements and missionaries. The traditional center and periphery of Christianity have changed places, and global Christians are therefore increasingly taking on the role of "victims" rather than "perpetrators" of so-called religious persecution. This has, to a large extent, driven the so-called international religious freedom movement initiated mainly by Western countries, especially the United States. The global expansion of Christianity and Islam and the changes in their believer structures have made the relationship between the two religions, religious freedom, and religious pluralism "increasingly important issues in 21st-century international politics." [18]18 The "Third Church" is a term used by some scholars to refer to the growing Christian communities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, distinct from the traditional Western and Eastern Orthodox churches. For example, immigration waves and the formation of international diaspora societies have embedded Eastern religions and ethnic conflicts into the heartland of the Western world, making "Islamophobia" a common phenomenon in European countries and having a huge impact on the traditional religious and ethnic integration models of immigrant-receiving countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. However, it is still too early to assert that the 20th century was the last century of white-dominated Christianity, or to declare that Christianity has decoupled from the West to become a "post-Western religion" or "multi-centric religion," or even that a "post-religious West" has emerged. The center of gravity of global Christianity's theology, institutions, and economic resources remains in the "Global North," [19]19 The "Global North" refers to developed, wealthier nations, primarily in North America, Europe, and parts of East Asia, in contrast to the "Global South" of developing countries. and the southward shift of the Christian population has not truly shaken the West's control over Christianity.

正如欧洲人口大转移一样，所谓“反向大转移”同样具有政治、经济、宗教以及国际关系的含义。被称为“第三教会”的发展中国家基督教会的崛起以及由其推动的新传教运动在较大程度上颠覆了关于传教运动和传教士的传统形象，基督教传统中心与边缘发生易位，全球基督徒也因此越来越具有所谓宗教迫害的“受害者”而非“施害者”的角色，这在很大程度上推动了由西方国家尤其是美国发端的所谓国际宗教自由运动。基督教和伊斯兰教的全球扩张和信众结构的变化使两教关系、宗教自由和宗教多元主义“日益成为21世纪国际政治的重要议题”，(18)如移民潮和国际散居社会的形成就把东方宗教与民族冲突嵌入西方世界的腹地，使“恐伊(伊斯兰教)症”成为欧洲各国的普遍现象，并且对移民接受国如英、法、德等国的传统宗教和民族融合模式产生巨大冲击。不过目前无论是断言20世纪是白人主导基督教的最后一个世纪，还是宣称基督教已与西方脱钩而成为“后西方宗教”或“多中心宗教”甚至已出现一个“后宗教的西方”，仍为时尚早，全球基督教的神学、机构和经济资源的重心仍在“全球北部”，(19)而基督教人口重心的南移并未真正撼动西方对基督宗教的掌控。

(IV) The trend of the politicization of religion has, to some extent, overturned the traditional positioning of religion in international relations.

(四)宗教政治化趋势在某种程度上颠覆了宗教在国际关系中的传统定位

Accompanying the global religious revival is the global trend of the politicization of religion and the religionization of politics. This has, to a considerable extent, overturned the traditional image of religion as quietist, passive, and apolitical, even making fundamentalism (so-called strong religion) and extremism popular explanations for the role of religion in international relations. The politicization of religion worldwide has various manifestations: the universalization of religious extremism and fundamentalism; the "political awakening" of religious groups and their large-scale involvement in the politics of various countries, especially in the field of foreign policy; the increasingly important role played by faith-based non-governmental organizations on the international political stage and the formation of transnational religious advocacy networks and international religious human rights mechanisms they promote; the "fourth wave of international terrorism" and the securitization trend of international religious issues it triggers, etc. Liberation theology in Latin America, political Islam, the American religious right, the Iranian Revolution, the upheavals in Poland and Eastern Europe, the September 11 attacks, and other religious currents and events closely related to or driven by religion have become notable markers of the politicization and radicalization of religion since the second half of the 20th century.

伴随全球宗教复兴而来的是全球性宗教政治化和政治宗教化的倾向，这在较大程度上颠覆了宗教的寂静、消极和非政治化的传统形象，甚至使基要主义(所谓强宗教)和极端主义成为宗教在国际关系中角色的流行解释。世界范围的宗教政治化有着种种不同的表现：如宗教极端主义和基要主义的普世化，如宗教团体的“政治觉醒”及其大规模介入各国政治尤其是外交政策领域，如以信仰为基础的非政府组织在国际政治舞台上扮演日益重要的角色及其所推动的跨国宗教倡议网络和宗教国际人权机制的形成、如“国际恐怖主义第四次浪潮”及其所引发的国际宗教问题安全化趋势，等等。拉美解放神学、政治伊斯兰、美国宗教右翼以及伊朗革命、波兰和东欧剧变、九一一事件等宗教思潮和与宗教密切相关或受宗教驱动的事件成为20世纪下半叶以来宗教政治化及极端化的显著标志。

In recent years, religious non-governmental organizations have been exceptionally active. They mobilize public opinion, social elites, and foreign policy decision-makers to achieve their policy goals through such resources of influence as information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, accountability politics, and global movement networks. Together with Western "middle powers"—that is, those so-called "Good Samaritan states" that advocate global social democratic values and policies—they are becoming an important factor in promoting global governance and the common good outside the state-centric international system.[20]20 The "Good Samaritan" is a reference to the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37), used here to characterize states that project a moral or humanitarian foreign policy identity. As a new type of international actor, religious NGOs represent a certain "shift in power" within existing international relations. Although religious NGOs do not possess the traditional legitimacy resources enjoyed by nation-states, they can realize their positions by resorting to economic sanctions and "humanitarian intervention,"[21]21 "Humanitarian intervention" refers to the use of force or other coercive measures by states or international bodies to protect populations from atrocities, often controversial for overriding state sovereignty. and even exhibit tendencies of "humanitarian fundamentalism," such as "the ends justify the means." However, these organizations, by crossing regional, racial, ethnic, and cultural boundaries, and by promoting economic empowerment, social improvement, cognitive liberation, political democracy, freedom of belief, transnational relief, international exchange, global governance, and world peace, have fully brought into play the positive functions of religion in international relations. Therefore, while various religious actors are making waves on the current international stage, they are also working quietly in various fields of ministry. Their basic attributes as "peacemakers," "quietists," and non-political actors have not been weakened by the news effect of the international "war of identities."

近年来，宗教非政府组织异常活跃，它们通过信息政治、象征政治、杠杆政治、责任政治和全球运动网络等影响力资源来动员公众舆论、社会精英和外交决策者以实现其政策目标，并与西方“中等国家”即那些推崇全球社会民主价值观和政策的所谓“好撒马利亚人之国”等一起，正在成为以大国为中心的国际体制之外的促进全球治理和共善的重要因素。(20)作为新型国际行为体，宗教非政府组织代表着现行国际关系的某种“权势转移”。尽管宗教非政府组织不具备民族国家所享有的传统合法性资源，但它们可通过诉诸经济制裁以及“人道主义干预”等手段来实现其主张，(21)甚至具有“为达目的不择手段”等“人道主义基要派”倾向。但这些组织在跨越地区、种族、肤色和文化界限以及在促进经济赋能、社会改良、认知解放、政治民主、信仰自由、跨国救援、国际交流、全球治理和世界和平方面，充分发挥了宗教对国际关系的正面功能。因此，各种宗教行为体不仅在当前国际舞台上呼风唤雨，而且更多地在各个事工领域默默耕耘，其“和平使者”、“寂静主义”以及非政治化的基本属性并未因国际“认同战争”的新闻效应而有所削弱。

(5) The religious internet has partially subverted the traditional model of international religious communication.

(五)宗教互联网部分颠覆了国际宗教传播的传统模式

If globalization has boosted the transnational flow of religion, then the internet has created another significant union of media and religion since the Reformation, and is even touted as having triggered a "Second Reformation." In the words of Michael Slaughter, a prominent pastor of the United Methodist Church in the United States: "Electronic media is to the 21st-century Reformation what Gutenberg's movable type was to the 16th- and 17th-century Reformation."[22]22 Johannes Gutenberg's invention of the movable-type printing press in the 15th century is widely credited with enabling the rapid spread of ideas that fueled the Protestant Reformation. Cyber-religion (also called "computer religion" or "virtual religion") has an "amplification effect" on the spread of all religions, greatly increasing the quantity of religious activities among the populace, becoming "God's microphone." The fit between the internet's "worldwide" nature and religion's "universal" nature also gives cyber-religion a greater capacity to cross national borders than any previous method of proselytism, enhancing the direct missionary capacity of religious organizations, as well as their ability to mobilize at the grassroots level, influence political agendas, and participate in global affairs. It can also rapidly make any religious issue anywhere in the world transparent, internationalized, and politicized. Whether as a new type of missionary subject or as a new tool for traditional missionary organizations, cyber-religion has already shown enormous potential in the contemporary missionary movement.

如果说全球化助推了宗教的跨国流动，那么互联网则造成自宗教改革时期以来媒体与宗教的另一次具有重大意义的结合，甚至被鼓吹为引发了“第二次宗教改革”。照美国联合卫理公会的著名牧师迈克尔•斯劳特(Michael Slaughter)的话来说：“电子媒体之于21世纪的宗教改革有如谷登堡的活字印刷之于16-17世纪的宗教改革。”(22)网络宗教(或称“电脑宗教”、“虚拟宗教”)对各种宗教的传播均有“放大效应”，大大提高了民众宗教活动的数量，成为“上帝的麦克风”。网络“世界性”与宗教“普世性”的契合，也使网络宗教具有比以往任何传教方式更大的穿越国界的能力，提升了宗教组织直接传教能力，也提高了它们社会基层动员、影响政治议程和参与全球事务的能力，并且可使世界各地的任何宗教问题迅速透明化、国际化和政治化。网络宗教无论作为新型传教主体，还是作为传统传教组织的新型工具，在当代传教运动中都已显示出巨大的潜力。

However, calling cyber-religion, with its revolutionary features of low barriers, low cost, and instantaneity, a "Second Reformation" comparable to the 16th-17th century Reformation is now difficult to sustain. First, in today's world, where culture is extremely diverse and the vast majority of countries practice separation of church and state, religion and the church are no longer the center of society, or only one center among many. Religious critique and revolution are no longer prerequisites for social critique and revolution. The conditions for producing a Reformation-style social transformation no longer exist. Second, although cyber-religion has creative and generative functions and possesses so-called negative congestion costs (i.e., online information does not decrease when someone accesses it, but instead increases), there is no qualitative difference between the internet and the comprehensive use of other new media and electronic communication tools that followed print media, such as radio, television, and telephones. In other words, the stepwise development of media has already diluted the impact of cyber-religion. Finally, the 16th-17th century Reformation was a comprehensive transformation involving doctrine and church polity, political change, economic modes, ideology and culture, and the nation-state. The influence of current cyber-religion is mainly in the realm of communication. Therefore, what cyber-religion has caused is still a tool-based change in communication and social interaction, not a major transformation of social culture, including religion.

但若将具有低门槛、低成本、即时性等革命性特征的网络宗教称作“第二次宗教改革”，与16-17世纪的“宗教改革”相提并论，现在看来是难以成立的。首先，在当前文化极为多元化和绝大多数国家实行政教分离的世界上，宗教及教会已非社会中心或只是中心之一，宗教批判和革命已非社会批判和革命的前提，产生宗教改革式社会变革的条件已不复存在。其次，网络宗教尽管具有创造和生成功能，并且具有所谓负拥挤成本(即网上信息不会因有人获取而减少，反而会因此而增加)，但网络与继纸面(平面)传媒出现的其他新型媒体和电子通讯手段如广播、电视、电话等的综合运用并无质的区别，或者说传媒拾阶而上的发展已经冲淡了网络宗教的冲击力。最后，16-17世纪宗教改革是涉及教义教制、政治变迁、经济方式、思想文化和民族国家等的全方位变革，而目前网络宗教的影响力则主要在传播领域。因此网络宗教所引起的还只是工具性的传播和社交方式而非包括宗教在内的社会文化的重大变革。

2. Research Approaches to Religion and International Relations

二、宗教与国际关系的研究路径

For a long time, social science theories rooted in Western experience since the Enlightenment have regarded religion as a dispensable epiphenomenon. The "Westphalian exile" of religion exists not only within the Western-dominated system of international relations but also within Western social science theory. The main theoretical schools of current international relations research all neglect, to varying degrees, the role of religion and culture in international relations. In fact, in many non-Western countries and religious traditions, and even in some Western countries, modernization has not led to the marginalization and privatization of religion. Therefore, the global large-scale religious revival has been described not only as "God's revenge" but also as "the East's revenge" or "the East's rebellion."[23]23 "God's revenge" alludes to the title of Gilles Kepel's book *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World* (1994), which argues that religious resurgence is a reaction to secular modernity. As Desmond Tutu, the retired Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, said, "It is only the strident secularism, so pervasive in the media and the social sciences, at least in the Western world, that blinds people to what we from Africa and other parts of the developing world have the privilege of knowing so much about."[24]24 Desmond Tutu (1931-2021) was a South African Anglican theologian and anti-apartheid activist, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. Peter Berger, the renowned professor of sociology of religion at Boston University, pointed out even more sharply that religious fundamentalism is not strange or bizarre in history or reality; on the contrary, it is those who do not think so who are strange. Therefore, "the phenomenon that is difficult to understand is not the mullahs of Iran, but the university professors of the United States."[25]25 "Mullahs of Iran" refers to the Shia Muslim clergy who have held political power in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

长期以来，植根于启蒙运动以来西方经验的社会科学理论均视宗教为可有可无的附带现象。宗教的“威斯特伐利亚放逐”不仅存在于西方主导的国际关系体系内，也存在于西方社会科学理论中。当前国际关系研究的主要理论流派均在不同程度上忽视宗教和文化在国际关系中的作用。其实在许多非西方国家和宗教传统中，甚至在一些西方国家里，现代化并未导致宗教的边缘化和私人化。因此全球大规模宗教复兴不仅被描述为“上帝的报复”，而且被形容为“东方的报复”或“东方的反叛”。(23)正如南非圣公会荣休大主教德斯蒙德•图图(Desmond Tutu)所说，“只是如此充斥媒体和社会科学的坚定的世俗主义，至少在西方国家，才使人们看不见我们这些来自非洲和发展中世界其他地方的人们有幸知之甚多的东西”。(24)波士顿大学的著名宗教社会学教授彼得•伯杰(Peter Berger)更是辛辣地指出，宗教基要主义(或原教旨主义)在历史上和现实中并不稀奇古怪，恰恰相反，稀奇古怪的正是那些并不认为如此的人们。因此“难以理解的现象并非伊朗的毛拉，而是美国的大学教授”。(25)

Ironically, although religion is prevalent in American society, the study of religion occupies a rather marginal position within political science, a first-level discipline. Two scholars studying American politics and religion, after researching the flagship journal of American political science, the *American Political Science Review*, pointed out: "Apart from economics and geography, it is hard to find a social science that pays less attention to religion than political science." They attributed the neglect of religion in American political science to the discipline's intellectual origins (e.g., influenced by behaviorism, positivism, and modernization theory), the relatively secular educational and social backgrounds of professional political scientists (e.g., most political scientists are either uninterested in religion or hostile to it), the complexity of religious issues, especially the measurement of religion (e.g., the diversity of religious denominations), and the "event-driven" or "event-oriented" research cycles and agendas of political science (e.g., religion was not headline news in the past and often failed to receive research funding), among other factors.[26]26 Behaviorism in political science emphasizes the empirical, observable behavior of individuals, often sidelining normative or cultural factors like religion. Positivism holds that only empirically verifiable knowledge is valid, which can marginalize non-empirical phenomena. The dominance of a secular worldview in universities and the secularization of American elite culture can also be traced back to the European, especially German, origins of traditional American disciplines, including political science. Some scholars regard the so-called "culture war" in the United States in recent decades, drawn along religious lines, as "a derivative and delayed reaction to the great migration of influential European intellectuals to America in the 1930s."[27]27 The "great migration of influential European intellectuals to America in the 1930s" refers to the flight of many scholars, including political scientists and sociologists, from Nazi Germany and fascist Europe to the United States, where they shaped the secular, empirical orientation of American social sciences.

具有讽刺意味的是，美国社会尽管宗教盛行，但宗教研究却在作为一级学科的政治学专业中处于相当边缘的地位。两位研究美国政治和宗教的学者在对美国政治学的旗舰期刊《美国政治学评论》(American Political Science Review)进行研究后指出：“除了经济学和地理学外，人们还很难找到比政治学更不关注宗教的一门社会科学。”他们把美国政治学对宗教的忽视归结于政治学学科的知识渊源(如受行为主义、实证主义和现代化理论的影响)、专业政治学者较为世俗的教育和社会背景(如大多数政治学者不是对宗教不感兴趣，就是仇视宗教)、宗教问题尤其是宗教测量的复杂性(如宗教派别的多样性)以及政治学受“事件驱动”或“事件导向”的研究周期和议程(如宗教在过去并非头条新闻，并且往往得不到研究资助)等。(26)世俗世界观在大学的支配地位和美国精英文化的世俗化还可以追溯到包括政治学在内的美国传统学科的欧洲尤其是德国起源。有学者就把美国近几十年来以宗教划界的所谓“文化战争”看成是“对20世纪30年代有影响的欧洲知识分子美国大迁移的派生和推迟的反应”。(27)

The global religious revival and three highly religious major events—the Iranian Revolution, the upheavals in Eastern Europe, and the world-shaking September 11 attacks—delivered a sharp rebuke to international relations theories that had neglected religion. Robert Keohane, a theorist of neoliberal institutionalism, acknowledged: “The September 11 terrorist attacks showed that all the mainstream theories of world politics were resolutely secular when it came to motivation. They ignored the influence of religion, even though political movements shaping the world have so often been fueled by religious passion.” [28]28 Robert O. Keohane, “The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’,” *Dialog-IO* (Spring 2002), p. 29. Jonathan Fox, a scholar of religion and international relations, likewise stated that the September 11 attacks “helped break the taboo against openly linking religion and international relations and opened the floodgates for research on various aspects of religion’s influence on international relations.” [29]29 Jonathan Fox, “The Multiple Impacts of Religion on International Relations,” *The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, ed. Jeffrey Haynes (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 173.

全球性宗教复兴和极具宗教性的三大事件(伊朗革命、东欧剧变及震惊世界的九一一事件)给予忽视宗教的国际关系理论以当头棒喝。新自由制度主义理论家罗伯特•基欧汉(Robert Keohane)就承认：“九一一恐怖袭击表明，世界政治的所有主流理论在论及动机时均断然世俗。它们忽视了宗教的影响，尽管塑造世界的政治运动一直如此经常地得到宗教激情的助燃。”(28)研究宗教与国际关系的学者乔纳森•福克斯(Jonathan Fox)亦称九一一事件“促进了打破把宗教与国际关系公开联系起来的禁忌的范式转移，并且打开了研究宗教对国际关系影响的各个不同方面的闸门”。(29)

Currently, Western academic research on religion and international relations has changed beyond recognition; relevant works, even entire series, are constantly emerging. Relevant data show that the number of books on Islam and war published after the September 11 attacks exceeds the total for any previous period. Works on religion and international affairs rose from an average of one per year from the 1970s to the 1990s to an average of six per year since 2002, and papers on religion published in major international relations journals increased from 15 per year before September 11 to 60 per year afterward. [30]30 See Timothy Samuel Shah and Daniel Philpott, “The Fall and Rise of Religion in International Relations: History and Theory,” *Religion and International Relations: A Primer for Research*, The University of Notre Dame, 2006, p. 3. Regarding the relevance of religion to international relations, Western scholars—especially international relations scholars—offer analyses that, while not identical, are broadly similar. It is generally believed that religion influences states’ foreign policies and international relations mainly through such pathways as religious worldviews, sources of legitimacy, institutions and leaders, group identity, diplomatic soft power, transnational religious movements, and issues. [31]31 See Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 23-24. The forms of internationalization of religious issues vary and overlap, and religion often does not operate alone. However, religion—a topic typically treated in international relations research as a secondary category or dependent variable linked to secular phenomena such as terrorism and civilization—has now entered the mainstream of international relations scholarship and begun to become a relatively independent field of study.

目前西方学界对宗教与国际关系的研究已今非昔比，有关论著甚至是系列论著可说是不断涌现。有关数据表明，九一一事件发生后出版的有关伊斯兰教和战争的著作超过了以往任何时期的总和，有关宗教与国际事务的著作从20世纪70年代至90年代的平均每年一本上升至2002年以来的平均每年六本，在主要国际关系期刊上发表的有关宗教的论文也从九一一事件之前的每年15篇增至之后的每年60篇。(30)关于宗教与国际关系的关联性，西方学者尤其是国际关系学者的分析虽不尽相同但大致接近。一般认为，宗教主要通过宗教世界观、合法性来源、机构和领袖、群体认同、外交软实力、跨国宗教运动和议题等路径作用于各国对外政策和国际关系。(31)宗教问题国际化的表现形式各异，交互重叠，宗教往往也并非单独发挥作用，但目前宗教这一通常在国际关系研究中被作为与恐怖主义和文明等世俗现象相关联的次类范畴或因变量来加以处理的课题在国际关系学界已登堂入室，开始成为一个相对独立的研究范畴。

Nevertheless, both religious studies and international relations are low-threshold disciplines that various fields can engage with, and the same applies to the study of religion and international relations. Regarding how to study religion and international relations, the academic community is divided, proposing various research pathways and approaches. Some scholars divide the study of religion and international relations into two major blocks: history and current conditions. One block is the study of history, that is, exploring the religious roots of ideas in international relations and the religious roots of international relations or modernity. The other block is the study of current conditions, or primarily examining the current global religious revival and the role of religion in contemporary international politics and international institutions. [32]32 See Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, “The Return from Exile: An Introduction,” *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, eds. Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 1-20.

不过，宗教学和国际关系学都是各种学科均可染指的门槛较低的学科，宗教与国际关系研究也是如此。对于如何研究宗教与国际关系，学界可说是众说纷纭，提出了各种研究路径和方案。有学者把宗教与国际关系的研究分为历史和现状两大板块：一大板块是对历史的研究，即探讨国际关系理念的宗教根源以及国际关系或现代性的宗教根源等；另一大板块是对现状的研究，或者说主要探讨当前的全球宗教复兴以及宗教在当前国际政治和国际体制中的作用等。(32)

Currently, the main research pathways adopted by the academic community are still the so-called “genealogical” or “archaeological” approach—that is, studying the aforementioned “roots of religion”—or the “organizational approach,” which studies various religious actors in international relations, and the “positivist approach,” which places the study of religion and international relations on the basis of positivism and functionalism, such as rational choice theory. These three pathways all more or less suffer from the defect of reductionism or “reducing the sacred to the secular.” In fact, there is indeed a fundamental tension between religion and international relations as disciplines, because people “cannot resolve the conflict between the transcendent and the secular at the ontological and epistemological levels.” [33]33 Vendulka Kubálková, “Toward an International Political Theology,” *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, eds. Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 80. Research methods for religion are generally summarized into three pathways: the humanistic, the theological, and the scientific (or positivist). International relations as a social science more readily accepts scientific (or positivist) religious research but finds it more difficult to accommodate humanistic and theological religious research. Therefore, the first two “turns” in international relations—the “political economy turn” and the “sociology turn”—were relatively easier as “mergers of like items.” Although a “religious turn” in international relations has been proposed, the two are “unlike items,” making merger more difficult. Promoting interdisciplinary research and breaking through the disciplinary boundaries of international relations also faces the question of whether non-positivist research on religion and international relations is feasible. [34]34 See Vendulka Kubálková, “Toward an International Political Theology,” *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, eds. Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 79-80.

目前学界采用的研究路径主要还是所谓“家谱学”或“考古学”路径，即研究上述“宗教之根源”或“组织学路径”，研究国际关系中的各种宗教行为体以及“实证主义进路”，把对宗教与国际关系置于实证主义和功能主义研究如理性选择理论的基础之上。此三种路径多多少少都存在着还原主义或“还圣为俗”的缺陷。事实上，宗教与国际关系学之间确实存在着基本张力，因为人们实在“无法在本体论和认识论上来解决超验和世俗之间的冲突”。(33)对宗教的研究方法一般被归纳为人文、神学和科学(或实证)三种路径，作为社会科学的国际关系学较易接纳科学(或实证)的宗教研究，但却较难包容人文和神学的宗教研究。因此国际关系学的前两次转向，即“政治经济学转向”和“社会学转向”作为“同类项合并”相对较为容易；而国际关系学的“宗教转向”虽已被提出，但两者互为“异类项”，合并则较为困难；而提倡跨学科研究，冲破国际关系学的学科界限，同样也面临着对宗教与国际关系的非实证性研究是否可行的问题。(34)

Some scholars have offered other critical methodological summaries of current research on religion and international relations. For example, political scientist Ron E. Hassner proposed three routes for studying religion and international relations: the broad route, the deep route, and the thick route. Researchers taking the so-called broad route focus their attention on the international relations stage without delving deeply into religion itself; their analysis tends to highly essentialize religion and reduce its role to social, economic, or political influences. The representative figure and work of this route are Samuel Huntington, founder of the “clash of civilizations” theory, and the “Culture and Religion in International Relations” series published by Praeger Publishers in New York. In lay terms, this route might be described as “seeing only the forest of international relations without seeing the trees of religion.” Researchers taking the so-called deep route typically focus on a detailed examination of a particular religious movement or a regional religion, without offering generalized or overarching conclusions in the field of international relations. Representative works of this route include the multi-volume study of religious fundamentalism led by American religious scholars Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, and Vali Nasr’s famous study of Shia Islam, *The Shia Revival*. Although these studies are authoritative in religious research, they fail to draw broader inferences and distill universal theories that contribute to international relations theory. The scholar advocates a compromise route, the so-called thick route. This route combines the deep route, which conducts in-depth research on religion and focuses on domestic and regional aspects, with the broad route, which emphasizes positivism and has an international and universal orientation. At each intermediate level of this research process—from the national to the regional to the international—it gradually merges reflectivism with positivism, and religious epistemology with international relations epistemology. Representative authors are Mark Juergensmeyer, who studies religious terrorism, and Daniel Philpott, who studies religious reform. Although the term “thick” is derived from the famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s research term “thick description,” these five English letters also carry a special meaning, respectively representing theology, hierarchy, iconography (or symbol), ceremony, and knowledge (or belief) in religion. This implies that, on the basis of fully attending to case studies of religion, one should summarize and distill broader theories to explain phenomena in international relations. [35]35 See Ron E. Hassner, “Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art,” *Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice*, ed. Patrick James (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 37-56.

有学者对当前宗教与国际关系的研究做了其他方法论的批评性归纳。如政治学者罗恩•哈斯纳(Ron E. Hassner)就提出了研究宗教与国际关系的宽泛、深窄和厚实三种路线。走所谓宽泛路线(broad route)的研究者将其注意力集中在国际关系舞台而不去深究宗教本身，其分析倾向于把宗教高度本质化并且将宗教作用还俗为社会、经济或政治的影响。这种路线的代表人物和著作就是“文明冲突论”的创始人塞缪尔•亨廷顿(Samuel Huntington)以及纽约普雷格出版社推出的“国际关系中的文化和宗教”系列丛书，用通俗的话来说该路线大概就是“只见国际关系的树林而不见宗教的树木”；走所谓深窄路线(deep route)的研究者通常把侧重点放在对某一宗教运动或某一区域性宗教的详尽考察上，而未在国际关系领域提出归纳和总体性的结论。这种路线的代表著作就是美国宗教学者马丁•马蒂(Martin Marty)和斯科特•阿普尔比(Scott Appleby)主持的多卷本宗教基要主义研究项目以及瓦利•纳斯尔(Vali Nasr)研究什叶派的名著《什叶派的复兴》(The Shia Revival)。这些研究虽然在宗教研究上堪称权威，但却未能举一反三，提炼出普遍性理论而对国际关系理论研究有所贡献。该学者倡导的是折中路线即所谓厚实路线(thick route)，此种路线把对宗教进行深入研究、侧重国内和区域性的深窄路线与强调实证主义、具有国际性和普遍性取向的宽泛路线结合起来，并在此种从国家到区域再到国际的研究过程的每一中间层面把反思主义与实证主义、宗教认识论与国际关系认识论渐次加以融合，其代表作者是分别研究宗教恐怖主义和宗教改革的学者马克•杰根史迈耶(Mark Juergensmeyer)和丹尼尔•菲尔波特(Daniel Philpott)。厚实(thick)一词虽脱胎于著名人类学家克利福德•格尔茨(Cliford Geertz)研究术语“深描(thick description)”，但这五个英文字母也别有寓意，分别代表宗教的神学(theology)、机构(hierarchy)、符号(iconography or symbol)、仪式(ceremony)和信仰知识(knowledge or belief)，意指需在充分注重宗教个案研究的基础上归纳提炼出解释国际关系现象的较广泛理论。(35)

However, although the above-mentioned substantive approach attempts to balance the two fields of study of religion and international issues, it still fails to address how international relations theory should view and handle religion and the global religious resurgence. A decade after relevant scholars declared that religion had returned to international relations, the impact of religion on the discipline of international relations remains relatively limited. “Mainstream scholars of international relations still find it difficult to integrate religious issues into their usual conceptual frameworks,” and the three major paradigms of international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) not only fail to “provide clear guidance” for such integration, but also “in some cases imply that within the logic of their paradigms, the status of religion may not even be recognized.” [36]36 Andrew Walls, “The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History,” p. 50, as cited in the original. Jack Snyder, an international relations scholar at Columbia University, has summarized four research approaches or attitudes toward religion within the international relations theoretical community: (1) discussing the role of religion in the state system and other matters within traditional paradigms, which can be called the conservative school; (2) religion should replace existing paradigms and become the main prism through which international relations is viewed, which can be called the transformative school; (3) advocating for adjusting basic perspectives on the world due to religion while incorporating insights from traditional paradigms, which can be called the eclectic or revisionist school; (4) avoiding paradigm issues and studying more targeted hypotheses in which religion serves as an independent or dependent variable, which can be called the pragmatic school. [37]37 Zhuo Xinping, “Globalization and Contemporary Religion,” as cited in the original. The divergence between the transformative school and the other three schools lies in whether to “rebuild the discipline” by means of religious factors (i.e., using religion as a non-positivist orientation to redefine and transform the discipline of international relations, such as establishing international political theology [38]38 Scott M. Thomas, “Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007, p. 21. and other transformative proposals), or whether international relations should “face up to” and “co-opt” religion (i.e., treating religion as an important object of study, or “mainstreaming” it within international relations research). The latter, especially the eclectic or revisionist school, argues that although the three major theoretical paradigms of international relations appear to neglect or even reject religion on the surface, they have in fact “provided a solid foundation upon which frameworks for studying religion and international relations can be built,” and that religious research can fully help “construct core assumptions for each major disciplinary paradigm” and “enrich the insights of their paradigms.” [39]39 Reference to the original author’s note 49, which is not provided in the source text. Currently, the mainstream international relations academic community clearly identifies more with the latter than the former, so the global religious resurgence has at most only a partial “subversive” effect on the discipline of international relations.

然而上述厚实路线虽然试图平衡宗教与国际问题两种研究，但仍未回应国际关系理论应如何看待和处理宗教及全球宗教复兴的问题。在有关学者宣布宗教已回归国际关系的十年后，宗教对国际关系学科的影响仍比较有限，“国际关系的主流学者仍发现难以将宗教议题融入他们通常的概念框架”，而国际关系的三大主要范式(现实主义、自由主义和建构主义)不仅未能为此种融入“提供明确指引”，并且“在某些情况下还暗示在其范式的逻辑内宗教的地位可能还得不到承认”。哥伦比亚大学的国际关系学者杰克•斯奈德(Jack Snyder)归纳了国际关系理论界对宗教的四种研究路径或态度：(1)在传统范式内讨论宗教对国家体系等的作用，可称为守旧派；(2)宗教应取代现有范式而成为透视国际关系的主要棱镜，可称为改造派；(3)主张因宗教而调整看待世界的基本观点，同时吸纳传统范式的见解，可称为折中派或修正派；(4)回避范式问题而研究宗教为其中自变或因变量的较有针对性的假设，可称为实用派。(36)改造派与其余三派的分歧在于是借宗教因素而“重建学科”(即把宗教作为重新界定和改造国际关系学科的非实证主义导向，如建立国际政治神学(37)等改造方案)，还是国际关系应“正视”和“收编”宗教(即把宗教作为重要的研究对象，或使其在国际关系研究中“主流化”)。后者尤其是折中派或修正派认为，从表面上看国际关系三大理论范式似乎忽视甚至摒弃宗教，但实际上它们已“提供了研究宗教与国际关系的框架得以建立在其上的坚固基石”，而宗教研究完全有助于“为每个主要学科范式建构核心假设”，并且“可丰富其范式的洞察力”。(38)目前国际关系主流学界显然主要认同后者而非前者，因而全球宗教复兴对国际关系学科充其量也只有部分“颠覆性”而已。

The intervention of international relations theory is undoubtedly an important factor in the in-depth development of the study of religion and international relations and its “mainstreaming” within the discipline of international relations. The author has previously pointed out that the study of religion and international relations or international issues can be divided into narrow and broad senses: the narrow sense of the study of religion and international relations can refer solely to the study of international religious issues based on the discipline of international relations or political science; while the broad sense of the study of religion and international relations generally refers to the study of international religious issues by disciplines other than international relations. In terms of topics, the above fields can also be divided into “primary topics” and “shared topics.” [40]40 Reference to the original author’s note 50, which is not provided in the source text. Although making such distinctions is somewhat arbitrary, it helps to understand the current state and prospects of the study of religion and international issues. Generally speaking, the former, i.e., the narrow sense of the study of religion and international relations, developed relatively late abroad, and it was only at the end of the 20th century, especially after the September 11 attacks, that this lagging situation began to improve; the latter, i.e., the broad sense of the study of religion and international relations, developed earlier and is relatively more advanced, mainly due to contributions from disciplines such as theology/philosophy, religious studies, sociology, history, and diplomacy. In the West, the above two types of research—narrow and broad—can now be said to be equally matched, and in fact many relevant works are the joint product of these two types of research. Although international relations as a discipline cannot monopolize research in this field, the study of religion and international relations can only gain indispensable and even more powerful analytical tools by fully integrating into the discipline of international relations. [41]41 A Chinese idiom describing two fields or groups that operate in parallel without interaction.

国际关系理论的介入，无疑是宗教与国际关系研究深入开展和在国际关系学科领域“主流化”的重要因素。笔者曾指出，宗教与国际关系或国际问题研究可有狭义和广义之分：狭义的宗教与国际关系研究可单指基于国际关系或政治学学科对国际宗教问题的研究；而广义的宗教与国际关系研究则泛指国际关系学科以外的其他学科对国际宗教问题的研究。就议题而言，上述领域还可有“主议题”与“共议题”之分。(39)做此类区分虽有武断成分，却有助于了解宗教与国际问题研究的现状和前景。总的来说，前者即狭义宗教与国际关系研究在国外开展较晚，只是在20世纪末尤其是九一一事件以来，这种滞后局面才有所改观；后者即广义的宗教与国际关系研究则开展较早且相对发达，这主要归功于神/哲学、宗教学、社会学、历史学、外交学等学科的贡献。在西方，目前上述狭义和广义两类研究可说是平分秋色，事实上许多有关论著为此两类研究的共同结晶。国际关系作为一门学科虽不能包揽该领域的研究，但宗教与国际关系研究只有完全融入国际关系学科才能获得不可或缺甚至更为有力的分析工具。(40)

III. The Impact of the “Return of Religion” in International Relations on China

三、国际关系“宗教回归”对中国的影响

Alongside the global religious resurgence since the 1970s, especially after the end of the Cold War, Chinese society has also entered an unprecedented period of development and transformation. Economically, China has replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest economy; politically, China has to some extent become a successful model for emerging and developing countries, with terms such as “China experience” and the “Beijing Consensus” appearing internationally; culturally, following the “going global” strategy in the economy, China’s “going global” strategy in culture has also gained considerable scale, with the increasing number of Confucius Institutes around the world being a clear example; religiously, various authoritative data indicate that China is not only a traditional but also an emerging “religious power,” with the growth of mainstream religions, the rise of new religious movements, and the revival of folk religions intertwining, [42] forming part of the global religious resurgence. The “return of religion” in international relations and the trend of the politicization of religion, along with changes in the domestic religious landscape, have also made religion a prominent issue in China’s domestic and foreign affairs. Religion involves the spiritual needs and lifestyles of hundreds of millions of people, and in the political and social spheres, it concerns the overall work of the Party and the state. It is one of the five major relationships (i.e., relations between political parties, ethnic groups, religions, social strata, and compatriots at home and abroad) that the united front work needs to comprehensively grasp and correctly handle. Therefore, if “one cannot understand international relations without paying attention to religion,” [43] then without paying attention to religion, we likewise cannot understand contemporary Chinese society.

在20世纪70年代尤其是冷战结束以来的全球宗教复兴的同时，中国社会也进入了前所未有的发展和转型期。在经济上，中国已取代日本成为世界第二大经济体；在政治上，中国在某种程度上已成为新兴国家和发展中国家的成功典范，国际上甚至有“中国经验”以及“北京共识”等说法；在文化上，继经济“走出去”战略之后，中国文化“走出去”战略也颇具规模，遍布世界各地数量越来越多的孔子学院就是此种战略的显例；在宗教上，各种权威数据均表明中国不仅是传统而且是新兴“宗教大国”，主流宗教的增长、新兴宗教的崛起以及民间信仰的复兴相互交织，(41)成为全球宗教复兴的一个组成部分。国际关系的“宗教回归”和宗教政治化趋势以及国内宗教格局的变化，也使宗教成为中国内政外交的突出问题。宗教涉及数以亿计的民众群体的精神需求和生活方式，在政治和社会领域中涉及党和国家工作全局，是统一战线工作需要全面把握和正确处理的五个重大关系(即政党关系、民族关系、宗教关系、阶层关系和海内外同胞关系)之一。因此，如果说“不重视宗教就无法理解国际关系”，(42)那么不重视宗教我们同样无法理解当前中国社会。

The global religious resurgence has caused a certain impact on China’s religious ecology and the pattern of state-religion relations. First, because the Chinese government explicitly prohibits foreign churches from proselytizing in China, missionaries are no longer the main spiritual link between China and foreign countries. Since reform and opening up, Sino-foreign religious exchanges have entered a so-called “post-missionary era,” with Western (and Eastern) Christian missions moving from the front stage to the backstage, but substantive exchanges are more diverse and complex than ever before. [44] The transnational spread of religion has broken the relatively stable religious ecology that existed in China before reform and opening up, causing a significant impact on China’s current pattern of “five major religions” and creating tensions with China’s religious management model. Second, the barrier-free spread of online religion, along with its openness, virtuality, transnationality, and penetrative nature, has left most of China’s current laws and regulations, which restrict religious activities to tangible spaces and physical forms, lagging behind, and poses challenges to both China’s religious management and online management work. Third, since the end of the Cold War, the role of religion in Western, especially U.S., foreign policy has become increasingly prominent. The “evangelicalization” of U.S. foreign policy has made religion a prominent issue in Sino-U.S. relations, not only making China a “country of particular concern” for the United States on the so-called “religious freedom issue,” but also “internationalizing” China’s religious issues, drawing high attention from the international community. Fourth, international religious movements and domestic and international religious extremist forces have placed China in a situation in the field of national security where “factors of traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats are intertwined.” [45] With the encouragement of international political and religious forces, the political and violent actions of the three forces of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and terrorism against China are escalating, and currently clearly constitute the most direct, sudden, and violent threat to China’s national security; while various forms of international religious human rights movements and religious non-governmental organizations are usually non-violent, their influence is broader or has a wide popular base, and they have the potential to fuel “color revolutions,” thus becoming a more regular factor affecting China’s national security. In fact, for China’s national

全球宗教复兴对中国的宗教生态和政教格局造成了一定的冲击。第一，由于中国政府明令禁止外国教会来华传教，传教士不再是中外之间的主要精神纽带。改革开放以来，中外宗教交流已进入所谓“后传教时代”，西方(以及东方)的基督教差会从台前退居幕后，但实质性交流却比以往任何时候都更为多样化和复杂化。(43)宗教的跨国传播打破了中国改革开放前相对稳定的宗教生态，对中国现行“五大宗教”格局形成较大冲击，并且与中国的宗教管理模式产生了张力。第二，网络宗教的无障碍传播及其网络宗教的开放性、虚拟性、跨国性和渗透性，使中国现行的将宗教活动限于有形空间和实体形式的大部分法律、法规处于滞后状态，并且对中国政府的宗教及网络管理工作都形成挑战。第三，冷战结束以来，宗教在西方尤其是在美国对外政策中的作用日益显著。美国外交政策的“福音化”使宗教成为中美关系中的突出问题，这不仅使中国在所谓“宗教自由问题”上成为美国的“特别关注国”，而且使中国宗教问题“国际化”而受到国际社会的高度关注。第四，国际宗教运动以及国内外宗教极端主义势力使中国在国家安全领域面临“传统安全威胁和非传统安全威胁的因素相互交织”(44)的局面。在国际政治和宗教势力的推波助澜之下，宗教极端主义、民族分裂主义、恐怖主义三股势力针对中国的政治和暴力行动在不断升级，目前显然已构成对中国国家安全的最直接、最具突发性和暴力性的威胁；而形形色色的国际宗教人权运动和宗教非政府组织通常不具暴力性，但其影响范围更大或具有广泛的群众性，并且有助推“颜色革命”的能量，因此成为影响中国国家安全的更为经常性的因素。事实上对中国国家安全来说，暴力性组织往往正是借助互联网等现代科技手段以及所谓宗教自由倡议团体的支持来开展活动的。(45)

As a carrier of traditional culture, a spiritual bond for national unity, and an element shaping China’s international image, Chinese religion also possesses unprecedented room for development in the age of globalization. China is a major religious country with abundant religious resources. The enhancement of China’s national strength has created conditions for the outward projection of religious influence. The growth of various religions in China and the vast number of overseas adherents of China’s various religions and folk beliefs can be said to constitute a hidden line of defense for China’s national sovereignty and interests. When discussing the growth of Christianity in China, Andrew Walls reminds us that we must not forget that “Chinese Christianity is not confined to China; Christians among the overseas Chinese population throughout Asia and beyond are now numerous,” and this constitutes a major development of Christianity in the twentieth century. He even argues that the interaction between Christianity and ancient Asian cultures “has opened an era comparable, in terms of theological creativity, to the encounter between Christianity and Greek culture from the second to the fourth centuries.” [36]36 Andrew Walls, “The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History,” p. 50, as cited in the original. Various traditional Chinese religions and beliefs, with longer histories and larger numbers of adherents, have long been the main channels through which other countries, especially neighboring countries, come to know and contact China at the grassroots level, and they are important resources for China’s public and people-to-people diplomacy. Coexisting with the global “Chinese economic circle” and “cultural China,” and serving as their value and institutional foundation, a “religious China” or “faith China” is steadily growing. Today, China is already the world’s largest producer and exporter of Bibles, and also one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of religious products such as Buddhist relics, Hindu icons, Russian icons, and Christmas gifts. However, these still represent the commodification or materialization of religion, lacking theological and cultural added value; Chinese religion remains at an extensive and inward-looking stage of development, and currently does not possess sufficient capacity for international scholarly dialogue. Yet this situation will change considerably as Chinese religion increasingly goes abroad. Given time, the traditional concepts and practices of Chinese religion, such as “多元通和” (pluralistic harmony) and “和合共生” (harmonious coexistence), will inevitably exert a significant influence on world religious exchange and dialogue, “sending the harmonious wind westward to provide a model of religious harmony for the international community to draw upon in resolving religious relations,” [37]37 Zhuo Xinping, “Globalization and Contemporary Religion,” as cited in the original. challenging the so-called international formula that a religious minority reaching 10%-20% of a country’s population is “sufficient to resist policies promoting religious harmony and even to support liberation struggles,” [38]38 Scott M. Thomas, “Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007, p. 21. and realizing a transformation in identity from a global supplier of religious commodities to a provider of institutional religious public goods.

作为传统文化的载体、国家统一的精神纽带以及塑造中国国际形象的要素，中国宗教在全球化时代也具有前所未有的发展空间。中国是宗教大国，具有丰富的宗教资源。中国的国力增强，为宗教影响力的对外投射创造了条件。中国各种宗教的增长以及中国各种宗教和民间信仰的广大海外信徒，可说是构成了中国国家主权和利益的隐性防线。在谈到中国基督教的增长时，安德鲁•沃尔斯便提醒人们不能忘记“中国基督教并不限于中国；遍布亚洲及亚洲以外的海外中国人口中的基督徒目前已为数庞大”，而这是基督教在20世纪的一大发展。他甚至认为基督教与亚洲古老文化的互动“就神学创造性而言开创了一个堪与基督教在公元2世纪至4世纪与希腊文化相遇相提并论的时代”。(46)历史更为悠久以及信徒人数更多的各种中国传统宗教和信仰，早已成为其他国家尤其是周边国家从草根层次认识和接触中国的主要途径，并且是中国公共和民间外交的重要资源。与全球性“中国经济圈”和“文化中国”并存且作为其价值观和机构性基础的“宗教中国”或“信仰中国”正在不断增长。如今，中国已经是世界上最大的《圣经》生产和出口国，也是世界上最大的宗教产品如佛教圣物、印度圣像、俄国圣像、圣诞礼品的生产与出口国之一，但这些还是宗教的商品化或物化，还不具备神学和文化附加值；中国宗教仍处于粗放和内向的发展阶段，目前也不具备国际学理对话的充分能力。不过此种情形随中国宗教日益走出国门将有较大改观。假以时日，中国宗教的“多元通和”、“和合共生”的传统理念和实践势必对世界宗教交流和对话产生重要影响，“‘和风西送’，为国际社会解决宗教关系提供可供借鉴的宗教和睦模式”，(47)挑战宗教少数派如达到一国人口的10%-20%便“足以抵御促进宗教和谐政策甚至可支持解放斗争”的所谓国际公式，(48)并且实现从全球宗教商品提供者到制度性宗教公共产品提供者的身份转变。

At present, China’s international engagement is no longer limited to the political and economic spheres but increasingly extends to the cultural and religious spheres. With the deepening of China’s reform and opening up, the ordering of China’s national interests in the post-Cold War period has changed and become increasingly diversified. Safeguarding national sovereignty and unity, upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist path, promoting harmonious economic and social development, and shaping the image of a major power can be said to constitute the four major components of China’s current national interests. National interests are formed through two-way construction; once internal survival and economic development are secured, the pursuit of national interests naturally incorporates more externally constructed factors such as international status and international image. International image is an important source of a country’s soft power, and religious image is a particularly weighty element of international image. Properly handling domestic and international religious issues has therefore become a crucial link in China’s effort to establish the image of a responsible major power. [39]39 Reference to the original author’s note 49, which is not provided in the source text. Chinese religious scholar Zhuo Xinping has pointed out that understanding and handling domestic religious issues must take into account their international significance and impact, and that religious issues should be linked to China’s “cultural strategy,” making religion an important component of China’s “soft power” when leveraging its positive role. [40]40 Reference to the original author’s note 50, which is not provided in the source text. China’s “going global” strategy should be comprehensive and systematically coordinated. It is difficult to imagine a sustainable economic going-global strategy without the support of traditional culture, and equally difficult to imagine traditional culture lacking a religious background and value foundation. Religion has always been an important part of cultural exchange between China and foreign countries. Public and people-to-people diplomacy, whether in the past or present, has been the main channel through which religion and religious organizations have intervened in China’s foreign relations, yet it is an issue neglected by various sectors, becoming a shortcoming or gap in China’s public diplomacy practice and theoretical research.

当前，中国的国际参与已不再限于政治和经济领域，而是日益涉及文化和宗教领域。随着中国改革开放的深入发展，在后冷战时期中国国家利益的排序已经发生变化并且日益多元化，维护国家的主权和统一、坚持中国共产党的领导和社会主义道路、促进经济和社会的和谐发展以及塑造大国形象，可以说已构成当前中国国家利益的四大要件。国家利益是由双向建构形成的，在内部生存和经济发展得到保障后，国家利益的追求自然会加入更多的外部建构因素如国际地位和国际形象。国际形象是一国软实力的重要来源，而宗教形象又是分量极重的国际形象要素，处理好国内外宗教问题因此也成为中国树立负责任大国形象的重要环节之一。(49)中国宗教学者卓新平曾指出，认识和处理国内宗教问题一定要考虑其国际意义及国际影响，而且对待宗教问题应与中国的“文化战略”相联系，在发挥宗教积极作用时使之成为中国“软实力”的重要构成。(50)中国的“走出去”战略应是全方位和系统配套的。我们很难设想没有传统文化支撑的可持续的经济走出去战略，同样也很难设想缺乏宗教背景和价值观基础的传统文化。宗教向来是中外文化交流的重要组成部分。公共以及民间外交无论是过去还是现在都是宗教和宗教团体介入中国对外关系的主要途径，但却是被各界忽视的议题，成为中国公共外交实践和理论研究中的短板或缺项。

The so-called “post-missionary era” of Sino-foreign religious exchange has greatly promoted China’s religious studies research, narrowing the gap with the international academic community. The level of religious studies research in domestic universities and related research institutions has gradually risen; some universities now rival or even surpass American private comprehensive universities in the number of religious studies research projects and religious courses offered. To some extent, this indicates that in the era of global religious resurgence, Chinese universities and related research institutions possess considerable foresight and adaptability, not only having the capacity to provide academic support and talent reserves for China’s foreign strategy in the field of religious studies, but also having themselves become platforms for Sino-foreign academic exchange and authoritative channels for mutual understanding in this field. The two disciplines of international relations and religious studies, one old and one new, are both relatively popular fields in Chinese academia, but there is little interaction between them, described as “vehicles running on two separate tracks.” [41]41 A Chinese idiom describing two fields or groups that operate in parallel without interaction. In recent years, many scholars, especially religious studies researchers, have actively engaged in discussions on religion and international relations, shifting their focus from “the immediate” to “the distant”; meanwhile, the international relations field has moved from completely ignoring religious issues to paying them a certain degree of attention, shifting from “the secular” to “the sacred.” Not only are there signs of mutual learning between religious studies and international relations, but there are also signs of cross-fertilization between broad and narrow studies of religion and international relations—that is, between broad and deep research approaches. Influenced by the global religious resurgence, drawing on China’s profound religious traditions, driven by the developmental needs of their own disciplines, and propelled by China’s foreign strategic interests, the study of religion and international relations has every possibility of attracting increasing attention from academia.

所谓“后传教时代”的中外宗教交流，大大推动了中国的宗教学研究，缩短了与国际学术界的差距。国内高校和相关研究机构宗教研究水准渐次攀升，部分高校在宗教研究项目和开设宗教课程的数量上已堪与美国私立综合性大学相比，甚至有过之而无不及。这在某种程度上意味着在全球宗教复兴的时代中国高校和相关研究机构具有较高的前瞻性和适应性，不仅具备在宗教学领域为中国对外战略提供学术支撑和人才储备的能力，而且自身也已成为在该领域中外学术的交流平台和相互认知的权威渠道。国际关系和宗教学新老两大学科目前均为中国学界相对热门的学科，但两大学科之间较少互动，被形容为“两股道上跑的车”。(51)近年来不少学者尤其是宗教学研究者积极介入对宗教与国际关系的讨论，把关注点从“身边”转向“天边”；而国际关系学界对宗教问题从完全忽略发展到一定程度的关注，从“世俗”转向“神圣”，不仅宗教学与国际关系学之间出现相互取经的端倪，而且宗教与国际关系广、狭义的研究，即宽泛与深窄研究路线之间也开始出现对流趋势。受全球宗教复兴影响、凭借中国博大精深的宗教传统、基于自身学科发展需要，并且由中国对外战略利益驱动的宗教与国际关系研究完全有可能引起学界越来越多的关注。

Notes:

注释：

①Scott M. Thomas, “Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007, p. 21.

①Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007, p. 21.

②See Conn Hallinan, “Religion and Foreign Policy: Politics by Other Means,” The Berkeley Daily Planet, November 9, 2007; Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, “Religion: The One, the Few, and the Many,” in Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1-3.

②参见Conn Hallinan, "Religion and Foreign Policy: Politics by Other Means," The Berkeley Dailey Planet, November 9, 2007; Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, "Religion: The One, the Few, and the Many," in Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1-3。

③Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Theorizing Religious Resurgence,” International Politics, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2007, p. 647.

③Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Theorizing Religious Resurgence," International Politics, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2007, p. 647.

④Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, pp. 28-32.

④Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, pp. 28-32.

⑤Ken R. Dark, "Large-Scale Religious Change and World Politics," in Ken R. Dark, ed., *Religion and International Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p. 73.

⑤Ken R. Dark, "Large-Scale Religious Change and World Politics," in Ken R. Dark, ed., Religion and International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p. 73.

⑥See Philip Jenkins, "Godless Europe?" *International Bulletin of Missionary Research*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2005, pp. 115-120.

⑥参见Philip Jenkins, "Godless Europe?" International Bulletin of Missionary Research, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2005, pp. 115-120.

⑦Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," p. 21.

⑦Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," p. 21.

⑧On the discussion of new secularization, see Xu Yihua, ed., *Religion and American Society – The "Road Map" of American Religion*, Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2004, pp. 6-11.

⑧关于新世俗化的讨论，参见徐以骅主编：《宗教与美国社会——美国宗教的“路线图”》，北京：时事出版社2004年版，第6-11页。

⑨See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. For a detailed discussion and critique of this work, which "reflects the revisionist view of secularization theory," see Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," pp. 21-45; also see Eva Bellin, "Faith in Politics, New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2008, pp. 331-334.

⑨参见Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004。关于对该“反映世俗化理论修正派观点”的论著的详尽讨论和批评，参见Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," pp. 21-45; 另参见Eva Bellin, "Faith in Politics, New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics," World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2008, pp. 331-334.

⑩N. J. Demerath Ⅲ and Rhys H. Williams, *A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New English City*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 255-301.

⑩N. J. Demerath Ⅲ and Rhys H. Williams, A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New English City, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 255-301.

(11)Scott M. Thomas, "A Globalized God: Religion's Growing Influence in International Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010, pp. 97-98.

(11)Scott M. Thomas, "A Globalized God: Religion's Growing Influence in International Politics," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010, pp. 97-98.

(12)Scott M. Thomas, "Religion and International Conflict," in Ken R. Dark, ed., *Religion and International Relations*, pp. 14-18; Richard Falk, "A Worldwide Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization and Apocalyptic Terrorism," in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2003, pp. 181-205; Jeff Haynes, "Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 157.

(12)Scott M. Thomas, "Religion and International Conflict," in Ken R. Dark, ed., Religion and International Relations, pp. 14-18; Richard Falk, "A Worldwide Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization and Apocalyptic Terrorism," in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2003, pp. 181-205; Jeff Haynes, "Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 157.

(13)The "responsibility to protect" was initially proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). See Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, p. 741.

(13)“保护责任”最初由于预与国家主权国际委员会(ICISS)提出。参见Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, p. 741.

(14)Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," pp. 748-749.

(14)Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," pp. 748-749.

(15)Jack Snyder, ed., *Religion and International Relations Theory*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, Introduction, p. 5.

(15)Jack Snyder, ed., Religion and International Relations Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, Introduction, p. 5.

(16) Andrew F. Walls, “The Dynamics of Christianity and Culture in the Context of Five Centuries,” paper presented at International Symposium on Christianity and Sino-US Relations, May 21-22, 2011, Beijing, Symposium Proceedings, pp. 69-70.

(16)Andrew F. Walls, "The Dynamics of Christianity and Culture in the Context of Five Centuries," paper presented at International Symposium on Christianity and Sino-US Relations, May 21-22, 2011, Beijing, Symposium Proceedings, pp. 69-70.

(17) Xu Yihua, “The ‘Four Crossings’ in the Study of Contemporary International Missionary Movements,” in World Religious Culture, No. 1, 2010, p. 65.

(17)徐以骅：《当代国际传教运动研究的“四个跨越”》，载《世界宗教文化》，2010年第1期，第65页。

(18) Scott M. Thomas, “Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion,” p. 30.

(18)Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," p. 30.

(19) See Robert Wuthnow, Boundless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

(19)参见Robert Wuthnow, Boundless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

(20) Western “middle powers” or “Good Samaritan nations” refer to countries such as Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada. See Steven L. Lami, “The Role of Religious NGOs in Shaping Foreign Policy: Western Middle Powers and Reform Internationalism,” in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011, pp. 244-254.

(20)西方“中等国家”或“好撒马利亚人之国”指挪威、瑞士、丹麦、荷兰、加拿大诸国。参见Steven L. Lami, "The Role of Religious NGOs in Shaping Foreign Policy: Western Middle Powers and Reform Internationalism," in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011, pp. 244-254.

(21) See Laurence Jarvik, “NGOs: A ‘New Class’ in International Relations,” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2007, p. 217.

(21)参见Laurence Jarvik, "NGOs: A 'New Class' in International Relations," Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2007, p. 217.

(22) Quoted from Norman E. Thomas, “Radical Mission in a Post-9/11 World: Creative Dissonances,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2005, p. 4.

(22)引自Norman E. Thomas, "Radical Mission in a Post-9/11 World: Creative Dissonances," International Bulletin of Missionary Research, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2005, p. 4.

(23) Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, p. 42.

(23)Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, p. 42.

(24) Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, p. x.

(24)Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, p. x.

(25) Quoted in Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, “Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement,” in Douglas Johnston, ed., Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 11-12.

(25)转引自Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement," in Douglas Johnston, ed., Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 11-12.

(26) Kenneth D. Wald and Clyde Wilcox, “Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?” American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 4, 2006, pp. 523, 525-529.

(26)Kenneth D. Wald and Clyde Wilcox, "Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 4, 2006, pp. 523, 525-529.

(27) Quoted from Chapter 4, pp. 46-47 of the lecture manuscript for the series “Religion in Contemporary America” delivered by Professor John F. Wilson at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, in April 2007. The manuscript is forthcoming from Shanghai People’s Publishing House.

(27)引自约翰•F•威尔逊(John F. Wilson)教授2007年4月在复旦大学美国研究中心所作“当代美国宗教(Religion in Contemporary America)”系列演讲的演讲稿的第4章第46-47页。该演讲稿即将由上海人民出版社出版。

(28) Robert O. Keohane, “The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’,” International Organization, Dialog-IO, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, p. 29.

(28)Robert O. Keohane, "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the 'Liberalism of Fear'," International Organization, Dialog-IO, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, p. 29.

(29) Jonathan Fox, “Religious Discrimination: A World Survey,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007, p. 48.

(29)Jonathan Fox, "Religious Discrimination: A World Survey," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007, p. 48.

(30) Ron E. Hassner, “Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art,” in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, pp. 38, 41.

(30)Ron E. Hassner, "Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art," in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, pp. 38, 41.

(31) Xu Yihua, “Religion and Contemporary International Relations,” *International Studies*, No. 2, 2010, p. 45.

(31)徐以骅：《宗教与当代国际关系》，载《国际问题研究》，2010年第2期，第45页。

(32) Petr Kratochvil, “The Religious Turn in IR: A Brief Assessment,” *Perspective*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2009, pp. 5-12.

(32)Petr Kratochvil, "The Religious Turn in IR: A Brief Assessment," Perspective, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2009, pp. 5-12.

(33) Vendulka Kubalkova, “Towards an International Political Theology,” in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, p. 89.

(33)Vendulka Kubalkova, "Towards an International Political Theology," in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, p. 89.

(34) See Xu Yihua, “The ‘Return of Religion’ in International Relations Studies,” *Chinese Social Sciences Today*, July 8, 2010, p. 4.

(34)参见徐以骅：《国际关系研究的“宗教回归”》，载《中国社会科学报》，2010年7月8日第4版。

(35) Ron E. Hassner, “Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art,” in Patrick James, ed., *Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice*, pp. 43-51.

(35)Ron E. Hassner, "Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art," in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, pp. 43-51.

(36) Jack Snyder, ed., *Religion and International Relations Theory*, Introduction, pp. 2-3. See also Eva Bellin, “Faith in Politics, New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2008, pp. 313-347.

(36)Jack Snyder, ed., Religion and International Relations Theory, Introduction, pp. 2-3. 另参见Eva Bellin, "Faith in Politics, New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics," World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2008, pp. 313-347.

(37) Here the term “theology” does not refer to a belief system, nor does it even involve religion or rest on religious premises; rather, it refers to the study of meaning that has been neglected by positivist social science research methods. See Vendulka Kubalkova, “Towards an International Political Theology,” pp. 79-105; Terry Nardin, “Epilogue,” in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, pp. 277-278.

(37)这里“神学”一词所指的并非信仰系统，甚至并不涉及宗教或基于宗教前提，而是指被实证主义社会科学研究方法所忽略的对意义的研究。参见Vendulka Kubalkova, "Towards an International Political Theology," pp. 79-105; Terry Nardin, "Epilogue," in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, pp. 277-278.

(38) Jack Snyder, ed., *Religion and International Relations Theory*, Introduction, pp. 6-7.

(38)Jack Snyder, ed., Religion and International Relations Theory, Introduction, pp. 6-7.

(39) “Primary topics” refer to research topics on religion and international relations dominated by the discipline of international relations, including religion and contemporary international institutions, the international system, national/international security, the foreign policies of various countries, and geopolitics. “Shared topics” refer to research topics on religion and international relations in which other disciplines have substantial involvement or even dominance, such as religion and global governance, international organizations, globalization, international law, and international conflict and dialogue.

(39)“主议题”指以国际关系学为主导的宗教与国际关系研究议题，包括宗教与当代国际制度、国际体系、国家/国际安全、各国外交、地缘政治等；“共议题”指其他学科有充分介入甚至作为主导的宗教与国际关系研究议题，如宗教与全球治理、国际组织、全球化、国际法、国际冲突和对话等。

(40) Xu Yihua, “Religion and Contemporary International Relations,” *International Studies*, No. 2, 2010, pp. 48-49.

(40)徐以骅：《宗教与当代国际关系》，载《国际问题研究》, 2010年第2期，第48-49页。

(41) See Jin Ze and Qiu Yonghui, eds., *Blue Book of Religions – China’s Religious Report (2008/2009/2010/2011)*, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011.

(41)参见金泽、邱永辉主编：《宗教蓝皮书——中国宗教报告(2008/2009/2010/2011年)》，北京：社会科学文献出版社2008、2009、2010、2011年版。

(42) Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p. 7.

(42)Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Brining Religion into International Relations, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p. 7.

(43) On the “post-missionary era,” see Xu Yihua, “Religious Factors and Current Sino-US Relations,” *International Studies*, No. 3, 2011, pp. 30-31.

(43)关于“后传教时代”，参见徐以骅：《宗教因素与当前中美关系》，载《国际问题研究》，2011年第3期，第30-31页。

(44) Hu Jintao, “Speech at the Thematic Seminar for Provincial and Ministerial-Level Leading Cadres on Enhancing the Ability to Build a Harmonious Socialist Society,” *People’s Daily*, June 27, 2005.

(44)胡锦涛：《在省部级主要领导干部提高构建社会主义和谐社会能力专题研讨班上的讲话》，载《人民日报》，2005年6月27日。

(45) Xu Yihua, “Contemporary Chinese Religion and National Security,” in Yan Kejia, ed., *Glorious Sixty Years: Chinese Religion and Religious Studies*, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2010, pp. 163-164.

(45)徐以骅：《当代中国宗教与国家安全》，载晏可佳主编：《辉煌六十年：中国宗教与宗教学》，上海：上海人民出版社2010年版，第163-164页。

(46) Andrew F. Walls, “The Dynamics of Christianity and Culture in the Context of Five Centuries,” p. 75.

(46)Andrew F. Walls, "The Dynamics of Christianity and Culture in the Context of Five Centuries," p. 75.

(47) Wang Zuo’an, “Exploring the Path of Religious Dialogue in China,” *China Ethnic News*, April 2, 2007.

(47)王作安：《探索中国宗教对话路径》，载《中国民族报》，2007年4月2日。

(48) Scott M. Thomas, “A Globalized God: Religion’s Growing Influence in International Politics,” p. 101. Another scholar of religion also states that missionary and religious migration movements may cause major upheavals in global politics. For example, among the 25 most populous countries in the world today, at least 10 exhibit severe antagonism between Christianity and Islam, making these countries potential “stages for serious religious conflict.” See Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 166-167.

(48)Scott M. Thomas, "A Globalized God: Religion's Growing Influence in International Polities," p. 101.另一宗教学者亦称，传教和宗教移民运动可能造成全球政治的大变局。如目前在全世界25个人口最多的国家中，至少有10个出现基督宗教与伊斯兰教严重对立的状况，因此这些国家均有可能成为“严重宗教冲突的舞台”。参见Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 166-167.

(49) Xu Yihua, “Several Issues on Current Religion and International Relations,” *Chinese Academy of Social Sciences News*, April 3, 2008; Xu Yihua and Zhang Yuan, “On the Paths and Paradigms of Religion’s Influence on China’s National Security,” *Fudan Journal*, No. 4, 2009, p. 113.

(49)徐以骅：《当前宗教与国际关系的若干问题》，载《中国社会科学院院报》，2008年4月3日；徐以骅、章远：《试论宗教影响中国国家安全的路径和范式》，载《复旦学报》，2009年第4期，第113页。

(50) Zhuo Xinping, *“Globalized” Religion and Contemporary China*, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008, pp. 276-277.

(50)卓新平：《“全球化”的宗教与当代中国》，北京：社会科学文献出版社2008年版，第276-277页。

(51) On the current state and problems of domestic research on religion and international relations, see Xu Yihua, “Religion and Contemporary International Relations,” *International Studies*, No. 2, 2010, pp. 47-48.

(51)关于国内宗教与国际关系研究的现状和问题，参见徐以骅：《宗教与当代国际关系》，载《国际问题研究》，2010年第2期，第47-48页。

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