A Brief Comment on the U.S. *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*

That a superpower enacts legislation to periodically review the religious conditions of countries around the world is an important strategic shift on the international stage after the Cold War. This “faith-based diplomacy” has become the latest version of the historical “missionary diplomacy” and contemporary “human rights diplomacy.” And the “cult problem” in contemporary China, which has long been scrutinized under the U.S. *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*, is one important case in point.

一个超级大国立法，定期审查世界各国的宗教现状，这是冷战后国际舞台上的一个重要战略变化。这种“以信仰为基础的外交”（faith-based diplo－macy），成为历史上“传教士外交”和当代“人权外交”的最新版本。而当代中国的“邪教问题”，长期被美国《1998年国际宗教自由法案》审查，就是其中一个重要的案例。

I. The Global Expansion Strategy of American Christian Neoconservatism

一、美国基督教新保守主义的全球扩张战略

Since the 1990s, the most important change in the international strategic landscape has been the attempt by American neoconservative forces to establish a unipolar era of global dominance. Certain authoritative figures advocate unilateralist hegemonic policies and promote a strategy of new interventionism. This theory has two fulcrums: first, defending “universal human values,” asserting that Western “human rights,” “rule of law,” etc., are all “universal values”; second, “human rights above sovereignty,” asserting that “human rights have no borders.” A key feature of the contemporary American-style human rights standard is treating “religious freedom” as the first cornerstone of human rights. American Christian neofundamentalist forces and political neoconservative forces formed an alliance to jointly push Congress to pass the *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*, making it a tool for the global strategic expansion of Christianity through state power.

20世纪90年代以来，国际战略格局最重要的变化是，美国新保守主义势力企图建立独霸全球的单极时代。某些权威人士鼓吹单边主义的霸权政策，推行新干涉主义战略。这一理论有两个支点：一是捍卫“人类普遍的价值观”，提出西方的“人权”、“法治”等等都是“普世价值”；二是“人权高于主权”，提出“人权无国界”。而当代美式人权标准的一个重要特征是，将“宗教自由”视为人权的第一基石。美国基督教新基要主义势力和政治新保守主义势力结盟，共同推动国会通过《1998年国际宗教自由法案》，使其成为以国家力量进行基督教全球战略扩张的工具。

During the Cold War, Christianity was regarded as “an important foothold for the United States against atheist communism.” [1]1 This is a quotation from a source cited by the author, likely an American political or religious figure, characterizing the Cold War role of Christianity. After the Cold War, bipolar confrontation disappeared, geopolitical factors weakened, and religious factors in international relations became increasingly prominent. The so-called “international religious freedom” issue became a catchphrase for certain individuals.

在冷战期间，基督教被当作“美国反对无神论共产主义的重要立足点”[1]。冷战之后，两极对抗消失，地缘政治因素减弱，而国际关系中的宗教因素日益突出。所谓“国际宗教自由”的议题，成为某些人士的口头禅。

An American scholar provided a rationale for this “faith-based diplomacy,” saying: “The struggle for the soul of the new world order has already occurred, and taking cultural and religious pluralism seriously is now one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the 21st century.” [2]2 The author cites an unnamed American scholar; the quotation is given in the original English in the Chinese text. In his view, one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the 21st century is “the struggle for the soul of the new world order.” But from the perspective of those who conserve their own national culture, certain countries, in order to “struggle for the soul of the new world order,” mobilize state administrative resources—such as diplomatic means, or even waging war—to spread a particular religious faith and culture, which is outright hegemonism.

有位美国学者为这种“信仰外交”的合理性注疏，他说：“争夺新世界秩序灵魂的斗争已经发生，认真看待文化和宗教多元主义，目前已经成为21世纪最重要的外交政策挑战之一”[2]；在他看来，21世纪最重要的外交政策挑战之一是“争夺新世界秩序灵魂的斗争”。而在保守本土民族文化的人们看来，某些国家为“争夺新世界秩序灵魂”，动用国家行政资源，如外交手段，甚至发动战争，传播某种宗教信仰文化，是十足的霸权主义。

(A) Historical Trends in World Religious Evolution in the 20th Century

（一）20世纪世界宗教演变的历史趋势

In the turbulent historical process of the 20th century, looking at the trends in world religious evolution, a complex situation of pluralization emerged. Among these, three major characteristics deserve attention: First, the main body of Christianity shifted from the Northern Hemisphere to the Southern Hemisphere; second, the rise and ebb of the Islamic revival movement; third, the rise of various religious fundamentalist sects became an important factor intensifying social conflicts. [3]3 The author cites a source, numbered [3] in the original, for these three trends.

在20世纪风云激荡的历史进程中，纵观世界宗教演变的趋势，出现多元化的复杂局面。其中有三大重要特点值得重视：其一，基督教的主要群体由北半球向南半球转移；其二，伊斯兰教复兴运动的高涨和低潮；其三，各种宗教基要主义教派的兴起，成为社会冲突加剧的重要因素[3]。

(B) The Symbol of American Religious Forces Influencing National Foreign Policy: The *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*

（二）美国宗教势力影响国家外交政策的标志：《1998年国际宗教自由法案》

The rapid rise of American Christian evangelicalism and its active expansion into the political arena has been one of the most striking phenomena in American social life over the past 30 years. Compared with religious liberals, the fervently proselytizing Christian evangelicals are more conservative. They form alliances with various traditional religious right-wing forces, such as “Voice of the Martyrs” and “Open Doors” organizations, and vigorously launch an “anti-religious persecution legislative movement.”

美国基督教福音派迅速崛起，积极向政治舞台扩张。这成为近30年来美国社会生活中最引人注目的现象之一。与宗教自由派相比，热忱宣教的基督教福音派更加保守。他们与各种传统宗教的右翼势力，如“殉道者之声”、“开放门户”组织等结盟，大张旗鼓地发动“反宗教迫害立法运动”。

1. The “Anti-Religious Persecution Legislative Movement” Led by American Christian Evangelicals

1.美国基督教福音派主导的“反宗教迫害立法运动”

American Christian evangelicals, using Congress as their main stage, launched a massive “anti-religious persecution legislative movement,” ultimately passing the *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*. The enactment of this Act was a landmark event in which American religious forces influenced national foreign policy.

美国基督教福音派以国会为主要舞台，发动声势浩大的“反宗教迫害立法运动”，最终通过了《1998年国际宗教自由法案》（The International ReligiousFreedom Act of 1998)。该法案的确立是美国宗教势力影响国家外交政策的标志性事件。

2. The Content and Core Values of the U.S. *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*

2.美国《1998年国际宗教自由法案》的内容和核心价值

The U.S. *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998* has seven titles and is 12,000 words long. It mainly includes the following content: (1) Establishing an “Office of International Religious Freedom” within the State Department and creating the position of Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom; (2) Requiring the State Department to publish an “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom”; (3) Requiring the President to take action against countries that “violate religious freedom”; (4) Establishing a “United States Commission on International Religious Freedom” and creating a Special Assistant to the President within the National Security Council specifically responsible for international religious freedom affairs; (5) Requiring the U.S. government to take action to promote international religious freedom; (6) Requiring revisions to asylum and refuge procedures to ensure that applications for religious asylum are not discriminated against.

美国《1998年国际宗教自由法案》共有七个标题，长达12000字。主要包括以下内容：（1）在国务院设立“国际宗教自由办公室”，并设立国际宗教自由无所任大使的职位；（2）要求国务院发表“国际宗教自由年度报告”；（3）要求总统对所谓“侵犯宗教自由的国家”采取行动；（4）设立“美国宗教自由委员会”，并在国家安全委员会设立总统特别助理，专职负责国际宗教自由事务；（5）要求美国政府采取行动，推进国际宗教自由；（6）要求修改避难和庇护程序，保证宗教避难的申请不受歧视。

This Act established a new framework for U.S. human rights policy. Its stated purpose is “to condemn violations of religious freedom and to promote, and to assist other governments in the promotion of, the fundamental right to religious freedom.” According to the Act’s drafters, the “cornerstone of the Act is taking action in response to violations of religious freedom.” [4]4 The author cites a source, numbered [4] in the original, quoting the Act’s drafters. According to the Act’s design, the concrete actions the government should take include: improving the training of diplomatic and immigration officials; engaging with non-governmental organizations and religious prisoners; providing economic assistance to groups supporting religious freedom; treating religious groups equally with non-religious groups in the use of embassy facilities; establishing a list of religious prisoners; promoting international exchanges in the religious field; and providing awards to diplomats who promote religious freedom.

该法案建立起美国人权政策的全新框架。其宗旨是“谴责对宗教自由的侵犯，推进并协助他国政府推进，宗教自由这一基本权利”。按照该法案起草人的说法，该“法案的基石，是采取行动来回应对宗教自由的侵犯”[4]。根据该法案的设计，政府应采取的实际行动包括：改善外交及移民和规划局官员的训练；接触非政府组织和宗教囚犯；对支持宗教自由的团体提供经济援助；对宗教团体使用使馆设施与非宗教团体一视同仁；建立宗教囚犯名单；在宗教领域里促进国际交流；对推动宗教自由的外交人员提供奖励等等。

In the implementation of this Act, designating certain countries as “Countries of Particular Concern” or placing them on a “Special Watch List” has become “an important tool” for the U.S. government. [5]5 The author cites a source, numbered [5] in the original, for this characterization.

在该法案实施中，将某些国家列为“特别关注国家”，或列入“观察名单”，成为美国政府的“一种重要的工具”[5]。

Subsequently, the *International Religious Freedom Report* issued by the U.S. government further elaborated its values. In the introduction to the *2001 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom*, the U.S. State Department declared its aim to “make religious freedom the first freedom in the Constitution.” The U.S. authorities use state power to strengthen American values in the international human rights field. For example, the *2006 Report on International Religious Freedom* states: “Religious faith as a personal choice and a fundamental freedom is a cornerstone of American identity, rooted in the ideals of our nation’s founders. From the founding of the Republic to the present day, religious freedom has been one of our foremost liberties. The American people’s commitment to defending religious freedom—not only at home, but around the world—is unwavering. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: ‘For America, there is nothing more fundamental than religious freedom and religious conscience. Our country was founded on that basis. Religious freedom is at the core of democracy.’” [6]6 The author cites the U.S. State Department’s *2006 Report on International Religious Freedom*, quoting its introduction and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

此后，美国政府发布的《国际宗教自由报告》，进一步阐述其价值观。美国国务院在《2001年度国际宗教自由报告》的导言中，宣称要“使宗教自由成为宪法中的第一自由”。美国当局运用国家力量，在国际人权领域里强化美国价值观。如《2006年国际宗教自由报告》宣称“：宗教信仰作为个人选项和基本自由，是美国特征的立足点，根植于我国开国先贤的理想。从建国至今，宗教自由一直是我国最首要的自由之一。美国人民捍卫宗教自由的决心——不仅在国内，而且在全世界——始终不渝。正如康多莉扎.赖斯国务卿所说：‘对美国来说，没有比宗教自由和宗教良心更根本的东西。我们国家就建立在这一基础上。宗教自由是民主的核心’”[6]。

At present, the U.S. authorities are further elevating the strategic value of “international religious freedom,” trumpeting that “religious freedom promotes national security.” For example, in 2008, Thomas F. Farr, Director of the U.S. State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, publicly called for U.S. diplomacy to “make the protection and expansion of religious freedom one of its core elements” and declared that “the central issue of U.S. national security is Islamic terrorism.”[7]7 "Letting a hundred flowers bloom" (百花齐放) is a slogan from Mao Zedong's 1956 "Hundred Flowers Campaign," which encouraged open criticism of the Party and government, though it was later followed by a crackdown. Here it is used idiomatically to suggest a diversity of opinions. Regarding the status of religious issues in international strategy, U.S. official and public opinion is increasingly converging. “Faith-based diplomacy” has become the latest version of contemporary “human rights diplomacy.”[8]8 *liang*: A traditional Chinese unit of weight, equal to 50 grams. Republican strategist Karl Rove explained: “Reason may be good for studying and analyzing history and politics, but it is different for practicing and creating history and politics. Perceived and anticipated faith, which cannot be proven or demonstrated in the earthly realm, is now more effective in mobilizing people to create change.”[9]9 Xi Wuyi is a Chinese scholar known for research on religion and cults; the journal *World Religious Studies* is a leading Chinese academic publication in the field. American politicians use the Christian “universal values” to inspire the people to create history, a phenomenon rooted in a uniquely American political ecological environment. However, when certain U.S. rulers take this religious belief value system as the foundation of diplomacy and forcefully promote it worldwide, how far can this hegemonic diplomacy go? The author believes that this phenomenon of Christian faith being ideological reflects history extending itself amid twists and turns. The revival of contemporary religious neo-fundamentalism and its expansion into the political sphere raise anew the question of whether modern states can uphold the principle of separation of church and state, once again becoming a focus of attention. Since the 1970s, the revival of Christian neo-fundamentalism in the United States, allied with political conservatism, has attempted to use state power to spread the Christian gospel worldwide, creating a new crisis of separation of church and state.

现在，美国当局进一步提升“国际宗教自由”的战略价值，鼓吹“宗教自由即促进国家安全”。例如：2008年，美国国务院国际宗教自由办公室主任托马斯.F.法尔（Thomas.F.Farr）公开呼吁美国外交应使“保护和扩展宗教自由成为其核心因素之一”，并宣称“美国国家安全的中心议题是伊斯兰恐怖主义”[7]。于宗教问题在国际战略中的地位，美国朝野看法日趋一致。“以信仰为基础的外交”（faith-based diplo－macy），成为当代“人权外交”的最新版本[8]。共和党的战略家卡尔．罗夫（Karl．Rove）的解释说“：理性对于研究、分析历史和政治也许是好的，但对于实践和创造历史和政治则不同。被感知和被期待的信仰，不能在尘世被证明和被演示，现在，则更为有效地动员人们去创造变化”[9]。美国的政治家用基督教的“普世价值”，激励民众创造历史，源于一种美国式的政治生态环境。可是，某些美国的执政者将这种宗教信仰的价值观，作为外交的基础，强力向全世界推广，这种霸权主义的外交能走多远呢？笔者认为，这种基督教信仰被意识形态化的现象，反映出历史在曲折中延伸。当代宗教新基要主义的复兴，向政治领域扩张，现代国家能否坚持政教分离的原则，再次成为人们关注的焦点。20世纪70年代以来，美国基督教新基要主义复兴，与政治保守主义联盟，企图以国家的力量，向全世界传播基督教的福音，造成新的政教分离的危机。

3. The National Interests Behind the American-Style “Religious Freedom”

3．美式“宗教自由”背后的国家利益

The author believes it should be pointed out that the “international religious freedom” vigorously promoted by the U.S. government is measured by U.S. national interests. For example, the U.S. State Department’s *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 2002* listed Myanmar, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan as “Countries of Particular Concern.” The 2004 annual report removed Iraq from the list. Yet in reality, in U.S.-occupied Iraq, killings and “jihad” are incessant, and the safety of people’s lives is hardly guaranteed. Does religious belief thereby gain greater freedom? From the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to the present, at least 660,000 Iraqi civilians have lost their lives in this war, which international human rights organizations have criticized as “the greatest humanitarian disaster of the first decade of this century.” “Counterterrorism, counterterrorism—the more you counter, the more terror there is” has become an international catchphrase. According to research by scholars at the University of Chicago, in the 1980s there were only five suicide attacks globally; by the 1990s, this rose to fifty; and in 2009, there were as many as 500 “human bomb” incidents worldwide. The most important reason is resistance to the occupation by foreign troops.[10]10 Wang Zuo’an was a senior official in China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs. The U.S. government vigorously implements the *International Religious Freedom Act*, claiming that “countries that respect religious freedom rarely pose security threats to others.”[11]11 Jin Ze and Qiu Yonghui are researchers at the Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and editors of the annual *Blue Book on Religion* series. These self-righteous preachings, in the face of hard facts, are like the emperor’s new clothes—self-deception. It is obvious that this standard for examining international religious freedom shifts solely according to U.S. interests.

笔者认为，应当指出的是，美国政府大力促进的“国际宗教信仰自由”，是以美国国家利益为标准的。例如：美国国务院发表的“2002年国际宗教自由年度报告”，将缅甸、中国、伊朗、伊拉克、朝鲜、苏丹列为“特别关注国家”。2004的年度报告又将伊拉克从名单上删除。而事实上，在美军占领的伊拉克，杀戮“圣战”不断，民众的生命安全都难以保障，难道宗教信仰反而获得更大的自由吗？从2003年美军入侵伊拉克至今，在这场战争中丧失生命的伊拉克平民至少有66万人，被国际人权组织批评为“本世纪第一个十年最大的人道主义灾难”。“反恐、反恐，越反越恐”，已经成为国际流行语。根据美国芝加哥大学的学者研究，20世纪80年代，全球仅有5起自杀式袭击事件，到90年代升至50起，而2009年，全球的“人体炸弹”事件高达500起。其中最重要的原因是反抗外国军队的占领[10]。美国政府大力实施《国际宗教信仰自由法案》，声称“尊重宗教自由的国家极少对他国造成安全威胁”[11]。这些唯我独尊说教，在铁的事实面前，如同皇帝的新衣，自欺欺人。显而易见，这种考察国际宗教自由的标准，是唯美国的利益为转移的。

Since the end of the Cold War, the core discourse of Western powers has shifted to human rights “based on religious freedom.” Christian “universal values” have been continuously abstracted, becoming the totem of the Western-style democratic system, just as former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: “Religious freedom is the core of democracy.” This symbolic “universal value” attempts to strip the core value system of society from the basic social relations of each country, turning it into a weapon of “new interventionism” on the international stage. This tendency toward religious ideologicalization has affected the development of cultural diversity in the international community, causing turmoil and instability in the world.

冷战结束以来，西方列强的核心话语，已经转向“以宗教自由为基石”的人权。基督教的“普世价值”不断被抽象化，成为西式民主制度的图腾，正如美国前国务卿赖斯所说的“宗教自由是民主的核心”。这种符号化的“普世价值”，企图将社会核心价值体系，从各国基本的社会关系中剥离出来，成为国际舞台上“新干涉主义”的武器。这种宗教意识形态化的倾向，影响了国际社会文化多元化的发展，造成世界的动荡不安。

II. The “Cult Issue” Becomes an Important Pretext for the U.S. to Accuse China

二、“邪教问题”成为美国指责中国的一个重要口实

The *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998*, passed by the U.S. Congress, uses domestic legislation in an attempt to “legalize” interference in other countries’ internal affairs through religious issues. In the implementation of this Act, China has consistently been one of its main targets of accusation. From 1999 to the present, the U.S. State Department publishes the *International Religious Freedom Report* every September and the *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* every March, while the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom publishes its own *Annual Report* every May. All these reports published by the U.S. over the years list China as “the country with the most severe violations of religious freedom.” This reflects the confluence of Christian neo-fundamentalism and political neo-conservatism, which, fanning the flames, increasingly makes religious issues a tool for the U.S. to distort, attack, and slander China. In the implementation of this Act, relevant institutions constantly use “human rights and religious freedom” as a pretext to challenge China, creating friction and obstacles in Sino-U.S. relations.

美国国会通过的《1998年国际宗教自由法案》，用国内立法方式，企图使利用宗教问题干涉他国内政“合法化”。在该法案的实施中，中国一直成为其指责的主要对象之一。自1999年至今，美国国务院每年9月发表《国际宗教自由报告》，每年3月发表《国别人权报告》，美国国际宗教自由委员会每年5月发表《国际宗教自由报告》。美国历年公布的这些报告都将中国列为“侵犯宗教自由最严重的国家”。这反映出基督教新基要主义和政治新保守势力合流，推波助澜，宗教问题日益成为美国歪曲、攻击和污蔑中国的工具。在该法案实施中，相关机构不断以“人权和宗教自由”为由，向中国发难，为中美关系制造摩擦和障碍。

If we search online, in the annual reports on “international religious freedom” published by the U.S. government over the years, contemporary China’s “cult issue” has always been an important object of their attention. For example, the U.S. State Department’s *International Religious Freedom Report* states: “Since 1999, pursuant to the provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) concerning particularly severe violations of religious freedom, the U.S. Secretary of State has designated China as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ (CPC).”[16]

我们上网查一查，在美国政府历年公布的“国际宗教信仰自由”的年度报告中，当代中国的“邪教问题”一直是其关注的重要对象。如：美国国务院在《国际宗教自由报告》中声称“，自1999年以来，依据‘国际宗教自由法’（IRFA）关于特别严重侵犯宗教自由的条款，美国国务卿认定中国为‘需要特别关注的国家’（CPC）”[16]。

This report lists many so-called “cases” of “serious violations of religious freedom” in China. Among them, cases involving the so-called “cult issue” occupy a very important position. The report claims: “In 1999, the (Chinese) government began to ban organizations defined as ‘cults,’ without publicly defining the term ‘cult.’ The (Chinese) government continues to suppress organizations designated as ‘cults,’ including several Christian groups and

这份报告列举了中国许多所谓“严重侵犯宗教自由”的“案例”。其中涉及所谓“邪教问题”的案例占有相当重要的位置。该报告声称“：1999年（中国）政府开始取缔被定义为‘邪教’（cults）的组织，并没有公开定义‘邪教’的术语。“”（中国）政府继续镇压被指定为‘邪教’的组织，包括若干基督教的团体和法轮功。政府从来没有公布将宗教团体认定为‘邪教’的标准”[12]。

(I) Standards Defined by the Chinese Government for "Cult" Organizations

（一）中国政府界定的“邪教”组织标准

The author suggests that the writers of the U.S. State Department's *2007 Report on International Religious Freedom*, when making presumptuous comments on the affairs of other countries, should learn more basic common sense and engage in less blatant misrepresentation. Has the Chinese government never publicly defined the standards for "cult" organizations? Anyone with even a modicum of knowledge of contemporary Chinese law would answer in the negative. As policy researchers, raising objections to the laws by which the Chinese government regulates "cults" can be seen as a reflection of the "letting a hundred flowers bloom" [7]7 "Letting a hundred flowers bloom" (百花齐放) is a slogan from Mao Zedong's 1956 "Hundred Flowers Campaign," which encouraged open criticism of the Party and government, though it was later followed by a crackdown. Here it is used idiomatically to suggest a diversity of opinions. approach to thought, but casually slapping on the label of a "complete blank" is inconsistent with reality.

笔者建议，美国国务院撰写《2007年国际宗教自由报告》的执笔人，在对他国事务评头品足时，应多学些基本常识，少一些指鹿为马的荒谬。中国政府从来没有公开界定“邪教”组织的标准吗？稍有一些当代中国法律常识的人都会作出否定的回答。作为政策的研究者，对中国政府治理“邪教”的法律提出异议，可以看作是“百花齐放”的思考，但随意扣上“一片空白”的帽子，是不符合实际的。

1. The *Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China* Revised in 1997

1．1997年修订的《中华人民共和国刑法》

To govern "cult" organizations that emerged during the period of social transformation, in November 1995, the Ministry of Public Security of the Chinese government first proposed the concept of "cults." In its official documents, "cults" were defined as: "a small number of lawbreakers who, violating the Constitution and laws, cloak themselves in a religious guise, pick out isolated phrases from religious scriptures, mix in large amounts of feudal superstition and heretical teachings, delude people, deceive the masses, secretly form illegal organizations, and engage in illegal and criminal activities." [13]13 Li Shunhua’s doctoral dissertation was completed at Peking University’s Department of Philosophy; Baidu Baike is a Chinese online encyclopedia. In March 1997, the *Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China*, revised at the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress, in Article 300, specifically stipulated clear penalties for criminal acts of organizing and utilizing "cult" organizations.

为治理社会变革时期孳生的“邪教”组织，1995年11月，中国政府公安部首先提出“邪教”概念。在其官方文件中，将“邪教”界定为：“少数不法分子违反宪法和法律，披着宗教外衣，摘取宗教经典中的片言只语，掺杂大量封建迷信和异端邪说，蛊惑人心，蒙骗群众，秘密纠合建立非法组织，从事违法犯罪活动”[13]。1997年3月，全国人大八届五次会议修订的《中华人民共和国刑法》，第三百条专门对组织和利用“邪教”组织的犯罪行为，作出明确处罚规定。

2. The 1999 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the Judicial Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate

2．1999年全国人大常委会的决议和两高的法律解释

In the spring of 1999, the

1999年春天“，法轮功”组织势力膨胀，在中南海外聚众静坐，震动海内外。这表明，当代中国的“邪教问题”已浮出水面，成为影响社会发展与稳定的问题。1999年10月30日，全国人大常委会作出决定，取缔“邪教”组织、防范和惩治“邪教”活动。同时，最高人民法院和最高人民检察院作出具体应用法律的解释。第一条对“邪教组织”的界定为“：冒用宗教、气功或者其他名义建立，神化首要分子，利用制造、散布迷信邪说等手段蛊惑、蒙骗他人，发展、控制成员，危害社会的非法组织”[14]。该司法解释对《刑法》第三百条惩处“邪教”犯罪的条款，加以具体说明，为依法治理“邪教问题”提供法律依据。两高的司法解释标志着中国治理“邪教”的工作，正在加快法制化的步伐。

The author believes that the definition of “evil cult” in contemporary mainstream Chinese society differs from the historical concept of “evil cult” and endows it with new connotations. It has transcended ideology and become an operable modern legal concept, the purpose of which is to govern the criminal acts of “evil cults.”

笔者认为，当代中国主流社会对“邪教”的界定，不同于历史上“邪教”的概念，赋予其新的内涵。它已超越意识形态，是一个具有可操作性的现代法律概念，其目的是治理“邪教”的犯罪行为。

(II) Contemporary China’s “Evil Cult”: “Destructive Cult”

（二）当代中国的“邪教”“：破坏性膜拜团体”

The author believes it is particularly necessary to emphasize that the “evil cult” as defined by Chinese authorities cannot be equated with “cults” commonly used in the English-speaking cultural sphere or “cult-sect” in the French- and German-speaking cultural spheres. Language is the carrier of culture and the expression of cultural traditions. The differences between Chinese and Western languages reflect differences in cultural traditions.

笔者认为，特别需要强调指出的是，中国官方界定的“邪教”，不能等同于西方英语文化圈通行的cults（膜拜团体）或法语、德语文化圈通行的cult—sect（膜拜教派)。语言是文化的载体，是文化传统的表达形式。中西方语言中的差异，是文化传统差异的反映。

1. The Concept of “Evil Cult” in the Historical Origins of Chinese National Culture

1．中华民族文化的历史渊源中的“邪教”概念

History is the author’s first professional background. Interpreted from the perspective of Chinese historiography and linguistics, the author believes that “evil cult” is originally a term unique to Chinese culture. In the historical origins of Chinese national culture, “evil cult” is primarily a political concept; its examination of the meaning of endangering social stability far outweighs its analysis of the meaning of distorting religious doctrine. Chinese folk secret religions have a long history. Through the Ming and Qing dynasties, they developed rapidly, with numerous sects, becoming a folk social movement with tenacious vitality. The rulers of feudal dynasties regarded all non-orthodox folk secret sects as “evil cults.”

历史学是笔者的第一个专业背景。从中国历史学、语言学诠释，笔者认为，“邪教”本是汉语文化的特有名词。在中华民族文化的历史渊源中“，邪教”主要是政治学概念，考察其危害社会稳定的含义，远远超过辨析其歪曲宗教学说的含义。中国民间秘密宗教历史悠久，经明清朝两代，发展迅猛，教门繁多，成为具有顽强生命力的民间社会运动。封建王朝的统治者把一切非正统的民间秘密教派均视为“邪教”。

Modern Chinese society experienced violent upheaval, and folk secret religions and secret societies faded and transformed, becoming even more complex. After the May Fourth Movement [8]8 *liang*: A traditional Chinese unit of weight, equal to 50 grams., the currents of science and democracy were introduced to China, and the modernization movement became the mainstream of historical development. However, most folk secret sects remained obstinately unenlightened, their doctrines becoming even more jumbled and chaotic. According to the latest research findings, in the past century, there have been as many as 4,500 types of sectarian organizations recorded in archival documents, forming a huge social force [15]. Their influence permeated all social strata, and their remnants continue to this day.

近代中国社会剧烈动荡，民间秘密宗教与秘密结社褪色变质，更加庞杂。五四运动以后，科学和民主思潮传入中国，现代化运动成为历史发展的主流。而大多数民间秘密教门执迷不悟，教义更为芜杂混乱，根据最新的研究成果，近百年来，有档案文献记载的会道门组织就多达4500多种，形成一种巨大的社会势力[15]。其影响渗透社会各个阶层，余脉延续至今。

How to translate the Chinese term “evil cult” into English is still under exploration. In the official English translation of China’s new criminal law, “evil cult” is translated as “Weird Religious Organization,” literally meaning a strange, secretive religious organization. Although this translation blazes a new trail internationally, it has not integrated into mainstream discourse.

中文“邪教”一词，如何翻译为英文，目前尚在探索。中国新刑法官方英文译本中，将“邪教”译为“Weird Religious Organization”,字面意思为奇怪的、诡秘的宗教组织。这种译文虽然在国际上独辟蹊径，但未能融入流通话语。

2. Differences Between the Chinese “Evil Cult” and the English “Cults”

2．汉语“邪教”与英语cults（膜拜团体）的差异

The English word “cults,” like the German “kult” and French “culte,” originates from the Latin “cultus,” whose original meaning is “colere” (to cultivate), extended to “culture.” The ancient Romans referred to the worship of gods as “cultus.” According to the traditions of ancient Judaism and Christianity, regions such as the Near East and Israel called the sacrifices held in temples “cult.” Later, the Christian cultural sphere used “cult” to refer to mystical worship and idolatry, endowing the word with a special “heretical” connotation. After the 1960s, developed countries in Europe and America experienced rapid socio-economic development, changes in social structure and lifestyle, and a certain crisis in cultural forms and value systems. Traditional religions were gradually neglected, and new religions proliferated. Based on the characteristics of the new religious movements, such as the surge in small religious groups and the prevalence of狂热膜拜 (fanatical worship), European and American societies critical of this began to use the term “cult,” which carries a relatively clear pejorative connotation.

英语cults（膜拜团体）一词，和德语kult、法语culte一样，源于拉丁cultus，其本义为colere（耕作），延伸为culture（文化）。古罗马人把崇拜神明称为cultus。根据古代犹太教和基督教的传统，近东和以色列等地区将在神殿里举行的祭祀称为cult。后来，基督教文化圈将cult用以转指神秘膜拜、偶像崇拜，赋予该词特殊的“异端”色彩。20世纪60年代以后,欧美等发达国家社会经济高速发展，社会结构、生活方式发生变化，文化形态、价值体系出现某种危机。传统宗教被逐渐冷落，新生宗教大量滋生。基于在新生宗教运动中，小型宗教团体激增、狂热膜拜较为普遍等特点，对此持批判态度的欧美社会开始使用Cult一词。其中含有比较明确的贬义。

In 1999, after “Falun

1999年“,法轮功”被定性为“邪教”取缔后，国际上许多重要通讯社，立即冠称其为cults。此后，我国的一些翻译家、法学家和新闻、宗教工作者曾进行专题研讨，与会者认为，用汉语拼音Falun Gong翻译“法轮功”，需要定性时可用cults[16]。

The author believes that while translating the Chinese term “邪教” as “cults” has some basis, it still contains many ambiguities. First, “cults” carries connotations of a Christian cultural-centrism, primarily used to critique opposing religious ideologies, whereas the Chinese “邪教” fundamentally belongs to the category of political science, mainly referring to “folk secret sects that use superstitious heresies, heterodox practices, recruit disciples to collect money, gather crowds to form factions, and even subvert political power”[17]; the meanings of the two are not identical.

笔者认为，将“邪教”一词译为cults，虽有某些的依据，但仍存在许多歧义。其一，cults含有基督教文化本位的内涵，主要用于批判对立的宗教意识形态，而中文“邪教”基本属于政治学范畴，主要指“利用迷信邪说、旁门左道、传徒敛钱，聚众结党、甚至颠覆政权的民间秘密教派”[17]，两者含义，不尽相同。

Second, in the contemporary European and American context, “cults” contains a connotation of fanatical pursuit of fashion, sometimes used to describe the public’s worship of celebrities and philosophers.

其二，当代欧美语境里，cults含有对时尚的狂热追求，有时用来形容民众对明星和哲人的崇拜。

3. “邪教” should be translated as “destructive cults,” i.e., “破坏性膜拜团体”

3．“邪教”应译为“destructive cults”，即：“破坏性膜拜团体”

Some scholars propose using qualifiers such as “crazed,” “dangerous,” or “destructive” to restrict “cults.” Among them, a growing number of scholars advocate using the term “destructive cults,” because such a definition can clearly highlight the criminal nature of “邪教.” The international symposium on the “cult issue” held in Beijing in November 2000 was titled in English as “International Symposium on Destructive Cults.” Therefore, the author believes that contemporary China’s “邪教组织” can be explained as “破坏性膜拜团体” and should be translated into English as “Destructive Cults.”[17]

有些学者提出，使用“疯狂的”（crazed）“、危险的”（dangerous）或“破坏性的”（destructive）等用来限制cults。其中,主张使用“destructive cults”一词的学者越来越多，因为这样的界定可以明显突出“邪教”的犯罪性质。2000年11月在北京召开的“邪教问题”国际研讨会，英文名称即为“International Sympo－sium on Destructive Cults”。因此，笔者认为，当代中国的“邪教组织”，可以解释为“破坏性膜拜团体”，英文应译为“Destructive Cults”。[17]

Regrettably, to date, in official documents both in China and abroad, the Chinese “邪教” is still translated as “cults.” Examined from the perspective of Western sociology of religion, “cults” (膜拜团体) belongs to the conceptual system of religious studies. Cults are also referred to as marginal religions, often small in scale, with a low degree of institutionalization, led by charismatic (Charisma) type leaders, exhibiting a tendency toward mystical salvation, focusing on personal spiritual and mystical experiences, and some adopt esoteric methods or closed activities. Among them, some factions go further to extremes, becoming “邪教” organizations that violate the law. Therefore, in foreign propaganda work, the proposition “法

令人遗憾的是，迄今为止，在中外官方文件中，仍将中文的“邪教”翻译为cults。从西方宗教社会学考察，cults（膜拜团体）属于宗教学语系中的概念。膜拜团体又被称为边缘宗教，往往规模较小，制度化程度较低，由卡里斯玛（Charisma)型教主领导，表现出神秘主义救赎倾向，注重个人精神和神秘体验，有些采取秘传方式或封闭式活动。其中有些派别进一步走向极端，成为触犯法律的“邪教”组织。因此，在对外宣传工作中“，法轮功是邪教，不是宗教”的命题，译为英文“fa lun gong is a cult,but not a religion”，从西方宗教社会学的范畴来看，存在着逻辑矛盾。

In contemporary Western society, the cults (膜拜团体) that emerge question and challenge mainstream culture, and most institutions, from civil society to state authorities, hold a derogatory attitude toward them. For example, in January 1989, a U.S. opinion poll showed that 62% of citizens felt antipathy toward “new religions—cults.” However, most cults occupy a legal status in Western societies, with only a very small number of destructive cults facing legal sanctions. Therefore, simply translating the Chinese term “邪教” as “cults” can easily lead Westerners to misunderstand, making them think that the Chinese government’s use of legal means to sanction “邪教,” i.e., cults, constitutes interference with freedom of religious belief.

在当代西方社会涌现的Cults（膜拜团体）质疑和挑战主流文化，从市民社会到国家权利机构，大多对其持有贬抑的态度。例如：1989年1月，美国的一项民意调查显示，有62%的市民对“新生宗教—膜拜团体”表示反感。但是，大多数Cults（膜拜团体）在西方社会处于合法地位，只有极少数破坏性的Cults（膜拜团体）受到法律制裁。因此将中文“邪教”一词，简单译为Cults，很容易被西方民众误解，认为中国政府运用法律手段制裁“邪教”即Cults，是干涉宗教信仰自由。

From the perspective of international academic discourse, the author believes that the contemporary Chinese “problem of 邪教” can be explained as the “problem of destructive cults.” Why should a social problem that has grown on Chinese soil now be placed within an international academic context, or, to some extent, draw on certain Western academic paradigms for examination? This is because, in the author’s view, the issues raised by real life should serve as the weather vane for academic research. With the development of globalization, the contemporary Chinese “problem of 邪教” has become an international social problem. Over the past thirty-plus years, some of these groups have been founded abroad and infiltrated China; others have been founded in China and spread overseas. Their practical activities cross national borders, and the trend toward internationalization is increasingly evident. For example, the Christian Protestant sect “the Shouters,” founded in California in 1962, entered mainland China after reform and opening up in the 1980s, affecting more than twenty provinces and cities. In recent years, the Shouters have continuously split and evolved into many branches, such as the “Changshou Sect,” “China Mainland Executive Station,” “the Established King,” “the Lord God Sect,” “the Almighty King,” “the Actual God,” and many other factions. They are linked by blood and persist without end. Why do these sects have such tenacious vitality? How do they inspire the piety of believers? How should we deal with them in the twenty-first century?

当代中国的“邪教问题”，从国际学术视野的角度审视，笔者认为，可以解释为“破坏性膜拜团体问题”。为什么一个在中国土壤上繁衍的社会问题，现在却要置于国际的学术语境下，或者说，在某种程度上，要借鉴某些西方的学术范式来考察呢？这是因为，在笔者看来，现实生活提出的问题，应是学术研究的风向标。随着全球化的发展，当代中国的“邪教问题”，已经成为国际性的社会问题。最近三十多年来，这些团体，有的在境外创立，向境内渗透；有的在境内创立，向境外蔓延。他们的实践活动跨越国界，国际化的趋势日益明显。比如：1962年在美国加利福尼亚州创立的基督教新教派别——“呼喊派”，自20世纪80年代改革开放以来，传入中国大陆，波及20多个省市。近些年来，“呼喊派”不断分化，演变出许多分支：如“常受教”、“中华大陆执行站”、“被立王”、“主神教”、“能力王”、“实际神”等等多种派系。他们血脉相连，绵延不绝。这些教派为什么有如此顽强的生命力？它们如何激发了信仰者的虔诚？我们在21世纪应当怎样与它们打交道呢？

III. Attention Should Be Paid to Christian-Type “Destructive Cults”

三、应当关注基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”

The author believes that a blind spot in research on the contemporary Chinese “problem of destructive cults” is Christian-type “destructive cults.” Given the current domestic and international situation, such groups will have considerable room for development, and their destructive elements will become an important factor affecting social stability.

笔者认为，当代中国“破坏性膜拜团体”问题研究的盲区是，基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”。根据目前国内外的局势，这类团体将会有相当多的发展空间，其中的破坏性因素将成为影响社会稳定的重要因素。

(1) Christian-Type “Destructive Cults” Will Become an Important Factor Affecting Social Stability

（一）基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”将会成为影响社会稳定的重要因素

The author believes that Christian-type “destructive cults” will become an important factor affecting social stability. This judgment is based on the following two reasons:

笔者认为，基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”，将会成为影响社会稳定的重要因素。这种判断基于以下两个理由：

First, on the international stage,

第一，在国际舞台上，“法轮功”将会日趋没落。它的政治性急速增强，远远超过其宗教性。今后，如果需要研究“法轮功”的命运，则更需要研究国际政治的学者，而不是研究宗教的学者。“法轮功”多次声称自己不是宗教。在国际政治舞台上，它热衷于以中国为敌的政治行为。正如一位俄国学者亚历山大.德沃尔金教授（Alexander Dvorkin）所指出的，它不仅以中国政府为敌，而且是以中国人民为敌①。例如：北京争办2008年奥运会时，国际独立媒体进行的民意调查显示，中国普通民众的支持率高达近99%，而某些境外“法轮功”分子四处活动，企图剥夺北京举办2008年奥运会的权力。这样与大多数民众的意向为敌，怎能不越来越失去本土的人心呢？目前，海峡两岸的关系日趋缓和，曾大力支持“法轮功”的陈水扁政府，早已成为明日黄花。“法轮功”“挟洋自重”，在当代中国民族主义日益高涨的未来，它的生存空间有多少呢？随着“法轮功”的日益没落，它的内部凝聚力正在日益衰退，它的利用价值还有多少呢？

Second, due to complex domestic and international factors, certain Christian-type "destructive cult groups" will have considerable room for development and will become a notable phenomenon worthy of attention in the work of governing "evil cults."

第二，由于境内外复杂的因素，某些属于基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”，将会有相当的发展空间，将会成为治理“邪教”工作中值得关注的重要现象。

(2) International factors in the development of Christian-type "destructive cult groups"

（二）基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”发展的国际因素

From the perspective of international factors, Christianity, as the world's largest religion, has a strong missionary desire. The most powerful country in the world today, the United States, is the base of Christianity's global missionary strategy. 1. The United States is the base of Christianity's global missionary strategy. Since the establishment of the U.S. "International Religious Freedom Act of 1998," the forces of Christian neo-fundamentalism and political neo-conservatism in the United States have further combined, using state power to promote the American standard of "freedom of religious belief" values worldwide. The essence of this so-called "faith-based diplomacy" is the combination of "religious belief" with "Western democratic political systems." As former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, "Religious freedom is the core of democracy." The focus of so-called "faith-based diplomacy" is on the "universal values" of Christianity. As the title of a 1997 U.S. State Department report put it: "U.S. Policy in Support of Religious Freedom: Focus on Christianity." This culture of religious belief is constantly abstracted, becoming a totem of the Western-style democratic system and a strategic tool for the United States to pursue its hegemony. Certain Christian neo-fundamentalist organizations emphasize the "universality" of their religion, their missionary zeal is high, and they mobilize vast resources to proselytize around the world.

从国际因素分析，基督教身为世界第一大宗教，自身具有强烈的传教愿望。当今世界最强大的国家——美国，是基督教全球传教战略的基地。1．美国是基督教全球传教战略的基地自美国“1998年国际宗教自由法案”确立以来，美国基督教新基要主义势力和政治新保守主义势力进一步结合起来，利用国家的力量，向全世界推广美国标准的“宗教信仰自由”价值观。这种所谓“信仰外交”（faith-based diplomacy）的实质是，将“宗教信仰”与“西方民主政治制度”相结合。正如美国前国务卿赖斯所说的“宗教自由是民主的核心”。所谓“信仰外交”的关注重点是基督教的“普世价值”。正如1997年美国国务院的报告题目：《美国支持宗教自由的政策：以基督教为重点》。这种宗教信仰文化不断被抽象化，成为西式民主制度的图腾，成为美国推行霸权主义的战略工具。某些基督教新基要主义组织强调其宗教的“普世性”，传教热情高涨，动员大量的资源向世界各地传教。

2. Christian-type "destructive cult groups" have become one of the main targets of funding from overseas right-wing forces.

2．基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”，成为境外右翼势力资助的主要对象之一

Since 1999, the annual "International Religious Freedom Report" issued by the U.S. government has, in dozens of pages, enumerated various so-called "cases," accusing the Chinese government of "seriously violating religious freedom." For example, the U.S. State Department's "2007 International Religious Freedom Report" (hereinafter referred to as the "Report") states: "The government has

自1999年以来，美国政府发布的历年《国际宗教自由报告》，均以数十页的篇幅，历数种种所谓“案例”，指责中国政府“严重侵犯宗教自由”。例如：美国国务院在《2007年国际宗教自由报告》（以下简称《报告》）中声称“：（中国）政府取缔了法轮功、观音法门、中功。政府认为某些基督教新教团体是邪教（cults），包括呼喊派（Shouters）、东方闪电(EasternLighting)、门徒会(Society of Disciples)、全范围教会(Full Scope Church)、灵灵教(Spirit Sect)、新约教会(New Testament Church)、三班仆人派(Three Grades ofServants)、门徒联合会(Association of Disciples)、主神教(Lord God Sect)、被立王(Established King Church)、统一教(Unfication Church)、家庭之爱(the Family ofLove)、华南教会(South China Church)。”[12]除了被界定为“精神运动”的“法轮功”外，美国政府相当关注某些基督教新教的团体。

The U.S. State Department, on the one hand, sternly accuses the Chinese government of “seriously violating religious freedom,” while on the other hand, it refuses to provide concrete evidence. As far as I know, apart from Fal

美国国务院一方面严厉指责中国政府“严重侵犯宗教自由”，一方面又拒绝提出确实的证据。据我所知，除“法轮功”外，中国政府没有再以“邪教”的名义，查处任何气功类的组织。可以推测，当局者已经发现，用大规模的政治运动查处类似组织，这样的治理成本太高。《报告》中所列举的这类基督教新教团体共13种。至今为止，我没有发现“门徒联合会”(Association of Disciples)的资料，可能是《报告》有误差，其他12种都是政府有关部门查处的对象。其中家庭之爱(the Family of Love)在中国官方译为“天父的儿女”。据我所知，实际上，这类基督教新教团体，包括变异的组织，至少有19种。

Against the backdrop of China’s reform and opening up, such Protestant Christian groups began to spread from abroad into mainland China, taking it upon themselves to

在中国改革开放的大背景下，此类基督教新教团体开始从境外传入中国大陆，并以推翻现存的社会主义制度为自任，引起执政者的警惕。始作俑者为1962年在美国加州创立的“呼喊派”。应当指出的是“，呼喊派”被中国政府查处，绝不是因为其另类的宗教信仰方式，而是其推翻政府的政治行动。此类组织将宗教信仰与某种政治制度捆绑在一起，是宗教利用政治呢？还是政治利用宗教呢？这些组织的差异有多少？应当区别对待吗？能够将中国政府查处此类宗教组织，归结为“严重侵犯宗教自由”吗？国际上许多基督教组织不分青红皂白，积极谋求向此类组织提供资助，这怎能不加剧他们与中国政府之间的紧张关系呢?

(3) Domestic Factors in the Development of Protestant Christianity’s “Destructive Cults”

（三）基督教新教的“破坏性膜拜团体”发展的国内因素

Analyzing from domestic factors, as a broad social backdrop, since reform and opening up, the phenomenon of Christianity in mainland China has been continuously heating up. This is a fact evident to all.

从国内因素分析，作为大的社会背景，自改革开放以来，中国大陆的基督教现象不断升温，这是有目共睹的事实。

1. Since reform and opening up, the phenomenon of Christianity in mainland China has been continuously heating up

1．自改革开放以来，中国大陆的基督教现象不断升温

Whether in cities or rural areas, the number of Christians and the quantity of churches and meeting points have all shown a clear upward trend. Regarding the scale of contemporary Chinese Christian development, the statistical figures published by the Chinese government, religious circles, and academia are not uniform. The official figures are relatively low-key and cautious. For example, in 2008, Wang Zuo’an, then Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, wrote that the number of Christian believers nationwide was 16 million, a very rapid increase compared to the 700,000 at the time of the founding of New China. Because this statistical data does not include Christians in unregistered churches, “the actual number of Christians is larger than this statistical figure.” [18]

无论是城市还是农村，基督教人数及教堂、聚会点的数量都呈明显上升的趋势。关于当代中国基督教发展的规模，中国政府、宗教界和学术界发表的统计数字不一。官方发布的数字比较低调谨慎。如2008年，国家宗教事务局局长王作安撰文说，全国的基督教信徒为1600万人，与新中国建立初期的70万人相比，增长十分迅速。因这一统计数据不包括未经政府登记教堂的基督徒，“因此基督徒实际数量比这个统计数字要大”[18]。

Survey data on contemporary Chinese Christians from academia is significantly higher than official statistics. From 2003 to 2006, under the leadership of Professors Tong Shijun and Liu Zhongyu, the East China Normal University research group conducted a sample survey of 4,569 individuals across 30 provinces and municipalities in China, estimating that the number of religious believers in contemporary China is about 300 million, among whom there are about 40 million Christians. Another survey organized by foreign scholars yielded conclusions close to those of the East China Normal University group. “China Partner,” an organization founded by Dr. Werner Burklin, conducted a sample survey of 5,430 individuals across 30 provinces and municipalities (excluding Tibet) in 2007, concluding that “the current number of Protestants in China is 39 million, with a margin of error of 3%.” Dr. Burklin believes that “in church history, the development speed of the Chinese church is higher than anywhere else in the world.” [20]

学术界对当代中国基督徒的调查数据，明显高于官方的统计。2003年至2006年，在童世骏和刘仲宇教授带领下，华东师范大学课题组在中国30个省市，对4569个样本进行抽样调查，估计当代中国信仰宗教的人数约有3亿，其中基督徒约有4000万。另一个由外国学者组织的调查数据与华东师大课题组的结论接近。博克林(Dr.Werner Burklin)博士为创始人的“中国伙伴”组织（China Partner）,于2007年，在除西藏以外的30个省市，对5430个样本进行抽样调查，结论是“中国现在的新教徒人数为3900万，这中间包含3%的误差”。博克林博士认为“，在教会历史上，中国教会的发展速度要高于世界其他任何地方”[20]。

In the eyes of most scholars, the majority of contemporary Chinese Christian churches have evangelical characteristics, displaying conservative theological tendencies, adhering to the literal words of the Bible, being keen on intense personal mystical experiences, and emphasizing miraculous healing, among other things. This strong charismatic tendency, focusing on the coming of the end times, can easily develop into heresy. In scholars’ social surveys, it has been found that in grassroots religious practice, although various Christian denominations differ, under the guidance of basic Christian doctrines, they are difficult to distinguish, and the vast majority exist in a state of mutual compatibility and symbiosis. Survey reports by contemporary scholars on the current state of Christianity in China indicate that the relationship between Christianity and “destructive cults” (evil cults) has two types. One type is a state of intertwined and conflicting existence; the other type is a state of “harmony in diversity” symbiosis.

在大多数学者眼中，当代中国的大多数基督教会具有福音派特征，表现出保守的神学倾向，坚守《圣经》字句，热衷强烈的个人神秘体验，强调神迹治病等等。这种强烈的灵恩倾向，关注末世的来临，很容易发展为异端。在学者的社会调查中发现，在基层社会的宗教实践活动中，各种基督教的派别虽有差异，但在基督教基本教义的指导下，是很难分别的，绝大多数处于相容共生的状态。当代学者对中国基督教现状的调查报告表明，基督教与“破坏性膜拜团体”（邪教）的关系有两种类型。一种类型是，处于矛盾交织生存的状态；另一种类型是，处于“和而不同”的共生状态。

2. The State of Intertwined and Conflicting Existence between Christianity and “Destructive Cults”

2．基督教与“破坏性膜拜团体”矛盾交织生存的状态

Regarding the first type, there are many field survey reports. In November 2008, the author and Dr. Zheng Yonghua went to Zhangjiajie, Hunan Province, to investigate the current state of Christianity. When conducting research at the Cili County Gospel Church, the clergy there told us that there are many “heretical sects” (evil cults) active in the Cili area, and those who often come to the Gospel Church to lure away believers include the “Three-Servant-People,” the “Disciples’ Society,” “Eastern Lightning,” the “Lord God Sect,” and so on. These “evil cult organizations” “use the banner of Christianity, take Bible verses out of context, and seek personal gain.” They often come to the church to “steal sheep, are hard to guard against, and are very secretive.” [20]

关于第一种类型有许多田野调查报告。2008年11月，笔者和郑永华博士到湖南省张家界调研基督教现状。在慈利县福音堂调研时，那里的教职人员告诉我们说，慈利地区有许多“异端教派”（邪教）在进行活动，经常到福音堂里拉拢信徒的就有“三班仆人”、“门徒会”、“东方闪电”、“主神教”等等。这些“邪教组织”“打着基督教的旗帜，讲《圣经》断章取义，为了谋取个人私利。”它们经常到“教会里拉羊，防不胜防，很隐秘”[20]。

This situation is a relatively common phenomenon across the country. In the Changde area of Hunan Province, clergy at the Christian True Light Church said: “Heretical teachings around the church are everywhere, like a vast net.” “Eastern Lightning, the Disciples’ Society, everything is there.” The Disciples’ Society here operates under the name “Three Redemptions.” The so-called “Three Redemptions,” as the name implies, refers to three redemptions. The first redemption was Noah’s Ark; the second redemption was the birth of Jesus; the third redemption is the “Three Redemptions Christ” who saves humanity at the end of the world, i.e., the organization’s founder, Ji Sanbao, a peasant from Yao County, Shaanxi Province. Ji Sanbao was originally a Christian and participated in the “Shouting Sect” in 1982. On the fifteenth day of the first lunar month in 1989, he held a meeting at his home, claiming that “Jehovah has directly spoken with me and has appointed me as a prophet, a substitute for God.” He selected “twelve disciples” and founded the “Disciples’ Society.” The “Three Redemptions” stipulates that believers must eat no more than two liang [8]8 *liang*: A traditional Chinese unit of weight, equal to 50 grams. of grain per day, hence this sect is also called the “Two Liang Grain.” The less one eats, the higher their spirituality; eating more than two liang indicates they have not truly repented. This sect forbids believers from going to church, opposes baptism with water, and advocates that believers “pass through fire.” Investigators found that a considerable number of believers in the True Light Church had previously participated in the activities of the “Three Redemptions.” [20]

这样的情况在全国各地是比较普遍的现象。在湖南常德地区，基督教真光堂的教牧人员说：教会周边的异端邪说，天罗地网的。“东方闪电、门徒会什么都有。”此地的门徒会以“三赎”名义活动。所谓“三赎”顾名思义，指三次救赎。第一次救赎是诺亚方舟；第二次救赎是耶稣降生；第三次救赎是末日来临时拯救人类的“三赎基督”，即该组织的创始人陕西省耀县农民的季三保。季三保原为基督教教徒，1982年曾参加“呼喊派”。1989年农历正月十五，他在家中召开会议，自称“耶和华与我直接对话，已定我为先知，是神的替身”。他拣选“十二门徒”自创“门徒会”。“三赎”规定，信徒每天吃饭至多不得超过二两粮，因此该派也被称为“二两粮”。吃得越少说明他的灵性越高，超过二两就表明尚未真心悔改。该派不许信徒去教堂，反对用水施洗，主张信徒“从火里过”。调查者发现，真光堂里有相当数量的信徒都曾参与过“三赎”的活动。[20]

These “heretical sects” (destructive cults) emphasize activities such as speaking in tongues, singing spiritual songs, dancing spiritual dances, seeing visions, and exorcising demons and healing diseases. This not only easily mixes with traditional Chinese folk beliefs but also caters to the utilitarian motives of faith among the Chinese populace. They focus on using miracles and spiritual phenomena to eliminate suffering and cure diseases. Whenever someone in a family is sick or hospitalized, or whenever an accident occurs, they will arrive upon hearing the news, tirelessly showing concern, and citing numerous cases of healing through prayer and disaster relief, all with the aim of persuading people to join. For ordinary believers lacking discernment, as long as they can solve practical problems, they see no harm in participating.

这些“异端教派”（破坏性膜拜团体）强调说方言、唱灵歌、跳灵舞、见异象、赶鬼医病等活动方式，不仅容易与中国传统的民间信仰相混杂，更迎合了中国民众带有功利性色彩的信仰动机。他们注重以神迹、灵异排除苦难，医治疾病。谁家有人生病、住院，谁家出了事故，他们就会闻讯而至，不厌其烦，问寒问暖，列举大量祷告治病、消灾免难的案例，目的则是劝人入会。而一些缺乏分辨能力的普通信徒看来，只要他们能解决实际问题，就不妨参与。

3. Christianity and “Destructive Cults” in a State of “Harmony in Diversity” Symbiosis

3．基督教与“破坏性膜拜团体”处于“和而不同的共生状态

There are also many investigative reports on this type of phenomenon. From 2005 to 2006, Dr. Li Shunhua, a specialist in the sociology of religion at Peking University, conducted field research on Christianity in his hometown of Weihui, Henan Province. In his doctoral dissertation, the author wrote: “Because their religious foundations are largely the same—‘Eastern Lightning’ is regarded by them as a heresy—the rural Christian churches in Weihui do not consider the above-mentioned sects to pose any substantive threat to them; in the view of the Weihui Christian churches, atheism, evolutionism, and folk religion are the greatest obstacles and threats to their survival and development. Therefore, in the sanctification activities of the rural Christian churches and their hymn groups, their attack naturally first targets atheism, evolutionism, and folk religion. This is an inevitable strategy adopted by rural Christian churches in constructing group self-identity and other sanctification activities, and it is also a necessary survival tactic they employ when facing external threats.” [20] This field report indicates that, in the view of the rural Christian churches in Weihui, “Christian heretical sects” like “Eastern Lightning” share roughly the same religious foundation as themselves, and therefore they do not consider these sects to “pose any substantive threat to them,” while “atheism, evolutionism, and folk religion are the greatest obstacles and threats to their survival and development.”

关于这种类型也有许多调查报告。2005年至2006年，北京大学宗教社会学专业的李顺华博士，在家乡河南卫辉市进行基督教田野调查。作者在其博士论文中写道：“基于宗教信仰基础的大致相同——‘东方闪电’在他们看来是异端——卫辉市乡村基督教会并不认为上述几个教派会对他们构成任何实质性的威胁；在卫辉市基督教会看来，无神论、进化论以及民间信仰才是他们生存与发展的最大障碍与威胁。因此，在乡村基督教会以及圣诗班的圣化活动中，其矛头很自然地会首先直指无神论、进化论与民间信仰。这是乡村基督教会在建构群体自我认同以及其他圣化活动中所必然采用的策略，也是在它面对外来威胁时所采取的必要的生存之道。”[20]这份田野报告指出，在卫辉市乡村基督教会看来“，东方闪电”之类“基督教异端教派”，与他们宗教信仰的基础大致相同，因此，不认为这些教派“对他们构成任何实质性的威胁”，而“无神论、进化论以及民间信仰才是他们生存与发展的最大障碍与威胁”。

Whether in a state of intertwined contradictions or in a state of symbiosis characterized by “harmony without uniformity,”[9]9 Xi Wuyi is a Chinese scholar known for research on religion and cults; the journal *World Religious Studies* is a leading Chinese academic publication in the field. the sustained development of Christianity in mainland China, especially in vast rural areas, has provided fertile social soil for the survival and development of various types of Christian “destructive cults.”

不管是处于矛盾交织生存的状态，还是处于“和而不同”的共生状态，总之，在中国大陆基督教的持续发展，特别是在广大乡村地区，为各种基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”的生存和发展，提供了肥沃的社会土壤。

(4) Exploring an Academic Paradigm for Cross-Cultural Research on the “Cult Problem”

（四）探索“邪教问题”跨文化研究的学术范式

The author believes that using the Western religious studies concept of “destructive cults” to examine China’s “cult” problem, and striving to explore a cross-cultural research paradigm, is a field of study worth developing. This will help advance research on the contemporary Chinese “cult problem” into the discourse of international academic circles.

笔者认为，以西方宗教学的概念“破坏性膜拜团体”，来考察中国的“邪教”问题，努力探索一种跨文化研究的学术范式，是值得开拓的研究领域。这将有助于推动当代中国的“邪教问题”研究，进入国际学术研究的话语圈。

First, the author agrees with the view that “religious phenomena are a cultural phenomenon that emerges at a certain historical stage of human social development and belong to social ideology.” [22] As a scientific atheist, the author believes that, with the development of modernization in contemporary society, religious forms are also constantly evolving, and their social function can be described as “a mixed blessing,” rather than being “perfect and supremely good” as some theologians claim.

首先，笔者认同这样的观点：“宗教现象是人类社会发展到一定历史阶段出现的一种文化现象，属于社会意识形态”[22]。作为科学无神论者，笔者认为，随着当代社会现代化的发展，宗教形态也在不断演变，其社会功能可以说是“喜忧参半”，而并非像某些神学家标榜的那样“至善尽美”。

Second, from the perspective of religious studies, contemporary Chinese “cult” organizations cannot be simply regarded as criminal organizations engaged in “swindling and deception.” They are a type of destructive extremist religious organization. Such organizations have unique religious and cultural characteristics, and their process of emergence, development, and malignant transformation involves complex social factors worthy of scholarly study. Such an investigative approach, at the very least, helps people understand this complex social phenomenon, namely: Why do “cult” organizations have the “charisma” to attract the masses? In contemporary society, why do such organizations “flourish despite repeated crackdowns” and “survive repeated eradication campaigns”? How should we deal with such complex social phenomena in the 21st century?

其次，从宗教学考察，当代中国的“邪教”组织，不能简单视为“坑蒙拐骗”的犯罪组织。它是一种具有破坏性的极端宗教组织。这类组织有独特的宗教文化特征，其萌生、发展、恶变的过程，有复杂的社会因素，值得学者研究。这样的考察思路，至少有助于人们认识这一复杂的社会现象，即：“邪教”组织为什么具有吸引民众的“魅力”？在当代社会，为什么这类组织“屡剿屡兴”、“剿而不灭”呢？在21世纪里，我们应当怎样对待这类复杂的社会现象呢？

Third, among the organizations designated as “cults” by the Chinese government, aside from Fal

第三，被中国政府认定的“邪教”组织，除打着气功旗帜的“法轮功”、以佛教名义出现的“观音法门”（包括其演变的派别“圆顿法门”）和“灵仙真佛宗”外，其他都是属于基督教新教的“异端派别”。在当代中国，这种基督教新教“异端派别”至少有19种，占此类非法组织的85%以上。分析这些属于基督教类型的非法组织，运用西方宗教学的概念“破坏性膜拜团体”，会有助于人们逐步认识这种复杂的社会现象，在中西不同文化背景下的“共性”和“特殊性”。在中国大陆，为治理此类社会问题，探索更合理的工作思路。在国际舞台上，为治理“破坏性膜拜团体”，寻求某种共识，扩大合作的空间。基于上述这些理由，笔者认为，当代中国“破坏性膜拜团体”研究的盲区是，属于基督教新教“异端派别”。西方宗教社会学者通过对基督教各种组织形态的考察，论述了“膜拜团体”概念。作者借用这样有基督教文化基因的学术概念，来分析当代中国属于基督教类型的“破坏性膜拜团体”，希望收获“它山之石，可以攻玉”的成果。

Notes:

注释：

①Minutes of the Sino-Russian Scholars Symposium (Beijing, November 24, 2009) (draft record). Professor Dvorkin is currently President of the “Russian Federation Union of Centers for the Study of Religion and Sects.” In April 2009, he was appointed Chairman of the “State Expert Commission on Religious Studies” of the Russian Ministry of Justice.

①中俄学者座谈会纪要》（2009年11月24日北京）（纪录稿）。德沃尔金教授现为“俄国宗教与教派研究中心联合会”总裁，2009年4月，他出任俄国司法部“宗教科学国家专家执行委员会”主席。

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