The Historical Evolution of the Ideology of Chinese Christian Churches in the United States

Foreword

前 言

Needless to say, religion is an ideology, and religion is closely related to politics. Many scholars in our country worry that emphasizing the ideological character of religion is detrimental to correcting the ultra-leftist line toward religion that was formed historically. Therefore, many advocate that religion is merely a culture, and that religion has nothing to do with politics. In fact, this is not only an attitude that fails to seek truth from facts [n1] and is unhelpful for objectively understanding the ideological character of religion, but also, by “excluding” religion from politics, it does not capture the true meaning of the principle of “separation of church and state,” and will generate new ideological and practical misunderstandings. Especially at a time when “theocratic politics” is gradually gaining dominance in the political life of certain Western countries, an in-depth understanding of the history and current state of religious ideology in these countries has important theoretical and practical significance.

毋庸讳言，宗教是一种意识形态，宗教与政治息息相关。我国很多学者担心，强调宗教的意识形态特征不利于我们纠正历史上形成的对宗教的极左路线，所以，很多人提倡宗教只是一种文化，宗教与政治无关。其实，这不仅不是实事求是的态度，不利于客观认识宗教的意识形态特征，而且将宗教“排斥”在政治之外，并不是“政教分离”原则的真正内涵，会产生新的思想和实践误区。尤其是“神权政治”在某些西方国家政治生活中逐渐占据主导地位的情况下，深入了解这些国家宗教意识形态的历史与现状具有重要的理论与现实意义。

From the mid-19th century to the 1950s, the main force of missionary work in China was Western missionary organizations and missionaries. From the second half of the 20th century to the beginning of this century, overseas Chinese Christians gradually replaced white people as the main force of missionary work in China. The United States was founded on Christianity and has a strong tradition of foreign evangelism, along with the religious ideology and assertive religious diplomacy formed under this tradition, which has a significant impact on other countries, especially developing ones. Therefore, the Chinese Christian community in the United States holds a particularly prominent position in missionary work toward China. Early Chinese Americans were the passive recipients of religious ideology and policy. From the time the first group of Chinese coolies entered the United States in 1849, racial and religious discrimination made life difficult for the Chinese, and the Chinese churches established in this context were also branded with this ideological imprint. Over more than 100 years, the social status of Chinese Americans has improved significantly, and the composition of Chinese Christians has also undergone fundamental changes. Especially after China’s reform and opening up, the United States became China’s largest destination for studying abroad, and Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. also became the largest group among international students in America. Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. are regarded as “China’s future leadership class,” and evangelizing to them is the most important task of Chinese Christian churches in the United States. Moreover, the addition of a large number of Chinese scholars is greatly changing and reshaping the ideology of the Chinese Christian community in the United States. This ideology, in turn, as an increasing number of scholar-Christians return to China, is having an increasingly evident and profound impact on Christianity in China.

19世纪中期至20世纪50年代，对华传教的主力是西方的传教机构与传教士。20世纪下半页到本世纪初，海外华人基督徒逐渐取代白人，成为对华传教的主力军。美国是基督教立国，具有强烈的对外宣教传统，以及在这种传统下形成的宗教意识形态与强势宗教外交，对其他国家尤其是发展中国家产生重要影响。因此，美国华人基督徒群体在对华传教方面更是具有突出的地位。早期的美国华人是宗教意识形态与政策的被动方，从1849年第一批华人苦力（coolie）进入美国，种族和宗教的歧视使华人处境艰难，在此背景下建立起来的华人教会也烙下了这种意识形态烙印。100多年以来，美国华人的社会地位有了显著提升，华人基督徒结构也在经历根本性变化，尤其是中国改革开放以后，美国成为中国最大的留学目的国，留美中国学人也成为美国留学生中数量最大的群体，中国留美学人被视为“中国未来的领袖阶层”，向他们传福音是美国华人基督教会的最重要任务。而一大批华人学者的加入，正极大地改变并重塑着美国华人基督徒群体的意识形态，这种意识形态又随着日益增多的学人基督徒的回国，越来越明显地对中国基督教产生深远影响。

At present, comprehensive historical studies of Chinese churches in the United States are relatively lacking, but there is generally considerable attention to the development of overseas scholar-churches, and research results are relatively concentrated. Since large numbers of students began going to the United States in the second half of the 20th century, research on the history of overseas scholar-churches mainly began in this period. For example, Mr. Su Wenfeng, founder of *Overseas Campus*, when recounting the history of overseas Chinese churches, believes that overseas scholar ministry can be divided into seven stages: 1. 1945–1950: Student evangelistic work began in mainland China; after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese scholar ministry left the mainland. 2. The 1950s: Student evangelistic work developed widely in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; campus gospel fellowships, English Bible study groups, etc., became the main forms, which later influenced Chinese scholar fellowships in the United States. 3. The 1960s–1970s: With the wave of people going abroad from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, large numbers of scholars entered Europe and America, establishing many scholar fellowships on European and American campuses. 4. 1978–1989: China’s reform and opening up; visiting scholars and students from mainland China entered Europe and America; although some had considerable interest in Christianity, most scholars felt alienated from it. 5. 1989–2001: Due to the political turmoil in mainland China [n2] and the U.S. Congress passing special legislation targeting Chinese scholars, large numbers of Chinese scholars joined churches. 6. 2001–2007: Large numbers of scholar-Christians returned to China to evangelize, promoting the rise of many urban house churches. 7. 2007 to the present: The 200th anniversary of Christianity’s arrival in China; a global missionary wave emerged in Chinese churches, with the slogan “the gospel back to Jerusalem”; many scholar-Christians dedicated themselves to global missionary work. Similarly, Pastor Zhang Boli of Harvest Chinese Church believes that although the first group of Chinese students came to the United States in 1979, the large-scale “movement of turning to the Lord” among scholars began after 1990. Hong Yujian divides the so-called “movement of turning to the Lord” into three stages: 1990–1993: a stage of individual evangelism by Chinese and Western churches to Chinese scholars; 1993–1996: campus Bible study groups dominated by mainland Chinese scholars began to appear, and many scholars were baptized; from 1996 onward, a small number of churches dominated by mainland Chinese scholars began to appear, but more common was a change in the membership structure of North American Chinese churches; among newly baptized Chinese Christians in North America, Chinese scholars often accounted for more than 60%. From the analysis of Su Wenfeng, Zhang Boli, Hong Yujian, and others on the development of Chinese scholar ministry, it can be seen that they

目前，美国华人教会史的通史性研究比较欠缺，但是，对于海外学人教会发展则普遍较为关注，研究成果也比较集中。由于大量留学人员进入美国开始于20世纪后半期，因此，对海外学人教会史的研究主要开始于这一时期。如《海外校园》创办人苏文峰先生在讲述海外华人教会史时，认为海外学人事工可以分为七个阶段：1. 1945年—1950年学生福音事工开始于中国大陆，中华人民共和国建国后，中国学人事工离开大陆；2. 1950年代学生福音事工在港澳台广泛发展，校园福音团契、英语查经班等成为主要形式，这一点影响到后来在美国的中国学人团契；3. 20世纪60-70年代，随着台港澳的出国热，大批学人进入欧美，在欧美校园建立了大量学人团契；4. 1978年—1989年，中国改革开放，大陆访问学者、留学生进入欧美，虽然有人对基督教有相当兴趣，但是，大多数学人对基督教感到隔膜；5. 1989年—2001年，由于大陆政治风波以及美国国会通过针对中国学人的特别法案，大批中国学人加入教会；6. 2001年—2007年，大批学人基督徒回国传教，推动了大量城市家庭教会的兴起；7. 2007年至今，基督教来华200周年，华人教会出现全球传教浪潮，以“福音传回耶路撒冷”为口号，许多学人基督徒献身全球传教事工。与此类似，丰收华夏教会牧师张伯笠认为，虽然第一批中国留学生来到美国始于1979年，但是，大批学人的“归主运动”是始于1990年以后。洪予健将所谓的“归主运动”分为3个阶段：1990年—1993年为华人、西人教会向中国学人个人布道阶段；1993年—1996年，开始出现以大陆学人为主的校园查经班，许多学人受洗；1996年开始少量出现大陆学人为主的教会，但是，更为普遍的是北美华人教会成员的结构发生变化，北美华人新受洗的基督徒中，中国学人往往达到六成以上。从苏文峰、张伯笠、洪予健等人对中国学人事工发展的分析可以看出，他们将“六•四”视为学人事工的分水岭，这一点也正好说明，这一批具有一定影响的华人基督徒领袖具有非常强烈的意识形态色彩。

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the ideological evolution of Chinese Christians in the United States, we must adopt a broader historical perspective. Therefore, we divide the ideological formation and historical evolution of Chinese Christian churches in the United States into three major stages, each of which endows the ideology of Chinese churches with different content.

为了更为全面地了解美国华人基督徒的意识形态演变，我们必须具有更为宏阔的历史视野。因此，我们将美国华人基督教会的意识形态形成及历史演变分为三大阶段，其中每个阶段都赋予了华人教会意识形态以不同的内容。

Stage One: Racial Discrimination and Religious Discrimination — 1849 to 1942

第一阶段、种族歧视与宗教歧视——1849年至1942年

In the history of Chinese diplomacy, the Chinese Exclusion Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1882 is very worthy of our reflection. Some of the ideological factors it contains still influence Sino-U.S. relations today. However, most Chinese scholars have neglected or deliberately avoided this history; only a few American scholars have offered some reflections in their works.

在中国外交史上，美国国会于1882年通过的《排华法案》是非常值得我们反思的，其中包含的一些意识形态因素，至今仍影响着中美关系。但是，华人学者大多忽视或者刻意回避这一历史，只有少数美国学者在其著作中有过一些反思。

In the second half of the 19th century, the United States, through its "Open Door" policy, was able to "share in the benefits" with China, and through the Toleration Clause, obtained religious privileges in China. Ironically, in 1882, the United States passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, the only law targeting a specific foreign ethnic group. The ideas expressed in this act were a strange mixture; its core ideology came from several contradictory sources. On the religious level, it viewed Chinese as dangerous heathens; on the level of national cultural psychology, it contained the incitement of the "Yellow Peril threat theory"; while its racism originated from social Darwinism, which is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of creation. In his book *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Michael H. Hunt points out that racial discrimination is one of the three fundamental ideologies of American diplomacy. The racist ideology of the United States held that people of color were at a lower stage of the evolutionary sequence, with Anglo-Saxons at the top of the racial hierarchy. Other lower-ranking races were either to follow the leadership of the Anglo-Saxons or fall to the bottom of the racial hierarchy to face their ultimate extinction.① Under the dominance of this ideology, which had a strong theocratic political character, the Chinese were severely demonized. They were stubborn heathens, licentious and immoral. They gathered like rats in plague-ridden slums, and "Chinatowns" were considered a serious threat to the health, morality, and welfare of white communities. In 1784, the geographer Elson, in his book *Defending Tradition*, described the Chinese as "the most dishonest, the lowest, and the most thieving people in the world."② "Therefore, it was necessary to adopt a two-pronged approach to dealing with the Chinese: on the one hand, the religious rituals of Christian missionaries; on the other hand, strictly excluding the Chinese from the remote areas of civilization in Hawaii and the West Coast."③

19世纪下半叶，美国通过“门户开放”政策得以对华“利益均沾”，通过《宽容条款》获得在中国的宗教特权。具有讽刺意味的是，1882年，美国国内却通过了唯一针对外民族的《排华法案》，该法案表达的观念是一个奇怪的混合物，其核心意识形态来自于相互矛盾的几个源头，宗教层面视华人为危险的异教徒，民族文化心理层面则包含“黄祸威胁论”的蛊惑，而种族主义却来源于与基督宗教创世论不相容的社会达尔文主义。Michael H. Hunt在《意识形态与美国外交政策》一书中指出种族歧视是美国外交的三大基本意识形态之一。美国的种族主义意识形态认为有色人种处于进化序列的低级阶段，盎格鲁•撒克逊人居于种族等级的顶端，其他低等级种族要么追随盎格鲁•撒克逊人的领导，要么跌入种族等级的底部，去面对其终极灭绝的命运。① 在这种具有浓厚神权政治色彩的意识形态主导下，中国人被严重妖魔化，他们是顽固的异教徒，荒淫无耻，道德败坏。他们像老鼠一样聚集在瘟疫流行的贫民窟，“唐人街”被认为对白人社区的健康、道德和福祉构成严重威胁。1784年，地理学家Elson在《保卫传统》一书中描述中国人是：“世界上最不诚实、最低等、最爱偷窃的人。”② “因此，对付中国人有必要采取两手，一方面是基督教传教士的宗教仪式，另一方面严格地将中国人从夏威夷和西海岸文明的偏远地区排除出去。”③

The American missionary community in China played a key role in shaping the image of China and the Chinese people among the American public. Some contemporary American scholars point out: "Those eloquent and opinionated missionaries widely disseminated their impressions in the United States. The gospel pioneers reported to America that China was a 'moral desert,' and its people were ignorant

在美国民众中塑造中国和中国人的形象方面，美国对华传教士群体扮演了关键的角色。美国当代一些学者指出：“那些能说会道、固执己见的传教士将他们的感想在美国广为传播。福音先驱们向美国报道的中国是一个‘道德荒漠’，它的人民愚昧、道德败坏和肮脏。”④

Against this ideological background, Chinese laborers entered the United States in large numbers in 1849. In the eyes of Americans, Chinese laborers had two major characteristics or threats: first, the Chinese were an inexhaustible supply of cheap labor — when the American labor market was scarce, Chinese laborers were a lifeline; when the American economy stagnated, Chinese laborers “took away the livelihoods of white laborers and destroyed their dignity.” Second, as stubborn heathens, the Chinese “made it impossible and unworthy to hope to assimilate these aliens.” Therefore, excluding the Chinese was both reasonable and should be legal. Chinese laborers, on the one hand, were helplessly subjected to physical persecution by white mobs, and on the other hand, faced comprehensive exclusion under the Chinese Exclusion Act. The ideological consequences of the latter went far deeper than what the law’s promoters and framers sought at the political and legal levels. Of course, the Chinese Exclusion Act was a disgrace to American democracy and was consistently criticized and resisted within the United States by some upright Americans. The liberal theological tendencies of early Chinese Christians in the United States and the “Three-Self” movement [1]1 The Three-Self movement (三自运动) refers to the Protestant church initiative in China advocating self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation, formally organized in the 1950s under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party. in the early 20th-century Chinese church should be related to this.

在此意识形态背景下，中国劳工于1849年大量进入美国。在美国人看来，中国劳工有两大特点或威胁：第一，中国人是源源不断的廉价劳力，在美国劳动力市场匮乏时，中国劳工是救命稻草；当美国经济停滞时，中国劳工则“抢走了白人劳工的生计并摧毁他们的尊严”。第二，中国人作为顽固的异教徒，“希望同化这些异族是不可能和不值得的。”因此，排斥中国人既是合理的，也应该是合法的。中国劳工一方面孤立无援地遭到来自白人暴徒的武力迫害，另一方面受到《排华法案》的全面排斥。后者的意识形态后果远比法律的推动和制定者在政治和法律层面寻求的目标更为深远。当然，《排华法案》是美国民主的耻辱，在美国国内也一直受到部分正直的美国人的批判和抵制。早期留美华人基督徒的自由主义神学倾向与20世纪初期中国基督教会的“三自”运动应该与此有关。

At the end of the 19th century, missionaries also keenly discovered China’s major geopolitical significance. China had enormous potential; Asia would change, and China would be the fulcrum of that change. The United States should exert greater influence on China through diplomatic investment, economic trade, and Christian missionary work. Two different voices were interwoven in the American ideology toward China: first, the Chinese were disgusting creatures who should be kept at a distance at all costs; second, China was America’s “responsibility ward” [2]2 “Responsibility ward” (责任病区) is a term used in the context of the “white man’s burden” ideology, implying a paternalistic duty to manage and civilize a region or people deemed incapable of self-rule. to which it had a special mission — Americans had the duty to teach, protect, and even punish them for their misbehavior. [5]5 WASP stands for White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, a term denoting the dominant cultural and social group in American history, often associated with privilege and influence.

19世纪末，传教士也敏感地发现中国在地缘政治上的重大意义。中国潜力巨大，亚洲将会改变，中国将是这种改变的支点。美国应该通过外交投资、经济贸易、基督教传教对中国施加更大影响。美国在对华意识形态方面交织着两种不同声音：其一，中国人是令人厌恶的生物，应该不惜一切代价与他们保持距离；其二，中国是美国人赋有特殊使命的“责任病区”，美国人有责任教导、保护他们，甚至包括对他们的不良行为进行惩罚。⑤

This ideology had a profound impact on Chinese churches. First, the Chinese Exclusion Act severely distorted the identity and interests of Chinese Americans. Because of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese laborers had no civil rights. Many white missionaries’ main goal in evangelizing the Chinese was not to help them integrate into American society, but to hope they would return to China to spread the gospel. “Bringing the gospel into China and transforming China’s heathen culture” was identified as the main goal of American Chinese churches — a key feature distinguishing Chinese churches from other ethnic minority churches in the United States. Other American ethnic minority Christian churches rarely have a conservative right-wing orientation on the belief spectrum; they generally take safeguarding their legitimate rights and interests in the United States as their primary political demand. Second, under the oppression of the Chinese Exclusion Act ideology, “anti-religious persecution” paradoxically became a tool for Chinese to defend their rights. Accusing the Chinese government of religious persecution, seeking political asylum, and obtaining residency and citizenship in the United States became a “business” among Chinese. Third, white American missionaries played a key role in shaping the early image of the Chinese. Although this role has gradually been replaced by Chinese missionaries, we see too many shadows of white missionaries in some people. They habitually call the Chinese government an “uncivilized” government; they spare no effort in calling on the U.S. Congress, the White House, and religious groups to impose more punitive measures on China’s “misbehavior”; they effortlessly copy the image of the Chinese as seen through white eyes. They even denounce U.S. President Barack Obama’s courtesy toward China as an act of “kowtowing,” because in their eyes, it is only reasonable for the Chinese to be “humble and subservient.”

这种意识形态对华人教会影响深远。第一，《排华法案》严重扭曲了美国华人的身份认同和利益诉求。由于《排华法案》的存在，作为劳工的中国人没有任何公民权利，许多白人传教士向华人传教的主要目标并不是帮助华人融入美国社会，而是寄希望他们能够回到中国传播福音。“将福音传入中国，改变中国异教文化”被确定为美国华人教会的主要目标，这一点是华人教会区别于美国其他少数族裔教会的重要特点。其他美国少数族裔基督教会在信仰光谱上极少具有保守的右翼色彩，他们一般将维护自身在美国的合理权益作为首要政治诉求。第二，在《排华法案》意识形态的压迫下，“反宗教迫害”吊诡地成为华人维护自身权益的工具。通过指控中国政府的宗教迫害，寻求政治避难，获取在美国的居留权和公民身份，在华人中成为一种“生意”。第三，美国白人传教士在塑造早期中国人形象的过程中，起到了关键性的作用。虽然这种作用已经逐渐由华人传教士取代，但是，我们从部分人身上看到了太多的白人传教士的影子。他们习惯称呼中国政府是“未开化”的政府，他们不遗余力呼吁美国国会、白宫、宗教群体对中国的“不良行为”采取更多的惩罚措施，他们轻松地拷贝了白人眼中的中国人形象。他们甚至痛斥美国总统奥巴马对中国的礼遇是“磕头”行为，因为在他们眼里中国人“低三下四”才是符合常理的。

Objectively speaking, entering the late 20th century, mainstream American society engaged in a certain degree of reflection and revision regarding racism, one of the three basic ideologies of American foreign policy. However, regarding the deeper theocratic political ideology embedded within racism, there has not only been a persistent lack of genuine self-awareness, but it has also intensified under the impetus of various political forces. We can clearly see that traditional religious discrimination and exclusionary ideology have gradually evolved into the modern “clash of civilizations” theory, while the ancient “Yellow Peril” threat theory has evolved into the 21st-century “China threat theory.” Chinese American Christians should have a more conscious awareness of reshaping the image of the Chinese in the minds of Americans, because this is the true interest of Chinese Americans. A minority of Chinese Christians should not, in a state of collective unconsciousness, lightly wield “anti-religious persecution” — this weapon of mass destruction in human history — against China, because it was the justification for the Crusades and the excuse for the Eight-Nation Alliance’s [3]3 The Eight-Nation Alliance was a multinational military coalition (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that invaded China in 1900 to suppress the Boxer Rebellion, leading to the looting of Beijing. sacking of Beijing. Many people emphasize the benevolence of the United States’ remission of the “Boxer Indemnity” [4]4 The Boxer Indemnity was the compensation imposed on China by the Eight-Nation Alliance after the Boxer Rebellion; the United States later remitted part of its share to fund Chinese student education in the U.S., often portrayed as a benevolent act. and the important role missionaries played in it, but where is the root of the disaster behind this benevolence?

客观地看，进入20世纪后期，美国主流社会对美国外交的三大基本意识形态之一的种族主义有过一定程度的反省和修正。但是，对于蕴含在种族主义中的更深层次的神权政治意识形态，不仅始终缺乏真正的自觉意识，而且在各种政治势力的推动下愈演愈烈。我们可以清晰地看到，传统的宗教歧视与排他性意识形态逐渐演变成现代的“文明冲突论”，而古老的“黄祸威胁论”则演变成21世纪的“中国威胁论”。重塑美国人心目中的中国人形象，美国华人基督徒应该更具自觉意识，因为这是美国华裔的真正的利益所在。少数华人基督徒不应该在一种集体无意识的状态下，轻率地将“反宗教迫害”这一人类历史上的大规模杀伤性武器指向中国，因为，它是十字军东征的理由，也是八国联军洗劫北京的借口。许多人强调美国退还“庚子赔款”的仁慈，强调传教士在其中起到的重要作用，但是，这种仁慈背后的灾难的根源在哪里呢?

Phase Two: Puritan Fundamentalism and the Evangelization of China — 1942 to 1989

第二阶段、清教原教旨主义与福音化中国——1942年至1989年

In 1942, war broke out between Japan and the United States, and China and the United States jointly resisted Japan. Against this backdrop, the United States repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act. The status and image of Chinese Americans improved somewhat. After 1949, American missionaries in China returned to the United States one after another, and some Chinese missionaries also entered the United States. After 1960, large numbers of Chinese students and immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau entered the United States. Against this backdrop, Chinese churches in the United States began to develop rapidly, with both the number of churches and believers growing quickly. This phase established the basic model of Chinese Christian churches in the United States; Chinese Christian missionary organizations were also founded in large numbers, and some influential Chinese preachers emerged. Constrained by the ideology of the first phase, a Chinese theology and ideology characterized by the advocacy of Puritan fundamentalism and WASP [5]5 WASP stands for White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, a term denoting the dominant cultural and social group in American history, often associated with privilege and influence. supremacy began to take shape.

1942年，日美开战，中美共同抗日，在此背景下，美国废除《排华法案》。美国华人地位和形象有所改善。1949年以后，在中国的美国传教士先后回到美国，一些中国传教士也进入美国。1960年以后，台港澳地区大批中国留学生和移民进入美国。在此背景下，美国华人教会开始迅速发展，教会和信徒数量都增长很快。这一阶段奠定了美国华人基督教会的基本模式，华人基督教宣教机构也大量创建，并出现了一些有影响力的华人传道人。受第一阶段意识形态制约，以鼓吹清教原教旨主义、黄蜂至上为特色的华人神学和意识形态开始形成。

Chinese churches actively participated in the evangelical movement initiated by Billy Graham and others, and promoted the evangelical movement among Chinese people worldwide. Evangelical theology became the dominant theology of Chinese churches in the United States, and even within the spectrum of evangelical theology, Chinese churches tended toward the extreme right-wing fundamentalism, even viewing the United States as a “non-Christian nation” and an “anti-Christian nation,” proposing to “re-evangelize the United States.” This theological choice was prominently manifested in tensions with China’s Three-Self Church; the theology of the mainland Three-Self Church was criticized as liberal theology and “theology of unbelievers,” while mainland “house churches” were criticized as charismatic and isolationist. The theological thought influencing urban house churches in mainland China in recent years is mostly related to this. Against this theological background, a mysterious ideology has formed, which holds that the greatest tragedy in modern Chinese history was choosing the French-Russian model or the German-Japanese model on its development path, missing the great English-speaking Puritan model. Therefore, China’s only way out is evangelization, and in the process of evangelization, the only correct choice is the Reformed theology of the Puritans, while in political practice, only the superior Anglo-Saxon model can be chosen. China should take the baton of the gospel from the United States and become the last or second-to-last stop for Christianity to be passed back to the Middle East and back to Jerusalem. Regarding Sino-American relations, if China becomes a Christian nation, then Sino-American friendship would surpass U.S.-Japan relations, because Japan is a non-Christian nation; if China cannot become a Christian nation, then the United States will forever regard China as an enemy. Even more extreme, a minority of radicals even advocate that “the development of atheist China will become a scourge for the world, a scourge even greater than that of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the past.”

华人教会积极参与由葛培理等人发起的福音运动，并在全球华人中推动福音运动。福音派神学成为美国华人教会的主导神学，而且即使在福音派神学谱系上，华人教会也倾向于极右翼的原教旨主义，甚至视美国为“非基督教国家”和“反基督教国家”，提出福音“传回美国”。这种神学选择突出表现在与中国三自教会的张力，大陆三自教会的神学被批评为自由神学和“不信派神学”，大陆“家庭教会”则被批评为灵恩主义、孤立主义。近年来影响大陆城市家庭教会的神学思想大多与此相关。在此神学背景下，形成一种神秘的意识形态，该意识形态认为，中国近代史上最大的悲剧是在发展道路上选择了法俄模式、德日模式，错过了伟大的英语国家清教模式，所以，中国的唯一出路就是福音化，在福音化过程中，唯一正确的选择就是清教徒的改革宗神学，而在政治实践上则只能选择优越的盎格鲁•萨克森模式。中国应该从美国手中接过福音的传递棒，成为基督教传回中东、传回耶路撒冷的最后一站或者倒数第二站。在中美关系方面，如果中国成为一个基督教国家，则中美友谊会超过日美关系，因为日本是非基督教国家；而如果中国不能成为一个基督教国家，则美国会永远视中国为敌。更有甚者，少数极端分子甚至鼓吹“无神论的中国的发展会成为世界的祸害，这种祸害甚至比昔日之纳粹德国和苏联更大”。

Corresponding to Puritan fundamentalism, the most representative ideology in missionary work toward China was the “Three Transformations Vision” proposed by Pastor Zhao Tian’en: the evangelization of China, the nationalization of the church, and the Christianization of culture. “Evangelization means spreading the gospel to every Chinese person, giving them the opportunity to know Christ.” “Therefore our vision is to train evangelistic workers in China and Hong Kong, so that they may harvest the crop on the land of China.” “Nationalization means that the church allows God’s authority to govern it, participating in God’s redemptive work in Chinese history, not limiting service to individuals, congregations, denominations, institutions, or movements, but equipping and mobilizing believers to widely spread the gospel and build the church. God is the Lord of the Chinese church and also the Lord of Chinese history; only the spiritual kingdom of Christ can transform people’s hearts and bring about renewal in society, morality, culture, and institutions.” However, “having workers for evangelization and nationalization, we should also have a longer-term goal, namely the Christianization of Chinese culture and society.” At the same time, U.S. missionary agencies toward China adjusted their missionary strategies, emphasizing “the evangelization of China” and “the gospel entering China” while placing “the gospel leaving China” in a prominent position. “Returning to Jerusalem,” as a westward plan for “the gospel leaving China,” does not merely mean “spreading the gospel to Jerusalem,” but “spreading the gospel to the various countries, cities, towns, and ethnic minorities between China and Jerusalem, and establishing fellowship with those believers.” The core part of this plan is to send at least 100,000 missionaries from China to Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist countries. Besides Zhao Tian’en, other overseas Chinese preachers such as Tang Chongrong and Wang Yongxin also influenced the ideology of Chinese Christianity in the United States during this period.

与清教原教旨主义相对应，在对华传教事工上，最具代表性的意识形态是赵天恩牧师提出的“三化异象”：中国福音化、教会国度化、文化基督化。“福音化是把福音传给每一个中国人，让他们有机会认识基督”。“因此我们的异象，是在中国及香港培训传道工人，俾可在神州大地上收割庄稼”。“国度化是教会让神的权能掌管，参与神在中国历史中的救赎工作，不将事奉只限于个人、堂会、宗派、机构、（运动），而是为装备及动员信徒广传福音，建立教会。神是华人教会的主，也是中国历史的主，唯有基督属灵的国度能改变人的心灵，带来社会、道德、文化、制度的更新”。但是，“有了福音化和国度化的工人，我们还应有更长远的目标，就是中国文化及社会基督化”。美国对华宣教机构同时调整宣教策略，在强调“中国福音化”、“福音入中国”的同时，将“福音出中国”摆在突出位置。“回归耶路撒冷”作为“福音出中国”的西向计划，并非只将“福音传到耶路撒冷”，而是“要把福音传到从中国到耶路撒冷之间的各个国家、城市、乡镇和少数民族中，并与那些信徒们建立团契。”从中国至少差派100000名宣教士赴伊斯兰教国家、印度教国家、佛教国家传教是该计划的核心部分。这一时期影响美国华人基督教意识形态的代表人物除了赵天恩外，还有唐崇荣、王永信等海外华人传道人。

In 1978, China’s reform and opening up began. Under the advocacy of some Chinese missionaries, Chinese churches in the United States adopted a strategy of completely denying and criticizing the Three-Self Church [6]6 The Three-Self Patriotic Movement is the state-sanctioned Protestant church organization in China, based on the principles of self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation., while vigorously supporting house churches, and striving to influence China’s house churches with evangelical theology. However, most Chinese students who came to the United States in the early years of reform and opening up had a poor impression of Christianity. First, they considered religion to be superstition; second, they saw that Chinese churches were still “launching movements,” as if the Cultural Revolution in mainland China was continuing within Chinese churches in the United States; third, there were conflicts in political stance. Chinese churches with a background from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao carried strong political ideological characteristics, especially regarding cross-strait relations and political systems, creating irreconcilable differences with mainland scholars.

1978年，中国改革开放，在一些华人传教士的倡导下，美国华人教会采取了彻底否定、批判三自教会，大力扶持家庭教会的传道策略，并且努力以福音派神学影响中国家庭教会。但是，改革开放初期来美的中国留学生大多对基督教观感不佳。首先，他们认为宗教是迷信；其次看到华人教会还在“搞运动”，好像大陆的文革在美国华人教会中延续一样；第三，政治立场的冲突。以“台港澳”为底色的华人教会带有强烈的政治意识形态特点，尤其在两岸关系和政治制度层面与大陆学人产生难以弥合的分歧。

The ideology of Chinese churches in this phase had two characteristics: First, Chinese churches formed a quasi-Christian “fundamentalist” ideology that aligned with the political positions of conservative and right-wing religious forces in the United States, representing the hawkish faction in the U.S. strategy toward China, and did not play a positive role in Sino-U.S. exchanges. Second, the ideology of Chinese churches did not represent the interests of Chinese Christians themselves, but became a tool for the United States to contain China. Therefore, despite strong support from the U.S. right wing, it had little influence among Chinese churches. Most mainland believers strongly disagreed with the political performances of certain church leaders. The interests of Chinese churches themselves could not be reasonably expressed in American society, let alone actively defended. The author believes this is the most important reason for the “internal strife” within Chinese churches.

这一阶段的华人教会意识形态有两个特点：第一，华人教会形成一种准基督教“原教旨主义”的意识形态，贴合了美国保守和右翼宗教势力的政治主张，代表美国对华战略中的鹰派，在中美交往过程中没有起到积极的作用。第二，华人教会的意识形态不代表华人基督徒的自身利益，沦为美国遏制中国的工具，因此，虽然有美国右翼的大力支持，还是在华人教会中影响甚微。大多数大陆信徒对个别教会领袖的政治表演秀极不认同。华人教会的自身利益在美国社会得不到合理表达，更谈不上积极维护，笔者以为，这是导致华人教会“内斗”的最重要原因。

Phase Three: Theocratic Politics and the New Cold War Ideology — 1989 to the Present

第三阶段、神权政治与新冷战意识形态——1989年至今

After 1989, Chinese churches and Western churches in the United States intensified their missionary work toward mainland scholars. They began to avoid certain political issues, particularly refraining from debating mainland scholars on cross-strait relations, while concentrating political issues on “religious freedom,” “democracy and human rights,” and so on. After 1989, many democracy activists entered the United States, and some leaders of Chinese churches paid special attention to recruiting and training a number of core democracy activists. After the 1990s, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States surged dramatically, and churches primarily composed of Chinese scholars began to appear, with religious ideology taking on new characteristics. The ideology of this phase manifested as a “new Cold War ideology” with “religious freedom and democratic human rights” as its slogan and theocratic politics as its core demand. The logic running through theocratic politics and the new Cold War ideology is: based on the premise that absolute divine authority is superior to secular political power, it relativizes state power, law, and ethics, and then sanctifies secular opposition movements. Promoting the publicization, unification, and movement-ization of China’s house churches became the main ideological goal of certain missionary agencies and individuals. In a sense, the traditional phase of “religious infiltration” has already been completed, and radical political participation and comprehensive “power-grabbing” will gradually unfold.

1989年后，美国华人教会和西人教会加紧了对大陆学人的传教事工，他们开始回避部分政治议题，特别在两岸关系问题上不与大陆学人进行争论，与此同时，将政治议题集中在“宗教自由”、“民主人权”等方面。1989年以后，许多民运分子进入美国，一些华人教会的领袖特别注意吸收、培养了一批民运骨干分子。90年代以后，中国赴美留学人员迅猛增加，以中国学人为主体的教会开始出现，宗教意识形态出现新的特点。这一阶段的意识形态表现为以“宗教自由与民主人权”为口号，以神权政治为核心诉求的“新冷战意识形态”。神权政治与新冷战意识形态贯穿始终的逻辑就是：以绝对神权高于世俗化政权为依据，将国家政权、法律、伦理等相对化，再将世俗性的反对运动神圣化。推动中国家庭教会公开化、统一化、运动化，成为某些宣教机构和个人的主要意识形态目标。从某种意义上说，传统意义上的“宗教渗透”阶段已经走完，激进的政治参与和全面“争权”将逐步展开。

In 1998, President Clinton signed the International Religious Freedom Act, marking the formal formation of a “new human rights strategy” led by the United States, centered on “international religious freedom.” George W. Bush, who took office in 2000, as “one of their own in the White House” for American religious right-wing forces, provided his supporters with “faith-based war, faith-based law enforcement, faith-based education, faith-based healthcare, and faith-based science.” [7]7 George W. Bush, speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, March 2004. Because the White House and Congress competed to court influential evangelical activists, the relationship between church and state in the United States became severely imbalanced. Christian right-wing supporters “had their hands on the policy process,” [8]8 This phrase is given in English in the original Chinese text. to the extent that American evangelical right-wing preacher Jerry Falwell directly declared, “The idea of separation of church and state was invented by the devil.” This trend toward political theocracy alarmed some Americans. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election, Obama’s pastor, Rev. Jeremiah Wright, forcefully expressed his reflection with the slogan “God damn America,” directly opposing George W. Bush. In Wright’s view, the theocratic political ideology of the United States led to the indiscriminate killing of innocents internationally and inhumane treatment of its own people domestically, and the crux of this ideology was that “America has consistently acted as if it were God and claimed supremacy for itself.” [9]9 This phrase is given in English in the original Chinese text.

1998年克林顿签署《国际宗教自由法》标志着美国主导的以“国际宗教自由”为核心的“新人权战略”正式形成。2000年上台的小布什作为美国宗教右翼势力“在白宫中的自己人”，为其支持者提供了“基于信仰的战争，基于信仰的执法，基于信仰的教育，基于信仰的医疗，和基于信仰的科学”。⑥由于白宫和国会争相取悦影响广泛的福音派活动家，美国政教关系出现严重失衡，基督教右翼支持者“操纵了美国的政治进程（Christian Right had their hands on the policy process）”⑦，以至于美国福音派右翼布道家杰瑞•法威尔直接宣告“宗教与政治分离的观念是魔鬼发明的”。这种政治神权化的趋势引起了部分美国民众的警觉，在2008年美国总统大选中，奥巴马的牧师Rev. Jeremiah Wright以“上帝诅咒美国”这种与小布什针锋相对的口号强力表达了自己的反思。在Wright看来，美国的神权政治意识形态导致了美国在国际上滥杀无辜，在国内非人道地对待其人民，而这种意识形态的症结就在于“美国一贯在行动中把自己视为上帝和自诩为至高无上者”⑧。

Among Chinese churches in the United States, most Chinese Christians regard the Christian faith as a way of life, neither identifying with nor caring about the U.S.-led international religious freedom movement (the new human rights movement). To address the widespread lack of motivation for political participation within Chinese churches, under the deliberate guidance of certain missionary organizations, “the Christianization of overseas democracy activists” became a “win-win” political engine for implementing the new Cold War ideology. “Specializing in evangelistic work among democracy activists” and “fighting side by side with overseas democracy activists” became important steps in the Christianization of Chinese politics. After more than 20 years of careful cultivation, many democracy activists “use Christian organizational names to participate in various overseas democratic movements and call for religious freedom activities,” and “are playing a huge role within Christianity and in overseas democratic movements.” They vigorously advocate that “Chinese Christians should earnestly study and plan a political system based on biblical foundations and the basic values of the public interest.” “Transform Chinese culture with the Christian faith, and provide contributions and leadership from the Christian faith in the cultural, intellectual, educational, political, and social spheres.” [10]10 This is a quotation from a source cited in the original Chinese text. “When an atheistic socialist state issues laws banning religion or policies resisting the advancement of God’s kingdom, Christians should protest to the government, helping the government not to resist the Lord who gave them authority.” “The attitude of Christians toward an atheistic government that persecutes the church must target the anti-Christ spirit behind that government.” [11]11 This is a quotation from a source cited in the original Chinese text. Not only should missionary work toward urban universities, intellectuals, and overseas students be further expanded, but it is also necessary to launch a sustained, global movement both inside and outside China to “evangelize Communist Party members.”

在美国华人教会中，大多数华人基督徒将基督宗教信仰视为一种生活方式，对美国主导的国际宗教自由运动（新人权运动）既不认同，也不关心。为了解决华人教会中普遍存在的政治参与的动力缺乏问题，在一些传教机构的刻意主导下，“海外民运基督化”成为落实新冷战意识形态的一种“双赢”的政治发动机。“专门开展民运人士福音事工”，“与海外民运人士并肩作战”成为中国政治基督化的重要步骤。经过20多年的精心培育，许多民运分子“以基督徒机构名义参与各类海外民主运动、呼吁宗教自由活动”，“在基督教内和海外民主运动中正发挥着巨大的作用”。他们极力鼓吹“中国基督徒应倾力学习并筹划一个建基于圣经基础，关于公众利益之基本价值的政治体系”。“以基督教的信仰改造中国文化，并且在文化界、思想界、教育界、政治界、社会里，提供基督教信仰的贡献，并领导之。”⑨“当一个无神的社会主义国家颁布禁教的法律，或发表抗拒神国进行的政策时，基督徒应向政府抗议，帮助政府不要抵挡那赐给他们权柄的主”。“基督徒对一个逼迫教会的无神论政府的态度，必须针对政府背后的那股敌基督的邪灵。”⑩ 不仅要进一步拓展对城市高校、知识分子、海外留学人员的宣教事工，而且有必要发起一场“给共产党员传福音”的中国内外、全球性的持续运动。

To adapt to the United States-led new human rights strategy, the United States has reconstructed religious infiltration organizations targeting China that bear the obvious characteristics of “de-religionization” and “politicization.” Internationally, with the U.S. government, Congress, and related religious institutions as the leading actors, and the “China Aid Association” as the organizational core, a pressure group has been formed targeting “China’s religious issues.” Domestically in China, the “China Aid Association” on the one hand covets the leadership of China’s house churches, attempting to establish a nationwide religious leadership body that “integrates urban and rural areas” to achieve a “nationalization of the church” under its control; on the other hand, it seeks to use house churches as a base to transcend the religious sphere, “cleverly editing the various free elements of Chinese society” to form a rights-defense political organization system that includes “forces such as the internet, the political-legal system, house churches, and the media.”

为适应美国主导的新人权战略，美国重新建构具有明显“非宗教化”和“政治化”特点的对华宗教渗透组织，在国际上，以美国政府、国会和相关宗教机构为主导者，以“对华援助协会”为组织核心，形成针对“中国宗教问题”的压力集团。在中国国内，“对华援助协会”一方面觊觎中国家庭教会的领导权，尝试建立“整合城乡”的全国性宗教领导机构，完成在其掌控下的“教会国度化”；另一方面，企图以家庭教会为依托，超越宗教领域，“巧妙编辑中国社会的各种自由元素”，形成包括“互联网、政法系、家庭教会、媒体等力量”的维权政治组织体系。

Theocracy and the new Cold War ideology mark the entry of U.S. religious infiltration of China into a new phase. The characteristics of this phase are: taking “religion as the first freedom” as its demand, relying on overseas pro-democracy forces as mutual support, manipulating mainland house churches as its target, integrating domestic and foreign anti-China forces, and aiming to promote radical social change in China. The main focus of this ideology is to demonize the Communist Party of China, to sever “patriotism from love

神权政治与新冷战意识形态标志着美国对华宗教渗透进入新的阶段。这一阶段的特点为，以“宗教为第一自由”为诉求，以海外民运势力互为依托，以大陆家庭教会为操纵对象，整合国内外反华力量，旨在推动中国激进社会变革。该意识形态的主要着力点则在于妖魔化中国共产党，割裂“爱国与爱党”，批判中国的民族主义和爱国主义。事实表明，这种意识形态日益成为一种无根的意识形态，逐渐被广大华人和华人基督徒所鄙弃。中国的发展和日益强大成为海外华人的骄傲，相信中国政府和人民有能力解决自身发展中遇到的问题成为海外华人的普遍共识。

Conclusion

结 语

The importance of religion in political participation is a significant topic in contemporary Western political science. Many political scientists have found in their research that even if individuals possess all the qualities and needs for political participation, they cannot put it into practice without external incentives, which often come from ideology and organizational mobilization. Religious leaders are usually the providers of these two needs. They provide ideology by creating topics and provide organizational incentives through the activities of religious organizations themselves. Therefore, clergy, religious activists, social activists with a religious background, and religious institutions, as political leaders, are the main means of religious political participation.{11}

宗教在政治参与中的重要性是当代西方政治学的一个重要课题。许多政治学家在研究中发现，即使个人有全部的政治参与的品性和需求，如果没有外在的激励就不可能付诸实施，而外在的激励往往来自于意识形态和组织动员。宗教领袖通常是这两种需求的提供者。他们通过制造话题提供意识形态，通过宗教组织自身的活动提供组织激励。所以，作为政治领袖的神职人员、宗教活动家、宗教背景的社会活动家以及宗教机构是宗教政治参与的主要手段。{11}

Influenced by Western religious ideology, some religious activists in China who actively promote religious political participation also fully recognize the special role and status of religion. They believe that in domestic mass incidents driven by rights defense, the vast majority of the masses are motivated by specific interest demands, and rights defense activities are temporary and partial. In contrast, the rights defense groups centered on Christian house churches possess long-term and holistic political demands and participation capabilities, the fundamental reason being precisely religious ideology and religious organizational mobilization. Therefore, it is necessary to fully understand and attach great importance to the evolutionary trends of Western Christian ideology and their impact on China’s ideological security.

受西方宗教意识形态影响，我国国内一些积极推动宗教政治参与的宗教活动人士也充分认识到宗教的特殊作用与地位。他们认为，在国内以维权为诉求的群体性事件中，绝大多数群众都是被具体的利益诉求所推动，维权活动是暂时性和局部性的。而以基督教家庭教会为主体的维权群体有长期性、整体性的政治诉求和参与能力，根本原因正是宗教的意识形态与宗教的组织动员。因此，必须充分认识和高度重视西方基督宗教意识形态的演变趋势及其对我国意识形态安全的影响。

Notes:

注释：

① Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Yale University Press, 2009, p79.

① Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy，Yale University Press，2009，p79.

② Ruth Miller Elson, Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks of the Nineteenth Century (Lincoln, Nebr., 1964), p. 162.

② Ruth Miller Elson，Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks of the Nineteenth Century（Lincoln，Nebr，. 1964） ，p. 162.

③ Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Yale University Press, 2009, p80.

③ Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy，Yale University Press，2009，p80.

④ Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Yale University Press, 2009, p70.

④ Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy，Yale University Press，2009，p70.

⑤ Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, Yale University Press, 2009, p71.

⑤ Michael H. Hunt: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy，Yale University Press，2009，p71.

⑥ Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2010, p225.

⑥ Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States，Rowman & Littlefield Publishers，Inc ，2010，p225.

⑦ Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2010, p225.

⑦ Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States，Rowman & Littlefield Publishers，Inc ，2010，p225.

⑧ Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2010, p277.

⑧ Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States，Rowman & Littlefield Publishers，Inc ，2010，p277.

⑨ Zhao Tianen: *Fu Wo Qian Xing* (Support Me to Move Forward), Zhongfu Publishing House, p184.

⑨ 赵天恩：《扶我前行》，中福出版社 ，第184页。

⑩ Zhao Tianen: *Dong Zhu Xian Ji* (Insight into the Forefront), Zhongfu Publishing House, p170.

⑩ 赵天恩：《洞烛先机》，中福出版社 ，第170页。

{11} Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2010, p141.

{11} Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown: Religion and politics in the United States，Rowman & Littlefield Publishers，Inc ，2010，p141.

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