On What Basis Is Science Used? — An Analysis of Basic Issues in Scientific Culture

I. Science Is “Stupid,” but Science Is Honest

一、科学很“笨”，但科学很诚实

Jiang Xiaoyuan says that many people believe “as long as we are given enough time, science and technology can solve all problems.” He also says that “this statement can be rephrased…: as long as I am given enough time, I can explain everything in this world.” [1]1 Jiang Xiaoyuan, “On the Belief in Science and Technology,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. However, these two statements are actually inconsistent.

江晓原说很多人相信“只要给我们足够长的时间，科学技术就能解决一切问题。”并且说“这个说法也可以换一种表述……：只要给我足够长的时间，我就可以解释这个世界上的一切。”① 然而这两个说法其实并不一致。

As for the first statement, neither in-school education nor out-of-school science popularization has ever taught this view. On the contrary, people are told that there are many problems that science and technology cannot solve. For example, science and technology cannot bring the dead back to life, cannot allow organisms to survive without the exchange of matter and energy inside and outside the body, cannot create matter and energy from nothing or make them vanish without a trace, cannot absorb energy from a single heat source to do work, cannot reverse time, cannot predict lottery numbers, cannot always unify individual rationality and collective rationality in a one-shot game (the prisoner’s dilemma), cannot always make the result of majority choice consistent with the preferences of the majority (the voting paradox), cannot simultaneously and precisely determine the position and momentum of an object (the uncertainty principle), cannot trisect an arbitrary angle using only a compass and straightedge, and so on. Science not only tells people that these things cannot be done now, but also that they can never be done! Compared with the abilities claimed by divine powers, Buddhist and Taoist magic, astrology, witchcraft, geomancy, cultivation techniques, and so on, science and technology should be the “stupidest” culture.

对于前一个说法，无论是校内的教育还是校外的科普，应该都没有传授过这种观点。相反地，倒是告诉人们有很多问题科学技术无法解决。比如科技不能让人起死回生，不能让生物没有体内外的物质能量传递而存活，不能让物质和能量无中生有或凭空消失，不能从单一热源中吸取能量做功，不能让时光倒流，不能预测彩票中奖号码，不能在一次性博弈中让个人理性与集体理性总是统一（囚徒困境），不能让多数人选择的结果总是与多数人的偏好一致（投票悖论），不能同时精确地测定一个物体的位置和动量（测不准关系），不能仅用圆规直尺三等分任意角等等。科学不仅告诉人们这些事情现在做不到，而且永远也做不到!比起那些神佛法术、占星术、巫术、风水术、修炼术等等所宣称的本事来说，科学技术应该是最“笨”的文化了。

However, the fact that science cannot solve those problems does not mean that science cannot explain why they cannot be solved. An important characteristic of science is that all its conclusions have reasons. If a scientist determines that a certain problem can never be explained, he must give a reason why it can never be explained, for example, that some accidental information disappears in time, etc. [2]2 See, for example, the discussion of the “information loss paradox” in black holes in Stephen Hawking’s *A Brief History of Time*. And this is actually an explanation of that problem. Therefore, the latter statement can be established in a certain sense, and this is also an important driving force for the development of science. Tian Song believes: “This statement cannot be falsified, because the future is infinite; you can always push the problems that cannot be explained now into the future. So this statement, said lightly, is a big talk; said heavily, is a lie.” [3]3 Tian Song, “The Belief in Science and Technology and Its Deconstruction,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. If admitting that some problems cannot be explained at present and await future efforts to explain them is also a lie, then, in the face of various incurable diseases that have not yet been conquered, what kind of “talk” is Tian Song’s statement that the “theories and practical basis of traditional Chinese medicine were already perfected and mature long before the birth of modern Western science” [4]4 Tian Song, “The Belief in Science and Technology and Its Deconstruction,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1.? When humanity faces unresolved doubts, what other good choices are there? To deal with them with “universal answers” like “it is God’s arrangement,” making people think that everything can be explained now and there is no need to explore further? Is this not a lie?! Or to say that this problem can never be explained, and likewise there is no need to explore further. But without giving a reason, how can it be seen that this statement is the truth? It can be seen that, compared with these other cultures, science is the most honest culture. As for Tian Song’s counter-question: “In my limited life, science is destined not to solve all problems and transform into that perfect, all-encompassing science. Why do I need to believe in this currently imperfect science now?” [3]3 Tian Song, “The Belief in Science and Technology and Its Deconstruction,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. This is even more absurd. In Tian Song’s “limited life” and even longer periods, medicine is certainly “destined not to solve all” diseases. Does Tian Song now not believe in “this currently imperfect” medical skill? Or, more simply, before there is a method of walking that never falls under any circumstances, does Tian Song not walk at all?!

但是科学不能解决那些问题不等于科学不能解释为什么不能解决，科学的一个重要特征就是自己的所有结论都有理由。如果有科学家认定某个问题永远也解释不了，那他就必须给出为什么会永远也解释不了的理由，比如一些偶然的信息在时间中消失了等等，② 而这其实也是对该问题的一种解释。因此后一个说法在某种意义上是可以成立的，而且这也是科学发展的一个重要动力。田松认为：“这个说法不能证伪，因为未来是无穷的，你永远可以把现在不能解释的问题推到未来去。所以这个说法，说轻了是一句大话，说重了是一个谎苦。”③ 如果说承认有些问题目前还解释不了，有待于通过将来的努力来解释，这也是谎言的话，那面对至今还未攻破的种种不治之症，田松说中医的“理论和实践依据远在西方现代科学诞生之前就已经完善成熟了”④，这又是什么“言”呢? 当人类面对不解疑问时还有什么别的好选择的吗? 用“这是神的安排”之类的“万能答案”来应付，让人们以为现在就可以解释一切，不需要再探索了? 难道这就不是谎言了吗? !或者说这个问题永远也解释不了，同样也不要再探索了。可是如果不给出一个理由，何以见得这种说法就是真话呢? 可见与这些文化相比，科学是一种最诚实的文化了。至于田松反问：“在我有限的一生里，科学注定不可能解决所有的问题，羽化成那个完关无瑕包罗万有的科学，为什么我现在就需要相信这个目前尚不完美的科学?”③ 就更荒唐了。在田松“有限的一生”以至更长的时间里，肯定医学“注定不可能解决所有的”疾病，那田松现在是不是就不相信“这个目前尚不完美的”医术了呢? 或者更简单些，在没有解决所有情况下都不摔跤的走路方法之前，田松是不是就不走路了呢?!

II. Science Cannot Completely Solve Problems Does Not Mean That Science Should Not Be Used to Solve Them as Much as Possible

二、科学不能完全解决不等于不应该尽量用科学解决

The guiding ideology of the planned economy was indeed to formulate a perfect production plan based on the total demand of society. However, on the one hand, people’s actual needs are constrained by their respective purchasing power. Without considering this constraint, demand will expand to the point where its statistics become meaningless. Purchasing power is not only related to income but also to factors such as the number of dependents, future expectations, and personal preferences. These factors differ for each individual, change at any time, and are difficult to measure. On the other hand, the demand for many new products and services may not be detectable through surveys before they are invented, but after they are launched, they stimulate a great deal of demand. That is, supply also affects demand in turn. Therefore, it is basically impossible for people to accurately calculate the total demand of society, let alone formulate a perfect production plan based on it. The higher people’s living standards and the richer their lifestyles, the more this is the case. Originally, this problem could be easily recognized by facing reality and conducting serious research. However, under the centralized system, government decrees were mainly implemented by using hierarchy to suppress people rather than by using reason to convince them. Therefore, the focus of plan compilers was often not on conforming to reality but on conforming to the “spirit of the higher authorities.” Irrational slogans such as “how bold a person is, how productive the land is” and false rational articles that “demonstrated” in line with the leaders’ intentions became prevalent. As a result, the formulation of plans increasingly departed from science, economic plans became increasingly divorced from reality, and the masses became increasingly impoverished.

计划经济的指导思想确实是想根据社会的全部需求去制定完美的生产计划。然而一方面人们实际的需求受各自购买力的制约，不考虑这个制约的需求将会膨胀得使它的统计毫无意义。而购买力不仅与收入相关，还与抚养赡养人数、未来预期、个人偏好等因素相关，这些因素每个人都不相同，并且还随时会变，难以计量。另一方面许多新产品和服务在发明之前可能根本调查不到它们的需求，而它们上市后却会刺激出许多需求，也就是说供给也会反过来影响需求。因此人们基本上不可能精确地统计出社会的全部需求，更不可能据此制定出完美的生产计划。人们的生活水平越高、生活方式越丰富就越是如此。本来这个问题只要面对现实认真研究是不难认识到的，但在集权体制下政令主要是靠以级压人而不是以理服人来推行，因此计划编制者的着力点往往不在如何符合实际而在如何符合“上级精神”，“人有多大胆、地有多大产”等非理性口号和顺着领导心思“论证”的假理性文章也就盛行了起来。致使编制计划越来越不依靠科学，经济计划与实际越来越脱节，人民大众越来越贫困。

Hayek believed that the ideological root of the drawbacks of the planned economy was scientism and the abuse of reason. [5]5 F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*, translated by Feng Keli, Yilin Press, 2003. However, his evidence contradicts this. He said: the engineer’s “knowledge does not explain why price changes that affect his plan have occurred; any such change appears to him as an irrational (i.e., not consciously controlled) factor. He hates having to pay attention to a large number of factors that have no meaning for him.” “The engineer finds the ‘irrational’ economic factors hinder him from achieving his ideal based on the study of the objective properties of things, and this ideal is usually the purely technical optimal solution with universal validity. He rarely realizes that his preference for these particular methods is entirely a result of the type of problems he frequently solves, and this preference is only correct under specific social conditions.” “The engineer’s ideal is based on disregarding the most basic economic fact, which is the scarcity of capital, and this fact determines our current situation.” (Ibid.) It can be seen that the problem with these engineers who have taken up management positions lies precisely in their inability to face reality rationally and objectively and comprehensively analyze the various factors affecting the economy. Instead, they irrationally select only certain factors to study based on personal preferences. It is not that they want to use science and technology to solve all problems, but that they have not used science and technology to solve many problems. In other words, the problem of the planned economy is not “scientism,” but “unscientific”!

哈耶克认为产生计划经济弊端的思想根源是唯科学主义和理性的滥用⑤，然而他的举证却与此相反。他说：工程师“的知识并不解释为何出现了对他的计划有影响的价格变动，任何这样的变动在他看来都是不合理的（即不受自觉支配的）因素，他讨厌不得不把注意力放在对他没有意义的大量因素上。”“工程师觉得‘不合理的’经济因素妨碍了他根据对事物之客观属性的研究达到自己的理想，而这种理想通常是具有普遍有效性的纯技术的最优方案。他很少认识到，他对这些特殊的方法有所偏爱，完全是他经常解决的那类问题所造成的结果，这种偏爱只有在特定的社会条件下才是正确的。”“工程师的理想是以不考虑最基本的经济事实为基础的，而这种事实，即资本的匮乏，却决定着我们当下的处境。”（同上）可见这种走上管理岗位的工程师的问题恰恰出在他们不能理性地面对现实，客观地全面分析影响经济的各种因素，而是非理性地凭着个人好恶只选取某些因素研究。不是他们要用科学技术解决一切问题，而是很多问题他们没有用科学技术去解决。换言之，计划经济的问题不是“唯科学”，而是“不科学”!

Once the crux of the problem is found, the path to a solution becomes clear. Jiang Xiaoyuan believes that because the planned economy was based on “this belief” that “science and technology can solve all problems,” it sought to calculate “the relationship between demand and supply” and aimed to achieve “neither waste nor surplus nor shortage,” which ultimately led to poverty and backwardness. [1]1 Jiang Xiaoyuan, “On the Belief in Science and Technology,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. However, contradictions between supply and demand are, after all, not a good thing. Under the market economy, people strengthen contract management, produce according to sales, implement “zero inventory,” and so on, all to overcome this contradiction. The fact that people cannot completely solve a problem does not mean they should not try to solve it as much as possible. If a doctor knew that he could not prevent people from dying forever, would he stop treating and saving patients?! Therefore, the mistake of the planned economy was not in trying to resolve the contradiction between supply and demand, but in trying to resolve it with the will of the officials! Abandoning the planned economy does not mean using less science and technology to solve economic problems, but using more science and technology to solve them!

找到了问题的症结，解决的途径也就明了了。江晓原认为是由于计划经济基于“科学技术能够解决一切问题”“这个信念”，要计算出“需求和供给的关系，”想达到“既不浪费也不过剩也不短缺”，结果才带来了贫困落后。① 然而供需有矛盾毕竟不是什么好事。市场经济下人们加强合同管理、以销定产、实行“零库存”等等，也都是为了克服这对矛盾。人们不能完全解决问题不等于不要去尽量解决，难道医生一旦知道了自己不能让人永远不死就不再去治病救人了吗?!所以计划经济不是错在要解决供需矛盾，而是错在用长官意志解决供需矛盾!抛弃计划经济不是要少用科技来解决经济问题，而是要尽量多用科技来解决!

III. Scientific Knowledge Has No Good or Evil, Scientific Research Is Always Beneficial, and Scientific Methods Should Be Promoted

三、科学知识无好坏，科学研究总有益，科学方法应推广

Tian Song accuses that “science has become an object of superstition!” and receives special treatment: “The good is attributed to science, the bad to improper application!” He says: “Since science cannot automatically do evil, how can it actively do good?”⑥ This likewise confuses the two layers of meaning of science. Science as a system of knowledge is certainly neutral. The law of universal gravitation, the periodic law of elements, Mendel’s law of heredity… can one say which of these laws is “good” or “evil”? However, science as a social activity does involve value judgments. “The spring of science has arrived” (ibid.) certainly refers to the arrival of spring for scientific research work, not for those laws or formulas. People study science in order to know objective laws, and “knowing is always better than not knowing, knowing much is always better than knowing a little.”⑦ Of course, after understanding them, some people may exploit these laws to do evil, but if certain scientific knowledge can be researched and used by bad people, is it better for good people to master this knowledge or not? On the other hand, from a certain perspective, some scientific knowledge is indeed “not good,” for instance, for an individual, “the dead cannot be brought back to life” is always rather not good (though it is not a bad thing for human society). Yet is it better for people to know such knowledge or not?

田松指责“科学成为迷信的对象!”获得了特殊的待遇：“好的归科学，坏的归不当应用!”说：“既然科学不能自动为恶，何以能主动行善呢?”⑥这同样是混淆了科学的两层含义。作为知识体系的科学肯定是中性的。万有引力定律、元素周期律、孟德尔遗传定律，……能说这些规律谁“善”谁“恶”吗? 可是作为社会活动的科学则是有价值评价的。“科学的春天来了”（同上），当然是指科学研究工作的春天来了，而不是指那些定律、公式的春天来了。人们研究科学是为了知道客观规律，而“有知总比无知好，知之甚多总比一知半解好。”⑦当然有的人了解后可能会利用这些规律来作恶，可如果某些科学知识会被坏人研究利用，那好人对这些知识是掌握好呢，还是不掌握好呢? 另一方面，从某种角度来看，有的科学知识确实“不好”，比如对个人来说“人死不能复生”总不太好（但对人类社会并非坏事）。可这样的知识人们是知道好呢，还是不知道好呢?

Of course, scientific knowledge inevitably contains some errors, which certainly have harmful effects. For example, the “parasite causes cancer” theory, which once won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, would certainly have harmful effects if such knowledge were used to design treatment plans. But should this harm be attributed to insufficient rigor in scientific research, or to scientific research itself? If the former, scientists should study the causes of cancer more rigorously; if the latter, scientists should abandon research into the causes of cancer! At this point, does one need to continue the analysis?! As for the example Tian Song gives of a peasant uncle using chemical fertilizers and pesticides leading to soil compaction⑥, first, it was the peasant who first had the demand for increased production, and only then did scientists invent chemical fertilizers and pesticides; second, chemical fertilizers and pesticides did achieve the goal of increasing production in the short term, so the knowledge provided by scientists was not wrong; third, the harm of chemical fertilizers and pesticides is that long-term use leads to reduced production, meaning the problem lies not in the application of scientific knowledge, but in the insufficiency of scientific knowledge — scientists only provided knowledge of the short-term effects of using chemical fertilizers and pesticides, not knowledge of the long-term effects; finally, does the peasant uncle hope that scientists will further research means to achieve increased production in both the short and long term, or does he hope scientists will abandon research into increasing production? There is no need to continue analyzing this either. There is also the example Liu Huajie gives of “Lysenko’s science indeed had a (negative) effect on his country”⑧, which in fact is not science having a negative effect on the country, but political forces intervening in scientific debates having a negative effect on science.

当然，科学知识中难免会有一些错误，这肯定会有坏处。比如曾获诺贝尔医学或生理学奖的“寄生虫致癌”说，用这样的知识来设计治疗方案肯定会有坏处。可这坏处是应该归咎于科学研究做得不够严谨呢，还是应该归咎于科学研究本身呢? 如果是前者，科学家就应该更严谨地研究癌症原因；如果是后者，科学家就应该放弃对癌症原因的研究!话说到这里，还用继续往下分析吗?!至于田松举的农民伯伯用了化肥农药导致土地板结的例子⑥，首先是农民先有了增产的需求然后才有科学家的化肥农药发明；其次化肥农药在短期内确实达到了增产的目的，所以科学家提供的知识并没有错；再次化肥农药的坏处是长期使用会导致减产，也就是说问题不是出在应用科学知识上，而是出在科学知识不足上，科学家只提供了使用化肥农药短期效果的知识，没有提供长期效果的知识；最后由此农民伯伯是希望科学家进一步研究既能在短期也能在长期达到增产目的的手段呢，还是希望科学家放弃对增产的研究? 这也不用再继续分析下去了吧。还有刘华杰举的“李森科的科学确实对其国家产生了（负面）作用”⑧ 的例子，其实这并不是科学对国家产生了负面作用，而是政治势力对科学争论的干预对科学产生了负面作用。

In Tian Song’s mind, science and its technology have always played an inglorious role: “Science has degenerated from the handmaiden of theology into the accomplice of capital.”⑨ So how to solve agricultural problems? Tian Song lists Yan Huoqi’s research on agricultural history and Jiang Gaoming’s ecological agriculture practices (ibid.). But aren’t these all scientific research? So are the two of them doing the work of a “handmaiden” or an “accomplice”? Tian Song repeatedly uses Freon as an example to illustrate the harms of technology⑥. The bad thing about this matter is that “Freon destroys the ozone layer.” But people did not know this knowledge when they invented refrigerators; if people had known it at the time, they would not have invented Freon refrigerators. This shows that the harm does not come from scientific knowledge and scientific research, but from insufficient scientific knowledge and insufficient scientific research! Of course, no matter how technology develops, there will inevitably be some situations that people have not anticipated in advance, but with the accumulation of experience and lessons, people will certainly consider things more and more comprehensively. On the other hand, if technology is imperfect, how can it be shown that witchcraft, dragon veins, Guanyin, and the like (ibid.) can solve problems? Tian Song says: “The approach of opposing superstition with science actually reduces science to the same level as superstition, turning science itself into an object of superstition.” (ibid.) So what should we use to oppose superstition? Anyway, whatever opposes superstition “is reduced to the same level as superstition” and “becomes an object of superstition.” “Whoever opposes Tian Song is reduced to the same level as Tian Song,” “whoever opposes the enemy becomes the object of enmity themselves.” What to do? We have to stop here.

在田松的心目中科学及其技术从来都扮演着不光彩的角色：“科学从神学的婢女，堕落成了资本的帮凶。”⑨ 那如何解决农业问题? 田松列出了严火其的农史研究、蒋高明的生态农业实践。（同上）可这些不都是科学研究吗? 那他俩干的是“婢女”的活儿呢，还是“帮凶”的活儿呢? 田松反复以氟里昂为例来说明科技的坏处⑥。这件事情坏就坏在“氟里昂会破坏臭氧层”。可这个知识人们在发明电冰箱时并不知道啊，如果当时人们知道就不会发明氟里昂冰箱了。可见坏处不是来自科学知识和科学研究，而是来自科学知识不足和科学研究不够!当然无论科技如何发展难免还会有一些情况人们事先没有料到，不过随着经验教训的积累人们肯定会考虑得越来越周全。另一方面，科技不完善，何以见得巫术、龙脉、观音之类（同上）就能解决问题呢? 田松说：“以科学反对迷信的思路，实际上把科学降到了和迷信相同的水平，把科学本身变成了迷信的对象。”（同上）那我们该以什么反对迷信呢? 反正以什么反对迷信什么就“降到了和迷信相同的水平”，“变成了迷信的对象”。“谁反对田松谁就降到了和田松相同的水平”，“谁反对敌人谁本身就变成了敌视的对象”。怎么办? 只好就此打住。

Wu Guosheng says: “Environmental problems suggest perhaps not just the issue of the proper application of technology, but the issue of the inherent defects of technology itself.”⑩ What “inherent defects” does technology itself have? He does not say, but he prescribes a remedy: “As long as humans conform to nature, adapt and cooperate with nature, natural resources will be more than sufficient for human use; otherwise, they will destroy the balanced relationship between humans and nature.” (ibid.) Yet “the very existence of humans itself is, or simply amounts to, a certain change to the world.”{11} To put it extremely, even if humans no longer exist, their corpses will still affect nature. Since influence is unavoidable, we must consider what kind of influence conforms to “conforming to nature, adapting and cooperating with nature” and does not “destroy the balanced relationship between humans and nature,” so that we can implement it. However, doesn’t answering this question still require scientific and technological research? To make “natural resources more than sufficient for human use,” population must be controlled. To achieve this goal, without relying on technology, can it be done through slaughter or prayer?!

吴国盛说：“环境问题提示的，也许不只是科技的正当运用问题，而是科技本身的固有缺陷问题。”⑩ 科技本身有什么“固有缺陷”? 他没说，但是方子开出来了：“人类只要顺应自然，与自然适应、协作，则自然资源供人类使用绰绰有余，否则就将破坏人与自然的平衡关系。”（同上）可是“人的存在本身就要，或者简直就是对世界的某种改变。”{11} 说得极端点儿，人即使不生存了，人的尸体仍然会影响自然。既然影响不可避免，那我们就要考虑什么样的影响符合“顺应自然，与自然适应、协作”，不会“破坏人与自然的平衡关系”，我们可以实施。然而解答这个问题不还是要通过科技研究吗? 要想让“自然资源供人类使用绰绰有余”，就必须控制人口。要达到这一目的，不靠科技，难道靠杀戮或祈祷吗?!

Jiang Xiaoyuan says that from a report he saw: “European public concern about or declining trust in science is mainly concentrated in two areas: nuclear power and biotechnology.”{12} But what the report actually says is: Austria “the people reject certain technologies that conflict with the universal value system (for example, biotechnology and nuclear energy).”{13} This shows that what they are concerned about or have declining trust in is technology, not science. Science deals with laws; specifically in these two areas, the most fundamental are the law of energy transformation and the law of asexual inheritance. Borrowing Tian Song’s format for deconstructing the “theory of punishment by laws”{14}: If these two laws are objective, the public cannot reject them, and concern is futile; if these two laws can be rejected, then they are not “objective,” or are not scientific “laws” — then the public need not worry about science at all. In short, the public will not worry about the increasing number of scientific laws discovered by humanity, still less will they trust these laws or their discoverers less the more scientific laws are discovered.

江晓原说从一本报告中看出：“欧洲公众对科学的担心或信任下降，主要集中在两个领域：核电和生物技术。”{12} 可该报告中的说法是：奥地利“人民拒绝与普遍价值体系相抵触的某些技术（例如，生物技术和核能）”。{13} 可见他们担心或信任下降的是技术而不是科学。科学讲的是规律，具体到这两个领域，最基础的是能量转化规律和无性遗传规律。套用一下田松消解“规律惩罚说”的语言格式{14}：如果这两个规律是客观的，公众就无法拒绝它们，担心也无济于事；如果这两个规律是可以拒绝的，它们就不是“客观”的，或者说不是科学“规律”——公众就更不必担心科学了。总之，公众不会担心人类发现的科学规律越来越多，更不会发现的科学规律越多越不信任这些规律或它们的发现者。

In terms of research fields, “it should not, and cannot, draw boundaries or set forbidden zones for scientific research.”{15} As for research conduct, science does indeed require norms. Conducting scientific research requires certain means and consumes certain human, material, and financial resources. Some means must be restricted, such as experiments using human subjects or hazardous substances, experiments that produce hazardous substances, or destructive experiments. Some consumption must take into account relevant affordability, such as using taxpayers’ money or consuming scarce resources. Yet Jiang Xiaoyuan believes this proves that science is not “a thing of perfect goodness and beauty.”① Do good things not require norms? Do not blood donation and public welfare donations have legal regulations? Charity is an “absolutely good thing” (ibid.), is it not? Yet the many problems currently emerging in the charitable sector precisely reflect our country’s urgent need for legislation in this area. Regulating good deeds can, on the one hand, encourage people to do good, and on the other hand, prevent people from doing bad things under the pretext of doing good. Liu Bing states: “Developing science should be for the ideal development of human society. When certain scientific research may conflict with this more fundamental goal, priority should be given to obeying the greater goal of the ideal development of human society outside of science.”{16} This sounds full of “social responsibility,” but in fact it cannot withstand scrutiny. The goal of scientific research is to explore objective laws. Which law, once known by people, would hinder human development, such that not knowing it would allow better development? If that were the case, how would we know which laws have this nature and thus avoid knowing them? If we knew which laws we should not know, would that not mean we actually already know these laws? That there are forbidden zones for the means of scientific research does not entail that there are forbidden zones for the goals of research. If humans cannot be used as test subjects, use animals; if physical experiments cannot be conducted, use models or simulations. What means of research can both reveal objective laws and not harm human society is still a matter of scientific research content, not a goal outside of science.

在研究领域方面，“不应该、也不可能为科学研究划定界限，设置禁区。”{15} 至于研究行为，科学确实需要规范。研究科学需要一些手段，需要消耗一些人财物力。有些手段要受到限制，比如用人或危险品进行实验，会产生危险品的实验，破坏性实验；有些消耗要考虑相关的承受力，比如用纳税人的钱，消耗稀缺资源。可江晓原认为这说明科学不是“至善至美的东西”①。美好的东西就不需要规范了吗? 献血、公益事业捐赠不都有法律规范吗?慈善是“绝对美好的东西”（同上）吧，可目前慈善事业出现的许多问题恰恰反映出我国急需这方面的法律。对好事进行规范一方面可以促进人们做好事，另一方面可以阻止有人以做好事的名义干坏事。刘兵说：“发展科学应是为了人类社会的理想发展，当某些科学研究可能与这个更根本的目标有冲突时，应优先地服从科学之外的人类社会理想发展的更大目标。”{16} 这话听起来很有“社会责任感”，其实经不起推敲。科学研究的目标是探寻客观规律。有哪个规律人们知道后会妨碍人类的发展，不知道反而会发展得更好呢? 果真如此，我们又如何知道哪些规律有这种性质而不去知道它们呢? 如果我们知道了哪些规律是我们不应该知道的，是不是意味着我们其实也就知道了这些规律呢? 科学研究手段有禁区并不导致研究目标就有禁区。不能用人做试验就用动物，不能用实物试验就用模型或模拟，用什么样的手段研究既能发现客观规律又不损害人类社会，这仍然是科学研究的内容而不是科学之外的目标。

Wu Guosheng considers it inadvisable to apply scientific methods to the sphere of everyday social life, citing the limitations of mathematical methods and black-box methods as examples.{17} Yet, on the one hand, the fact that these two methods are inapplicable in some places does not mean that other scientific methods are also inapplicable; on the other hand, even if there are places where no scientific method is applicable, that does not mean that scientific methods cannot be used in any sphere of social life. Wu Guosheng also believes that among scientific methods there is one that is most unacceptable: “using any means to achieve an end.” He gives an example: “No one would agree to ‘dropping atomic bombs and conducting nuclear tests in densely populated areas to solve the population problem,’ even though the method is efficient. Hitler’s scientists were always researching how to efficiently poison Jews and efficiently cremate Jewish corpses; they were indeed very scientific in their methods.” (Ibid.) However, first: both of these examples refer to technology, not scientific methods. Second: why “solve the population problem” in the first example? It is for people to live well, but being blown up clearly contradicts this purpose. Therefore, this is not a means that achieves the goal but is not accepted by people; rather, it is a means harmful to the goal and thus unacceptable. The error in the second example is even more obvious: “poisoning Jews” is itself a wrong goal; it is not that the efficient means Hitler “chose” for killing Jews is unacceptable! In the final analysis, if there is any means that cannot be “chosen,” it must be because we have other goals to “achieve,” and scientific methods can precisely help us find means that take multiple goals into account. (See Section 2 of the next chapter.) Scientific methods are “tools for revealing the nature and laws of the objective world, acquiring new knowledge, and exploring truth.”{18} Their highest level is the mode of thinking in scientific research, namely rational thinking. In plain terms, this means that any conclusion must have a basis. Can this mode of thinking not be applied to the sphere of everyday social life? Can people make judgments and decisions in daily life, work, and various interpersonal affairs without any basis at all?! This is also the greatest significance of popularizing science — not every one of us needs to engage in scientific research, nor is it possible for us to master all kinds of scientific knowledge, but every one of us should make our thinking and behavior more rational!

吴国盛认为把科学方法运用到日常社会生活领域中去不可取，并举数学方法、黑箱方法有局限性为例。{17} 可是一方面这两种方法不适用的地方不见得其他科学方法也不适用，另一方面即使有些地方任何科学方法都不适用也不等于所有的社会生活领域都不能使用科学方法。吴国盛还认为科学方法中有一种最不能赞同的方法：“为达目的不择手段。”并举例说：“没有人会认同‘为了解决人口问题而在人口稠密的地区放原子弹、做核试验’，虽然其方法是高效的。希特勒手下的科学家一直在研究如何高效地毒死犹太人和高效地焚化犹太人的尸体，他们确实很讲科学方法的。”（同上）然而其一：这两个例子讲的都是技术，不是科学方法。其二：第一个例子为什么要“解决人口问题”? 是为了人们能生活得好，而被炸死显然有悖于这个目的，所以这并不是一个能达目的却不彼人认同的手段，而是一个有害于目的所以才不可取的手段。第二个例子的错误更明显，“毒死犹太人”这个目的就是错的，而不是希特勒在杀犹太人时“择”的高效手段不可取!归根结底，如果有哪种手段不可“择”，那一定是我们还有其他目的需要“达”，而科学方法恰恰可以帮助我们找到兼顾各种目的的手段。（参见下篇第二节）科学方法“是揭示客观世界的性质和规律、获得新知识和探索真理的工具。”{18} 其最高层次是科学研究的思维方式即理性思维，通俗地说就是任何结论都要有理由。难道这种思维方式不能运用到日常社会生活领域中去吗? 难道人们在日常生活、工作及各种为人处事的事务中做出认定和决定就可以毫无根据吗?!这也是普及科学的最大意义——我们每个人不见得都要去研究科学，也不可能各种科学知识都去掌握，但是我们每一个人都应该使自己的思维和行为更理智!

IV. Whether Technology Is Good or Bad Depends on Its Use; Technological Development Relies Even More on Science

四、技术好坏重在使用，技术发展更靠科学

Technology is indeed not neutral, as Tian Song argues.⑥ Yet he questions: “Since we cannot condemn scientists in the matter of the atomic bomb, why can we eulogize Yuan Longping in the matter of hybrid rice?” (ibid.) Taken simply, the former is indeed a bad technology and the latter a good one. The reason we cannot condemn the scientists involved in the former is that “if Hitler’s scientists under him had not rushed to build the atomic bomb first, the Americans would not have felt such an urgent need to build it either.”{19} Scientists who developed the atomic bomb for the United States were choosing the lesser of two evils, whereas those who did so for Germany are condemned (e.g., Heisenberg). Liu Bing traces the origin of the nuclear threat even further back, “to the physical study of the atomic nucleus,” and asks rhetorically: “Is this not the most powerful example of the possible negative effects that scientific research can bring in its results?”{20} True, without nuclear physics research there would be no atomic bomb, but can the problem of building the atomic bomb therefore be reduced to the problem of studying the atomic nucleus? First, who is the chief culprit? It is those who want to wage war and use it, not nuclear physicists. If the “origin” of nuclear war can be “traced back” to nuclear physics research, then should the “origin” of biological warfare be “traced back” to Leeuwenhoek, who discovered bacteria? When the same piece of knowledge is used by some to benefit humanity and by others to harm it, is this a problem with science or a problem with humanity? Second, where does the relevant responsibility lie? The developers of the atomic bomb, though not its users, certainly knew what it was for, so they bear some responsibility. But do the researchers of the atomic nucleus also bear responsibility? If someone uses gunpowder to cause destruction, we can hold the keeper of the gunpowder responsible, but can we “trace it back” to hold the researcher of explosives responsible? Third, where should prevention focus? Whoever masters the technology to build an atomic bomb may build one, so the spread of atomic bomb technology must be prevented. But should nuclear physics knowledge also be kept from the public? Demerol is addictive, so knowledge of its production should be kept secret, but should we “trace it back” and even keep its pharmacological knowledge secret? Finally, is there a foolproof solution? If nuclear energy should not be studied because it can be used to make weapons, can other energy sources be studied? Who knows which energy source might not be used to make weapons in the future? By extension, can oxidation theory be studied? Might someone use it for arson? Can fluid dynamics be studied? Might someone use it to breach dikes? … Which scientific achievement does not have “the potential risk of its application” (ibid.)? Should we simply study nothing? Then how would we know whether what we do has “negative effects”? Or should we do nothing and “sit and wait for death”? But if everyone is “sitting and waiting for death,” why fear “negative effects”? Furthermore, the concept of science’s “negative effects” seems to be extended from the concept of drugs’ “side effects,” but Liu Bing’s use here overlooks an important boundary. Drug side effects refer to harm to the human body when a drug is used normally for treatment. If we set aside the premise of “normal use,” eating can choke someone to death, and wearing clothes can cause heatstroke, but do we need to establish concepts like “the side effects of rice” or “the side effects of cotton-padded clothes”? The same applies to scientific and technological research. Automobiles produce harmful exhaust under normal use; this is a negative effect of automotive technology that needs to be solved by improving automotive technology. But if a car drives onto railway tracks and hijacks a train, this is not a negative effect of automotive technology; it must be addressed by other means such as regulation and protection. Similarly, the atomic bomb was deliberately developed by certain people for war; it was not a byproduct of physicists studying the atomic nucleus, so it is not a negative effect of nuclear physics research. Nuclear physics research need not make any adjustments because of this, nor can other scientific research derive any preventive measures from this reflection.

技术确实如田松所说不是中性的。⑥ 可是他质疑：“既然在原子弹这件事儿上我们不能谴责科学家，为什么在水稻杂交这件事儿上我们就可以歌颂袁隆平呢?”（同上）单纯地讲确实前者是坏技术，后者是好技术。之所以我们不能谴责前者中的科学家，是因为“如果当年希特勒他手下的科学家不是先抢着造原子弹的话，美国人也不会觉得造原子弹那么迫切”。{19} 科学家为美国研制原子弹是两害相权取其轻，而为德国研制则是受到谴责的（如海森堡）。刘兵追究核威胁的源头更是“追溯到对于原子核的物理学研究。”反问到：“难道这不正是科学的研究在结果上可能带来的负面效应的一个最有力的例证吗?”{20} 不错，没有核物理研究就不会有原子弹，然而因此造原子弹的问题就可以归结为研究原子核的问题吗? 首先，罪魁祸首是谁? 是想打仗的人要用，而不是核物理学家。如果打核战争的“源头”可以“追溯到”核物理研究，那打细菌战的“源头”是不是要“追溯到”发现细菌的列文虎克头上呢? 同一项知识有人用来造福人类，有人用来祸害人类，这到底是科学出了问题，还是人文出了问题呢? 其次，相关责任归哪儿? 原子弹的研制者虽然不是使用者，但他们肯定知道这是干什么用的，所以他们也有一定的责任。然而原子核的研究者也有责任吗? 有人用火药搞破坏，我们可以追究火药保管者的责任，然而我们能“追溯到”爆破的研究者也有责任吗? 再次，防范着眼何处? 掌握了造原子弹的技术就可能造出原子弹来，因此要防止原子弹技术的传播。然而核物理知识也不能让公众知道吗? 度冷丁会使人成瘾，因此它的生产知识应该保密，然而要“追溯到”连它的药理知识都保密吗? 最后，万全之策可有? 如果因为核能可以用来造武器，核物理就不应该被研究，那别的能源就能研究吗? 谁知道哪种能源将来就不会用于制造武器呢? 推而广之，氧化理论能研究吗? 会不会有人用于纵火? 流体力学能研究吗? 会不会有人用于决水? ……有哪种科研成果没有“其应用之潜在风险”（同上）呢? 干脆什么都不研究? 那又怎么知道所干的事情有没有“负面效应”呢? 要不什么都不干，“坐以待毙”? 可如果都“坐以待毙”了，还怕什么“负面效应”呢? 还有，科学的“负面效应”概念应该是从药物的“副作用”概念扩展而来，可刘兵在这里的使用忽视了一个重要的界限。药物的副作用是指为了治病药物在正常使用的情况下对人体的损害。如果抛开“正常使用”这个前提，吃饭还会撑死人昵，穿衣还会热死人呢，可我们有必要建立“米饭的副作用”、“棉袄的副作用”之类的概念吗? 科技研究也是同样。汽车在正常使用的情况下会产生有害的尾气，这是汽车技术的负面效应，需要通过改进汽车技术来解决；可如果汽车开到铁轨上把火车劫了，这可不是汽车技术的负面效应，这要靠监管防护等其他手段来解决。同理，原子弹是某些人为战争专门研制出来的，不是物理学家在研究原子核的过程中附带出来的，所以不是核物理研究的负面效应。核物理研究不需要为此做任何调整，其他科学研究也无法由此反省出任何预防措施。

As for the problems Jiang Xiaoyuan mentions that “those environmentalists” list as arising from the development and application of science and technology — “the internet brings spiritual alienation, computer games bring pathological states in young people”① — this “dirty water” really cannot be “poured” onto the head of science and technology. The internet is a technology that helps people communicate; how could it instead cause spiritual alienation? This is actually caused by anonymity. But whether people choose to use their real names or remain anonymous online — is this determined by science and technology? Scientists invented computer technology, but whether the games built with this technology can be ended in a timely manner or always leave people unable to stop is a choice made by game developers. Just as inventors invented film technology, but whether those who master this technology make romance films or horror films — is this also determined by science and technology? To borrow Jiang Xiaoyuan’s words, these “are entirely matters outside of science; this is precisely what humanity is.”{19} Collingwood argues: “Humanity possesses a far stronger ability to control nature than two thousand years ago, but its moral level has not progressed much. This situation is like a five-year-old child brandishing a sharp knife.”⑥ If this is truly the case, why blame the rapid progress of science and technology rather than the slow progress of morality?! Or, to borrow Tian Song’s phrasing: “Since the rapid progress of science and technology is something to be condemned, should the slow progress of morality be something to be eulogized?”

至于江晓原所说“那些环保人士”列举的科学技术的发展和应用带来的其他问题——“互联网带来了心灵的疏离，电脑游戏带来了年轻人的病态”，①这“脏水”还真不能“泼”在科技头上。互联网是帮人交往的技术，怎么会反而使人心灵疏离? 这其实是匿名造成的。然而人们上网选择实名还是匿名，这是科技决定的吗? 科学家发明了电脑技术，然而用这种技术编造的游戏是能够适时结束还是总让人欲罢不能则是游戏商的选择。好比发明家发明了电影技术，可掌握了这种技术的人是拍言情片还是拍恐怖片，也是科技决定的吗? 借用江晓原的话来说这些“完全就是科学之外的事情，这就是人文嘛。”{19} 科林伍德认为：“人类拥有了比两千年前强得多的控制自然的能力，但道德水平并没有什么进步，这种情形，就好比一个五岁儿童挥舞一把锋利的刀子。”⑥ 如果真是这样，那为什么不怪道德进步得慢而要怪科技进步得快呢?!或者套用一下田松的语言格式：“既然科技进步得快这件事儿应该被谴责，那道德进步得慢这件事儿是不是应该被歌颂呢?”

Jiang Xiaoyuan believes that the adulteration of milk powder with melamine is “a bad result brought by science and technology.”① But is the toxic milk powder incident a result of certain bad people abusing the knowledge that “melamine contains nitrogen,” or is it that this knowledge and the technology for producing melamine are themselves harmful? To prevent poisoning, should scientists simply not tell people what is poisonous, or even stop researching what is and is not poisonous altogether?! As for Jiang Xiaoyuan counting certain television advertisements that make false claims in the name of science and certain companies using science to amass wealth as problems brought by science (ibid.), this is even less worth refuting. By this logic, should the harm caused by counterfeit名牌 also be the responsibility of the brand-name manufacturers? Liu Bing says: “Even if science and technology were truly neutral, they could not escape the fate of being abused.”{21} Yet even if this were so, should we completely ban the use of science and technology? As long as the answer is not affirmative, then questions such as how to distinguish between reasonable use and abuse of science and technology, how to try to prevent abuse, and once abuse occurs, how to minimize harm — these inquiries cannot be evaded. Can answering these questions be done without scientific research and technological progress?!

江晓原认为奶粉被掺三聚氰胺是“科学技术带来了不好的结果”。① 可毒奶粉事件难道不是某些坏人滥用了“三聚氰胺中含氮”这个知识的结果，而是这个知识以及生产三聚氰胺的技术本身有害吗? 那为了防止有人投毒，是不是科学家就不应该告诉人们什么东西有毒，甚至根本就不应该研究各种东西有毒无毒呢?!至于江晓原把某些电视广告以科学的名义作虚假宣传以及某些公司利用科学来敛财等等也算做科学带来的问题（同上），就更不值一驳了。照此逻辑，假名牌给人们带来的损害，是不是也应该由名牌厂家负责呢? 刘兵说：“即便科学技术真是中性的，它也无法逃避被滥用的命运。”{21}然而即便真是如此，难道我们就要全面禁止使用科技吗? 只要回答不是肯定，那么如何区分科技的合理使用与滥用? 如何尽量防止滥用? 一旦出现滥用如何尽量减少损害? 等等追问就无法逃避。要解答这些问题难道离得了科学研究、技术进步吗?!

Tian Song traces the “evil” of technology back to capital accumulation and industrial civilization: “Since the Industrial Revolution, technology has fundamentally not been ‘for’ meeting ‘human’ needs from its starting point or its end point, but rather ‘for’ meeting the needs of ‘capital accumulation.’” [22]22 Tian Song, “Good Goes to Science, Bad Goes to the Devil,” in Jiang Xiaoyuan, ed., *Look! Scientism* (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, 2007), 138. Has technology not met human needs? Does meeting the needs of capital accumulation necessarily harm human needs? The article itself subsequently negates both points. So how to resolve the situation where “in order to meet the needs of capital accumulation, technology … often meets the needs of one part of the people while depriving another part of the people of their needs” (ibid.)? Tian Song depicts a “beautiful picture” without industrial civilization: “Traditional peasants are self-sufficient and depend on heaven for their livelihood — they rely solely on heaven, asking nothing from others, which leaves capital with no place to sink its teeth in.” [9]9 Tian Song, “Science Has Become an Object of Superstition,” *China Book Review*, 2007, No. 5. If “depending on heaven” could provide enough to eat, capital would naturally have no say; if pies fell from the sky, capital would not bother to “sink its teeth into” the peasants. The problem is that a large body of “historical evidence” shows that “heaven” cannot be relied upon. What then? “Follow nature,” [10]10 Wu Guosheng, “The ‘Science and Superstition’ Debate: A Philosophical Perspective,” *Peking University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, 2008, No. 3. and save the trouble of family planning? But what if some people refuse to starve to death “naturally” and rise in revolt? Then continue to “follow nature”? Or is this already a matter of “human culture,” and technology should not concern itself with it? Some pharmaceutical companies are indeed willing to develop drugs for the diseases of the rich but not for the diseases of the poor. Yet without the driving force of capital accumulation, would drugs for the poor’s diseases become more plentiful? Should we use policy adjustments to allow capital invested in both directions to accumulate, or should we prevent it from accumulating in either? If saving lives and healing the sick involves profit, should it be opposed [22]22 Tian Song, “Good Goes to Science, Bad Goes to the Devil,” in Jiang Xiaoyuan, ed., *Look! Scientism* (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, 2007), 138.? Then should all profitable enterprises be shut down? To take a step back, even if capital uses technology to deprive one part of the people of their needs, does that make science an “accomplice of capital,” and should we therefore hate technology (ibid.)? Without the help of land, landlords would also find it difficult to control the peasants; does that make land an “accomplice of the landlord,” and should peasants hate land and oppose farming? “Science and technology themselves are merely a kind of instrumental rationality; they cannot determine the purpose of their use or the social mode of their use.” [23]23 Ibid., 139. In contrast, Tian Song elevates traditional culture to an extreme, disagreeing with distinguishing the essence from the dross. [24]24 Ibid., 135-141. Yet on the one hand, he himself has said: “As for human sacrifice, is it the case that all nature worship demands human sacrifice?” [25]25 Ibid., 139. This shows that Tian Song does list human sacrifice as dross. On the other hand, “taking the essence and discarding the dross” implies neither total negation nor total affirmation of either traditional or modern culture. Compared with Tian Song’s absolute affirmation that “tradition itself is value,” which slogan implies a “condescending attitude” [24]24 Ibid., 135-141.? Since Tian Song believes that “no one can possess a transcendent, mysterious yardstick and dare to ultimately judge what is essence and what is dross” (ibid.), on what basis does he “dare to ultimately” “negate modernization as a whole” (ibid.)?

田松追究科技的“恶”追到了资本增殖和工业文明头上：“自从工业革命之后，技术从起点上以及归宿上根本上就不是‘为了’满足‘人’的需求，而是‘为了’满足‘资本增殖’的需求。”{22} 技术没有满足人的需求? 满足了资本增殖的需求就一定会损害人的需求? 该文接下自己来都给予了否定。那如何解决“为了满足资本增殖的需求，技术……常常会为了满足一部分人的需求，剥夺另一部分人的需求”（同上）呢? 田松描绘了一个没有工业文明的“美好图景”：“传统农民自给自足，靠天吃饭——所靠者唯天而已，对人无所求，这使得资本无处下口。”⑨“靠天”要是能吃饱当然不容资本置喙，天上要是能掉馅饼资本也不会去向农民“下口”了。问题在于大量的“历史依据”表明“天”靠不住，怎么办?“顺应自然”⑩，省得计划生育了? 可如果有人不甘心被“自然”地饿死，要暴动，怎么办? 再继续“顺应自然”? 或者说这已属“人文”，“科技”就别操心了? 一些制药公司确实愿意研制治疗富人病症的药而不愿生产治疗穷人病症的药。然而没有资本增殖的动力治穷人病的药就会多起来吗? 我们是应该通过政策调节让投向两方面的资本都能增殖呢，还是让它们都不能增殖呢? 治病救人的事如果有利益就该反对{22} 吗? 那是不是凡赢利者都该查封呢? 退一步说，即使资本利用技术剥夺了另一部分人的需求，科学就是“资本的帮凶”、就该仇恨技术（同上）吗? 没有土地的帮助地主同样注定难以实现对农民的掌控，那土地是否就是“地主的帮凶”，农民是否就该仇恨十地、反对种地呢?“科学技术本身只是一种工具理性，它是不能决定它的使用的目的和社会使用方式的。”{23} 与此相对照，田松把传统文化捧到了极端，不同意区分精华和糟粕。{24} 然而一方面他自己也说过：“至于说活人献祭，难道所有的自然崇拜都是要求活祭的吗?”{25}可见活祭田松还是列为糟粕的。另一方面“取其精华、弃其糟粕”意味着对传统文化和现代文化都不要全面否定或肯定，对比田松“传统本身就是价值”这种绝对肯定的说法，到底是哪个口号“隐含着”“居高临下的心态”{24} 呢? 田松既然认为“没有人能够掌握超验的冥冥中的尺度，敢于最终断定何谓精华何为糟粕，”（同上）那又凭什么“敢于最终”对现代化“从整体上予以否定”（同上）呢?

Jiang Xiaoyuan uses stock speculation as a metaphor for developing technology. He says that if someone loses money in stocks, they want to turn defeat into victory; if they win, they want to build on the success — whether they win or lose, they always keep on speculating. Those who advocate developing technology, regardless of whether the outcomes technology brings us are good or bad, use this as a reason to push it further. [1]1 Jiang Xiaoyuan, “On the Belief in Science and Technology,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. In fact, this approach is precisely the mode of operation of pseudoscience! The scientific approach is to continuously analyze previous lessons and experiences in order to adjust subsequent actions. For stock speculation, this means analyzing why one lost or won, and adjusting one’s strategy at any time, including timely withdrawal from the stock market to choose other investment methods. For developing technology, this means continuously adjusting research and development ideas based on the results of technological implementation (including simulation results), so that the things technology brings us are as good as possible and as bad as possible, including timely development of technologies with many benefits to eliminate those with many harms. Only pseudoscientists, regardless of success or failure, stubbornly stick to one strategy or line of thought. Both science and pseudoscience can make mistakes; the difference is that science develops in the process of continuously correcting mistakes, while pseudoscience continuously repeats previous mistakes [26]26 This distinction between science and pseudoscience is a standard formulation in the philosophy of science, often associated with Karl Popper’s criterion of falsifiability.! Moreover, comparing technology to stock speculation is highly inappropriate. Stock speculation is merely one means of increasing capital; if this means is bad, it can be replaced by another. But technology is a general term for all means of doing everything; if we do not use technology, how do we do anything? Peasants may not use chemical fertilizers and pesticides, but they still have to produce grain. Even slash-and-burn cultivation is a kind of technology, is it not? As for prefixing “technology” with “science,” this is also an inevitable trend. If we do not rely on science to develop technology, what do we rely on? Custom? Tian Song strongly recommends the “slash-and-burn cultivation of the Jingpo, Wa, and Dulong ethnic villages” researched by Yin Shaoting. [27]27 Tian Song, “Promoting Genetically Modified Technology Is First of All Not a Scientific Issue,” *Dushu*, 2010 (7): 64. But if the nationwide “building of terraced fields” back then was “absurd” (ibid.), would nationwide slash-and-burn cultivation now be “wise”? Even in the areas where these Yunnan mountain ethnic groups live, one of the research conclusions is the need to open up terraced fields and build water conservancy projects, is it not? [28]28 Ibid., 63-64. Since “one cannot make blanket judgments with a single mysterious yardstick” [27]27 Tian Song, “Promoting Genetically Modified Technology Is First of All Not a Scientific Issue,” *Dushu*, 2010 (7): 64., can slash-and-burn cultivation be applied in densely populated areas with little land, and how? Does this not still require scientific research? Tian Song says: “Why have those backward, superstitious customs preserved the environment, while science, which helped humanity conquer nature, has instead plunged people into difficulty? Is this because we are too superstitious about science?” [29]29 Ibid., 64. If a certain custom has indeed played a role in protecting the environment, then we should understand the origins of that custom, assess its pros and cons, and thus determine which aspects can be retained, which can be promoted, and which must be reformed. This is precisely the task of scientific research! If we do not analyze, are we supposed to promote every custom and resist every instance of science? Would this not be “too superstitious” about custom? Then I could also pose a puzzle: Why do those wicked, bad people live long lives, while good people who help others overcome difficulties die young? From this, should we praise the wicked and denounce the good?!

江晓原用某些人炒股来比喻发展科技。说一个人炒股输了要反败为胜，赢了要再接再厉，不管是输是赢反正总是要继续炒下去。主张发展科技的人也是不管科技给我们带来的东西是好是坏，都以此为由让它进一步发展。① 其实这种做法正是伪科学的活动方式!科学的做法是不断分析前面的经验教训以调整后面的行为。对于炒股来说就是分析为什么会输、会赢? 随时调整自己的策略，包括适时退出股市选择其他投资方式。对于发展科技来说就是根据技术实施的结果（包括模拟的结果）不断调整研发思路，使技术带给我们的东西能够尽量好的多，坏的少，包括及时开发出好处多的技术以淘汰坏处多的技术。只有伪科学家才不管成败如何，一条道走到黑地就认准一种策略或思路。科学和伪科学都会犯错误，它们的区别在于科学是在不断纠正错误的过程中发展，伪科学是在不断重复以前的错误{26}!而且用炒股与科技相比也极不恰当。炒股只是使资金增值的手段之一，这个手段不好可以换另一个手段；可技术是干所有事情的所有手段的统称，如果不使用技术我们怎么干事呢? 农民可以不使用化肥农药，可总得生产粮食吧。即使刀耕火种，不也是一种技术吗? 至于在“技术”前面冠以“科学”，这也是必然趋势。我们不靠科学来发展技术靠什么? 靠风俗吗? 田松力荐尹绍亭调研的“景颇族、佤族、独龙族等村寨的刀耕火种”。{27} 可如果说当年“全国造梯田”“荒谬”（同上），那现在全国都刀耕火种就“智慧”了吗? 就是这些云南山地民族生活地区，调研结论之一不也是要开垦梯田、建设水利工程吗?{28} 既然“不可以用一把冥尺一概而论”{27}，那刀耕火种能否在人多地少的地方应用，如何应用? 不还得靠科学研究吗? 田松说：“为什么那些落后、迷信的风俗保住了环境，而帮助人类征服自然的科学却反过来使人陷入了困境，这是不是因为我们对科学过于迷信了呢?”{29} 如果某种风俗确实起到了保护了环境的作用，那就应该了解该风俗的由来，评估它的利弊，从而确定它哪些方面可以保留，哪些方面可以推广，哪些方面必须改造。而这恰恰就是科学研究的任务!如果不加以分析，难道要我们见风俗就弘扬，见科学就抵制吗? 这岂不是对风俗又“过于迷信了呢?”那我也可以提出一个困惑：为什么那些恶劣的坏人长寿而帮助他人克服困难的好人却短命呢? 由此我们是不是应该见坏人就赞扬见好人就斥责呢?!

References

参考文献

[1]1 Jiang Xiaoyuan, “On the Belief in Science and Technology,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. Jiang Xiaoyuan, “Three Major Misleading Aspects of Science,” *Wenhui Bao*, 2009-2-26.

① 江晓原：《科学的三大误导》．《文汇报》，2009-2-26

[2]2 See, for example, the discussion of the “information loss paradox” in black holes in Stephen Hawking’s *A Brief History of Time*. Steven Weinberg, “Can Science Explain Everything?” trans. Wen Ya, *Science & Culture Review*, 2006 (5): 61.

② 史蒂文•温伯格：《科学能够解释一切吗?》．文亚翻译．《科学文化评论》，2006（5）：61

[3]3 Tian Song, “The Belief in Science and Technology and Its Deconstruction,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. Tian Song, “On What Basis Do I Believe I Am Correct?” *Democracy & Science*, 2007 (1): 29.

③ 田松：《我凭什么相信我是正确的?》．《民主与科学》，2007（1）：29

[4]4 Tian Song, “The Belief in Science and Technology and Its Deconstruction,” *Shanghai Jiao Tong University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 2016, No. 1. Tian Song, “Why Must Traditional Chinese Medicine Have a Scientific Basis?” in Zhang Lisheng, ed., *Sociologist’s Teahouse*, Vol. 14 (Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 2006), 67.

④ 田松：《中医为什么要有科学依据?》．见：张立升主编：《社会学家茶座．总第十四辑》．济南：山东人民出版社，2006．67

[5]5 F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*, translated by Feng Keli, Yilin Press, 2003. Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*, trans. Feng Keli (Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2003), 98; 101-103, in the *Humanities and Social Sciences Translation Series*: 33.

⑤[英]弗里德里希•A．哈耶克著：《科学的反革命•理性滥用之研究》．冯克利译．南京：译林出版社，2003．98；101-103．《人文与社会译丛》：33

[6]6 Tian Song, “Science Has Become an Object of Superstition,” *China Book Review*, 2007, No. 5. Tian Song, “Good Goes to Science, Bad Goes to the Devil,” in Jiang Xiaoyuan, ed., *Look! Scientism* (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, 2007), 138, 137, 136; 138; 139; 135-141; 138, 139, 140; 138; 139; 137; 139-140.

⑥ 田松：《好的归科学，坏的归魔鬼》．见：江晓原主编：《看!科学主义》．上海：上海交通大学出版社，2007．138，137，136；138；139；135-141；138，139，140；138；139；137；139-140

[7]7 Tian Song, “Science Has Become an Object of Superstition,” *China Book Review*, 2007, No. 5. Li Xinmin, “Science Benefits Peace,” *Future and Development*, 1992 (2): 7.

⑦ 李醒民：《科学有益于和平》．《未来与发展》，1992（2）：7

[8]8 Liu Huajie, “Reflections on the ‘Science and Superstition’ Debate,” *Peking University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, 2008, No. 3. Liu Huajie, “More on ‘Anti-Science,’” in Liu Huajie, *Not Everything in the Hall Is a Buddha* (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2004), 85, in the *Science and Humanities Dialogue Series* (Second Series).

⑧ 刘华杰：《再说“反科学”》．见：刘华杰著：《殿里供的并非都是佛》．南京：江苏人民出版社，2004．85．《科学与人文对话丛书》（第二辑）

[9]9 Tian Song, “Science Has Become an Object of Superstition,” *China Book Review*, 2007, No. 5. Tian Song, “Promoting Genetically Modified Technology Is First of All Not a Scientific Issue,” *Dushu*, 2010 (7): 65; 63-64; 64.

⑨ 田松：《推广转基因技术首先不是科学问题》。《读书》，2010（7）：65；63-64；64

[10]10 Wu Guosheng, “The ‘Science and Superstition’ Debate: A Philosophical Perspective,” *Peking University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, 2008, No. 3. Wu Guosheng, *The Course of Science*, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002), 584.

⑩ 吴国盛著：《科学的历程（第二版）》．北京：北京大学出版社，2002．584

{11} Shu Xuan: “On Conquering Nature — A Re-evaluation of Ms. Wang Yongchen’s ‘Reverence for Nature’ Thesis and Other Matters.” Guangming Net — Guangming Blog — Shu Xuan’s Blog, 2007-2-12

{11} 树玄：《论征服自然——重评汪永晨女士“敬畏自然说”及其他》．光明网—光明博客—徐树玄的blog，2007-2-12

{12} Jiang Xiaoyuan: “How Does the Public Actually Understand Science? — Reflections Inspired by ‘Optimizing Public Understanding of Science’.” In: Jiang Xiaoyuan and Liu Bing, eds., *Gently Settling Accounts with Scientism — Southern Accent, Northern Tune 2*. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010. 46

{12} 江晓原：《公众到底怎样理解科学?——从〈优化公众理解科学〉想到的》．见：江晓原、刘兵著：《温柔地清算科学主义——南腔北调2》．北京：北京大学出版社，2010．46

{13} Jan Nolin et al.: “Optimizing Public Understanding of Science in Europe: A Comparative Observation.” In: [Austrian] Ulrike Felt et al., eds., *Optimizing Public Understanding of Science — A European Overview of Science Popularization*. Translated by Zhang Ruishan et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Science Popularization Press, 2006. 593

{13} 阳•诺林等：《优化公众理解科学在欧洲：比较观察》．见：[奥]乌里克•费尔特等著：《优化公众理解科学——欧洲科普纵览》．张瑞山等译．上海：上海科学普及出版社，2006．593

{14} Tian Song: “Can Laws Be Violated?” In: Li Xia and Li Dahong, executive eds., *The Foreign Land of Science*. Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2008. 200. *851M: Our Scientific Culture*; 3

{14} 田松：《规律可不可以被违背?》．见：李侠、李大光执行主编：《科学的异域》．上海：华东师范大学出版社，2008．200．《851M：我们的科学文化》；3

{15} Li Xingmin: “Between Science and Technology.” *Guangming Daily*, 2003-4-29

{15} 李醒民：《在科学和技术之间》．《光明日报》，2003-4-29

{16} Liu Bing: “Scientists’ Social Responsibility and Science Communication Aimed at Scientists.” *Science and Society*, 2011 (1): 59

{16} 刘兵：《科学家的社会责任感与面向科学家的科学传播》．《科学与社会》，2011（1）：59

{17} Wu Guosheng: “Science and the Humanities.” In: Wang Wenzhang and Hou Yangxiang, chief eds., *Science and the Humanities in the Eyes of Chinese Scholars (Volume on the Relationship between Science and the Humanities)*. Kunming: Yunnan Education Press, 2002. 364-365; 366

{17} 吴国盛：《科学与人文》．见：王文章、侯样祥总主编：《中国学者心中的科学•人文（科学人文关系卷）》．昆明：云南教育出版社，2002．364-365：366

{18} Xia Zhengnong and Chen Zhili, chief eds., *Cihai: Sixth Edition, Compact Volume*. Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 2010. 1027

{18} 夏征农、陈至立主编：《辞海：第六版缩印本》．上海：上海辞书出版社，2010.1027

{19} Jiang Xiaoyuan: “Misleading and Reconstruction — The Image of Science.” In: Wang Yifang, executive ed., *The Calculations of Science*. Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2009. 95; 96. *851M: Our Scientific Culture*; 4

{19} 江晓原：《误导与重构——科学的图像》．见：王一方执行主编：《科学的算计》．上海：华东师范大学出版社，2009．95；96．《85lM：我们的科学文化》；4

{20} Liu Bing: “Copenhagen: The Enigma of 1941.” In: Jiang Xiaoyuan and Liu Bing, eds., *Southern Accent, Northern Tune: Dialogues on the Relationship between Science and Culture*. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007. 128; 127

{20} 刘兵：《哥本哈根：1941年之谜》．见：江晓原、刘兵著：《南腔北调：科学与文化之关系的对话》．北京：北京大学出版社，2007．128：127

{21} Liu Bing: “Progress Is Real, But It Is a Myth.” *Wenhui Book Review*, 2011-6-3

{21} 刘兵：《进步是真实的，但它是一个神话》．《文汇读书周报》，2011-6-3

{22} Tian Song: “New Writings from Daoxiangyuan, No. 6: Whose Needs Does the Technology of Science Actually Satisfy?” *Extensive Reading of Books*, 2008 (7): 51; 53; 52-53

{22} 田松：《稻香园新笔之六•科学的技术到底满足了谁的需求?》．《博览群书》，2008（7）：5l：53：52～53

{23} Zhang Huaxia: “Scientific Development and Ethical Issues.” In: Tian Song, executive ed., *Can Ethics Govern Science?* Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2009. 15. *851M: Our Scientific Culture*; 5

{23} 张华夏：《科学发展与伦理问题》．见：田松执行主编：《伦理能不能管科学》．上海：华东师范大学出版社，2009．15．《851M：我们的科学文化》：5

{24} Tian Song: “On Tradition, Science, and the Future of Civilization — A Few Responses to Mr. Fan Dainian.” *Science and Culture Review*, 2009 (4): 97; 97; 97; 99

{24} 田松：《关于传统、科学与文明未来——对范岱年先生的几点同应》．《科学文化评论》，2009（4）：97；97：97：99

{25} Tian Song: “How Is Human Dignity Manifested?” *Science Times*, 2005-2-25

{25} 田松：《人的尊严何以体现》．《科学时报》，2005-2-25

{26} Li Chaoying: “An Analysis of Basic Issues in Pseudo-Science.” *Science and Atheism*, 2007 (5): 30

{26} 李超英：《伪科学基本问题辨析》．《科学与无神论》，2007（5）：30

{27} Tian Song: “Random Notes from Daoxiangyuan (22): The Survival Wisdom of Slash-and-Burn Agriculture.” *China Reading Weekly*, 2005-6-22

{27} 田松：《稻香园随笔（22）•刀耕火种的生存智慧》．《中华读书报》，2005-6-22

{28} Yin Shaoting, *Humans and Forests — Swidden Cultivation in the Perspective of Ecological Anthropology*. Kunming: Yunnan Education Press, 2000. 353-358. *Borderland Culture Series*

{28} 尹绍亭著：《人与森林——生态人类学视野中的刀耕火种》．昆明：云南教育出版社，2000.353-358．《边地文化丛书》

{29} Tian Song: “Superstition about Science and Superstitious Science.” *Science Times*, 2003-8-8

{29} 田松：《科学的迷信与迷信的科学》．《科学时报》，2003-8-8

Online editor: Jia Fei

网络编辑：嘉扉

*Science and Atheism* 2012, Issue 1

《科学与无神论》 2012年第1期